But Hume was a nominalist? — Michael

Sorry, I should have said his account is an alternative to traditional nominalism like Occam's. He didn't believe in objects. A thing is a bundle of properties and properties are identified by resemblance of perceptions.

The Platonist might say that height is real iff height is a mind-independent abstract object. — Michael

Hume gives a non-Platonic alternative to nominalism.

I wasn't really interested in pushing any particular account of abstract objects and universals. I was pointing out the problem with denying that they exist, which Hume's bundle theory explains pretty succinctly.

Your question for NOS4A2 should be "is an electron's spin a mind-independent abstract object?" rather than the ambiguous "is an electron's spin real?" — Michael

You've misunderstood the discussion between NOS and me.

It's not an ontological claim, it's a methodological suggestion. If we have two explanations and both work, we might as well use the simpler one...that's just easier. But no one has to follow this suggestion. — Bylaw

Sounds reasonable.

OK, then is there a difference between spin being real and a top really being able to spin? — Michael

I've lost track of your point. It seems like you're constructing word salad.

My question to NOS about whether spin, as an essential property of electrons, is real, was aimed at his earlier statement that nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than the alternatives.

You started talking about the verb "spin", which electrons don't do. So I tried to adjust by talking about tops, which do spin, and have the property of spinnability, spinness, or the ability to spin, however you want to put it.

Could you clarify your point?

That's the question I asked of you. Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? — Michael

Yes, there's a difference. Saying that tops have the property of being able to spin is not the same as saying that tops sometimes spin. You could have a top that spends its whole existence in a drawer. It still has the property of being able to spin.

If there is a difference then prima facie one can deny that spin is real but accept that things really spin. What issues would arise from this? We have evidence of things really spinning. What evidence is there of spin being real (as something else)? What need is there for spin being real (as something else)? — Michael

Have you ever heard of Hume's bundle theory?

But when you dismissed me and my arguments with a dismissive gesture, — god must be atheist

I wasn't being dismissive. I just didn't have any response.

The concrete behaviour of physical objects is a sufficient account of spin. — Michael

I think you're saying that you're satisfied that things sometimes spin. That tops have the property of being able to spin is a different proposition, though.

Are you ok with that proposition?

The fact that I use an object pronoun ought not to suggest I believe “us” exists as an object. — NOS4A2

Then there's no real foundation for descriptions. Right?

NOS has been more gracious than I could ask for. He's rational, to the point, and eminently non-abusive. :up:

put down my proposition: Abstractions and universals (non-physical things) exist but not in the physical world. — god must be atheist

The whole discussion takes place in the shadow of Plato. You're offering his middle period view.

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. — Michael

I don't know how they exist, although I have speculations. I just know there's a logical problem with denying that they exist, which is the nominalist claim.

It depends on the sense in which you use it. If it is a “state of affairs”, then it is a statement. Do you mean it in another sense? — NOS4A2

Propositions are the primary truthbearers. It's the content of an uttered sentence. Multiple sentences can be uttered to express the same proposition. This shows that propositions are not equivalent to sentences or utterances.

If you really want to wade into those thickets, we can, or we can go back to the fact that you provided "us" as the foundation for descriptions. That's an abstract object. No one individual creates language. It's created by humans. See what I mean?

What need and evidence is there for some additional abstract property, above-and-beyond the physical act? — Michael

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects.

Do they deny that it’s appropriate to say that tops spin? — Michael

They would allow that some tops spin some of the time. Their starting point is that there are only individual entities. Think of M. Thatcher saying that there's no such thing as society. She was speaking as a nominalist.

Propositions do not transcend space and time. I’ve quoted your propositions right here, the product of a particular mind. If it’s easy to demonstrate that a proposition transcends space and time perhaps you might entertain us by doing so. — NOS4A2

It would probably bring clarity if you explained what you think a proposition is.

Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? Is an answer to one also an answer to the other? — Michael

The spin of an electron isn't like a top spinning. Electrons don't actually spin. So to address your question, let's think of tops. One of the properties of tops is that they can spin. The noun/verb issue showing up in this property isn't relevant to nominalism. The nominalist denies that it's appropriate to say that tops have this property.

More AI generated art:

Socrates' (I really like this one)


Nietzsche as a Russian icon:



Karl Marx as Uncle Sam



Random other stuff:

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

It’s not independent, though. You said yourself it’s made of propositions. We make propositions, descriptions, abstract objects, universals, and so they are forever dependent on the human mind. They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else. — NOS4A2

A proposition is a state of affairs. Propositions transcend time and space by definition. It's easy to demonstrate that they can't be the product of any particular mind, and if they're products of mind at all, it would be in a Kantian sense. An individual human may give expression to a proposition by uttering a sentence, but in that act, the only thing with spacial and temporal extension is the marks or sounds of the utterance.

But even if you reject the above and opt for some sort of hard behaviorism, you've still given an abstract foundation to descriptions: us.

If abstractions like words do not exist then this debate is non-existent. — I like sushi

I agree we can't escape the use 9f abstract objects and universals.

the contention for the nominalist is that abstract objects and universals do not exist independently of descriptions — NOS4A2

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

Or you can define "description" as a specific action on the part of a specific human, in which case electrons are only negatively charged during those describing activities.

Do you have another option?

Your belief in universals indicates knowledge of the world — Gregory

In the OP, I offered to take either side of the debate. I'm interested in where the arguments lead.

Do we say they have the universal of tree-ness and shrub-ness at the same time? — Gregory

Sometimes things have contrary properties, but the forms don't. :grin: That's from Plato's Parmenides.

Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is — Gregory

This suggests that the whole issue is beyond our ability to answer because we can't see beyond our own minds.

But we struggle to say something about it anyway. I think universals and abstract objects do have something to do with the architecture of the mind. I don't have the vantage point necessary to go further though, and say that this architecture fools us. How do we decide which part of our experiences are lies? Occam says properties are lies. Hume said the object is. How would I know who's right?

I don’t know. I’m not a physicist. I’m only saying that we’re speaking about electrons when defining their movements in mathematical terms, such as with “spin”. — NOS4A2

Spin is a particular kind of momentum, which is mass times velocity. Spin is represented as a vector. The electron itself is a point particle. It doesn't have any volume. Electrons are negatively charged.

The above description of spin and electrons is full of universals and abstract objects. If you deny the existence of those properties, you have no real terms with which to explain what an electron is. "Electron" becomes a blank.

But we already describe what an electron is. We’re speaking about an electron when defining its movements in mathematical terms. So I do not see what you mean. — NOS4A2

Are you saying that speaking of a specific electron's movements is sufficient to give the word "electron" its conventional meaning?

You'll have no way to explain what an electron is in real terms. It becomes blank. See what I mean?

Debates usually involve two or more competing ideas, not a series of questions and answers. So if you believe in the existence of properties then surely there is a reason why. — NOS4A2

You've moved to shifting the burden instead of answering my question. That doesn't bode well for your argument.

Was I supposed to get that from the Tim Jones song?

I’m afraid it is not real in the way you say it is. Do you think the spin is real? — NOS4A2

I haven't made any claims. I was simply asking if the spin of an electron is real, unreal, or some third option.

I was aiming to explain that if you rule out the existence of the properties of an object, you'll soon find that you have no words at all to describe reality. This is because you're left with raw, unformed matter as the only "real.". I wanted to debate it to work through that idea.

But your claim was about how we address existence, and what strategies serve us best in that regard, so you derailed me. :nerd:

Thanks for the discussion!

An electron spins. The spin needn't be abstracted into its own entity. — NOS4A2

Is the spin real or not?

One "speaks of spin as if it's something real" because it is useful to do so. — 180 Proof

I'm not ignoring your post, but NOS made a specific claim that I'm working back toward.

No, I would speak of the electron as real (assuming there is a referent) and spin as a predicate. — NOS4A2

So the spin of the election is not real?

So when you talk about electrons, which have the property of spin, you speak of spin as if it's something real, is that correct?

Long, drawn out fart noise.

Then who would make your stuff? It's all made in countries that pollute and have bad working conditions. — Tzeentch

Which would be impossible if it were outlawed by a global government. See how nice?

Platonic realism or any realism in regards to abstract ideas and universals. — NOS4A2

But can you really escape universals and abstract objects? When you separate the universe down to its tiniest parts, what do you call those parts?

Long, drawn-out fart noise.

The US just outsourced child labour to third world countries, though. — Tzeentch

Which would be impossible if it were outlawed by a global government.

:up:

Nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than realism does. — NOS4A2

What kind of realism are you referring to?

If countries are unable to wield power responsibly, even when they are not hampered by great power politics as they are today, like the United States during the unipolar moment. What makes you think more centralized power would do the trick? — Tzeentch

Because it worked in the case of child labor in the US. Individual states couldn't outlaw child labor without crippling themselves economically. The answer was for everyone to do it at the same time according federal law.

This is essentially the second biggest obstacle to doing something about climate change: lack of central authority to make everyone act in concert.