The question is why did the person buy a shirt which they know is of unknown fabric, when the person's desire was to only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton. Do you not see that the action as contrary to the person's desire? How can you claim that a choice which is contrary to the person's desire, is understood by the person? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because people are capable of acting contrary to their own desires and/or having contrary desires. That really isn't what understanding a choice is about.

How does that make any sense to you? You are saying that the person understands the choice, even if the process of understanding it hasn't occurred yet — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am saying that the kind of understanding of a choice I am discussing here isn't about what reasons one has for a specific choice, it is about knowing what the choice is and what it means to make that choice such that one CAN respond to reasons regarding that choice. It is prior to what you are discussing.

Reasoned choices, whether to act or prevent acting, are always blameworthy or praiseworthy, so there is no question, or issue here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we are close to agreeing on a point here. Except that it's not just reasoned choices. The choice to act some way can be praiseworthy or blameworthy regardless of whether one has made a reasoned choice or acted out of habit or on a whim or what have you. Seems to me that you could do away with considering these differently at all and just look at the consequences.

I've explained, your adherence to consequentialism is based in misunderstanding. This misunderstanding inclines you not to make a distinction between choosing (mental process) and acting (physical process). Further, your belief in libertarian free will inclines you to deny that mental processes are "the cause" of physical actions, and this reinforces your refusal to make a distinction between mental processes and physical processes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah but you were wrong on both these counts. The second count also misrepresents me completely as I have not claimed that mental processes are not the cause of our physical actions. I would say that they definitely are. So everything further said on this can be directed at someone else as it certainly doesn't apply to me.



On a different note, I'm going away so expect no replies for a while.

Like, I can disagree with all the things you've said and point out all the strange assumptions and dubious logic there, but I think it would be better to clarify what is actually being disagreed about clearly.

I mean, I gave a definition in the last post twice. What part are you having trouble with? Are you after a more formal definition?

Then why do you not accept that the shirt example is a case of a person not understanding one's own choice? The person has the desire to buy a shirt only if it is 100% cotton, and then for no reason at all buys a shirt of unknown composition. If we ask the person "why did you do that?", there is no answer provided in the example. We can only conclude that the person did it on a whim or something. However, you deny that choosing on a whim is a case of not understanding one's choice. But "whim" is defined as "caprice", an unaccountable change of mind.

You say you want less from "understanding" than I do. In reality you want nothing from "understanding". Your principle is really "the ability to make one's own choice", and "understand" plays no role at all. So long as the person is capable of speaking and can give an answer to "why did you do that?", such as "I felt like it", this qualifies as "understanding" the choice, to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, "why did you do that" doesn't really factor into it. I might ask them if they know what choice they are making (in this case, giving up ownership of some money in exchange for a shirt) and what it means to make that choice (eg, if you give up this money, you won't have it in the future etc), but why they want the shirt is more or less beside the point (except in some niche cases where they think it will protect them from aliens that are chasing them because they are suffering from a delusion, or something to that effect).

This is because you do not want to deal with all the real issues concerning "understanding" one's own choices which I've been bringing to your attention. These issues are the role of habit, education, deception, and things like that. Further, since your principle of "understanding" is to be able to "apply one's rationality", you would accept all different sorts of what is known as "rationalizing", and other specious forms of explanation as "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover

I would accept not applying one's rationality also. So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient. If they then decide to do things for no reason or just because they felt like it or whatever, then that's fine.

The simple fact is that "allowing" does not require a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are a great many things that we allow to happen which do require a choice. When bad things happen and we watch on with indifference when we could prevent them, we are allowing them to occur. I'm not suggesting that people are morally responsible for things they couldn't prevent (ought implies can and all that), rather I am suggesting that the whether you are actively doing something or simply letting it happen when you could easily prevent it doesn't make much of a difference.

You can give many examples which create the appearance that allowing is a choice, but these are false for the following reason. All choices are personal. The choice to act is personal, something I do my self. The choice not to act is personal. The choice to allow something else, not of my choice, to occur is a choice not to act in an attempt to prevent it. So, like I explained a choice not to act is a choice of disallowing myself to act. So what you call "allowing" is really a choice of disallowing. "Allowing", in a true sense of allowing something to occur, is something completely different which is neither a chosen act nor a choice to disallow action. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, it seems very odd to say that you choosing to walk on past rather than saving the drowning child is "disallowing yourself to act". Yes, allowing something to happen does seem to be choosing not to try to prevent it. My question is, why does any of this matter? Does any of this lead to us not being blameworthy for things we let happen? Does any of this make us more blameworthy for killing the one to save the five? What does this mean in terms of how we should live our lives? This would be my question generally, as quite often I will point out something wrong with your argument and you will respond by picking at a detail of the example that I didn't include because it wasn't relevant or a word I didn't define give a formal definition for. My question is, what are you claiming I am wrong about when it comes to evaluating moral decisions or giving moral guidance?

I really think I need to figure out how you are using the word "understand", because it's not making any sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said in a previous post I would say that to understand one's choices it to comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.

So when the person decides to buy a used shirt only if it is 100% cotton, you call this a desire, and insist that it's not a choice, because it's not acted on, and the person's choice (act) is to buy the shirt of unknown fabric — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not insisting that it isn't called a choice. I'm not worried whether it is called a choice or not. I don't think choosing one thing and then later on choosing something that goes against the goal expressed by that first choice implies misunderstanding of either choice. Also competing desires isn't the same thing as changing one's mind.

And would you agree that "understanding" and its contrary "not understanding", are terms used to describe a judgement against this medium process, thinking, decision making? "Understanding is a judgement of correctness, and "not understanding" is a judgement of incorrectness in the associated thinking process. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this, particularly this last sentence. But, as mentioned above, I wasn't insisting on a specific choice of words here and how I am using "understand" in this context can be found earlier in this post.

I assume that in all cases of acting (choosing), there are competing desires, otherwise a desire would lead directly to an act, without any medium, and there would be no choosing. Do you agree? And would you agree that the medium, consisting of thinking, could be judged as either understanding or not understanding? — Metaphysician Undercover

No I wouldn't say that in all cases of acting there are competing desires, but again I wasn't using "competing desires" to mean a whole lot of extra stuff. So no, I don't think if you just want one thing and then choose to pursue that thing you have somehow not chosen.

Also no I don't think the process of thinking about a choice is itself the understanding or not understanding of that choice. Me deliberating on whether to make some chicken for dinner isn't the understanding of that choice, that understanding of that choice is the thing which allows me to engage in that deliberation.

Now, the important point, who would make this judgement? The judgement of whether the thinking process was correct or incorrect, understanding or not understanding, must be made by someone. We cannot say that the person engaged in the thinking process, making that choice, also makes the judgement of correct or incorrect, or else all cases would be judged as correct, because the person would not make the choice unless they thought it was correct. Their judgement would have to correspond with the thinking process, because the choice actually is that judgement. Therefore the distinction of understanding/not understanding would be meaningless. In all cases of making a choice, the person would understand the choice, and there would be no question of the possibility of not understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is all based on the false premise that there needs to be a judge in order for their to be a fact of the matter. This just isn't the case. The truth is not determined by the judgment of an observer. The truth simply is, and it is up to us to find it as best we can. Also, this all seems to come from you seeming to think that I was claiming a bunch of stuff that I wasn't.

Do you agree with this Dan? If not, tell me please what you mean by "understand" in the context of the principle "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't. As mentioned above, in that context I am using understanding one's choice in the sense of to comprehend the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.

I think that if we say a person understands one's own choice, this is a judgement we pass on the person, not a judgement that a person would pass on oneself, because that would be meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we say it then yes, I suppose we are passing that judgement. But no, it wouldn't be meaningless for a person to say that they understand their own choice. For example, in cases of euthanasia, the person might need to affirm that they understand the choice to end their own life and they would, presumably, judge this for themselves.

When we ask the person "why did you do that?" what sort of guidelines ought we to follow in our judgement of whether it is a case of the person understanding the act or not understanding the act?. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Why did you do that" probably wouldn't be high on my list of questions in order to determine if they understand their own choices. I might ask them about the nature of the choice they are making, and try to ascertain their general level of mental competence. I might also check whether they are suffering from any delusions which lead to them not knowing what choice it is they are making.

But the examples I mentioned are cases of disallowing, i.e. preventing one's one actions. This is distinctly different from "allowing". So the difference I am talking about is the difference between acting and disallowing one's own actions. It is not a matter of "allowing" the actions of others, those are irrelevant. What is relevant is the choices (actions) of oneself, and the difference I am talking about is the difference between allowing oneself to act, and disallowing oneself to act. In the shirt case for example, adhering to the principle "I'll only buy a shirt if it is 100% cotton", is a choice (I believe it is a choice anyway), which would have disallowed action in the circumstances of the example. However, in the example the person allowed oneself to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does this have anything to do with whether or not there is a distinction between acting or allowing which I suggested is the reason consequentialism is the best approach to morality? I can engage with this if you want, but it appears to be divorced from what we were talking about.

Changing your mind does not constitute misunderstanding one's choice, that's what I said. However, exchanging one choice for a contrary choice, without any reason, must indicate that the person does not understand one's own choices. A whimsical choice, if it is contrary to a prior choice, must be a misunderstood choice, because there is no real reason why the person negates the prior choice in favour of the new choice. The person can give no explanation for the choice. "Whim" means precisely that, without explanation.

Here's another way of looking at it. Lot's of people make New Years' resolutions, then many end up breaking them. Suppose a person resolves to quit smoking, then two days later is lighting up a cigarette. Notice that the two choices are contrary, first to not smoke, second to have a cigarette. One of the two choices must be misunderstood. Either the person doesn't misunderstand the force the addiction has on oneself, making the first choice misunderstood, or the second choice is misunderstood for the reason above. Usually we would not say that the first choice was misunderstood, we'd say that the person was not strong enough to overcome the addiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think either was misunderstood. I don't think we need to say much about either one morally, but if I was to describe them, I would say that the person had competing desires and that they gave in to their urges rather than stick with the better course of action long-term. I don't think either one of these constitutes them not understanding their choices in the way I have described though.

So, don't you agree, that changing one's mind to a contrary choice, without a good reason for doing such, constitutes not being able to comprehend the nature of the choice? Take the shirt example, there is no reason given for the change of mind, therefore the person cannot respond with reasons for making that choice. Imagine the person told someone else, a spouse or someone like that, that they were going to buy a shirt, but only if the shirt is 100% cotton. Then the person brings home a shirt of unknown composition, and the spouse asks, why did you buy that. I don't know. There is no reason given in the example. That's a common answer for children when asked why did you do that, I don't know. Adults give that answer sometimes too. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't agree at all. The person still understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it. That's all that is required.

I think you are missing the essence of the example. The decision to only buy the shirt if it's 100% cotton is clearly a choice. It's stated as that in the example. It's not a desire to have a cotton shirt, it's a choice to buy a used shirt, but only if it is 100% cotton.

You can rewrite the example, so as to call it a desire for a shirt, or a desire for a cotton shirt, but then you miss the essence of the example, which is the act of changing one's mind for a contrary choice. Please take note that this is just like your proposal to only consider "actioning choices". By doing this you exclude all the choices which do not end up in action, the choices of inaction, which is will power, and the choices which later get changed and do not end up in action. You can call all these choices "desires" if you want, but what's the point?

Why do you want to exclude all these choices from your consideration of choices? Obviously it's because this type of choice doesn't fit within you moral principles, your morality cannot deal with them. So instead of changing your moral principles to be consistent with the nature of choices in general, you choose to ignore all these choices, and hang on to defective moral principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of these things are inconsistent with my moral principles. As I said, I don't think the language used here really matters.

Sure, anyone can contrive an example where choosing inaction is just as morally reprehensible as choosing to act. I do not see how this is relevant to the issue of the distinction between choosing and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't remotely the distinction that is important for whether or not we should be consequentialists or not. Whether there is a distinction between acting and allowing is what matters. If you agree that it is incredibly easy to imagine a case where it is as blameworthy to act as it is to allow (and not even a case where the situation is somehow your fault in the first place), then how can there be an important distinction to be drawn between acting and allowing.

Do you recognize that choices very often define conditions of inaction? Don't buy lottery tickets. Don't buy the shirt if it's not 100% cotton. Don't have a cigarette. Don't have a drink before driving. Thou shalt not... And so on. These are reasoned choices which serve as principles, rules which are designed for the purpose of preventing the urge to act, when the specified act is understood as unreasonable. Such choices do not produce observable acts, though they can change our attitudes. Since a judgement of one's moral character is a judgement of one's attitude, these choices which produce no actions turn out to be very important choices, morally. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's say, for the sake of argument, that I agree that these are cases of inaction (which I'm not sure I do as it seems like they could also be framed as actions). I would say that I am the one who is treating inaction is morally relevant here. I am saying there is no important difference between acting or allowing, so "inaction" is as morally relevant as "action". Further, I would say that the reason these things are good, to the extent that they are, is their consequences. To borrow one of your examples, the reason it is good not to impair yourself with alcohol before driving is that doing so increases the risk of harming yourself and others, wouldn't you agree?

Can you see how one is contrary to the other? Unless there is a reason for the change of mind, then a misunderstanding of one's own choices is indicated by the fact that the person has made contrary choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, so you mean that this indicates a misunderstand?

That is less crazy, but I think still wrong. I don't think it is a misunderstanding to change your mind. Or even to do so on a whim.

As I said, you demonstrate a misunderstanding of "understanding". By my OED, it means "perceive the significance or explanation or cause of". Unless a person apprehends the reason why they discard an earlier choice that they have made to adopt a contrary choice, it is impossible that they could perceive the significance or explanation or cause of that change of mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, there are a ton of definitions of words, and all of those are just based on common usage. Words are just ways of conveying meaning to one another. I think "understand" is a good choice to convey the meaning I am attempting to convey here, of being able to comprehend the nature of a choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to a choice and can respond to reasons for making it. Not knowing why you changed your mind does not preclude that one understood that choice in this way as one can clearly still know what the choice is and what it means to make that choice. In this case, that it is exchanging money for a shirt of an unknown material that feels like cotton.

If the point of the example is merely to show an instance of making a choice on insufficient information, then it would not be relevant to what we are discussing. We are discussing "understanding" one's choice. Understanding is not simply a matter of having information it also involves applying the relevant information to the situation at hand. This is the point which you just don't seem to be getting. When a person has relevant information, they do not necessarily apply it. And that is why habit is so important as a source for misunderstanding one's own choices. It inclines one to act (often taking risks) without considering all the relevant information which is available. Failure to consider all the relevant information does not necessarily lead to misunderstanding, it often does not. But it can lead to misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is definitely relevant. To understand the choice someone does not need to have all the information they might wish to have, never mind needing to apply it. My point is that the bar I am setting for understanding here is much lower than what you are talking about.

Acting in a contrary way to how one previously decided that they would act, without a reason for making this contrary choice, implies that the choice is not understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't. They might well have changed their mind on a whim, which would not be considered misunderstanding the choice.

I really do not know what you could possibly mean by "understanding one's choice", if it's not to perceive the significance or explanation or cause of one's choice. How would you define "understand" in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover

To comprehend/recognize the nature of the choice and what it means to make that choice such that one can apply one's rationality to it.

No, this makes no sense. I am telling you that there is a distinction between acting and choosing, and you are now starting to agree with me. Yet you propose "actioning choices" as a way to deny the evidence which demonstrates your misunderstanding of "choice". Look at the shirt example. The choice to only buy if the shirt is 100% cotton, would be excluded as not an "actioning choice", because the person ended up acting on the contrary choice. Then we would be left unable to consider the very important condition of changing one's mind.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I would also quite happily describe the shirt example in terms of having a desire and then making a choice to buy a shirt that doesn't necessarily fufil that desire. I am not worried about whether the person wanting to get the shirt in the first place should be considered a choice or not. I just don't think it matters.

Why not recognize the real separation between choosing and acting, and then proceed to recognize that you were wrong to conclude that there is no serious distinction to be made between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen? From here we can properly assess your reasons for believing in consequentialism. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no idea how you have gotten from one to the other there. Let's say we agree that there is a difference between choosing and acting (mostly this seems linguistic to me at the moment). I'm not sure why I should think that choosing to act in a way that brings about some outcome, let's say the death of a person by my flipping a switch and sending a trolley to crush them, and me choosing to act in some other way which leads to the death of five people, in this case, not flipping the switch and watching while the trolley crushes them, are somehow different. Both of them could be considered a choice or an action, or both. The terminology isn't what's important. What's important is that there are two possible worlds (in this hypothetical) and I can pick one in which one person dies or one in which five do, and I can't see a principled reason why the fact that I have to flip a switch (or whatever) to get to the better world but only have to stand around twiddling my thumbs to get to the worse one should make a moral difference. This has nothing to do with whether or not there is a difference between acting and choosing.

Also, for what it's worth, I think choosing is definitely a type of action, even if it is a mental one. Though I don't think that has anything to do with whether there is a principled reason to draw a distinction between acting and allowing. The two things just don't seem to be related at all.

More generally. While I have tried to keep up with all comments, helpful and otherwise, on this post despite it not being my preferred method to discuss solutions to this problem, I am going away for a while soon and will not be replying. I will get back to this eventually, and I do appreciate the suggestions I recieved to the email address provided.

This choice, to take a risk on the unknown is the one which is misunderstood because it is contrary to the original. — Metaphysician Undercover

This looks like you are claiming something lunatic here. Could you please clarify what you mean.

We can see that it is a misunderstood choice, because there is no explanation, no reason given, as to why the change of mind was made. In other words, this choice was made without any reason, and without a reason for it, it cannot be understood. If the example stated a reason, 'it was so cheap it was irresistible', or, 'it looks so good I forfeit the 100% cotton rule, or the person decided that if they bought it and didn't like it they could give it to someone else, then the choice would be understood. But that's not what happened in the example. The person had a clear choice to only buy cotton, then suddenly dismissed that choice and for no reason at all, bought a shirt of unknown material. Since the person did this for no reason at all, it is very clear that the person did not understand one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Putting aside that I didn't give a reason because it isn't the point of the example, you are wanting way too much in order for someone to understand a choice. If people change their mind on a whim, that doesn't mean they don't understand the choice they are making. They might not understand their motives for making it (though this is also debatable) but that isn't the same as not understanding the choice they are making. In this case, they understand that they are making a choice with incomplete information to buy a specific shirt.

But the issue of the example is not a matter of making a choice with incomplete information. As you say, we make all choices this way. The issue of the example is that a choice is made without a reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that is the point of the example. I think the original version had a reason given since it had more of a complete story. I was just giving you a brief version and the reason behind the choice really isn't the point.

There is no reason why you went against your rule, you were suddenly overcome with the urge to buy. So you clearly do not understand your choice. This is known as impulse buying, and in a more general sense, it is called "whimsical", and a similar concept is "overcome by passion". They are all concepts which refer to cases of not understanding one's own choices. And, you ought to see that acting by habit fits right in with these, as a case of not understanding one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah I would also say that in this case of buying lottery tickets on a whim, that the person seems to understand their choice perfectly well. They seem to understand what they are choosing and what it means to make that choice. Again, you want a lot more from "understanding one's choice" than I do. But, hopefully, that difference is now cleared up from these examples.

Do you recognize that a person can choose to do something, yet fail in doing it? If so, then you need to recognize the distinction between choosing and acting. If you continue to avoid this issue I will be forced to conclude intellectual dishonesty. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, it depends what you mean by "choose", but yes I suppose I would agree that someone can choose to do something but fail to acheive it. However, I've already offered to use "actioning choices" or some similar language if you would prefer. Also, I really don't know what this has to do with what you are responding to here. You seem to be saying that choosing and acting are different, but that is a whole different kettle of fish from acting and allowing being different.

Do you recognize the difference between misunderstanding, and understanding? Any time that not having adequate information results in misunderstanding, then there is a case of not being able to understand one's own choice. Therefore any time deception influences one's choice, or any sort of falsity influences one's choice, there is a case of a person not being able to understand one's own choice. Furthermore, since a well educated person has better knowledge about a situation relevant to what the person's education is, than does a not well educated person, and can therefore better understand one's own choice in that situation, then that person is better able to understand one's own choice in that situation. I think it is very clear that having better information is of great consequences in relation to being able to understand one's own choice.

I really cannot understand why you deny this. Is it really the case that your ability to understand your chosen principles is that deficient? Or, do you actually understand this and are simply denying it for some other reason? — Metaphysician Undercover

To not have the information you might wish to have is not to misunderstand (or fail to understand) the choice you are making. To borrow and example of Hallie Liberto's paper "Intentions and Sexual Consent", imagine you are wanting to buy a secondhand shirt, but you only want to buy it if it is 100% cotton. Sadly, as it is secondhand, the shirt you like is missing any identifying tags that would tell you this and the person working at the secondhand clothes store doesn't know. If you knew that it was a cotton blend, you wouldn't buy it, but if you choose to buy it without knowing one way or another, you have not misunderstood (or failed to understand) your choice. You are making a choice with incomplete information (which is presumably how we make basically all choices we ever make) but you understand what it is you are choosing and what it means to make that choice, even if you don't know what the consequences will be from it in the future (such as whether you will have a shirt you are happy with).

That's not the situation here. There are two theories involved, not one, the moral value of freedom and the moral value of consequentialism. It is very obvious that the two theories are incompatible. I pointed that out to you when I first participated in this thread. If, after ten years of studying this subject, you still do not see what is very obvious, then there is a problem with your approach. If you insist that there is only one theory, your theory, that the two are compatible, then the ten years of study should have proven to you that they are not, and that theory is incorrect. I mean, I recognized the incompatibility after less than a half hour of reading your material.

So I am not saying that you should abandon a problem because it is difficult. I am saying that if after ten years of studying something, you cannot see what others see as obvious about that thing, then the problem must be with your approach. The solution to the problem is to change your approach, allow the possibility that the two are incompatible, and understand each of the two separately. It makes no sense to manipulate the concept of "freedom", or "free will", just to make it fit with consequentialism, because all this does is force you into expressing a misunderstanding of "freedom". — Metaphysician Undercover

It appears obvious to you, but you are just wrong. You have a lot of strange ideas about consequentialism and freedom which are incorrect. For example, consequentialism is not a "moral value" it is feature of a moral theory, specifically related to how said theory evaluates actions.

I think I see the problem with much more clarity now. You never learned the distinction between choosing and acting on one's choice. This distinction is necessary to uphold, for the reasons I explained. Because you never learned this distinction, and the great importance and significance of it, you did not have the principles required to make the distinction between choosing to make something happen (choosing to act), and choosing to let something happen (choosing not to act). Not recognizing the distinction between choosing, and acting, has made it impossible for you to understand a choice which is not an act, "choosing to let something happen". Choosing not to act is equivalent to acting for you, because you do not distinguish between choosing and acting..

Because of this misunderstanding, you have chosen consequentialism as the only tenable moral position. Clearly your ability to understand your own choice has been crippled by this misunderstanding. The misunderstanding is that you do not differentiate between choosing and acting. And so you understand your choice of consequentialism, as the only tenable choice, when this is actually a misunderstanding. Your own ability to understand your own choice in this instance, is seriously deficient, due to this misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeeeeah, I don't think there is a principle to make a serious moral distinction between choosing to let something happen and choosing to make something happen. I agree that I didn't learn such a principle or recognize it, but I think that's because it doesn't exist. I think you may be suffering under a misapprehension. However, this doesn't prevent you from understanding your own choices, it just makes you wrong.

I am simply employing your primary principle, "the ability to understand and make one's own choices". I am demonstrating how your ability to understand and make your own choice concerning the best moral philosophy, has been compromised by a failure to understand the distinction between choosing and acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are very clearly not employing my principle, as mine would certainly not suggest that a) one of my own choices is to know the best moral philosophy, or b) that not understanding what the best moral philosophy is consitutes not understanding my own choices. Also, this is a broader criticism than simply of your most recent post. You seem to proceed from the assumption that I am wrong and also, seemingly, a moron. I suggest that making such an assumption is hindering you from understanding what I am saying. I suggest trying to read what I am saying with the assumption that it is consistent and makes sense, as this will likely cause less confusion if I use ambigious words like "it" in a sentence.

I have been telling you since the beginning, that freedom of choice as the measure of moral value, is incompatible with consequentialist principles as the measure of moral value. This make the challenge of your op irrelevant. You are offering 10k to anyone who can solve a problem which a sound understanding would designate as impossible to solve. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree you have been telling me this, but your reasons are unconvincing.

The real issue then, is your motive for doing this. If it is true, as you say, that you've spent close to ten years studying this problem, then by now you should have come to the conclusion that the two are incompatible. This presents the possibility that you are being dishonest, either you did not spend that time studying this problem, or you already know that a solution is impossible and your challenge is a trick of some sort. Another possibility is that you have a disability in relation to your capacity to understand and make your own choices. This would mean that there is some kind of restriction, a force of habit or something similar, which is preventing you from understanding that your choice, to attempt to achieve compatibility between these two, is a choice to do something impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a bizarre claim because it seems to rule out the possibility that I am just wrong, which is a common affliction among us humans. It also doesn't make room for the possibility that you are just wrong, which appears to be the case here.

Based on this assessment, I will ask you to justify your belief in consequentialism as providing the best conceptual structure for moral philosophy. To explain what I mean, consider the following example. Suppose you spent ten years trying to solve the problem of making the conceptual structure of libertarian free will compatible with the conceptual structure of consequentialist morality. In this time you were not able to solve this problem, and your philosophical studies only strengthened your believe in libertarian free will. Why would you continue to believe that the conceptual structure of consequentialism provides the best principles for moral philosophy? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your question relies on the fallacy that if a problem is hard to solve, you should abandon the theory or position that spawned it. This seems fairly obviously not true.

It also relies on the idea that libertarian free will is somehow incompatible with consequentialism or that that is what I have been struggling to solve. Neither is true. I would say that libertarian free will is necessary for consequentialism as I think it is necessary for any moral philosophy since ought implies can do otherwise. What I have been struggling with for the past decade (though I will say that I have been doing other things too, not just sitting in a room trying to solve this problem) is how to determine what to do when freedom to make different choices conflicts.

As to why I think consequentialism is the best approach to moral philosophy, I have a few reasons, but perhaps the most compelling is that I don't think we can make a principled distinction between choosing to make something happen and choosing to let it happen. To put it another way, between acting and allowing. Without such a distinction, consequentialism seems like the only really tenable position. There are other discussions to be had, about why we should think someone's motives should matter and how action-guiding consequentialist theories can be compared to some others, but the lack of a principled reason to draw a distinction between acting and allowing is I think the most compelling reason to be a consequentialist rather than adhere to other intuitively-appealing and seemingly action-guiding types of moral theory.


More generally, I suggest that your approach of assuming I am victim to a bias or indeed a disability may be an instance of engaging in a mode of thought that is perhaps not helpful. It seems, and feel free to disagree, that you are starting with the assumption that I am wrong and preceding from there. I suggest that this may be the cause of the strange understandings of what I mean.

I am not saying that by your claim, "understanding" is the only measure of moral value, I am saying that the ability to "understand" must be given equal weight with the ability to "make" one's own choices, by the statement which is your principle. You clearly give preference to the ability to carry out the act which is representative of the choice (because of your consequentialist bias), and when I give you examples concerning a person's ability to understand one's own choices you simply dismiss them as not morally relevant.

Do you not understand, that it is illogical for you to proceed in this direction? You have defined "moral value" with the principle "able to understand and make one's own choices". Therefore any situations which affect a person's ability to understand and make one's own choices are necessarily of moral value. It is contrary to logic (illogical) to then turn around, and approach from your consequentialist moral principles, and say that since this instance of inhibiting a person's ability to understand one's own choices appears to have no consequences in actions it is therefore not morally relevant. Moral relevance has been defined by that principle. So you cannot logically override your definition to say that in these cases, affecting one's ability to understand and make one's own choices is not morally relevant.

This is the problem I've been showing you since the beginning. You have two incompatible principles, moral value based in freedom, and moral value based in consequentialism, and you are trying to display them as being compatible. So you sometimes approach from the side of freedom (the ability to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value), and you sometimes approach from the side of consequentialism (only specific actions are morally relevant), and when you meet in the middle, you annihilate the one side (the side of freedom) in preference of your consequentialist bias. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not ignore things that affect a persons ability to understand their own choices. You want "understanding one's own choices" to include more than I think it does. I would say that the cases you have presented as problematic simply aren't. I am not annihilating the side of freedom, I am simply pointing out that not having the information you might wish is not the same as being able to understand one's own choice.

So what? "Planning" is just a specific type of "choosing".

This is the fault of your way of understanding "understanding" which is clearly deficient. You relate things to the more specific, and claim that this constitutes "understanding". You say to me "you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made", and so you fail in your denial of the relevance of the general.

Here's a simple example. Consider what it means to understand what "human being" means. You could point to many specific examples, showing me, those are human beings. But this does not demonstrate an "understanding", because you need to refer to the more general concepts, "mammal", "animal", "living", the concepts which inhere within the concept of "human being", as the defining features, to demonstrate a true understanding.

So when you point to a choice made about what will be done tomorrow, and you say 'that's not a case of making a choice, it's a case of planning', it's like pointing to a child, and saying 'that's not a mammal, it's a human being'. All you do here is demonstrate a gross misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Planning to do a thing and choosing to do a thing are different, wouldn't you say? But either way, we seem to be getting bogged down in the words chosen, rather than the meaning thereof.

As it is a case of pointing to a true and real separation, according to the concepts involved, (the separation between making a choice, and acting on a choice), my objection is normative. You ought to respect this difference which I have described, in order that we can go forward with our communication, and this discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have offered to use different language regarding this in deference of exactly this disagreement about what constitutes making a choice. You're welcome to suggest what it is. Would you prefer we discuss "actioning one's choices" would that be more beneficial? I think within the context of this discussion that is likely to mean something close to the same thing in most contexts, so I'm happy to use that language instead if you'd prefer.

As I've shown, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as explained by you, is not a reasonable principle. This is because you fail to properly account for the meaning of "understand" in your explanation. So you make that principle into something which neglects the moral value of understanding one's choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not shown that. You have asserted that. I have properly accounted for understanding.

Very often, you seem to want words to correspond with concepts in the broadest possible sense. For example, when I say that being able to understand and make one's own choices is the measure of moral value, you seem to take that to mean that understanding generally is the measure of moral value. I suggest focusing more closely on the specific claim made.

None of these restrictions provide the force required for your claim. I can still choose to leave the room if I am locked in. Whether or not I am locked in the room only changes the probability of success or failure in carrying out my choice. Likewise, I can still choose to take a walk after my legs are broken. And I can still choose to sell my car even after it's been stolen. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think this discussion was related to force at all, but rather being unable to make a choice.

You seem to be interpretting making a choice as an entirely mental exercise. I don't think it is sensible to say you are able to choose to do something that you cannot do. If you would prefer I use a different word rather than "choice" in deference to your view on choices, feel free to suggest one.

Your examples simply display your failure to recognize the distinction between making a choice, and carrying out the chosen activity. As I told you, it is necessary to maintain this distinction to account for the fact that we often make mistakes or for some other reason do not succeed in carrying out the choices we make. Because of this we must conclude that the choice to act is distinct and separate from the act itself.

Another proof of this separation is the fact that I can choose today, what I will do tomorrow. The act does not necessarily follow directly and immediately from the choice. And in the meantime I might even change my mind, so the original choice is never even acted on. This clearly indicates that there is a separation between the choice, and the act which follows from the choice.

This is all very strong evidence that you misrepresent what it means to understand one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this definitely isn't very strong evidence of anything. I think it is reasonable to say that your choices are limited by not being able to action them and that the way you are using the word "choice" is perhaps a bit nonstandard. Certainly your example of choosing what you will do tomorrow is quite odd, since it seems even in your example that the choice to do the action happens at a later time, and that a better word here might be "planning".

But basically that's all fine. I don't really mind how you're using the word, so long as everyone is being clear with their communication. But, more importantly, my question to you is whether your objection is a normative one or more a linguistic one?

Sure, each case has a number of differences from every other. That is why I think your procedure of singling out specific cases and claiming "morally relevant" , and claiming others as "not morally relevant" is unjustified. You have not provided any reasonable principles for making that distinction. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't singled out cases. I have said that the morality of actions is determined by the extent to which they lead to consequencesthat protect or restrict/violated the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

I do not see any other possibility for being unable to make a choice, other than that it is too difficult. How else could someone be unable to make a choice? — Metaphysician Undercover

For example, you might be able to choose to leave the house if you're locked in a room. You might be unable to choose to go for a walk if you've had your legs broken by local mobsters. You might be unable to choose to sell your car if it's been stolen. Lots of things might prevent you being able to make those choices that belong to you.

OK, so now you accept that teaching someone something (providing the location in your example), actually is causal in a morally relevant way. I'm glad you've come to understand that.

Now, you need to justify the boundary you impose between some acts of teaching, and others. Why, for instance is the person who taught the assassin morally responsible, yet the person who taught the arsonist how to light a fire, is not. Your principle of understanding one's own choices seems completely inadequate. The difference to me seems to be a difference of intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have at no point said that teaching someone something is never morally relevant. Simply that being taught something does (in most cases) not constitute restricting your freedom. "Causal" is a bit of a difficult claim to make here. Rather I would say that it certainly seems to be a contributing factor to the action occuring and it seems like the person who taught the assassin bears some responsibility. The arsonist is a very odd case, as presumably they would have learned to light a fire without that person's intervention so they (the teacher) aren't a necessary condition for them (the arsonist) lighting fires.

Again, it isn't the nature of the action that I am concerned with, it is the consequences.

I don't see the difference. A threat involves the possibility of having freedom restricted. Likewise,
when someone offers to teach you how to swim, there is the possibility that your freedom will be violated in the future, by drowning, if you choose not to accept the offer. Your claim of a difference is unsubstantiated. The forces of nature are all around us, violating our freedom in many different ways, and learning helps us to make choices which avoid these violations. So I really believe your claim of a difference is completely unjustified. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose someone is at some threat of being drowned in the future if they don't know how to swim. There are quite a few differences between that and the case of someone pointing a gun at you and saying 'your money or your life' though, don't you think?

As I said, if these are your claimed principles, you obviously do not know what "understand" means, or you are using the word in a very unusual way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am using the word "understand" regarding a specific thing. Specifically one's own choices. I am not requiring that people understand everything, just what choice they are making and the nature of that choice (assuming that the choice in question belongs to them).

Kidnapping a person is not forcing them to do something. You were talking about forcing a person to do something, as distinct from persuading or threatening them to cause them to do it. I do not see how anyone could force someone to do something other than by some form of persuasion, such as a threat. But all these are instances of using communication to tell people something. By what principle do you distinguish some cases as morally relevant and others as not? — Metaphysician Undercover

Kidnapping someone is absolutely taking them somewhere by force, against their will. It is forcing them to be there.

Again, I would distinguish which actions (of all types) are morally relevant by reference to whether they restricted/violated someone's freedom or not (or removed/prevented some restriction/violation of someone's freedom).

It's not a matter of learning about the nature of one's own choices, it's a matter of how education effects one's ability to make one's own choices. You seem to have no respect for how a difference in the number of possibilities present to one's mind, at the time of making a decision, affects the person's ability to make decisions. This is what I've been telling you about since the beginning, and why habit makes a significant difference to one's decision making ability. Lack of relevant knowledge makes a choice difficult, decreasing one's ability to make choices. Increased knowledge which is relevant to the situation makes the choice easier, increasing one's ability to make the choice. This has nothing to do with whether the knowledge is about the nature of making a choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I don't think any of that is right. Finding a choice difficult to make because you aren't sure which option will be best for you is not the same thing as being unable to make it.

You need to take a good look at what "the ability to make a choice" means. Clearly the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability. This is a principle which is applicable to any type of decision making. Now you propose a special type of decision making, making one's own choice, and my principle, "the degree of knowledge which is relevant to the circumstances at hand, affects that ability", is clearly applicable, just like it is applicable to any other type of choosing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. I am very capable of investing all my money into some new business. How much I know about that business's future profitability does not affect whether I am able to do so or not. I might like to know that, but not knowing it does not restrict my ability to do so.

Of course it is all wrong. You described for me specific things, like a distinction between "free will" and "freedom", and I proceed on that basis to show inconsistency in your thesis, so now you must take back what you said, as "all of it is wrong".

So let's go back then, and you can try again. Please define "free will", and "freedom", so that I can have some sort of understanding of what you are talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have defined both of these things many times for you. What I have said, each time, is what I meant. I went on to explain why everything you said in that section was wrong in several points.

We could take that route, but I think it would prove disastrous to consequentialism. Consider that if we maintain such principles, that there are necessary conditions for an effect, but none of these can suffice as the cause of the effect, then we do not have what is required to tie the voluntary act to the consequences, as the cause of those consequences. The circumstances which a human being finds oneself in, are all equally necessary for the resulting consequences, and "causation" has been reduced in this way, such that the voluntary act cannot be said to suffice as "the cause" of the consequences, it is necessary but not sufficient. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, surely we are in a world where events can have multiple necessary but not individually sufficient conditions, aren't we? For example, if you provide the location of an assassin's target and I provide the asssassin with a sniper rifle (assuming they couldn't get either of these things otherwise), and the assassin then assassinates said target with said rifle, surely we all bear some responsibility here. I think we have to accept that responsibility for consequences is often a bit more complicated than we might like.

The issue is that threatening is a matter of persuading someone through the use of communication. The question for you, is how is this substantially different from any other form of persuading someone through the use of communication, teaching and deceiving in general? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is different because in the case of coercion it leaves the person with the choice to do as you say or have their freedom violated in some way.

My criticism is that you employ an arbitrary division whereby sometimes the use of communication is morally relevant, and other times it is not. And the principles you employ in making this division are not based in whether the use of communication is good, bad, or indifferent, as they should be for a true determination of "morally relevant". Your principles are based in harm or benefit to body and property, with complete neglect for harm or benefit to one's mind, even though your claim is that the principles are based in the ability to understand and make one's own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not employ an arbitrary division. The divison I employ is whether the communication in question restricts/violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

This is nonsense. You cannot grab a person and make them act out a procedure. How could they be performing the request while they are being held? What are you insinuating, that you could grab a person and move their arms and legs like a puppet, making them carry out an act? You are slipping into nonsense Dan. — Metaphysician Undercover

You could grab someone and carry/push/otherwise bundle them into a car. That would be forcing them into a car and different from persauding them to get in. I was thinking more that kind of thing, rather moving someone like a puppet.

You really haven't taken a look at what the word "understand" means. If you truly believe that deception and education do not, in general, effect one's ability to understand one's own choices, you have a lot of reading, and thinking, to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can decieve and educate people on a lot of things that aren't the nature of their own choices.

You've fallen into a trap. Just last post, you distinguished between "free will" and "freedom". And, I explained how "free will" as you defined it related to decision making, choice, (which is mental), and "freedom" as you separated it from free will, related to (physical) actions in the world. Then, to avoid having to deal with causation in the realm of the mental, decision making, and free will, you proposed a distinction between sufficient and necessary. Now you want to focus on consequentialism, and the world of physical actions, but your proposed distinction between sufficient and necessary, in the terms of causation, completely undermine your consequentialist principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, pretty much all of that is wrong.

First, freedom isn't related only to the physical. There are mental freedoms also. That is not how I distinguished between free will and freedom.

Second, I didn't introduce a distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions to avoid having to deal with anything. I assumed we were all happy with that distinction already. Further, I simply pointed out that I was open to the possibility, rather than asserting it.

Third, I have been focusing on consequentialism the whole time, and consequentialism is not wholly concerned with "the world of physical actions". As an example (and let me be clear that this is just an example using a different theory of consequentialism and not something I am proposing as true) a utilitarian might say that you ought not to think of things that make you needlessly sad and should instead focus on things that make you happy instead as this will lead to a better outcome.

Fourth, the idea that things can have necessary and/or sufficient conditions for their existence/realizement does not undermine consequentialism. It certainly makes it more complicated than asserting that every event has a single well defined and understood cause, but surely no one would make that assertion because it's pretty obviously wrong. Consequentialism in the world in which we live must by necessity deal with events which multiple people seem to share some responsibility for.

OK, so the key phrase is "not wholly determined by preceding events". I would say that "determined" is the type of concept where we would say that an action is either determined by preceding events, or it is not. That's my understanding of "determined". It wouldn't make sense to say that an act was partially determined, because determined is an all or nothing sort of concept. So, I will assume that by "not wholly determined by preceding events" you mean not determined by preceding events. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think it has to be quite so all or nothing. I'd be open to the idea that certain preceding events were necessary but not sufficient causes of some action being undertaken.

After that, I am going to have to disagree with you that things like lack of education or rashness count as restrictions on one's freedom (and certainly not restrictions on one's free will). But presumably you know that I disagree on that count since we have discussed it quite a lot by this point.

The "forces" which a person applies to another, in forcing that person, are the "forces" of the universe. There is no other type of "force" available to the person, to use when "forcing" another, so the word has the very same meaning. The difference is as I explained, we can be restricted by force, or we can use force to our advantage. In the case of "forcing another", the person is manipulating the forces of the universe to take advantage of another. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you go to a police officer and tell them that you just witnessed someone being forced into a car and they respond with a question about whether you're discussing the weak nuclear force, the strong nuclear, force, magnetism, or gravity, that is not an appropriate understanding of how you are using the word 'force'.

However, you use an ambiguous and deceptive phrase, "forcing someone to do something", in order to veil your underlying inconsistency. When a person persuades or coerces another into carrying out an act for them (forces someone to do something), they use words, gestures, or other actions, to influence a person's decision making (to get them to decide to do the thing), they "cause" the person to decide on that act. But your stated principles of libertarian free will do not allow that a free agent's choices can be caused in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Persuading someone to do something is not forcing them to do it. Coercing someone by threatening them could plausibly be considered forcing. What you are doing in such a case is restricting their choices through a threat (for example, give me your money or I will shoot you). This is not inconsistent with thinking that one's actions are not wholly determined by preceding factors or in-principle predictable with 100% accuracy.

This is also fairly obvious in the case where you are literally forcing someone to do something, such as by grabbing them and physically making them do it. This is not the same thing as persauding someone or educating someone.

I am not making any special categories here. Some actions restrict someone's ability to understand and make their own choices and some don't. The use of force is often in the former category, and the use of deception or education is often in the latter. But, again, this is consequentialism. The type of action is not what is important. It is the consequences which determine an actions morality. In cases where education restricts someone's ability to understand and make their own choices (generally this would involve teaching them something incorrect about the nature of those choices or about some threat etc) then that education is morally bad. But, for example, teaching someone how many wives Henry the 8th had does not restrict their ability to understand and make their own choices.

Yes, that would be a good idea. I cannot follow what your saying now, so maybe a definition, or even a description of what you think free will is. You said something about libertarian free will, but to me that doesn't seem at all consistent with the principles you are arguing. But maybe you have a different idea from me, about what constitutes libertarian free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough. I would suggest that for an agent to have libertarian free will, it must be the case that their actions are caused by the agent themselves and not wholly determined by preceding events (I think I'd also add that they aren't random but that's maybe a debate for another day), and that their actions are in-principle not wholly predictable with 100% accuracy prior to their occurance (Lapse's demon is impossible).

So are you saying that the "free" in "freedom" has a different meaning from the "free" in "free agent"? I assume also, that since you assert that defining "free agent" with "free will" is not self referential, then the "free" of "free will" has a different meaning from the "free" of "free agent". This is getting very confusing to me, and the likelihood of equivocation is looming large. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I think freedom and free will are different things. As I have said before, I would say that freedom is the ability to understand and make choices (and I would say that the kind of freedom that we should care about morally is the freedom to make one's own choices). To understand and make choices is the use of one's free will and one's rationality. Having free will is not the same as being able to use it to make your choices (since those choices might be restricted in some way). When I talk about a "free agent" I mean an agent possessing free will. I am not making a claim about how restricted or unrestricted their freedom is.

You were attempting to make a distinction between the physical forces of the universe, and the force someone uses to force a person to do something. You said: "This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe." — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, because "forcing" someone to do something means something different than the "forces" of the universe, and I was very confused that you seemed to be using them interchangably.

That is because I want premises for the purpose of proceeding logically. If we allow the ambiguity of words meaning numerous different things, then we open ourselves to equivocation and logic becomes useless. Then there is no point to proceeding. That's why I'm now looking for some clearly defined terms to provide for us some agreeable premises for logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think we can be clear about what we mean even if words have more than one possible meaning.

This is self-referential. You define "free agent" with "free will", but nothing tells us what "free" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not self-referential at all. I define "free agent" with reference to free will. I feel like I already explained what I mean by free will but I can do so again if you would like.

Now "freedom" becomes totally meaningless. "Free" to me, as the common dictionary definition indicates, means unrestricted. Now you say freedom might be restricted, or it might not. That leaves "freedom" itself as nothing.

And as I've shown, the "ability to understand and make their own choices" is not freedom at all. Because you qualify "their own choices", with moral principles, this phrase, as you define it, just refers to a type of restriction. And as far as I understand "free", restriction is opposed to "free". — Metaphysician Undercover

First, freedom is not meaningless, it is simply different from being a "free agent" in the sense of an agent with free will. To have free will and to have the freedom to express it are different things.

Second, you haven't shown that. You have insisted it, usually backing it up with a misunderstanding of what I've said or the assertion that I should be using words the way you would prefer. It is freedom to make a certain kind of choices.

Third, I'm not saying that what freedom is could be restricted or not. I am saying that being a "free agent" in the sense of having free will is not the same as having freedom to express that free will (as mentioned above).

The point is that you have named a special type of restriction, one which is imposed upon a person by another, and you have singled this out as if it has special moral significance. What my explanation of your "locked in the room" example shows, is that whether or not a restriction is imposed by another person is usually very insignificant relative to the required decision making at that time. If you find yourself locked in a room, the issue of whether or not someone imposed this upon you intentionally ought to have very little significance over the choices you need to make at that time. And in general, in cases where we find ourselves confronted with unwanted restrictions, whether these restrictions are natural, or artificially imposed, ought not have a serious affect on our decisions making. We must work to understand the restrictions, and free ourselves from them, not worry about who, why, or if, someone laid them on us. Therefore "imposed by another" is not a species of "restriction" which is important to distinguish at this time. We need to first understand what "free" and "restricted" mean, in their basic sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, aside from the fact that someone has acted wrongly in this case, I am generally inclined to agree. But I don't think I ever suggested or implied that someone's freedom being restricted or violated by another person was in some way more significant than it being violated by something else. You said that restrictions were inherent to the person, and I was simply pointing out that this seems like a silly way to conceptualize restrictions. In this case, there was another person involved, but there need not be. We might imagine a similar case where a rock has fallen on your leg and trapped you under it, thereby restricting your freedom. It would be very strange to categorize the rock on your leg as an restriction that is inherent to you or in some sense internal. It is a thing that has happened to you that is restricting your freedom.

OK, but since "freedom is restricted" is a blatant contradiction, and you seem to believe that "restricted" represents the truth in this matter, we need to start with the premise that the agent is not free. The agent is restricted. Whether or not you believe in free will is irrelevant now, what you believe is that the agent is restricted, and therefore not free. Now we can proceed to outline the nature of the restrictions.

I believe, as I said earlier, the most important and significant restriction is the nature of time. It is impossible to alter the past. And, it's not the case that this type of restriction is not morally relevant, because this restriction affects everything we do, that which is morally irrelevant, as well as that which is morally relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you seem to want words to only mean one thing, and they don't.

A free agent is one that has free will. Their freedom (their ability to understand and make their own choices) might be restricted, or it might not. If it is restricted, I would say that was a bad thing. But such a restriction would not stop them being a free agent in the sense of having free will.

I'm not really sure what point you are making in your discussion of the person locked in the room.

This qualification, "that someone has imposed upon you" such and such restriction, is generally insignificant, and unimportant. Consider that you suddenly find yourself locked in a room. And, your desire is to be free. Look at the possibilities for the means to freedom, which I mentioned above. That someone has imposed the restriction on you is completely irrelevant. However, when we look at the memories from the past experience, this qualification may be significant. If you think you might call the person on your phone, and get them to let you out, then it would be important. But this is unlikely, so the qualification that it "is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you", is probably completely irrelevant to your desire for freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether it is relevant to your escape attempts is a seperate issue to whether the proper way of thinking about it is a restriction inherent to you or a restriction someone has imposed on you.

I'm not entirely sure what points you are making as they seem to bounce around a lot.

Again, to be a free agent is to have free will, even if your freedom is restricted.

Also, I think this way of thinking about restrictions is just incorrect. If someone has locked you in a room, that is not a restriction inherent within you. That is a restriction that someone has imposed upon you. I mean, there's a sense in which you wouldn't be restricted by this were it not for your inability to pass through solid matter. Is this the kind of thing you are raising, that the things that restrict our freedom are contingent upon various physical facts about us?

That's human nature, people hold fast to the beliefs they have. Because of this, I think moral philosophy is the most difficult field You are not listening to me. I am not listening to you. I think the analogy is good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I think you're half right.

Are you not listening, in denial, or do you seriously not understand this point? The fact that force often appears to restrict freedom does not justify the proposition "force restricts freedom".

Exceptions to the rule indicate that the rule is faulty. What is required is a comparison of cases where force does restrict freedom to cases where it does not restrict freedom, and this will reveal what really restricts freedom, and why there is the appearance that it is force which restricts freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not suggesting "force restricts freedom" as a rule. You suggested a rule and I am pointing out that it isn't accurate.

"Free" implies a state of being unrestricted, yet we are surrounded by forces. So if forces are restrictions, we could not be free — Metaphysician Undercover

This sounds like equivocation to me. Surely you don't mean to equate "force" as in to force someone to do something with "forces" as in the physical forces of the universe.

I think 'goal' might be more appropriate there as I think Aristotle would say that things can have a final cause without the capacity for intentions, but for moral agents I think I see what you mean. Though I wonder whether that means you think you can't have a final cause you are unaware of, or if you think this amounts to being unaware of your intentions.

I don't think I dismissed the importance of teaching.

In Plato's cave the prisoners refuse to listen to the escapee. They think the sun has ruined his eyes for he cannot see the shadows with the same clarity they can. Plato seems to be making the point that the enlightened cannot necessarily share their wisdom with those who see only shadows. I'm not saying I agree, just that I'm not sure you analogy is doing the work you want it to.

The point is, that we cannot proceed from this proposition "force restricts freedom", as a premise, because it is a false proposition. Therefore if we want to understand how freedom is restricted, and proceed with a true premise about this, we really need to look elsewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the point is that you claimed that one thing does not cause another. I pointed out that it often does.

As for understanding how freedom is restricted, it seems that it is restricted in lots of ways, and that an understanding of what it means for it to be restricted is probably more useful to recognizing them than making sweeping generalizations. That being said, as a broad generalization, we could do a lot worse than 'force restricts freedom'. As a heuristic, this seems like it would get us to the right answer more often than not, given that 'forcing' someone to do something is pretty directly opposed to them having a choice in the matter.

I think calling intentions a final cause might be quite different from how that term is generally used. I confess I'm not entirely sure what you mean by the term in this context as you seem to be using it in quite a different way from the teleological sense. Also, I don't think intentions are or should be the focus of morality (which will come as no surprise given I am a consequentialist).

Consequentialism does indeed judge whether actions are good based on their consequences, but consequentialism by itself isn't a moral theory. Utilitarianism, freedom consequentialism, even egoism, give moral guidance for what actions should be done based on either their consequences or their expected consequences (there's a whole discussion to be had about expected value vs actual value here, but let's not get into that).

I don't think the primary goal of moral philosophy is to incline or inspire people to act well. I think it is determine what it is to act well. While it is reasonable to say that a goal of moral philosophy is to share moral truths with people, I would say its primary goal is to discover them in the first place.

I don't think I said that influencing people to do immoral things is not morally relevant. I think I said that libertarian free will makes this complicated as the consequences of someone else's actions are caused by them, not by you, though you seem very clearly to have contributed to them. It's potentially a difficult question to pin down, and I would freely admit that I don't really know how free will works (assuming we have it). But I don't think the issue is in not having enough causes in our proposed ontology, I think it is that free will is weird.

If you are stating "force restricts freedom", as a proposition, a premise for a logical proceeding, then it is implied that force always restricts freedom. And if what you meant was "force sometimes restricts freedom", then please state it that way. The problem though is that if you did state it that way, it wouldn't carry the logical force required for your argument, and that's why you stated it the other way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am fairly sure that what I said, and what I meant, was that force very often restricts freedom. You were the one that suggested that force does not restrict freedom, I was simply pointing out that this is not the case because it often does. I need not show that it always does to show that you are wrong, only that it sometimes does. In this case, it often does.

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense.
— Dan

Can i clarify something here (not realated to any previous discussions)?

Is this to insinuate that you can only conceive of "universal or objective" morality, or simply that the concept of Morality is this - and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant? — AmadeusD

What I mean to say is that this (the definition given in the quote you have used here) is what I take morality to be and what I mean when I am discussing morality. I do not mean to insinuate that this is the only definition of the word "morality" I could concieve of, though I might say that morality defined thusly (or perhaps very similarly) is the kind worth discussing.

I'm not sure what you mean by "and so, whether or not any theory obtains is irrelevant" so I've left that alone as I feel you might need to explain your reasoning a bit more there before we can discuss it.

I suggest that your conclusion, "that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take" restricts your ability to understand the true nature of freedom. "Freedom" in it's normal usage, also the sense of "free will" denies the necessary relation between posterior and prior (after and before). This means that the concept of "freedom" does not accept as true, the determinist proposition that after is determined by before. Because of this, consequentialism, which bases its judgement of before, on after, is not suited to any moral philosophy which accepts "free will" as true,

What you do, is that instead of accepting this incompatibility, which ought to force you to choose one or the other (freedom or consequentialism), or neither, you propose a compromised sense of "freedom". This is a restricted sense of "freedom", qualified by "to make one's own choices". Here, "one's own choices" is defined by consequentialist principles. So your proposition is a sense of "freedom" which is defined by consequentialist principles. However, since "freedom" in the sense of "free will" is incompatible with consequentialist principles, your proposition consists of a freedom which is incompatible with free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is almost quite an interesting point here, but free will doesn't require that nothing is caused by anything, only that our choices are not wholly caused by preceding factors. It is not incompatible with consequentialism (and in fact, I would say that consequentialism is incompatible with a lack of free will inasmuch as all morality is) because the consequences of our actions are still caused by those actions. Though, admittedly, consequences such as other people acting immorally is quite weird to determine given that you can't really cause other people to make immoral decisions if you assume free will in the libertarian sense (which I do), but you can certainly contribute to such decisions, such as by providing them information (false or otherwise) without which they would not have made that decision. For example, providing the whereabouts of a abused spouse to their abuser would contribute to the immoral action of that abuser continuing to abuse their victim or indeed killing them etc.

Here's a fine example. In this statement, "very often" is the important, or significant qualifier. The truth and reality that force very often restricts freedom does not necessitate the inductive conclusion "Force restricts freedom". The qualifier "very often" does not provide the necessity required for a valid inductive conclusion. So the evidence you present as cases in which force does restrict freedom, do not serve to justify your proposition "force restricts freedom", as a valid, evidence based, inductive principle.

This is an example of how consequentialism relies on faulty inductive propositions. The determinist principles at work here, are as follows. We see that in the particular case, and even specific cases, the posterior is determined by the prior. In these cases, force is what restricted freedom. Because we see a causal relation we say that force caused restricted freedom. This is a case of looking backward in time. We can look at a multitude of such events which have occurred, without comparing the type of force, degree of force, and a slew of other factors, and we see that force "very often" restricts freedom. This commonly referred to as "cherry picking" which supports faulty induction. Then we see the cause/effect relation which creates the appearance of necessity, and we are inclined toward the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom".

But if we look toward the future, instead of looking toward the past, we see the inevitable nature of "force". Force itself is necessary, as inevitable, an unescapable aspect of reality. However, we understand ourselves as beings with free will, who can understand, and often avoid the restrictive aspect of force. We can even strategize and use force to our advantage. Looking at the future, from the perspective of "free will", nullifies, and invalidates, the faulty inductive conclusion "force restricts freedom". This is because from the perspective of "free will", what happens after what is happening now, is never necessitated by what is happening now. The concept of free will breaks that necessity, that the posterior (the after) will be determined by the prior (the before). The concept, "free will", allows that a freely chosen choice, at any moment in time, can affect what occurs afterward, in a way which is not determined by what occurred before. This breaks the inductive necessity of the cause/effect determinist assumption, that the after will be determined by the before. Without this necessity, inductive propositions like the one in your example, and similar one's employed by consequentialism, do not qualify as valid moral principles.

This is commonly understood as the gap between is and ought. The inductive principles state what "is the case", at the present, based on observations of the past. But moral principles look to the future and state what ought to be. So moral philosophy seeks to have an effect on the approaching time, in a way which is not determined by past observations, "what is", but by freely chosen choices, guided by knowledge and understanding, which produces "ought". — Metaphysician Undercover

Lot going on here. First, necessity is not required for inductive reasoning. Second, "force restricts freedom" does not imply that force always restricts freedom and is in fact technically true if it occurs even occasionally, let alone very often. Third, you kind of lose me when you start talking about force itself as this seems very divorced from the concrete reality of examples like "if you cut off my arm, you reduce my freedom over my arm". Fourth, as mentioned above, free will isn't incompatible with consequentialism because consequentialism doesn't require everything to be casually determined, only that consequences can result from actions. There might well be breaks in causality when it comes to free agents decision points, and what we should say about this is potentially an interesting topic, but it certainly seems that we can agree that actions can have consequences, so it seems that those actions can be assessed by reference to those consequences. Fifth, that isn't really what the is-ought gap is at all.

What you call "universal and objective sense" has been revealed as faulty inductive reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not even sure what you mean by this, but I'm fairly sure it's incorrect.

This is to clarify that when I am discussing morality and theories thereof, this is what I am talking about.

You seem to be claiming a consequentialist bias because I am a consequentialist. I suggest that this is not bias but rather a considered evaluation that consequentialism is the appropriate form a moral theory should take. You seem convinced that consequentialism must be concerned with "observable" consequences. While it is certainly the case that observable consequences are much eaiser to measure, they are not the only ones which can be morally relevant for a consequentialist theory. Also, you accuse me of not considering an act itself immoral regardless of its consequences. Well yeah, no kidding. That is not a consequentialist "bias," that is just what consequentialism is. The morality of actions is determined by their consequences, that's very much the whole thing.

Force very much does restrict freedom. It does so very often. When people are murdered, when they have their bodies maimed and their property destroyed by explosives, when they are captured and held against their will, these are all examples of their freedom being reduced by force employed by another party. But presumably all of this is obvious.

Again, I have not had to overide any definitions. I have offered to provide a formal definition, but heard nothing back on the matter.

I would say that morality is the way in which persons ought to be or act, where "ought" is understood in a universal and objective sense. We have already discussed at length your issues with me using the word "freedom." I have attempted to be specific in what I mean, but you still seem to be caught on the word, rather than the concept. I think "freedom" is the most appropriate word for the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, but you are welcome to disagree (and indeed you have). However, I have been pretty clear in how I am using the word throughout this discussion.

Obviously, deception creates exactly that type of misunderstanding. For example, when I am choosing which park to walk in, you lie to me and tell me park X is currently closed, this creates misunderstanding about the choice I am making, reducing my understanding of the choice I am making. I would go so far as to say that all cases of deception do this or something similar, that's what deception does, creates misunderstanding in the person concerning choices they are making. Even in the innocuous joke deception like April Fools day, the "joke" is brought about by making a public display of how the person misunderstands one's own choice in reaction to the deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is neither obvious nor the case. People are capable of misunderstanding a great many things beyond just the nature of the choices that belong to them.

It is unwise for you to dismiss this situation, when a person is listening to another to be educated, as the fault of the student, for allowing oneself to listen to the other. When an individual "takes one's own choices away", due to the attitudinal nature of being human, with the desire to know, this is no less forceful than strapping the person to the chair. In fact, in this situation it is much more forceful, because strapping to the chair does not force them to listen and accept, but the person's disposition does force them to listen and accept. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it is. It is entirely less forceful. Making your own choices is not being forced. It is not reducing your freedom. It is using it. I feel like we have been over this point quite a bit, and we are in danger of devolving into nuh-uh territory, but I absolutely do not agree to your categorizing of someone making a choice as them being "forced by their disposition". Rather, I think they have free will, and have exercised that free will in this case.

and you completely ignore what one person does to another person's mind through communication, claiming this is not morally relevant. I believe that this is due to your consequentialist bias. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't ignore this, nor is my view due to any "consequentialist bias". Rather, I simply disagree that these cases constitute taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. As I have explained to you. That you seem to be dismissing my stated reasons and asserting that I have hidden motives for this (and other things) is, to my mind at least, not a very useful way of discussing something. Imagine if I were to dismiss your stated reasons for everything you have said and ascribe to you some sinister ulterior motive, perhaps one you are not even aware of. I think this is unlikely to further the discussion.

However, the results of a person's actions which affect the minds of others, to influence the ideologies, desires and wants of those others, which ultimately have great influence over the person's actions in the world, are dismissed as not morally relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. It might be morally relevant if a person convinces someone else to do something immoral by providing them misinformation. This information doesn't need to cause them to misunderstand their choice, it could still be immoral if it leads to bad consequences. This is entirely consistent with consequentialism. But giving other people information, whether true or not, is not in itself taking away a choice that belongs to them.

The issue is as I've shown, that not every choice regarding what happens to one's own mind, body and property, is one's own choice. In many cases (examples I have provided), you have said that a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, will have an effect on others, which makes you judge the choice as not one's own, due to that effect. So you negate your own definition, with a whole slew of exceptions, principally if the choice restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, then the choice does not belong to the person. You really do override your own definition. How does it make sense to you, to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body and property, and then proceed to dismiss a whole bunch of choices regarding one's own mind, body and property, as not qualifying to be one's own choice, for some other reason.

It might be more accurate to define one's own choice as a choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property, which does not interfere with another's choice regarding one's own mind, body, and property. But this would be very problematic, because most choices interfere with others, in some way or another. That would leave "one's own choice" as a rather useless principle. So you have described a special type of interference, and this becomes the base of your exceptions. The problem which you and I have, is that we do not agree on when the named boundary, outlining the exceptions, has been crossed. And, there can be no clear solution here due to the issue of self-reference. Therefore we will likely always disagree and there will be no principles available to resolve the disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure you have shown this. There are potentially some complicated cases, but I don't think the ones you have suggested, such as stealing my car, are among them. These seem pretty clear.

We clearly disagree about the nature of deception. I think that you do not understand it at all, trying to belittle its effect. I don't think homework on my part will resolve this, I think you need to look more closely at what deception really is, rather than just considering one very uncommon type, being "deceived about the nature of the choice they have to make". This doesn't even make sense. Convincing a person that they "have to make" a specific choice, is an act of deception itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not "have to" in the sense of must. "have to make" in the sense of the choice that they have. I can give some examples that don't involve property if you like, though they can get a bit distasteful as sexual consent is the next most obvious case.

The issue is not whether deception is "wrong". The issue is whether it restricts another's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. And, regardless of the fact that your refuse to recognize this, the answer is yes, it does. Deception creates misunderstanding therefore it restricts a persons capacity to understand and make one's own choices. On the contrary, education increases one's capacity to understand and make one's own choices, but faulty education, even if it's not intentional deception, restricts that capacity by creating misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

It might create misunderstanding, but unless it creates misunderstand about what choice the person is making (or what it is to make such a choice), then it doesn't reduce their ability to understand and make that choice.

Of course it does. Can't you see that? Me lying to you about the car caused you to misunderstand the gift, which you accepted, but you may not have accepted it if you knew the truth. You had a lack of understanding within your own choice to accept the gift — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't misunderstand the choice to accept the car though. I understood what I was accepting, which was the choice that belonged to me. I didn't understand your nefarious plans to ruin my reputation and, had I understood this, I might not have accepted the gift, but whether or not you set out on such a plot was not a choice that belonged to me. The choice that was mine to make was whether to accept the car you are presenting me with, possibly in a certain condition specified by you, and your deception didn't make me misunderstand that choice.

Of course it reduces their ability to understand and make their own choice. When they believe the lie, their choice is based in a misunderstanding. This explicitly means that their understanding has been reduced. How can you think otherwise? — Metaphysician Undercover

They might make their choice based on a misunderstanding, but it is not a misunderstanding of what choice they are making. It is only the person's ability to understand and make the choices that belong to them that is being used as the measure of value here. I think you think I am setting a higher bar here than I am.

You are flatly denying what is obvious. A choice to educate another person is a choice to do something with that person's mind, just as much as a choice to steal another's car is a choice to do something with another's property. That it must makes sense to the person to be able to teach it to the person, does not imply that teaching isn't doing something with another's mind. It's just a condition, like in order for me to steal your car I need to be in the proximity of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I choose to educate you, you might simply walk away, or not check my post, or simply ignore what I'm saying. Unless I am strapping you to a chair and forcing you to listen, then I'm not taking your choice away. Can you see how this is quite clearly different from you taking my car?

This is incorrect. You very clearly said that when I use my own mind, body, and tools, to take your car, this is not a choice which belongs to me, even though I am using my own mind, body, and property. But when using my own property has an effect on your property which is morally irrelevant, then you allow that it is my own choice. Clearly you allow whether you believe that a choice is right or wrong, to influence your judgement as to whether the choice belongs to the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, because it's a choice about what to do with my stuff. Choices of what to with your own stuff belong to you, choices of what to do with mine (or anyone else's) don't. Think of it this way: There are things that belong to you, specifically your mind, body, and property. Where only those things are concerned, you get to make all the decisions. When it comes to other people's stuff, such as their minds, bodies, and property, those choices belong to them. Is that a clear way of thinking about it? I can give you a more formal definition if it would help.

I don't agree with this. I think choices are very specific, while desires may be more general. I believe the proper representation is that my desire is to take a walk (something general), and my choice is to take a walk in that specific park. The choice is what inclines one to act, and it is always specific, never general. For example, hunger manifests as a general desire to eat, but when a person decides to eat, it always must be a specific thing which they chose to eat.

I believe this difference between the general desire, and the specific choice is very important to moral philosophy. Since desire is general, and choice is specific, this allows us to mitigate the effects of desire, because we can entertain numerous possibilities as to the specific thing which will fulfil the desire. So, in the example of taking a walk in the park, the general desire is to take a walk, but it is not a choice until I choose an actual pace to walk. In the meantime, between desiring to walk, and actually choosing to walk (which requires a specific place to walk), I can consider the moral consequences of the different specific possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the choice which belongs to you is the choice to take a walk, not to take a walk in that specific park. Though any exercise of that choice might involve a specific destination, the destination is not the thing that belongs to you, and no particular destination (as opposed to any other) is required for you to exercise that choice.

You're obviously not understanding my criticism, so let me put it in another way. When judging whether a choice is one's own or not, you often refer to how the choice affects another's capacity to make one's own choices. This is an overriding principle, it overrides your definition of one's own choice, as a choice which involve one's own mind, body and property. It overrides your definition, because many examples I have given you, of choices which concern my own mind, body, and property, you reject them as my own, on the basis that such a choice would restrict another's ability to make one's own choices. So do you agree, that the true definition of one's own choice, the one which you are actually applying, is a choice which does not limit another's capacity to make one's own choices? But that definition suffers the problem of being self-referential — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure that I do this at all. I'm not necessarily opposed one's own choices being in part determined by whether those choices belong to someone else, but I think I have been fairly consistent that your own choices are those regarding what happens to your own mind, body and property. I don't think I have introduced an overriding principle so much as you have claimed that you stealing my car is your choice to make because it involves your own body, when it is clearly a choice of what to do with my car.

It is you who is continually ignoring the fact that lying and deception actually do take away peoples' ability to understand and make their own choices. Lying and deception creates misunderstanding which is clearly contrary to someone's ability to understand and make their own choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is only contrary when the person is decieved about the nature of the choice they have to make. Decieving them about other things (even things that might influence what choice they make) does not reduce this ability. There's quite a good paper by Hallie Liberto regarding sexual consent that could potentially help clarify this discussion a bit if you don't mind some homework.

This is obviously wrong. That's exactly what lying and deception does do, reduces their ability to understand and make their own choices, through the means of misunderstanding. How is it possible that misunderstanding does not reduce a person's ability to understand one's choices? To put it in terms of property (which seems to be the only terms you understand), imagine if I give you a car, and I say here, I bought this for you. So you drive it and it turns out that you are driving a stolen car. Doesn't this "misunderstanding" demonstrate clearly to you, how lying and deception reduces the ability to understand one's own choices? And it isn't just in some cases, it's in all cases, because that's what deception is, the creation of misunderstanding for the purpose of manipulating the person's choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a fine example of deception being wrong. The person thinks they are making one kind of choice but they are actually making another. That's fine. I have no issue with deception sometimes being wrong, I'm just pointing out that it often isn't. To use a different example, imagine you buy me a car which I accept because I believe it to be a gift in good faith. Unbeknown to me, you have chosen this car because you wish to ruin my reputation. Perhaps it has been recently voted the worst car for the environment and you intend to smear me for being irresponsible. You lying to me about your reasons does not reduce my ability to understand and make the choice to accept the car. Your reasons were never my choice to make.

This is a bit of a silly example, but there are plenty of sensible ones we could use too. For example, imagine you tell people at a party that you are an olympic athlete so they will think you are cool. This does not reduce their ability to understand or make their choice to spend time with you (I think I would say that the nature of this choice that belongs to you is de re, rather than de dicto). This is a much more realistic example of lying not reducing a person's ability to understand and make their own choices.

Further, I think it is you who are getting too caught up on property. You keep asserting that it is all I care about, but it just isn't.

You are ignoring the comparison. Choosing to deceive, and choosing to educate are both choices concerning doing something with something that isn't yours. You are doing something with the mind of another. Yet you allow that choosing to do these things with the minds of others are choices which belong to a person. However, when it's something like walking in the park, you say that it is not a choice which belongs to the person because it involves property which does not belong to the person. Clearly, "property" is valued higher than "minds". To do something with property which does not belong to you is not your own choice, but to do something with a mind which doesn't belong to you is your own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't categorize choosing to try to decieve as a choice regarding what to do with someone else's mind. It might affect them, but it isn't a choice of what to do with them. Same for education. For example, I might continually tell you that I don't value property more highly than mind or body, but I can't make you learn that.

See, there you go, switching definition. What is important, according to your definition, is whether the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. Now you say, "what is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not". Which is the defining feature? They are not the same. You simply switch back and forth, as convenient, and in this way you avoid the criticism. When it suits you, one's own choice is a choice concerning one's own mind, body and property, but then other times it serves you better to say that one's own choice is a choice which doesn't reduce another's ability to make one's own choices. The latter is a self-referential definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not switching the definition, I'm talking about two different things. Whether a choice belongs to someone is about whether it is a choice of what to do with their mind, body, or property. Whether a choice is right or wrong (or good or bad) is about whether it reduces or protects (or neither) someone's ability to understand and make those choices that belong to them. Same definitions as always.

I'm starting to think you really are suggesting lunacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given what you are inferring from everything I say, I don't doubt it. What I would ask is to read what I've written with the assumptions that I am being consistent and am at least moderately intelligent. This will likely lead to fewer misunderstandings.

This makes no sense to me. Choosing to take a walk, is a choice of what to do with my own body, how does choosing a specific place to walk change this? Don't we always choose a specific place to walk? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a matter of what constitutes reducing your ability to make a choice. Your choice is to take a walk, so stopping you taking a walk would take that choice away from you. Your choice is not to take a walk in that park, so that park not being there does not reduce your ability to make a choice that belongs to you.

This is a fine example of the problem you create by discarding your stated definition of one's own choice, and taking up a new problematic self-referential definition. Now, all of a sudden, "one's own mind, body, and property" has no definitional bearing, because you've replaced it with not "taking someone's choice about their mind away from them". But in doing this you negate the original definition as inapplicable, so I have no idea what "someone's choice about their mind" actually means, just a self-referential definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not changing any definitions. Again, you seem to be interpreting me in a very strange way. When I say "Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them" I mean that none of the actions you have mentioned reduce the person's ability to understand or make their own choices.

See, now you've gone completely to the new definition, if the choice one makes "does not take away their choices about their mind", then it does not rob them of the capacity to make their own choices, and therefore it is a choice one can make. However, you've negated the original definition "choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property", so that we cannot even refer to it in our judgement as to whether the choice is truly one's own (by the original definition).

Clearly, by the original definition, the choice to teach someone, just like the choice to deceive someone, is a choice about what to do with another person's mind. But we cannot discuss this, because "one's own choice" has been given a new definition, "does not take away another's capacity to make one's own choice", Furthermore, "another's capacity to make one's own choice" is strictly qualified with "one's own property", such that another's choice always concerns one's property, and one's mind is completely irrelevant, as your attitude toward teaching and deceiving reveals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no new definition. The choices one can make are not only their own choices (choices that belong to them). Rather, only one's ability to understand and make one's own choices (choices that belong to them) needs to be protected. You seem to be bulling past this distinction and it is causing confusion. Neither of the things you have mentioned involve taking away someone's ability to understand and make their own choices, so they aren't morally problematic.

It's very clear, that in your judgement, as to which choices qualify as "one's own", property is valued higher than one's mind and body. Look at the example of taking a walk. That's a choice concerning one's own body. However, as soon as we determine the specific property upon which the walk will be taken, the nature of that property takes precedence and becomes the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. And this is the case in all of your examples, stealing etc., as soon as there is property involved in the choice, ownership of the property overrides all other features of the choice, becoming the determining factor as to whether the choice is one's own or not. But, things involving another's mind, like teaching and deceiving, have no such determining influence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not "very clear" at all. It is simply not the case. Whether or not other people lie to you is not a choice that belongs to you, so lying to someone does not reduce their ability to understand or make their own choices (by itself, obviously it could in some circumstances). The case of the park is not a case of choices over property trumping choices over one's body, it is simply a case of the choice to do something being different from the choice to do something with a specific thing that isn't yours. For example, the choice for you to swing your arm might be a choice that belongs to you, the choice for you to swing your arm into my face is not. Me not providing my face to be swung into does not reduce your ability to understand and make your own choices, just like your local authority not providing you a park does not reduce your ability to understand and make your own choices. I am merely being specific and you are infering things I am not implying.

However, in the case of teaching or deceiving, where the choice clearly involves an intentional effect on another's mind, there is an exception imposed, it is judged as not morally relevant. Why is the choice to use the public park not provided the same exception of not morally relevant? — Metaphysician Undercover

An effect is not what is at issue. What is important is whether someone's ability to understand and make their own choices is reduced/protected or not. In both the case of not providing a park and the case of lying to someone, it is not.

By the principle you demonstrate here, the choice to speak is not a choice which belongs to a person. The air we breathe is public, just like the park, and choosing to speak into it is not a choice which belongs to the person, just like choosing to walk in the public park does not belong to a person. This is the problem you've caused yourself by giving priority to property as a principle for judgement as to what constitutes one's own choice — Metaphysician Undercover

No, much like choosing to go for a walk is a choice that belongs to a person, choosing to speak also is a choice that belongs to someone. Choosing to speak into that specific air isn't a choice that belongs to someone. If a wind blew past and they were suddenly speaking into different air, that wouldn't wrong them, just like choosing to walk in that specific park is not a choice that belongs to them such that they would not be wronged were that park not there. Seriously, you would find it much easier to understand what I'm saying if you stopped assuming I was suggesting something lunatic. I'm not. I am saying that the choice to walk in a specific park is not one that belongs to you, but the choice to go for a walk is.

This is exactly the problem you have created by replacing the definition of one's own choice, "choices concerning ones own mind, body, and property", with the self-referential definition of not interfering with another's capacity to make one's own choices. Now, it is impossible to be specific about which choices are one's own, because there is no definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I haven't replaced any definitions. I have been consistent in how I am using these terms throughout.

This makes no sense at all to me. How is it that choosing to amputate my arm is a choice of what to do with my own body, but choosing to take a walk is not? Is it only choices to injure myself which qualify as choices of what to do with my own body? How can it not be the case that choosing to take a walk is choosing to do something with my own body? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say choosing to take a walk isn't a choice that belongs to you, but choosing to take a walk in a specific park, as opposed to somewhere else, does not belong to you.

See, another's property is considered in the judgement, but another's mind is not considered. You argued that teaching is irrelevant, so I assume that giving false information, and lying are also not morally relevant. You argued that making someone angry has no moral relevance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because none of these things involve taking someone's choice about their mind away from them. There are certainly things that might do this, but simply lying to someone, or teaching them something, does not take away their choices about their mind. You might well disagree with me about what constitutes the choices that belong to a person regarding their mind (and it certainly seems that you do) but that doesn't mean I don't value the choices a person has over their minds as much as I do those over their property. I simply don't agree with you that some of these things, such as teaching someone, constitute taking away someone's choice regarding what to do with their mind.

The latest thing you said, to indicate that you value property higher than body and mind is that a walk in the park is not a choice about the health of one's own mind and body, it's a choice about the public property, the park. You prove this by saying that the choice is no one's because the property is public, even though the choice is about doing something with one's own mind and body. You continually demonstrate this, judging whether a choice is one's own or not, by reference to property, and with complete disregard for what the person is doing with one's mind and body, and how the choice will affect the minds of others. It's very clear evidence that you value property over minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this is just incorrect. The choice to take a walk in a specific park very much relies on that specific park. The person doesn't own that park, so that choice does not belong to them. If the park is removed to make way for something else, that person is not wronged by no longer being able to walk in that specific park. If they were not able to go for a walk at all that would indeed be reducing their ability to make their own choices regarding their body, but the choice to go for a walk in a particular park clearly isn't a choice that belongs to the person. It isn't about property mattering more than one's body or mind, it is about being specific about what choices belong to a person and which don't. You are very quick to interpret what I'm saying in a way that supports your assertion that I value choices over property more than choices over body and mind, given that I am telling you that I don't, perhaps it would benefit you to consider whether you might be interpreting me wrong when you keep coming to those conclusions?

Mind and body are not at all accidental. Choices about what to happens to do with your own mind, body, and property, are yours. Choices which aren't about that aren't yours. Unless someone has built a park around you such that you can't go for a walk at all without crossing it, then yes walking in the park is a choice about how to use some public property, not about what to do with your body. A choice about what to do with your body might be, for example, whether you want your arm amputated. I would be inclined to agree that one's mind and body are more important than one's property (though exactly how that works I'm not sure, hence the original post).

Sure it's different, but the difference is insignificant. Instead of having individuals divided by distinct goals, as I described, your proposal divides by distinct groups, sects of humanity. Individuals cannot cooperate without common goals, and distinct groups or sects cannot cooperate without common goals. So the very same problem persists, but instead of consisting of individuals who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals, it consists of groups pf people who cannot cooperate because they do not have the same goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it's not insignificant. I think a lot of people share some common goals, but not that all people share one common goal.

Oh, that's very problematic. Means are deemed as "good" in relation to goals. If there is no system for judging ends then differing ends will produce inconsistent and conflicting "goods". If we couple this with the principle you propose, of no common goals for all humanity, then humanity becomes disunited, unable to resolve the question of who\s goods are the real goods. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not at all, because I don't think morality is the same thing as rationality, so there can be moral good without it being something that all rational agents would agree on as their goal/end.

Since, as described above, you value property higher than an individual's mind, you restrict one's choices (and ends) according to property based principles (what we get to do in relation to property). And property based principles require an assumed equality of individuals. Equality of individuals reduces to an equality of ends, what I desire is equal to what you desire, therefore we have equal access to ownership of property. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, all of this is wrong. I don't 'value property higher than an individual's mind' at all. This is exactly what I mean by you misunderstanding me to such a degree that I wonder if it is intentional. I have never said that, and I think I have been pretty clear that I don't think that. But you keep insisting that I do think that and then running with that assumption. I mean, I don't think what you've said here follows either, but that is all secondary to the fact that the core assertion here, that I value property over individual's minds, is just incorrect.

You're really losing me Dan. How can there be a choice which does not belong to me , and yet does not belong to someone else? Who's choice is it? What type of existence does this choice have? I can see how it might be considered as a possibility, but how is it a choice? — Metaphysician Undercover

The choice to say, write your name on the moon, does not belong to anyone. Nobody has a "right" to do so, so we not need to protect anyone's ability to make that choice.

Wow, you do have strange beliefs, don't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, strange in the sense of uncommon, sure. But you did ask what my problem with traditional moral philosophy is and many disagreements come down to starting assumptions.

How could you justify cooperation without common goals? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say people don't have common goals. I said I take issue with the idea there is a goal or end that all of humanity is aimed at. Big difference.

Since human beings are rational animals, how could they be inclined to do what is moral, if it is not rational to do what is moral. Your claim makes not sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, in brief (and heavily simplified) I think Hume is broadly right that we should consider rationality more in terms of means-ends, rather than specificying rational goals.

This is the issue I took up with you already. I do not see how your position could be justified. When one decides that another's end is as valuable as one's own, this is just to make another's end one's own. It is logically impossible to make the ends of others as valuable as one's own, because all this means is to adopt another's as one's own. So only the ones judged as being valuable enough to be adopted as one's own are truly seen to be as valuable as one's own, and this is only by way of actually making them one's own. Therefore to keep moral principles aligned with truth, we must hold that one's own ends are always the most valuable to the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here. Are you taking issue with me disagreeing with this assumption, or are you claiming that I'm making this assumption?

The latter (what you propose), provides no basis for judgement of the ends of others, because they already must be assumed to be just as important as one's own. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think I have ever claimed or implied that individuals need to consider the ends of others as important as they consider their own ends.

But it isn't morally bad to make another's choice. That's what we already went through. It is generally good to save a person's life, for example. That's where your theory ran into problems, and you had to make all sorts of exceptions to allow that making another's choice is sometimes good. So, you do "get to" make choices which are not your own. Then this whole distinction (choices which do belong, and do not belong to the person) falls apart as meaningless, because what you are really trying to protect is choices which are morally good. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've made a category mistake. Making someone else's choice for them, taking it away from them, is bad. It might not always be wrong (for example, killing one to save five) but it is always bad. It always counts against the action. There are lots of choices that aren't yours that would be good and/or right to make, but not belonging to you is not the same as belonging to someone else.

Actually, I think that might be very helpful if we are to get anywhere in this discussion, because it might help me to understand why we are so far apart. On the other hand, you seem firmly attached to your beliefs, and I to mine, so it's unlikely we will get anywhere anyway. — Metaphysician Undercover

In briefest of brief, moral philosophy tends to rest on assumptions that I think are either incorrect or at least unfounded. Some of those include but are not limited to (and not all moral theories rely on the same assumptions of course, I'm just giving a few examples):

* That there is some end that all humanity is aimed at or some goal that all humanity pursues
* That if there were such an end or goal, it would be morally valuable (which in turn can often rest, though not always, on metaethical assumptions about what the point of morality is)
* That it is rational to do what is moral (and sometimes vice versa)
* That is is irrational to make an exception of yourself or treat your own ends as more valuable than those of others (this one can be a bit more complicated than this and the extent to which I have an issue with it depends a lot on how this is fleshed out)

It's a "turn around" because at first you were just distinguishing between choices which belong to a person and those which do not, and claiming to protect the ability to make the one type. Now you imply that there is a mechanism in place which would restrict one's decision (therefore one's mind), to only make choices which one gets to make. So instead of looking forward to the future "I want to promote the ability to make one's own choices', you are now looking back at the past 'there is a mechanism which has been put in place which prevents one from making choices which are not one's own'. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I am not claiming any such mechanism. I meant "you don't get to" in the sense that it is morally bad for you to make my choices for me.

But dismissing it as wrong, without showing these reasons, is to show complete disrespect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it? Again, I'm not sure that's true. Further, given the depth and breadth of traditional moral philosophy, explaining why it, as a whole, is wrong would be quite the undertaking, and we seem to have trouble even communicating what seem to be fairly simple ideas. If you would like me to explain why I think why much of moral philosophy is barking up the wrong tree, I can do it, but that might be getting rather off topic.

Motivation is a large aspect of "one's mind". If it is not important to FC, then your principle, "one's own choice", defined by you as a choice concerning one's own mind, body, and property is not consistent with FC. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean by this.

You are changing the goal post. You spoke about protecting a person's ability to make one's own choices. When I suggest that stealing your car is a choice I might make, you said it is not my own choice to make, because it concerns your property. Then you defined "one's own choice" as a choice about what to do with one's own mind, body, and property.

Now you have turned things completely around, saying "you get to choose what happens...and not what happens to...". You are now not talking about "one's own choice" in any stretch of the imagination. You are now telling everyone what they must and must not choose, so you are imposing your own choice onto the minds of others, "you get to choose...". How could this be a choice which belongs to you, to impose such restrictions on the choices of others? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, the goalposts are where they always are. I'm not sure what you think I am turning around here. Is it "you get to choose" that you are taking issue with? What do you take that to mean that is different? I think you may be reading something different than what I am writing as I have been saying the same thing (though sometimes in different ways in order to clear up any confusion) from the off.

As discussed, I strongly disagree with this. And it is things like this, and your complete disrespect for conventional moral philosophy, (saying that it is wrong), which make me realize that you truly are way off track. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be to be the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Also, on a related note I'm not sure I would consider saying something is wrong to be "complete disrespect"

Your principle, "one's own choice" states that the choice concerns one's own mind, body, and property. This implies that the motivation for the act, as that which concerns one's "mind" is just as much a determining factor as one's property. The car thief uses one's own mind, one's own body, and one's own tools, to achieve one's own ends. As I said, most all choices ought to be considered "one's own choices", by the dictates of your primary definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I doesn't imply that at all. Motivation is not important in FC. I certainly didn't suggest that any choices one makes that in any way involve things that belong to you therefore belong to you. You are free to choose what happens to your body, but not to my car.

However, you do not accept your own definition — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't my definition. It is your definition. Again I did not define it this way. I am not overriding anything, I was never suggesting that anything you do that in some way involves your mind, body, and property is your choice. I was suggesting that you get to choose what happens with your own mind, body, and property, and not what happens to the minds, bodies, and property of others.

Furthermore, you then place undue restrictions on your judgement as to which ways that one's choice affects others, are to be prioritized, to match the prejudice of your preference. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I dismiss feautres of actions that do not involve protecting or limiting the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. I do not dismiss effects on one's mind. There are quite a few effects on one's mind that one could have which would be morally relevant. But someone being upset is not one of them. You are, again, putting words in my mouth that do not belong there.

We're very far apart on this. What I pointed out to you, is that to steal your car is a choice of what I want to do with my own body. That it is your car being stolen, is completely accidental. I want to get myself from A to B, so I grab a car, or I want to make some quick cash, so I grab a car, and sell it. Whatever the case, what I want, and what I am doing with my own body, is the primary motivation here. Theft is fundamentally a selfish act. That it is your car which enters into my plans and not some other thing, or things, is purely accidental. There is no essential relation between my choice and your car, so my choice to steal your car is not at all "about your car", it is about my own selfish wants and desires, what I want, for myself. The choice shows complete disregard for you and your property, rather than your representation of it, as a choice about what to do with your property. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are confusing the motivation for the act with the act itself. Your stealing my car is very much about what happens to my car.

You are simply in denial, refusing to accept that I completely understand you, after weeks of quizzing you, but I also completely disagree with you. You have demonstrated very clearly that the concept of "one's own choice" which you propose, cannot be made to be coherent. That you insist it to be coherent, when I've demonstrated its incoherency, shows not a misunderstanding on my part, but denial on your part. — Metaphysician Undercover

I only don't believe that you understand me because in almost every post you have made, you have misrepresented me dramatically and/or accused me of making a claim I have not made.

You have not demonstrated anything of the sort. You may have claimed it, but you have not in the least demonstrated it. You have asserted that some definitions that aren't the same as what I have said don't work and you have insisted that stealing my car constitutes your own choice because you use your body to do the stealing. I am still not sure if you would like a clear explanation of why this isn't so or if you are being facetious in this case.

The problem I pointed out involved using self-reference in a definition. What happened was that you first defined "one's own choices" as a choice relating what to do with one's own mind, body and property. Then I pointed out that every choice which a person makes, relates to what to do with one's own mind, body, or property. And, what is really at issue is how one's choice to do something with one's own body, affects others. You moved to define "one's own choice" based on how a person's choice of what to do with one's body, affects others. So you came up with, if the choice doesn't limit another's ability to make one's own choice, then it is one's own choice.

Clearly, what you have proposed is a self-referential definition. I prefer to characterize it as infinite regress rather than circular. Q. How do we know if the choice is one's own? A. if it does not limit another's ability to make one's own choice. Q. How do we know if another's ability to make one's own choices has been limited if we do not know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it is a choice which does not limit this ability of another? See, we cannot ever get anywhere because we do not know what it means to make one's own choices, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. But we cannot make that judgement as to whether it affects another in this way, because we don't know what it means to make one's own choice, other than that it doesn't affect another's ability to make one's own choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fairly sure I didn't propose any of that. I think I pointed out that choosing to steal my car is a choice of what to do with my car, not your body. It's a choice that belongs to me, not you.

You have been unable to even adequately define your primary principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". Your attempts have been reduced to a meaningless self-referential definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I've been pretty clear on what I mean and given a fairly clear and consistent definition. You seem intent to interpret what I'm saying in a strange way, then when I clarify that was never what I meant, you take me to be changing what I'm saying and interpret what I'm saying in a different (but no less strange) way.

According to the op, you have spent the better part of ten years trying to resolve the issues of your moral theory. You have become so stymied that you now offer $10,000 to anyone who can resolve the problems with your theory. I suggest that it is high time for you to consider that the reason why you cannot solve the problems is that your theory is simply wrong, therefore there are issues which are impossible to resolve. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have of course considered that I might be wrong, but I think we have good reason to think this is our current best bet. Certainly you misunderstanding me is not good reason for me to change my mind.