As I explained, I believe this is exactly what "a problem" is. And, this is what decision making is all about, resolving conflicting inclinations. If this is not what "a problem" is, then what is a problem to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure you are referring to the same thing as a problem that I am. What I am saying is the fact that people have conflicting desires is not a problem that needs solving or explaining. It is not running afoul of the law of noncontradiction.

That's clearly incorrect. consider this statement, in that context, "the judgement is 'wrong'". It is a judgement of "wrong". Obviously, "is" signifies identity here, it does not signify predication, or else it would mean that the judgement is judged as wrong. We can refer to "the judgement", and we can refer to "wrong", in this context, and they both refer to the very same thing. It is not the case that "wrong" is what the judgement is about. What the judgement is about, is the action which was judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

If someone said "that judgement is wrong" I would absolutely take them to mean that they think the judgement in question has the property of wrongness (probably in the sense of incorrectness). It would be incredibly weird to say that the judgement is the same thing as wrong. I'm not even really sure what that means.

In your usage, in this example, "not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". This is a rule about judging something as "true". To judge it as true requires that it be judged as not mistaken. Accordingly, "being sure that we are not mistaken" is a logical requirement for "true". — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't follow. You have added in "being sure", which is exactly where the problem arises. If we judge something to be true, we judge that belief to not be mistaken, but that isn't the same thing as being sure it isn't mistaken.

Further, there is no sophistry in pointing out that the judgement we make about something is different to the thing we are judging.

This is to say that there is a thing which we name as or describe as "true". No such thing is ever apprehended as existing anywhere or is ever named as "true", and no such thing is ever described as true. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by this. On it's face, it looks very obviously wrong. Perhaps it is just unclear though.

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and ideas, are judged as true. A judgement of a belief as true or false is not a description of a thing. Furthermore, if we accept the conditional proposition in its proper form (and assume that your incoherent expression is an honest mistake), then to know something to be true requires knowing that it is not mistaken, and this is beyond the limitations of human ability. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, yes the judgement of a belief as true or false is very much a judgement that involves the description of some thing (the belief) as being a certain way or having a certain property (being true or false or, if you prefer, having the property of truth of falsity, I'm not really that worried about whether this is described in terms of properties or not). Second, you appear to be trying to smuggle certainty into the mix where it doesn't belong. It might be fair to say that if I know 2+2=4 to be true, then I know this not to be mistaken, but that isn't the same as me being certain that I know this or being justified in that certainty. If, from the information I have, I could be wrong, then the level of certainty I am justified in holding is presumably somewhat less than 100%. But what levels of certainty we are justified in our lack of mistakenness regarding some belief is not the same as whether we are in fact mistaken or not.

This is similar to the sophistical treatment of "the conditional" which you did with "if I do not breathe and eat, then I will not live". The conditional proposition sates a rule for logical proceeding, but you present it as an "objective truth" independent of the logic which makes it valid. This makes a subjective value statement have the appearance of an "objective truth", in a similar way to the way that the values in a number system make "1+1=2" appear to be an objective truth. See how sophistry can make the subjective appear to be objective? — Metaphysician Undercover

This states an empirical fact, rather than a deductive argument, so logical validity doesn't really come into it. However, I'm not really sure how I am presenting anything as 'independent of the logic which makes it valid', or what exactly you are accusing me of here.

You are still missing the point. That something is a misjudgment, is itself a judgement. And, there is no need for any assumption of an "objective truth", to make the judgement of "misjudgment". It is just a matter of two different subjective judgements. You can say that I am wrong (misjudge), and I say that you are wrong (misjudge), because we disagree, no assumption of objective truth is needed. Any supposed "objective truth" is irrelevant, because it is just introduced as what one of us believes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective truth is very much relevant. It is what determines which judgement is correct and, as demonstrated in the tiger and the pitfall trap example, it can rudely disabuse us of our previous notions without the need for anyone to disagree with us.

Therefore, your example makes no sense because you assume a "truth of the matter", when it is irrelevant to our discussion. The "tiger and pitfall trap" are imaginary things, as is the whole story, fiction designed to prove the nature of truth. How is that reasonable? You make an imaginary story to exemplify the relevance of truth. There is an imaginary "truth of the matter" and in the imaginary example the imaginary truth of the matter makes a difference. How is that supposed to convince anyone that there is a real truth of the the matter which really does make a difference? — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you serious with this? Are you genuinely suggesting that hypotheticals shouldn't be used in discussions regarding the truth? Are you suggesting my point would be better if I actually dug a trap on a path you were walking and filled it with a tiger?

You might as well be telling me that there is an objective truth, and if I don't believe in the objective truth, it is going to kill me. What good does that do? I believe I'm going to die anyway. In Christianity, at least they promise eternal life if you believe in the objective truth (God). I'd far rather believe in God and eternal life, than that the objective truth is going to kill me. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are doing that thing again where you assert things as objective truths but refuse to call them such. You claim you are "going to die anyway" but your position (that truth is subjective) makes this only true if you believe it.

Look at your example realistically. I want the take path Z because it is the shortest way from A to B. You tell me there are tigers and pitfalls down there. So I either decide to go another way, or I take some precautions and take path Z, carry a gun and walk carefully. Or I decide that you are lying, or I ask you for proof. of this Your proposed "truth of the matter" is completely irrelevant. But in your make-believe story, you speak as if it is relevant, and thereby fabricate its relevance. That's sophistry, pure and simple. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've missed the point entirely. I don't tell you anything. You go down the path believing there is no pitfall trap filled with a hungry tiger. However, the world does not live up to your belief and, despite your belief that the path you are treading contains no pitfall traps, you subsequently fall into one and are eaten. My point, which I thought was fairly clear, is that just believing something doesn't make it so and the truth or falsity of those beliefs has very real, sometimes lethal, consequences.

When we treat a subject as something with properties to be judged according to the fundamental laws of logic, then "what a person wants", would clearly violate the law of noncontradiction. This indicates that we cannot treat "what a person wants" as an objective property, because it would be a property which violates the law of noncontradiction, and this would make the supposed "objective" independent world unintelligible, if we allow for such violations in the "objective" world. . This is why I keep telling you that there is no "objective truth" to what a person desires. "What a person desires" exists relative to subjective value structures, of which a person has more than one, and which are constantly changing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no. It doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction because wanting something does not imply wanting something else which conflicts with the first thing. There isn't a problem here.

No, it's you who is conflating the judgement with the thing that the judgement is about. The judgement is "true" or "false", and the thing judged is a statement, proposition, idea, belief, or something like that. In the other case the judgement is "right" or "wrong", and the thing judged is a human action. Whether it's "true", "false", "right", or "wrong", this is the judgement, not the thing being judged. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the statement "Your action is wrong" there are two things that judgement refers to, the action, and the property of wrongness. Neither of those things is equal to the judgement, they are what the judgement is about.

I don't understand why this is so difficult for you. What I say is that none of our knowledge is truth as you describe "truth". You describe "truth" such that "a truth: is something in which the possibility of a mistake is excluded. Human beings are fallible, imperfect in their knowledge, so there is always a possibility of mistake within any human knowledge. All of our knowledge is imperfect. There is always the possibility of mistake. Therefore none of our knowledge obtains to the level of "truth" as you describe it, as requiring that there is no possibility of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, if we know something that is true, then we aren't mistaken, that's correct. But that isn't the same as being able to be sure that we aren't mistaken. Again, you are conflating what is the case with how certain we can be in our knowledge that it is the case.

The only relevant "truth" to this matter is a subjective truth. "Safe path" is a subjective judgement, relative to the values of a subject. The subject may misjudge, and make a mistake. The assumption of an "objective truth" to this matter is completely, and absolutely irrelevant. So why make it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Someone cannot misjudge if there is no objective truth to the matter and the truth only relies on what they believe. If you prefer, I will state it as such: If you believe you are on a path that does not contain a tiger and a pitfall trap in a place that will lead to your death if you continue along it, but the truth of the matter contradicts this belief, then it is going to have fairly significant bearing on you, and indeed on the tiger's prospects for lunch.

You said that truth is "the way that the world is". That is clearly not "in the world itself", but something which corresponds with the world.

To make this clear to yourself, consider where falsity is. Clearly falsity is not "in the world itself", but it must be somewhere mustn't it? But the difference between truth and falsity is that one is the way that the world is, and the other is the way that the world isn't. That does not put truth into the world itself, it just shows that the designated "way" of truth is different from the "way" of falsity. Where might these different "ways" of the world exist? I assume there must be an infinity of them, because of all the possible wrong ways. These "ways" are not in the world, where are they? And what separates the true way from the false ways? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yea, I think I'd say that the truth of a proposition is in its correspondence with reality, at least as a fairly basic good-enough-for-government-work definition. I'm not sure asking "where falsity is" is a sensible question.

"Subjective" means "of the person", which we know as "the subject". "Objective" means not of the subject, what is other than the subject, which we know as the objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not a good definition when it comes to subjective and objective claims. I suspect this is going to be one of those things that is hard to pin down with definition. For example, there are definitions of "subjective" I might consider reasonable in which we perhaps wouldn't say that there is an objective fact of the matter to one's desires. So, let me offer some general comments rather than defining these terms.

To say that something is "subjective" generally refers to things such as matters of taste, where there is no right answer beyond what the person in question thinks.

To say that something is "objective" generally refers to things in which the truth of the matter exists independently of what the person in question thinks.

We can absolutely make objective claims about ourselves. If I claim that I am the president of Morocco, or that I have six arms, or that I am a centaur, these are certainly claims about me (the subject) but they aren't subjective claims. The truth (or in these cases falsity) of these statements depends on the state of the world.

What has been revealed now, is why there is such a huge difference between you and I as to what it means to "understand" one's choice. I believe that making a decision often involves having contradictory inclinations, and decision making involves resolving those contradictions. You have asserted that there is an "objective truth" concerning what one desires. This makes the way that I understand decision making unintelligible to you. And, the way that you understand decision making is unintelligible to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have absolutely been saying that people have conflicting inclinations, but this isn't a problem. Also, since I haven't defined understanding a choice in relation to someone's desires for making that choice, it really isn't relevant.

The point is that if we treat "inclinations" as objective properties, like you proposed we do with "desires", then there is a violation of the law of noncontradiction. A person cannot have, as objective properties, both the inclination to eat cake, and the inclination to not eat cake, at the same time without violating the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're just wrong. This is not a violation of the law of noncontradiction at all. Wanting something does not imply not wanting something else which conflicts with the ability to get the first thing. It would be true that it couldn't be true of someone that they both have a desire to eat cake and do not have a desire to eat cake, but they might well have a desire not to eat cake, as this is not mutually exclusive with having a desire to eat cake. Conflicting desires are not logically problematic in the least.

Sure, and of course, there is a reason why one has a higher value than the other, that is what I referred to as the "higher goal". The higher goal gives the higher value. And this is why one thing is wanted more than another.

In the case of objects, it makes no sense to say that an object has a specific property more than the contradictory property. We don't say that an object has the property of being red more than the property of not being red, allowing some of each. This would just be seen as an instance of attempting violate the law of excluded middle, by saying that the object is "to some degree" both red and not red.

This is more evidence as to why we need to maintain a distinction between "subjective" (of the subject), and objective. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, no need for another goal to get involved, we can simply want two things but want one more than another.

Again, conflicting desires are not contradictory in the sense of one implying the lack of another.

You are changing the description to suit your purpose. I am talking about deliberation, the desire to eat cake versus the desire to not eat cake. There may be numerous reasons to eat cake, and numerous reasons to not eat cake (of which the desire to lose weight may be one). I am not talking about any specific reasons, I am talking about deliberation, in general, which considers various reasons for and against a proposition, or idea. So your straw man is not relevant.

Now, once you get beyond the straw man, you will see that people "can definitely have both" of contradictory desires. If, a person is weighing factors against, and for, a specific action, and this is not a case of having contradictory desires, then we need to answer which is properly called "the desire", and which is called "reasons against the desire"? Since "desire" is commonly associated with base emotions, we would say that "to eat cake" is the desire, and the other is "against the desire". In this way we might avoid the contradiction. That, I tell you is the sophistry designed to make the problem appear like an illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

There isn't a problem. You are inventing a problem where none exists.

So let's replace "desire" with "goal", "intention", or "end", to see the situation more clearly, free from that deceptive sophistry . Suppose I have two distinct goals. Goal #1 requires that I perform action A, and goal #2 requires that I do not perform action A. For example, I want to complete my Christmas shopping today, and this requires that I take the afternoon off from work, but I also want a clean absentee record at work, and this requires that I do not take the afternoon off. The subject of deliberation here is "I take the afternoon off from work". It is apprehended as a necessary means to the end which is goal #1. The exact contrary of this is recognized as the means to the end which is goal #2. Since I hold both goals at the very same time, I have an inclination (I excluded the word "desire" above) toward choosing contradictory propositions. The "inclination" which I have, as a describable property of a subject, "my attitude", violates the law of noncontradiction. I have, as a property of myself, contradictory inclinations. — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't violate the law of noncontradiction at all. This is exactly the kind of situation I am saying is fine and not in the least contradictory (in the sense of having mutually exclusive properties). It's not a matter of words. People can have conflicting, or contradictory inclinations, these aren't contradictory properties since one does not imply the lack of the other.

When two goals collide, we need to refer to a higher goal in order to reasonably choose one over the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems fairly clearly not to be true. We can want two things but want one more than the other.

As explained above, conflicting goals, intentions, or ends, produce contradictory inclinations or attitudes. Describing the contradictory inclinations in different ways, to make them appear like they are not actually contradictory, does not resolve the issue. And yes, that is sophistry, as it does not provide adequate principles for moral philosophy. We need good principles which help us to understand the problem of contradictory inclinations, and methods for resolving them. If we simply create the illusion that they are not contradictory, and insist that they are not actually contradictory, then we will be inclined to allow them to continue to coexist, and we will always be debilitated by a condition of indecision, or else we will continually make decisions which we do not properly understand, like the shirt example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, it's not a matter of using a different word. I'm not engaging in any sophistry here, I'm just pointing out that it isn't in violation of the law of noncontradiction to want two things which conflict with one another.

What kind of bull shit is this? "Wrong", and "right" are judgements. And, it is subjective opinions which we judge as wrong or right. Your assumed "fact of the matter" is completely irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are confusing the judgement with the thing the judgement is made about.

No, I've already explained why this is not what I am saying. The supposed independent "reality" which I assume, is continually changing. We make "objective" judgements (judgements concerning supposed independent objects), based on certain logical principles, which are inconsistent with the reality of continual change. Therefore "objective reality" is incoherent as self-contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, every part of that is nonsense. 1) whether something is changing or not doesn't make it not objective or not existent. 2) The feature of constant change would, as mentioned earlier, be an objective truth about the world. 3) Logical principles aren't inconsistent with continual change unless you are suggesting that the laws of logic are included in the things that are always changing, is that what you are suggesting? 4) None of that shows anything like objective reality being in any way contradictory.

The problem I described though, is that we can know for sure that we will never have "truth" as you use the word, due to the fact that we know for sure that human beings are not perfect in their knowledge. This makes "truth" as a goal, out of reach to human beings, an impossible goal for human beings. Having an impossible goal is counterproductive because when we come to realize (through demonstrations like mine), that the goal is impossible, it becomes very discouraging, as there is then a hole, where there should be a realistic (potentially obtainable) goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can't know all of the truth, so we can't know any of it? Because that is fairly obviously a fallacy.

This is the unnecessary, and completely useless assumption you make, that there is something beyond the judgement "it is true", which is "itself the truth". All we have, beyond an individual judgement, is further judgements, personal reflection, and judgements from others. What produces the further judgement, that the initial judgement of "true" was a "wrong" judgement, is a change of mind, generally created by a difference of information, applied in personal reflection. Also, one person can judge another's judgement of "true" as "wrong" based on a similar difference of information. This other assumed thing, which you say is "itself the truth", is completely irrelevant, having absolutely no bearing on any of these judgements. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you judge that you are running along a safe path but the truth of the matter involves a pitfall trap and a hungry tiger, then the truth has pretty significant bearing.

But "truth" as you represent it, is absolute certainty. It is "the way the world is" without any possibility of error. Notice "the way the world is", is something distinct from "the world itself", as that which corresponds with "the world itself", in "truth". And as you insist, this correspondence must be without error. Therefore "truth" as you represent it, is a correspondence of absolute certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, truth is not certainty at all. Certainty relates to degrees of confidence for our beliefs. It relates to states of mind. It is epistemic. The truth of those beliefs is (or isn't) in the world itself. Just because something believes something that is true is not a reason to believe their belief is certain.

For example, if we were playing poker and I believed you had three nines in your hand, and you did, then my belief would be true. But this wouldn't make me any more certain of my belief. It would still be a guess based on the information I had, just one that happened to be true in this case.

What? This makes no sense. The need to eat and breathe is not an objective fact, because it is not a fact about objects, it is a fact about subjects. That makes it a subjective fact. And, as I've explained, facts about subjects are completely different from facts about objects. In the case of the former we must allow violation to the fundamental laws of logic, in the case of the latter, we do not (try Charles Peirce for information on this). We must allow violation to those laws of logic for the reasons I explained, the facts about subjects (subjective facts) exist in relation to value structures, which are often conflicting. The fact that a person needs to eat and breathe exists as a fact, in relation to life, as the valued goal. If a person is suicidal, and values death, the need to eat and breathe is no longer given priority, and is therefore no longer a fact. That is the nature of "subjective facts" (facts about subjects), they shift, and change, depending on what the subject values. And since a single subject often has conflicting values, subjective facts are often contradictory. That produces the need for deliberation, and principles to resolve the reality of contradictory facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't include any claim about need here to avoid you trying to weasel out of the core point in exactly the way you are doing here, but you seem to have ignored that and done it anyway.

Also, an objective fact isn't a fact "about objects" nor is a subjective fact a fact "about subjects". Neither in the grammatical sense nor in the everyday use of that sense. That is not an appropriate definition.

This really depends on how one would interpret the statement. If you interpret it as a value judgement, then it is making a subjective normative statement, indicating that the author believes that the type of action which one ought to do, is the good type. Then it might be interpreted as a normative statement, telling you that there is a type of act, called a good act, which is what you ought. Of course you can see how useless such a statement, as a normative statement, would be, as it gives no indicatinon as to how to identify an act as a good one. That's why I say it really is not a normative statement, because it says nothing about what type of acts one should make, only naming them as good acts.

But if you interpret it as an objectively true proposition, then it is a descriptive statement indicating that acts which are referred to with "ought" are only those describable as "good". In this case, the statement is interpreted as intended to demonstration (through a sort of description), the meaning of "ought". This is analogous to "all bachelors are unmarried men". It can be interpreted as a normative (subjective value) statement, meaning you ought only use "bachelor" to refer to a married man, or you can interpret it as a demonstrative, descriptive (objectively true) proposition, meaning that if it is called "bachelor" it is an unmarried man.

As a demonstrative, descriptive statement, is a more meaningful interpretation of "we ought to do good". Then if we are told "you ought to do X", we know that X is good, or desirable, from this descriptive interpretation. "We ought to do good" demonstrates the meaning of "ought", through that description, just like "all bachelors are unmarried men" demonstrates the meaning of "bachelor" through that description.

Clearly, these two modes of interpretation are completely different from each other, and this constitutes a form of ambiguity. To mix them up, and conflate the two is a form of equivocation which was common to classical sophistry, as demonstrated by Plato.

This is the type of sophistry which you are currently engaged in Dan. You interpret the statement true by definition, and you assume that this provides "objective truth" to the normative interpretation. So, you also take the inverted, normative (subjective value) interpretation of that statement, and you conflate the two. The conflation of two distinct, and incompatible interpretations provides you with the fallacious conclusion of a normative statement with objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't do anything of the sort. I haven't been claiming that my position is correct because it is true by definition, nor have I been conflating different definitions in order to pull some dubious trick. The rest of this looks like highly dubious and you seem to be making a lot of assumptions you aren't entitled to and conflating terms and concepts inappropriately. What I will say is this:

"You ought to do good" is a normative claim. It appears to be making the claim that one (or you) ought to perform good actions or promote good, (as is distinct from simply refraining from committing bad actions). That seems the most obvious way to interpret it and what I would probably take someone to mean if they said it to me.

If you say the desire to eat cake, and the desire to not eat cake, are not contradictory properties, then this is simple denial. And to stretch for other words to describe the desire to not eat cake, (the desire to lose weight or something like that), just demonstrates your refusal to acknowledge what "deliberation" really consists of, weighing the reasons for and against accepting a proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are very often reasons for and against a proposal, but the desire to eat cake and the desire to lose weight are not contradictory in the sense of being contradictory properties. People can definitely have both of them. One might count against an action (such as eating a cake) and one might count for it. None of this is a problem.

OK, now please accept the implications of this admission. If you are the subject, and you have contrary desires, then this means that if we are to predicate desires of that subject, you, in the same way that we predicate properties concerning an object with an identity, we must allow for violation of the law of noncontradiction.

Will you accept that, or are you going to go back to describing the "conflicting desires" with words that create the appearance that such desires are not really contradictory, in the way of sophistry? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have consistently been using words to describe conflicting desires that do not create the appearance of them being contradictory, because they are in fact, not contradictory (in the sense of being contradictory properties in violation of the law of noncontradiction). This is not sophistry, this is talking about things sensibly as they are.

As indicated above, it can be interpreted in two very distinct ways. If you interpret the categorical imperative as "normative", then it is a subjective value statement. If you interpret it as a proposition with "objective truth", then it is a descriptive principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is incorrect. It is an objective normative principle. I don't think it's correct, but it appears to very much be aiming at objective truth.

As explained above, the word "ought" does not necessarily imply that the statement indicates what one ought to do. To make that assumption would cause equivocation, when the statement was demonstrative, demonstrating or describing the meaning of "ought".

Here, let me formulate the statement in a slightly different way to demonstrate. "The acts which a person ought to do, are acts which are good." See how the statement is descriptive, and demonstrating the meaning of "ought", by describing what we ought to do, as good acts. This makes the same descriptive statement as "we ought to do what is good". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, it is true that dictionaries aren't making normative claims when they talk about the meaning of the word "ought", but people are very rarely talking about the meaning of the word "ought" when they say "you ought to do good". This would be a very strange way to talk about the meaning of the word.

In this case, the first statement isn't totally clear about what it means, and the second statement appears not to mean what you are suggesting it does. It is possible to interpret it that way, but it would be odd to do so, and it would not be a very clear way of making that claim.

How is "belief regarding objective fact based on reason" anything other than a subjective opinion to you?
I'll refer you back to your claims about understanding one's own choice, to show you that having reasons for what one believes, does not negate the subjectivity of the belief. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, subjective opinions cannot be wrong, as there is no fact of the matter. Beliefs about objective matters of fact can be wrong.

That's exactly what you did do. You said that a belief about the planet is a belief about objective reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say that a belief about the planet was a belief about all of objective reality, rather that it is a belief about objective reality, in this case, a part of objective reality. The parts that are most accessible to us to know things about tend to be on our planet.

I do not deny reality beyond what we believe. I deny that there is truth beyond what we believe, unless one assumes God or some other divinity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what this means. Are you allowing for an objective reality that has features/properties that we can be right or wrong about? Because, if so, good news, you believe in objective truth.

This indicates the problem about your perspective which I pointed out already. If, as is indicated here, "truth", and "fact" signify an exclusion of the possibility of error, then it is irrelevant to this world of human beliefs which we are talking about. If this is what you want from "truth", that the possibility of error is completely excluded, then we cannot use the word at all in talking about human affairs, because human beings are fallible, and cannot exclude the possibility of error. If this is what you desire from "truth" then we can never truthfully call a human belief "true", and the word becomes useless to us.

Therefore we need to respect the reality that "truth" actually is a judgement. We judge propositions as true, we judge beliefs as true. And if we use "truth" in this other way, which you propose, as an independent, objective form of "truth", we need to respect the difference lest we equivocate. But this other sense of "truth" which you propose is completely irrelevant, so we do not need to use it at all. So we have to accept "truth" as a type of human judgement Of course the sophists will equivocate though, and say that some human judgements of "truth" are objective truths. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we can absolutely use the word "truth" because we can aim at truth even if we cannot know for sure we have got it. When we claim that something is true, we usually mean that we think it is true, since there are so few things we can be sure about. But the judgement that it is true is not itself the truth. The judgement can be wrong. What makes that judgement wrong is that it doesn't match up with the truth.

Human beings are fallible. No judgement of truth or fact, made by a human being can exclude the possibility of mistake. Therefore human beings cannot have "objective truth" in any matters. — Metaphysician Undercover

Putting the cogito aside, you're rather missing the point here. Truth isn't the same as certainty. Just because something exists in the world doesn't mean we can know about it, and even if we do, we aren't likely to have complete certainty of it.

We do not need to eat and breathe, as an "objective fact", that's the point. If we do not eat and breathe we simply die. So, we only need to eat and breathe if we want to stay alive. This makes "we need to eat and breathe" a subjective value statement. We only need to eat and breathe for the sake of that specific subjective end, to stay alive. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is very much nit-picking and avoiding the core point. If you don't think there is an objective fact to whether you not eating or breathing will lead to your death and that this is just subjective, then presumably you think that if you believe that failing to eat or breathe will not lead to your death, then it won't.

You are sorely mistaken. All we "need", to make conclusions about what we must do, is desires, goals or intentions, as well as some experience. The desires tell us what we want, and the experience tells us the successful method of getting it. From this we can make a conclusion about "what we must do". If a person is lacking in experience, then they proceed through trial and error, but this type of choice is not of what we "must" do, it's a choice with less imperative.

Your claim "We must assume there is objective truth" makes no sense at all. How does the assumption of "objective truth" even have any bearing on our conclusions about what we must do? We cannot assume to know the objective truth. So the idea of objective truth becomes completely irrelevant, and we make our conclusions about what we must do relative to what we desire, and our experience, as I explained. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, we need a lot more. We need to assume that the future will resemble the past in order to draw from our experiences to make judgements about the future.

Again, you are confusing "there is objective truth" with "we know the objective truth". These are not the same, but the assumption that there is a reality beyond that which we believe is necessary to any investigation/discovery/analysis/etc. You can't improve your beliefs if they are all correct by definition.

I believe you are conflating "descriptive rules" with "prescriptive rules". A universal, descriptive rule, such as "we ought to do what is good", does not apply as a prescriptive rule. It is categorically distinct, as stating what is the case (description) rather than stating something we ought to do (prescription). What causes the confusion, is that it is a descriptive statement about what is valued, or as I say, what is desired.

The descriptive rule does not tell us how to act, it tells us "what is the case". A prescriptive rule, such as "you ought to save an abandoned baby", tells a person how to act, by projecting what is valued or desired into the individual. Descriptive value-based rules, such as "abandoned babies should be saved", and even "people should save abandoned babies", do not tell anyone how to act. Notice, that once the universal "people" is used, the statement becomes a descriptive "is" statement, as compared to the prescriptive which is directed at the individual named as "you".

Kant's so-called categorical imperative is a descriptive value-based rule. It tells us what is the case, that there is a prescriptive rule for every situation. As a descriptive rule, it does not tell us how to act. Prescriptive rules tell us how to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

"We ought to do good" is a normative statement, not a descriptive one. You can tell because it's about what one ought to do. Kant's categorical imperative also attempts to tell us what we ought to do (or in this what we ought not to do) so it is normative, rather than descriptive.

I am using "truth" in a different standard way. If you check a dictionary you will notice two basic ways to use that word. — Metaphysician Undercover

By all means explain what you mean.

All you do here is use sophistry to hide what you truly understand as contradictory. The properties of "wanting to eat cake", and "wanting not to eat cake", which make it difficult to decide whether or not to eat cake, are truly contradictory.

This way that you have, of refusing to accept what you know to be true, because it is inconsistent with the principles you espouse, is a sort of dishonesty, self-deception which interferes with good philosophical discourse. That is what led to the impasse in our discussion of "understanding". When it comes down to looking at these conditions which are internal to us, subjective features, you make statements which are completely inconsistent with my personal experience. This is the case now with your attempt to make "desire" objective. I cannot agree with such statements, and you refuse to consider the possibility that your statements may be inconsistent with your own experience. The impasse is imposed. — Metaphysician Undercover

They aren't contradictory properties. One doesn't imply the lack of the other. This seems very obvious to me, and I certainly don't know the opposite to be true. This isn't sophistry, nor is it inconsistent with my own experience. I have conflicting desires all the time. I don't lose one desire because I choose to act in accordance with a conflicting one. We are entirely capable of having conflicting desires, there's nothing about that which runs afoul of the lack of non-contradiction.

Further, I don't have any particular attachment to the idea that desires are objective, but it seems as though we can be wrong about what it is that we desire, which suggests that there is some objective truth to the matter.

The point is that a universal descriptive statement, by the fact that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive,, does not tell a person how to act. That is the point of the is/ought divide. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is true, but Kant's categorical imperative is very much a normative claim.

So, "one ought to do good" is a descriptive value-based statement of what "is" the case, which may or may not be a good inductive conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. The biggest clue that it is a claim about what one ought to do might be the word "ought".

Your so-called "good reasons" to believe in objective truth, is that it is the only thing which makes sense to you. That is nothing other than a subjective opinion. So a true, honest understanding of your "objective truth" reveals it to be subjective.

And when you apply your premise of objective truth toward trying to understand "subjective truth", you create a contradiction which makes subjective truth appear to be absurd. These absurdities created by your begging the question constitutes your "good reasons". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, not a subjective opinion, but a belief regarding objective fact based on reason. And not because it is the only thing that "makes sense to me" but rather because it is the only viable option for any kind of investigation, discussion, discovery, and really anything worth doing. "Subjective truth" is absurd, it's not me making it appear that way.

That's a composition fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. It would be a composition fallacy if I were to suggest that anything true of the planet we live on would be true of the whole of objective reality. It is not a composition fallacy to point out that the planet we live on exists objectively and claims made about it are claims about (a part of) objective reality.

This merely demonstrates the incoherency of "has moral value as an objective fact". You are proposing, as a personal (subjective) opinion, your choice of "value", as a principle which "determines the morality of actions". You support this principle with reasons, an attempt at justification. Your reasons are "it is an objective fact".

Obviously, it is not an objective fact. It is your subjective opinion, an idea which you are proposing. And if you are capable of supporting this principle, it is a justified idea. But no amount of justification can turn it into an "objective fact" as you desire this to mean, independent from human values. Therefore "it is an objective fact" is incapable of justifying your opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am not proposing anything as a personal subjective opinion. I propose a candidate for objective value which I support with reasons which I have mentioned both in this discussion and in the initial primer, my reasons are not "it is an objective fact".

No, you really haven't. You begged the question, assuming objective truth as a primary premise, then from this premise you show how the secondary premise of "subjective truth" produces absurdities. Duh! Obviously when you assume contradictory premises, the result is absurd. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I allowed for things to be true subjectively and showed that this leads to absurdity. Things being true "subjectively" is what allows for contradictory premises, although exactly what you mean by being true subjectively has been difficult to pin down as you seem to make claims that you seem to be making about objective facts.

Why do you think that the premise of objective truth provides the only means for justification? I already explained to you how application of beliefs in actual pratise is what justifies them. Further, I explained how we employ principles such as the law of noncontradiction in our judgements of justification.

It is your assumption of "objective truth", which is absolutely useless for any form of justification. What are we supposed to do, compare a belief with "the objective truth" to judge that belief in justification? Where would we find that "objective truth" to make the comparison, when all that appears to us is beliefs? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have no idea what you mean by actual practice (or practise) without the assumption that there is a world beyond what we believe. It is only with this assumption, that we can be wrong, that we can determine what beliefs can or cannot be justified.

And no, I do not suggest we have access to the objective truth of all matters (perhaps we do for some things, like the cogito, but not much) but we do our best to figure out what the world is like by considering the evidence we have available to us. If we instead assume that whatever we believe is correct, then there is no need for any of this surely.

Actually, if you had taken just a tiny bit of your precious ten years, to think about this, you would easily have recognized that the idea of "being true" as independent from "being believed to be true", is what is nonsense. There is absolutely nothing to the judgement "X is true" other than a belief that X is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

But the truth isn't the judgement. The fact isn't the belief. Again, people can be wrong.

You have clearly reversed the logical priority here. Because we observe the necessity in the following, "we must breathe, eat, etc,", then we infer the logical conclusion, "there is an objective fact of the matter". Do you understand the difference? Please take some time to consider this because it is very important.

We cannot proceed logically from the premise "there is an objective fact of the matter", to the conclusion "we must breathe, eat, etc.", as you do when you say "that is because there is an objective fact of the matter". This is because these things, the need to breathe, eat, etc.. do not necessarily follow from a supposed "objective world". The premise "objective world" does not necessitate logically the need to eat, breathe, etc., so we cannot say that the need for these things is because there is an objective fact of the matter. This is the issue with free will as well. Freely chosen acts are not necessitated by "objective fact", that is the gap between what is, and what we choose, (and what we ought to choose), which cannot be bridged with logic, due to that lack of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I think you are assuming I'm doing something here that I'm just not. I'm not suggesting for a second that we can tell that we need to eat and breathe because the truth is objective. What I am suggesting is that if you don't think there is an objective fact about whether we need to eat and breathe (which requires there to be such a thing as objective facts/objective truth) then you must accept that if you believed otherwise, you wouldn't need to breathe or eat.

Notice that "the obective world" is produced as a logical conclusion from our observations, induced by our observations of "necessity". The very same type of observations of what is natural to us, as living beings, produces inductive conclusions about what is valued. Then, we can make logical conclusions about what is "necessary" in this other sense, as required to achieve those ends. But starting with "there is an objective fact about the matter" gives us nothing to base any logic in, because the is/ought gap cannot be bridged in this direction. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't produced by the logical conclusion. We must assume there is objective truth in order to come to any conclusions about what we must do in any sense.

And again, you are bringing in the is/ought gap where it doesn't belong. There isn't any attempts to jump from the descriptive to the normative without intervening normative premises here. It is you who are making the claim that we must eat and breathe if we want to live (which is debatably normative in a pretty limited sense). I completely agree with this claim, and am simply pointing out that unless we think that our beliefs about the world can be wrong, then presumably anyone who does not believe this would not need to eat or breathe.

Perhaps not my most polite of comments. Perhaps while attempting to spit someone else's words out of my mouth, I accidentally spat out some venom.

You are not getting it Dan. The subject matter here, the issue which the example exposes, is the relevance of particular circumstances. The nature of particular circumstances is that they are features unique to the individual situation and therefore are outside the applicability of general, universal principles. In Aristotelian logic, these particular circumstances, which escape the formal rules, are known as accidents.

What you have done in reply here, is instead of respecting the reality of, and the nature of, particular circumstances, as features which fall outside the applicability of the universal rules, you have produced a universal rule to include that particular set of circumstances. This just indicates that you misunderstand the nature of particular circumstances. If it was feasible to produce a universal rule for every particular set of circumstances, then the applicability of universal rules would be negated, by the requirement of a different rule for every particular set of circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover

Universal rules do apply to every particular circumstance. That's what makes them universal.

That's right, I do not deny the relevance of "objectivity". What I am arguing is that "truth" and "right", as concepts produced by human subjects, are wrongly represented as "objective". To argue that "truth" and "right" are wrongly classed as "objective" does not imply that there is nothing which can be classed as "objective". — Metaphysician Undercover

If not the truth, what can be objective? Are you perhaps using "truth" in some non-standard way? Perhaps you agree that there is an objective world with facts about it, but don't want to refer to these facts as true?

Huh? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, typo. Not all things that are objective are the same thing.

The point though, is that to consider opposing desires, as we do in deliberation, it is required that contrary desires are predicable of the same subject, at the same time, in violation of the law of noncontradiction. The three fundamental laws of logic dictate how we understand objects. Objects have identity as an object, and what we say about "the object" must obey the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle.

If we make the subject the object, as you propose in saying that the subject's desires are objective, there is an incompatibility with the law of noncontradiction when the object has contrary predicates (desires) at the same time, as is evident in deliberation.

I see a few possible solutions.

The first, most obvious possibility is to allow for a general violation of the law of noncontradiction. However, this has far reaching ramifications for our capacity to understand "the object", and further ramifications on the nature of "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects) in general.

The next possibility which I see, is to alter the law of identity, design a form of "identity", which allows that the identity of a subject, as an identifiable object, is a different kind of object (allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction) from other types of objects (not allowing violation of the law of noncontradiction). However, this is very confusing because now we have two distinct types of objects, those which obey the law of noncontradiction, and those which do not. Further, this would produce a bifurcation in "objective knowledge" (knowledge of objects), according to that same division. Since the same words are used, "object", "objective", etc., equivocation and very significant, and important, misunderstanding, is inevitable.

What I propose therefore, is to maintain the separation between subject and object. This allows distinct words, "subject" and "object", so that we do not confuse things which are "subjective" (of the subject) with things which are "objective" (of the object). In this way, we are not inclined to call things which are property of the subject, like desires, "objective", because we maintain a proper separation between the categories, subject and object. That this categorical separation is required is demonstrated by the fact that understanding of "the object" is facilitated by adhering to the three fundamental laws of logic. However, understanding of "the subject" is facilitated by allowing for violation of those laws. This is because the fundamental, or essential nature of the object (describable by determinist principles), is incompatible with the fundamental, or essential nature of the subject (describable by the principles of free will). — Metaphysician Undercover

A much easier way to go would be to recognize that having conflicting desires is not in violation of the law of noncontradiction since having the property of "wanting to eat cake" and the property of "wanting to be thin" or whatever conflicting desires you like, aren't mutually exclusive and one does not imply the lack of the other.

No it really doesn't tell you this, because you still have to make the decision for yourself, rather than having the categorical imperative state it for you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not really sure what you mean by this. Morality tells us how we should act, but you still make the decision of whether to do so yourself. It doesn't make you act in some way. But perhaps you mean instead that there are multiple maxims one might act in accordance with that may all be acceptable according to the categorical imperative? That's also not problematic, as morality telling you what to do doesn't require it to tell you that only one thing is permissible. There may be multiple actions that are morally permissible. That doesn't make the moral theory in question not action-guiding.

You seem to be forgetting what I am arguing. Being right is not simply a matter of truth, there is also the issue of justification.

This is exactly the problem with your approach, You state all these things about obective truth and objective right, which you seem to honestly believe, therefore they are true for you, but you haven't been able to justify any of it. Your attempts demonstrate incoherency in your beliefs. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have given good reasons to believe in what I have presented. I have not demonstrated incoherence or inconsistency in my beliefs. These accusations have been based on either misunderstanding the core concepts under discussion or on simply claiming I am making claims that I am not.

This example is not applicable. Claims about the world being flat, or round, are not claims about objective reality, they are claims about the world. You continue to demonstrate that you just do not understand predication at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

The planet that we live on is very much a part of objective reality. Claims about what shape it is absolutely are claims about objective reality.

Look at the conclusions more critically. Pious/good is not determined by the gods or God. Pious/good might be arbitrary. But obviously it is not arbitrary, because there are human trials going on which determine pious/good. That's the evidence. The conclusion we ought to draw, is obvious, human beings determine pious/good, in a non-arbitrary way. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a poor conclusion to draw from that information. First, that people would have a trial for something does not mean it exists in the first place (plenty of witchcraft trials, but no witches). Second, these things need not be "determined" by anyone, but rather discovered. Certainly we might have a trial where we attempt to discover the truth.

This makes no sense. If you say that it is morally valuable, then you are assigning value to it, moral value. What could "valuable, but not valued by anyone" possibly mean? What would justify the claim that it is valuable? And if you say "it's just a belief", then as I explained, a belief must be justifiable through application, or it's worthless. Therefore it's a belief with no value, and self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't say "it's just a belief". I give reasons why this is an appropriate belief to hold. And no, I am not assigning moral value to it, rather I am suggesting that it already has moral value as an objective fact. What "value" could mean in this context is that its presence determines the morality of actions (that's not an entire or formal definition of moral value of course, but rather an example of what it can mean for something to have moral value).

Unless it is justifiable, it is just a subjective opinion. I think I've adequately demonstrated that your supposed concept of "objective truth" is unjustifiable. Therefore it is a subjective opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have demonstrated that it is the only justified option. There are potentially other reasons to think so, but the fact that it is the only option where we can consider whether beliefs are justified (since it is possible for them to be wrong) or have any kind of meaningful discussion about anything, provides good enough reason in this case.

I think you are continuing to judge "subjective truth" from your premise that truth must be objective. Of course this is the instance of' begging the question' which I explained earlier. It makes "subjective truth" appear self-contradictory to you. Therefore you make all sorts of absurd conclusions about subjective truth. The problem, obviously, is that you are not letting go of your premise that truth must be objective, before considering the concept of "subjective truth". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I am just taking what you have said at face value and pointing out that it is inconsistent.

I don't see your point. We must breathe, eat, etc.. If you believe that you can live without these go ahead and try. I will then judge whether you've justified those beliefs or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

My point is that your view that anything you believe is true is nonsense. I agree that we must breathe, eat, etc, but that is because there is an objective fact of the matter. Your position seems to be that if you believed that you no longer needed to eat, or breathe, then you would no longer need to.

I don't think so. As you state, the rare condition "causes drug X to be lethal". The act of administering the drug is not a lethal act, as indicated by all the other instances. Therefore the rare condition is the cause of death, not the doctor's action, which you mistakenly judge as wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider the implications of what you are saying here. Do you meant to imply that a doctor is not responsible for the death of a patient when proscribing a medicine that is lethal to a patient who has a specific condition. It seems like you are implying that doctors need not check for potential risk factors at all. I imagine you don't mean to imply this.

I explained the reasons. It seems you didn't pay attention, maybe you didn't understand, or just ignored. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your reasons seem to be based on a poor understanding of free will and objective truth.

Sure they are different, when the desire is understood as subjective, and the action is understood as objective. But the issue is how could both the action and the desire be objective without them being one and the same — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, are you suggesting something is objective?

As for how they can be the same thing, that's easy, not things that are objective are the same thing.

And the reason why objectivity of desire is incompatible with free will is that if there was objective fact about what I desired, then I, the subject could not use my will power to overcome that desire. — Metaphysician Undercover

That just isn't so. Even if we take objective to imply that it is observable to someone other than the subject, which I don't agree with, something being observable doesn't make it immutable. We might imagine a mind reader who can tell what you desire, but you might nevertheless be able to overcome that desire or not act in accordance with it.

The categorical imperative says what kind of maxims tell one how to act. It does not "tell you how to act". It tells you what kind of maxims tell you how to act. This is another good example of the same type of category mistake you make when you say "the world is changing" says something about the way that the world is. In this case, since there is one maxim which says that there are many maxims required to tell you how to act, you conclude that there is one maxim which tells you how to act. In the other case, "the world is changing" tells you that there are many ways which "the world is" and you conclude that it states that there is one way that the world is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does tell you how to act. It tells you what you should and shouldn't do, specifically, tells you which maxims you should and shouldn't act in accordance with.

This is the problem. What Kant did, is not the same as what he said he did. What he said he was doing (his goal or intention) doesn't pan out in what he did. This is because what he was trying to do, base moral philosophy in one objective principle was impossible, so his endeavour was doomed to failure. So when we state what he did, he would disagree and say that's not what I was doing. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are asserting it is impossible. You have given no reason to suggest that it is that doesn't require one to misunderstand essentially every element of the discussion in order to accept.

OK, and what do you base your claim that they are wrong on, other than insisting that your morality is right? These statements of yours are useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Among other things I base it on rational analysis of principles as well as the underlying assumptions that support those principles and the logic connecting the two.

Ha ha, that's funny. You have good reason to think that objectivism is the correct view, because objectivism states its position to be objective, therefore impossible to be wrong. Oh, that's actually begging the question, and truly a very bad reason. "I hold the correct view, because I assert that it is impossible for me to be wrong." — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't remotely what I said. I don't know where you got this from, but it certainly isn't a claim I made.

Also, it is your position that claims one cannot be wrong. My position is there is a right answer, and I am attempting to find it. Yours appears to be that whatever one thinks, they're right.

Beliefs about "objective reality" are metaphysical speculations which are subjective opinions, "matters of taste". This is one's attitude toward reality, what you prefer to believe, just like your attitude toward ice cream flavours. — Metaphysician Undercover

They really aren't. One of them can be incorrect. If I like chocolate ice cream and you prefer strawberry, one of us isn't wrong. If you think the world is flat and I think it's round(ish) one of us is wrong.

To start with, I've read Plato, and I've also read St Augustine, a Church Father. Augustine claimed to base many of his ideas in Plato, and I've corroborated that claim through my own comparison. I've also read other Christian theologians, and have seen how they were influenced by reading Plato. We could discuss this, but you already demonstrated a strong aversion to theology. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not suggesting that no Christian thinkers were influenced by Plato, but you seem to be suggesting that their entire school of thought is based on his work, or that the two are in some way interchangable. That is rather a larger claim.

With the dilemma illustrated in Euthyphro, it is shown that it is neither the case that the pious is called "pious" because it refers to what is loved by the gods or God, nor is it the case that the gods, or God loving the pious is what causes it to be called "pious". And in the context of the discussion, court trials about impiety, it is demonstrate that in our world of existence, "pious" is what human beings determine it to be. So the idea of one common, independent "good", validated by divinity, is demonstrated as false, and "good" is what human beings determine. — Metaphysician Undercover

The Euthyphro dilemma shows that suggesting that the good/pious is determined by god/the gods leads one to either the good/pious being arbitrary or nor actually being determined by god/the gods after all. But this does not mean that there is no objective good/right. Good/right in the moral sense need not be 'determined' by anyone.

You have not demonstrated how something which is not valued by anyone could be valuable. If you are the one assigning "value" to it, then it is valuable to you. But that is clearly subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not 'assigning' value to it, I am suggesting that it might be morally valuable. Valuable as such. Valuable whether or not anyone values it. What one should do (or how one should be, or what one should pursue etc) regardless of what one wants. A categorical imperative, rather than a hypothetical one.

Thanks for letting me in on your subjective opinion. Not that it does you any good. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not my subjective opinion. It is my belief on an objective matter.

Right, now you're catching on. When someone says "tell the truth", and you tell the truth, you do actually tell the truth, even if you are wrong. That is the nature of human fallibility. Even when we tell the truth there is a possibility that "the truth" which is told, might still be wrong. That is what constitutes "an honest mistake".

If you insist that "the truth" must exclude the possibility of being wrong, you place 'truth" right outside the world of human existence, and human activity. This is the interaction problem of Platonic realism. Your proposed "objective truth" is a fantasy, a product of your imagination which has no bearing on the existence, and actions of human beings, unless these human beings are willing to accept this ideal (imaginary perfection), and allow it into their lives. Then it becomes a divinity, like God, something we accept, believe in, and have faith in. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, when someone says 'tell the truth' and you tell what you believe to be the truth but you are wrong, you have made an honest mistake but you have not 'told the truth'. You have been honest, but not truthful. And no, that doesn't imply any of what you said in the second paragraph here.

I don't know how you can consistently say that someone can say what they believe and be wrong. I don't know how your beliefs allow for honest mistakes.

Believing and doing are distinct things. If a person could sit in meditation, without doing anything, they could believe "any old nonsense, and believe it's true" as you say. However, life requires action or we die. When we move to act, our beliefs are tested for usefulness. Ones which do not produce success are forgotten, and no longer is it possible that a person believes any old nonsense. Beliefs of "any old nonsense" die with those who hold them. And "rules" which prove to be useful prevail over our activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you think that life requires action or we die? Just believe something different and it won't anymore according to your position.

It is those of us who believe that there is a world beyond our beliefs that are entitled to suggest that one's beliefs can come into conflict with reality and prove to not be useful. If you think that anything you believe actually is true, then surely you can just stop believing that that lion is going to eat you, and it won't.

There is nothing in this example to indicate that the wrong choice was made. There is only indication that the right choice was made. Therefore we ought to conclude that the right choice was made. Furthermore, if a patient does dies from that "rare condition", it is the rare condition which causes the patient's death, not the doctor's actions, and we still cannot conclude that the doctor's actions were wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

The rare condition in this case causes drug X to be lethal, so the doctor's actions did kill them, which from an actual-value consequentialism perspective, does make them wrong inasmuch as the doctor could have acted differently and their action caused worse consequences than had they done so.

You are speaking nonsense again. If it is objectively true that you desire ice cream then it is objectively true that your are seeking it. How could it possibly be an objective truth that you desire ice cream unless you were seeking it? What produces the objective conclusion is the fact that you are seeking it. If you say "I feel like I want ice cream, but I am not seeking it", then you refer to subjective feelings, and it's not an objective truth, it's subjective. You, the subject are interpreting your own feelings as a desire for ice cream, and this means it's a subjective conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

The rest of what I said here I think explains what I mean.

Right, and that's one example of why there is no such thing as objective truth about such feelings. They are what defines "subjective", feelings of the subject. You propose "that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", but as I've explained to you, this would exclude the possibility of free will. If there was objective truth in the matter, desires, and the actions which we say are caused by desires, would be one and the same. That is what is required to make the desire objectifiable. Conventionally we hold the desire as separate as separate from the action, because the causal connection is not necessary (free choice being intermediary), and the desire is of the subject, not observed, therefore subjective.

What I've been telling you, your presumption, "presumably there is an objective truth to the matter", is nothing but a fiction, a fantasy of your imagination, which is demonstrably incoherent. You presume this because it provides some support to your consequentialist morals. In reality though, if what you presume was true, it would deny the possibility of free will, and all types of moral philosophy. Therefore if you keep supporting your so-called moral philosophy on such presumptions, you render what you propose as something other than moral philosophy. I've been calling it "immoral", but I now see it's better called "amoral", because your principles put what you propose right outside the field of moral philosophy, so that it cannot be judged by the principles of moral philosophy to be immoral. What you propose is simply not relevant to moral philosophy, therefore amoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have just asserted that if there was an objective truth about the matter, this would make free will impossible, but there is no reason to think this. You are asserting that it can't be the case that it is objectively true that I desire ice cream but I am not seeking it, but there is no reason to think this is the case. Desires are indeed different from the actions one takes in pursuit of them.

The reason I think that truth is objective has nothing to do with consequentialism. The truth is objective, believing so is really the only viable option, as I've explained before. It is a necessary assumption to have any discussion of anything worth discussing.

You don't seem to understand the meaning of what you are saying here. If the imperative states "act according to maxims", that imperative is not telling anyone "how to act". It is telling them that there is a maxim which will tell them how to act. Then there needs to be a different maxim for every different situation to tell a person how to act in that situation. This proposed categorical imperative tells everyone that they must act according to a maxim which is applicable to each particular situation one finds oneself in, but that says nothing about how one should act in any situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, it says rather a lot more than "act according to maxims". It specifically says what kind of maxims it is rational (according to Kant) and therefor moral (according to Kant) to act in accordance with. It is very much telling you how to act.

And if we say that deciding how to act is itself an action, and this is the action which that categorical imperative refers to, then the imperative becomes incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's also not true, as presumably Kant would presumably say that the categorical imperative is consistent with itself so considering how one should act is an action that is in accordance with the formualtion of universalizability.

You employ another version of the same type of sophistic trick when you claim that "one imperative which states that you must act according to many imperatives", means that there is one imperative which tells you how to act. Really, what this means is that there is one imperative which tells you that there are many imperatives which tell you how to act. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I would say Kant does propose multiple rules for action, rather than just one, though he would surely disagree. Either way, they definitely are rules for acting. They don't spawn many imperatives, but rather limit the maxims we can justifably (according to Kant) act in accordance with, the actions we can justifiably take.

Again, all this says is that there is a different way to act for every different situation, which is the best way according to the situation. It is not one rule which tells you how to act in all situations. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is one rule which tells you how to act in all situations. Specifically, in the way that produces the most utility. Yes, that will certainly be different based on the situation, but it is clearly action-guiding.

Yes, this is really the issue we have now. Since it is very clear that moral theory is inherently subjective, moral philosophers can produce all sorts of different moral theories. That is evident from the abundance and variety of moral theories which avail us. Some are quite absurd. However, some, like Platonic moral theory for example, get accepted, conventionalized, and become quite influential, through a sort of intersubjectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't inherently subjective. But people are wrong a lot, and not clarifying their starting assumptions is a big part of this.

On the other hand, there are some people who do not like the idea that moral theory is inherently subjective. They believe that the reality of a multitude of moral theories which is enabled by free will, freedom of choice in thinking, and the inherent subjectivity of moral theory, is for some reason a defect to moral theory, which ought to be corrected. So these people, like Kant, like yourself, and many others, ignore the lessons of history which teach us the reality about moral theories, and they produce further subjective theories, which propose objective principles as the foundation for their subjective theories. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't what Kant or I do. Morality isn't subjective. People all believing different things about morality is a result of some (or all) of them being wrong.

Of course we can reject these as being inherently self-defeating, untrue in the sense of dishonesty, subjective theories which claim to be objective. Further, since their basic principles miss the true essence of a moral theory, a subjective theory which is agreeable, and likely to be accepted, and conventionalized in an intersubjective way, we can dismiss these proposals as outside the category of what constitutes a "moral theory". — Metaphysician Undercover

No idea who "we" is in this context as I'm fairly sure that moral objectivism is the majority view, but even if it weren't, we have good reason to think it is the correct view. Although, if I am right that objectivism is the majority view, this also means that objective theories are more likely to be accepted.

Any "belief about the objective" very clearly is a subjective opinion. If you understood metaphysics and ontology, you'd see this very clearly. Our beliefs about "the objective" are all subjective opinions. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. When we hold beliefs about objective reality, those are not the same as subjective opinions about, for example, matters of taste. One set can be correct or incorrect, the other set, not so much.

The problems which he encounters which I explained, but you didn't understand demonstrates that his goal is doomed to failure. Maybe you'll understand better from what I said in this post, concerning the "one imperative", which dictates that a vast multitude of imperatives tells us what to do. Making an imperative which dictates that many imperatives are required, does not constitute demonstrating that one imperative will suffice. It actually demonstrates that the opposite is probable. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I didn't understand it because it didn't make sense. What you said in this post showed wrongheaded thinking about what constitutes action-guidingness in moral theories.

I don't think so. Christianity is based in Platonist moral theory. It held sway in the western world for many hundreds of years. Kant pales in comparison. In fact Kant as a moralist, is more often than not, criticized and rejected, as insufficient. Where is the supposed "influence"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sorry, why do you think that Christianity is based on Plato?

This demonstrates the same misunderstanding of the Platonic/Christian tradition you showed earlier. If you read Plato's Republic, you will see that each individual person has one's own place within the state, with ones own desires and goals. "The good" refers to what is desired by the individual, as the motivation for activity, and this is not one common, objective goal which we all seek. The idea of one common goal, validated by the divinity, is the idea which is shown to be incoherent in The Euthyphro. — Metaphysician Undercover

Euthyphro shows nothing of the sort. Also, Plato and Christianity aren't the same thing. Also, Plato at least seemed to think there was a form of the good which all good things participated in. Given that this form is supposed to exist in the same realm of the forms as things like mathematical objects, presumably he thinks that this is an objective property things can have.

The goal of moral philosophy is not to be "true" in the "objective" way that you understand this word. That shows your attempt to conflate is and ought. The goal is to be "true to oneself", honest. And when an individual moral philosopher is honest in this way, the principles will be espoused by others. "Truth" in the way you use that word is irrelevant and outside of moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Truth is very much the goal of moral philosophy, certainly any moral philosophy worthy of discussion.

How would you get anyone to accept your moral philosophy if you put forth a system where what is proposed as "valuable" is not actually valued by anyone? How is that coherent? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because it is morally valuable. It is coherent because moral value and being valued by someone aren't the same thing. Further, how to make a theory persuasive is a different question to whether it is correct. As to why anyone might care, I think that a reasonable number of people do want to do the right thing, which is a good piece of luck for persauding them to do so.

No, I'm not suggesting any such equivalence. I am suggesting that moral philosophy must be based in something real, and what we have as "real" in relation to the acts of beings, is what is natural. That doesn't say that what is natural and what is moral are equivalent. Basing moral philosophy in some fictional fantasy of what is "objectively" true or right, provides no traction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective truth is not a fiction or a fantasy. It is in fact quite the opposite.

Yes, when I say "X is true", it means that I honestly believe X. You know, like when someone says "tell the truth", and in court when they say "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth", it means what you honestly believe. How could there be anything more to "is true" than this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because people can be wrong.

The law of noncontradiction is a rule I believe in because of its usefulness. Depending on one's attitude toward the law of identity, the applicability of the law of noncontradiction may be accepted or rejected. Hegel rejected the law of identity as a useless tautology. But then some who follow him, like dialetheists and dialectical materialists, also reject the law of noncontradiction, as inapplicable in cases where identity is inapplicable. They do not believe in the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Usefulness in what sense? I don't know how any laws of logic or rules of theory selection in, for example, science can be useful if you think that whatever you believe is true. There's no fail-state, so there's no need for any of these rules. You can just believe any old nonsense and hold that it's true, no need to evaluate your beliefs for consistency or consider whether they match reality at all.

I disagree, we always want doctors to be aware of possible negative effects of any drugs they prescribe. Telling doctors this drug usually saves lives when a person has such and such symptoms, therefore always prescribe it when a person has those symptoms, is wrong, and not he way doctors are actually trained. They are trained to be aware of, and look for possible complications — Metaphysician Undercover

That also isn't what is happening in my hypothetical. The situation I presented was that of a patient in a time-sensitive situation where spending time investigating rare conditions may result in their death, drug X is the most effective drug for the condition and has the least general risk associated with it, and the patients does not present any signs in either their behaviour, symptoms, or available medical history that would suggest they have the rare condition that would make the proscribing of drug X the wrong choice.

Right, that's what I am talking about. Training is not simply about teaching general rules (prescribe X drug when a patient has such and such symptoms), it's also about culturing good intuition, which is reading the peculiarities of the unique circumstances. Doctors need this just as much as firefighters do.

You are wrong to say no such sign is present in this case. If I remember the example correctly, the sign is explicit, and tattooed right on the foot of the patient. The doctor might be aware of a trend to make such a tattoo, or some other factor learned might subconsciously incline the doctor to check the foot. And in real life cases there are often indications that a doctor might look for, just like a firefighter. Intuition is a factor which gives the expert an edge over others. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, they might be aware of that if such a trend existed, but it doesn't. It's just this fellow doing it in this case. There are not indications that the doctor can see or notice without checking the patient's foot.

You might presume this, but if it were true, it would deny the possibility of free will. As I explained if it was an objective truth that a person desires X, then the person would have to seek X and would not be free to do otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't what it means for something to be objectively true at all. It is presumably objectively true that I want some ice cream. That doesn't mean I have to seek ice cream. I might change my mind and stop desiring it, or indeed act contrary to that desire (perhaps in pursuit of some other desire, or perhaps for some other reason). Just because I want something doesn't mean I have to keep wanting it or indeed have to pursue it. The reason I suggest that presumably there is an objective truth to the matter is that presumably we can be wrong about what we desire. We can think we desire one thing, but in fact we don't (this is different from desiring something and then, once we get it, we decide we don't really like it after all).

This is nonsense. No moral philosophy claims to state objective facts about the way people ought to act. We might make a general statement like "a person ought to do what is good", but since "good" is such a general term, this sort of statement says noting about any specific "way" that a person ought to be. Even Kant's presumed categorical imperative doesn't state a way that people should live. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are badly mistaken. Kant's categorical imperative absolutely does say how people should act. Specifically, that they must always act according to maxims that they can at the same time will to be universal law, that they must always treat humanity whether they find it in themselves or in others as an end unto itself and never as a mere means only, etc.

Not all adherents to normative theories have the same metaethical commitments, which is what will determine whether they think that their theory is aiming at objective moral truths or something else, but normative theories very much are aiming at figuring out how persons ought to be or act. Kant is one example, but certainly not the only one. For another, the classical utilitarian would say the way you should act is in the way that maximizes utility (usually understood as happiness - unhappiness).

You are wrong. As I demonstrated already, "the sort" you are interested in, is not a sort of morality at all. You pretty much accepted this already when you told me that you didn't agree with any traditional moral principles. So it's just like my example. If a person came up with a bunch of axioms which are completely inconsistent with traditional mathematics, and said "this is the sort of mathematics I'm interested in", we'd have to say that is not mathematic at all. And to take the analogy further, if someone proposed "a sort" of logic which was completely inconsistent with traditional logic, we'd designate it as illogical. Likewise, your "sort" is immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't demonstrated anything but a complete lack of understanding of the subject of moral philosophy. I recommend reading any introductory ethics textbook. The elements of moral philosophy by Rachels and Rachels might be a good place to start.

I'm starting to see that your form of "objectivism" is actually inconsistent with free will. This makes it inconsistent with moral theory, therefore immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

It isn't inconsistent with free will in the least. That being said, many moral philosophers seem to think free will is not necessary for moral theory (especially not of the strong, incompatibilist sort). I disagree with them on this point, but again, you appear to be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the landscape of moral philosophy.

You are demonstrating a very low level degree of education in moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not. You are making massive claims about the discipline that are just incorrect. What you percieve as a lack of education is actually just you being wrong about the thing we are discussing.

Different "formulations" is the key thing here. The problem for Kant is that there are two distinct universals to deal with, every situation, and every human being. Due to the incompatibility between these two universals, there cannot be one law for both, every human being in every situation. Kant thought there ought to be one overarching categorical imperative so he tried to determine it.

However, his attempt breaks down, such that we can either have distinct laws for each situation, which apply to all people, or we can have distinct laws for each person which apply in all situations. Either way ends up with a multitude of categorical imperatives, either a distinct imperative for each situation, or a distinct imperative for each person, and there cannot be one categorical imperative which determines them all because there are two distinct types. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't really know what this means. I don't know what it means that "every person" and "every situation" is a "universal". I don't really know what your criticism of Kant is here. And I don't know if you are claiming that Kant thinking there are multiple formulations of the categorical imperative is something to do with this point you are making and, if so, what you are saying the one has to do with the other.

Take Kant's for example. He starts from the personal believe, a subjective opinion, that there ought to be one categorical imperative. That is a subjective opinion. No matter how you look at it, you cannot get away from the subjectivity of moral philosophy.

You like to think that moral philosophy can start in objectivity, but that's your subjective opinion, and as Kant's effort demonstrates the quest for objectivity is doomed to failure. Therefore every successful (i.e. influential) moral philosophy in the past, begins with the subject. You can show me as many proposals for moral philosophy, as you like, which begin in objectivity, and I will show you how each fails. And, since they are all inconsistent with true, accepted, conventional, and influential moral philosophy, it's best to describe them as immoral. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't start with a subjective opinion, but a believe about the objective. Also, whether or not Kant succeeds does not demonstrate that the goal he is aiming at is doomed to failure. Also, if you are calling a moral philosophy successful based on how influential is has been, then objectivity is very much the name of the game. Kant is one of the most influential moral philosophers of all times. Jeremy Bentham also begins with objective assumptions, such as it being irrational and impermissible to make an exception of oneself, such that if one values one's own happines, one ought to value others'. I mean, arguably the most influential moral tradition in the western world is the Christian tradition. It's vague, awful, and badly wrong, but it's certainly influential, and I think you'll find that the Christians are definitely aiming at objectivity.

On a different note, being accepted and convential is not the same as being true.

Unless you can provide the reasons, there is no abductive reasoning here at all, and your claim of what provides the best candidate for moral value is arbitrary.

I've provided good reason why "desire" grounds "value" in what is desirable. This is because desire is what shapes and guides our decisions. We choose things which we desire, and that is a natural fact. So we ground "value" in how it is naturally grounded. Notice, this is not proposed as "objective fact", it is a natural inclination. Since free will allows us to create structures of value not grounded in natural inclinations, such as what you propose, we cannot say that it is an objective fact that value must be grounded this way. It is a choice to be made, ground value in the natural way or not, just like the choice to be moral or immoral. We cannot say that it is an objective fact that we must behave morally, because that would be denying our freedom of choice to act immorally.. Such proposals, being inconsistent with what is natural, ought to be rejected as immoral, but I cannot say it's an objective fact that they must be rejected.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't say must I would say should. I think you'll find I did provide the reasons why this was the best candidate for moral value, I'm fairly certain I did so both in the initial primer and then again in response to your posts. Also, why should we assume that what we value and what is morally valuable are the same? Also, you appear to be committing a naturalistic fallacy towards the end there, suggesting that what is natural is moral etc.

I explained to you how this idea is very faulty. So it's definitely not an assumption I am making. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by this. It doesn't appear to relate to what I said though.

I don't see the contradiction. You simply demonstrate your lack of understanding of predication.
P1 predicates of the subject MU, the belief that truth is subjective.
P2 predicates of the subject Dan, the belief that truth is objective.
There is nothing more than this, and no incompatibility nor contradiction, different beliefs are predicated of different subjects.

It is only if you add a further premise, P3 "truth is subjective", that the appearance of contradiction arises. However, the appearance of contradiction is due to the way "truth is subjective" is interpreted by you. You interpret "truth is subjective" as an objective truth. And of course, if you interpret the proposition "truth is subjective": as an objective truth, contradiction is implicit within your interpretation, and so absurdity appears.

The issue therefore, is that since you believe truth is objective (P2), then if you judge P3 "truth is subjective" as true you create a contradiction. Therefore to judge P3 as true you need to be a different person than the Dan mentioned. Then you will not judge P3 "truth is subjective" through an interpretation of this as an objective truth, you will judge it as true in the only way that it could truly be judged as true, a subjective truth (you simply believe it), and then there is no contradiction and no absurdities. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you say something is true, do you just mean that you believe it? There is nothing more to it than that? I want to be clear on what untennable position it is that you hold here.

No, I didn't imply any objective truth. I said that if two premises contradict each other, and we accept one as correct, then we must reject the other as wrong. There is no implied "objective truth" just adherence to the law of noncontradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but why do we need to abide by the law of noncontradiction if it is not true? What if you don't believe in the law of noncontradiction?

To justify this would require demonstrating a causal relation between the proposed cause, praising the wrong, and the effect, future right ones. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I gave you an example of this in this hypothetical scenario. In real life, we would praise the wrong action when we had good reason to think this would lead to good consequences.

In the example, administering drug X caused the death of the patient, that's why it was judged as wrong. If you praise administering drugs which cause death to patients, how do you think that this promotes future right acts.

As I've been trying to tell you, without analyzing the act, and separating the right from the wrong, you cannot conclude that promoting the act will have the best consequences. This is because separating the actions of the acter, which you wish to praise, from the particular circumstances, which are responsible for the judgement of wrong, will have better consequences than simply praising the act which was wrong. The consequences will be better because analysis will enable the students to better "understand" the role of circumstances in relation to the consequences of their actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

In this case, the drug caused the death of the patient due to unusual circumstances that would be irresponsible to check for in most cases where the patient is presenting with those symptoms/has that medical history/etc due to needing to act quickly or risk the patient's death. Assuming that this specific scenario has been analyzed and concluded that it is unlikely to come up again, or is likely to come up so rarely that checking for it will cost more lives than it saves, then we might well praise the wrong action in the hopes that doctors in the future will also proscribe drug X to patients presenting with the same symptoms/medical history/etc.

So, " you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X." But this is clearly not the best approach. We want doctors to do more than just consider "the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc,", we want doctors to also be aware of unique and peculiar circumstances. "Etc." here might indicate other situations in which the patient would die. This is a special sort of keenness which is sometimes associated with intuition, but it can be identified and cultivated by educators. It is a heightened sense of awareness of the risks and dangers in a given situation, and the capacity to rapidly assess and judge the potential impact of the circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, in this case we don't want doctors to be doing that because not proscribing drug X will kill more people than it saves.

Intuition, of the reliable kind that might present in this kind of context, is more about unconsciously noticing circumstances that your experience and training have prepared you to notice. Eg, a firefighter "just knowing" that a building is about to collapse, because they have unconsciously noticed signs that correspond to things they have seen in buildings on the verge of collapse in the past. In this case, no such signs are present in the patients who will die from drug X.

Because of this, there is no "objective truth" to "what a person desires". If there was objective truth to "what a person desires", this would implicitly negate freedom of choice, by contradiction and incompatibility. So, moral philosophy takes this as a fundamental principle, not necessarily an "objective truth", though some may say that God supports this as an objective truth. I take it as an axiom, a self-evident principle, since it is evident that we have free will, it is a necessary conclusion that nothing desired is desired as necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, there presumably is an objective truth to what a person desires. I think you may be misusing "objective truth" there. Second, moral philosophy does not take this as a fundamental principle. It is an assumption presumed by some moral theories, but not all. Third, I'm not sure it is evident we have free will, though I think we do. Fourth, even if we did, that wouldn't mean that our desires wouldn't be hard-wired into us. Fifth, I am in no way claiming that our desires are necessary or all the same, and it wouldn't make any difference to me if they were, since I'm not making the assumption that what we desire is morally valuable.

So, your idea " any moral facts that exist are objectively true" is actually counter productive to moral philosophy. "Moral facts" are statements about human subjectivity, what we value, and desire. And, it is essential to recognize and promote the "moral fact" that we may value and desire different things. This is necessary to avoid fighting over the same thing. Further, allowing for these differences allows us to cooperate toward common goals or ends, by each person playing a different role. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, moral facts are facts about the way that persons ought to be or act. You are either assuming that what is desirable is valuable or indeed treating moral values as something we invent, like the rules of chess. I did ask about this, but I don't seem to have gotten an answer.

The difficult part to understand, and accept, is that "moral facts" themselves cannot be objectively true. This is what I've been trying to tell you concerning the nature of a predication, as a judgement. Judgements are made by subjects, and as such they are guided by one's desires and intentions, so they are inherently subjective. If we assume facts which are "objectively true" these fall outside the realm of human judgement, therefore outside the realm of "moral facts", which consists of human judgements. Then the only time they can become relevant is if we attempt to determine what these divine judgements might look like, but that is a completely different subject, not moral philosophy, but ontology or metaphysics. Plato outlined that separation in The Euthyphro. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, no, morality (at least, of the sort I am interested in) is not about human judgements, but about the way all persons, actual and merely possible, ought to be or act. Of course, both are the subject of moral philosophy, as what morality is and what the goal of morality is is a question of metaethics.

That's consistent with your usual response. You insist that I am "dead wrong", but you offer nothing to back that up. You clearly have a misunderstanding of "moral philosophy", believing that it consists of some universal, objective statements about "the thing we all desire" when I've explained how this is dead wrong. Moral philosophy must be based in assumptions that we desire different things. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be fair, that wasn't the end of my response there. Also, moral philosophy is about a lot of things, such as whether morality is objective, or subjective, or relative, etc. I think that objectivism is the only viable metaethical option at this level, and that leaves us with either moral realism (paired with objectivism) or moral error theory as our potential plausible views of morality, of which I think moral realism is the better view to take. Also, quite a lot of normative theories in moral philosphy are very much based on the assumption that we all desire (or perhaps aim at) the same end. Utilitarianism very commonly relies on this assumption, and Aristotle seems to make it in the Nichomachean Ethics with regard to eudaimonia. That being said, I am not saying that morality is about what we all desire. I am saying it is not about what we desire at all.

So you really do share ideas with traditional moral philosophy. That is why I still think it is worthwhile discussing these things with you. We don't throw out the baby with the bath water. Your idea to maximize freedom is consistent with traditional moral philosophy. you just do not seem to have the same understanding of "freedom", and so you have a different approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is very much not an idea that is common in moral philosophy.

I think you misunderstand Kant's concept of categorical imperative. Notice, there is not one universal "imperative", but a better interpretation would reveal a different imperative for each different situation. That renders Kant's idea as useless.

Moral philosophy is intended to help guide us through the difficulties of the uniqueness of situations, where universal objective principles do not well apply. So if you seek such universal, objective principles, as a basis for moral philosophy, you are proceeding in the wrong direction. What you ought to look at is how such universal principles fail us in the uniqueness of particular circumstances. That's what moral philosophy is all about, guiding us in dealing with the unique and peculiar circumstances which we find ourselves in every day. I think that is the lesson of the doctor example. The doctor follows "the universal rule" but still ends up making what could be judged as "the wrong choice". Moral philosophy guides us to hone our intuitions enabling us to rapidly assess the peculiarities of the circumstances, and how these peculiarities may effect any attempts to apply universal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, Kant aboslutely would say that there is one universal imperative, though he would claim there are different "formulations" of it.

Universal objective principles, assuming that any exist, do well apply to individual situations. That's rather what "universal" means. If the principle fails to provide appropriate guidance in some particular circumstance, then I suggest it wasn't the right principle in the first place.

The doctor case is a bit different, but I'd sooner not distract from my core point with that here.

That's right, there is absolutely no place for objectivism in moral philosophy, which deals with the decision making of subjects. The subject of moral philosophy is the decisions of the subject, so objectivity is irrelevant. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear on moral philosophy assume a compromised (false) sense of objectivity, often called intersubjectivity, which is nothing more than convention, agreement between subjects. Objectivism is relegated to a place outside moral philosophy, i.e. ontology or metaphysics. From there it can bear on epistemology, and even moral philosophy, but only in the way that it affects an individual subject's attitude toward these fields. — Metaphysician Undercover

So on one reading of this, you're very badly wrong. Moral philosophy as a discipline doesn't start with an assumption of subjectivity and then proceed from there. If you'd like, I can point you at some moral philosophy textbooks if you like so you can get a better grasp of this.

If however you are saying that moral philosophy should start with an assumption of subjectivism, then you're still wrong, but you at least have some company in your view. Those who want to bring objectivity to bear in morality (which I think is probably most of us, and is certainly me) are not using intersubjectivity and calling objectivity, we are talking about actual objectivity. I expect the reason you are having trouble with this is that you are making the assumption that morality is about what is desired, which isn't an assumption that everyone else is making, and that we all desire different things, which also isn't a desire that everyone else is making. It may be worth considering what assumptions you are making and ensure one of them is not that everyone else is making the same ones.

But you do not say why freedom of persons over their choices has "value". Because of this, it is just an arbitrary assertion. You assert something like "the ability to make one's own choice freely is the most valuable thing". But someone could say "the ability to eat is the most valuable thing", or "the ability to breathe", "the ability to move", or "the ability to see", or "hear", etc.. Unless you support your claim with reasons, it is just arbitrary like all these others, and many more.

To support or justify your position you need a definition of "value" which is consistent with your claim. The common definition associates "value" with what is desirable, but this does not work for you. And when we associate "value" with freedom in a more general sense, it is incompatible with general universal "objective" moral principles. So you need to give up one or the other. Either give up associating "value" with freedom. or give up associating "value" with objective moral principles, because the two produce incompatible definitions of "value". What I have proposed is to associate value with freedom, but then moral principles are taken as subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not an arbitrary assertion, it is abductively reasoning towards the best candidate for moral value under the assumption that something has such value.

There is absolutely nothing incompatible between freedom and moral value being universal and objective.

No, it doesn't work that way. If I state P1 as "I think truth is subjective", and P2 as "Dan thinks truth is objective", then it is recognized as the beliefs of two different subjects. How do you get from this to "truth isn't subjective"? That would require the same sort of misunderstanding of predication which you demonstrated with "that expert is a person". See, "objective truth" is predicated to what "Dan thinks". It is not stated as "there is objective truth and Dan believes this", it is stated as Dan's belief, so it is only true if truth is subjective. Therefore we cannot conclude that truth is not subjective, because without the further premise "truth is subjective" none of the premises can be taken as truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

How I get from one to the other is that, presumably, if truth is subjective, then each of our beliefs are true "for us". I agree it is only true if truth is subjective, but if you think truth is subjective, then presumably you must accept that if I think truth is objective, I am also right, thus the contradiction.

And with that premise, it just means that Dan's belief is inconsistent with that premise (i.e. wrong if we accept that premise). — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying that if we accept the premise "truth is subjective", then my beliefs about whether truth is subjective or not can be wrong? Which is to say, there is an objective truth to whether truth is subjective? I mentioned this earlier, but you tried to dodge it by allowing the subjectivity of truth to itself be subjective, which gives rise to exactly the problem I pointed out here.

Obviously then, you are not praising the "same act" which was judged as wrong, you are praising, and promoting, what you clearly describe as "similar" acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the wrong action is being praised in order to promote the right ones.

I'm still waiting for a logical explanation of how you believe that praising a bad, incorrect, act could lead to the best consequences. You've switched from your equivocation of "the same" to acknowledge that you are praising and promoting "similar acts". But now there is no principle whereby you would praise the bad act itself, you only praise and promote similar acts. The difference however, is that one is bad, and the others good. I suggest to you, that since bad and good are opposing predications, they aren't really "similar" at all, you just illogically claim this for argument sake. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have not equvocated so much as clarified since you seemed to be stuck on the term "same act". I have absolutely given you an example of this that used neither of these terms in the case of "proscribing drug X to a patient who has a specific medical history, set of symptoms, etc". In that case, praising the wrong action (from the perspective of actual-value consequentialism) of proscribing drug X to that patient is done because you want other doctors when faced with patients with the same set of symptoms, medical history, etc, to also proscribe drug X.

None of this justifies your claim.

a0 It is not necessary that we all want the same thing, to base moral value in what people value. In fact, it is in wanting different (though many are similar) things rather than the same thing which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If we all valued the same thing we would just fight over it, and we couldn't get anywhere with moral values. But since we may value different things, we can structure moral values in a way which allows us all to have what we need.

b) This is Irrelevant, because "moral value", as derived from what people value, does not assume that we all value the same thing. In fact, the opposite is the case.

c) The fact of the matter is as you say, when people value "the same thing", this is only contingently true, not a necessity. Because of this we can base moral principles in a system which allows people to value different things, and each have the different things that they value, without fighting over the same thing. So it actually is this "contingent fact" about "what people value", that they do not necessarily all value the same thing, which allows moral value to be based in what people value. If it was a necessary fact that we all valued the very same thing, we'd all fight over it and we could have no moral system based in what people value. Since what people value is contingent, we can all value different things and not fight over the same thing.

So your claim is not justified by your statements, it simply shows a lack of understanding of what it means to base moral value in what people value. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think there may be a clash of underlying assumptions here. I am assuming that things that any moral facts that exist are objectively true, in fact I would go as far as to say necessary truths. It seems as though you are treating moral values as something we invent? Is that fair to say? I think this might be the source of this disagreement.

Wow, you really do have a lack of understanding of moral philosophy. Do you really believe that moral philosophy dictates that we ought to all live our lives in the same way, according to some "universal, objective" sense of "ought". This is exactly the opposite of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy is designed to allow us maximum freedom, for each person to seek after their own goals, in a way which doesn't interfere with others. We might employ universal principles, like love thy neighbour, but these are not employed in an objective sense, they are employed as a tool, the means toward allowing people to live their lives in the way they want, seeking the goals they want to seek, while allowing others the same capacity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm struggling with this one, because a lot of what you've said is dead wrong, down to the bones wrong. But, on the other hand, I would agree that moral philosophy should allow us maximum freedom (over our own choices) in a way which doesn't interfere with others' (possessive apostrophe added as I obviously mean others' freedom over their own choices). Let me say a few simple things then, rather than getting bogged down.

Having to live our lives "the same way" is not the same as all being subject to the same categorical imperative(s).

When I discuss "morality" I am referring to objective, universal, indeed necessary, morality. Those truths, if indeed they exist, are the ones I am after. I think that is what people say when they say "morality." If it isn't, then so much the worse for them, and I will accept the asterisk next to the word and continue on regardless, as those are the kind of moral truths that are worth pursuing.

I don't know if you mean to suggest that moral philosophy, as a discipline, doesn't include objectivism, but this is fairly obviously not the case. So I'm going to assume you don't mean to say that.

But you need to ground "value". By common definition "valuable" is defined as what is desirable, therefore value is grounded in what is desired. When you deny this relation, this grounding of "value" , you need to replace it with something else, otherwise you just make an arbitrary assertion, "X is valuable" without any reason as to why anyone might value it.

So, if "the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them" does not have value because it is desirable, then what makes it valuable. If you cannot say what makes it valuable then it's just an arbitrary random assertion. And, arbitrary random assertions do not produce moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would say instead that the freedom of persons over the choices that belong to them is the best candidate we have for moral value (for all the reasons mentioned in my primer and the referenced works). So, assuming anything has moral value, we should assume it is this. Abductive reasoning, not deductive.

You stated that consequentialism is the method. As method, it is the means. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not really. It is a method of evalutating actions, but it is a feature a theory can have, it isn't a theory by itself.

The view that truth is subjective does not allow that P1 and P2 are both true, as I explained. If you believe P1, therefore P1 is true by the subjective perspective, then P2 must be false. A person who thinks that truth is subjective cannot also think that truth is objective. And if you start with P2, "I think truth is objective", you cannot truthfully state P1, truth is subjective. No matter how you look at it, from the "truth is subjective" perspective you have sated two contradictory premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that I don't think truth is subjective, but presumably you think I am wrong? Presumably you could state P1, and then state P2 (as Dan thinks etc etc), and thus end up with the conclusion that truth isn't subjective.

It is only from the perspective of "truth is objective" that the two contradictory premises appear to be coherent, and that demonstrates the faultiness of that perspective. It makes two contradictory premises appear to make a coherent argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know where you've gotten this from or why you think this, but it's not correct. It is very much your position which allows for contradictory premises since it allows the same proposition to be both true and untrue, especially when I start having beliefs about your beliefs etc.

So you accept my demonstration of how your use of words is very deceptive, when you say "be an expert" and "not be one". There is no such thing as being an expert, or not being an expert, there is only instances of being judged to be an expert. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I didn't say that at all. For example, there is such a things as the rules of chess, though they were invented.

The problem was, that if we adhered to the first definition, I made it clear to you that most choices concerning one's own body and property also affect the body and property of others, so you had to switch definitions to a choice which doesn't restrict the ability of others to make their own choices. But this definition is meaningless, because it's self-referential. So you use both definitions, switching back and forth in equivocation, however it suits you.

Then, when we discussed what it means to "understand" one's own choice, you made several attempts to define this. And, you switched from several different meanings for that word, in our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No I didn't. I used the same definition throughout, and you assumed extra definitions when they weren't given. When it comes to one's own choices, they are those regarding that is done with one's own mind, body, and property, but this is more of an outcome of the assumption that there are choices which belong to someone, rather than a definition. I'd suggest reading some of the initial material for further discussion of this. I also didn't define them as those that don't restrict other people's choices. That was you assuming, rather than me stating. I also gave a single definition of what it means to "understand" one's choice, these other definitions were not made by me, but incorrectly read into what I said by you.

Yes, words have different meanings in different contexts, and that is how words work in common vernacular. Relative to a different subjects the same word has a different meaning. In reasoning, we stay within the same subject, and we must adhere to one meaning even in different contexts within that subject, to produce valid conclusions. Otherwise, "the work" that the words are doing is equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

We haven't remotely stayed within the same subject here though. Since there are often five disagreements about different topics covering different fields, words need to be used in different ways.

I don't see how expressing approval of a wrong act could possibly produce the best consequences. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already explained how it could lead to the best consequences: by promoting people acting in similar ways in situations that appear similar to them as the wrong action did to the actor in question but which are in fact different and will lead to good consequences rather than bad ones.

As I said above, I cannot accept this, even though I am quite sure that you can explain it through your equivocal ways. "Wrong" means mistaken, in error, incorrect. "Praiseworthy" means admirable, commendable, favourable. Both are judgements. One is a judgement of the quality of the act, the other a judgement of how we ought to respond to the act. You are claiming that in some cases we ought to respond to a mistaken, incorrect, wrong act with admiration and praise. That makes no sense if we adhere to moral principles which praise good, correct acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, I think I see the assumption that is leading to confusion. You are assuming that moral principles must praise good, correct acts. That just isn't so. If praising a bad, incorrect act will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism recommends we do.

So, we might say, "we ought to encourage correct acts, and discourage wrong acts", as a moral axiom. Rules like this make up the conventional principles of moral philosophy. However, you do not want to accept these conventional principles, and you propose a system which leads to situations such as the described one (we ought to encourage a wrong act) which contradicts conventional moral principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Praising a wrong act might well, such as in this case, be encouraging good acts. The world might be such that the best way to encourage good actions in future is to praise a bad action that has already occurred.

You can proceed with your own definition of "freedom" and your own definition of "system of evaluation" which are completely inconsistent with how the words are conventionally understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, that is fairly true of "freedom," as I am using it in a fairly revisionist way as a shorthand for "the ability of persons to understand and make choices", mostly because the latter is a mouthful. This is not the case for "system of evaluation."

You are going off on your own definition of "value" now. If "value" is not assigned in relation to what is wanted, desired, as "the desirability of a thing", then you have completely separated yourself from moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it often assumed that what people value has moral value, certainly by the utilitarians and the virtue ethicists, but this is not a required assumption, and not one that I think we ought to make.

And "good" in moral philosophy is grounded by what is desired. If you do not ground "good" in what is desired, then how do you judge whether the consequences are good or not? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, it just isn't. It's often assumed that what we value is moral valuably, but I am not making that assumption as a) I don't think we do all necessarily want the same thing, b) even if we, as humans did, that is no reason to think that all persons do, and c) even if they do, as a matter of fact, that would merely be a contingent fact about them, rather than a necessary one. Instead, I would say that I begin with simpler assumptions, which I detailed in the initial primer, and then from there try to determine what is the best candidate for moral value.

The correct moral theory is necessarily a means to an end. This is because "value", "worth", and ultimately "good" and "right" is determined by what is desired. And what is desired is the end. So the system of valuation, which is the moral theory, is the means to that end. With each passage you write, you demonstrate more and more clearly that what you are proposing is not moral philosophy at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, nope. Moral philosophy, as I understand it, is about how we ought to live our lives, where ought is understood in a universal, objective sense. To borrow a concept from Kant, think in terms of the categorical imperative, what we ought to do regardless of our desires (Kant is making some other assumptions I also don't make, such as morality being about rationality, but this concept is hopefully helpful in terms of expressing the general character of what I'm aiming at here).

Here, you make an attempt to present your theory as moral philosophy by designating "the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them" as the end, what is desired. However, when you try to make it into a moral theory in this way, it proves itself to be incoherent. This is due to what I've already demonstrated concerning your proposed concept of "those choices that belong to them". — Metaphysician Undercover

First, you haven't demonstrated any such thing. Second, I am not presenting the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them as desired by people. I am presenting it as valuable whether or not it is desired.

That is not what I claimed. I said that when the proposed means is not conducive to the end (no cause/effect relation), then the means becomes an end in itself. This is what happens with your proposal of using consequentialist morals, as a method (means) to produce the desired end of "freedom" (your stated measure of value). Consequentialist morals cannot produce freedom because moral principles are fundamentally opposed to freedom as forms of restriction. Since the consequentialist morals are not conducive to your desired end (freedom) then the morals become an end in themselves. But morals cannot be an end, as moral principles are designed as a means to an end, so your theory is left as wanting an end. So you try to ground these morals in "objective right" rather than a true end, what is desired, the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, consequentialism isn't really a "means to an end". Also, I think you are taking consequentialism to include a lot more than it does. A consequentialist moral theory is one that evaluates the morality actions by reference to their consequences. That's it.

I refer you back to the example of buying the second hand shirt. First you said "to understand" ones choice is to know what the choice means, and to be able to apply one's rationality to it. When I explained that "what the choice means" implies meaning, what is meant, and this implies what is intended, and this implies putting the choice into the context of what is desired, so that the choice to buy the shirt was contrary to the intention to only buy a shirt if it was 100% cotton, the contrariness implying a misunderstood choice, you then altered the definition. The new definition became the following:
So long as the person understands the choice such that they are able to apply their rationality to it if they choose to, then that is sufficient.
— Dan
I think it's obvious that "able to apply their rationality to it", means to be able to give reasons for the choice in retrospect. — Metaphysician Undercover

There aren't two definitions there. The second one is a clarification as you seem to have thought that to be able to apply one's rationality to it is to actually do so, and those are not the same thing. Also, being able to apply one's rationality to a choice is definitely not the same as giving reasons in retrospect, it is being able to recognize and respond to reasons for making that choice. And, in case it wasn't clear, the time you need to understand the choice such that you are able to apply your rationality to it is the time you are making it, not some time after the fact. This is a perfect example of me defining something consistently and you reading some bizarre new definition into what I have said.

Your definition of "freedom", like your definition of "their own choices" becomes incoherent when someone requests that you explain what the definition means. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't. Any percieved incoherence is likely the result of you reading additional claims I haven't made into what I have said, or else misunderstanding either what I'm saying or the fundamental concepts needed to discuss these points.

OK, so you only use contradictory premises when someone proposes a view which is contrary to your view, and the only way to demonstrate that the other person's view is wrong is to use an argument with contradictory premises. This would appear to indicate that really, the contrary view, your view is the one which is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is not what I said. Since the view that truth is subjective allows for contradictory propostions to both (or all) be true, I demonstrated how this leads to problems using an argument that included contradictory premises to demonstrate why this position is not acceptable.

This makes no sense, and indicates that you do not understand predication at all. If we make judgements about whether a person "is an expert", this means that we judge the person to have this quality, "is" signifies predication. It does not mean that there is such a thing as "an expert", and the expert has the quality of being a person. That's what "the expert is a person" would signify. That would be a switching of subject and predicate. — Metaphysician Undercover

To judge someone as an expert indeed judges someone as having a quality, but "an expert" is a person who has that quality.

As indicated above, it is "the only workable option" for your moral theory. You seek to ground your moral principles in some fictitious, fantasy, "objective truth", rather than accept that a true moral philosophy grounds its principles in intention, what is desired, the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is the only option for any sensible discussion of anything worthy of serious consideration.

As I explained, "be an expert" really has no meaning in the context of this discussion. What we are talking about is "being judged as an expert". So what you are saying is that you would judge a person as an expert, even if that person demonstrates misunderstanding in aspects of the field which you judge that person to be an expert in.

Am I correct here? If so, that's fine, it is an indication of how you would make such a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I would happily say that I would judge someone to be an expert even if they demonstrate misunderstandings in aspects of the field I judge them to be an expert in. While we're on the subject, I would say that this is also how most people make such a judgement, and that to judge someone not to be an expert (despite evidence that they are) based on a single misunderstanding would not be a very useful way of judging expertise.

If the doctor was not "right" then on what principle do you say that the doctor's action is praiseworthy? To say it is "praiseworthy" is to express sincere approval of the act, to indicate that you think the act is commendable. You have judged the act to be "wrong" by actual-value consequentialism. How do you then turn around and express sincere approval of it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because expressing approval of it is an action, and if expressing approval of a wrong action will lead to the best consequences, that is what consequentialism (of the types under discussion at least) would recommend.

If it helps you conceptualize this, it might be easier to imagine that the act consequentialist could just lie about the moral status of the action when they praise it (they don't need to actually lie, but they certainly could).

Will you accept my interpretation of this ( "...think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one") as well? If you judge a person to be an expert at one time, you might later judge the person not to be an expert. And, in retrospect, you might admit that your earlier judgement was wrong. In this case "turns out not to be one" really indicates that whoever made the judgement has had a change of mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not sure the judgement of expertise is subjective, it might well be intersubjective or objective but invented etc, but sure, I think I am probably fine with accepting that way of talking about expertise.

I assume that this is what you mean by "objective" in this context. You do not mean the same thing as when we discussed "objective truth", which referred to a sort of correspondence with reality which existed completely independent of all human judgement. You now use "objective" to indicate that there is a "standard", or conventional criteria for judgement, which many people adhere to, and this forms a sort of agreement between people, which you call "intersubjectivity". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, objective but invented is more like the rules of chess, where as intersubjective is more like whether someone is attractive or not. In one case, there are clear, objectively correct rules, but they are just made up by some group. In the other, it's more a general agreement or opinion. But I'm not particularly married to either concept when it comes to expertise and in neither case am I proposing there is some objective standard of expertise irrespective of people's opinions on the matter.

You don't employ any rigorous definitions, which I told you is required for logical proceedings. You simply use these words in whatever way strikes you as convenient for the situation. This makes the meaning of these words, in your usage, context dependent. And what I also told you, is that logical procedure (consequently rigorous definition) is very important to moral philosophy. That is because in moral philosophy we are required to go far beyond the world as revealed by the senses and empirical evidence, "what is", into the realm of "what ought to be". Since "what ought to be" cannot be revealed to us by the empirical evidence of "what is", we must be guided by logic rather than sense observation. This implies that rigorous definition is essential to moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do employ rigorous definitions. I have given several. I also use words differently in different contexts, since that is how words work. I completely agree that rigorous definitions of key terms and concepts is very important for moral philosophy, or indeed any philosophy, since we only have words to communicate our ideas to others. However, I think you often want to pick over terms that have very little to do with the point I'm making and/or take issue because I'm not using words the way you want them used, despite me giving a clear and rigorous definition of how I am using them.

So, with respect to this particular claim, I've already shown how your previous attempt to justify it violated the law of identity, which allowed you to equivocate the meaning of "the same action". That equivocation was the basis of your supposed justification. You showed that the particular action referenced was "wrong", yet similar acts (which you termed "the same action" in different circumstances), would be praise worthy. Through equivocation between "the same action" referring to the particular, individual act, which is judged as "wrong", and "the same action" referring to any one of a number of similar acts of a general type, you supported your assertion that "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised". That is not justification though, it is fallacious logic due to equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm not saying similar actions would be praiseworthy, I am saying THE WRONG ACTION ITSELF is praiseworthy. There isn't any contradiction here because rightness and praiseworthiness (or wrongness and lack of praiseworthiness) are not the same thing. You are, one again, attacking points I haven't made, rather than the one I have.

I have swiftly and effectively "solved" your problem, by pointing out that you are trying to establish compatibility between two incompatible principles of valuation. That is logically impossible. You refuse to acknowledge the solution, insisting that the impossible is possible, and persisting in your determination to do what is logically impossible. Since you've been trying to do what is logically impossible for close to ten years, and have now even offered a substantial sum of money to anyone who can do the logically impossible, and you persist even after that logical impossibility has been demonstrated to you, this justifies an impugning of your character. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not logically impossible. These things are not inconsistent in any way. You are just wrong. I understand that you have tried to show that they are incompatible, but what you have said (as I have pointed out and explained before) was based on a faulty understanding of freedom (both the kind I am referring to and generally), consequentialism, and what constitutes a system of evaluation.

What you are saying here is that freedom is the end. The thing by which value is measured is the end, what is desired, and values are assigned (measured) according to the capacity of the act, to produce the end. The stated "method" of evaluating is the means by which that measurement is made.

Do you see what I mean? Since freedom is the measure of value, it must be what is desired as the end, because the goal is what makes any act valuable. The act is "valuable" in relation to an end. A method, is a means, the way that the end is brought about. The end is to have acts evaluated according to their capacity for freedom, and the means to this end is the application of consequentialism. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have gotten a couple of things wrong here. First, this connection with desire. That's getting awfully "the end which all mankind aims at" for my liking, and I do not make any such assumption. But, assuming that was just imprecise use of language, the other issue here is that you are treating consequentialism as a means to the end of freedom, and that's all wrong. Consequentialism is a way of evaluating the morality of actions, specifically by their consequences. The correct moral theory should either be consequentialist or not, but it isn't a means to some other end. If my theory were not consequentialist but instead deontological, then it would presumably look a lot like a classic deontological theory of rights, where we must not violate someone's freedom over those choices that belong to them no matter what. Instead, it is a consequentialist theory, that evaluates the consequences of actions by reference to the extent to which they violate or protect the freedom of persons over those choices that belong to them. Everything which you say following on from this is wrongheaded due to this mistake.

Although, and keep in mind that this isn't what I am doing and I am not suggesting for a second this is what I am doing, your assertion that you cannot produce something with the use of something that is fundamentally different, or opposed, to that thing seems demonstrably false.

No you did not. For example, first you said that the ability to give reasons for one's choices, in retrospect, to rationalize one's choice after the fact was sufficient to qualify as understanding one's choice. Later you denied that this was what you said. You gave a number of such "definitions" which upon questioning demonstrated that you did not know what the definition you stated, meant. This is your habit, to make assertions such as the above "I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised" without being able to explain what the stated claim could actually mean. — Metaphysician Undercover

I absolutely never said that it was the ability to give reasons for one's choices in retrospect. I absolutely denied that is what I said becuase it isn't. I have explained what I meant by "understand" many different ways to you because you didn't get it the first time, or any of the subsequent times. Likewise, I have tried to explain what I mean by "the action is wrong and also praiseworthy (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective)" many times, which should be very easy, because I mean exactly what I said. But you keep assuming I mean other, bizarre things, and then claim I'm flip-flopping when I say I don't mean them. But I never said or meant them in the first place. You grabbing the wrong end of the stick and then getting annoyed that the stick and then claiming that I am offering you lots of different sticks. In fact, it is the same stick every time, but you keep finding a way to grab a new and incorrect part of it (which is very strange as the stick I offered didn't have that many ends in the first place)

Sure, but as I showed, your use of "their own choices" is not consistent with "freedom" at all, being a severely restricted type of choice. Further, your definition of "own choices" was inconsistent with your application. The application required a circular self-referential definition in order to avoid the charge that "their own choices" was just a consequentialist restricted form of supposed "free choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you want to use "freedom" in a very general sense. I have used the word "freedom" specifically to refer to the ability of persons to understand and make choices, and then further specified that it is only the ability of person to understand and make their own choices that we ought to use as a measure of moral value.

This implies a general sense of "freedom". Then in application you utilize a restricted sense of "freedom" in an attempt to make "freedom" consistent with your consequentialist moral principles. In your application of "the method", "freedom" means the capacity to understand and make "their own choices". Here, "their own choices" is severely restricted by moral principles which define it as choices relating to their own body and property. You claim "their own mind" is included here, but you exclude the relevance in application, because many thoughts do not show up in actions. Therefore the conception of "freedom" which you use in the application of your method, is severely restricted by the moral principle of "their own choices". — Metaphysician Undercover

It only implies that if you haven't read the many, many times I gave a specific, precise definition. Which I did in the initial primer that I provided. No, "freedom" doesn't mean that. "Freedom" as I've used it here, means the ability to understand and make choices, and I have specified that it is freedom over one's own choices that matters. Though I will concede that, with that established, I do often shorthand to "freedom is the measure of value".

Also, I don't exclude mental freedom at all. Many of the most important freedoms are ultimately mental ones. I'm not sure which stick you grabbed there, but I'm certain you got the wrong end of it.

I did not propose that at all. That was stated as your presumption. Obviously, anyone can state contradictory premises, and contradictory statements, as you consistently do. Whether or not you can "presumably get away" with this depends on whether or not you presume you will be called to justify such claims. You seem to presume that you will never be called to justify your contradictory claims so you can presumable get away with such arguments. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not state contradictory premises except when parodying lunatic views such as truth being subjective. As I was doing here.

I am still waiting for you to justify this belief, without an appeal to God or some other divine mind which makes the judgement of "true" and "false". You do recognize that such predications "true" and "false", like "expert", are judgements don't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I do not recognize that "true" and "false" are, themselves judgements, much like "expert" isn't a judgement. An expert, is a person. We make judgements about whether people are experts or not. Those judgements can be right or wrong in some way that I will happily agree is not objective in the sense we have been discussing. True or false are characteristics of propositions, theories, etc. We make judgements about them, which are either correct or not in a way which is, sometimes, objective. I have justified this belief by reference to it being really the only workable option. When it comes to truth, objectivity is the only game in town.

Why is that "silly"? Sophists fool us into thinking that they are experts. When the sophistry is revealed, we have to admit that they are not experts at all, and never were. You say it's silly, because you want to refuse to look back at your mistaken judgement as a mistaken judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, my point is that someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise.

You want to have it both ways. The doctor was an expert, and "right" at the time that the decision was made, but when the patient dies, the doctor is wrong. You refuse to let the posterior judgement reflect on the prior judgement, to see that if the doctor was wrong in his actions, then it was a mistake to have judged him to be an expert in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I didn't say that the doctor was right at the time the decision was made.

Look, you are saying it "does not preclude them being an expert", as if there is some "objective truth" about whether or not the person is an expert. In reality, we are talking about a judgement as to whether the person is an expert or not. This is all we have to go on, our judgements of whether the person is an expert. And, to the people making that judgement, "information" about whether the person understands or misunderstands, is all we have to base the judgement in. Therefore "thinking they are an expert" is what is being discussed here, and there is no such thing as "they are an expert until...". The latter refers to an imaginary "objective truth". And, if after the judgement is made, additional information becomes available which demonstrates that judgement to have been wrong, we must accept that the judgement made at that time, was wrong, due to a lack of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think I have implied some objective universal standard of expertise. I'm perfectly willing to grant that expertise as a standard may be either intersubjective, relative, or objective but invented.

I also agree that we might think someone is an expert who later turns out to not be one. No problem on that.

But heres the thing: Someone can be an expert and misunderstand some aspect or part of their field of expertise. In fact, I would go as far as to say that all experts do. These are exactly the people that we all refer to as experts and, I suspect, so do you, and we're not wrong to do so. They are experts, and they misunderstand a part of their field. These things are not mutually exclusive.

Sure, but if you are talking about "an individual action", then you need to respect the law of identity, therefore accept your own judgement that the doctor's act was wrong. You cannot now say that this very same "individual action" which you judge as wrong, should be praised and encouraged — Metaphysician Undercover

I can say exactly that. I can say that the action is wrong, and it should be praised. There is no inconsistency here as I've explained many times.

You only move to praise and encourage it by removing the circumstances, thereby making it "a type of act", and now you claim tht you are only dealing with an "individual action" — Metaphysician Undercover

The actual-value consequentialist can praise it because doing so will likely lead to good consequences. That's it.

We might, therefore, ask what drives Dan to continue. Possibly, it is the case that Dan has come to recognize that the problem is impossible to resolve, and has posted a significant reward money as a sort of hoax. Possibly, Dan has gotten so frustrated in his endeavour that he is willing to give up substantial money ownership to anyone who can get him out of that mess. 'I'll give you everything I own if you'll just solve this one problem for me. Please!'. — Metaphysician Undercover

As this is a direct impugning of my character, I'll respond: I am not committing any sort of hoax. I am offering money to help solve a problem in the hope that someone will do so, because the solution is worth more to me than the money. I am indeed frustrated with not being able to solve the problem. So far a couple of people have put some effort in and sent me their thoughts that they have worked hard on via email. No workable solutions, but I appreciate their effort and have enjoyed discussing their ideas with them.

If you look at my first reply on this thread, it pretty much answers your question. Dan has two perspectives, what I've come to call two systems of evaluation, one values freedom, the other values consequentialist moral principles. The two are incompatible in a way similar to how the free will and determinist perspectives are incompatible. Not only does Dan not recognize the incompatibility, but he refuses to even accept that he uses two distinct systems to determine the moral value of human actions — Metaphysician Undercover

That's because there are not two systems. There is one system that uses freedom as the measure of value and consequentialism as the method of evaluating actions. I do not recognize the incompatibility because it doesn't exist.

This shows where you really do misunderstand my argument. Remember, we had a big discussion about what it means to "understand" one's choices. I gave a clear description, to understand one's choice is to put the choice into the context of one's wants, needs, desires, and intentions. You rejected this, complaining that I expect too much from the term. But then you could not give any coherent description of what it means to "understand" one's choice, slipping around from one half-baked idea to another, like a chameleon. That's when I gave up and said that what "understand" means to me is just too far away from what "understand" means to you, to accommodate any reasonable discussion on this subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is nonsense, and you seem to have your tongue on the keyboard again. I'll thank you to put it away. I gave a fairly clear definition of "understand" when it comes to what it means to "understand one's choices". I have used the same definition of what it means to "understand one's choices" not only for the duration of this discussion, but for years before hand and you will also find it in the linked works mentioned in the initial primer.

Consequentialist moral principles stipulate that only specific acts ought to be valued, those with "good" consequences. It is incoherent to say that only acts with good consequences have value, but the capacity to make any act (including acts with bad consequences) is also valued. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you'll find that I didn't say that the capacity to perform any act should be valued. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the measure of value by which we evaluate the consequences of actions.

This, I believe is the route toward solving Dan's problem. I explained this to him a while ago. We do not value freedom of choice, we take it for granted as a fact of life. This puts free choice in a position where it transcends any system of moral evaluation, as the prerequisite for even needing such a system. The issue is that Dan cannot understand "freedom" by these terms, terms which describe freedom in an absolute way. Dan conceives of "freedom" as already restricted, so he talks of this type of freedom, and that type of freedom, according to the restrictions which signify the type. Then this or that named type of freedom is valuable, while the freedom to do immoral things is not valuable. To maintain his principle, that freedom of choice, in general, is something to be valued he is forced to exclude the choice to do immoral things as not a free act at all. Of course this leaves us with no principles to apply toward understanding the reality of freely choosing bad acts. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not an accurate representation of me or my views in any way. I didn't say that doing immoral things is not a free act, I didn't "conceive of freedom as already restricted", and I didn't say freedom of choice "in general" is to be valued at all.

This, I think, is the core of the problem. I make a claim, and you start arguing against some other claim which I've never made.

All this demonstrates is that one can state premises which contradict each other, like P! and P2, and draw absurd conclusions. Notice, that if P1 is true, this means that you think it is true, and that denies the truth of P2. So the two contradict. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree the two contradict, but this is the position you are proposing, not me. My position is much simpler and doesn't turn to custard as soon as you think about it for five minutes. I think that some propositions are objectively true, and some are objectively false, and if you think something false is true or vice-versa, you're incorrect.

I'm going to avoid quoting except where necessary to avoid excessive length.

Habits: Whatever we might say of people choosing to sleep in different circumstances, they are surely still free to do so. The dangerous option was an option, their inclination not to choose it wasn't a restriction on their freedom. This would be a very strange way to talk about this, right?

Also, as an aside, hearing voices probably isn't terribly restrictive either. The percentage of healthy people who will at some stage experience auditory hallucinations is surprisingly high. Delusions, rather than auditory hallucinations, are probably more of a concern (or at least, they could be, depending on the delusion), but that's really neither here nor there.

Some might view the two as inseparable or perhaps better said, a prerequisite to the other or description of one or the other's affinity. Say we take consequentialism as meaning human efforts ultimately matter in a world and reality that seems to place such far beneath any sort of functional status quo. This is indeed the sole monument of "freedom" for those who believe we are otherwise bound to randomness with any such attempt at definition or value literally as sound or constant as the predictability of the tides. You can even reverse the two and find relatable sentiment.

This is I think is the ultimate point of contention simply for the fact there are so many valid views or understandings that even from a passing glance come to mind.

I would, at last preliminarily, say, certain views of how reality ultimate is (consequentialism) remains a world of difference from how reality ultimately can, should be, and at times is as far as the limited time and ability of human observation goes (freedom). — Outlander

I'm not totally sure I understand what you mean by this. Perhaps you could explain it in another way?

What I will say though is that consequentialism isn't a theory of what reality is. It's a type of normative theory (or perhaps a feature a normative theory can have depending on how you think about it), it is very much about how the world should be.

Time: Well, maybe. I'm not convinced we have a very good understanding of what time is or how it works, but yes I'd say that a basic understanding, like how the future follows the present etc, is certainly very useful.


Experts: No I think wisdom is very different from intelligence and both are different from knowledge. But I think we should all agree that just because someone has turned out to be wrong about something, it doesn't mean they weren't or aren't an expert in that field.

Objective truth: Well, there's a few options here. The first is to consider the alternative, that no truth is objective. What then? Subjective perhaps? If so, wouldn't "truth is subjective" be objectively true? And if not, then I can presumably get away with arguments such as this:

P1: Truth is subjective, whatever I think is true is true
P2: I think truth is objective, and not subjective
P3: The truth is objective, and not subjective (from P1 and P2)
Conclusion: The truth is not subjective

Actually, I can get away with rather a lot more than that. There's a thing called logical explosion or logical armageddon that occurs when you allow both classic logic and things to be both true and false at the same time where you can prove and disprove everything with logically sound arguments. It's bad, we don't want that. And the truth being intersubjective just shifts the problem to a bigger group but doesn't solve it. There are other reasons to think we should accept objective truth, but this seems the easiest to express in this context.

God: Science isn't a god, but more importantly, gods aren't necessary or even helpful for the existence of objective truth. If we suppose that a God were required to ground objective truth, then that God would need to exist objectively, surely, so we must first presuppose that things can exist, or not exist, objectively, before we can discuss whether such an entity does indeed exist.

Further, whether people care is not the same as whether something is true. The world is as it is, regardless of whether we pay attention.

Further further, I don't think people do only do things because they have to. I think most things people do because they want to (or because they get them something else they want).

Words: I think the point of words is to enable communication. While definitions are important, I think that if we all know what we're talking about, we are generally better off talking about it rather than spending all our time discussing whether we should use different words.

Right, and that's likely what MU's resistance is fueled by. Understandably enough, yes? — Outlander

I mean, MU has not expressed that point in this context as far as I can tell, and has instead accused me of inconsistency and incoherency, which is quite different from saying I'm wrong because intentions matter.

See this is where things get, understandably, a bit "trippy". Your declaration of someone who hypothetically literally breathes morality and compassion being written off as "immoral" because something outside of his control happened in 2 seconds at the last minute. I mean. It just leaves a bad taste in one's mouth, philosophically speaking. Morally, at least. Surely you understand that. So, the difference or "point of contention" appears to be how you can simply look past that, in your view, likely as a service to a greater truth or logic, while others see such a hang-up as, well, to put it bluntly, a non-starter as far as any sort of validity as far as the subject at hand goes. — Outlander

I wouldn't quite say that I am suggesting you write someone off as immoral, I did use quotation marks there as that was your phrasing. Also, the kind of consequentialism I outlined in the initial primer is a bit more sophisticated in terms of blaming people for things outside of their control. And validity is probably not the right word here as it isn't the reasoning between premises you're taking issue with.

All that being said, I get what you mean and I can certainly see how it runs counter to commonly held moral intuitions. Not considering intentions is, as I mentioned, one of the most common criticisms of consequentialists theories.

But all of that is surely beside the point as to whether consequentialism can consider something to be both wrong and praiseworthy (in the sense that we should praise it). That is fairly obviously the case as praising the thing is an action that can also evaluated by reference to its likely consequences to determine if we should do it.

From an outside perspective. Freedom meaning "sans" restriction. This is not inherently "good." Humanity with "freedom" from an oxygen-rich environment results in a pile of bones. I mean, perhaps that's good for the planet in the long-term freeing it from pollution. But, as human persons, that would be, you know, kinda bad, wouldn't you say? — Outlander

I agree that "freedom" doesn't automatically mean good. But, to be fair, I never claimed that it did. I said that the ability of persons to understand and make choices (which I called "freedom" to save time), specifically, their own choices, is morally valuable, which I think you will agree is a much more specific claim.

Allow me ample room to make mistakes as I attempt to become acquainted with this "Consequentialism". As I. and I would attest most if not many would understand, this, to put things in extremes for purpose of understanding, would mean, the person who dedicates their life to human welfare yet say, gets drunk, and accidentally burns down their dwelling in which they stored their life's work before they have yet to actualize such time, effort, and resources into such a goal, lived an "immoral" life. While, on the same hand, the person who spent a lifetime killing, robbing, and let's just say much worse, also got drunk and accidentally gave a slip of paper that contained the access code to his crypto-currency that contained the sum of his ill-gotten goods to one who immediately either gave it to the police or psychically accessed it themself, then donating it to charity, lived and died a "moral" person. Is that correct? — Outlander

I mean, sort of. Consequentialism isn't really about determining whether people are moral so much as actions. Also it's not clear that the person who was trying to do good has actually done anything immoral, rather than failed to do something moral (and this is less clear in the case of the thief). But, broadly speaking, I think you've more-or-less got the right idea. Certainly this intuition pump is close enough to describing consequentialism in order to express a common criticism of consequentialism, which is that it doesn't care about intentions and this seems to run counter to commonly held moral intuitions.

As an aside, and as it relates to the point that I was trying to make to MU, we might still praise the person whose "life was immoral", since we want others to act in a similar way, and blame and even punish the one whose "life was moral" since we don't want others to act in a similar way.

They certainly have easily perceived inconsistencies. Freedom being a lack of constraint, consequentialism being an ultimate fate of such. A layman's perspective being such is what life and therefore intelligence is (Goldilocks anyone?). Which one can exist without the other? Only one. Though that doesn't necessarily defeat the ultimate truth and relevance of the other. The disagreement appears to be based, or at least of some notable relevance, to this dynamic. — Outlander

I'm not entirely sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you could try explaining it another way?

As to percieved inconsistencies, there really aren't any. Consequentialism is simply the view that the morality of actions is judged by reference to their consequences. This doesn't at all conflict with either the idea of freedom or the idea that freedom is valuable.

"Wrong" has several definitions that can reasonably be sided with. "Incorrect" (per procedure), "immoral" (per subjective zeitgeist, perhaps based on objective damage or similar aspect), or "imperfect" (not quite hitting the bull's eye but with every reasonable attempt to have done so).

Actual-value is tricky. What seems to work immediately and perhaps for 1,000 years may actually be proven to have been a failure in 10,000 years. Surely you account for this.

These are all great and amazing points. Thank you for replying, *ahem*, finally. I will continue with the following bullet points shortly — Outlander

I agree that actual-value is tricky. I think expected-value is also rather tricky and am not sure which is the better approach really. That's why I keep adding the qualifier, on an actual-value view, though to be fair, what I've said can also apply to expected-value consequentialism depending on how "expected" is fleshed out. All I was pointing out that on an actual-value approach, an action can be wrong, but still worth praising (since praising is a different action that can be evaluated by reference to it's likely consequences etc etc). This is a fairly obvious implication of the view of actual-value consequentialism, and I'm not really sure how it has gone on so long.

"Wrong" in this case meaning morally wrong (definitely not as per subjective zeitgeist, as I'm sure you've noticed I'm a moral objectivist).


When you say "finally," have you posted something here before and not recieved a reply? If so, I can only apologize, I almost certainly didn't see it.

I just think this whole exchange is a marvel of human endeavor, no matter who is "more correct" or I suppose "ultimately wrong". That aside, truth must remain truth. So, if I could ask each of the participants, what, in explicit detail, is the singular most "hard problem" the others view has in their eyes? Just so perhaps others who are a bit less entrenched in one or the other's particular "view" might have a crack at sharing their own perspective on the matter. — Outlander

I expect you'd have to ask MU. This discussion started because they (he?) claimed I was trying to marry two things that were supposedly inconsistent (freedom and consequentialism). It has since exploded into what feels at times like a game of philosophical whack-a-mole. Let me try to list some of the things we are disagreeing on, though you'll have to forgive me for missing some:

* Whether an action can be wrong but also praiseworthy (on an actual-value consequentialist account)
* Whether one's freedom is restricted by one's habits
* Whether consequentialism is in some way inconsistent with freedom
* Whether an understanding of the nature of time is of critical importance to the project of ethics (and indeed, what that means)
* Whether someone can be an expert while also misunderstanding some elements/aspects of their field of expertise
* The existence of objective truth
* Whether God is in some way necessary for objective truth
* The meaning and appropriate usage of a laundry list of words, and more generally to what extent words should be allowed to be used to mean different things in different contexts (so long as that meaning is made clear)

I don't know what MU considers the central disagreement here, and would happily address just that if it was clarified.

Recognizing the general principle, "no one is perfect", therefore acknowledging that someone who appears to have impeccable understanding must still have some degree of misunderstanding, even though that misunderstanding is not apprehended, is not at all silly. It is actually a very common precautionary approach. — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't at all what I was saying was silly. I completely agree that we should think experts probably have some misunderstanding. The bit that is silly is the bit where you seem to think that if we find out what they misunderstand/misunderstood, we then judge them to have never been an expert at all.

Obviously, if an individual puts on a great air of expertise, such that people are fooled into judging the person as an expert, then it is later revealed that it was a pretense, any rational person would revise that judgement, and admit that the person is not an expert. The Socratic method is designed to expose such "false expertise", in the effort to reveal sophism — Metaphysician Undercover

That definitely isn't what I said or implied. There is a big difference between acting like you know a lot when in reality you know very little and actually knowing a lot, but still misunderstand or being wrong about some aspect of the thing you know a lot about.

Dan, how can you seriously ask this? It's the issue of "available information", and how it affects a person's judgement. If the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert, and the person is persuasive in one's actions, then the judgement is "expert". But if the information which demonstrates that what a person is doing is not the actions of an expert is available to the one making the judgement, then the judgement is "not expert". How is this not obvious to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

The information that the person in question misunderstands some aspect of their field does not preclude them being an expert. That's my whole point and it seems you are willing to accept that so long as we don't know what they misunderstand. You are now framing this in terms of thinking they are an expert until it is revealed that they have a misunderstanding regarding their field, which is a different thing entirely.

Now, the distinction I am making is the distinction between "I know there is more information but it's not available to me", and "I know there is more information, I will uncover it and I will consider it". You can see that the former attitude acts as a real restriction on one's freedom of choice, by limiting the possible choices through the acceptance of a lack of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, such an attitude does not by itself restrict someone's freedom of choice. Moreover, neither has much to do with the case of the doctor as searching for the information in similar circumstances is likely to get the patient killed and is exactly the kind of behaviour we want to discourage.

This goes back to what I said about the force of habit. Habit inclines the former attitude, and rash actions, "additional information is not available to me, move forward". This is clearly a restriction on one's capacity of free choice because it limits the possibilities available to the person. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. Feel free to reread my earlier posts as to my views on this.

"Circumstances that appear the same" is insufficient for the conclusion of "the same action". That's the violation of the law of identity I referred to, which supports you contradictory approach. If we ignore enough information, because it's "not available", a whole slew of actions will "appear the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

The "same action" in this case refers to proscribing drug X in this case (or whatever set of medical tests and treatments are enacted in the initial case)

You are missing the point. I will use "type of action" to explain. If there is a type of action which is subjected to moral evaluation, judged as good in relation to moral evaluation, in a vast majority of situations (as your example), but in some situations, or even one situation, this type of action is judged as bad in relation to moral evaluation, then we must reject the judgement that it is one "type of action" in respect to moral evaluation. "Bad" and "good" are irreconcilable types imposed by moral evaluation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, I think I see where some of your confusion is coming from. Any act consequentialist, actual-value or expected-value wouldn't judge a "type of action" as good or bad at all. They (and indeed I) would judge an individual action as good or bad, but not generalize this to the type of action.

Let me try to put this in a way that avoids the issues you having with the words I'm using:

Doctor Bob proscribing drug X to his patient. This action is bad (on an actual-value consequentialism view) and leads to the patients death. However, in the set of possible actions that includes all and only proscribing drug X to patients who present with the same symptoms, have the same available medical history as it relates to this drug, and are of a similar age, weight, etc, most of those actions are good ones (and indeed right ones). We praise Doctor Bob for performing the wrong action because we want to encourage other doctors toward that set of actions, which contains many right actions, and away from the set of possible actions which includes all and only all the instances checking the patients' feet for clues, because most of those actions lead to the patient in question's death, and are bad (and indeed wrong).

This is a bit rough, but hopefully it is helpful to frame it not in terms of actions being good and bad, but actions that share similar qualities not having the same moral status because they occur in different circumstances, and aiming to produce the best outcome with our praising.

However, what I've been trying to tell you, is that the judgement "they are the same type of act" is really a correct judgement. What is really faulty, is your inclination, expressed desire, and need, to judge the acts as sometimes good, yet sometimes bad. This inclination is produced from your application of two incompatible systems of moral evaluation. If you rid yourself of this inclination to try to make two incompatible systems compatible, you can judge the acts as I do, all of the same type, always good, and the death of the patient was incidental, not judged as the result of a bad type of act. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is faulty is that you are judging "types of act" as good or bad, and I'm judging specific acts as good or bad (or indeed right or wrong). There aren't two systems here at all. There's one, it's just that you seem to be under the misapprehension that it is aimed at "types of act" rather than specific acts.

Well then what is Dan's problem? He's been fruitlessly working on the same problem for almost ten years. If it isn't the case that he's trying to unite two incompatible principles, so he gets lost in contradiction, then what do you think his problem is? — Metaphysician Undercover

And I'm not trying to unite two incompaitible principles at all. No part of the problem comes from the inconsistency you have imagined.

I dealt with this already. I agree "expert" does not exclude misunderstanding, we all know that no one is perfect. However, "expert" implies the highest level of understanding, and that means no known misunderstanding. "Expert" signifies the highest possible level of understanding, and this means "no known misunderstanding, in the area one is an expert in. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this reads like a contradiction. However, I will assume you aren't intending a contradiction here and assume you mean that experts can believe things that are wrong so long as we don't know what those things are. That is also silly. If we are sure that someone believes something incorrect about their field but but don't know what, I'm not sure why finding out what it is they are wrong about would lead us to not thinking they are an expert.

And, "no known misunderstanding" is substantially different from "some known misunderstanding". If the misunderstanding is known, then the person cannot be judged as "expert", because this is not the highest level of understanding which is "no known misunderstanding". The fact that we know that no one is perfect, and even the expert has unknown misunderstandings, is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are drawing a really odd distinction here. If we are willing to accept that experts can misunderstand some element of their area of expertise, then why does it matter if we find out what it was they misunderstand/misunderstood or not?

However, if the person has a misunderstanding which is evident, and known, we do not judge the person as an expert. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it possible you are using "known" in a different sense here? Because my first thought it "yes we do, of course we do", but perhaps you mean "known" in some other sense. Perhaps you mean that if someone misunderstands something about their field, and everyone else in the field knows this to be wrong because it has been proven to be false a long time ago, then we wouldn't call them an expert? Is that what you mean?

I already explained to you why this is incoherent. "Different circumstances" implies different acts. Therefore it is incoherent to refer to the same act in different circumstances. And when we consider the difference of circumstances we can understand why similar acts are judged in different ways, because they are not the same act, they are different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, I have explained why you're wrong here. The doctors are in circumstances that appear the same to them (at least in terms of relevant features, I'm not counting things like what day of the week it is or other trivial details).

You seem to have no respect for the law of identity. But of course, denying one of the three fundamental laws of logic incapacitates the other two, so this violation of the law of identity is a tool which enables your contradictory argumentation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you prefer I didn't use the phrase "the same action"? Because I can explain the point without it. I think it's a very sensible way of talking about two actions that appear in all relevant ways to be the same, but I will happily concede that they aren't identical.

Instead, I will say that the doctor's initial action, which we will say was proscribing Drug X (from an actual-consequentialist perspective) was wrong. However, we may want to praise the doctor for proscribing Drug X because in most cases of patients presenting the way the patient presented in this instance, proscribing Drug X would be the right thing to do. Is that easier to grasp?

Thanks, Amadeus. I have been endevouring to answer everyone's questions and criticisms, whether or not they are relevant. I am asking for help on a philosophical problem after all, so it seems the polite thing to do.

"Expert" implies a quality of understanding, 'goodness', and this excludes "misunderstanding, which is 'badness'. But when we say that the person is a specialist we just acknowledge that the person's attention is focused on a very specific aspect of a field, so it is implied that the person is possibly an expert in that specific aspect. An accurate judgement of "expert" though, is much more difficult than a judgement of "specialist", because the latter only requires that the person has specialized one's study, but the former judgement, "expert", is best reserved until after the person proves oneself through experience, practise. Notice the difference between theory and practise here. The judgement of "expert", if rigorous standards are employed, requires practise as acts of proof, to demonstrate the quality of the person's education. And this is why many fields employ apprenticeships and internships. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was with you until this part. This part is just incorrect. Expert implies a quality of understanding I agree, but this does not exclude misunderstandings. What I am saying is that those who are experts in their field, who have a strong understanding of it, can and do still misunderstand aspects of that field, even narrowly construed.

I know you think it's silly. You think adhering to strict rules of definition is unnecessarily pedantic, and doing such in the field of moral philosophy is a ridiculous way of proceeding. So you'd rather go around in your circles of vagueness and principles with self-referential definitions which lead nowhere. This enables your intention of hiding contradictory statements in your illogical endeavour of attempting to show how two incompatible systems of evaluation are compatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do not think that adhering to the strict rules of definition is pedantic at all. I think that quibbling over the defintiion being used rather than addressing the point is sometimes pedantic. I have been clear and precise in how I have defined terms and am not hiding anything. The supposed incompatibility comes entirely from your misunderstanding. But your point here, that expertise is mutually exclusive with holding a misunderstanding in one's field, is just wrong. That's not how we define "expert" and, further, defining it in such a way would make the term essentially useless.

The fact that we make the general judgement that experts are not perfect, and all experts have misunderstanding, is irrelevant to the judgement of whether an individual with a known misunderstanding ought to be called an "expert". This is because the former is concerned with unknown misunderstandings while the latter is concerned with known misunderstandings. This makes the type of :misunderstanding of the two examples categorically different. Because of this difference it is acceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of unknown misunderstandings, yet unacceptable to judge the person as "expert" while acknowledging the reality of the person's known misunderstandings. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there isn't a substantive difference here. If we judge someone to be an expert knowing that they likely misunderstand something, then later on we find out what it is that they misunderstood, we don't say "oh, well they weren't an expert then". Also, there are people we judge as experts now despite judging them to be wrong on some aspect of the topic. When two experts in a field disagree about something, they don't no longer consider one another experts because they judge the other person to misunderstand. Expertise is not mutually exclusive with misunderstanding.

But we cannot do as you propose, and have it both ways, saying that the doctor's actions were both right and wrong, that in itself would constitute misunderstanding in the field of moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, that's not what I claimed. What I claimed was that (from an actual-value consequentialism perspective) the doctor's actions were wrong, yet those same actions would be right in most circumstances, so we may want to praise the doctor's actions in this case because we want to encourage future doctors to act the same way in the same (in terms of the relevant information they have available to them) situations.

I don't know what you are talking about. A "field" is not something broad like "science". When we say that a person is an expert in one's field, we mean the subject of one's study or education, so even within the various branches of science, like biology, chemistry, or physics ,there are many fields of study, which an individual can be an expert in. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. I definitely didn't intend to suggest that someone would be an expert in "science".

You are not making any sense, because you still want to make "the field" something broader than the person's area of expertise, like "science" in general, so that the person can misunderstand things in "the field" which are outside the person's area of expertise. But if the misunderstanding is not part of the person's area of expertise, then it is not part of the person's field of expertise, even if it might be in the same branch of science. And if the misunderstanding is within the person's field of study, then that person is obviously not an expert in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I would say a field of study might be something like evolutionary biology, astrophysics, biochemistry, etc. I don't want it to be something like "science". This is just a misunderstanding. I was just saying that there would be no experts in any field worthy of the term, I wasn't suggesting that we should consider someone an expert in "science". And of course people have misunderstandings within their own field and are still experts, what you are asserting here is just silly.

I am not talking about believing that an expert "probably" has some misunderstanding. I am talking about judging that the person actually does have misunderstanding, and also judging at the same time, that the person is an expert in that field within which the person has misunderstanding. This implicitly violates the law of noncontradiction, because expert in the field implies understanding in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand what you are claiming, and it's silly. We absolutely do say that someone is wrong about something, and yet they are an expert in the field. Having an understanding of some topic does not imply not being wrong about or misunderstanding any aspect of that topic, so there is no contradiction here.

The reason why your strawman is irrelevant is as follows. To say that a person is an expert in a specific field implies that the person understands that field. To say that the person has misunderstanding in that field contradicts this — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. There is no contradiction here because having a misunderstanding about your area of expertise does not contradict either having expertise in that field or having a good understanding of that field generally.

To say the person is an expert in such and such field, but probably misunderstands something in that field, is simply a way of stating that you judge the person to be an expert, while admitting that you are probably wrong in judging the person to be an expert. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it isn't. I might go as far as to say that all experts in all fields worthy of study misunderstand aspects of their field.

Irrelevant due to your strawman. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not a strawman, it's just that the point you are making is very weak. To suggest that someone cannot both be an expert in a field and misunderstand some aspect of that field is to set a bar that essentially no one can clear. To know something very well, to be an expert in it, is not to be wrong about no aspects of it. You are confusion expertise, or understanding, with perfection.

Common usage would not say that the doctor's action was wrong, yet we ought to encourage others to act this way because it was also right. Nor would common usage say that an expert has misunderstanding within the field which one is an expert in. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, common usage is useful for definitions, but not so much for actual claims of what is correct and isn't. Second, common usage would absolutely allow for an expert to have a misunderstanding within the field they are an expert in. That is absolutely how people use "expert". There is a big difference between knowing and understanding a lot about something and having no misunderstandings about that thing.

That's exactly what we do say. "I thought that guy was an expert, but he fucked up, now I know otherwise." — Metaphysician Undercover

We absolutely don't do this. If you stop thinking someone is an expert in a field when they get something wrong about that field, then I suggest you should not think there are any experts in science, or for that matter any field broad enough to be worthy of the title of "expert" in the first place. Everyone gets things wrong. Everyone misunderstands things. What you are looking for is not expertise, but perfection, and you will not find it amongst humans.

You somehow seem incapable of understanding the issue. The point is not that we exclude the possibility of misunderstanding from the judgement of "expert", to hold that the person must be proven to perfection to be called an expert. The point is that we don't judge the person to be an expert, and also judge the person to have misunderstanding in the same respect, at the same time. This is an implicit violation of the law of noncontradiction. "Expert" implies understanding. "Misunderstanding" is the predication opposed to "understanding". By the law of noncontradiction, we cannot judge the person to have both these properties, understanding and misunderstanding, in the same respect, at the same time. The "same respect" refers to the specific field of study. If we judge one to be an expert in some field, we judge that person to have understanding in that field. We cannot also judge that person to have misunderstanding in that field without contradiction.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand what you are claiming, I am telling you it's wrong. We absolutely do judge people to be experts while knowing that they are probably wrong about/misunderstand some aspects of their field. Again, it isn't a violation of the law of non-contradiction because having a good understanding of some subject does not preclude misunderstanding some element of that subject. There's not a logical issue here, just an issue with your use of words.

People don't say things like that, because they are polite. I'll say it here though. Clearly the guy fucked up. Everyone thought he was an expert until some smart ass came along and proved him wrong. Then the truth was revealed, he was not an expert at all, and inside, everyone was laughing at him, but too polite to say anything rude — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you're just badly mistaken about what it means to be an expert. Also, I think you're badly mistaken about what bar people who aren't you are holding others to.

The true situation is exposed by the phrase "zealously defending a view". What drives a person to zealously defend a view, is an unhealthy type of self-confidence, often known as "conceit". The conceited person creates an air of expertise, which is a false expertise. This is a deceptive attitude designed to give others the impression that one is an expert, when it's not really the case. In the example, it required a special individual to demonstrate the conceit to the person who had it. That's not an easy task, to get someone to see oneself as conceited. The others most likely could already see through the conceit, so it probably came as no surprise to them when the guy was outed as phony, and the false expertise was demonstrated. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of that is accurate. This isn't a story of someone who didn't know what they were talking about being exposed as a fraud, it's a story of someone being shown to be wrong and accepting that because every expert in every field worth discussing is likely to be wrong about some of their beliefs. This is especially the case in empirical pursuits. It certainly doesn't make those people not experts. What you are claiming here is just silly.

I know, this is exactly the problem with your dual evaluation system approach. If you value free choice, ('the ability to make one's own choice' or however you represent it), then you also value the ability to choose something other than the "objectively right" choice. But this robs the value from "objectively right", by allowing that the possibility of choosing something other than what is objectively right has a higher value than actually choosing what is objectively right. Then how would the concept "objectively right" be supported as a valid concept, if there is something of higher value (freedom to choose)?. — Metaphysician Undercover

The ability to choose is the measure of value here. It is very much the thing which determines what is objectively right. Objective rightness isn't some other system. I could offer some specific examples that may clarify this if you'd like, but you'll need to stop asserting that I claim things that I don't.

The two valuation systems are incompatible, yet you want to employ them both. This results in incoherency, contradiction throughout your examples. The doctor's action was both right and wrong, depending on the valuation system employed. The person ought to be able to choose, even when that means choosing what is wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are inventing the idea that there are two systems here. There really aren't.

If we employ "objective right" as the value system, then the highest goal is to do what is objectively right. But you also want to assign value to making one's own choice", and this would mean often choosing other than what is objectively right. If doing what is objectively right is the highest value, then you cannot also hand value to the possibility of doing something other than what is objectively right, without contradiction. The two values are simply incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again "objective right" isn't a value system. What is objectively right is determined by reference to the freedom of persons to understand and make the own choices (though again, this isn't quite my view as I'm a satisficing consequentialist, this is just for simplicity's sake).

Speak for yourself then. If I knew that a particular person misunderstood some elements, or even one element, of a specific field, I would never call that person an expert in that field.

It appears like you would. And that is why I say you use words in a sloppy way. You see no sloppiness in speaking this way. And that's why I judge you as unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a ridiculous bar to set. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are using them in a way that is divorced from both common usage and, in this case and others, reality.

The issue is not a question of whether the person might be called an expert even when there is the possibility of that person being "wrong about some element" in that field. The issue is having judged the person to actually be wrong, about a specific element in that field. — Metaphysician Undercover

When it turns out that someone was wrong about some aspect of their field, and they come to a better understanding, we don't say that they weren't an expert previously. Expertise, and indeed understanding, is not the same as perfection. There is a story that Richard Dawkins tells about a colleague zealously defending a view on some niche aspect of in evolutionary biology and then, one day, being shown to be wrong by a visiting academic and thanking the academic in question for showing that he was wrong all these years. The point of the story is about science admitting it can be wrong, but it would be a very different story indeed if all those present said "well, I guess he wasn't an expert in evolutionary biology after all". Again, this is not a sensible bar to set when it comes to expertise.

You are missing the point. If the person apprehends the choice as the objectively right choice, then they must choose it necessarily, according to the apprehension that it is objectively right. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, this just isn't true. Knowing the right thing to do and actually doing it are entirely different things. Also, while we're on the subject, there being a right thing to do and knowing what the right thing to do is are also different things, but that's secondary to my point here.

So when you say "it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely", it is implied that the thing chosen is not the "objectively right" thing, because it is chosen freely. So "right" here does not mean objectively right, and "objectively right" would remain irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

All incorrect because knowing what the objectively right thing to do is does not mean they must choose it necessarily. It means they should, but not that they will.

This is the principle which produces the incoherency in your doctor example. The doctor chooses freely to do what is believed to be "the right thing". However, from the actual-value (objectively right) perspective, it is the wrong thing. You refuse to acknowledge the incoherency and insist that it can be both, the right thing to do, from the free choice perspective, and also the wrong thing to do, from the objectively right perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actual-value consequentialism isn't the same thing as claiming there is objective right at all. These are not the same claim. Both actual-value consequentialism and expected-value consequentialism can claim there is an objective right and, likewise, neither of them are any more required to than the other (though I may suggest they are both required to depending on how "objective" is fleshed out here)

Also, I'm not in any way claiming it is the right thing to do. If you're going to keep putting words in my mouth, I'm going to start asking for quotes where I have said these things.

how do you make this consistent with what you posit as the objectively right choice, "the most freedom"? The 'most freedom" implies not being restricted by those conditions, "understanding", and the restriction you described earlier as the person's "own" choices. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, again, I'm not a maximizing consequentialist so I wouldn't say this, but for simplicity's sake: The right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom of persons over their own choices where "freedom" is understood as the ability of persons to understand and make choices. And no, the most freedom does not imply this if freedom is understood as the ability of persons to understand and make choices and specifically only freedom over those choices that belongs to persons is taken to be the measure of value.

This is a sloppy use of words designed to cover up or veil the incoherence in your belief. You use "field" which has a very broad an ambiguous meaning to produce the equivocation required to accept your statement. The equivocation is between the specific "field" which the person is an expert "in", and the more general "field" which the expert has beliefs "about".

An expert "in" a field has a specific area of expertise and this is known as one's field of expertise. Within that field of expertise, there can be no misunderstanding or else we cannot say that the supposed expert has a good understanding of that field, and is therefore an expert. However, the "field" in general extends far beyond the expert's specific field of expertise, and so the expert's knowledge "about that field" in general, may contain misunderstanding concerning areas which are not a part of the specific field of expertise.

In other words, if we clear up the ambiguity you introduce with your use of "field", "in a field" and "about that field", we'll see that your claim cannot be accepted. A person may claim to have a "field of expertise", or may be judged to have a "field of expertise". If the person is judged to have misunderstanding within that field we cannot also judge the person to be an expert in that field. The one judgement excludes the other. The judgement of misunderstanding excludes the judgement of expert, and the judgement of expert excludes the judgement of misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not using words in a sloppy manner. We absolutely can and do consider people to be experts in a specific field in which they misunderstand (or misunderstood) some element of that field. One judgement does not preclude the other at all. There is a big difference between knowing a lot about a subject and having a good understanding of it, and having a perfect knowledge of a subject and not being wrong or misunderstanding any part of it. I suggest you go ask scientists about their area of expertise and ask whether they think it is likely that they are wrong about some element of that area, or that something they have thought they understand will one day turn out to be misunderstood, I think you will find that those who are intellectually honest will say that this is very likely indeed.

This does nothing to validate your incoherency. You are claiming that we ought to encourage others to carry out an act which has been judged as wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, not incoherent at all. A little odd to consider, but entirely coherent and consistent.

What I said is that we cannot value both principles, "there is an objectively right choice", and also the principle "a person ought to choose freely". The two principles are implicitly incompatible.

If there is an objectively right choice, then the person ought to make that choice and no other choice. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the person ought to choose freely. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, this isn't true, as we might think that it is important that a person choose to do the right thing freely. I imagine Kant would take this view for example. Second, I'm fairly sure what I said was that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices is the measure of moral value, which is rather different to "a person ought to choose freely". In this case, the objectively right choice would be the one that protects the most freedom (again, this is a simplified maximizing verison, which I don't agree with, I'm just pointing out that these things aren't inconsistent)

I agree that people state things about the world, laws of physics, etc., which are intended to be eternal unchanging facts about the world. However, I would also argue that the latest evidence, and what numerous physicists agree to, is that this is not an accurate representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what this means. Further, laws of physics which adhere in our world are the very least of the truths we might point to as unchanging. For example, we might point out that the laws of logic are true in all possible worlds (if they are true at all).

That's incoherent. "Misunderstanding" explicitly indicates the incorrectness of one's assumed understanding. It does not signify an incompleteness of understanding, it signifies an incorrectness of understanding. By acknowledging that there is incorrectness within the proposed understanding, you implicitly acknowledge that it is not a good understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that misunderstanding implies an incorrectness in one's understanding. What I am saying is that you can have an incorrectness in your understanding and still have a good understanding of the thing as a whole. Every expert in every field worth discussing will have incorrect beliefs about that field, but they could still be said to have a good understanding of it.

This is very similar to your idea that the doctor's action (in your example) might be the correct choice from the doctor's perspective prior to the action, but the wrong choice from a perspective posterior to the action. Just like the person with the supposed "good understanding" does not recognize and acknowledge that aspects of this understanding are incorrect, and therefore it is not a good understanding, the doctor does not recognize and acknowledge the information which makes the choice wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, that isn't what I said at all. What I said was that it might be wrong (on an actual-value consequentialist approach) but the doctor might have every reason to think it's right and we may want future doctors to continue to act in the same way in the same (in terms of relevant features) situation.

What is indicated by the nature of these examples, is that you are consistent in your incoherency. This demonstrates a deeply entrenched habit of illogical thinking. You have a way of thinking which accepts contradiction and incoherency. I suggest that this is likely the result of many years of attempting to reconcile incompatible ideas. When an individual takes up the challenge of attempting to reconcile contradictory ideas (which is really to do the impossible), the resolution to the problem often appears to the person to be a sloppy use of words (which I've exposed), so that the incoherency of uniting two contradictory ideas is hidden underneath that sloppy use of words. It then appears like contradictory ideas have been united We might conclude that the person appears to have "a good understanding", in uniting incompatible ideas, but what lies underneath is a misunderstanding of the elements, which makes such a union impossible, so it is not a good understanding at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no incoherence in what I said. But what I said and what you are claiming I said are different things. I am not using words in a sloppy way, you are adding in extra claims which I haven't made or implied.

I really can't believe that you do not see the incoherency here. I think you are glossing it over, in an attempt to hide it under a sloppy use of words. Let me state the situation clearly and succinctly. If it is the case that "the most freedom" is what is valued the highest, then it is impossible that there is an "objectively right" choice in any situation. Absolute freedom, which is what is signified by "the most freedom", if assigned the highest value, denies the possibility that any value can be assigned to any choice for being "the right choice". This is because that value, assigned to "the right choice" would detract from the person's freedom to choose anything (which is stated as the most valuable by "the most freedom"), by making that specific choice 'weighted' with more value than any of the other possibilities. Therefore assuming a "right choice" negates the value assigned to "the most freedom". The two are simply incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, what I said wasn't the same as "the most freedom", but that's not really the point here so I'll move past it. A choice being right does not impinge on anyone's freedom. That is similar to saying that there being a right answer to questions impinges on people's freedom of thought.

I propose to you that this is a very sloppy form of predication. It is sloppy because it is a form of predication specifically designed to avoid the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Instead of determining whether it is correct or incorrect to say whether the subject has a certain property at a specific time, we simply predicate that the subject "is changing" at that time. This is meant to imply that the proper predication is not required, thereby averting the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

I put it to you that it is entirely reasonable to say that something is changing and that if you think this violates the law of non-contradiction, then you are not using "changing" appropriately. Off the top of my head, I'd suggest that we might understand changing as being in an intermediate stage of some process that will continue toward some state that is different from the current one in the future. For example, we might say that something is at a certain temperature, but we might also say that it's temperature is increasing. This seems like an entirely sensible claim to make and not one that violates any of the laws of logic, so long as it is properly understood.

Also, and again, I have also pointed out many features of the world which seem not to be changing, which we could describe as features of the way the world is without any reference to a specific time period. You must agree, even on your restrictive use of "is" and "the way" that unchanging facts about the world can be considered facts about the way it is, right?

You have not used "understand" in a precise way at all. In fact, you complained about my request for precision in meaning when we discussed what it means to understand one's own choice. You wanted to allow 'understand" to mean anything from being able to provide a reason for the choice, after the fact, to simply being able to describe the choice with words. Now, you state that a good understanding can consist of elements of misunderstanding. That's incoherency, and clear evidence of sloppy usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not want that. You were the one that claimed I was including "providing reasons after the fact". That is not something I claimed at all. Also yes, I think you can have a good understanding of something that you misunderstand elements of. However, that is discussing understanding in a general sense, rather than the specific sense of understanding one's choices, which I gave you a precise definition for, which you completely ignored.

Your example only demonstrates the incoherency which results from the incompatibility. If "objectively right" is taken as a general principle, "protect the most freedom", then each person in each situation which one finds oneself in, must have the most freedom to choose, and this implies that there is not an objectively right choice to be made. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of that is correct. First, I'm not sure what it means to take "objective right" as a general principle. There being a right choice does not limit one's freedom.

The incompatibility is between the general and the particular. If there is an objectively right choice in particular circumstances, then the value of freedom must be denied in favour of the value of the objectively right choice. The freedom to choose can have no value relative to the need for the objectively right action. And if "objectively right" is taken as a general principle to state "the most freedom is what is objectively right", then the person must be allowed the most freedom, to choose whatever one wants to do in any circumstances. This leaves us no principles to determine what is "the right choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

The objectively right action would be the action which protects the most freedom. There isn't two different measures of value here, there is one measure of value to determine what is action is right (and again, this isn't what I would say, as I am a satisficing consequentialist, so I would say there are often multiple morally permissible actions, I'm just simplifying it for you).

Of course you try to find your way around this problem by restricting "freedom of choice" to "freedom to make one's own choice", where the meaning of "one's own choice', we've already seen, gets lost in sloppy usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sloppy at all. Really quite clear. I would indeed limit the right to only protecting the person's own choices, but that isn't necessary in order for the two not to be incompatible. The reasons for doing that are different.

"The way the world is" indicates a static unchanging thing signified as "the way". To affirm that you use "the way" with meaning which could include change, is no different, in principle from saying that you use the word "square" in such a way so that it could include circles. If we say that there is such a thing as circles, then it would be contradictory to say that all figures are squares. Likewise, if the world is said to be changing then it is contradictory to say that there is such a thing as "the way the world is". What would be the purpose of the usage you propose, if not to create misunderstanding and/or to deceive? — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you're just wrong. That doesn't imply that. It doesn't imply that not just when I use it, but when people use it generally. If someone says "the river near your house is polluted, I know you may not like it, but that's just the way it is" that does not suggest that said river has always been or will always be that way. That being said, I have also made numerous claims about the features of the world that presumably do not change, but you have ignored those points and instead focused on how I am using the words "is" and "the way". In both cases, the way I am using them is consistent with common usage as well as coherent for explaining the points I was trying to make, which you seem to have largely ignored.

I'm not using words in a sloppy way. I'm using them in a precise way, just not the way you want them to be used.

My difficulties solving the problem of weighing freedom over different things do not come from dubious definitions, but from difficulty. Moral philosophy is hard and, while I am not dismissing the possibility of incompatibility completely, the reasons you have given for thinking that weighing freedoms is impossible in the way I have described are grounded in fundamentally misunderstanding the claims being made and the words used to make them, as well as untenable meta-ethical and meta-physical beliefs.

Objective right also does not conflict with freedom being valuable. For example, if the thing which is objectively right is the thing which protects the most freedom (which is not my view, but is an example of a maximizing view with the same measure of value) then that is surely treating freedom as valuable.

Further, I am not using terms in a way similar to defining square in a way that can include circles (though there are certainly contexts in which this could be entirely reasonable, eg "a square meal"), I am using words in a fairly common way to communicate sensible points.

In my understanding, there is two distinct senses of "implied". One means what is indicated by evidence, the other means what is indicated by logic. The first sense does not produce necessity, because "evidence" does not provide the required certainty. The other sense, being valid logic, produces logical necessity. So for example, All men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, "implies" that Socrates is mortal, by logical necessity.

The latter sense, the one of logical necessity is the one used in the argument about the relation between understanding time and understanding human actions. When we say that an understanding of human actions "implies" some understanding of time, it is a logical relation being referred to. We are saying that any understanding of human actions necessarily consists of some understanding of time, through a logical relation between "the understanding of human actions" and "the understanding of time". In the example above, when we say Socrates is a man "implies" that Socrates is mortal, we are referring to a relation of logical necessity between "man" and "mortal", in the very same way. Understanding human actions implies, due to logical necessity, some understanding of time.

With respect to the relation between degrees of understanding, and misunderstanding, this is what I tried to explain to you earlier, as two distinct things. When we are learning things, mathematics in school for example, we go through degrees of understanding as we increase our knowledge. Never can this be classified as "misunderstanding" unless the student learns a wrong thing, goes in a faulty direction. "Misunderstanding" consists of mistaken knowledge, when someone learns something which is wrong. Since it is mistaken, and wrong, it cannot be any degree of understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

In that case I don't think I would agree that understanding human action implies understanding time in the sense you have said here.

I mean, one can absolutely misunderstand some element of mathematics yet still have a good understanding of mathematics generally. It seems that we can understand something reasonably well, but still misunderstand part of it, can't we?

I'll try, but since it is the lounge, inhibitions loosen, then spontaneity and habit guide the tongue. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I suggest keeping your tongue off the keyboard.

Uh, continuing with the ...assertions. Look Dan, you assert that what I say is incorrect, and my arguments are fallacious, but you do not address them. You just assert, assert, assert. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have addressed them again and again. If you wish for evidence of this, I suggest looking at my many posts replying to you. You will find many examples of me addressing your assertions, pointing out dubious uses of words, etc.

This is incorrect for the following reasons. You explained how you interpret the meaning of the "is-ought gap", and I proceeded to show you how that understanding of the principle was completely consistent with what I was arguing, how I was "using" the is-ought gap..

See, I produced an application of that principle, the is-ought gap, I applied it to what we were arguing. Then you provided an understanding of the is-ought gap, and I showed you that your understanding is consistent with my application. However, instead of accepting my application, or even trying to demonstrate that it is not consistent with how you understand the principle, you simply denied my application, and asserted that I am wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

You really shown that so much as made a bunch of dubious assertions about normative claims vs descriptive claims which seem to be rooted in misunderstanding and the implication that descriptive claims must be about something static, rather than something that may be dynamic/changing. If you did not mean to imply this, feel free to correct me and explain what you meant instead.

Then you topped that off with something extremely rude, and downright stupid:
"I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean."
How can you proceed from the premise that you cannot understand me, to the conclusion that I do not understand myself? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say you didn't understand yourself, I said you don't understand what many of these words mean. These are clearly not the same claim (you are not equal to the definitions of words, in case that needed justifying). If you are using them in some way completely divorced from how they are generally used, feel free to provide definitions.

This is an invalid implication. Consider how I explained the logical sense of "implies" above. Now, take a look at your proposition "the physical properties of the universe are changing now". Your claim is that this proposition implies something about "the way the world is". It does not, for the reasons I've already explained to you. Simply put, "the way the world is" implies that there is a way that the world is, while "the properties of the universe are changing" implies that there is not a way that the universe is, because it is in a condition of changing. There is no logical relation, therefore no logical necessity, because the two are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you want "the way the world is" to mean more than it does. And, again, the condition of changing is a claim about the way something is, because "the way something is" does not imply that the thing is not changing.

"Is" can be used to refer to the state something is in at a particular time, or it can be used to refer to the state of something throughout time. On the first definition, it is entirely reasonable to say a number of things about the way the world is (for example it contains chairs). On the second, that it is in a state of constant flux (assuming that it is) would be a claim about the way the world always is. Further, as mentioned previously, there are a number of features of the world that do not change

See, you simply ignore the logic applied to the meaning of the terms, and insist and assert things which if accepted, render the words incoherent and meaningless. What's the point? We wouldn't be able to get anywhere if we accepted things like that. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not ignoring the meaning of words, you're just incorrect about them both in the particular case of assuming that "the way something is" must refer to something that is unchanging and in the general case of assuming that words can only have a single meaning, rather than being context sensitive and capable of picking out multiple concepts depending on how they are used.

You say this is pedantic, but pedanticism is extremely necessary here. We are trying to get a handle on moral principles, a field in which the deeper we delve into it, the less relevant empirical evidence becomes, due to the is-ought gap. Therefore the only thing we have to guide us, to keep us on the straight and narrow, is strict adherence to rigorous principles. Without that, we can claim anything as ought, right, good, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

It really isn't. What is important is careful consideration of concepts, not nit-picking over words. I could have, by the same token, pointed out that the universe is not changing "now" if "now" is taken to be a specific moment, since everything is always exactly equal to itself so whatever state the universe is in within a specific moment is exactly what state it is in. Alternatively, I could have disputed the idea of a present moment by way of relativity. Neither of these would have been good points though. Better to deal with what you meant, rather than fretting over your word usage.

No, you have merely asserted that. It is nothing but your opinion, and as I said, it's a principle you assert for the purpose of begging the question. If you know Plato, you would see that goals are named as "the good". And, you'd understand that "the good" is distinctly other from "objective truth". Again, the difference between the two denies the possibility of logical implication. — Metaphysician Undercover

Putting aside to what extent Plato's views matter, are you genuinely claiming that Plato was not concerned with or aiming at objective truth?

Also, I've already explained to you that any worthwhile discussion relies on the assumption of objective truth. When Plato claims that the form of the good exists in the realm of the forms, he is claiming that this is objectively true, not just that he finds it fun to believe so. Whether he is right or not has an answer. There either is a form of the good somewhere in a Platonic realm, or there isn't.

It doesn't follow, for you, because you didn't follow the argument. That is evident from this misrepresentation. Allow me to restate it please.

The argument starts from the primary premise which you and I agreed on, "understanding of human actions implies some understanding of time". "Implies" here, indicates that "some understanding of time" is necessary to understanding "human actions", as an essential part of the concept indicated by "human actions". That word "implies" indicates the logical relation, some understanding of time is required for an understanding of human actions. Do you understand the premise?

Now the second premise is "a misunderstanding of time". "Misunderstanding" means something other than understanding, as we've discussed earlier. A person thinks oneself to understand, and appears to oneself as having an understanding, but the thing which appears to the person as an understanding, is not an understanding at all, it is something other than an understanding, and actually opposed to understanding, so it is properly called "misunderstanding".

The conclusion drawn from those two premises is that the person who has a misunderstanding of time will necessarily have a misunderstanding of "human actions". This is because the concept "human actions" is dependent on "some understanding of time", and "misunderstanding of time" signifies a lack of understanding, something other than understanding. which appears like understanding but is not. Therefore, what appears to the person as an understanding of "human actions" would really be a misunderstanding, according to the extent that "understanding time" is required, necessary, or essential to, "understanding human actions", indicated by that word "implies". — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I don't agree that implies indicates necessity, but putting that to one side, are you suggesting that to misunderstand something is to not understand it at all surely there are degrees of understanding?

There you go, backing up your use of stupid assertions with more stupid assertions. We'll have an infinite regress of stupid assertions, with nothing justified. How is the statement "you are blatantly wrong" supposed to indicate anything to me other than how stupid you are?

Have you ever been in this situation? You demonstrate to someone what you believe to be sound logic, premises backed up with good evidence, and arguments of valid logic, and the person replies "you're blatantly wrong". So you provide more evidence and logic, and the person persists with "that's simply incorrect". Wouldn't it occur to you, that the person is just countering sound logic with stupid assertions? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll thank you to keep your rudeness to yourself.

Also, that isn't remotely the situation you find yourself in. I am denying obviously incorrect claims that you haven't backed up properly. You haven't provided logic and evidence, you have provided fallacious arguments, usually backed by improper definitions of terms. Further, I am often explaining why you are wrong, but you seem to not be listening. For example, your points about the is-ought gap. I pointed out this was wrong and then explained what the is-ought gap is, and that you were using it improperly. You then responded "well how can the situation one is in affect morality?". Which a) was obvious from what I had just said, and b) wasn't remotely related to the point I was making. I could address the original point you were taking issue with as well, but that is discussed in the next paragraph.

I made no such assertion, that's a complete misrepresentation. I said "the way something is" refers to something static, unchanging, as "the way", and "is" refers to the present time, now. I never said that this implies that it hasn't changed in the past, or that it implies that it will not change in the future. So your representation of what I said is clearly wrong.

But I also said that the proposition "there is a way the world is" is contrary to evidence. This is because evidence indicates that the world is changing at the present time, now, which is what "is" refers to. So your statement "the way something is" indicates something unchanging at the present, now, while allowing that this static condition of now, might change in the future, or past.

This statement is clearly contrary to reality. In reality, known by empirical evidence, things do not change in the past, nor do they change in the future, they change only at the present, now. That is the only time when change occurs, at the present. So the evidence is clear, you are the one who is blatantly wrong. Things are not static now, as "the way something is" indicates, with the possibility of change in the past and future, in reality things are changing now, with the possibility that the named thing might be the same in the past or future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, this seems both pedantic in the extreme and probably just incorrect depending on how we flesh out "now". But let's take a fairly everyday usage of "now" and say that the physical properties of the universe (where things are, what state they are in, etc etc) are changing now. That is a claim about the way the world is. The way it is, assuming you are right, is a state of flux. Also, there are a bunch of features of the universe that presumably aren't changing, such as the laws of physics, and things that hold true across all possible worlds which aren't changing, such as the laws of logic. None of this means we can't talk sensibly about the way the world is.

Again, an unsupported assertion, which is the basis of the fallacy of begging the question, that you commit. — Metaphysician Undercover

First, that begging the question requires more than unsupported assertion. Second, I haven't committed that fallacy. Third, this is less an unsupported assertion, and more an explanation. I have pointed out the goal of metaphysics and ontology and explained that that is a goal directed at objective truth.

Are you presenting this as evidence of how important an understanding of time is to moral philosophy. That's what I argued since the beginning. And I also said that the biggest, most significant restriction on one's freedom is that the past cannot be changed. Both you and Amadeus dismissed this fact as irrelevant to moral philosophy.

Now I see that you are starting to understand how time actually does restrict one's freedom to act. You call it "the situation", but if you keep looking at your example, you'll see that the description names time as applying the restriction. This is indicated by the condition "I have no time machine". This shows that if you had a time machine, the restriction would not apply, therefore it is time rather than "the situation" which is limiting your freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am using this as an example of the situation I am in, which includes the time I am in, meaning I can't do something and how this relates to the principle of ought implies can.

There is not something I am starting to understand here, so much as something I have understood from the off and am trying to explain to you as you seemed to misunderstand what I was saying.

I don't see your argument. What you "ought to do" is determined by intention, not the situation. As I said, the context is the intention, the context is not the situation. Intention dictates the end, the situation dictates the means. So if "ought to save the child" indicates the good intention, then you ought to do this regardless of the situation. This means that if the situation limits your means, it only makes the task more difficult. You can't swim, so you think of the stick method. That doesn't work so you try something else, etc. etc. etc., maybe even call for help.

The fact that you provide all these different alternatives indicates that you recognize "ought" belongs to the intention, "save the child" in this case, and not to any particular one of the specified means, which are dictated by the situation. "Ought" therefore, is not restricted by the situation, nor is it restricted by what is apprehended as what "can" be done. We must allow that it transcends the situation, as intention transcends the situation, inspiring us to find the means to get through seemingly impossible situations — Metaphysician Undercover

No, ought is not determined by intention. Ought is determined by morality, regardless of your intentions.

The reason I provided other explanations was I thought you might immediately start trying to dispute the example rather than addressing the point, which I can see you have done as well.

This issue of "ought" being restricted by the situation is very similar to the issue of "ought" being restricted by "the information which one has". This is a defeatist attitude which allows "the good" (what is intended), to be compromised unnecessarily by the way that one perceives "the situation". This is is conducive to cop outs, excuses, and rationalizations as to why one did not do what ought to have been done. Sorry, I was limited by the circumstances".

When you allow "ought" to be restricted by the situation, or by the information which one has, then you need a whole slew of other principles applicable in all the different circumstances, to determine, at what point do I stop trying to find ways to save the child, at what point do i stop seeking further information. To properly deal with this problem, we need to allow that "ought" transcends the situation. Therefore, "situation" is irrelevant, as I said. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fairly sure I didn't say that ought was restricted by merely the information that one has, as I very much left room for people to be wrong due to ignorance.

Further, it isn't defeatist to say that you only ought to do things you are able to do. It is realistic. Are you suggesting that people ought to do things that are impossible for them to do?

OK, It looks like we finally have some agreement on something. Understanding of human actions "implies some understanding of time". From this, we can also conclude that a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human actions.

Since moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions we can conclude that the moral philosopher requires sound premises regarding the nature of time. Therefore "a discussion of time" is not to be avoided, but is a necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't follow. Requiring some understanding of something does not imply that having a misunderstanding of time would result in a misunderstanding of human action as one might have some understanding but also misunderstand something to with time

Also, I wouldn't agree that moral philosophy is an attempt to understand and evaluate human actions.

Again, you keep making stupid assertions like this without any justification. I explained very clearly how "the way the world is" implies staticness. Allow me to reiterate:

"The way" implies one way. And "one way" implies unchanging. If the world was changing (unstatic) at the time designated by "is" (now), we could not truthfully call it "the way" the world is, we'd have to say "the ways" which the world is (now).

I'm really tired of such stupid assertions, where you simply ignore my logical demonstrations and make a contrary (stupid) assertion. — Metaphysician Undercover

These are not stupid assertions. You keep claiming things that are blatently wrong and I am just pointing it out. It is as if you said "well obviously, 'time' implies the use of an armadillo as a sundial" and I am simply pointing out that this is obviously incorrect.

The way something is does not imply it is the only way it ever will be. You are asserting that it does, but it just doesn't. That isn't a reasonable thing to infer from what I said.

Also, while I have been granting your assertion that the world constantly changes for the sake of pointing out that this would be a feature of the way the world is, there are plenty of things about the world that presumably do not change, such as the fundamental laws of physics, and things which don't change across all possible worlds, such as necessary truths.

This is simple begging the question, in the way I explained. You assume that the statement "changing is the way that the world is" is meant to represent an objective truth, rather than what the author claims, that it is meant to represent a subjective opinion. And this assumption provides the conclusion you desire "if the world is in a constant state of change...". That's begging the question, making an assumption which produces the desired conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you genuinely mean that as a subjective opinion similar to "I don't like tomatoes" then why are you telling me and why should I care?

You do not seem to have a firm understanding of ontology and metaphysics. Propositions in these fields are speculative, and not meant as "objective truth". These are like unproven hypotheses in science. They are not proposed as objective truths, they are proposed as theories to try with evidence and logic, in a procedure which would hopefully lead toward understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just incorrect. Certainly there are some metaphysicians who are happy to spout similar nonsense, but it certainly isn't the case that metaphysics does not aim at objective truth as a rule. Also, unproven theories in science are proposed as suggestions of what the objective truth might be, or at least some approximation of it, to be tested when possible.

So we can take your representation "the world is in a constant state of change", or my representation, "changing is the way that the world is", and analyze such propositions for the potential of truth. Now we can see that each representation is self-contradicting in the way described above. "State of change" is incoherent by contradiction, as well as "changing is the way" is incoherent by contradiction, as explained above. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a contradiction because you are adding an assumption of staticness which you aren't entitled to.

Therefore opinions like those, which appear to express what is intended as "objective truth" must be rejected because of incoherence. This leaves us with two distinct and incompatible approaches, the approach of staticness, "the world is in a constant state", and the approach of activity, "the world is changing". Empirical evidence supports the latter, "the world is changing". Now we must dismiss all such propositions which appear to express opinions intended as objective truth, as inadequate for an accurate ontology, metaphysics, and consequently moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

None of this makes a lick of sense. Even if it were the case that what I said implied staticness, which it doesn't, none of this would follow from it. To say that truth is objective certainly does not imply that the world never changes. That is fairly clearly silly.

Also, I'm not sure you get to appeal to empirical evidence as support for a position without the assumption of objective truth.

Right, but can't you see that "descriptive claims" are essentially claims about "the way the world is"? These are claims which are intended to purvey an "objective truth". And, as explained above, this approach is inadequate for ontology and metaphysics. And, because this approach produces faulty ontology and metaphysics, it is also a faulty approach for moral philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

The claims of ontology and metaphysics are descriptive claims about the way the world (or possibly worlds) is (or possible are). They are very much concerned with objective truth.

So ontology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy must assign priority to change, as changing is how we actually know the world. Once the world is understood to be known as changing, rather than misunderstood to be known by descriptive claims, which imply "objective truth" (is), then we seek normative claims which involve judgements concerning good and bad changes (ought). — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what any of this means. It looks to me like you don't understand what many of the words you are using mean.

Yes, that's exactly what you need to justify. And, the problem is as I've explained above. The "situation" is always rapidly changing, Therefore, in reality, what is actually happening in any real circumstances, is that there is activity which cannot be understood through descriptive claims intended to represent an "objective truth" concerning "the situation".

Furthermore, since this is what is actually going on (rapid changes), and the subject is conditioned to deal with what is actually going on, through evolutionary forces, these changes are understood through the context of intentions, wants, desires. Therefore reference to "the situation one is in" is meaningless and irrelevant. The person is in the midst of rapid changes, which are understood by that person in relation to (within the context of) what is intended, wanted, or desired by that person. The proposed "situation one is in" has no relevance.

If you really believe that "the situation one is in", is of any relevance here, you need to justify that opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think you have understood what I was talking about at all here as you seem to have gone off on a weird tangent that has very little to do with it. But sure, I will explain why how the situation one is in relates to what it can be the case that one ought to do.

Hitler killing millions of Jewish people was a bad thing. One might think that I should prevent him from doing so. However, the situation I find myself in is that this happened many years before I was born and, alas, I have no time machine. Thus, I cannot do this. Because I cannot do this (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to do it.

Similarly let's say I come across a child drowning on my way home from work. One might think that I ought to jump in and save the child. However, for the sake of argument, I am paralyzed from the neck down and so cannot do so (also there is no way I can use my hypothetical wheelchair to push a stick over to them etc etc etc). Since I cannot jump in and save the child (due to the situation I find myself in) it is not the case that I ought to (though perhaps I ought to call for help or something else that I am capable of).

These examples demonstrate the way in which ought implies can and how the situation we find ourselves in is relevant to this.

I know, I expected a reply like this. You and I have significant difference in how we understand "understand". You seem to think that if a person can recognize a thing, and call it by the appropriate name, the person "understands" that thing. That's how you described "understanding one's choice". — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't remotely how I described understanding one's choice.

But you are clearly inconsistent with your usage of the term. Now, to suit your purpose, you want a "low-level understanding of the nature of time" not to qualify as "understanding", though you insisted on an extremely low level, in the other case. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not being inconsistent in the least, but if you mean a low-level understanding, then I'd probably agree. Given your history, I thought it was unlikely you would be setting a low bar for understanding.

To understand "making scrambled eggs" one must understand temporal order, which action is first, second, and after this and after that. In "understanding" any human action, it is necessary to recognize the temporal order of means to end. The means are carried out as the actions necessary to bring about the end, which follows the means in time, as the effect of the causes. Also, in the case of your example, scrambled eggs, as in most cases, the means are most often very complex, requiring a temporal order of causes and effects within the means required to bring about the final effect, the end, which is named "scrambled eggs". — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, I'm not sure whether I understand time or not, but I have a reasonable guess. I think if this is the bar you are setting for understanding time (assuming that this understanding is correct, but let's not get into a discussion of time) then I think I would probably agree that understanding something like scrambing eggs probably implies some understanding of time.

You contradict yourself. "The way the world is" implies a staticness. That is unavoidable, "the way it is" indicates one unchanging thing "the way". Any change and it could no longer be called "the way" it would be a different "way". We cannot say "the way it is" without implying staticness because "the way" implies one unchanging "way". — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't imply that. You are inferring that inappropriately.

This is why, if someone says "changing is the way that the world is", it's meaningless incoherency which can be interpreted in the two opposing ways I explained. You say that this means "change" is the one "objective truth" that we have about the world. I say that this means that that there is no "objective truth" about the world. I say that the statement "changing is the way that the world is", ought to be interpreted as a descriptive opinion about the world, rather than an objective truth. But you do not seem to understand what it means to accept a statement as meant to be a subjective description which people can either agree or disagree with, rather than as meant to be an objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't say it is the "one" objective truth. I said that if the world is in a constant state of change, then that is something that is true about the way the world is.

It's not a subjective description at all. It is an objective claim which may or may not be true. People certainly disagree about things that are objective all the time, it's just that some of them (sometimes all of them) are wrong.

This is the point. The most general statements, (most zoomed out), "the world is this way..." are completely useless in guiding human actions because they have no applicability. Applicability is determined by the particular circumstances. And, the particular circumstances are a feature of the individual's wants, needs, desires, or intentions. So if the person's intent is to make a map of the river, the description required is completely different from the description required if the person is trying to understand flow patterns and erosion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean this is fairly obviously not true. There are plenty of general statements about the way the world works that are also of practical importance to the individual and their goals. Further, whether something is useful to the individual and their goals is a completely different issue to whether it is correct.

Since you are going to keep insisting this, without explanation as to how this is possible, as you've done in other instances, I'm going to ask for justification. How does "what is" refer to anything other than a static unchanging situation, without the attempt at justification reducing the statement to meaningless incoherency? As I said above "the way it is" refers to one unchanging way, as does "what is". If "change" is invoked, then a before and after in time is also implied, and this negates "is", which refers to the present, "now". Then you no longer have "is', but a temporal distinction between two distinct times, before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Is" in the is-ought gap refers to descriptive claims, rather than normative claims. The point of the is-ought gap is that you cannot derive a normative conclusion from non-normative premises. Premises can be descriptive without refering to only a single time, for example they might describe a process that occurs over time.

You haven't justified "objective moral fact". Nor have you justified that "the situation one is in" refers to anything other than the context of one's intentions, as I explained above. So none of this has any bearing on the understanding of human actions until these assumptions you throw around can be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking me to justify the words or the claims here, I'm unclear? Do you really need me to justify what "the situation one is in" refers to in the context I've used it here?

I mean, that since time is an essential aspect of activities, then to correctly understand any activity requires a correct understanding of time. For example, animality is an essential aspect of being human, so to correctly understand what it means to be human requires an understanding of what it means to be an animal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Eh, I'm not sure that this is true. Perhaps to fully understand an activity requires an understanding of time, but I think this is a very high bar you are setting for understanding an activity. I think one can understand making scrambled eggs with a fairly low-level of understanding of the nature of time itself.

If we "zoom out", such that "the present" is a day, a month, a year, or a million years, then the changes which are occurring at the present, get increasingly significant as we zoom out, and it makes less and less sense to even think that there is "way that the world is". And if we zoom in, the changes get faster and faster, and it becomes more and more clear that change is of the essence of the world, rather than any assumed state of being (way that the world is). — Metaphysician Undercover

If that is indeed true, then that is the way the world is. I am not assuming a staticness.

So if we "zoom out" the maximal amount, like you suggest, we end up being able to make the most general statement only, "the world is changing", or " a constant state of flux". That is supposed to be "the way the world is". This is just like your claim, that even if there is no "objective truth", that there is no objective truth would be an objective truth. Then we could choose to interpret "the world is changing" as indicating that this is the way that the world is (your interpretation), or that there is no such thing as the way that the world is (my interpretation. We'd both be right, with contradictory meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mine would be right. Yours would be silly. If the world is constantly changing, that is a fact about the world that is important to know.

Also, I didn't suggest zooming out to the maximal amount. Again, that is something you have added in there. I suggested that we could zoom out. For example, when describing a river, it is silly to describe the position of each water molecule because (apart from practical considerations) they're moving. Likewise, we might seek to describe the physical laws of our universe, the phenomena we find in a particular location (for example, on earth), the logical laws that apply in all possible universes, etc.

All this does is provide a good demonstration to justify my claim, that "objective truth", or "the way the world is" is completely irrelevant to moral philosophy. This is because "objective truth" can only refer to the most zoomed out, general statements, while moral philosophy needs to apply to the particular actions of here and now. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, none of that is correct. I'm not totally sure what assumptions are lying behind this, but this claim is fairly obviously just wrong. A claim about something happening at a particular time and place can be true or false just as a claim about something happening throughout the universe can be true or false.

Also, I would say that moral truths, if they indeed exist, are necessary truths so are true in all possible worlds at all possible times, and we ought to apply those truths to the situations we find ourselves in.

Again, this is the separation between "is" and "ought". "What is" is a general statement indicating a static condition of things, while "what ought to be done" is a specific action unique to the particular circumstances of individual persons here and now. Until you demonstrate how one might be related to the other, your starting point of "what is" remains irrelevant" to "what ought to be done". — Metaphysician Undercover

What is, especially when it comes to the is-ought gap, does not indicate a static condition of things at all. That is completely wrong. It indicates a descriptive claim as opposed to a normative one. "Ought" when it comes to the is-ought gap, refers not only to specific actions, but also general moral rules and indeed normative claims of all types. This is just a misunderstanding of the is-ought gap.

As for how one might relate to the other, there are some ways in which they relate. The most obvious being that ought implies can (and can do otherwise), so the situation one is in and what actions they are capable of taking limit the space of things it can be the case that they ought to do.

Also, I would suggest that normative claims are also claims about objective facts, just objective moral facts. That an action being right, or wrong, or good, or bad, is also a part of objective reality to be discovered.

Do you not agree that moral philosophy deals with human activity? And, to adequately understand "activity" of any kind requires an understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know how this relates to what I said. I would say that moral philosophy deals with the activity of moral agents, which includes but is not limited to, most adult humans. Whether I would say that understanding an activity requires an understanding of time depends on what you mean by this.

I assume that in the phrase "the way the world is", "is" implies the present time. However, our sense observation (empirical data) indicates that the world is always changing at the present time. Since the world is changing (in flux) at the present time, it is impossible that there is a specifiable "way that the world is", because "is" implies the present time. This is the basic fact which Einstein takes advantage of with his principle called "the relativity of simultaneity". — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't really imply that as we can zoom out temporarily rather than trying to specify a present moment which as past by the time we express the point. Though, this is largely irrelevant as, again, points such as whether time is relative to speed are themselves claims about the way the world is. Even being in a constant state of flux is a claim about the way the world is.

I put it to you that this dualism is fundamentally incorrect. Time is passing, and as time passes things change. Therefore there is no such thing as "the way that the world is". Your claim that the world is "some way" is demonstrably incorrect through demonstrations of empirical evidence. The theory of special relativity shows this quite clearly. The fact that time is passing makes "the way that the world is" best understood as perspective (frame) dependent, and this way of understanding, is to assume that there is no such thing as "the way that the world is". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is nonsense. To the extent that time is relative to the speed one is going, that itself is a fact about the world.

OK, so you propose a dualism, what is referred to by "the world", and what is referred to by "some way" that the world is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm really not proposing any dualism. I'm proposing there's a real world and we're just living in it, rather than making worlds all our own from whatever tosh we happen to believe.

Furthermore, since moral philosophy deals with human activities, actions, which require the premise that the world is actively changing, in order to properly understand human actions, your proposal (the "world is some way)" would leave us incapable of producing a moral philosophy. Your premise that the "world is some way", is inconsistent, and incompatible with the true premise, that the world is active and changing. Therefore this premise of yours that the "world is some way", would seriously mislead us, make moral philosophy unintelligible, leaving us incapacitated in that faculty. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to be taking "there is some way the world is" to mean "there is some way the world is and nothing ever changes". I'm fairly sure the two don't mean anything like the same thing. You are infering things that I am not implying.

This is why I tried to explain to you, that first and foremost, prior to proceeding into any moral philosophy, it is necessary to have a very clear understanding of the nature and reality of time and change. This provides the ontological basis which makes moral philosophy intelligible. Without this, one might start from a faulty ontological principle such as that the "world is some way", which would make true moral philosophy impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, you are arguing with a claim I haven't made.

This problem commonly manifests as the is/ought distinction. The premise "the world is some way" is an "is' premise. The "ought" premise assumes that the world is actively changing, and there is a way which we as human beings, should act within this active world. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm fairly sure that isn't an assumption required to make a normative statement, though I suppose it depends what you mean by changing. Either way, it is an argument against a point I haven't made.

As I've been trying to tell you, "objective truth" is irrelevant to moral philosophy. If there is such a thing, it falls within the category of your ontological assumption that the "world is some way". This is an ontological assumption which is fundamentally incompatible with the ontological assumption required for moral philosophy that "the world is actively changing". — Metaphysician Undercover

One, it isn't irrelevant, it is necessary to have any discussion about what if any moral truths there are. Two, I haven't claimed that the world doesn't change.

You state it yourself, as a dualism. There is "a world", and there is "some way" that the world is. Obviously these two are not the same, because then you would just state "there is a world". However, if this is really your desired starting point, we can apply Aristotle's law of identity, and claim that by the law of identity (a thing is the same as itself), the world, and the way the world is, are one and the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

I mean, they aren't different things. I suppose you might think of them as qualitatively different inasmuch as the world might be one way today, but something might change tomorrow, but this is mostly nit pickery. Further, there are lots of things that we might say are different from the world without implying a dualism. I have a pen on my desk, and the pen isn't the world, it's just a part of it, but this isn't a dualist claim. Similarly, saying that the world has properties or there are facts about the world to learn isn't a dualist claim. It is all entirely consistent with physicalism.

If you take this approach, you still need to allow for the reality of change, activity within the world to be able to proceed into moral philosophy which deals with activities. And change requires potential, the possibility of change, so we still need a basic dualism which allows for a separation between "the world" (the way that the world is, being one and the same as the world), and the real possibilities for change. The way that the world is, is changing, and this implies real possibility, potential.

Now, the dualism proposed here is not the traditional dualism of "the world", and statements or ideas about the world (the world and the way the world is), it is a dualism of "the actual" and "the potential". We must allow that both of these aspects of the world are equally real, but mutually exclusive, in the way of a dichotomy. Also, each must be accepted as equally important to any moral philosophy.

This, I propose to you, is the way to deal with the two incompatible principles which you desire to employ, moral consequentialism (based in the assumed reality of what actually "is"), and the freedom of the individual (based in the assumed reality of potential, possibility). But you need to understand the dichotomy, and how the two are based in incompatible principles, due to the difference between "being" (what is), and "becoming" (change). So we represent them as a dichotomy due to the reality that they are incompatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by claiming that the possibilities are equally real but I'm fairly sure I don't need to claim that. Further, I'm not convinced this is dualism in any sensible sense of the word.

Again, there is no incompatibilitiy there at all. I would suggest that all moral theories, including consequentialism, require the freedom of the individual to work at all, as ought implies can and, presumably, "can do otherwise". Without freedom, there can be no normative force. Further, consequentialism is all about change, all about the consequences of some action.