Ultimate or not, being bitten by a snake or run over by a train is a strong argument for what appears real. — jgill

And standing outside and looking at the sky is a strong argument that the Earth is flat and unmoving.

Hoffman is on record saying 'natural selection favours perception which hide truth and guide useful action.' It's not far from CS Lewis. Let us know when you find how he grounds his own truth seeking. — Tom Storm

Hoffman says natural selection also favors logical reasoning.

What exactly makes snakes and trains not real? — Banno

The idea is that snakes and trains are like icons on a computer desktop. The icon for a Word document is really on the screen but it is not the Word document itself, so in that sense is somewhat unreal. The reality of the Word document is computer bits. Janus and Wayfarer make a similar point.

But you did intend it to denote a literal domain of existence in which ideas exist eternally and independently of minds, yes? — Jamal

Yes. Well said.

You take "P exists" to imply that P has a spatial location — Banno

When I say the mindscape is the place where ideas exist, "place" is a spatial metaphor, not to be take too literally.

If we stick with the equivalence class metaphor (with a blurry substitute for the mathematical version), then the idea dies with its last representative, just as it was born with its first. — green flag

I'm asking how exactly does an idea like 2+2=4 cease to exist. You seem to say it dies when the last representative in its equivalence class dies, but don't address how the last idea (or any idea) could cease to exist.

Maybe I can go along with an ontological pluralism in which ideas can be said to exist in their own domain, but they would exist in a different way from stars and brains — Jamal

True, but isn't that obvious? I'm puzzled why there have been so many posts about the word "exist". The definition of mindscape would be essentially unchanged if "subsist" or some other word were used.

So ideas exist in their own domain. Very well. But what is happening to this concept when it turns into the mindscape? What justifies this leap? — Jamal

Mindscape says ideas exist in their own domain and, as you point out later your paragraph, that ideas are eternal.

it's a wildly speculative reification t — Jamal

I think the reification accusation can be avoided if for "exist" people substitute "subsist" or whatever word they like that allows ideas to be.

So you end up with something like Platonism — Jamal

Yes! I read the mindscape as applying Mathematical Platonism to all ideas, not just mathematical ideas, which is my opinion of what Rucker, a Ph.D. mathematician, has done. Before I posted, I would have thought it uncontroversial that 2+2=4 is an idea which has existed from all eternity, just as the square root of 2 has been an irrational number from all eternity, and always will be.I was surprised that some people took issue with the word "existed."

On the other hand, the idea of a shared landscape of ideas is an attractive one, but only as at least part-analogical — Jamal

I agree, and never intended for mindscape to denote a literal place in spacetime.



.

The question I would have for Donald Hoffman is why is his theory not a product of the same evolutionarily-conditioned process that our perception of everything else is? What faculty is it that is capable of arriving at the judgement that he is making? I'm sure he must have considered this, or that it has been asked of him, but I'd like to see the answer. — Wayfarer

Good question. I've seen him address this, but I don't recall which YouTube clip. In my own understanding, it's as follows. Evolution has conditioned our perceptions of the physical world to see icons rather than truth, but that doesn't necessarily imply our logical faculties have been conditioned the same way. Seeing the icon rather than the truth of transistors gives us an evolutionary advantage but so does being able to reason logically.

But we can and do talk about the very same snakes and trains.
Hence his conclusion is wrong, and there is an error somewhere in his theory. — Banno

He addresses this in the YouTube clip when he points out everyone in the audience sees the same illusion of the cube.

So what do you think the "materialism" Hoffman is arguing against is? — Banno

He is arguing against the ultimate reality of objects in spacetime.

So my argument is that they're real, because they're the same for all who think, but they're not strictly speaking existent. — Wayfarer

A few posts seem to be quibbling over the word "exists". What word would you prefer instead? Subsist? Something else?

Do ideas exist or not? Would you rather the world "subsist"? Or some other word? — Art48
The trouble is you haven't set out what it is you are asking; how you are using the word "exist". — Banno

Ideas exist. Tell me if there's a sense of "exist" where you think the statement is true and maybe we can go from there.

Good post ! Rucker is great. Let me throw a wrench into the machine. What is an idea ? One approach, that might save us some trouble, is that it's an equivalence class of expressions. — green flag

I'm familiar with equivalences classes. The same idea can be expressed in different ways (for instance, in different languages). But I'd give logical priority to the idea itself so defining the idea in terms of its expressions seems backwards.

In short, I don't think ideas always existed. Or always will exist. — green flag

Can you describe how and when an idea goes out of existence. For example, 2+2=4 is an idea. Will it ever cease to exist.

One of the points against "consciousness is what the brain does" is that correlation doesn't prove causation. — Art48
Quantum entanglement is a correlation. Do you accept that quantum entanglement really happens? — universeness

Yes, it happens. How is that relevant to the question of if correlation proves causation or not?

What a bizarre scenario to suggest, A conscious mousetrap!!! — universeness

In the mousetrap thought experiment, there is a perfect correlation between potential energy and the feelings of anticipation and peace. It was meant to illustrate that correlation doesn't prove causation. It also illustrates how correlation might utterly fail to explain a phenomena, as I also note in the next response.

Even if we had a perfect correlation, such as "firing of these specific synapses in this specific part of the brain corresponds with tasting vanilla and only with tasting vanilla" that would fail to explain why the synapses firing is experienced as vanilla. — Art48
I am sure you would agree that answering why questions is the most difficult task in science. — universeness

The point is, again, correlation and causation. To use another example (which you may also find bizarre), suppose a woman in Germany using her toaster corresponds perfectly with headaches I experience. The correlation leaves entirely unexplained how her using a toaster thousands of miles away, could cause my headache. Now, substitute "certain of my synapses firing" for "toaster" and "the taste of vanilla" for "headache". Is the taste of vanilla any better explained than my headaches?

Correlation does not proves causation. We may one day perfectly understand how consciousness corresponds to physical, chemical, and biological brain processes, but how such processes can possibly cause consciousness might remain as mysterious as today. (Of course, this is not to say we shouldn't study how brain processes impact consciousness.)

P.S. Leibniz's Mill makes points similar to my own.

When thoughts stop happening we stop thinking don’t we ? — invicta

Yes, if you consider thoughts a process.
On the other hand, the mindscape idea says thoughts are pre-existing and we encounter them, just as we encounter the pre-existent tree in a landsacpe.

Wayfarer,

You make interesting points.

You're dealing with the reality of abstract objects, such as ideas, numbers, universals, and so on. I agree with you that it's a valid question and an important question, and I also agree that such things as ideas, numbers, universals, and the like, are real. But they're not existent as phenomena, they are not real in the sense that tables and chairs and trees are real. That's the conundrum you're outlining - how can these ideas be real if they don't actually exist? It is a metaphysical question par excellence. — Wayfarer

I perceive thoughts, ideas, and emotions directly in consciousness. I perceive the external world indirectly, via the five physical senses. The ideas I perceive definitely exist. The water I perceive may be a mirage, or I may be a brain in a vat. It seems odd (and wrong) therefore to say tables and trees have more reality than thoughts, ideas, and emotions, although I admit it's a widespread and understandable view.

He distinguishes thoughts from universals, because he says that universals (such as whiteness) must be the same for all. Which is just the same for mathematical and geometrical proofs! They too are the same for all who can grasp them. So they can only be grasped by thought, but they're not the product of thought. — Wayfarer

So, universals pre-exist in what is called the mindscape? It's a short step to say all thoughts exist there, although, of course, the step has to be justified.

You're just misusing the word "exists".

You've taken the way we talk about the common stuff around us existing in a place and a time and applied it unjustifiably to Russell's paradox.

Paradoxes are not just like trees and rocks. — Banno

Do ideas exist or not? Would you rather the world "subsist"? Or some other word?

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? — Art48

No. It's a working assumption in cognitive neuroscience (and philosophies of mind which are constrained by experimental findings) in the absence of any grounds (other than folk psychology) for assuming its an entity (pace Descartes et al).

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree?
Of course not. Reread above. — 180 Proof

Reread. So, you're saying it's a working assumption that consciousness is a process, and that a working assumption has made whether consciousness is a process or an entity a closed question?

Can you envisage the properties of such a 'substance'? — universeness

Let's suppose I can't. Then what is your point? That lack of a full and complete explanation proves a hypothesis invalid? Careful. Can you solve the hard problem of consciousness? If not, then you lack a full and complete explanation of how consciousness arises from brain activity, correct? So, is "consciousness is what the brain does" is an invalid hypothesis?

One of the points against "consciousness is what the brain does" is that correlation doesn't prove causation. For example, imagine a mousetrap of the old kind: a wooden base, a spring connected to a hammer, cheese bait that triggers the hammer. Also imagine the mouse trap is conscious. It experiences anticipation when triggered, and peace after catching a mouse. There are physical correlates: the spring has more potential energy when set (anticipation) and less potential energy (peace) after it’s been triggered. Spring potential energy might perfectly correlate with feelings of anticipation and peace, but would not explain how a mouse trap could experience those feelings.

Even if we had a perfect correlation, such as "firing of these specific synapses in this specific part of the brain corresponds with tasting vanilla and only with tasting vanilla" that would fail to explain why the synapses firing is experienced as vanilla.

So the best evidence we have, supports the proposal that consciousness 'emerged' as the result of earlier processes. These processes emerged from very large variety combining in every way possible.
What's the alternative's on offer?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree? — Art48

Consciousness the entity!!! What entity? ..... god? aliens ( is consciousness panspermic?), are we all holograms? or in a matrix? I think consciousness did 'emerge,' from previous processes, leading all the way back to the big bang singularity, style placeholder. I give far far more credence to that, than to any of the alternative offerings. — universeness

Not entity as in a person (god, aliens) but entity as in substance, i.e., something which exists independently, in its own right. In contrast, a process supervenes on its components. For instance, the whirlpool process supervenes on water. The claim is that consciousness supervenes on the brain. "Consciousness is what the brain does."

Our own consciousness is the only thing we can be absolutely certain exists. We know the external world only through consciousness. I don't seriously say the external world does not exist, but it is a fact that there is some epistemic uncertainty about the existence of the external world, however small. We could be brains in a vat, or victims of Descartes' demon. So, maybe the hard problem of consciousness exists because it tries to explain the absolutely certain, i.e., our own consciousness, in terms of the, however slightly uncertain, i.e., exterior world. It’s Bss Aackwards. (If you don't understand the last sentence, switch the bold letters.)

Darkneos,

What do you think of this? Go to top of thread.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14113/solipsism-and-universal-mind

1. Do you think a process is fundamentally different from ''a thing"?
2.Do you think processes are so distinct from the rest of reality that they are neither fundamental nor emergent?
3. Do you think ''emergent process" would be a non-sense concept? — Eugen

1. Normally, we consider processes and things as different. A whirlpool is a process of water spinning. The water is the thing that is spinning. But if everything is a manifestation of universal mind or Brahman or The One, then everything could be considered a process. Analogy: every thing we see on a computer monitor is the result of the monitor's light. The action of the light forming a thing can be considered a process. In a monist ontology, there is only one "thing" and everything else is a process, an action of The One.

2. Hm. If we consider matter as a thing, then any material process is merely the thing in motion. Is the whirlpool fundamentally different than the water molecules? Is the whirlpool an emergent process of the water. I think both questions can be argued different ways depending on someone's ontology. If everything is a manifestation of The One, then processes are not fundamental but might be considered emergent.

3. Again, I think it depends on someone's ontology. Taking water as matter, then I'd say the whirlpool is an emergent process because a whirlpool fundamentally differs from water. For instance, if the flowing water were gradually replaced with alcohol or a thin oil, then the whirlpool would continue existing but no longer as water spinning.

Question for 180 Proof: Are you taking as axiomatic that consciousness is a process ? Isn't that the basis of the reification criticism? After all, if consciousness is not a process but in fact an entity in its own right, then the reification criticism is unjustified, is it not?

I'd believe whether consciousness is a process or an entity is an open question. Agree?

↪Art48
Thank you a lot! By the way, are you familiar with Bach's theory of mind? Is that weak or strong emergence in your opinion? — Eugen

I’m not familiar with Joscha Bach but I’m looking at some web pages about him now. What I’ve read so far reminds me of Bernardo Kastrup’s theories.

As to consciousness and emergence, I think much depends on if we regard consciousness as something that is, or something that the brain does.

If we regard consciousness as something that is (perhaps what 180 Proof means by reification), then it seems difficult to me to understand how any type of emergence could explain consciousness as emerging from fundamental entities (electrons, quarks) which themselves do not possess consciousness. Thus, the hard problem of consciousness. One solution is panpsychism, i.e., that the elementary particles possess some form of consciousness or proto-consciousness, but then we have the problem of how trillions of proto-conscious entities unite to form my single, united consciousness. Another solution is that consciousness is fundamental and universal (per Kastrup and others). Then we have what has been called “the hard problem of matter”, i.e., how/why a single consciousness appears as separate, individual consciousnesses in an external world of what is apparently matter.

If we regard consciousness as something the brain does, then emergence may work, just as individual water molecules can unite to form waves. Waves don’t exist at the molecular level but only emerge in large bodies of water. But this is only a vague explanation of how consciousness could emerge from non-consciousness fundamental entities. Waves are merely the motion of large collections of water molecules and water molecules exist in space so their motion doesn’t seem mysterious. But how the “motion” (i.e., physical, chemical, and biological brain processes) can produce consciousness still seems mysterious to me. The hard problem of consciousness returns.

Q1: I don't think it is possible
Q2: Not that I know of.

I am anti-religion and a true believer in God. Maybe you think these things don't mix, but they do. — Raef Kandil

They do. Religion tells enormous lies about God, like wiping out the entire world (minus Noah & Co) with a flood, or that God impregnated a woman who was not his wife. Religion often uses God's existence for its own benefit rather than leading people to God, which is why religion is often wealthy and has much political power.

Wayfarer,

Thanks for the extended response. The mindscape idea is that all thoughts are pre-existent; that when we have a thought, we don’t create the thought. Rather, we perceive something pre-existent in the mindscape, just as when we see a tree, we are encountering something pre-existent in the landscape. This view is similar to Mathematical Platonism, which says that mathematical truths exist independently of us. The mindscape extends this idea and says that all possible thoughts exist independently of us.

Russell, apparently, regards thoughts differently, as acts. He writes: “One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's.” Under this view, thoughts are ephemeral; they last only as long as the act continues. And the thought, as an act, belongs only to the thinker, who is doing the thinking. You seem to have the same view when you write “predication, is only understandable through a cognitive act.”

The two views of thoughts are different. I don’t argue that regarding a thought as an act is invalid. But I claim that regarding a thought as a pre-existent entity is equally valid. Once that view is accepted, it seems to me an acceptable step to call the entirety of all thoughts the “mindscape.”

One possible objection with the mindscape concept is that the mindscape might be called “the thought of all thoughts.” The logical problems with “the set of all sets” are well-known; it might be suspected “the thought of all thoughts” has similar problems.

Rather than defend against such a charge, I’ll simply note Rudy Rucker, the author of Infinity and the Mind: The Science and Philosophy of the Infinity, is a Ph.D. mathematician and his book goes into set theory in great detail. Apparently, Dr. Rucker did not believe the mindscape concept has the same problem as the set of all sets concept.

Art48 has rediscovered Popper's World 3 — Banno

There seems to be a difference. The mindscape exists independent of the physical but Popper's World 3 seems to be dependent on it.

The illicit reification in ↪Art48's post is pretty clear. — Banno

How so? "Reification is when you think of or treat something abstract as a physical thing." I'm not suggesting thoughts are physical; merely, that they are pre-existent. And picturing the mindscape as a place is merely metaphor. The claim is all thoughts are pre-existent (just as the trees we encounter when we walk in a forest are pre-existent). "Mindscape" is the phrase for the collection of all thoughts, just like "Black Forest" is a phrase for the collection of all trees in "a large forested mountain range in the state of Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany, bounded by the Rhine Valley to the west and south and close to the borders with France and Switzerland."

Can anyone coherently explain how this is so? — Richard B

I think it's coherent that we experience thoughts exactly how we experience trees, rocks, and people. In both cases, we experience pre-existent entities. Of course, this doesn't prove the mindscape is true. But it seems coherent.

a private world call "Mindscape." — Richard B

No one said the mindscape is private. Quite the opposite.

Art48has rediscovered Popper's World 3 — Banno

Interesting. I haven't seen that before. Reading Wikipedia now.

It has always seemed to me that this "universal mind" is just another name for God. — T Clark

I'd say that if God exists, then God is universal mind. But there could exist a universal mind that contains all possible thoughts but is not all-good, all-powerful, etc., as so is not God as usually conceived.

Do babies enter the Mindscape,? Infants? Children? Adolescents? Adults? A certain IQ level? Cultural background? — Richard B

Just as there is one "landscape" (i.e., the physical world) where anyone can roam, there is one mindscape where any being capable of thought can roam.

The mindscape is an idealist approach. — T Clark

Agree. The concept of mindscape suggests universal mind, an idealist concept.

Is the mindscape hypothesis metaphysical? I think so. That's why I posted in the Metaphysics & Epistemology section. Can metaphysical questions, in particular, the mindscape hypothesis, give us useful guidance into how to study and make sense of the world? I'd have to think about that. Maybe someone else has some thoughts, too.

I'd say the sense data is not in the mindscape, but the idea of shit is. The idea coordinates and makes sense of the visual sensation of brown, the tactile squishy sensation, etc. (This is a philosophy of shit as opposed to a shit philosophy. :) )

One way to refute the OP is to provide a counterexample.
Here is what I believe is a valid counterexample.
Explanation:
There are two co-equal Gods, a good God and an evil God. They are at war.
Those who fight on the side of the good God, go to heaven when they die.
Those who fight on the side of the evil God, to to hell when they die.
Those who refuse to fight on either side, also go to hell when they die.
If this explanation were universally accepted, it would not lead to complacency towards the struggle against evil.

The faithful can't agree on anything and they all think they have god's word sorted. — Tom Storm

Yes. Agree :100:

The problem with an allegorical interpretation is that it can mean anything given a clever enough interpretation. The following Sam Harris' cookbook example.

Harris wrote this in the end-notes of his book “The End of Faith” and intends it to be a counter-example to Joseph Campbell’s work on mythology.

He walks into a bookstore (Barnes & Noble), and with his eyes closed, randomly grabbed a book and opened it at random. The book was called “A taste of Hawaii: New Cooking from the Crossroads of the Pacific.”

Here’s what Harris wrote in the end-note.

“And therein I discovered it as yet uncelebrated mystical treatise. While it appears to be a recipe for seared fish and shrimp cakes with tomato relish, we need only study list of ingredients to know we are in the presence of unrivaled spiritual intelligence. Then I list the ingredients: One snapper fillet cubed, three teaspoons of chopped scallions, salt and freshly ground pepper… there’s a long list of ingredients. Then I go through with a mystical interpretation of this recipe. The snapper fillet is the individual himself. You and I, awash in the sea of existence, and here we find it cubed which is to say that our situation must be remedied in all three dimensions of body, mind, and in spirit. They have three teaspoons of chopped scallions, this further partakes of the cubic symmetry suggesting that that which we need add to each level of our being by way of antidote comes likewise in equal proportions. The import of the passage is clear: the body, mind, spirit need to be tended with the same care. Salt and freshly ground black pepper; here we have the perennial invocation of opposites. The white and black aspects of our nature. Both good and evil must be understood if we would fulfil the recipe of spiritual life. Nothing after all can be excluded from the human experience. This seems to be a tantric text. What is more, salt and pepper come to us in the form of grains which is to say that the good and bad qualities are born at the tiniest actions and thus we’re not in good or evil in general but only by virtue of innumerable moments which color the stream of our being by force of repetition. Then this dash of cayenne pepper: clearly a being of such robust color and flavour signifies the spiritual influence of an enlightened adept. I go on and on and this is all bullshit because it’s meant to be bullshit.”

https://unearnedwisdom.com/the-problem-with-sam-harris-cookbook-example/

Yes it’s affects on the subject are pain although the subject might say the pain is theoretical. — invicta

Pain is a sensation we directly experience.

So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. — Art48
As I noted, this is a metaphysical question, not a factual one. — T Clark

That my five senses are all I directly experience of the world is a fact, not a metaphysical statement. If you disagree, if you believe we have some other way of perceiving the world, then what is that way?

The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. — Art48

People are always saying this, but it's really untrue in an important sense. The only worthwhile thing "direct experience of the external world" can mean is what we can experience with our senses along with any technological extensions we can devise. — T Clark

So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. For instance, we may sense water but if it's a mirage, there is no water, merely the sensations that normally indicate water.

There's an error in thinking of a tree as a mental construct. A tree is the epitome of the non-mental - along with the cup and the kettle. Here Art has misunderstood what is mental and what isn't, or at least is misusing those terms. — Banno

Can you explain exactly what the error is? Of course, if you assume the tree, cup, and kettle exist as independent objects, then I'm wrong. But you haven't justified your assumption. Or do you have some other argument?

Those books were staples of my reading in the 1970's. — Wayfarer

Mine, too.

As I mention, the theoretical construct idea is independent of solipsism. The brain in a vat answers your question: we can be certain about what we actually experience, i.e., sensations, but as to what is causing the sensations (tree, supercomputer, LSD, etc.) we are less certain.

Matter, therefore, is an idea we use to make sense of experience, not something we directly experience. It’s a theoretical construct. — Art48

The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind. The idea is a theoretical construct, i.e., something that unites and makes sense of what we are directly experiencing, in the case of the tree, brown and green, a feeling of roughness, perhaps, the scent, too. A "brain in a vat" could experience exactly what we experience yet no corresponding tree would exist.

Thanks again Wayfarer. — T Clark

Agree.

But the rational argument deconstructs already-established beliefs, concept definitions, and misconstrued readings. From life and career experience, I can say that the success rate of actually reaching someone is very low if they believe in the magic and not the trick and do not share your discipline. — Experience of Clarity

Good point.

Definition of Supernatural: ignorance of the mechanics behind a cognitive illusion which is not yet embarrassed by knowledge – and it may never be embarrassed. — Experience of Clarity

I don't disagree but I think what the OP says is easier to support, because it, in effect, puts an impossible burden of proof on the person who says something is supernatural; to know something is supernatural we need to know it's beyond all known and yet to be discovered facts about nature. Whereas calling something a cognitive illusion places the burden of proof on the person who calls it an illusion.

If I’ve read you right, I think you would agree with a follow-up sermon — Experience of Clarity

Yes. I like the green light/red light analogy. When we see something we cannot explain (like animals falling from the sky https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rain_of_animals), it's better to stop and say we don't understand rather than take that as a green light to go ahead and conclude it's supernatural.

As a philosopher how do you reconcile these two seemingly contradictory notions of being given existence but only for a limited time? Does it not sometimes make one feel powerless or at worst nihilistic in the face of it? — invicta

From an evolutionary point of view, we think of ourselves as separate and distinct from the universe. After all, if I don’t see myself as separate from the tiger, I may end up as lunch. But we also see the Earth as flat and at rest. Moral: what we perceive may not be the truth.

If we see ourselves as a temporary manifestation of the universe, then things are different. If I play Hamlet, when the play is over, I still exist. I don’t mourn the fact that my Hamlet no longer exists. If I see myself as a temporary manifestation of the universe, I don’t mourn when the temporary manifestation ends.

Of course, it’s easier said than done.

it is self-inconsistent (i.e. impossible) for any natural event, force or agent to cause any fundamental constant of nature to change — 180 Proof

I don't see the relevance of this remark to what I've said.

So my point is, in sum, that we know enough today about what is the case in order for us to have known and, even if only in principle, what can and cannot be known (though not, of course, what we will learn). — 180 Proof

We don't. For 2 or 3 centuries Newtonian Mechanics was accepted as true; warping of space and time appeared "obviously" impossible and outside the realm of natural law.