. I don’t think he wrote it to show what nonsense looks like. — schopenhauer1

That is the point, though.

When he says the logic of the world is sympathetic to the logic of language, your response should be: how does he know that?

I climbed it. I got it. It's not really that complicated.

Reading Schopenhauer would prime you to get it, though. It's similar stuff.

Per the SEP:

"It becomes clear that the notions used by the Tractatus—the logical-philosophical notions—do not belong to the world and hence cannot be used to express anything meaningful. Since language, thought, and the world, are all isomorphic, any attempt to say in logic (i.e., in language) “this and this there is in the world, that there is not” is doomed to be a failure, since it would mean that logic has got outside the limits of the world, i.e. of itself. That is to say, the Tractatus has gone over its own limits, and stands in danger of being nonsensical.

The “solution” to this tension is found in Wittgenstein’s final remarks,"

Wittgenstein emphasized that the ProTractacus contains the essence of the whole book: that when we try to define the limits of thought, we discover that we can't get there from here. Philosophy in general requires a vantage point that we don't have.

As he said, you probably need to have thought of this yourself prior to reading the Tractacus in order to get it.

Ok. But this debate seems inconsequential once you get the punchline.

It's all nonsense. :blush:

You need to read the SEP article. Wittgenstein knew that his picture theory was literal nonsense, which means he knew it doesn't correspond to anything in the world.

You have to read the whole thing to get it. This book is a demonstration of philosophical nonsense. For a purpose.

His next step is to declare that everything he just said about propositions and thoughts being like pictures is nonsense. This doesn't mean it's false. It means that what he just wrote literally has no sense.

Even the statement "There are objects" is nonsense.

:smirk:

It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts — Fooloso4

I didn't say otherwise. ?

The world is not linguistic in form. — RussellA

Per the Tractacus, states of affairs are isomorphic with thoughts and propositions. Thought is linguistic for Wittgenstein.

A major challenge to correspondence is explaining how exactly a true proposition "corresponds" to reality.

Wittgenstein just lays it out there that the world corresponds to true propositions because they have the same form.

This is not Kant. There is no a priori knowledge. It's all just a world put together with the same logic that is the backbone of language.

Not profitable industry. That's not a subsidy anymore. — Benkei

Whatever you call it, it's pretty common.

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are.
— Tate

There can be no states of affairs without the objects that combine to create those states of affairs: — Fooloso4

But the world is made of facts, as opposed to being made of objects.

Per the SEP:

"Starting with a seeming metaphysics, Wittgenstein sees the world as consisting of facts (1), rather than the traditional, atomistic conception of a world made up of objects."

Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. Any object has inherent properties of relatability: it can relate in logical ways to other objects.

This is how the SEP puts it:

"The logical structure of the picture, whether in thought or in language, is isomorphic with the logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures."

The isomorphic part is what's astonishing.

He doesn't make any explicit connections, so again, why are you doing more legwork than himself? — schopenhauer1

What specifically are you talking about?

Subsidizing industry is pretty common. That probably happens in most countries.

Yet he mentions none of them, not even a “See Russell. See Schopenhauer. See Kant for the foundations of what I mean by object”. Objects are just assumed. Not even an “IFF objects are the basis for the world”..Why are you doing more work than him at his own argument? — schopenhauer1

I mean, the SEP says the Tractacus was influenced by Schopenhauer. It also says that contemporary scholarship rejects the sharp divide between the Tractacus and the PI.

Interesting stuff.

He does not say that the world is linguistic in form. He says that the world is LOGICAL in form. It is this logical form that makes it possible for language to REPRESENT things in the world. — Fooloso4

I'm going off the SEP article right now. I'm reading the text as well. I'm actually going to get a collection of essays on the multiple interpretations. I'm just curious because I picked up the Schopenhauerian backdrop just from a few sentences out of the Tractacus, so I'm curious to know what he has to say.

We do not 'see' mental representations, — Isaac

That makes sense. The content of experience includes a visual field that changes as you turn your head and glance around. This visual field with accompanying sound and sensations of aroma and heat or cold, taste and so on is believed by biologists to be constructed from sense data and various contributions from the brain itself.

I think the homunculus keeps creeping into your outlook because the content of experience implies an experiencer. Following the same mode that if we see the car, not a perception of a car, if we experience, a subject is experiencing it.

You'll have to get picky choozy about how you deploy arguments from ordinary language use to avoid the dreaded "subject."

the Tractatus, I don't believe that Wittgenstein's meaning of the term "world" is made explicit and remains ambiguous. The "world" may be read as something existing outside the mind, but I read it as something existing inside the mind — RussellA

At first glance it looks like W is justifying correspondence theory by saying the world is linguistic in form. If the backdrop is Schopenhauerian, W's cosmology is pretty astonishing. I'm still looking for a good source. Gordon Baker?

Ha! I called it!

"Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was first published in German in 1921 and then translated—by C.K. Ogden (and F. P. Ramsey)—and published in English in 1922. It was later re-translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. Coming out of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic (1913), “Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore” (1914), his Notebooks, written in 1914–16, and further correspondence with Russell, Moore, and Keynes, and showing Schopenhauerian and other cultural influences,". -- SEP on Wittgenstein

Subsist means to have timeless or abstract existence, as a number, relation, etc. To say that relations exist outside of time and space is no more an explanation that saying that they have magical powers. — RussellA

Likewise saying that numbers exist outside of time and space (which just means they're not the kind of thing that ages or moves) doesn't explain anything. Nevertheless, number don't age, and are still independent of any particular mind.

As regards Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the word "world" can be read as being either inside or outside the mind of the observer. — RussellA

The use of the word "subject" and the way he uses the word "world" sounds like he's riffing on Schopenhauer, especially of the third book of WWR. That's why I'm intrigued to learn more. I've never had any interest in the Tractacus before. :grin:

An even simpler example: fire causes most of us to feel pain. Pain isn’t a “hidden state” of some external thing; it’s a quality of our experIence. Colour is of the same kind.

People seem so bewitched by the complexity of visual experiences that they think sight works differently to other senses. If a dog could talk it would probably make the same mistake about smell. — Michael

:up:

The metaphysical subject is not found in the world. It is not a relation between things in the world, but, rather, between the self and "my world". — Fooloso4

Ok. That doesn't comply with the quote you gave though. Plus for some reason you have brought up the T schema.

The question is, is there an external world, and if there is, do these objects exist in it. Assuming there is an external world, an important question would be, do relations exist within it. Because, if relations don't exist in the external world, then neither do properties, and neither do objects s — RussellA

The standard perspective is that relations are attributions. As I said, they're similar to properties. Properties are predicates. The linking verb "to be" associates objects and properties, and this association gives rise to propositions.

Now you can go neutral monism and say that propositions are states of affairs, and that the world and language have some sort of sympathy with one another.

Or there are alternatives.

Thank you. Can you advise a good secondary resource?

The proposition "The cat is on the mat" is true if the cat is on the mat. The limits of my language play no role here. The problem Wittgenstein is pointing to does not occur in the world, but only at the limits of the world. — Fooloso4

What problem?

Note that he calls it "pure realism" — Fooloso4

Berkeley's idealism is a kind is realism. The SEP calls it ontological idealism to distinguish it from epistemological idealism.

There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world, matters of ethics and aesthetics. — Fooloso4

Not according to the quote you provided:

The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.

You want to talk about me instead...? :roll: Suggest posting about the comment. — jorndoe

Sorry. I might have failed to get your point. :grimace: I'll try again later.

If a dress is both red and blue, viewers will see a purple dress. (human viewers, anyway).

Maybe there are actually two cups, one for you and one for me, and we communicate telepathically about our individual scenes.
— Tate

:D (you're just dreaming that you're reading posts on a forum) — jorndoe

Could be.

Point is: watch out for question begging.
— Tate

There are no proofs here. Just switching to other (descriptive) verbiage. — jorndoe

I think you are trying get leverage from aspects of your worldview. All that allows you to do is comment on your worldview.

Honestly, I think of voting as a ritual in the religion of democracy (that's roughly how I see it, anyway).

Democracy is cumbersome, inefficient, and prone to corruption. The voting ritual creates an expectation of control, though. This expectation gets people out protesting.

Although this may all be wrong as Chinese people do a lot of protesting.

The two occurrences aren't the same, they can't be, though there's just the one Cup (the perceived). — jorndoe

Maybe there are actually two cups, one for you and one for me, and we communicate telepathically about our individual scenes.

Point is: watch out for question begging.

Whether or not a proposition is true is determined by comparing it with reality. But:

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits
of my world. — Fooloso4

How does this work then? I compare a proposition to the state of a world that is limited by my language.

This actually sounds like empirical idealism. It's not Berkeley, but it's similar. And this is indeed a kind of realism (per the SEP article on idealism).

Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.

How would logic pervade the world? Because it pervades language, it pervades the world?

I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.632 The subject does not belong to the world:
rather, it is a limit of the world.

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.

5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

This is heavily idealistic, isn't it?

Where have I claimed anything like that? — Isaac

I must have been mistaken. You wouldn't say something so ridiculous.

Yep. But it sees the prey. Not the representation. — Isaac

So we're straight that the representative data the spider has direct access to is not identical to hidden states, as you've been claiming.

:up:

No. I'm denying that they're what we 'see'. They're part of 'seeing', they're not what we see. — Isaac

The spider sees its prey because its brain is receiving data representative of the prey.

The representation and the prey are distinct. This is basic biology.

The electrical signals it receives from the optic nerve are a representation.
— Tate

But we don't 'see' the electrical signals."
— Isaac

Not without an ampmeter, no. Nevertheless those signals are representative. Are you denying that? Because you would be grossly out of step with biology if you do.

An impossible situation from the outset. Hidden states cannot cause us to see colours. There's no mechanism by which that can happen. Seeing a colour is a process which starts with the property of a hidden state and ends with a series of responses (one of which might be to reach for a colour word).

You're imagining that 'seeing a colour' is some internal process, but you've given no reason why you'd imagine such a thing. — Isaac

:up:

The lenses, the photo-receptors, the optic nerves delivering electrical signals.
— Tate

You're just naming parts of the optic system. Your claim was that they give us reason to believe that a spider's brain is receiving a representation of its environment. — Isaac

The electrical signals it receives from the optic nerve are a representation. What did you think that data was?

The schematic of the nervous system gives us ample reason to believe that a spider's brain is receiving a representation of its environment.
— Tate

Does it? In what way? — Isaac

The lenses, the photo-receptors, the optic nerves delivering electrical signals.