He does not say that the world is linguistic in form. He says that the world is LOGICAL in form. It is this logical form that makes it possible for language to REPRESENT things in the world. — Fooloso4
Yet he mentions none of them, not even a “See Russell. See Schopenhauer. See Kant for the foundations of what I mean by object”. Objects are just assumed. Not even an “IFF objects are the basis for the world”..Why are you doing more work than him at his own argument? — schopenhauer1
I mean, the SEP says the Tractacus was influenced by Schopenhauer. It also says that contemporary scholarship rejects the sharp divide between the Tractacus and the PI.
Interesting stuff. — Tate
The Tractatus is wrong if it fails to prove the very foundation it stands on. — schopenhauer1
Physicists have identified 12 building blocks that are the fundamental constituents of matter. Our everyday world is made of just three of these building blocks: the up quark, the down quark and the electron. This set of particles is all that's needed to make protons and neutrons and to form atoms and molecules. — Fermilab
He doesn't make any explicit connections, so again, why are you doing more legwork than himself? — schopenhauer1
The larger problem is not the ontological assumptions but the linguistic ones, that is, the elemental names that name the elemental objects and combine to form propositions. More precisely, the ontological is the linguistic - what is said and thought about what is. When all is said and done, what stands outside the limits of what can be said, what shows itself experientially remains. The problems of life, the aesthetic and ethical. — Fooloso4
It means it is a sort of lame-duck theory. If he is trying to explain something about the world, then he better be prepared to explain the very foundation of his edifice.Does his failure to prove the assumption that there are elemental building blocks mean that it is wrong? — Fooloso4
Right, that's what he is trying to claim, but his claim rests on a sort of existence that takes for granted "objects" and with it allusions like "scientific conceptions", but none of that is discussed. It would be prone to attack (which I would probably do on it), but it is worse than that.. He doesn't even posit anything. He just starts with this assumptions and hopes you fall for it.. Again, I will point you back to here:But this is the stuff of philosophy proper, not to be glossed over. His argument ONLY works if you believe the ontological framework. If anyone else just "started" and didn't explain why they started there, they would be called out. I don't see why he should get a pass.
I can predict a sort of response whereby you mention that he was demonstrating his own values whereby philosophy cannot speak of things that can't be pictured.. But BECAUSE it is the very basis for which the picture theory "hangs" (get what I did there).. it MUST be discussed otherwise, Witty garners himself right by way of never having to prove anything outside of what he himself is claiming. How convenient that works.. "I make a claim, but it would be 'nonsense' to refute its very basis". Again, real convenient. — schopenhauer1
But this is the stuff of philosophy proper, not to be glossed over. His argument ONLY works if you believe the ontological framework. If anyone else just "started" and didn't explain why they started there, they would be called out. I don't see why he should get a pass.
No that's not how that works Witty.. You POSITED something of the WORLD (objects)... — schopenhauer1
He just starts with this assumptions and hopes you fall for it. — schopenhauer1
We are in agreement regarding his a priori assumptions. The idea of something fundamental, however, is as old as western philosophy itself. It persists in modern science. That is not to say it is correct, but do we know it is incorrect? What are the alternatives? — Fooloso4
Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
2.011 It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
2.0121 If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world.That is why they cannot be composite.
2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.
2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.
2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
The world is the totality of facts. — Ludwig Wittgenstein
I’m not against the idea of something fundamental but rather that Witty isn’t doing anything to defend his claim. — schopenhauer1
In the absence of a cogent argument against simples does this need to be defended? Can simples be denied without also denying complexes? — Fooloso4
Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are.
— Tate
There can be no states of affairs without the objects that combine to create those states of affairs: — Fooloso4
At first glance it looks like W is justifying correspondence theory by saying the world is linguistic in form — Tate
The problem, as I see it, is not the claim that there are simples but naming them. If we cannot name them we cannot give an analysis of elementary propositions. The following is then nonsense: — Fooloso4
The world is not linguistic in form. — RussellA
But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate
Per the SEP — Tate
Facts are existent states of affairs and states of affairs, in turn, are combinations of objects.
What does he or you mean by we cannot name them. — schopenhauer1
He does not claim that we cannot name them, but he does not name them. — Fooloso4
I can predict a sort of response whereby you mention that he was demonstrating his own values whereby philosophy cannot speak of things that can't be pictured.. But BECAUSE it is the very basis for which the picture theory "hangs" (get what I did there).. it MUST be discussed otherwise, Witty garners himself right by way of never having to prove anything outside of what he himself is claiming. How convenient that works.. "I make a claim, but it would be 'nonsense' to refute its very basis". Again, real convenient. — schopenhauer1
It is not just a collection of objects, but the combination of objects that make up the facts
— Fooloso4
I didn't say otherwise? — Tate
But the world is made of facts, as opposed to be made of objects. — Tate
Objects aren't fundamental in the Tractacus. States of affairs are. — Tate
2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
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