You are describing exactly what I consider the core confusion.
The problem is not the wish to connect physics and meaning — it is the belief that this connection can be realized by a physical mechanism.
When you speak of a “bridge mechanism,” you already presuppose that there is a level of description where semantics becomes physics. But this presupposition is itself metaphysical. Biophysics may show correlations between energy dissipation, metabolic regulation, and neural complexity — but it does not and cannot show how meaning arises from these processes. It only shows how living systems correlate with the conditions that make meaning possible.
The difference is not rhetorical but categorical.
Physical systems can organize, synchronize, and self-stabilize — all of which can be formally modeled. But semantic reference, intentionality, or subjective experience are not additional physical phenomena that arise through complexity. They are descriptions that belong to a different epistemic domain.
There can be no bridge law between the two, because any such law would require a common metric — and there is none.
A neuron can fire, but it does not mean.
Energy can flow, but it does not know.
Meaning appears only at the level of systemic coherence where correlations are interpreted — and “interpretation” is not a physical operation, but an epistemic one.
So when you say that biophysics “has already provided the bridge,” I would say: it has provided the conditions of correlation, not the transition itself. What you call a “bridge” is in truth an interface of perspectives, not a mechanism.
This is why the Free Energy Principle cannot “unify” physics and semantics — it only overlays one vocabulary on top of the other.
It does not explain how consciousness arises; it only reformulates life in terms of a statistical metaphor. And that is precisely the point where the philosophy must step in again.
I think I mentioned this before:
it is as if one tried to explain social bonding through magnetism, simply because both use the category of attraction.
The concept may be shared, but the phenomena have entirely different origins — and they cannot be causally connected.