He analogizes a physical principle with a semantic concept — Wolfgang
And then he assumes organisms have the ability to calculate probabilities. — Wolfgang
1. what does this have to do with prediction — Wolfgang
2. what do you want to do with such a general statement — Wolfgang
A model endures if it can be shown that it creates a system that actually possesses consciousness. — Wolfgang
It would be best to ask an organism whether it actually uses algorithms. — Wolfgang
when a system does such-and-such, you declare it to be conscious. — bert1
Each theory interprets optical illusions differently, since all are underdetermined, i.e. they have no empirical explanatory power. — Wolfgang
Theories of consciousness usually start with an unproven assumption and then build a theory around it. This assumption is neither empirically confirmed nor even verifiable – and therefore such a theory is not only unscientific but also epistemically useless.
[...]
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claims that consciousness arises from and is identical with integrated information.
The second example is Predictive Coding [...] [it] claims that organisms minimize uncertainty. — Wolfgang
It claims that organisms minimize uncertainty. This claim cannot be empirically confirmed. — Wolfgang
Physical energy and semantic uncertainty belong to entirely different descriptive levels; they have nothing to do with each other. — Wolfgang
Elite batting or return tasks show anticipatory control because neural and sensorimotor delays demand feed-forward strategies. That is perfectly compatible with many control-theoretic explanations (internal models, Smith predictors, model predictive control, dynamical systems) that do not require Bayesian inference or a universal principle of “uncertainty minimization.” From “organisms behave as if anticipating” it does not follow that they literally minimize epistemic uncertainty. — Wolfgang
Sliding between these domains without a strict translation rule is a category error. — Wolfgang
Between physics and semantics there can be no bridge law, only correlation. — Wolfgang
f “organisms minimize uncertainty” is to be an empirical claim rather than a post-hoc description, it must yield a pre-specified, falsifiable prediction that (i) distinguishes the FEP/predictive-coding framework from alternative non-Bayesian control models, (ii) is measurable in the organism itself (not only in our statistical model), and (iii) could in principle fail. — Wolfgang
The issue is the illegitimate conceptual leap from physical energy flow to semantic uncertainty, and from probabilistic modelling to biological reality. That’s precisely the confusion I am objecting to. — Wolfgang
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.