In other words how do you justify cooperation to those who aren't interested? — Tom Storm

I can't. What I can do is have nothing to do with them. If they exploit other people, I can, at minimum, warn other people these are poor cooperators and they should have nothing to do with them also.

If they just want to be left alone, we can leave them alone.

This is how our ancestors have been handling the problem for perhaps hundreds of thousands of years.

it is possible to determine one moral position as being objectively better than another on the basis of non-moral meta-empirical values such as consistency, universalizability and effects on well-being — Joshs

I agree, but the subject of moral positions in terms of answers to “How should I Live”, “What is good?”, and “What are my obligations?” is beyond what I would like this thread to be about. I’d like this thread to focus on what science can tell us about cultural moral norms as heuristics for cooperation strategies. Perhaps we can return to this in a future thread?

the supposed neutrality of objective scientific inquiry is itself grounded in pre-suppositions ( consistency, parsimony) that amount to ethical valuations Thus, science is as much in the business of determining ‘oughts’ as any other ethical stance. — Joshs

I understand this is a position some have defended. I see science as not based on premises (pre-suppositions) but as a coherent web of knowledge (as per W. V. Quine) from which the specific pre-suppositions you refer to emerge. Again, this is a topic I would like to put off for another thread.

Thanks for pointing out that my explanations need more details to clarify how I am handling is/ought issues.

Assume there is a dispute about when, or even if, following a cultural moral norm will be advocated.

Lacking the empirical knowledge that cultural moral norms are heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies:
• The mysticism of religious and cultural heritage and moral norms’ intuitive imperative oughtness can protect cultural moral norms from rational discussion.

With this empirical knowledge:
• Any perceived imperative oughts are debunked. (Despite our intuitions, the Golden Rule, do not lie, steal, or kill, and other cultural moral norms do not have any innate, mystical, imperative oughtness. They are only heuristics for parts of cooperation strategies.)
• Agreement on if or when moral norms will be advocated becomes an instrumental choice. If people want the material and psychological benefits of cooperation in their society, they should (instrumental ought):

o Advocate following cultural moral norms when they will predictably solve cooperation problems and
o Advocate not following those moral norms when they predictably will create cooperation problems. (Not following the moral norms when, as fallible heuristics, they act opposite to their function.)

The scientific study of cultural moral norms reveals that, as heuristics for cooperation strategies, advocating or not advocating cultural moral norms can be justified as an instrumental ought.

As I said - that's where the contest of ideas comes in. Which is already in place and morality (in the West) is an active part of public discourse and subject to incremental tweaks, mods, and set backs over time. As a secularist, I might argue for preventing suffering as the primary goal. No doubt others have their goals, from pleasing gods to rule utilitarianism. Which to choose? All we can do is argue a case based on our convictions. — Tom Storm

I agree, except our convictions can be naive or informed by the accumulated moral wisdom of the ages from moral philosophy.

What I am proposing (that is newish in the modern age) is the usefulness of understanding cultural moral norms’ underlying principles. Cultural moral norms are a topic almost ignored by traditional moral philosophy as just a chaotic mess. Fortunately, science’s tools can sort through such messes to reveal underlying principles. And I am happy to say that these conclusions about what moral means ‘are’ are complimentary, not contradictory, to traditional moral philosophy’s investigations into moral ‘ends’.

Oliver Curry is a prominent advocate of “Morality as Cooperation” and I have sometimes used his phrase. However, the responses here have emphasized that such nomenclature is misleading because it reads as an ought claim not justified by science.

What I propose as culturally useful is that “cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies”, an ‘is’ claim. My claim is silent regarding the broader scope of ethics.

If I just had a more memorable name for the idea…

You and I are standing on the edge of a cliff. I say that my moral values lead to the concussion that I should throw you off. You say "hold on a moment, let me talk to you about what is." I listen patiently, thank you for the interesting insight into what is, but since you have given me nothing about what I should do, my should from earlier remains and I throw you off. — PhilosophyRunner

The ‘is’ claim about cultural moral norms being cooperation strategies could help me if you were going to throw me off the cliff because one of your cultural moral norms advocated killing me and you are trying to act as a moral person.

By explaining that the moral norm, perhaps something like “People who work on the Sabbath should be killed”, is a marker strategy for increasing cooperation in your ingroup, you might be convinced, as a moral person trying to act coherently, to not cause that harm (if causing harm would contradict other moral norms or values you try to follow).

But what if your moral values lead you to believe that you ought to throw me off the cliff because it would be fun and you have no more important moral values that tell you that you should not do so? There is nothing about what we ought to do in the ‘is’ claim about cultural moral norms, so I expect I should be ready to resist being thrown off the cliff.

For me morality seems to be an open conversation and contest of ideas conducted between groups holding a multiplicity of values and beliefs. — Tom Storm

Right. But ethics is a much broader subject than cultural moral norms which advocate parts of cooperation strategies. What goals ought we have for our cooperation? How ought we live, apart from living cooperatively with other people?

The ”open contest of ideas” is more about these important ultimate goals and values, a subject that moral norms as cooperation strategies is silent on.

If morality is all about cooperation strategies then why do you need to use the term morality at all. Why not just say what are the best cooperation strategies? No problems with that goal. — Andrew4Handel

Cooperation is a rapidly expanding field, a wonderful topic all on its own, and people can certainly talk about it without mentioning moral norms.

But assume you are arguing with someone about cultural moral norms. If you said “We could enjoy more benefits of cooperation in our society if you abandoned this or that cultural moral norm either permanently or in these special cases and rather followed this or that moral norm”, I expect all you would get is a puzzled expression.

Most people would be thinking “Why is he talking about cooperation when the dispute is about following moral norms? My religion or culture provides my moral norms and my intuitions are that they apply to everyone. There is nothing in them about cooperation.”

Using the insights from cooperation studies to solve disputes about moral norms requires an extra bit of empirical information - cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies. This hypothesis can be shown to be correct based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange. That such as simple hypothesis has the ability to explain such a huge, superficially chaotic data set supports its robustness as scientific truth.

That cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies must be presented if we are to use what we have learned from cooperation studies to resolve disputes about cultural moral norms.

I am not a fan of Dawkins’ selfish genes perspective. While perhaps technically correct, it is highly misleading and other technically correct perspectives provide useful insights much more readily.

... as an ultimate goal for moral behavior.
— Mark S
Well, for proximate beings like us, "an ultimate goal" is about as useful for flourishing as tits on a bull. — 180 Proof

When I said "ultimate goal" I was thinking of standard moral goals such as increasing flourishing or reducing suffering.

Thanks for asking! If you did not understand my key point, I expect there are also many others here who did not. I’ll try to clarify "Cultural moral norms are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies that solve cooperation problems,"

This is not a theoretical approach to understanding morality - what we somehow ought and ought not do. And specifically,

It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

It is an empirical approach to understanding the function of past and present cultural moral norms, a subject of little interest in traditional moral philosophy.

This approach takes moral norms to be cultural norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment, though the violator may not actually be punished.

Its scientific truth claim is based on its explanatory power for past and present cultural moral norms, no matter how diverse, contradictory, and strange plus other relevant criteria for scientific truth. Virtually all past and present cultural moral norms can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies. (Proposed counterexamples are always welcome.)

For example, “Do to others as you would have them do to you” is a heuristic (a usually reliable, but fallible rule of thumb) for initiating the powerful cooperation strategy, indirect reciprocity. But the Golden Rule only initiates indirect reciprocity; it is only a subcomponent of the strategy. Indirect reciprocity typically includes other subcomponents such as punishment of people who do not reciprocate (free-riders) and criteria for who you choose to cooperate with and who you choose to ignore.

So we have:
“Cultural moral norms such as the Golden Rule are arguably heuristics (usually reliable but fallible rules of thumb) for subcomponents of strategies such as indirect reciprocity that solve cooperation problems."

This is a scientific claim about what ‘is’. It is a different category of knowledge than claims about what we ought to do.

Does this help at all?

"Cultural moral norms as parts of cooperation strategies" is consistent with cultural moralities being seen as dialects (specific applications) of those strategies.

The dialects can be oppositional though. Contradictions are common. Homosexuality is worthy of death in some cultures and morally irrelevant in others.

Plurality (available variations), particularly in a rapidly changing environment, is beneficial for either biological or cultural reproductive fitness but I expect we would agree that reproductive fitness is not interesting as an ultimate goal for moral behavior.

Thanks for the welcome! I am glad to be here.

My post is a proposal for an approach to establish if a scientific observation about past and present cultural moral norms could have implications for ethics. If that scientific observation is useful for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms, then we have reasons for believing science can have some limited implications for ethics.

As you point out, there are differences of opinion, but I am happy to defend that past and present cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies. Note that this is a claim about what ‘is’ (science’s domain), not what ought to be (moral philosophy’s domain).

For this thread, can’t we take it as a hypothetical that past and present cultural moral track cooperation strategies and then explore the implications?

The implications:

This knowledge can help resolve disputes about cultural moral norms because it provides an objective basis for:

1) Not following moral heuristics (such as the Golden Rule or “Do not steal, lie, or kill”) when they will predictably fail in their function of solving cooperation problems such as in war and, relevant to the Golden Rule, when tastes differ. — Mark S

Without this knowledge, a few people might think of the Golden Rule and “Do not steal, lie, or kill” as mystical moral absolutes and follow them blindly. Most people would intuitively abandon them in such cases (as cultures typically do) but lack an objective criterion for doing so. I can imagine huge arguments about if and when such norms ought to be abandoned. Knowing that these norms track cooperation strategies seems to me useful for resolving such disputes when these heuristics can be expected to fail at that function.

Key question for you: Why do you think this knowledge would not be useful as I have described?

I want to emphasize the “limited” implications of science for moral philosophy:

What about its limits? This observation’s usefulness in resolving moral disputes is limited by its silence on important ethical questions. It is silent about what our ultimate moral goals either ‘are’ or ought to be and what we imperatively ought to do. It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited. And except regarding cooperation with other people, the observation is silent concerning:

1) How should I live?
2) What is good?
3) What are my obligations? — Mark S

I like your other questions and look forward to exploring some interesting possibilities with you. But, for now, can we focus on why you think this knowledge would not be useful as I have described?