Comments
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How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputes
Hanover,
I want to thank you for prompting me about how I might usefully communicate this information to people who are religious. It triggered some productive thinking.
First, the obvious people to start with are religious academics who focus on “evolutionary accounts of altruism, morality, and religion” as does Jeffrey P. Schloss (Distinguished Professor of Biology and T. B. Walker Chair of Natural & Behavioral Sciences at Westmont College).
Second, I was able to add brief explanations to my paper about how morality as cooperation, since its cooperation strategies are as innate to our universe as their simple mathematics, could be understood by religious people as God’s creation of moral means. Further, these moral means are compatible with religious goals of loving each other and helping the poor and immigrants. I think it improved the paper.
I expect Jeff is too busy to be a reviewer, but perhaps he will suggest another expert in evolutionary morality and religion. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesAnd I am absolutely convinced you don't wish to convert anyone as a matter of principle and likely bristle at my suggestion that that is what you seek to do because you've said iit a number of times. But understand that is how you will be perceived, and ask yourself if you don't truly hope to change someone who relies on revelation to rely on reason. — Hanover
I disagree that my sketch of an approach to religious people attempts to convince a religious person to give up on revelation and rely on reason. It explains how a supernatural creator of the universe created morality. It does not claim that the supernatural being does not exist.
By explaining how the Golden Rule can, as Jesus said, "summarize morality", I engage with their religious beliefs rather than refute them.
By bringing up the "pure" form of morality revealed by science and explaining that people (just as religious people already know) self-interestedly modify morality to benefit themselves and their groups, I engage with a dominant theme and quandary in the academic Christian morality literature. That theme and quandary is how to explain the evil morality advocated for in the New Testament (homosexuality is evil and women must be submissive to men). I think many Christians (particularly academics) would be delighted to hear this message and its offer of an escape from their quandary.
Sure, maybe I'll find out differently - my communication skills may not be up to the task. But my goal is to meet religious people where they are and present morality as cooperation as an idea that can improve their lives as religious people.
What choice do I have if I want people to benefit from this knowledge? There are a great many religious or semi-religious people in the world who would like the morality handed down by tradition or sacred book to make more sense. I offer that. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputes
Hanover,
Here is a very rough draft of one approach Ithat might encourage religious people to consider what science can tell them about morality as cooperation.
To avoid misunderstandings, remember that morality as cooperation describes what morality 'is' which is in science's domain, not what morality ought to be - moral philosophy's normal focus.
“Do to others as you would have them do to you.” Jesus is quoted as saying that this version of the Golden Rule summarizes morality. For over 2,000 years, across cultures, people have said that versions of the Golden Rule summarize morality. What makes the Golden Rule so special?
Building on advances in evolutionary game theory, scientists have begun to unravel the mysteries of cultural moralities and moral norms. Cultural moral norms, no matter how contradictory and strange to outsiders, are parts of cooperation strategies. Versions of the Golden Rule can be said to summarize morality because they advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, a powerful strategy for cooperating in groups. The cooperation strategies encoded in our moral sense and cultural moral norms by biological and cultural evolution are primarily what have allowed the emergence of civilizations. Scientists call what they have discovered morality as cooperation.
Evolutionary game theory relies on simple mathematics that are as innate to our universe as gravity. Morality as cooperation is then as innate and universal to our universe as gravity.
If God created the universe, he wove simple mathematics into its foundations, along with that mathematics’ product—the strategies that compose morality as cooperation. Morality as cooperation is then God’s creation, pure, without any of the self-interested modifications people are so inclined to add. As you might expect of the creator of the universe’s morality, the core of morality as cooperation is universal and the same in every galaxy for every species from the beginning of time to the end of time. How species with civilizations apply morality to solve cooperation problems and the goals they choose for that cooperation will vary, but the function of their morality will everywhere be the same – solving cooperation problems. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesGiven that they are more adept than your upstart group, I think should you enter their church for the purposes of saving them, more of you will become Christian than Christians will become you. — Hanover
I have little interest in converting anyone (unless their morality really is despicable). My interest is in presenting morality as cooperation in ways that anyone might find helpful. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesMorality is clearly not one of them: the moral aspect tends to come from human creation and assent. — ProtagoranSocratist
Your use of the word morality is as an answer to ought questions such as "How should I live?", "What are my obligations?", and "What should our ultimate goals be?". The answers to these questions are human creations and, I agree, are not encoded in our DNA or biology or to be found in science.
The paper proposes 1) scientific explanations of the origins of the contradictions and strangeness in past and present cultural moral norms and 2) how, within the morality as cooperation framework, we can categorize behaviors as descriptively moral, universally moral and immoral. Here, universally moral and immoral refer to what is universal to cultural moral norms and what has the opposite function of cultural moral norms.
I describe what moral norms 'are' as products of evolutionary processes (a topic within science's domain) not what moral norms 'ought' to be - a different subject that is in the domain of moral philosophers.
My paper, like science, is silent on the big-ought questions in moral philosophy that I understand you to be concerned with. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesYou assume as a given (and I don't mean to be presumptuous, so feel free to correct me) that morality is a naturalistic outgrowth of reason so all reasonable people will reject moral rules with immoral origins. This excludes those people who disagree and insist a realism to morality without human existence at all. That is, even if homosexuality can be shown to have been prohibited in the past for some horrible reason, those who believe it absolutely wrong will just see that horrible reason an unfortunate aside but that it still should have been prohibited for the correct reason, which is that stands in that place of absolute wrong. — Hanover
Hanover, you are pointing out a very real problem for how religious people will or will not benefit from understanding the evolutionary origins of cultural moral norms. I expect many will not benefit at all.
Perhaps some will understand the science of morality as describing how God created morality. In the paper, I quote Jesus as saying the Golden Rule summarizes morality and then explain why that is the case. Maybe that is a start.
But many religions are currently in the midst of internal disputes about the morality of sanctions for homosexuality. Perhaps those on the “no sanctions” side would gladly accept a scientific explanation of the shameful reasons that moral sanctions against homosexuality exist. That would not convince everyone on the other side, but it might help.
It is my goal to figure out how this science of morality can be useful for religious people, but that is still a work in progress.
One perspective I have been thinking of is that if God created the universe, he set things up so that the mathematics underlying game theory innately contained solutions to cooperation problems. These are the solutions that biological and cultural evolution encoded into our moral sense and cultural moral norms. Therefore, God created morality as cooperation. What do you think? Any chance? . -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputes
Regarding Protagoras,
In retelling the perhaps common myth of how Zeus gave people a moral sense, Protagoras explained that the function of our moral sense (the primary reason that it exists) was to enable cooperation to form societies and said that without a moral sense, “societies couldn't exist at all.” If indeed it was a common myth about our moral sense, his morality as cooperation perspective would likely have been a common view at the time.
Just before this, Protagoras describes how people got fire and technical knowledge from the gods.
‘So now that people had their little share of what is given to the gods, in the first place, on account of their connections in high places, they alone among living things had any notion of the divine, and they set about building altars and making statues of the gods. And as well as that, by using their ingenuity, they soon came up with words for things and formed articulate speech and invented shelters, clothes, shoes and bedding, and worked out how to grow their own food.
‘Now, supplied with these advantages, in earliest times people lived scattered here and there. There were no societies. So they started being killed by the wild animals, since they were weaker than them in every way, and their technical skills, although up to the task of providing them with food, just weren't good enough for the battle against the beasts (they didn't yet have any civic and ethical know-how, remember; and knowing how to fight a war is part of that). So they kept on trying to find a way to gather into groups and defend themselves by founding communities, but every time they came together, they would do one another wrong, since they didn't have any ethical know-how, and so they would scatter again and go back to being slaughtered.
‘At this point Zeus became worried that our species might perish altogether from the earth, so he asked Hermes to take down to people a sense of right and wrong. This was to bring order to societies, and to serve as the bonds for friendship and love, and bring us together. So Hermes says to Zeus, “But how? How am I supposed to give people this sense of right and wrong? Should I hand it out in the same way we handed out the technical skills?
You remember how they were handed out. One person with, say, knowledge of medicine is enough for a large number of people who don't know anything about it; and it's the same with the other skilled professions. So shall I put a sense of right and wrong in human kind like that, or should [d] I hand it out to all of them?”
“Give it out to all of them,” said Zeus. “Every single one must have a share. The fact is, there's no way societies could exist at all if only a few people possessed a sense of right and wrong, the way it is with those other skills. In fact, make it a rule, on my authority, that anyone who proves incapable of acquiring some sense of right and wrong must be thought of as a sickness to society and put to death!”
Plato. Protagoras and Meno (Penguin Classics) (Kindle Locations 875-887). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputes
Your comment suggested how I might improve my abstract. Here is the updated version. I hope it is clearer.
Abstract
There is a growing scientific consensus that the primary reason cultural moralities exist is that they solve cooperation problems. I propose that 1) insights from evolutionary game theory and moral psychology can explain why the contradictions and strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms exist and 2) how understanding why they exist can be useful for resolving disputes about their enforcement. No moral premises are claimed. Case studies include the norms “homosexuality is evil” and “abortion is wrong from the moment of conception.” Exposing the exploitative origins of such norms—where outgroups were exploited to enhance ingroup cooperation—can assist societies in deciding whether to continue enforcing them. Beginning with examples such as the Golden Rule, prohibitions against killing, and the above contested norms, I outline how behaviors can be categorized as descriptively moral, universally moral, or immoral within a morality-as-cooperation (MAC) framework, depending on whether they solve or create cooperation problems within or between groups. I then argue why rational individuals may prefer to advocate the three principles implied by this categorization as references for refining moral norms. No claim is made that all rational people will, or ought to, advocate for these principles except as an instrumental means for achieving their goals. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputes[Am I correct that you are not presenting a moral theory? You're just saying that the most pragmatic way to implement a goal is through scientific analysis and methodology, regardless of whether we're seeking to build a house or seeking to institute our agreed upon social norms? — Hanover
Right. I am not proposing any moral premises that would enable answering moral ought questions such as “How should I live?” and “What are my obligations?”
I am presenting 1) scientific explanations of why the contradictions and strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms exist and 2) how understanding why they exist can be useful for resolving disputes about their enforcement.
I use the word shameful simply because I expect people, when they understand the origin and function of moral norms such as “homosexuality is wrong”, to commonly think enforcing such norms is shameful. I propose no moral premise that would tell us whether something is shameful.
Without a moral premise, this science (like the rest of science) is useful only for the instrumental oughts it suggests.
Thanks for commenting. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesI think here we risk confusing "specific x moral law is encoded in our biology" with "our biological encoding to nuetralize threats and shoot for personal equilibrium leads us to develop moralities". As can be easily confirmed, there's nothing encoded about morality in DNA. If that were the case, there would be no disagreements about how to punish rulebreakers. Things would be much easier.
Nor is there any shared sense of strategy in DNA, which is what makes that statement confusing. I ain't no geneticist, but thats not how it works... — ProtagoranSocratist
ProtagoranSocratist,
Would you agree that the design of the human body is encoded in our DNA? In comparison, the encoding of the behaviors that implement some cooperation strategies seems trivial.
We have a moral sense that, when triggered by detecting morally relevant circumstances, can produce strong emotions such as empathy and loyalty (that motivate initiating reciprocity strategies), disgust and "righteous indignation" (that motivate punishment of moral norm violations) and shame and guilt (that motivate internal punishment of moral norm violations). Together, these emotions motivate a sustainable, and powerful, reciprocity strategy called indirect reciprocity.
From this perspective, indirect reciprocity is encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense and I would say it is therefore encoded in our DNA even if no one knows how to find it.
Is your screen name a reference to the pre-Socratic philosopher Protagoras? I am an admirer of Protagoras. He patiently explained to Socrates that the function of morality was enabling cooperation and, if you replace "Zeus" with "evolution," you get a remarkably accurate account of the evolution of morality. Socrates did not respond to that claim at all, perhaps because it was too common at the time and therefore not interesting. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputes
All cultures have moralities. America has subcultures with contradictory moral norms. Morality as cooperation explains the origins and functions of contradictory norms.Is there an American morality at variance from the one in Madagascar? Or is the human culture throughout all time and place, leaving us with just a single absolute morality? — Hanover
Cooperation is a means, not an ultimate goal. Cooperation without a goal is pointless.Cooperation isn't always a goal, so the lack of cooperation may not be a problem. — Hanover
An ingroup is a preferred group for cooperation. We are all members of many ingroups, such as family, friends, and larger groups like religions and nationalities.How are we defining "ingroup"? — Hanover
I do not claim that the protection of fetuses is shameful. What is shameful is the exploitation of women by norms such as "abortion anytime after conception is immoral" (which holds that the moral worth of a fertilized egg cell and a woman are similar) to benefit political and religious elites gaining and holding on to power and as an ethnic marker strategy.Why is the protection of fetuses shameful — Hanover
Explaining why cultural moral norms exist is entirely in the domain of science. I do not claim that everyone ought (as either an imperative ought, or as the rational choice) to use what morality 'is' as a model for what morality 'ought' to be. What ought to be is not in science's domain.How isn't this this a textbook naturalistic fallacy. — Hanover
Science helps determine instrumental oughts of the form "If your goal is X, then science says you ought (instrumental) to do Y." Instrumental oughts of the usual kind in science are the only kind of oughts I am claiming. They have nothing to do with the naturalistic fallacy. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral Disputeswhat's your view on the social contract? — Copernicus
I prefer to keep this thread on the topic of morality as a cooperation. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesI think the very word "morality" is a term with a collectivist (cultural or not) origin. Ethics, values, laws, and norms are all communitarian inventions. To even mention them or define them is an act of tyranny — Copernicus
Copernicus,
You can choose liberty as an over-riding ultimate goal if you like. But you should be aware of the high price in mental and material well-being you will likely pay if ‘liberty’ means that you reject cooperation with others.
Your quotes about morality’s impingement on liberty were prompted by and aimed at pre-scientific understandings and implementations of morality. And, yes, some past and present moral norms were and are horrible transgressions of liberty.
But morality as cooperation offers an objective basis for refining cultural moral norms to reduce and eliminate those transgressions.
Understanding morality as strategies for solving cooperation problems, rather than a set of rules that reduce your liberty mostly to benefit others, is a new perspective you might consider.
Perhaps you think you are at liberty to cooperate only when it pleases you. Moral norms are enforced by punishment of at least reputation damage in order to exclude free-riders who choose when to cooperate based on their expected benefits. Prepare to be excluded -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesI have not actually accepted the premise that evolutionary game theory is the explanation for morality.
Remember, religion was the first to spread moral principles. — L'éléphant
No problem for me. But I would point out that the hypothesis that evolutionary game theory explains morality is supported by its explanatory power for the vast, chaotic dataset of past and present cultural moral norms. No other explanation comes remotely close to explaining why they exist.
Regarding religion, it started with the need for punishment of free riders which is a necessary part of cooperation strategies. But punishment by people can be risky. It can also incite cycles of retribution that destroy cooperation. The perfect punisher would be all-seeing (so he could see wrongdoing) and all-powerful so retaliating against him would be pointless. Hence gods were created. The moralities religions advocate are still cooperation strategies. Religions exist because they provided useful supernatural punishments. -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesActually I was referring to the evolutionary game theory you mentioned when I said VOI could counter it. — L'éléphant
Evolutionary game theory is in the domain of mathematics and morality as cooperation is in the domain of science since it is a claim about why cultural moralities exist. VOI is in the separate domain of knowledge based on assumed moral premises. VOI can not contradict either because they are in different domains of knowledge.
Can you imagine a moral premise that counters (shows an error in) mathematics? Of course not. Similarly, a moral premise cannot show an error in empirical observations about why cultural moral norms exist – they are what they are.
Consider Kantianism. It defines moral means differently than morality as cooperation. Can Kantianism show that science is wrong about why moral norms exist? No, of course not. What moral norms 'are' is in a different domain of knowledge than what moral norms ought to be.
What if I want to deliberate first and eventually come up with a different conclusion that what the group has concluded? Is a deviation from the norm a bad thing automatically? — L'éléphant
Yes, you can “deliberate first and eventually come up with a different conclusion (about moral norms) than what the group”. The drawback to that is potentially losing out on the benefits of cooperation which can be a big deal.
Here is an extract from my paper about why we have a moral sense and cultural moral norms. Perhaps it will answer some of your questions.
“Cooperation problems arise when individuals or groups could mutually benefit by cooperation but conflicts between self-interest and shared interest, short and long-term self-interest, free-rider problems, and lack of trust prevent that cooperation. Creating civilizations required finding biological and cultural solutions to these problems (Nowak 2011).
Fortunately for us, the biological evolution of our moral sense and the cultural evolution of moral norms did that for our ancestors. The cooperation strategies encoded in our moral sense and cultural moral norms have enabled us to become an incredibly successful social species. Martin Nowak (2011) describes us as super cooperators.” -
How Morality as Cooperation Can Help Resolve Moral DisputesFirst, virtually all the contradictions and strangeness of past and present cultural moral norms can be explained by evolutionary game theory and moral psychology as parts of cooperation strategies.
— Mark S
Not all. Tyrannical moral laws were part of the past (and present). There was no "cooperation" strategy, except the laws made by the one person in power. There were also tribes, nation, communities that had become extinct because morality was to serve the almighty being, to the detriment of the population. — L'éléphant
Hi L'éléphant, thanks for commenting.
Since “cultural moral norms are those norms whose violation is commonly thought to warrant punishment of at least reputation damage”, a tyrant can try to impose tyrannical moral norms, but may fail, because that would require convincing the population that violators deserve punishment. Moral norms are what a culture says they are.
Of course, tyrants can dictate laws and claim, like a current politician does, that anyone who opposes him has violated the norm “don’t criticize the tyrant” and has acted immorally. While tyrants can make a law and he can punish violators, it does not make the law a cultural moral norm.
Tribes and nations could become extinct because, for example, their cultural moral norms focused on cooperating to increase the general welfare rather than cooperating to defend against or attack their neighbors. Morality as cooperation is about what moral means are, and is silent about what the goals of that cooperation (such as general happiness or exterminating the group’s perceived enemies) ought to be.
Counterexamples of cultural moral norms that might not be parts of cooperation strategies are always welcome. In the OP, I write:
To illustrate how this perspective can be culturally useful, I will explain what this perspective reveals about 1) the Golden Rule and “do not kill”, 2) the sometimes fervently defended norms “abortion is wrong from the moment of conception” and “homosexuality is evil”, 3) the strange norm “eating pigs is morally wrong”, and 4) “women must be subservient to men” and “slaves must obey their masters”. — Mark S
That is, I explain how all of these moral norms are, surprisingly to me when I was looking for counterexamples, parts of known cooperation strategies. Almost all contradictions and strangeness in past and present cultural moralities are due to different definitions of favored ingroups and disfavored or exploited outgroups, different ethnic marker norms, different strategies, and emphasis on different ultimate goals for moral behavior.
The veil of ignorance as a hypothesis should counter evolutionary game theory in one way. The VOI theory wants to bring up the least advantaged members of society without the members knowing their own talents and abilities. If wages are the measure of equality, would you agree to equal wages for both non-productive and highly productive members of your society? — L'éléphant
I am in awe of Rawls’ VOI theory. It is a wonderful heuristic for designing a society without exploitation of others (without creating cooperation problems). Consider two cases.
Case 1 - If the non-productive members of society are free-riders who could help others and not harm them but self-interestedly choose not to, then yes, they are creating cooperation problems and that is immoral in the morality as cooperation framework. They deserve punishment of at least reputation damage.
Case 2 - - If the non-productive members of society are doing the best they can, then in a moral society (again in the morality as cooperation framework) they would be helped by others and not deserve punishment.
But you asked if, regardless of their contribution to the public good, all deserved the same wages. If giving everyone the same wages creates cooperation problems (as I expect it would by demotivating hard work) then that would be immoral (in the morality as cooperation framework).
I don’t remember that Rawls claimed that everyone should (in effect) get the same reward regardless of contribution. To the extent that Rawls VOI does advocate behaviors in the designed society that create cooperation problems rather than solve them, then yes, morality as cooperation does contradict VOI.
But I would disagree that VOI can “counter” morality as cooperation. The scientific truth of morality as cooperation is in a different domain of knowledge from morality based on assumed ethical premises. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?I would agree that cooperation of a kind is necessary in a moral situation (not everything is a moral moment). I would only question the desire that it need be “factual”, either innate or based on a (agreed/universal) response to the world. The human condition of being separate requires cooperation, but nothing (no fact) ensures it. — Antony Nickles
Anthony, their nature and if “moral facts” exist is a big deal in moral philosophy.
My goal here is to explore “Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?”
I argue there is.
Is that function required to be solving cooperation problems?
All species that are cooperative enough to build civilizations must solve the same cooperation problems that are innate to our physical reality. So yes, something like morality as cooperation (as humans implement it) is required for all civilizations from the beginning of time to the end of time. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?hypericin
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To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups”
— Mark S
Or, what about a cooperation that does away with the notion of out-groups entirely?
I've long had the idea of morality as cooperation strategy without knowing it has had any scientific validation.
.... — hypericin
Hi hypericin,
A lot of science has been done in the last 50 years on morality as cooperation.
Just this week, I came across a 2022 Master's Philosophy thesis that provides an excellent summary of the science of morality, specifically, morality as a form of cooperation. It is Escaping the Darwinian Dilemma with Cooperation-based Moral Realism by Frederico Carvalho.
https://www.proquest.com/openview/2ae1390e8bf5d68f04d4c0819ca8d9d0/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y
And though he holds a utilitarian, rather than a morality as cooperation, perspective, the philosopher Peter Singer's book "Expanding the Circle" describes the history of moral progress as expanding the circle of who is considered worthy of moral regard. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?Have to disagree with this. Take a living human body as a typical fairly stable dynamic environment. Around half the cells in the body are non-human see here
....
Genes themselves of course have no interest either way, they have an effect on the organism, and either survive to reproduce or not. We call those that survive 'winners' and call their effects 'self-interested'. And we call that equivalent behaviour in ourselves, 'rational'.
So let me put a little challenge to you, because what you say above about the predominance of competition is the received wisdom that founds also the terminology of game theory, and a deal of politics too: if self interest is rational, then reason it out for me. Because in fact game theory is symmetrical, and evolution works just as well if we call the survivors the losers; the aim of life is to go extinct and 99.9% have managed to find their rest sooner or later, and we are the unlucky ones who have to carry on a bit longer. — unenlightened
A human body is an organism, it would not be useful nomenclature to call it an ecosystem. Our gut and skin bacteria form ecosystems where competition reigns (with some necessary cooperative behavior with us, the host organism), but they are not part of the organism defined by a fertilized egg.
I was talking about ecosystems such as those composed of many organisms of many different kinds.
“Rationality refers to choosing the best means, using logic and evidence, to achieve one’s goals, whatever those goals may be.”
Our goals are not necessarily the same as our self-interest, so acting in our self interest is not always rational.
For example, sacrificing our lives is usually not thought of as being in one’s self interest. But we could have a goal of defending others at all costs. In that case, it would be rational to sacrifice our life.
99….% of species have gone extinct because of a variety of environmental and competition reasons. I don’t see the relevance of that.
I think you're going off-topic for this thread. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?I wasn't wanting to bring rationality into it at this point. The comparison I'm inviting between "actual" and "descriptive" would be this: An actual question of right and wrong would not reduce to its description. And I admit that "actual" is probably tendentious; perhaps I should have said "traditional."
....
I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe . . . However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational.
— Mark S
Again, I agree about the rationality question, and I wouldn't confront Joe on those terms. True, if we're going to say anything to him, we'd probably propose some reasons or arguments why he should prefer the inherently moral in our universe. But that can be done without claiming he's irrational to disagree. My question is, Are there any such arguments, given your thesis? It sounds like you agree that there are not.
...
When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation."
— J
If I understand your OP question, this is a good result, or at least good enough. For my part, I think it leaves a lot of unanswered questions about what ethical choice is, largely because I'm a semi-demi-Kantian about ethics and I don't think we can leave anyone out -- it has to be universalizable. So if we can't earn Ornery Joe's assent, we haven't set the problem up correctly.
... — J
J, the meaning of “Traditional moral talk” is clearer.
To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups” than traditional moral talk based on unverified (to date) speculations about moral premises.
I understand that there are arguments for and against the idea that acting immorally (based on one or another moral premise) is irrational. I expect posters here will have a range of opinions. But I am comfortable with the idea that acting morally sometimes, depending on one’s goals, requires acting irrationally.
Morality as Cooperation is universal to all cultures and, due to its origin in the mathematics of game theory, universal to all intelligent species that form highly cooperative societies. That is more than enough universality for me.
That it sometimes advocates irrational behavior (depending on one’s ultimate goals) is not a fatal flaw. As a part of science, it is what it is. Our preferences are irrelevant to its existence. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?Have you thought about cooperation in nature, apart from between humans? Bees and flowers, the symbiotic relationship that produces lichens, ant colonies, and so on; it seems there is in every aspect of relations between an organism and its environment elements of cooperation and of exploitation.
A tiger creeps through the long grass towards its prey, and the vertical stripes and slow sinuous movement convey its absence - 'just the grass rustling in the breeze'. Or the reverse deceit of the prey, as a stick insect stands immobile at just the right angle and in the right place to appear to be a dry twig. Examples of an evolved form that cooperates with the general environment to deceive, on the one side its prey, and on the other, its predator.
Or the icon of immorality - the cuckoo; .... — unenlightened
Unenlightened, I have thought about cooperation in nature.
The examples of bees/flowers, lichens (fungus and algae/cyanobacteria living together, each providing something the other needs) are good examples of mutually beneficial cross-species cooperation.
The detailed behaviors encoded in their biology maintain the benefits of cooperation (as well as for the single species examples, bees and ants) are selected for consistent with the simplest of the same cooperation problem solving strategies that humans use to gain the benefits of cooperation – though it is unlikely the lichen are aware of game theory.
Stable ecosystems could be viewed as a cooperative venture (including the tiger /prey and perhaps even “the icon of immorality,” the cuckoo). Still, I don’t see this as the most useful perspective. Stable ecosystems are better understood as stable competition with some examples of cooperation for mutual benefit.
I distinguish between cooperation in nature and morality in people based on if violations of the relevant norm are commonly thought to deserve punishment. Morality, as I understand it, is thus largely, but not entirely, a human phenomenon. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
You argue that "moral sense" equates to "what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’." I think you mean that it follows that therefore, if anyone refers to their moral sense, they are referring not to actual questions of right and wrong as usually discussed in ethics, but rather to the built-in behaviors that our species is endowed with, both biologically and culturally. OK, fair enough. — J
Not quite right about “not referring to actual rights and wrong”. If anyone refers to their moral sense’s judgments, they are referring to what is at least descriptively right and wrong. If one does not like the consequences of conforming to those judgments, they can violate those judgments without acting irrationally. When you say “actual questions of right and wrong” are you thinking of judgements justified by rational thought and violating them would be irrational?
You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice.
— Mark S
But now we're right back in the middle of ethics as usually discussed. Here are the good reasons for following a particular maxim, and here's Ornery Joe saying, "Well, I don't prefer the consequences." Is there something further that Morality as Cooperation can say to Joe? Is he "wrong"? I don't see how he can be. He sees the universal "moral fact" about cooperation and claims he doesn't give a toss. — J
If Joe does not prefer the consequences of acting morally (according to Morality as Cooperation) or using it to refine cultural moral norms in his culture, then there is not much to be done. I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe (the cooperation strategies underlying cultural moral norms and moral sense that solve cooperation problems without creating cooperation problems with outgroups). However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational.
Could Joe’s rationality or irrationality when he acts’ immorally’ be a distinguishing characteristic (along with moral ‘means’ vs moral ‘ends”) between the two kinds of ‘morality’ under consideration: Cooperation Morality and traditional moral philosophy’s moral systems?
So . . . the question I'd put to you is, Does this matter? Can we get the most out of "moral facts" and use the Cooperation thesis to point a path forward, without worrying about the likes of Joe, and the usual disputes about ethical reasons? You could, for instance, say something like, "Look, we understand how 'morality' came about -- it's a way of improving cooperation and helping cultures thrive -- and that's plenty good enough. Some people will never get it, and insist on a different kind of reason for what they call moral behavior, but that's irrelevant. We can still use the 'moral fact' of a universal cooperative strategy to help us decide many important questions about how we ought to behave. When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation." — J
Yes, you have captured what I am proposing. Continuing my above thought, I am not proposing that it is irrational to violate Morality as Cooperation if you don’t like the consequences of following it.
Yes, that is close to my position. Thanks for your comment.I put a lot of words in your mouth, but is that close to your position? — J -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms.
— Mark S
I really like this. It makes a great starting place by indicating that we have intuitions and make moral judgements not only with them but also of them.
Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy.
— Mark S
I don't.
...
My goal in this discussion is the same as my goal in every discussion, to arrive at the truth together. But particularly to this topic it is important to me to point out that our communication is necessarily a moral endeavour. And thus I close the circle back to those intuitions by which we judge the very investigative discourse on which we are embarked. Are our goals moral? — unenlightened
Of course, my goal here is also to arrive at truth. In aid of that, I am doing my best to honestly portray the data, as I understand it, about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, and how it can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies.
My intermediate goal is to identify how understanding cultural moral norms and our moral sense, as parts of cooperation strategies, can be a useful reference for refining cultural moral norms with the ultimate goal of increasing flourishing – my ultimate utilitarian goal.
So yes, my goal, and I assume yours, is moral. Also, specifically, my means of achieving that goal is moral by Morality as Cooperation. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
I definitely want to reply in depth to your points -- you're right, for one thing, that I'd forgotten the thrust of your OP -- but will shortly be offline probably till "my" tomorrow. (it's 8:45 am EDT, USA, now, where I live). So, since I don't want to do a hasty job .. . till then. — J
J, no rush. I find that the quality of discussions on complex issues improves if I refrain from replying immediately. My responses to you may often be delayed by a day or two, and sometimes more. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality. — Bob Ross
Bob, your definition of moral fact is ambiguous with respect to the kind of ought it refers to.
You assured me that this ought does not refer to “What we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.”.
It also obviously does not refer to an instrumental or intuitive ought. Right?
Perhaps it refers to “What we ought to do as a universal rule with a motivating source of bindingness.” And that motivating source of bindingness could be rational thought.
But its universality, as required of a “fact”, would then be equivalent to what is imperatively moral.
What do you say the ought in your definition refers to? -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?But of course, claims about anything come from people, and this claim comes from you, but I don't think much of it. I think we ought to have a shared goal in discussion to get as close as we can to the truth, and this shared aim is what grounds the morality of our interaction. Now if someone does not share this aim, there is nothing to be done, but to ignore what they say, and move on, unless we can somehow persuade them that the truth must be their goal in communication in general or communication loses its meaning, value, and function. — unenlightened
This is a discussion forum about ethics.
Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms.
Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy.
My main goals here are to clarify why “morality” as moral ‘means’ (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) exists so we can 1) refine cultural moralities to better meet our need and preferences, 2) separate out the search for moral ‘ends’ that are the other part of the larger subject, ethics.
What is your goal here? -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?You continue to confuse moral facticity with inter-subjective agreement. A moral fact is not traditionally an 'imperative ought' where we ought to do something indpendently of our needs. A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.
A million people socially accepting norms is not a source of facticity about anything. It would be a fact that they accepted it and that it is a norm, but the norm itself would be non-factual. — Bob Ross
Hi Bob, I see a lot of ambiguity about what people mean by the term moral facts. I’ll take your word for it that imperative oughts are not as common an assumption as I have perceived it to be. I expect we agree that such strange things are unlikely to exist.
Let’s consider your definition: “A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.”
Do you believe that someone has come up with a widely convincing argument that such a moral fact exists? Have I missed a revolution in moral philosophy?
The function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense, solving cooperation problems, is a statement about reality.
It is grounded in reality in two ways: 1) It explains why our moral sense and virtually ALL cultural moral norms exist and 2) its origin is in the simple mathematics underlying game theory which can be argued to be innate to our physical reality. It is the universality of this function and its innate to our universe origins that give it its power. How many people recognize it is irrelevant.
But even with that ‘power’, no oughts are attached to it yet.
But we could logically say “We ought (instrumental) to use the criterion, does it solve or create cooperation problems, to refine our cultural moral norms with the goal of increasing the benefits of cooperation in our society.”
I would appreciate your explanation of why you might think that understanding the function of what virtually all people (except philosophy majors) everywhere and everywhen consider ‘morality’ is not useful or relevant. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors.
— Mark S
It is. In Chapter 28 of Leviathan, Of Punishments, and Reward, he writes that without fear of punishment people would simply follow their own interests and ignore the common good. It's a view held by many. But so what? So you share a view with Hobbes (and you like game theory). — Tom Storm
Tom, Hobbes is correct that purely self-interested agents will, without punishment, simply follow their own interests, leading to his description of pre-civilization life as nasty, brutish, and short. This necessity for punishment is why the feeling that moral violations deserve punishment is encoded as one of part of the cooperation strategies in our moral sense. Indeed, moral norms can be distinguished from other norms by the common feeling that violators deserve punishment.
But contrary to Hobbes, people are not purely self- interested agents. In the long-term company of small groups, particularly kin, people can act in highly unselfish ways with little punishment of immoral behavior required. Social punishment becomes more important for preserving cooperation when there are ingroups and outsiders (exploitable outgroups).
Morality as cooperation contradicts Hobbes understanding of our pre-civilization nature. It is not Hobbesian. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?Now you have every right to describe morality and immorality in this way, and you are scrupulous in calling the behaviors "descriptively moral" rather than just "moral." If there is nothing further to the idea of the moral than a certain group of behaviors that assist humans in cooperating, such a description sounds plausible to me.
But what I'm claiming, along with a few others here, I think, is that this misses entirely what "moral" means, except as a sociological or biological description. When I ask, "Is X the right thing to do?" I'm not posing a question about whether X is consistent with the evolutionary strategy you describe. Of course, nine times out of ten -- perhaps 99 out of 100 -- it may well be. Cooperation, the Golden Rule, etc. are usually very consonant with what I will decide is the right thing to do.
......
I'm trying to avoid putting this in terms of "is can't generate ought," but that's what it comes down to. Mother Nature is what she is, but ethical questions are about what I ought to do. It takes an independent argument to establish that the two are the same. — J
J, thanks for your careful response.
I thought I was clear in my OP that the subject was the usefulness of understanding the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense (what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’) and NOT what we imperatively ought to do.
I then proposed that, even lacking any imperative oughts, this kind of ‘moral fact” could help resolve disputes about:
• The relevance of moral intuitions.
• Enforcement of cultural moral norms by revealing the shameful, to modern sensibilities, origins of cultural moral norms such as “women must be submissive to men”, “homosexuality is evil”, and “abortion is always immoral”.
• Morality when blindly acting according to moral principles such as the Golden Rule, Kant’s moral imperative, or simple Utilitarianism is intuitively immoral.
I was hoping responses would focus on whether this knowledge could help resolve such disputes.
Any opinions?
I sympathize with the urge to fall back to standard ought questions like “But why ought I avoid exploiting other people (causing cooperation problems) just because solving cooperation problems is the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?”
The answer was clearly not as obvious as I had assumed.
You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice.
Why might it be your preferred moral means as a rational choice? It is
1) Arguably the most effective means for achieving common shared goals.
2) Universal to all cultures (and, in its game theory roots, arguably the one moral theory that is as innate to our universe as mathematics)
3) The moral theory that is most harmonious with our moral sense. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
The prosecution is making a category error.1. Facts are always about what is the case.
2. What ought to be the case is manifestly not inevitably what is the case.
The prosecution rests. — unenlightened
The scientific hypothesis Morality as Cooperation, which is about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, makes no claims about what ought to be.
Claims about what ought to be binding come from people based on their goals and how they choose to accomplish them. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
I did not find any contradictions between the study's results and morality as cooperation. The behaviors the babies exhibited that were identified as moral were parts of cooperation strategies.Here's something you might be interested in. I think it's relevant. First, a link to a "The Moral Baby," an essay by Karen Wynn.
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/f/1145/files/2017/10/Wynn-Bloom-Moral-Handbook-Chapter-2013-14pwpor.pdf — T Clark
However, morality as cooperation expands on our innate moral motivations (the paper's focus) to include and explain cultural moral norms - norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment.
And, even in infants, they found disapproval of perceived harm to others - be root of punishment of violations of moral norms. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
You might check my answer to Count, who made some of the same points.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/997480 -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?A Hobbesian position. You're arguing that there is 1) morality and 2) it's implementation, which are made up of two separate domains - cooperation and coercion. Sure, you can argue that coercion is needed to ensure compliance by certain society members. But this is an entirely separate project from what constitutes morality. Whether punishment is necessary for morality to function effectively is a separate philosophical claim, isn't it? Morality can stand alone and whether people follow it or not is separate matter to identifying what morality is. — Tom Storm
Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors. As I described, the first category of moral norms increases cooperation within an ingroup but can exploit (sometimes coerce) outgroups. The second category solves cooperation problems within ingroups and does not exploit outgroups - as Golden Rule and so forth.
When I describe a behavior as innately immoral, I mean that it creates cooperation problems. Moral norms that exploit outgroups are, in that aspect of evolutionary morality, acting in an innately immoral way even though their behaviors are descriptively moral. Morality as cooperation offers an explanation of why moral relativism should be an unappealing idea. I also remind you that the morality as cooperation hypothesis has no innate bindingness as scientific truth. Any moral bindingness comes from our choosing it as a preferred moral reference.
Getting back to the punishment of moral norm violators, immoral people might see that punishmnent as coercion. However, game theory shows that punishment (of at least social disapproval) is necessary to maintain cooperative societies. Otherwise, they are taken over by free-loaders and morality motuvated cooperation is destroyed. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
Count, so many cogent points!
First, I reiterate that the hypothesis is that cultural moral norms and our moral sense can virtually all be explained as parts of cooperation strategies - moral ‘means’. The hypothesis is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’.
This hypothesis is consistent with the three common observations of moral behavior you and others mention as follows:
1) Biology triggered motivation to help others “out of love“ as evolved by kin altruism and sexual selection for bonding.
The initial step of the powerful cooperation strategy indirect reciprocity (which underlies much of human morality) is helping others without expectation of reciprocity from that person (which includes a child or a disabled person). The hypothesis is silent on the reason the motivation exists. That evolutionary source could be kin altruism, pair bonding, or reproductive fitness increased by cooperation within groups of unrelated people (the common focus in game theory).
Also, for indirect reciprocity, delays in reciprocity and any eventual reciprocity being to people other than the initial helper are normal. Kin altruism for immature kin can be understood as cooperation between generations.
2) Forming a goal to do “good’ or live a ‘good life’ based on rational thought and, in morally interesting cases, "acting for higher principles"
Again, the initial step of indirect reciprocity is helping others, independent of the source of that motivation. Helping others based on rational thought ("acting for higher principles") does not contradict the hypothesis.
Also, the hypothesis is essentially silent about ‘ends’, it describes ‘means’. So neither the hermit whose goal is isolation, nor Socrates whose goal to live consistently with his moral judgements leading to drinking the poison, are counterexamples to the hypothesis. The hermit and Socrates simply have, or had, different goals than their societies.
But some goals (such as those preferred by psychopaths or implied by some versions of egoism) can include, as a matter of indifference, exploitation of others to the extent exploitation benefits oneself. In these cases, it is the means that morality as cooperation identifies as innately immoral, not the goals.
3) What about cultural moral norms that have nothing to do with reproductive fitness?
The biology underlying our moral sense was selected for by the reproductive fitness benefits of the cooperation strategies it motivated.
But what motivates groups to choose, advocate for, and enforce cultural norms? Groups choose moral norms based on whatever benefits of cooperation appeal to them – reproductive fitness is generally not explicitly considered. Hence, cultural moral norms can be directly counter to reproductive fitness while still being parts of cooperation strategies. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
In science, facts (of science’s usual provisional kind) can be established by criteria such as explanatory power, simplicity, no competitive hypothesis, consistency with established science, and the like. That is the basis for claiming it is provisionally true that the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is to solve cooperation problems.
Morality based on Divine command theory is also explained by Morality as Cooperation. Who better than an all-seeing, evil-punishing, all-powerful divinity to motivate people to act morally? Whether the divinity is real or not does not matter to believers' motivation to act morally.. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
If there is a moral imperative to care for, look after, and protect our fellow humans, I don’t see that it has any connection with a motivation to punish other people for behaviors we don’t like.
— T Clark
I agree. People are conditioned to feel certain ways, based on culture and upbringing, but I doubt it is innate. — Tom Storm
As I said to T,
the scientific claim about our moral sense is that the reason it exists is because it motivates cooperation strategies. Without punishment, free riders would destroy cooperation by exploiting others' efforts to “care for, look after, and protect” them. By “exploit,” I mean accepting help and not reciprocating. Punishment of exploiters is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.
Punishment’s necessary role in morality is an example of how science can illuminate morality.
— Mark SHence, cooperation cannot be the measure of the good; we should cooperate just when it is truly best to do so.
— Count Timothy von Icarus
Yes, and we can certainly (and have) cooperated to achieve violent and oppressive goals which cause mass suffering. — Tom Storm
From my OP
Limitations:
The proposed moral fact about “morality as cooperation” only addresses the morality of interactions between people. It is a fact about moral ‘means’ and is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’. It will have only some relevance, and in some cases be irrelevant, to important broad ethical questions such as “How should I live?”, “What is good?”, and “What are my obligations?”. — Mark S
And yes "we can certainly (and have) cooperated to achieve violent and oppressive goals which cause mass suffering".
Right. Our cultural moral norms and moral sense advocate and motivate cooperation with few restrictions on what people want to cooperate to do. Morality as Cooperation explains why this happens, why people can consider it moral, and why some descriptively moral cultural norms can have such horrific consequences.
That might be a useful understanding when you are trying to reason with someone who holds such views. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
As I said to Count,↪Mark S I see this as a well-considered version of an evolutionary explanation for morality. As such, I think we need to pose the usual objection: If morality equates, in some sense, to "what is beneficial for the species" -- its "universal function" -- why does that entail that I should care what is beneficial for the species, or regard that as in any way a good for me? — J
You may not care about the species, but I expect you will find you prefer to live in a cooperative society.Also, when thinking about the relevance of reproductive fitness to the evolution of morality, I suggest you keep in mind that increased reproductive fitness is merely how morality was encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense. What was encoded in our moral sense was cooperation strategies. Confounding the means (reproductive fitness) of encoding morality in the biology underlying our moral sense and what was actually encoded (cooperation strategies) can be a serious error when discussing human morality. — Mark S -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
Hi T, the scientific claim about our moral sense is that the reason it exists is because it motivates cooperation strategies. Without punishment, free riders would destroy cooperation by exploiting others' efforts to “care for, look after, and protect” them. By “exploit,” I mean accepting help and not reciprocating. Punishment of exploiters is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.If there is a moral imperative to care for, look after, and protect our fellow humans, I don’t see that it has any connection with a motivation to punish other people for behaviors we don’t like. — T Clark
Punishment’s necessary role in morality is an example of how science can illuminate morality.
Can you provide some evidence of this growing scientific consensus? Can you provide some examples. — T Clark
I am not satisfied with any summary of the state of the field, but Oliver Curry offers a useful, but much more complex, perspective in Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-Centred Approach
January 2016. You may be able to access a free pdf on
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281585949_Morality_as_Cooperation_A_Problem-Centred_Approach
Among recent workers in the field, he quotes:
Jonathan Haidt ‘Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfi shness and make cooperative social life possible’ (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010 )
Michael Tomasello ‘Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating with others’ (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013 )
Joshua Greene ‘[The core function of morality is to promote and sustain cooperation’
(Greene, 2015 )
Curry also quotes philosophers about cooperation and morality:
John Rawls ‘The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions
under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary’ (Rawls,
1971 , p. 126)
John Mackie ‘Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume and Warnock are all at least broadly in
agreement about the problem that morality is needed to solve: limited
resources and limited sympathies together generate both competition
leading to conflict and an absence of what would be mutually beneficial
cooperation’ (Mackie, 1977 , p. 111)
The Morality as Cooperation idea is way older than these references.
Protagoras, in Plato’s dialogue of the same name, patiently explained to Socrates that our moral sense exists to enable cooperation. Thereby, he implied how one can teach morality by teaching how to better cooperate in society. It seems to me that science can enhance our ability to cooperate.
What is new are advances in game theory that reveal powerful cooperation strategies encoded in our moral sense and cultural norms but not consciously understood. Game theory shows, for instance, the necessity of punishment and the role of marker strategies such as sex, food, and dress norms that increase cooperation by marking membership in a favored, more reliably cooperative, ingroup.
The long list of strange moral norms recorded in Leviticus were just a bunch of nonsense to me before I realized they were marker strategies. -
Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
Count, I essentially agree and see my OP as consistent with your point. For example, I said:Man has a moral sense to aid cooperation, perhaps, because this aids survival and reproduction. But it doesn't follow from this that the human good is limited to cooperation (or survival, or reproduction). Cooperation is not sought for its own sake, but rather as a means. Hence, cooperation cannot be the measure of the good; we should cooperate just when it is truly best to do so. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Also, when thinking about the relevance of reproductive fitness to the evolution of morality, I suggest you keep in mind that increased reproductive fitness is merely how morality was encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense. What was encoded in our moral sense was cooperation strategies. Confounding the means (reproductive fitness) of encoding morality in the biology underlying our moral sense and what was actually encoded (cooperation strategies) can be a serious error when discussing human morality.Limitations:
The proposed moral fact about “morality as cooperation” only addresses the morality of interactions between people. It is a fact about moral ‘means’ and is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’. It will have only some relevance, and in some cases be irrelevant, to important broad ethical questions such as “How should I live?”, “What is good?”, and “What are my obligations?”. — Mark S
Mark S
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