Comments

  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
    I would agree that cooperation of a kind is necessary in a moral situation (not everything is a moral moment). I would only question the desire that it need be “factual”, either innate or based on a (agreed/universal) response to the world. The human condition of being separate requires cooperation, but nothing (no fact) ensures it. — Antony Nickles

    Anthony, their nature and if “moral facts” exist is a big deal in moral philosophy.

    My goal here is to explore “Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?”

    I argue there is.

    Is that function required to be solving cooperation problems?

    All species that are cooperative enough to build civilizations must solve the same cooperation problems that are innate to our physical reality. So yes, something like morality as cooperation (as humans implement it) is required for all civilizations from the beginning of time to the end of time.
  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
    hypericin
    1.7k
    To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups”
    — Mark S

    Or, what about a cooperation that does away with the notion of out-groups entirely?

    I've long had the idea of morality as cooperation strategy without knowing it has had any scientific validation.
    ....     — hypericin

    Hi hypericin,

    A lot of science has been done in the last 50 years on morality as cooperation.

    Just this week, I came across a 2022 Master's Philosophy thesis that provides an excellent summary of the science of morality, specifically, morality as a form of cooperation. It is Escaping the Darwinian Dilemma with Cooperation-based Moral Realism by Frederico Carvalho.
    https://www.proquest.com/openview/2ae1390e8bf5d68f04d4c0819ca8d9d0/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=2026366&diss=y

    And though he holds a utilitarian, rather than a morality as cooperation, perspective, the philosopher Peter Singer's book "Expanding the Circle" describes the history of moral progress as expanding the circle of who is considered worthy of moral regard.
  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
    ↪J

    Very interesting discussion, thanks. — J
    Yes, I enjoyed it also.
  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
    ↪unenlightened
    Have to disagree with this. Take a living human body as a typical fairly stable dynamic environment. Around half the cells in the body are non-human see here
    ....

    Genes themselves of course have no interest either way, they have an effect on the organism, and either survive to reproduce or not. We call those that survive 'winners' and call their effects 'self-interested'. And we call that equivalent behaviour in ourselves, 'rational'.

    So let me put a little challenge to you, because what you say above about the predominance of competition is the received wisdom that founds also the terminology of game theory, and a deal of politics too: if self interest is rational, then reason it out for me. Because in fact game theory is symmetrical, and evolution works just as well if we call the survivors the losers; the aim of life is to go extinct and 99.9% have managed to find their rest sooner or later, and we are the unlucky ones who have to carry on a bit longer.     — unenlightened

    A human body is an organism, it would not be useful nomenclature to call it an ecosystem. Our gut and skin bacteria form ecosystems where competition reigns (with some necessary cooperative behavior with us, the host organism), but they are not part of the organism defined by a fertilized egg.

    I was talking about ecosystems such as those composed of many organisms of many different kinds.

    “Rationality refers to choosing the best means, using logic and evidence, to achieve one’s goals, whatever those goals may be.”

    Our goals are not necessarily the same as our self-interest, so acting in our self interest is not always rational.

    For example, sacrificing our lives is usually not thought of as being in one’s self interest. But we could have a goal of defending others at all costs. In that case, it would be rational to sacrifice our life.

    99….% of species have gone extinct because of a variety of environmental and competition reasons. I don’t see the relevance of that.

    I think you're going off-topic for this thread.
  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
    I wasn't wanting to bring rationality into it at this point. The comparison I'm inviting between "actual" and "descriptive" would be this: An actual question of right and wrong would not reduce to its description. And I admit that "actual" is probably tendentious; perhaps I should have said "traditional."
    ....

    I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe . . . However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational.
    — Mark S

    Again, I agree about the rationality question, and I wouldn't confront Joe on those terms. True, if we're going to say anything to him, we'd probably propose some reasons or arguments why he should prefer the inherently moral in our universe. But that can be done without claiming he's irrational to disagree. My question is, Are there any such arguments, given your thesis? It sounds like you agree that there are not.
    ...

    When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation."
    — J

    If I understand your OP question, this is a good result, or at least good enough. For my part, I think it leaves a lot of unanswered questions about what ethical choice is, largely because I'm a semi-demi-Kantian about ethics and I don't think we can leave anyone out -- it has to be universalizable. So if we can't earn Ornery Joe's assent, we haven't set the problem up correctly.

    ...     — J

    J, the meaning of “Traditional moral talk” is clearer.

    To me, what is “actually moral” is closer to the subset of descriptively moral behaviors (cooperation strategies) that” do not exploit outgroups as they increase cooperation in ingroups” than traditional moral talk based on unverified (to date) speculations about moral premises.

    I understand that there are arguments for and against the idea that acting immorally (based on one or another moral premise) is irrational. I expect posters here will have a range of opinions. But I am comfortable with the idea that acting morally sometimes, depending on one’s goals, requires acting irrationally.

    Morality as Cooperation is universal to all cultures and, due to its origin in the mathematics of game theory, universal to all intelligent species that form highly cooperative societies. That is more than enough universality for me.

    That it sometimes advocates irrational behavior (depending on one’s ultimate goals) is not a fatal flaw. As a part of science, it is what it is. Our preferences are irrelevant to its existence.
  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
    Have you thought about cooperation in nature, apart from between humans? Bees and flowers, the symbiotic relationship that produces lichens, ant colonies, and so on; it seems there is in every aspect of relations between an organism and its environment elements of cooperation and of exploitation.

    A tiger creeps through the long grass towards its prey, and the vertical stripes and slow sinuous movement convey its absence - 'just the grass rustling in the breeze'. Or the reverse deceit of the prey, as a stick insect stands immobile at just the right angle and in the right place to appear to be a dry twig. Examples of an evolved form that cooperates with the general environment to deceive, on the one side its prey, and on the other, its predator.

    Or the icon of immorality - the cuckoo; ....     — unenlightened

    Unenlightened, I have thought about cooperation in nature.

    The examples of bees/flowers, lichens (fungus and algae/cyanobacteria living together, each providing something the other needs) are good examples of mutually beneficial cross-species cooperation.

    The detailed behaviors encoded in their biology maintain the benefits of cooperation (as well as for the single species examples, bees and ants) are selected for consistent with the simplest of the same cooperation problem solving strategies that humans use to gain the benefits of cooperation – though it is unlikely the lichen are aware of game theory.

    Stable ecosystems could be viewed as a cooperative venture (including the tiger /prey and perhaps even “the icon of immorality,” the cuckoo). Still, I don’t see this as the most useful perspective. Stable ecosystems are better understood as stable competition with some examples of cooperation for mutual benefit.

    I distinguish between cooperation in nature and morality in people based on if violations of the relevant norm are commonly thought to deserve punishment. Morality, as I understand it, is thus largely, but not entirely, a human phenomenon.
  • Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?

    You argue that "moral sense" equates to "what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’." I think you mean that it follows that therefore, if anyone refers to their moral sense, they are referring not to actual questions of right and wrong as usually discussed in ethics, but rather to the built-in behaviors that our species is endowed with, both biologically and culturally. OK, fair enough.     — J

    Not quite right about “not referring to actual rights and wrong”. If anyone refers to their moral sense’s judgments, they are referring to what is at least descriptively right and wrong. If one does not like the consequences of conforming to those judgments, they can violate those judgments without acting irrationally. When you say “actual questions of right and wrong” are you thinking of judgements justified by rational thought and violating them would be irrational?

    You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice.
    — Mark S

    But now we're right back in the middle of ethics as usually discussed. Here are the good reasons for following a particular maxim, and here's Ornery Joe saying, "Well, I don't prefer the consequences." Is there something further that Morality as Cooperation can say to Joe? Is he "wrong"? I don't see how he can be. He sees the universal "moral fact" about cooperation and claims he doesn't give a toss.     — J

    If Joe does not prefer the consequences of acting morally (according to Morality as Cooperation) or using it to refine cultural moral norms in his culture, then there is not much to be done. I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe (the cooperation strategies underlying cultural moral norms and moral sense that solve cooperation problems without creating cooperation problems with outgroups). However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational.

    Could Joe’s rationality or irrationality when he acts’ immorally’ be a distinguishing characteristic (along with moral ‘means’ vs moral ‘ends”) between the two kinds of ‘morality’ under consideration: Cooperation Morality and traditional moral philosophy’s moral systems?

    So . . . the question I'd put to you is, Does this matter? Can we get the most out of "moral facts" and use the Cooperation thesis to point a path forward, without worrying about the likes of Joe, and the usual disputes about ethical reasons? You could, for instance, say something like, "Look, we understand how 'morality' came about -- it's a way of improving cooperation and helping cultures thrive -- and that's plenty good enough. Some people will never get it, and insist on a different kind of reason for what they call moral behavior, but that's irrelevant. We can still use the 'moral fact' of a universal cooperative strategy to help us decide many important questions about how we ought to behave. When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation." — J
    

    
Yes, you have captured what I am proposing. Continuing my above thought,  I am not proposing that it is irrational to violate Morality as Cooperation if you don’t like the consequences of following it.
    

    

    I put a lot of words in your mouth, but is that close to your position? — J
    Yes, that is close to my position. Thanks for your comment.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms.
    
— Mark S
    

    
I really like this. It makes a great starting place by indicating that we have intuitions and make moral judgements not only with them but also of them.
    

    
Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy.
    
— Mark S
    

    
I don't.
    

    
...
    

    
My goal in this discussion is the same as my goal in every discussion, to arrive at the truth together. But particularly to this topic it is important to me to point out that our communication is necessarily a moral endeavour. And thus I close the circle back to those intuitions by which we judge the very investigative discourse on which we are embarked. Are our goals moral?     — unenlightened

    
Of course, my goal here is also to arrive at truth. In aid of that, I am doing my best to honestly portray the data, as I understand it, about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, and how it can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies.
    

    
My intermediate goal is to identify how understanding cultural moral norms and our moral sense, as parts of cooperation strategies, can be a useful reference for refining cultural moral norms with the ultimate goal of increasing flourishing – my ultimate utilitarian goal.
    

    
So yes, my goal, and I assume yours, is moral. Also, specifically, my means of achieving that goal is moral by Morality as Cooperation.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪J

    

    I definitely want to reply in depth to your points -- you're right, for one thing, that I'd forgotten the thrust of your OP -- but will shortly be offline probably till "my" tomorrow. (it's 8:45 am EDT, USA, now, where I live). So, since I don't want to do a hasty job .. . till then. — J

    
J, no rush. I find that the quality of discussions on complex issues improves if I refrain from replying immediately. My responses to you may often be delayed by a day or two, and sometimes more.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality. — Bob Ross

    
Bob, your definition of moral fact is ambiguous with respect to the kind of ought it refers to.
    

    
You assured me that this ought does not refer to “What we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.”.
    

    
It also obviously does not refer to an instrumental or intuitive ought. Right?
    

    
Perhaps it refers to “What we ought to do as a universal rule with a motivating source of bindingness.” And that motivating source of bindingness could be rational thought.
    

    
But its universality, as required of a “fact”, would then be equivalent to what is imperatively moral.
    

    
What do you say the ought in your definition refers to?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    But of course, claims about anything come from people, and this claim comes from you, but I don't think much of it. I think we ought to have a shared goal in discussion to get as close as we can to the truth, and this shared aim is what grounds the morality of our interaction. Now if someone does not share this aim, there is nothing to be done, but to ignore what they say, and move on, unless we can somehow persuade them that the truth must be their goal in communication in general or communication loses its meaning, value, and function. — unenlightened

    
This is a discussion forum about ethics.
    

    
Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms.
    

    
Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy.
    

    
My main goals here are to clarify why “morality” as moral ‘means’ (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) exists so we can 1) refine cultural moralities to better meet our need and preferences, 2) separate out the search for moral ‘ends’ that are the other part of the larger subject, ethics.
    

    
What is your goal here?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    You continue to confuse moral facticity with inter-subjective agreement. A moral fact is not traditionally an 'imperative ought' where we ought to do something indpendently of our needs. A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.
    

    
A million people socially accepting norms is not a source of facticity about anything. It would be a fact that they accepted it and that it is a norm, but the norm itself would be non-factual.     — Bob Ross

    
Hi Bob, I see a lot of ambiguity about what people mean by the term moral facts. I’ll take your word for it that imperative oughts are not as common an assumption as I have perceived it to be.  I expect we agree that such strange things are unlikely to exist.
    

    
Let’s consider your definition: “A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.”
    

    
Do you believe that someone has come up with a widely convincing argument that such a moral fact exists? Have I missed a revolution in moral philosophy?
    

    
The function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense, solving cooperation problems, is a statement about reality.
    

    
It is grounded in reality in two ways: 1) It explains why our moral sense and virtually ALL cultural moral norms exist and 2) its origin is in the simple mathematics underlying game theory which can be argued to be innate to our physical reality. It is the universality of this function and its innate to our universe origins that give it its power. How many people recognize it is irrelevant.
    

    
But even with that ‘power’, no oughts are attached to it yet.
    

    
But we could logically say “We ought (instrumental) to use the criterion, does it solve or create cooperation problems, to refine our cultural moral norms with the goal of increasing the benefits of cooperation in our society.”
    

    
I would appreciate your explanation of why you might think that understanding the function of what virtually all people (except philosophy majors) everywhere and everywhen consider ‘morality’ is not useful or relevant.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors.
    
— Mark S
    

    
It is. In Chapter 28 of Leviathan, Of Punishments, and Reward, he writes that without fear of punishment people would simply follow their own interests and ignore the common good. It's a view held by many. But so what? So you share a view with Hobbes (and you like game theory).     — Tom Storm

    
Tom, Hobbes is correct that purely self-interested agents will, without punishment, simply follow their own interests, leading to his description of pre-civilization life as nasty, brutish, and short. This necessity for punishment is why the feeling that moral violations deserve punishment is encoded as one of part of the cooperation strategies in our moral sense. Indeed, moral norms can be distinguished from other norms by the common feeling that violators deserve punishment.
    

    
But contrary to Hobbes, people are not purely self- interested agents. In the long-term company of small groups, particularly kin, people can act in highly unselfish ways with little punishment of immoral behavior required. Social punishment becomes more important for preserving cooperation when there are ingroups and outsiders (exploitable outgroups).
    

    
Morality as  cooperation contradicts Hobbes understanding of our pre-civilization nature. It is not Hobbesian.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    Now you have every right to describe morality and immorality in this way, and you are scrupulous in calling the behaviors "descriptively moral" rather than just "moral." If there is nothing further to the idea of the moral than a certain group of behaviors that assist humans in cooperating, such a description sounds plausible to me.
    

    
But what I'm claiming, along with a few others here, I think, is that this misses entirely what "moral" means, except as a sociological or biological description. When I ask, "Is X the right thing to do?" I'm not posing a question about whether X is consistent with the evolutionary strategy you describe. Of course, nine times out of ten -- perhaps 99 out of 100 -- it may well be. Cooperation, the Golden Rule, etc. are usually very consonant with what I will decide is the right thing to do.
    

    
......
    

    
I'm trying to avoid putting this in terms of "is can't generate ought," but that's what it comes down to. Mother Nature is what she is, but ethical questions are about what I ought to do. It takes an independent argument to establish that the two are the same.     — J

    
J, thanks for your careful response.
    

    
I thought I was clear in my OP that the subject was the usefulness of understanding the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense (what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’) and NOT what we imperatively ought to do.
    

    
I then proposed that, even lacking any imperative oughts, this kind of ‘moral fact” could help resolve disputes about:
    

    
•	The relevance of moral intuitions.
    

    
•	Enforcement of cultural moral norms by revealing the shameful, to modern sensibilities, origins of cultural moral norms such as “women must be submissive to men”, “homosexuality is evil”, and “abortion is always immoral”.
    

    
•	Morality when blindly acting according to moral principles such as the Golden Rule, Kant’s moral imperative, or simple Utilitarianism is intuitively immoral.
    

    
I was hoping responses would focus on whether this knowledge could help resolve such disputes.
    
Any opinions?
    

    
I sympathize with the urge to fall back to standard ought questions like “But why ought I avoid exploiting other people (causing cooperation problems) just because solving cooperation problems is the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?”
    

    
The answer was clearly not as obvious as I had assumed.
    

    
You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice.
    

    
Why might it be your preferred moral means as a rational choice? It is
    

    
1)	Arguably the most effective means for achieving common shared goals.
    

    
2)	Universal to all cultures (and, in its game theory roots, arguably the one moral theory that is as innate to our universe as mathematics)
    

    
3)	The moral theory that is most harmonious with our moral sense.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪unenlightened

    

    1. Facts are always about what is the case.
    
2. What ought to be the case is manifestly not inevitably what is the case.
    

    
The prosecution rests.     — unenlightened
    The prosecution is making a category error.
    
The scientific hypothesis Morality as Cooperation, which is about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, makes no claims about what ought to be.
    
Claims about what ought to be binding come from people based on their goals and how they choose to accomplish them.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪T Clark

    

    Here's something you might be interested in. I think it's relevant. First, a link to a "The Moral Baby," an essay by Karen Wynn.
    

    
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/f/1145/files/2017/10/Wynn-Bloom-Moral-Handbook-Chapter-2013-14pwpor.pdf     — T Clark
    I did not find any contradictions between the study's results and morality as cooperation. The behaviors the babies exhibited that were identified as moral were parts of cooperation strategies.
    
However, morality as cooperation expands on our innate moral motivations (the paper's focus) to include and explain cultural moral norms - norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment.
    
And, even in infants, they found disapproval of perceived harm to others - be root of punishment of violations of moral norms.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪J

    
You might check my answer to Count, who made some of the same points.
    
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/997480
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    A Hobbesian position. You're arguing that there is 1) morality and 2) it's implementation, which are made up of two separate domains - cooperation and coercion. Sure, you can argue that coercion is needed to ensure compliance by certain society members. But this is an entirely separate project from what constitutes morality. Whether punishment is necessary for morality to function effectively is a separate philosophical claim, isn't it? Morality can stand alone and whether people follow it or not is separate matter to identifying what morality is. — Tom Storm

    
Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors. As I described, the first category of moral norms increases cooperation within an ingroup but can exploit (sometimes coerce) outgroups. The second category solves cooperation problems within ingroups and does not exploit outgroups - as Golden Rule and so forth.
    

    
When I describe a behavior as innately immoral, I mean that it creates cooperation problems.  Moral norms that exploit outgroups are, in that aspect of evolutionary morality, acting in an innately immoral way even though their behaviors are descriptively moral. Morality as cooperation offers an explanation of why moral relativism should be an unappealing idea.  I also remind you that the morality as cooperation hypothesis has no innate bindingness as scientific truth. Any moral bindingness comes from our choosing it as a preferred moral reference.
    

    
Getting back to the punishment of moral norm violators, immoral people might see that punishmnent as coercion. However, game theory shows that punishment (of at least social disapproval) is necessary to maintain cooperative societies. Otherwise, they are taken over by free-loaders and morality motuvated cooperation is destroyed.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪Count Timothy von Icarus

    
Count, so many cogent points!
    

    
First, I reiterate that the hypothesis is that cultural moral norms and our moral sense can virtually all be explained as parts of cooperation strategies - moral ‘means’. The hypothesis is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’.
    

    
This hypothesis is consistent with the three common observations of moral behavior you and others mention as follows:
    

    
1)	Biology triggered motivation to help others “out of love“ as evolved by kin altruism and sexual selection for bonding.
    

    
The initial step of the powerful cooperation strategy indirect reciprocity (which underlies much of human morality) is helping others without expectation of reciprocity from that person (which includes a child or a disabled person). The hypothesis is silent on the reason the motivation exists. That evolutionary source could be kin altruism, pair bonding, or reproductive fitness increased by cooperation within groups of unrelated people (the common focus in game theory).
    

    
Also, for indirect reciprocity, delays in reciprocity and any eventual reciprocity being to people other than the initial helper are normal. Kin altruism for immature kin can be understood as cooperation between generations.
    

    
2)	Forming a goal to do “good’ or live a ‘good life’ based on rational thought and, in morally interesting cases, "acting for higher principles"
    

    
Again, the initial step of indirect reciprocity is helping others, independent of the source of that motivation. Helping others based on rational thought ("acting for higher principles") does not contradict the hypothesis.
    

    
Also, the hypothesis is essentially silent about ‘ends’, it describes ‘means’. So neither the hermit whose goal is isolation, nor Socrates whose goal to live consistently with his moral judgements leading to drinking the poison, are counterexamples to the hypothesis. The hermit and Socrates simply have, or had, different goals than their societies.
    

    
But some goals (such as those preferred by psychopaths or implied by some versions of egoism) can include, as a matter of indifference, exploitation of others to the extent exploitation benefits oneself. In these cases, it is the means that morality as cooperation identifies as innately immoral, not the goals.
    

    

    
3)	What about cultural moral norms that have nothing to do with reproductive fitness?
    

    
The biology underlying our moral sense was selected for by the reproductive fitness benefits of the cooperation strategies it motivated.
    

    
But what motivates groups to choose, advocate for, and enforce cultural norms? Groups choose moral norms based on whatever benefits of cooperation appeal to them – reproductive fitness is generally not explicitly considered. Hence, cultural moral norms can be directly counter to reproductive fitness while still being parts of cooperation strategies.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪AmadeusD
     
    ↪AmadeusD

    
In science, facts (of science’s usual provisional kind) can be established by criteria such as explanatory power, simplicity, no competitive hypothesis, consistency with established science, and the like. That is the basis for claiming it is provisionally true that the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense is to solve cooperation problems.
    

    
Morality based on Divine command theory is also explained by Morality as Cooperation. Who better than an all-seeing, evil-punishing, all-powerful divinity to motivate people to act morally? Whether the divinity is real or not does not matter to believers' motivation to act morally..
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪Tom Storm

    

    If there is a moral imperative to care for, look after, and protect our fellow humans, I don’t see that it has any connection with a motivation to punish other people for behaviors we don’t like.
    
— T Clark
    

    
I agree. People are conditioned to feel certain ways, based on culture and upbringing, but I doubt it is innate.     — Tom Storm

    
As I said to T,
    

    the scientific claim about our moral sense is that the reason it exists is because it motivates cooperation strategies. Without punishment, free riders would destroy cooperation by exploiting others' efforts to “care for, look after, and protect” them. By “exploit,” I mean accepting help and not reciprocating. Punishment of exploiters is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.
    

    
Punishment’s necessary role in morality is an example of how science can illuminate morality.
    
     — Mark S
    Hence, cooperation cannot be the measure of the good; we should cooperate just when it is truly best to do so.
    
— Count Timothy von Icarus
    

    
Yes, and we can certainly (and have) cooperated to achieve violent and oppressive goals which cause mass suffering.     — Tom Storm

    
From my OP
    

    Limitations:
    

    
The proposed moral fact about “morality as cooperation” only addresses the morality of interactions between people. It is a fact about moral ‘means’ and is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’. It will have only some relevance, and in some cases be irrelevant, to important broad ethical questions such as “How should I live?”, “What is good?”, and “What are my obligations?”.     — Mark S

    
And yes "we can certainly (and have) cooperated to achieve violent and oppressive goals which cause mass suffering".
    

    
Right. Our cultural moral norms and moral sense advocate and motivate cooperation with few restrictions on what people want to cooperate to do. Morality as Cooperation explains why this happens, why people can consider it moral, and why some descriptively moral cultural norms can have such horrific consequences.
    

    
That might be a useful understanding when you are trying to reason with someone who holds such views.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪J

    

    ↪Mark S I see this as a well-considered version of an evolutionary explanation for morality. As such, I think we need to pose the usual objection: If morality equates, in some sense, to "what is beneficial for the species" -- its "universal function" -- why does that entail that I should care what is beneficial for the species, or regard that as in any way a good for me? — J
    As I said to Count,
    

    Also, when thinking about the relevance of reproductive fitness to the evolution of morality, I suggest you keep in mind that increased reproductive fitness is merely how morality was encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense. What was encoded in our moral sense was cooperation strategies. Confounding the means (reproductive fitness) of encoding morality in the biology underlying our moral sense and what was actually encoded (cooperation strategies) can be a serious error when discussing human morality. — Mark S
    You may not care about the species, but I expect you will find you prefer to live in a cooperative society.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪T Clark

    

    If there is a moral imperative to care for, look after, and protect our fellow humans, I don’t see that it has any connection with a motivation to punish other people for behaviors we don’t like. — T Clark
    Hi T, the scientific claim about our moral sense is that the reason it exists is because it motivates cooperation strategies. Without punishment, free riders would destroy cooperation by exploiting others' efforts to “care for, look after, and protect” them.  By “exploit,” I mean accepting help and not reciprocating. Punishment of exploiters is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.
    

    
Punishment’s necessary role in morality is an example of how science can illuminate morality.
    

    

    Can you provide some evidence of this growing scientific consensus? Can you provide some examples. — T Clark

    
I am not satisfied with any summary of the state of the field, but Oliver Curry offers a useful, but much more complex, perspective in Morality as Cooperation: A Problem-Centred Approach
    
January 2016. You may be able to access a free pdf on
    
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281585949_Morality_as_Cooperation_A_Problem-Centred_Approach
    

    
Among recent workers in the field, he quotes:
    

    
Jonathan Haidt ‘Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfi shness and make cooperative social life possible’ (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010 )
    

    
Michael Tomasello ‘Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating with others’ (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013 )
    

    
Joshua Greene ‘[The core function of morality is to promote and sustain cooperation’
    
(Greene, 2015 )
    

    
Curry also quotes philosophers about cooperation and morality:
    

    
John Rawls ‘The circumstances of justice may be described as the normal conditions
    
under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary’ (Rawls,
    
1971 , p. 126)
    

    
John Mackie ‘Protagoras, Hobbes, Hume and Warnock are all at least broadly in
    
agreement about the problem that morality is needed to solve: limited
    
resources and limited sympathies together generate both competition
    
leading to conflict and an absence of what would be mutually beneficial
    
cooperation’ (Mackie, 1977 , p. 111)
    

    
The Morality as Cooperation idea is way older than these references.
    

    
Protagoras, in Plato’s dialogue of the same name, patiently explained to Socrates that our moral sense exists to enable cooperation. Thereby, he implied how one can teach morality by teaching how to better cooperate in society.  It seems to me that science can enhance our ability to cooperate.
    

    
What is new are advances in game theory that reveal powerful cooperation strategies encoded in our moral sense and cultural norms but not consciously understood. Game theory shows, for instance, the necessity of punishment and the role of marker strategies such as sex, food, and dress norms that increase cooperation by marking membership in a favored, more reliably cooperative, ingroup.
    

    
The long list of strange moral norms recorded in Leviticus were just a bunch of nonsense to me before I realized they were marker strategies.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?		
    ↪Count Timothy von Icarus

    

    Man has a moral sense to aid cooperation, perhaps, because this aids survival and reproduction. But it doesn't follow from this that the human good is limited to cooperation (or survival, or reproduction). Cooperation is not sought for its own sake, but rather as a means. Hence, cooperation cannot be the measure of the good; we should cooperate just when it is truly best to do so. — Count Timothy von Icarus
    Count, I essentially agree and see my OP as consistent with your point. For example, I said:
    Limitations:
    
The proposed moral fact about “morality as cooperation” only addresses the morality of interactions between people. It is a fact about moral ‘means’ and is essentially silent about moral ‘ends’. It will have only some relevance, and in some cases be irrelevant, to important broad ethical questions such as “How should I live?”, “What is good?”, and “What are my obligations?”.     — Mark S
    Also, when thinking about the relevance of reproductive fitness to the evolution of morality, I suggest you keep in mind that increased reproductive fitness is merely how morality was encoded in the biology underlying our moral sense. What was encoded in our moral sense was cooperation strategies. Confounding the means (reproductive fitness) of encoding morality in the biology underlying our moral sense and what was actually encoded (cooperation strategies) can be a serious error when discussing human morality.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪180 Proof
    I don't know if the science of descriptively moral behaviors (the Science of Morality) will help with ethics. I fear that ethicists will not recognize its usefulness.
    
— Mark S
    
Okay.
    

    
You have not provided sufficient grounds for (or any persuasive examples of) "its usefulness" to ethics.     — 180 Proof

    
Okay.
    

    
I'll further consider the usefulness to ethicists of the science of descriptively moral behaviors. Perhaps I can produce something better than the examples I listed above.
    

    
In any event, people are still free to apply this science in their personal morality and advocate for its use for refining cultural moral norms. I have done so in my life and am pleased with the result.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Fooloso4

    

    If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome.
    
— Mark S
    

    
I have no alternative hypothesis.     — Fooloso4

    

    
Counterexamples refer to the hypothesis.
    

    
Surely you can think of a few cultural moral norms that seem unlikely to be parts of cooperation strategies.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    180 Proof
    
14.2k
    
I am not trying to do ethics.
    
— Mark S
    
If so, then how do you know that your "science of morality" can help anyone actually do ethics?     — 180 Proof

    
What I intended to convey was that am trying to restrict my claims to science's domain.
    

    
Science's domain includes:
    
1) Understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.
    
2) Revealing underlying principles that explain virtually all past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense's motivations and judgments.
    
3) Revealing how cultures can choose those underlying principles as moral references for refining their moral norms to better achieve their goals by increasing cooperation.
    

    
I don't know if the science of descriptively moral behaviors (the Science of Morality) will help with ethics. I fear that ethicists will not recognize its usefulness.
    

    
But it seems at least likely that understanding descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies will be helpful because:
    

    
1) Those doing ethics risk losing their audience and relevance if they stray too far from the principles that underlie what average people have consistently thought and felt was moral over thousands of years.
    
2) If those doing ethics ignore the core of what makes us human, our incredible ability to cooperate, when answering the ethical questions "What is good?", "How we ought to live," and "What are our obligations?", they risk, again, losing their audience and relevance.
    
3) If those doing ethics ignore the universal moral principles of descriptively moral behaviors, then they are making claims about what morality ought to be without understanding what morality 'is', which seems like a shaky foundation for truth.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    But in your view...
    
— Mark S
    
None of those are views I advocate.     — Banno

    
I am glad to hear that you advocate none of the following views (which I falsely thought were implied by your comments).  I think all three are ridiculous opinions.
    

    
1) The principles that underlie what average people have consistently thought and felt was moral over thousands of years are irrelevant to ethics.
    
2) The core of what makes us human, our incredible ability to cooperate, is irrelevant to answering the ethical questions "What is good", "How we ought to live" and "What are our obligations".
    
3) It is good to claim the well-tested, universal moral principles of descriptively moral behaviors are irrelevant to ethics even when you have nothing better to offer as moral guidance.
    

    
A question for you. Which discipline's methods do you think are better suited for studying descriptively moral behaviors (behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by past and present cultural moral norms)?  I think science's methods (such as inference to best explanation) are critical. Which, if any, of moral philosophy's methods do you think would be suitable?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    You appear to not understand what is included in empirical evidence for scientific truth.
    
— Mark S
    

    
I think it is the other way around.     — Fooloso4

    
This thread's topic is Defining What the Science of Morality Studies. It is not a synthesis of the evidence for behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by past and present cultural moral norms being part of cooperation strategies (see the OP references).
    

    
In short, though, that hypothesis is robustly supported by inference to the best explanation of the data set of past and present cultural moral norms and what we know about our moral sense. If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Bob Ross

    

    The problem is that, on the one hand, you are claiming that this "science of morality" does not inform us what we ought to do, and then, on the other, you say that this science is a perfectly adequate informant of "moral guidence" (i.e., what one ought to do). — Bob Ross

    
The science of descriptively moral behaviors (what I have been referring to as the Science of Morality) cannot tell us what we imperatively ought to do. This science, like the rest of science, is limited to telling us what 'is'.
    

    
On the other hand, understanding descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies can be culturally useful for groups with goals that can be achieved by increasing cooperation. Choosing this scientific understanding as a reference for refining cultural moral norms that will be advocated and enforced can provide high-quality moral guidance. This choice is based only on an instrumental ought, not an imperative one.
    

    
"Moral guidance" (what one ought to do in a society) can be based on an instrumental ought of the kind science can provide.
    

    
Is the problem you saw now resolved?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Tom Storm

    

    I don't see how this is 'not trying to do ethics' when you appear to be trying to develop a foundation for morality. Is 'moral guidance' a separate avenue of study to morality?
    

    
You may have spoken to this already, but what are you hoping to achieve with all your threads on morality?     — Tom Storm

    
Tom,
    

    
I am learning to describe to philosophy majors how the science of descriptively moral behaviors can 1) be culturally useful on its own and 2) might be useful in the pursuit of questions outside the domain of science such as “what our ultimate moral goals ought to be”, “what is good?”, “how should I live?”, and “what are my obligations?”
    

    
When I said I am not trying to do ethics, I was referring to refusing to answer ethical questions that are outside science’s domain.
    

    
Does this science provide a foundation for morality? It does not provide an imperative ought morality – science can’t tell us what we imperatively ought to do or what our goals or values ought to be.
    

    
But consider the following:
    

    
Versions of the Golden Rule and “fairness” are perhaps the most cross-cultural common moral guidance.
    

    
Science can reveal that the Golden Rule and “fairness” are fallible heuristics for solving cooperation problems. If following the Golden Rule and “fairness” is expected to sometimes increase cooperation problems rather than decrease them, we would have reasons to not follow them.
    

    
If a group has a goal to increase the benefits of cooperation, they might advocate for a refined moral code that recognized the function of their moral norms is to solve cooperation problems. In such a society, it might be immoral to follow the Golden Rule if doing so is expected to increase cooperation problems (as when tastes differ, in time of war, and when dealing with criminals).
    

    
I’ve argued that what is universal to all cooperation strategies (implemented as descriptively moral behaviors) is “Behaviors that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others”. Could this be a foundation for morality?
    

    
Yes, but with two large shortcomings. It is silent regarding the ultimate goal of this cooperation, and it has no innate moral bindingness.
    

    
But if it is the most attractive option available, groups could advocate and enforce it as their group’s moral foundation.
    

    
My goal is to publish a peer reviewed paper on the subject.
    

    
Thanks for asking good questions.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Banno

    

    If you want to study anthropology, go ahead. But don't make the mistake of thinking you are doing ethics. — Banno

    
I am not trying to do ethics. I am trying to 1) show how the science of descriptively moral behaviors can be useful in ethical investigations into what we ought to do, and 2), in that absence of conclusively argued-for imperative oughts, that science is an excellent source of moral guidance.
    

    
But in your view as I understand it,
    

    
1) The principles that underlie what average people have consistently thought and felt was moral over thousands of years are irrelevant to ethics.
    
2) The core of what makes us human, our incredible ability to cooperate, is irrelevant to answering the ethical questions "What is good", "How we ought to live" and "What are our obligations".
    
3) It is good to claim the well-tested, universal moral principles of descriptively moral behaviors are irrelevant to ethics even when you have nothing better to offer as moral guidance.
    

    
You puzzle me.   Are you sure about all of these?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Fooloso4

    
You appear to not understand what is included in empirical evidence for scientific truth.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    And even within a society we may cooperate with some members while conspiring against others. — Fooloso4

    
Right. I would add that some will cooperatively conspire against others (or other societies) while believing they are acting morally.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Fooloso4

    

    That what is thought of as moral is biologically encoded is at best a hypothesis and at worse an unsubstantiated assertion. In either case it is in need of scientific evidence. What is that evidence? — Fooloso4

    
The evidence is in 1) the explanatory power for virtually all the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies, 2) huge superiority over any competing hypothesis, 3) simplicity, 4) integration with the rest of science, and other normal criteria for scientific truth.
    

    

    If the foundations of moral judgement and behavior are biologically encoded then they is not cultural. To the extent those foundations are cultural they differ from culture to culture. — Fooloso4

    
Both our moral sense and cultural moral norms have the same selection force, the benefits of cooperation they produce. The benefits relevant to the biology underlying our moral sense are reproductive fitness. The benefits relevant to cultural moral norms are whatever goals for cooperation that we seek.
    

    
Virtually all the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of cultural moral norms can be explained as applications of cooperation strategies. This remarkable explanatory power is what makes it such a robust hypothesis.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪180 Proof

    

    You make it an empty phrase, Mark, by confessing you do not know what "our ultimate moral goals" are and yet propose that a "science of morality" can describe conditions whivh determine them. This kind of jugglery is of no use to moral philosophy. — 180 Proof

    
To be clear, my subject is the science of what is descriptively moral, not any hypothetical (and incoherent in my mind) science of what is prescriptively moral.
    

    
Understanding what is descriptively moral in terms of cooperation strategies (which normal scientific methods enable) tells us nothing about what we imperatively ought to cooperate to do. Like the rest of science, the science of descriptively moral behaviors is silent about what we imperatively ought to do or value.
    

    
And just because it is silent about ultimate moral goals does not mean it is useless.
    

    
Indeed, absent a conclusive argument for any imperative moral systems, the moral principle "Act to solve cooperation problems without exploiting others" is the best high-level principle for moral guidance I know.
    

    
This principle encompasses fairness, the Golden Rule, and even arguably some of John Rawls' principles in Justice as Fairness. Its advantage over these is it clarifies that these are fallible heuristics for solving cooperation problems, not moral absolutes. If following them would create cooperation problems rather than solve them, we would have reasons for not following them.
    

    
Also, note that neither fairness nor the Golden Rule have a stated goal. Their lack of a goal does not make them useless as moral guides.
    

    
Do you have a conclusive argument justifying an imperative moral system? If not, what moral guidance would you suggest as superior to what I propose here?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Count Timothy von Icarus
    “The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".
    

    
Interestingly, for Hegel, this historical question is central the ethics proper. Both what we "have done," and what we "ought to do," are ultimately driven by reason's propelling humanity towards the accomplishment of human freedom.     — Count Timothy von Icarus

    
I've only read a few introductory summaries about Hegel but did not see that connection.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪180 Proof
    ↪Mark S So "our ultimate moral goals" is just an empty phrase, mere rhetoric, and your "science of morality" "determines" that. :ok: — 180 Proof
    In no way does the science of morality (as the study of what is and has been descriptively moral) make our ultimate moral goals an empty phrase. Rather the opposite, I advocate for science to be silent on our ultimate moral goals just as the rest of science is silent on what our other goals ought to be.
    
Science leaves the field open for you to argue for your preferred ultimate moral goal or goals.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Bob Ross

    
We disagree if ethics refers to the same thing as morality. To avoid confusion, let’s just use the word morality and avoid the word ethics.
    

    
The heart of my proposal is that the science of morality studies what is descriptively moral (our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms), NOT what is prescriptively moral.
    

    

    If you define morality with any terms that refers to morality, then you are have defined it circularly because one has to understand first what morality is to parse the definition of morality of which you have presented. — Bob Ross

    
First, the definition is for the science of morality, not morality itself. Is it circular? No.
    

    
Ask the most philosophically ignorant person you can find “what is right and wrong”. They will cheerfully tell you what is right and wrong by their moral sense and cultural moral norms. No more of a ‘definition’ of morality is required. My definition generates no “circularity” issues.
    

    
Further, defining morality beyond what is “right and wrong”, for example as Kant’s categorical imperatives, would make the definition nonsense. You could have the scientific study of cultural Kantian norms or Kantian sense motivations - incoherent nonsense.
    

    

    you are in no way engaging in morality, even with respect to your own definitions, with this “science of morality”. The science you describe, would be distinct from morality itself and would amount to a psychological and sociological account of morality—which is useless for the actual study of morality. — Bob Ross

    
What is your basis for claiming that what descriptively moral behavior ‘is’ has zero relevance for what morality imperatively ‘ought’ to be?
    

    
The principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors are what people have thought of as moral (because it has been encoded into the biology underlying our moral sense) for as long as we have lived in cooperative societies. Any proposed imperative moral system that is not harmonious with the principles encoded into our moral sense will be rejected as “not what morality is about”. So one application of understanding what descriptively moral behaviors are will be as a check on the cultural utility of any proposed imperative moral system.
    

    
Also, remember there is no agreement and there may never be agreement on what morality imperatively ought to be. In the perhaps permanent absence of imperative moral oughts, the universal principle “Behaviors that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others” is the most effective and useful definition of descriptively moral behavior I am aware of.
    

    
Do you have a better suggestion for moral guidance?
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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		Defining what the Science of Morality Studies		
    ↪Banno
    Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals.
    
— Mark S
    

    
Instrumental oughts are directed at some goal. But what ought our goal be? Try addressing that question.     — Banno

    
The subject of this thread is "Defining What the Science of Morality Studies".
    

    
The science of morality, like the rest of science, is silent regarding what we ought to do or what our goals ought to be.
    

    
There is no reason to think that the study of descriptively moral behaviors (cultural, moral norms and our moral sense) could tell us what we morally ought to do or what our goals and values ought to be.
    

    
Can you explain why you keep thinking science should be able to tell us what we ought to do?
    

    
Science may be able to tell us how we are most likely to be able to achieve our moral goals, but it will be forever silent on what those goals ought to be.
    
				
    
			
		
    
	
    

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