I don't know if the science of descriptively moral behaviors (the Science of Morality) will help with ethics. I fear that ethicists will not recognize its usefulness.
— Mark S
Okay.

You have not provided sufficient grounds for (or any persuasive examples of) "its usefulness" to ethics. — 180 Proof

Okay.

I'll further consider the usefulness to ethicists of the science of descriptively moral behaviors. Perhaps I can produce something better than the examples I listed above.

In any event, people are still free to apply this science in their personal morality and advocate for its use for refining cultural moral norms. I have done so in my life and am pleased with the result.

If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome.
— Mark S

I have no alternative hypothesis. — Fooloso4

Counterexamples refer to the hypothesis.

Surely you can think of a few cultural moral norms that seem unlikely to be parts of cooperation strategies.

180 Proof
14.2k
I am not trying to do ethics.
— Mark S
If so, then how do you know that your "science of morality" can help anyone actually do ethics? — 180 Proof

What I intended to convey was that am trying to restrict my claims to science's domain.

Science's domain includes:
1) Understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.
2) Revealing underlying principles that explain virtually all past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense's motivations and judgments.
3) Revealing how cultures can choose those underlying principles as moral references for refining their moral norms to better achieve their goals by increasing cooperation.

I don't know if the science of descriptively moral behaviors (the Science of Morality) will help with ethics. I fear that ethicists will not recognize its usefulness.

But it seems at least likely that understanding descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies will be helpful because:

1) Those doing ethics risk losing their audience and relevance if they stray too far from the principles that underlie what average people have consistently thought and felt was moral over thousands of years.
2) If those doing ethics ignore the core of what makes us human, our incredible ability to cooperate, when answering the ethical questions "What is good?", "How we ought to live," and "What are our obligations?", they risk, again, losing their audience and relevance.
3) If those doing ethics ignore the universal moral principles of descriptively moral behaviors, then they are making claims about what morality ought to be without understanding what morality 'is', which seems like a shaky foundation for truth.

But in your view...
— Mark S
None of those are views I advocate. — Banno

I am glad to hear that you advocate none of the following views (which I falsely thought were implied by your comments). I think all three are ridiculous opinions.

1) The principles that underlie what average people have consistently thought and felt was moral over thousands of years are irrelevant to ethics.
2) The core of what makes us human, our incredible ability to cooperate, is irrelevant to answering the ethical questions "What is good", "How we ought to live" and "What are our obligations".
3) It is good to claim the well-tested, universal moral principles of descriptively moral behaviors are irrelevant to ethics even when you have nothing better to offer as moral guidance.

A question for you. Which discipline's methods do you think are better suited for studying descriptively moral behaviors (behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by past and present cultural moral norms)? I think science's methods (such as inference to best explanation) are critical. Which, if any, of moral philosophy's methods do you think would be suitable?

You appear to not understand what is included in empirical evidence for scientific truth.
— Mark S

I think it is the other way around. — Fooloso4

This thread's topic is Defining What the Science of Morality Studies. It is not a synthesis of the evidence for behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by past and present cultural moral norms being part of cooperation strategies (see the OP references).

In short, though, that hypothesis is robustly supported by inference to the best explanation of the data set of past and present cultural moral norms and what we know about our moral sense. If you suspect the hypothesis is false, any candidate counterexamples would be welcome.

The problem is that, on the one hand, you are claiming that this "science of morality" does not inform us what we ought to do, and then, on the other, you say that this science is a perfectly adequate informant of "moral guidence" (i.e., what one ought to do). — Bob Ross

The science of descriptively moral behaviors (what I have been referring to as the Science of Morality) cannot tell us what we imperatively ought to do. This science, like the rest of science, is limited to telling us what 'is'.

On the other hand, understanding descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies can be culturally useful for groups with goals that can be achieved by increasing cooperation. Choosing this scientific understanding as a reference for refining cultural moral norms that will be advocated and enforced can provide high-quality moral guidance. This choice is based only on an instrumental ought, not an imperative one.

"Moral guidance" (what one ought to do in a society) can be based on an instrumental ought of the kind science can provide.

Is the problem you saw now resolved?

I don't see how this is 'not trying to do ethics' when you appear to be trying to develop a foundation for morality. Is 'moral guidance' a separate avenue of study to morality?

You may have spoken to this already, but what are you hoping to achieve with all your threads on morality? — Tom Storm

Tom,

I am learning to describe to philosophy majors how the science of descriptively moral behaviors can 1) be culturally useful on its own and 2) might be useful in the pursuit of questions outside the domain of science such as “what our ultimate moral goals ought to be”, “what is good?”, “how should I live?”, and “what are my obligations?”

When I said I am not trying to do ethics, I was referring to refusing to answer ethical questions that are outside science’s domain.

Does this science provide a foundation for morality? It does not provide an imperative ought morality – science can’t tell us what we imperatively ought to do or what our goals or values ought to be.

But consider the following:

Versions of the Golden Rule and “fairness” are perhaps the most cross-cultural common moral guidance.

Science can reveal that the Golden Rule and “fairness” are fallible heuristics for solving cooperation problems. If following the Golden Rule and “fairness” is expected to sometimes increase cooperation problems rather than decrease them, we would have reasons to not follow them.

If a group has a goal to increase the benefits of cooperation, they might advocate for a refined moral code that recognized the function of their moral norms is to solve cooperation problems. In such a society, it might be immoral to follow the Golden Rule if doing so is expected to increase cooperation problems (as when tastes differ, in time of war, and when dealing with criminals).

I’ve argued that what is universal to all cooperation strategies (implemented as descriptively moral behaviors) is “Behaviors that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others”. Could this be a foundation for morality?

Yes, but with two large shortcomings. It is silent regarding the ultimate goal of this cooperation, and it has no innate moral bindingness.

But if it is the most attractive option available, groups could advocate and enforce it as their group’s moral foundation.

My goal is to publish a peer reviewed paper on the subject.

Thanks for asking good questions.

If you want to study anthropology, go ahead. But don't make the mistake of thinking you are doing ethics. — Banno

I am not trying to do ethics. I am trying to 1) show how the science of descriptively moral behaviors can be useful in ethical investigations into what we ought to do, and 2), in that absence of conclusively argued-for imperative oughts, that science is an excellent source of moral guidance.

But in your view as I understand it,

1) The principles that underlie what average people have consistently thought and felt was moral over thousands of years are irrelevant to ethics.
2) The core of what makes us human, our incredible ability to cooperate, is irrelevant to answering the ethical questions "What is good", "How we ought to live" and "What are our obligations".
3) It is good to claim the well-tested, universal moral principles of descriptively moral behaviors are irrelevant to ethics even when you have nothing better to offer as moral guidance.

You puzzle me. Are you sure about all of these?

You appear to not understand what is included in empirical evidence for scientific truth.

And even within a society we may cooperate with some members while conspiring against others. — Fooloso4

Right. I would add that some will cooperatively conspire against others (or other societies) while believing they are acting morally.

That what is thought of as moral is biologically encoded is at best a hypothesis and at worse an unsubstantiated assertion. In either case it is in need of scientific evidence. What is that evidence? — Fooloso4

The evidence is in 1) the explanatory power for virtually all the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of descriptively moral behaviors as parts of cooperation strategies, 2) huge superiority over any competing hypothesis, 3) simplicity, 4) integration with the rest of science, and other normal criteria for scientific truth.

If the foundations of moral judgement and behavior are biologically encoded then they is not cultural. To the extent those foundations are cultural they differ from culture to culture. — Fooloso4

Both our moral sense and cultural moral norms have the same selection force, the benefits of cooperation they produce. The benefits relevant to the biology underlying our moral sense are reproductive fitness. The benefits relevant to cultural moral norms are whatever goals for cooperation that we seek.

Virtually all the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of cultural moral norms can be explained as applications of cooperation strategies. This remarkable explanatory power is what makes it such a robust hypothesis.

You make it an empty phrase, Mark, by confessing you do not know what "our ultimate moral goals" are and yet propose that a "science of morality" can describe conditions whivh determine them. This kind of jugglery is of no use to moral philosophy. — 180 Proof

To be clear, my subject is the science of what is descriptively moral, not any hypothetical (and incoherent in my mind) science of what is prescriptively moral.

Understanding what is descriptively moral in terms of cooperation strategies (which normal scientific methods enable) tells us nothing about what we imperatively ought to cooperate to do. Like the rest of science, the science of descriptively moral behaviors is silent about what we imperatively ought to do or value.

And just because it is silent about ultimate moral goals does not mean it is useless.

Indeed, absent a conclusive argument for any imperative moral systems, the moral principle "Act to solve cooperation problems without exploiting others" is the best high-level principle for moral guidance I know.

This principle encompasses fairness, the Golden Rule, and even arguably some of John Rawls' principles in Justice as Fairness. Its advantage over these is it clarifies that these are fallible heuristics for solving cooperation problems, not moral absolutes. If following them would create cooperation problems rather than solve them, we would have reasons for not following them.

Also, note that neither fairness nor the Golden Rule have a stated goal. Their lack of a goal does not make them useless as moral guides.

Do you have a conclusive argument justifying an imperative moral system? If not, what moral guidance would you suggest as superior to what I propose here?

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".

Interestingly, for Hegel, this historical question is central the ethics proper. Both what we "have done," and what we "ought to do," are ultimately driven by reason's propelling humanity towards the accomplishment of human freedom. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I've only read a few introductory summaries about Hegel but did not see that connection.

↪Mark S So "our ultimate moral goals" is just an empty phrase, mere rhetoric, and your "science of morality" "determines" that. :ok: — 180 Proof

In no way does the science of morality (as the study of what is and has been descriptively moral) make our ultimate moral goals an empty phrase. Rather the opposite, I advocate for science to be silent on our ultimate moral goals just as the rest of science is silent on what our other goals ought to be.
Science leaves the field open for you to argue for your preferred ultimate moral goal or goals.

We disagree if ethics refers to the same thing as morality. To avoid confusion, let’s just use the word morality and avoid the word ethics.

The heart of my proposal is that the science of morality studies what is descriptively moral (our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms), NOT what is prescriptively moral.

If you define morality with any terms that refers to morality, then you are have defined it circularly because one has to understand first what morality is to parse the definition of morality of which you have presented. — Bob Ross

First, the definition is for the science of morality, not morality itself. Is it circular? No.

Ask the most philosophically ignorant person you can find “what is right and wrong”. They will cheerfully tell you what is right and wrong by their moral sense and cultural moral norms. No more of a ‘definition’ of morality is required. My definition generates no “circularity” issues.

Further, defining morality beyond what is “right and wrong”, for example as Kant’s categorical imperatives, would make the definition nonsense. You could have the scientific study of cultural Kantian norms or Kantian sense motivations - incoherent nonsense.

you are in no way engaging in morality, even with respect to your own definitions, with this “science of morality”. The science you describe, would be distinct from morality itself and would amount to a psychological and sociological account of morality—which is useless for the actual study of morality. — Bob Ross

What is your basis for claiming that what descriptively moral behavior ‘is’ has zero relevance for what morality imperatively ‘ought’ to be?

The principles that underlie descriptively moral behaviors are what people have thought of as moral (because it has been encoded into the biology underlying our moral sense) for as long as we have lived in cooperative societies. Any proposed imperative moral system that is not harmonious with the principles encoded into our moral sense will be rejected as “not what morality is about”. So one application of understanding what descriptively moral behaviors are will be as a check on the cultural utility of any proposed imperative moral system.

Also, remember there is no agreement and there may never be agreement on what morality imperatively ought to be. In the perhaps permanent absence of imperative moral oughts, the universal principle “Behaviors that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others” is the most effective and useful definition of descriptively moral behavior I am aware of.

Do you have a better suggestion for moral guidance?

Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals.
— Mark S

Instrumental oughts are directed at some goal. But what ought our goal be? Try addressing that question. — Banno

The subject of this thread is "Defining What the Science of Morality Studies".

The science of morality, like the rest of science, is silent regarding what we ought to do or what our goals ought to be.

There is no reason to think that the study of descriptively moral behaviors (cultural, moral norms and our moral sense) could tell us what we morally ought to do or what our goals and values ought to be.

Can you explain why you keep thinking science should be able to tell us what we ought to do?

Science may be able to tell us how we are most likely to be able to achieve our moral goals, but it will be forever silent on what those goals ought to be.

Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”?

I do not recognize any valid difference between morality and ethics. — Bob Ross

I don’t know what a “Science of Ethics” could usefully study and have never heard of anyone who claimed that as their field. I would have to be convinced that “the science of ethics” is a coherent concept.

The Science of Morality, as I propose it to be defined, is a field strictly within science’s domain.

From the OP, the Perplexity AI defines it as
“The science of morality studies the psychological, neurological, and cultural foundations of moral judgment and behavior”.

Or as you imply: a study of moral pyschology and sociology regarding cultural moral norms.

We can distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive morality. Distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive metaethics, for example, seems incoherent. I consider ethics to be the study of prescriptive morality; they are not the same.

Consider the study of descriptive morality. Can ethics usefully study it? No. Traditional ethics can make no sense of the superficial chaos of past and present descriptively moral behaviors.

However, science’s tools are well suited to that study; hence, my proposed definition of the science of morality as " the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.”

Or I could say “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist”.

Does that help?

Perhaps it would be helpful, if you defined what you mean by “morality”. I thought you meant:

“The study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist".

P.S.: this definition is circular (see underlined). — Bob Ross

No, it is not circular. What our “moral sense” is and “cultural moral norms” are is established in all societies independent of how anyone defines or does not define morality.

I don’t see how one can validly call it a study of ‘morality’ if there is no consideration of what ought to be: — Bob Ross

Would saying “The science of morality studies why descriptively moral behaviors exist” help clarify why there is no consideration for what morally ought to be done?

Is this all you mean by “morality”? Because this is just a study of the pyschology and sociology of a person—and has nothing to do with morality. — Bob Ross

One could argue “The study of descriptively moral behaviors has nothing to do with ethics”. However, arguing that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms have nothing to do with morality” would require some truly tortured definitions.

I suspect that saying, “The science of morality studies descriptively moral behaviors” would better convey my point. I thought it was obvious that “our moral sense and cultural moral norms” are about descriptively moral behaviors, but perhaps not.

Hi Banno,

The problem remains, as has long been pointed out, that a description of what is the case does not tell us what ought be the case. — Banno

Right. As has long been pointed out, we have no disagreement there.

A "moral science" that does not tell us what to do is of no use. — Banno

Really? Excluding ought claims from the rest of science does not diminish its usefulness.

Like the rest of science, the science of morality, defined as “the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist”, provides instrumental oughts for achieving our otherwise defined goals. If we can use it to achieve our goals, it is not useless. For the science of morality, these otherwise defined goals can even include goals for moral systems.

The Wikipedia entry suggests defining the science of morality as a mixture of scientific and ethical arguments about what we ought to do. This definition moves the field firmly outside the domain of science, which I see as a serious error.

Let’s let science, even the science of morality, do science and moral philosophers do ethics. A clear separation of their domains will benefit both disciplines.

How do you define “moral science”? I am not familiar with it.

Due to advances in game theory in the last 50 years or so, it has become possible to reduce past and present cultural moral norms and our moral senses to two simple moral principles. Could that reduction lead to facile categorization? Perhaps, but refusing to try to reduce past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense to simple moral principles would have left us ignorant of the core of what makes us human.

facile categorization or a rigid ideology. — Vera Mont

Rigid ideology implies imperative oughts or delusions. I advocate for scientific truth of the usual provisional kind.
Why do you call the principles that explain virtually everything we know about past and present cultural moral norms and our moral sense "Facile categorization"?

I'm not a big fan of turning humanities into sciences. — Vera Mont

How about understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist?
Are you an advocate of NOT knowing the simple principles that underly and explain the diversity, contradictions, and strangeness of our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms? If so, why?

What exactly are those "ultimate moral goals" and, since "moral science" is not prescriptive, what is the non-scientific basis for determining such "goals" and that they are "ours" (i.e. universal)? — 180 Proof

What those ultimate moral goals are has been debated by philosophers for a long time and I expect that debate to continue. There may be no final, universal answer. But even if there is no final answer, the process of that philosophical debate is useful for people considering what ultimate moral goal they will use as a well-considered moral reference in their lives.

What is the philosophical basis for determining such “goals”? You know much more about that than I do.

If you can use scientific methods to determine ultimate moral goals – more power to you! But I don’t understand how it could be possible.

Bob, Thanks for taking the time to comment.

I see Sam Harris as an embarrassment to the Science of Morality field. His science is minimal, and I (and many others including you) cannot follow his ‘ethical’ reasoning. I mentioned Harris only because he is well-known. Oliver Curry’s science is exemplary, but, again, his ethical reasoning is not respected among moral philosophers. I have no problem with scientists attempting to do moral philosophy, but Please keep such musings well separated from scientific claims, and don’t mix the two in one paper!

To remove “moral ought claims” is to remove the fundamental aspect of the study of ethics: an investigation of what is intrinsically valuable, and subsequently how to act in accordance with it. — Bob Ross

Are you interpreting the “Science of Morality” to refer to something like the “Science of Ethics”? I have no idea what a science of ethics would be. It certainly could NOT be a part of science as science is commonly understood.

My goal in this post is to argue for defining the Science of Morality as firmly within science’s domain. I have said nothing about what arguments should or should not be part of ethics. I advocate removing moral ought claims only from science, not from ethics. A clear boundary between the scientific and moral philosophy domains would benefit both.

By including moral ought claims, Wikipedia’s definition of the Science of Morality either removes the field from the domain of science or proposes that moral ought claims are a part of science. Neither seems sensible. It is a poorly thought-out definition.

A description of how people generally behave is not an ethical judgment — Bob Ross

We agree. We agree more than you realize.

All you have described, is how best people can pragmatically achieve goals; — Bob Ross

Right, I have described how understanding why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist can be culturally useful in terms of instrumental oughts for achieving goals. How is that a facade?

you are talking about a form of moral anti-realism — Bob Ross

That depends on one's definition of moral realism - a separate topic. For example:

‘‘[M]oral facts are facts about cooperation, and the conditions and practices that support or undermine it” (Sterelny & Fraser, 2016).

The philosophers Sterelny and Fraser argue that understanding why morality exists provides an objective moral realism. Their paper could be a good topic for a future post. But first, let’s sort out how to define the “Science of Morality."

I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.
— Mark S

Very much unluckily for you, I didn't do that and expressly addressed the fact that you're system is not scientific, or derived from science. — AmadeusD

It seems an appropriate time to write a post describing the different perspectives in the present state of the science of morality and my synthesis of that science. I'll do that in my next thread. I apologize for misreading your comment as implying the science I described was necessarily flawed because it was deriving ought from is.

I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'. — AmadeusD

... literary phil seems quite dead outside the existentialist frame. Where are the poetic epics looking at the philosophical implications of quantum foundations or extended evolutionary synthesis!?
— Count Timothy von Icarus
:up: :up: Actually, there are quite a few speculative fiction authors on the margins ... — 180 Proof

Do you know of any speculative fiction by authors knowledgeable about moral philosophy regarding the philosophical implications of the evolutionary synthesis? What a moral philosopher (or a knowledgeable non-professional) was willing to speculate about could be revealing.

Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?
— Mark S

↪Mark S Sure would, Mark! Where are we starting from? — Kizzy

I have started composing a thread on the state of the science of morality and my synthesis of that science. Give me a week or so to post it, and then you can let me know what you think.

,

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman.
— Mark S

Then your entire premise is false and I am happy to leave it here for you to play with :) — AmadeusD

The topic of this thread is the science of morality which studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist.

“Moral science” implies a ‘science’ of bindingness, which does not exist as far as I know, but has been a common basis for strawman arguments against the science of morality. I am again surprised to see it resurrected here. It is the zombie strawman that will not die.

It occured to me that the science of morality is just about useless for Boethius as he sits in his prison cell awaiting his torture and execution for not not allowing corruption. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Where science is probably most helpful is in knowing what to do and how to do it, — Count Timothy von Icarus

Science would be extremely helpful to Boethius while he is still Consul and dealing with the intricacies of public policy. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Point being, science, and techne in general, is only useful once one is already self-determining to some degree. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Excellent.

You aptly describe my perspective also, including Stoicism being the best philosophical therapy for those who are suffering. I hope you didn’t think I would disagree. Thanks for commenting.

Science can’t tell us what our values and goals imperatively ought to be, but once we choose values and goals, science can often tell us what we ought (instrumental means) to do to be most likely to achieve them.

The science of morality can tell us (or Boethius) how we ought (instrumental) to refine cultural moral norms to best support moral values and achieve moral goals using means defined by the moral principles that underly our moral sense and cultural moral norms. Because of their origins, we will find these moral means more harmonious with our moral sense and more motivating than any other possible set of means for achieving moral goals.

I am glad you find them interesting. The references include several different perspectives on the science. What I have presented in this forum is my synthesis of those perspectives.
Would you be interested in a thread here about the state of science about our moral sense and cultural moral norms?

I'm asking what literature you're using, and what ideas you're basing this off of. When you reference something by science, put a quote so we can see where you're coming from and what research you're basing it off of. — Philosophim

The references are representative of the literature I am using. What I propose here is a synthesis of this literature and, in that sense, a personal perspective. I am thinking of going into that more in a separate thread.

Ok, but that's not cooperation. I can do many things for my gene's advantage that do not involve cooperation. How is me, under threat of jail or duress, getting drafted in a war to die for my country cooperation? — Philosophim

Much of cooperation has nothing to do with morality. I have not claimed all cooperation is relevant to morality.

The two most powerful means of promoting cooperation in the modern world are money economies and the rule of law. Both can increase cooperation in amoral ways. Prior to their invention, cooperation relied on morality with a little help from the inefficient strategy of barter. Remember Protagoras's myth about the function of morality enabling cooperation (in Plato's dialog of the same name)? At one time, morality as cooperation would have been the common view, and I expect I would not have had as much pushback as I am getting here. Money economies and the rule of law are fantastic at increasing cooperation, but really muddied the waters about the function of morality.

There are cultural norms connected with both money economies and the rule of law. whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. These are moral norms which solve cooperation problems.

Why do you think the law that threatens jail or duress if you refuse to get drafted for war is a moral norm? Obeying laws in general is a moral norm. Helping defend the group is a moral norm. A specific law is not necessarily a moral norm.

Many ideas of morality and laws in culture are not about cooperation or willingness, but forced obeyance under threat of punishment or death. — Philosophim

Laws that force cooperation are not recognized as moral norms for good reasons. And moral norms that exploit others to increase the benefits of cooperation for ingroups are only descriptively moral. So what?

If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality?
— Mark S

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity.
— Mark S

Indirect reciprocity? Look, I'm not thinking they're going to pay it forward. For all I know the guy's a psychopath. I also lost 20$. I do it because I think if I have spare resources, it should go towards helping another life live well. This is not cooperation. This is sacrifice. Altruism. — Philosophim

I agree; you are not necessarily thinking they will pay it forward, thereby continuing indirect reciprocity; you are just acting on your altruistic impulse.

I was explaining why the impulse exists. The biology underlying your altruistic impulse and when it is triggered was selected for in our ancestors because, on average, increase in reproductive fitness. You act altruistically because of the impulse, not because of any knowledge about cooperation strategies.

You're really going to try to claim that if I stomp on a bug, it could be considered immoral because it means I'm not good to cooperate with? How does that have anything to do with whether I can work with other people towards a common goal? — Philosophim

Jainism, Buddhism and Hinduism forbid harming any living thing. This can be a high-cost moral norm for farmers or anyone bothered by bedbugs or mosquitoes. The best explanation I know of for why such a high-cost moral norm has persisted in cultures with billions of people is that it is marker of being a good person in that culture. Do you have a better explanation?

Threat of punishment for not following a culture or society is not cooperation. Its also not 'reciprocity'. Its servileness. Slavery. Personal sacrifice for obedience to others. — Philosophim

Direct and indirect reciprocity are cooperation strategies. Punishment of violators (such as people who exploit others) is a necessary (not an optional) part of those strategies in order for them to be stable in a society. Punishment can be as simple as social disapproval or refusal to cooperate with the exploiter in the future. Punishment of moral norm violations also have included death.

Cultural norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment are moral norms. Punishment, like altruism, is a necessary part of cooperation strategies.

This needs work. A lot of work Mark S. — Philosophim

That is why I post here.

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.
— Mark S

No it isn't. — AmadeusD

You are incorrect. Can you say why you think it is not?

Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
— Mark S

This is a shotgun to the foot. This is an emotive position. — AmadeusD

How is someone's preference for the moral principle that is most harmonious with people's moral sense a "shotgun to the foot"? Please explain. Are you saying they should not prefer it?

It is an instrumental ought
— Mark S

Then I have no issues. I just reject that anything you've posited is any way 'moral science'. It appears, patently, your assertion carried forth into a logical framework where you get the desired result of a self-consistent system. This is just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim. Nothing wrong with that, but it certainly falls short of anythign we could consider a scientific position or train of thought. — AmadeusD

I am glad to hear you have no issues.

Of course, science, including the science of morality (which studies why moral norms and our moral sense exist), only provides instrumental oughts. Beyond exploring how this instrumental ought knowledge could be culturally useful, I have no plans to comment on any possible imperative oughts..

No, it is not "just utilitarianism with 'co-operation' instead of 'happiness' as its aim". Morality as cooperation is silent regarding ultimate moral goals (utilitarianism's focus). Morality as cooperation only deals with moral means as defined by our moral sense and cultural moral norms, not moral ends.

There is no "moral science" except as a strawman. As I have described, there is a science that studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms extst. Perhaps you think the study of why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist is off-limits for science? If so, why?

Yes, scientism (or pseudo-science) is, at best, bad philosophy (i.e. sophistry). — 180 Proof

Sophistry implies clever arguments that make the worse argument appear to be the better. I don't believe I am clever enough for sophistry.

Wikipedia says that "Scientism is the view that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality." This thread is dedicated to explaining what science can tell us about why cultural moral norms and our moral sense exist. That science, supported by evolutionary game theory, now reveals why they exist and their underlying universal core cooperation strategy. That is not scientism.

If someone decides they prefer that underlying principle as the basis for their society's moral norms, I still don't see that as scientism. But perhaps you do?

No, you don't. Look Mark, proposing cultural values are moral values is ethics 101. Its highly debated. Your 'no contradiction with known facts' is dogmatic at this point with the examples I've given you. I still see no posted scientific papers that agree with you. You haven't addressed the specific examples I've given you like "Dying for your country". I'm not feeling like you're engaging with questioning, but dogmatically harping that your theory is right because 'science'. — Philosophim

Some of the peer-reviewed literature:

You can connect with it by googling morality as cooperation on google scholar. But rather than dump you off into that ocean, which contains many perspectives on morality as cooperation, I suggest the following list compiled by Oliver Curry with quotes by their authors:

‘Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices,
identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that
work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make cooperative social life
possible.” (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). ‘‘[M]orality functions to facilitate the generation
and maintenance of long-term social-cooperative relationships” (Rai & Fiske, 2011).
‘‘Human morality arose evolutionarily as a set of skills and motives for cooperating
with others” (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). ‘‘[T]he core function of morality is to promote
and sustain cooperation” (Greene, 2015). ‘‘[M]oral facts are facts about cooperation,
and the conditions and practices that support or undermine it” (Sterelny & Fraser,
2016). (Compiled in a paper by Oliver Curry)

Curry, O. S., Mullins, D. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2019). Is it good to cooperate? Testing the theory of morality-as-cooperation in 60 societies. Current Anthropology, 60(1).

Haidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010). Morality. In S. Fiske, G. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 797–832). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. Psychological Review,
118(1), 57–75. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021867.

Tomasello, M., & Vaish, A. (2013). Origins of human cooperation and morality. Annual Review of Psychology, 64(1), 231–255. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev- psych-113011-143812.

Greene, J. D. (2015). The rise of moral cognition. Cognition, 135, 39–42. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.11.018.

Sterelny, K., & Fraser, B. (2016). Evolution and moral realism. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 68(4), 981–1006.


Important note: “Moral systems”, “Morality”, “Human morality, and “Moral facts” from the quoted authors refer to behaviors motivated by our moral sense and advocated by cultural moral norms, and not necessarily to philosophical meanings.


Regarding your proposed counter-examples, I thought I had explained them, including how dying for your country is part of a reciprocity strategy. The short answer is the motivation for loyalty only works to your gene's advantage on average.

I have said:

“Also fully in the domain of science is understanding how the biology underlying empathy and loyalty can exist and motivate true altruism, sometimes even unto the death of the giver.
That explanation, first proposed by Darwin, is that empathy and loyalty motivate cooperation that can increase what is called inclusive fitness of groups who experience empathy and loyalty even at the cost of the life of the individual.”

“So when I find a bug in my home and decide on my own to capture it in a cup and put it outside instead of stepping on it, that has nothing to do with morality? If someone in trouble tells me they don't need help, but I secretly slip them 20$ that can't be traced back to me, that's has nothing to do with morality? I could give tons more. Very few, if any people, are going to buy into the idea that morality must involve cooperation.— Philosophim

Our moral emotion of empathy exists because empathy for other people motivates initiating the powerful cooperation strategy of indirect reciprocity. Our ancestors who did not experience empathy tended to die out. Empathy for a bug is a misfire on its evolutionary function. Could stomping on the bug still be immoral in a culture? Sure. People who kill bugs can be thought of as deserving punishment (being descriptively immoral in that society). In that society, this moral norm would be a marker strategy for a person with empathy and therefore a good person to cooperate with.

Secretly slipping $20 to someone initiates indirect reciprocity, the core of social morality. Having received $20 from an unknown person will make the receiver more likely to help someone else thereby spreading cooperation. Perhaps you are thinking of cooperation only in terms of direct reciprocity? Indirect reciprocity, in which reciprocal help is usually returned to someone other than the initiator, is a far more powerful strategy.

Understanding our moral sense and cultural moral are parts of cooperation strategies explains much about human morality that would otherwise remain puzzling.”


“Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided. Behaviors that, on average, increase reproductive fitness are what are selected for, An individual’s survival is not assured.

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Without punishment of violators, self-interest would drive people to exploit other’s efforts at cooperation by not reciprocating. For example, why be loyal if there is no punishment for being disloyal? Science's answer to the why be loyal (or why be moral) question is at the heart of the cooperation problems human morality solves.”

Proposed counterexamples are still welcome.

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark S

Why would this be an Ought?
— AmadeusD

That's what I keep coming back to. It seems there is an assumption that cooperation strategies are good and therefore ought to be obligatory or foundational to any moral system. Sam Harris did the same thing when he proposed that 'wellbeing' is good therefore it ought to be obligatory as the foundation for moral decision making. — Tom Storm

Tom, see my reply about its bindingness to Amadeus https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/15230/mark-s.

What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others
— Mark

Why would this be an Ought? — AmadeusD

Amadeus, this question merits a careful answer. I’ll describe:
1) What makes it “universally moral”
2) What kind of ought that origin implies.
3) What kind of ought it is not.

The above principle is universal to the direct and indirect reciprocity strategies that are encoded as our moral sense and cultural moral norms. It is universal to what is descriptively moral in societies with the exception of favoritism for kin.

Answering your question: It is an instrumental ought regarding which moral principles to advocate and follow in a society given any and all of these goals:
1) Increase the benefits of cooperation within and between societies
2) Maximize harmony with everyone’s moral sense.
3) Define a moral code based on a principle that is not just cross-culturally, but cross-species universal

However, its origins in science entail no imperative bindingness – what everyone ought to do regardless of their needs and preferences. Any arguments for its imperative bindingness would be philosophical arguments, not scientific ones.

...I don't have a problem with examining the hypothesis. But if you're claiming its fact? There's a LOT that needs answering.
...How do you explain someone who believes their cultural norms are immoral?
...This is a very unscientific set of thoughts.
..Hand waving away anything that doesn't agree with the desired conclusion and telling people "It Doesn't matter if we don't like it" because 'science' says so, is not a good argument.
...How is dying for my country cooperation when I'm not going to receive one single benefit from dying for it?
...Often times morality has the threat of punishment or death if one does not follow it, such as following God's commands. Why would cooperation need threats if we both mutually benefit?
..., I think it would help at this point that you publish some of these scientific articles and conclusions you keep purporting. . — Philosophim

Responding in order to your above comments:

I propose a highly robust hypothesis based on its remarkable explanatory power for the huge, superficially chaotic data set of our moral sense and cultural moral codes, no contradiction with known facts, no remotely competitive hypotheses, simplicity, and integration with the rest of science.

Such robust hypotheses are excellent candidates for scientific truth.

I personally see it as true in the normal provisional scientific sense. Not all investigators accept that, so I sometimes refer to it as a hypothesis despite my opinion.
...
What people believe is moral is a function of their cultural moral norms. Not everyone necessarily agrees with, advocates, follows, and enforces their culture's norms. Everyone in a culture is not required to agree on what is moral.
...
What criteria are you proposing that make my hypothesis unscientific?
.....
What is universally moral – strategies that solve cooperation problems without exploiting others – is a universal part of descriptively moral behaviors since to exploit others requires cooperation in the ingroup that exploits the outgroup.
...
The science of morality studies why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. That limited area of study necessarily limits its usefulness for resolving edge cases in ethics that have little to nothing to do with solving cooperation problems - why our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist. There is no “Science of ethics” that I am aware of. that would be relevant to all ethical disputes. No handwaving involved.
...
Loyalty – one of six commonly recognized emotions triggered by our moral sense that motivate behaviors that are parts of known cooperation strategies – Loyalty motivates initiating indirect reciprocity (unselfishly helping our group) and exists because our ancestors who experienced this emotion tended to survive due the benefits of cooperation it provided. Behaviors that, on average, increase reproductive fitness are what are selected for, An individual’s survival is not assured.

Punishment – by our conscience, a god, other individuals, society, or the law – is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Without punishment of violators, self-interest would drive people to exploit other’s efforts at cooperation by not reciprocating. For example, why be loyal if there is no punishment for being disloyal? Science's answer to the why be loyal (or why be moral) question is at the heart of the cooperation problems human morality solves.
...
I have started thinking about a “Recent perspectives within the science of morality” thread and how it could be helpful. There is essentially universal agreement that human morality exists because it enabled our ancestors to cooperate in groups. However, there are different perspectives (hypotheses) about how science best expresses that.

Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim. — 180 Proof

A thread about the state of the science of morality might be well worthwhile. I’ll give that some more thought.

in situ 'moral sciences' do not motivate/facilitate either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct. — 180 Proof

Are you claiming that science cannot study what motivates/facilitates ethical judgment or moral conduct?

Our moral sense and cultural moral norms motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture—descriptively moral behaviors.

Do you see anything illogical about science studying our moral sense and cultural moral norms that motivate/facilitate moral behaviors within a culture?

Further, the science of morality identifies what “motivates/facilitates either ethical (or juridical-political) judgment or moral conduct” as part of cooperation strategies.

Here are two examples of the science of morality’s relevance to moral naturalism:

1) The fact that our moral intuitions regarding interactions with other people are part of cooperation strategies reveals much about the natural conditions relevant to moral naturalism. This knowledge should be helpful in defining moral naturalism.

2) Indirect reciprocity is a much more powerful cooperation strategy than direct reciprocity. (In indirect reciprocity, the reciprocated help will generally not be returned to the person who initially helped another as required for direct reciprocity.) The non-reciprocal part in your moral naturalism’s "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" implies cooperation to reduce harm by indirect reciprocity. If so, the science of morality directly supports "non-reciprocal harm-reduction" as the goal of the most natural of moral naturalisms.

Some nontrivial percentage of individuals are psychopaths, and that has been investigated in a game theory context as well: — wonderer1

Nice study. Thanks for posting.
We could summarize the results as "moral idiots" are bad at cooperation.
That is the point.

↪Mark S "Empathy" and other emotions are not "cooperation strategies innate to the universe" anymore than (e.g.) strawberries are caused by strawberry-flavored atoms. Cite some reputable scientific studies which corroborate your claim. — 180 Proof

Of course, empathy and other emotions are not cooperation strategies.

Empathy and the other emotions I mentioned motivate behaviors that are heuristics for the two necessary parts of reciprocity strategies.

I've tried posting links to the literature, but I could never tell that anyone read the links.

In this thread, I am trying to discuss the relationship to moral philosophy of the scientific study of our moral sense and cultural moral norms.