What evidence can the discursive intellect alone give us? — Janus

I don't know. I'm wracking my brain.

What do mean by saying that consciousness is not physical? — Janus

It is not measurable or detectable in any way. There is nothing about any or all of the physical properties of the universe that is in any way similar to consciousness, or that anyone can point to, and say, "There it is. X is the mechanism of consciousness. Because..."

What if discursive reasoning just is a certain kind of neural activity, and consciousness is also a kind if master neural network, a condition, that is necessary (or perhaps not?) in order that discursive reasoning be able to occur? — Janus

What if? What if it's not? As I said, this is what I think. When someone gives any kind of physicalist explanation, I'll check it out. Maybe I'll change my mind. Until such time, I'm concentrating on this idea. Everyone concentrates on the idea that makes sense to them until someone gives a reason to think it doesn't make sense, or shows why another reason makes sense.

1. You have previously said: "The continuity of self is due to the memories" i.e. taking the exact opposite position on the transporter hypothetical. This is a thing that I am struggling to make sense of.

2. It's easy to just assert a position on this. The critical thing is how you arrived at that position, and how you would go about answering follow-up questions e.g. "What if the transporter spits the original particles across space?" "What if I separate your particles for one nanosecond?" — Mijin

Your continuity ends when your particles are separated, regardless of the scenario or any considerations.

The reassembled person, or exact replica, will not feel other than the original. And anybody who knew the original will not know it's not the original. (Assuming they are not aware of what happened.) But, regardless of what happened next, the person ended when their particles were separated.


I really don't know how I can state it more clearly. And I really don't think you don't understand what I'm saying. I think you just disagree.

Well, I've read your first couple posts a few times. But I don't see that my comments would need different than what over been saying.

Now here's the problem: there has to be a line somewhere between "transported" and "not transported". Because, while "degree of difference" might be a continuous measure, whether you survive or not is binary (surviving in a imperfect state still counts as surviving). — Mijin

You do not survive. The "degree of difference" is not between you at the beginning and you at the end. It is between you at the beginning and the copy of you at the end. Maybe the copy of you will be perfect. Maybe it will be so flawed that it can't be considered a copy. Like if Lincoln appears at destination.

Remember I am talking about your own perspective. So if Picard uses the transporter, I am talking about the perspective of the Picard that entered at the source, not whether the rest of the bridge crew considers it to be the same Picard. — Mijin

The Picard that entered at the source no longer has a perspective, because he no longer exists.

Am I not addressing the original problem?

No problem. Forums can be like that.

I don't know what to do with this thread. This thread is meant to be about a variation of the transporter problem, but I just seem to be having to explain the original problem, over and over again.

It's like I have a theory of a new allotrope of carbon, but all the responses are questioning the existence of atoms. — Mijin

I came in after a few pages, and joined the conversation that was in progress. Thread drift is inevitable, as they say. I'll read your OP before posting again.

A reductive explanation of consciousness would not only show how it comes to occur, but also why it is identical, in some significant sense, to its physical components, just as water reduces to H2O. I'm suggesting that explaining consciousness may not fit this model. — J

I agree.

That's not true. Consciousness is not trying to explain itself―it is reason, the discursive intellect, that is trying to explain consciousness. — Janus

That sounds right to me. I don't think reason and intellect are parts of consciousness, so it's not even a case of something examining itself. Which I don't think is impossible on principle, as J just noted. I think consciousness is not physical, so it's not going to be explained in physical terms. Reason, the discursive intellect might be a better approach.

Ah. I misunderstood how you meant it.

An atom is organic? How is memory accomplished in an atom? How does an atom change what it does in a given set of circumstances the next time it encounters those same circumstances, in order to better cope?

I really can't tell from your post if you want to understand my position. If not, no worries.

If you are, you have a lot of it wrong. I'm not going to reply. I started, but it was too much. I figured easier to start over if you're interested. In case you are, here's a beginning.

I think a photon is conscious. But it is not subjectively aware of any kind of mental activity. It is not subjectively aware of anything that would allow it to act intentionally.
— Patterner
In what way do you mean a photon to be conscious if it lacks all that? — noAxioms

Consciousness is simply subjective experience. It doesn't have anything to do with thinking, or any mental activity. Mental activities are among our abilities, so we subjectively experience them. But, since they are the biggest part of us, what sets us apart from anything else we're aware of, and what we focus on, we came to think they are consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

This is good. He shouldn't have said "minds", though. Minds means mental activity. Thinking. Better to say;
Consciousness of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.
Of course they're memory-less, since atoms don't have memories. But the general ideas is there. There's nothing complex about it. Simple, "raw", experience.

ilding a replica of me means it has my memories, and everything else. But it's still a replica, and I am gone
— Patterner

But when I said that memories are irrelevant to determining whether something is the same instance of consciousness, you disagreed with me. And now you're making exactly the same point — Mijin

I'm not. Consciousness A can be identical to Consciousness B. But A is not B. Identical things are not the same thing. That applies to consciousnesses as much as it applies to mass produced items that are so precisely manufactured that they are indistinguishable. It's easy to understand this. You only need to count.

Once again: from the principled point of view, from my current best understanding of instances of consciousness, I may as well hop in, because persistence of consciousness does not seem to be a thing regardless of whether I take the trip or not.
Pragmatically, I wouldn't take the trip because I would want near certainty before doing anything life or death.

I don't think the question "What would you do in real life?" tends to be very helpful for these kinds of philosophical questions. In real life, we are cautious, and frequently default to taking no action...I'm sure that in real life most people probably wouldn't redirect a trolley towards killing fewer people, for example.
A "God's eye view" is better for drawing out our best understanding and principles. — Mijin

If you are looking at your duplicate, with a consciousness identical to yours, then there are two consciousness. When you are disintegrated, only one will remain. You will be dead.

If a "God's eye view" tells you otherwise, then perhaps philosophical questions are better answered by combining it with "What would you do in real life?".

No, the galley is not conscious as a unit.
— Patterner

I think it may be. — bert1

I'll tell you why I think not. I believe I define consciousness, and interpret everything we see and everything within us, differently than anybody else here. However, I don't think that matters for this particular question. However consciousness works, however it's defined, you and I can do some pretty serious communicating. We can discuss an amazing variety of topics. Philosophy, mathematics, women, comedy, the nonsense science behind various science fiction books or TV shows, time travel, favorite colors, on and on and on and on. We can talk about these things in person, or write messages back-and-forth here, or use pictures and symbols instead of letters, or act out what we want to say like we're playing charades, or phrase everything so it sounds like sarcasm, or phrase everything so it sounds like jokes, on and on and on and on.

If the galley, all the people and all the parts, is one consciousness, it doesn't make sense to me that it would not be able to communicate with us. A consciousness that is made up of, among other things, a bunch of pretty competent communicators should be able to communicate at least as well as any of its independent parts. A human communicates far better than any if its parts can.

And how would such a consciousness act? If the slaves are all part of this consciousness, why does this consciousness still have slavery? Why not a new conscious entity that behaves as one entity, rather than one entity that still behaves like the multiple entities that comprise it, which are so very opposed to each other?

Why is the conscious galley only doing what the humans wanted to do when they crafted the boat? Why does it not have its own goals and needs?

For millennia, people have debated whether or not this or that animal is conscious. Often whether or not a given action is evidence of consciousness. I think a photon is conscious. But it is not subjectively aware of any kind of mental activity. It is not subjectively aware of anything that would allow it to act intentionally. I would expect a consciousness entity that is made up of many parts that can each act intentionally on their own, to act intentionally. But we see no sign of that from a galley.

Inheriting memories is how the persistence of consciousness is accomplished.
— Patterner

The position is the argument. Source Kirk is killed. That's what happens when someone's atoms are dispersed.
— Patterner

Do you not see how those statements are in conflict? Because this conflict (and related issues) is exactly the point of the transporter problem. — Mijin

If my atoms are dispersed, I have no memories. Or life.

Building a replica of me means it has my memories, and everything else. But it's still a replica, and I am gone. The facts that the replica feels exactly like I would feel if I had not been disintegrated, and no conceivable test could tell the difference, don't matter.

I ask again. If you are the Source, and there is a 5 second delay between the duplicate materializing and you being disintegrated, would you do it? If the continuation of your memories and characteristics was all that mattered, you would. But I don't think you would go for it.

What does IIT say when there is no Φ?
— Patterner
There is always Φ for anything. It might work out to zero, but that's still a Φ. Zero I suppose means not conscious at all. — noAxioms

So that's a difference between (at least my) panpsychism and IIT. Zero consciousness does not exist. A photon subjectively experiences, though, obviously, without thought, emotion, memory, sensory input, and most other things that I believe are confused for consciousness. or maybe a better word would be things that are considered unnecessary part of consciousness.

Consider a galley, a ship powered by slave-driven oars during battle. Is such a galley conscious? Not asking if it contains conscious things, but is the boat system, fully loaded with slaves and whatnot, is that system itself conscious? More conscious or less than say you? I ask because it is obviously running many information processing systems. Even the barnacles contribute.

You seem to go with the panphychists, so the answer is probably yes (everything is), so the important question is if the galley is more or less conscious than you, and why. — noAxioms

No, the galley is not conscious as a unit. Many information processing systems make it up. But they don't have to be a part of the galley. They can all go their separate ways, and function as individual units.

An entity that subjectively experiences as a unity can't do that. Like people. Your visual system processes information. But it wouldn't, and would be skiver at all, if it was removed from you. None of your senses would. Nor your immune system. Which information system within you is a functioning, independent unit outside of you? That's what I think makes a unit, in regards to subjective experience.

A guy at another site caught Gemini inn a lie.

This time I decided to test its ability to create jokes.

I first made sure it understood the basic requirements of a Western joke - the 'turn' and what have you - and then gave it an example of the kind of thing I was after. "Two cannibals eating a clown. One turns to the other and says, "Does this taste funny to you?"

"Now it's your turn," I said, "but I want something that you have created from scratch."

It 'thought' for a moment. "Why was the scarecrow given an award? Because it was outstanding in its field," came back the response.

"That's not new!" I told it. "That's as old as the hills."

The AI returned with an embarrassed, "I'm sorry - I'll try to do better next time." — A guy

That seems pretty serious to me. Lying??

It's meaningless just taking a position. What's the argument? — Mijin

The position is the argument. Source Kirk is killed. That's what happens when someone's atoms are dispersed.

Destination Kirk is a duplicate. Destination Kirk doesn't even know he's not the original. But the original's atoms were dispersed, so...

But I'll comment on #3:

3. Nothing I do could possibly make my consciousness persist. Even if I don't take the transporter, consciousness doesn't have persistence, only the illusion of it, because it inherits memories. I may as well let the next guy holiday on Mars. — Mijin

Inheriring memories is how the persistence of consciousness is accomplished. It's not an illusion. It's just not what people generally think it is if they haven't thought or read/heard much about it. But even after all the thought, reading, and discussion anybody has had, it's still what defines us more than anything else, and it's the last thing anyone would give up. How many body parts would you give up before it's not worth it any longer, and you would give it up? Million Dollar Baby and Whose Life Is It Anyway? are both movies about people paralyzed from the neck down who want to die.

Put a delay of five seconds into the scenario. Five seconds after Destination Kirk materializes, Source Kirk dematerializes. Who's going for a ride?

Incidentally, the illusion is also confusing in the “Total Recall” scenario. If person X has the memories of person Y implanted, are they then the continuation of person X or person Y? — SolarWind

There's a fun show called Blindspot.

B: Killed -- The Kirk at Source is one and the same with the Kirk that was born 30 years prior, but he is simply killed by this process. The Kirk that emerges at Destination is a new human, with a new consciousness, that just happens to be qualitatively the same as the Kirk that died. — Mijin

This is the one. Except Destination Kirk doesn't "just happen" to be the same. He's a copy. Of course he's the same. But Source Kirk was disintegrated.

The issue of how, concretely, an instance of consciousness is determined turns out to be really problematic to answer. So, as I say, the simplest option right now is to question the assumption itself. If an instance of consciousness is merely an instant of consciousness, with no persistence, just the illusion of being the same person by virtue of inheriting the memories of the last guy, all the problems disappear. — Mijin

Is it not a problem that, despite there being no self beyond the instant, the "illusion of persistence" of more is the only thing none of us would give up? Is the end of the self, through death or lobotomy for example, anything anybody would try to avoid? If the self is the thing we all cherish above everything else, I'm not sure "the self is an illusion" is the way to look at it. I think maybe "this is what the self is" or "this is how the self comes about" makes more sense.

I suspect nobody would go along with my scenario of being disintegrated after seeing the copy come into being. Much less assuming or being assured a copy has come into being in some distant place. Despite the certain knowledge that their identity, their self, still exists and will continue.

I'd need to see a formal proof to even consider using it. — Mijin

Make up any formal proof, any scenario you like. What is it that would convince you?

Does IIT not say consciousness is information processing?
— Patterner
From what I can tell, consciousness is manifested in information processing. There's a complex computation of Φ that is dependent on six factors, so a huge computer cranking out teraflops for weather prediction probably doesn't qualify.

Still, it's a variant of panpsychism, asserting that consciousness is intrinsic, not emergent. But it is negligible for most things with low Φ. — noAxioms

What does IIT say when there is no Φ?

A computer that processes information may do so remarkably well, and at speeds we can't imagine. ... But that's all it does.
— Patterner
But that's all a biological information processor does as well. You've not identified any distinction. — noAxioms

My distinction came next, when I said even the simplest organism is running many information processing systems. If someone thinks consciousness emerges from physical properties and processes, particularly information processing, I wouldn't think the theory would say it emerges from just one such system. I would think the theory would say many information processing systems, working together as one entity, as is the case with living organisms, are needed.

And I think consciousness is always present, but information processing is what makes conglomerates of particles subjectively experience as units, rather than as individual particles. So the computer might be experiencing as a unit because it is processing information. But, despite how incredibly well it processes information in the one way it does so, it is not experiencing as much as the simplest organism is.

Frankly, though, I'm not sure the computer is processing information. I don't think manipulating 0s and 1s is processing information in an objective sense. It is in our eyes, because we programmed it to manipulate them in ways that are meaningful to us. But I'm not sure being meaningful in our eyes is sufficient. It doesn't do anything. The information in DNA is used to synthesize proteins. The information a retina (or a simple eyespot) generates and sends to the brain (or flagellum) has meaning that we did not assign it. These are naturally-occurring information processing systems that lead to something. A computer can calculate things all day long, and nothing is necessarily going to come of it.

How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist?
— Patterner

Yes. A significant problem within personal identity is whether my particles could be separated for T time interval and still preserve my instance of consciousness.
You have given your position of "no", but is there an argument / reasoning behind that? — Mijin

Would you willingly be transported if, for some weird reason of the technology, the duplicate came into being, and then you were disintegrated? You see your duplicate, so you know your identity survives. Then you wait some seconds, knowing you are about to be disintegrated. No problem with that?

I never heard of Parfit until you mentioned him in the other post. But I know what I think about the topic, so if such a device is built, I will avoid it at all costs. :grin:

Klingons are from this galaxy.

The OP vaguely mentions that its 'like star trek'. This thought experiment is from Derek Parfit. Including the problematic versions. — AmadeusD

The OP is about the transporters on Star Trek, and it doesn't mention Parfit.

This is a genuine question, are you just working through these intuitions as we go? — AmadeusD

No. I first started thinking of it when I read a Star Trek novel called Spock's World. McCoy didn't like using the transporter, because he was worried that the soul would be lost. Silly, because he had been transported many times, so, if that was a problem, it was already too late.

In a good episode of The Next Generation, they went to an uninhabited planet where Riker and a team had been doing some work many years prior. When they got there, they discovered another Riker. When he transported away those years ago, the beam had both gotten through and been reflected back to the surface. So two of him. Both were the result of the same transport. Neither could claim to be more the person that dematerialized than the other could.

Of course, the actual original Riker had dematerialized many years before that, when he was transported for the very first time. So, after the unusual transport, these two were identical copies of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy... And years later, during this episode, the Riker we had known all along was many times removed from that.

Not necessarily. People can still be confused, and imagine criteria for "sameness" in certain scenarios that neither they nor anyone else actually apply. For instance, the criterion that "all the molecules have to be the same" is simply imaginary, its not actually a thing. — hypericin

How is it decided what is confusion, and what is or is not a thing?

Either the chairs are all the same chair and the people are all the same person, or the chairs and the people are identical copies. If the universe isn't keeping track, meaning there is no objective answer, then it's up to each person to judge for themselves.

↪Patterner I think the very concept of original and duplicate breaks down entirely. — flannel jesus

Can you explain what you mean?

Whoever is keeping track, I would think it would be the same for us as it is for chairs.

I think there is a difference between two things being identical and two things being the exact same thing. A factory can pump out, let's say, 1,000 chairs in a day. if this factory is perfect in all detail, including the number of atoms of each type in every one of those thousand chairs, they are not all exactly the same chair. They are only all identical to each other.

I wouldn't say it is otherwise with a human. Identical copies of me are not the exact same person.

What's interesting is that the universe doesn't have a sense of identity for things like atoms. At a fundamental level, the universe can't tell the difference between one electron and another one, one atom and another one.

So if a god steps in and separates all the atoms in your body, and then puts together a bunch of "different" atoms in the exact same arrangement half a meter to your left... who is to say that those aren't "your atoms"? Atoms have no identity, so they have just as much a claim to being your atoms as any other atoms do. — flannel jesus

We all have our opinions. Mine is that, if all of my atoms are separated from each other, I no longer exist. Just because my atoms all still exist doesn't mean I still exist. Just because my atoms can be put back together doesn't mean I still exist. If an exact duplicate is made so both original and duplicate exist, are both originals? I don't see how that can be. If you then destroy the original, is the duplicate now considered the original? I don't see how that can be, either.

Sorry. I just realized you quoted a different post than the one I thought you I'm talking about my post immediately before your previous post.

If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be.
— Patterner

Why? Because he doesn't have your soul? — flannel jesus

No. For the reasons I said. (I don't believe in any soul.)

Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters
— Patterner

Err, I don't ... think ... that's happening. But nevertheless, if I;ve missed that, it's worth noting that what Star Trek does has zero bearing on the discussion as its not one based within the restrictions of that universe. — AmadeusD

It's the premise of the OP. But that's a catch-all. Any other hypothetical methods of doing the same thing are fine.

The entire point is to figure out whether you think the guy walking out on Mars is 'you' and then if so, how that's the case. Your position is quite clear, happily :P

You obviously don't think it is for similar reasons I don't. That's not particularly relevant, I don't think. We have no idea what B would 'think' because this is fiction, speculation and semi-nonsense all rolled into one.

Your response applies to a body well, but not a self as we can't know what that consists in (currently). But that response - It's the one i gave to Mijin in certain terms - covers any argument for bodily continuity well in this TE. Parfit's take is that there is no 'you'. There is no self - simply relation R. That relation is just psychological continuity. There need be no identity (nor could there be, on his and my conceptions). There was no identity to continue. So while intuitively, I think everything you've said makes sense, when you drill into the thought experiment, they largely don't answer much I think. — AmadeusD

I don't think there's any need for the thread if the person walking out on Mars does NOT think he's me. In Star Trek, he thinks he is. indeed, he could not think otherwise, and is indistinguishable from me. But, as has happened on Star Trek, and could happen in scenarios we devise, the original could remain, joined by the copy, or it could be multiple copies but no original. If the original is not destroyed, then the copy is more obviously not the original, regardless of how these things are defined.


As for a self, we can only all give our opinions, I suppose. Mine is that the self is simply the subjective experience of the entirety on question. My self is the experience of this body, with these senses; this brain, with these memories; etc. The continuity of self is due to the memories.

Of course, in regards to this thread, the self of the original and the self of a copy are going to be indistinguishable. Even the copy wouldn't feel other than the original feels/felt.

No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist.
— Patterner

How do you know that? — Mijin

How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist?

the replica would not know he wasn't me
— Patterner

I find it quite exciting that we actually do not know whether this would obtain. — AmadeusD

Well, we're talking about Star Trek transporters, or whatever is similar enough. Nobody has ever materialized on any of the shows and thought they were a duplicate.

I certainly agree - but humour me - is your take that there's a set of interlocking criteria (these atoms, at this time, in this configuration) that cause someone to be 'you'? Obviously, I take there is only one shot/possible 'you' in this, just asking in that form to get clear response. — AmadeusD

Not sure you meant to word it the way I'm taking it. Nothing can cause anyone or anything to be me. I'm the only possible me. Even if a duplicate of me was made, nobody could tell us apart, and neither of us could prove that we were the original, there would still be only one original me.

I could even be a duplicate, and not know it. But I'd still be the only me.

The computationalists and IIT proponents, for example, suggest that consciousness emerges from computation and/or information processing, and they usually invoke a threshold of computation/processing before consciousness emerges, else they end up close to panpsychism. — RogueAI

Does IIT not say consciousness is information processing?


[

There's plenty of artificial computer devices that do a whole lot more information processing than does what I might consider to be a barely conscious organism, and I don't consider the devices to be conscious. — noAxioms

Well, I think everything is conscious, but only of itself. A computer that processes information may do so remarkably well, and at speeds we can't imagine. (We can't solve a billion simple addition problems in a lifetime.) But that's all it does. Otoh, the simplest organism that you might consider to be barely conscious has quite a few different information processing systems within it. Starting with DNA synthesizing protein. I don't know which organism you have in mind, but there is likely sensing the environment, doing something in response to what is sensed, metabolism, etc. I would say that organism's subjective experience of itself is a lot more complex than most computers.

Well done.

You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists.
— Patterner

How do you know that? Let's say there was technology that allowed me to separate and reform all your atoms within a nanosecond. Would you survive that process? — Mijin

No. If my atoms are separated, I do not exist. You can build a replica of me, from the atoms that were once part of me, or from different atoms of the same kinds, in a nanosecond or a decade. If done perfectly, the replica would not know he wasn't me. But he wouldn't be.

If moving my actual atoms is needed for a successful transport...why is that? What's so special about my atoms? What if we partially use my atoms....how do we square the binary nature of me being alive or dead and the apparent continuous nature of n atoms being from the original? — Mijin

You cannot successfully transport a living person if you separate all their atoms. You have already failed, because separating all of a person's atoms means the person no longer exists.

Well, if the experiments go the way he expects them to go, it would be reasonable to think they went that way for the reason he expected them too.

Heh. Fixed.

The original is always killed, and a copy constructed at the destination. Maybe deconstructing the original is needed to get all the information, and I don't know how deconstructing a living human can be seen as not killing them. Or deconstructing is not needed, but the original is destroyed so that there aren't multiple copies.