This also has issues; e.g. what if we don't delete the original, does it mean we have multiple "I"s? And how can that be, when the experiences of those I's is separate? — Mijin
I see zero vulnerability here. There is only a problem, again, if you are secretly importing the notion of metaphysical selves. If not, it is just the problem of damage. If you sustain enough damage, you may not really be "you" any more, in the sense that you won't identify with your previous, undamaged self.It's also vulnerable to the "imperfect transporter" as described in the OP. — Mijin
We all have our opinions. Mine is that, if all of my atoms are separated from each other, I no longer exist. Just because my atoms all still exist doesn't mean I still exist. Just because my atoms can be put back together doesn't mean I still exist. If an exact duplicate is made so both original and duplicate exist, are both originals? I don't see how that can be. If you then destroy the original, is the duplicate now considered the original? I don't see how that can be, either.What's interesting is that the universe doesn't have a sense of identity for things like atoms. At a fundamental level, the universe can't tell the difference between one electron and another one, one atom and another one.
So if a god steps in and separates all the atoms in your body, and then puts together a bunch of "different" atoms in the exact same arrangement half a meter to your left... who is to say that those aren't "your atoms"? Atoms have no identity, so they have just as much a claim to being your atoms as any other atoms do. — flannel jesus
if this factory is perfect in all detail, including the number of atoms of each type in every one of those thousand chairs, they are not all exactly the same chair. They are only all identical to each other. — Patterner
Can you explain what you mean?↪Patterner I think the very concept of original and duplicate breaks down entirely. — flannel jesus
If the universe isn't keeping track, meaning there is no objective answer, then it's up to each person to judge for themselves. — Patterner
Is that, like, yes, both? — bongo fury
but evidently you don't bother read through? — bongo fury
Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity? — bongo fury
We have to establish criteria beyond that? I don't follow. — bongo fury
ou wouldn't seek to convince me I was deluded by pointing to evidence of provenance contradicting my claim of bodily continuity with Napoleon? By asking me to reconcile that claim with historical evidence of my more recent birth in South London, e.g., etc? — bongo fury
It's the premise of the OP. — Patterner
I don't think there's any need for the thread if the person walking out on Mars does NOT think he's me. — Patterner
and is indistinguishable from me — Patterner
If the original is not destroyed, then the copy is more obviously not the original, regardless of how these things are defined. — Patterner
My self is the experience of this body, with these senses; this brain, with these memories; etc. The continuity of self is due to the memories. — Patterner
How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist? — Patterner
That is all. — hypericin
I think there is a difference between two things being identical and two things being the exact same thing. — Patterner
It's obviously unintuitive, but it is also unsatisfactory as it gives us no notion of self. It allows for 1:x without explanation. Isn't that an issue, to you? — AmadeusD
How is it decided what is confusion, and what is or is not a thing?Not necessarily. People can still be confused, and imagine criteria for "sameness" in certain scenarios that neither they nor anyone else actually apply. For instance, the criterion that "all the molecules have to be the same" is simply imaginary, its not actually a thing. — hypericin
And this implies that, as intuitive as it sounds, you "continue" after entering the teleporter, after being cloned, etc, because "continuance" is just the succession of these experiences of "self" over time — hypericin
The OP is about the transporters on Star Trek, and it doesn't mention Parfit.The OP vaguely mentions that its 'like star trek'. This thought experiment is from Derek Parfit. Including the problematic versions. — AmadeusD
No. I first started thinking of it when I read a Star Trek novel called Spock's World. McCoy didn't like using the transporter, because he was worried that the soul would be lost. Silly, because he had been transported many times, so, if that was a problem, it was already too late.This is a genuine question, are you just working through these intuitions as we go? — AmadeusD
The OP is about the transporters on Star Tre — Patterner
these two were identical copies of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy of a copy... And years later, during this episode, the Riker we had known all along was many times removed from that. — Patterner
How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist? — Patterner
What exactly is the problem with multiple "I"s? If we had metaphysical selves, aka souls, then it would be a problem. Which one would the soul ("I" here) go to? How could the soul be in two places at once? But if we don't, then simply, two entities would have the experience of being you, instead of one. What is the contradiction? — hypericin
"why would the universe decree that, say, X=12,371 means surviving with brain damage, and X=12,372 means you effectively die from the injury?"
Obviously, the universe is doing no such thing. Adding a teleporter on top of this scenario changes nothing. — hypericin
but evidently you don't bother read through?
— bongo fury
No idea what you're referring to. Everything I've said is relevant and seems pertinent at the time I commented it. — AmadeusD
I mean to say that you can't give a criteria for the 'self' to being 'self-same' isn't quite available. — AmadeusD
Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity?
— bongo fury
No, and I don't think you do either. — AmadeusD
If you're simply stipulating that, for you, a 'self' is, in fact, a confluence of mind and body in a single, recognizable-over-time entity, that's fine. — AmadeusD
Would you willingly be transported if, for some weird reason of the technology, the duplicate came into being, and then you were disintegrated? You see your duplicate, so you know your identity survives. Then you wait some seconds, knowing you are about to be disintegrated. No problem with that?How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist?
— Patterner
Yes. A significant problem within personal identity is whether my particles could be separated for T time interval and still preserve my instance of consciousness.
You have given your position of "no", but is there an argument / reasoning behind that? — Mijin
Make up any formal proof, any scenario you like. What is it that would convince you?I'd need to see a formal proof to even consider using it. — Mijin
I suspect nobody would go along with my scenario of being disintegrated after seeing the copy come into being. — Patterner
Make up any formal proof, any scenario you like. What is it that would convince you? — Patterner
Right now, as I say, the most bulletproof position is to basically say that there's never continuity and personal identity is basically an illusion. — Mijin
I don't think this is a sensible position: whose illusion? On the contrary, my subjective experience and its continuity are the only certainties in the world. — SolarWind
In the first case, the self could be transported, in the second case it could not. — SolarWind
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