What 'new good things' do you think may benefit us? — Jeremy Murray

I'm just thinking that it would be bad if we only gained negative things. Have we also gained self-love? I would think that, if you are right, and self-love is truly a new thing, then maybe yin and yang require an opposite. If we don't have one, then we can only become more and more negative as a species. More hurting, and more hurtful.

Perhaps I'd have to use a better-suited word. — Copernicus

I agree. Because if something does not have physical properties, then it is not physical.

it also has non-physical characteristics
— Patterner

If they stemmed from physical properties, then they're also physical properties, regardless of characteristics. — Copernicus

That is not how physical is defined.
If something does not have physical characteristics, then it is not physical.
Just as if something does not have solid characteristics, then it is not a solid.
Just as, in chemistry, if something does not have carbon in it, then it is not organic.
If something does not have wood in it, then it is not wooden.
If something does not have metal in it, then it is not metalic.

My point is, everything came from the Big Bang (assuming it's legit), but varies in characteristics. All are physical. The universe is physical. — Copernicus

It certainly has physical characteristics. But it also has non-physical characteristics. Such as consciousness.

Unless anyone can point out any physical characteristics of consciousness.

Exactly. Both have different classes. — Copernicus

That's my point. Eyes are physical. Consciousness is not.

Of course you can quantity heat and light.
— Patterner

I meant to say "count" (like physical objects). — Copernicus

Being countable like physical objects is not a requirement for being considered physical. Heat and lighte have other physical characteristics, even if they are not countable.

It can't be sensed with any of our senses
— Patterner

Like eyes can't see themselves. Consciousness itself is a kind of sense. — Copernicus

I said consciousness can't be sensed with any of our senses. That is not similar in any way to an eye not being able to see itself. Eyes can still be sensed visually, by other eyes. Further, my eyes can be felt, tasted, etc., even by my own senses. They are physical, because they have physical characteristics.

Consciousness has none.

Of course you can quantify heat and light. We do it all the time. We feel heat on our skin, and can measure it in degrees with a thermometer. We can see light with our eyes, and measure it in lumens per square meter, or square foot, with a light meter. We also know what they are made of/how they comes into being.

But not consciousness. It can't be sensed with any of our senses, and it can't be measured or quantified with any of our technology. Although it is inextricably bound to the physical, and doesn't exist without a physical component (at least we are not aware of any consciousness without a physical componentry), it is not, itself, physical. If every other product of physical events is, itself, physical, why would we think this lone, non-physical thing is also the product of physical events? Why would we not think this lone, non-physical thing is the product of something non-physical?

Physical property doesn't have to have tangibility. — Copernicus

"Tangible" is just one physical characteristic. Not every physical thing has every physical characteristic. But you can't call something physical if it doesn't have any physical characteristics. How is such a thing deemed to be physical?

What do you think the nature of the nonphysical part is? — frank

I think the only way to put it is subjective experience. It can't be worded in any physical way. If it could be, someone would be able to give me what in asking for. Without all the physical terms that we're so used to and comfortable with, it's not easy for us to talk about it. Especially me, since very few on TPF think consciousness is fundamental. It's the property that subjectively experiences. Not a physical property. Not all properties are physical.

Seeing and licking are physical processes. We can describe and measure them physically. And we can discuss the lower level structures, down to the particles, that allow for, and give rise to, the processes.

I'm hoping someone can tell me about the physical aspects of consciousness that are physically describable and measurable. It could be that, like a hurricane, it is far too complex for us to figure out in every detail, and far too complex for us to fully describe how its constituent parts allow for, and give rise to, its existence. But what are it's physical characteristics?

Certainly we are physical. At least in part. I believe not entirely, but maybe someone will tell me of consciousness's physical, quantifiable characteristics, they way we can talk about the physical, quantifiable characteristics of other processes.

I guess we could say any fatal disease threatens it's own existence by possibly wiping out all hosts. But it doesn't work out that way. At least not when humans are the host. I don't know if there have been other diseases that no longer exist because all hosts were killed?

IV. Emergence: When Physics Becomes Experience

Though each neuron obeys physical law, the collective pattern of billions of neurons yields subjective experience. This phenomenon, known as emergence, marks the transition from matter behaving mechanically to matter behaving meaningfully.
A single water molecule is not “wet,” yet collective behavior gives rise to wetness. Likewise, a single neuron does not “think,” but structured neural networks do.

Hence, consciousness does not violate physical law—it is physical law in a higher-order configuration. — Copernicus

This is, of course, the point of contention for many. As said, it's just a statement of belief. It's not an argument or evidence for that belief. It would be great if anyone presented evidence. I just posted along these lines in another thread. The heat and pressure in a room are measurable things. we use the thermometers and barometers. And we know that heat and pressure are the same thing as the movement of the air molecules. James Clerk Maxwell worked out the math for the average speed of a molecules, what percentage are moving half the average speed, what percentage are moving twice the average speed, etc.

Flight is a physical process that we can measure in various ways. How fast is something flying. How high is it. What direction is it moving in. we also know how it works. We know that air flows is faster over the curved top of the wing then the flat bottom. This results in less air pressure on top then on bottom, which causes aerodynamic lift.

A hurricane is also a physical process that we can measure in various ways. we can measure its circumference and diameter. We can measure the speed of its spin, and the speed and direction it moves over the surface of the planet. We can calculate how much water it contains. A hurricane's behavior is influenced by far too many constantly changing factors for us to predict its behavior perfectly. But we understand it.

Tropical storms form from an atmospheric disturbance like a tropical wave or group of thunderstorms. For these disturbances to grow into a tropical cyclone, the following environmental conditions must be in place:

Warm ocean waters (at least 80°F/27°C).
An unstable atmosphere driven by differences in temperature, where temperature decreases with height.
Moist air near the mid-level of the atmosphere.
Must be at least 200 miles (with rare exceptions) north or south of the equator for it to spin (due to the Coriolis effect).
Little change in wind speed or direction with height (known as low vertical wind shear). — NOAA

Weather.gov has more info without going overboard.

These are all examples of macro physical things caused by smaller physical things. Consciousness is different. We can't detect it. We can't measure anything about it. We can't calculate anything about it. We can't determine its physical causes because there's nothing physical about it to to follow down to lower level structures or particles. It's just a broad assumption that it must be caused but the physical.

The ecosystem has developed in such a way that it doesn’t disturb this equilibrium*.
When we came along, we thought we knew better and disturbed the equilibrium for purposes of internal conflict (within social groups) power struggles and greed. — Punshhh

Indeed. And what other species acts in ways that disturbs the equilibrium so badly that we are concerned it might wipe itself, if not all life, out?

That's like one step away. Yes, heat is simple and can pretty much be described that way. From atoms to consciousness is about 12 steps away (my quote, and no, I didn't count). I gave the example of trying to explain stellar dynamics in terms of particle interactions. — noAxioms

Yes. Chalmers mentions the hurricane in this video:

Who would ever guess that the motion of a hurricane would emerge from simple principles of airflow. But what you find in all those other cases, like the hurricane, and the water wave, and so on, is complicated dynamics emerging from simple dynamics. Complicated structures emerging from simple structures. New and surprising structures. — Chalners

The same for stellar evolution, which, certainly, nobody considers to be a supernatural process. There is no point in time when any part of a star, or hurricane, that we can observe in any way, is not physical, not observable and measurable in one way or another. We can measure a star's size, it's brightness, its output of various kinds of radiation. We can measure the diameter and circumference of a hurricane, its temperature, how fast it circulates, how fast it moves over the surface of the planet. We can calculate how much water it contains. The defining characteristics of stars and hurricanes are physical events that we can quantify. I don't hold it against scientists who study stellar dynamics and hurricanes that they can't calculate exactly when one will begin or end, know exactly what is going on at any point inside it, or understand it in every detail at every point at every moment.

Regarding the 'magic' thing, then, it seems to me that the criterion you give about 'not being magical' is something like being 'totally understandable', something that is not too dissimilar to the ancient notion of 'intelligibility'.
— boundless
Let's reword that as not being a function of something understandable. — noAxioms

The definition of "magical" can only be something along the lines of:
Something that operates outside of the laws and properties of this reality.
Our understanding is irrelevant.

We don't understand how mass warps spacetime. But we don't think gravity is magic. We don't understand how dark matter warps spacetime, but doesn't interact with light or other electromagnetic radiation. But, despite not being able to detect it, we hypothesize dark matter's existence, and we don't say the motion of the galaxies is the result of magic.

Hmm I think I was quite aware of your definition for consciousness as I stated it as subjective experience.
I just assume for now that we need neurons for a subjective experience. — Jack2848

If subjective experience is fundamental, we do not need neurons. Everything subjectively experiences. If something does not have neurons, then it does not subjectively experience things neurons do/are capable of. But what neurons do is not what consciousness is.

"I am trying to understand your position."

My position is simply that nobody has ever demonstrated the simpler model wrong. — noAxioms

I am trying to understand the simpler model.

Ok, wrong word. You agreed they are the same thing. But they can't be described as the same thing.
— Patterner
Not sure what two things are the same here, but I don't think I said that two different things are the same thing. Certainly not in that quote. — noAxioms

You agreed that

brain states and conscious events are the same thing. So the arrangements of all the particles of the brain, which are constantly changing, and can only change according to the laws of physics that govern their interactions, ARE my experience of seeing red; feeling pain; thinking of something that doesn't exist, and going through everything to make it come into being; thinking of something that can't exist; on and on. It is even the case that the progressions of brain states are the very thoughts of thinking about themselves. — Patterner

But then you said "I cannot describe thoughts in terms of neurons any more than I can describe a network file server in terms of electrons tunneling through the base potential of transistors." So they are the same thing, but they can't be described as the same thing.

Granted, "described" might not be the best word. Maybe it's wrong wording to say the movement of air particles in a room is a description of the room's heat and pressure. But they are the same thing. And it's all physical, and mathematically described. As Paul Davies writes in The Demon in the Machine:

I mentioned that gas molecules rush around, and the hotter the gas, the faster they go. But not all molecules move with the same speed. In a gas at a fixed temperature energy is shared out randomly, not uniformly, meaning that some molecules move more quickly than others. Maxwell himself worked out precisely how the energy was distributed among the molecules – what fraction have half the average speed, twice the average, and so on. — Paul Davies

We don't need AI to help us accomplish our downfall.

No, I cannot describe thoughts in terms of neurons any more than I can describe a network file server in terms of electrons tunneling through the base potential of transistors. It's about 12 levels of detail removed from where it should be. — noAxioms

Ok, wrong word. You agreed they are the same thing. But they can't be described as the same thing.

Your incredulity is showing. — noAxioms

I am trying to understand your position. Can you give me any detail, or direction? My incredulity is a given. But if you're right, I'd like to understand.

But not understanding how something works is not any sort of evidence that it isn't still a physical process. — noAxioms

Maybe so. But not understanding how it works is certainly not any sort of evidence that it is a physical process.


I'm wondering if you can tell me how this works. Or tell me what's wrong with my understanding.

This is what Google AI says about the release of neurotransmitters:

1. Arrival of Action Potential:
The action potential travels down the axon of the presynaptic neuron and reaches the axon terminal.

2. Calcium Influx:
The arrival of the action potential opens voltage-gated calcium channels at the axon terminal.
Calcium ions (Ca2+) flow into the neuron.

3. Fusion of Synaptic Vesicles:
Ca2+ binds to proteins on the synaptic vesicles, which are small membrane-bound structures containing neurotransmitters.
This binding triggers the fusion of the synaptic vesicles with the presynaptic membrane.

4. Neurotransmitter Release:
As the vesicles fuse, the neurotransmitters are released into the synaptic cleft, the space between the presynaptic and postsynaptic neurons.

5. Diffusion and Binding:
The released neurotransmitters diffuse across the synaptic cleft and bind to receptors on the postsynaptic neuron.

6. Termination of Neurotransmitter Action:
Neurotransmitters are eventually removed from the synaptic cleft by reuptake into the presynaptic neuron, enzymatic breakdown, or diffusion away from the receptors.

Here's what it says about the first step - Action Potential:

Resting Membrane Potential: In a resting neuron, the inside of the cell is more negative than the outside, establishing a resting membrane potential (around -70 mV).

Threshold: A stimulus, often in the form of chemical signals from other neurons (neurotransmitters), causes the membrane to depolarize (become less negative). If this depolarization reaches a critical "threshold" level (e.g., -55 mV), it triggers an action potential.

Depolarization: At threshold, voltage-gated sodium channels open rapidly, allowing a large influx of positively charged sodium ions into the cell. This makes the inside of the neuron rapidly more positive.

Repolarization: Sodium channels then inactivate, and voltage-gated potassium channels open, allowing positively charged potassium ions to flow out of the cell. This efflux of potassium ions causes the membrane potential to become more negative again, moving it back towards the resting potential.

Hyperpolarization: The potassium channels may remain open a bit longer than needed, causing the membrane potential to dip below the resting potential before they close.

Return to Rest: Finally, ion pumps (like the sodium-potassium pump) restore the resting membrane potential, preparing the neuron for another action potential.

You say all of this, along with whatever other processes are taking place, is a description of not only things like receiving sensory input and distinguishing wavelengths of the electromagnetic spectrum, and receptors on my tongue distinguishing molecules that have made contact, but also seeing the color red, and tasting the sweetness of sugar. More than that, it's a description of my thoughts.

My thoughts is what I'm really wondering about at the moment. That kind of activity is why I'm thinking of the number 7. And, over the next several seconds, due to the laws of physics working on what was there, the arrangements of all the particles of my brain change from X to Y to X. And those arrangements just happen to mean "+ 18 = 25".

The same could be said for any thoughts I ever have, mathematical or otherwise.

Of course, it's not simply one chain of neurons involved in a thought. I wouldn't care to guess how many are involved in any given thought. Or how many are involved multiple times in a single thought. There's probably all kinds of back tracking and looping.

How does all that work??? In particular:

-How do progressions of arrangements of all the particles in my brain mean all the things they mean?

-How do all the action potentials and releasings of neurotransmitters coordinate throughout the brain, or an area of the brain, so that X , Y, and a million others happen at the same time in order to bring about the needed thought? (I could understand if one specific neuron initiated it all, so that the timing would be assured. But that would mean the single neuron already had the thought, and initiated all the activity to, shall we say, actualize(?) the thought. But that whole idea is a bit silly.)

People treated each other as horrifically in the past as they do now. The gap between the wealthy and thre destitute has existed at all times. So I wouldn't think there's reason this aspect of us was not also around in the past. But, like I said, I've never thought about this before, so can't have considered all the possibilities.

But if you're right, if self-loathing is a new thing for us, is there a new good thing to balance it?

It seems to meet you are saying brain states and conscious events are the same thing. So the arrangements of all the particles of the brain, which are constantly changing, and can only change according to the laws of physics that govern their interactions, ARE my experience of seeing red; feeling pain; thinking of something that doesn't exist, and going through everything to make it come into being; thinking of something that can't exist; on and on. It is even the case that the progressions of brain states are the very thoughts of thinking about themselves.

Is that how you see things?
I'm willing to accept all that without edit. A few asterisks perhaps, but still yes. — noAxioms

Do you have any thoughts on how that works? Why are progressions of physical arrangements self-aware?

I can see how electrons moving from atom to atom is electricity.
I can see how the movement of air molecules is heat and pressure.
I can see how the movement of an object is force: F=ma.
I can see how a fluid, whether liquid or gas, flowing around an object creates lift, which is a factor in flight.

All of those examples are physical activities. I don't see how self-awareness is a physical activity, and don't see how physical activity is responsible for, or identical to, it. Can you explain, in general even if not in detail?

Well, if we can in principle explain our reports and behaviors regarding our own conscious experiences in terms of physics and biology, and epiphenomenalism is ridiculous, then this suggests that a coherent view of these kinds of metaphysics has to be monistic, if thats the right word. — Apustimelogist

I see.

But if we can't in principle explain our reports and behaviors regarding our own conscious experiences in terms of physics and biology...

I can't really imagine how people would have thought to even consider self-esteem prior to the 20th century. It feels like an outcome of the Enlightenment and post-WW2 prosperity. I doubt it had much global resonance prior to the 21st century, although AI tells me it is a universal concept? — Jeremy Murray

I think I'm thinking what AI is thinking. I would bet anything nobody used the phrase "racial privilege" in the US the 1700s. But, holy cow, it existed. Many never considered it was anything but the natural order. Even those who opposed slavery probably didn't think of those words. But they thought about what was happened.

There must have been people 500 years ago who thought they were ugly, or weak, or stupid. They might have had that ingrained by an abusive parent. Don't you think?

Or maybe the dualism of physical and mental is illusory with regard to fundamental metaphysics. — Apustimelogist

Can you elaborate?

So it seems difficult to see how any system, if it experiences at all, can experience anything but itself. That makes first-person experience not mysterious at all. — noAxioms

The mystery is how it experiences at all.
— Patterner

OK, but experience seems almost by definition first person, so my comment stands. — noAxioms

The "first person" part is not a mystery, as you say. It's the "experience" part that is the mystery.

It seems to meet you are saying brain states and conscious events are the same thing. So the arrangements of all the particles of the brain, which are constantly changing, and can only change according to the laws of physics that govern their interactions, ARE my experience of seeing red; feeling pain; thinking of something that doesn't exist, and going through everything to make it come into being; thinking of something that can't exist; on and on. It is even the case that the progressions of brain states are the very thoughts of thinking about themselves.

Is that how you see things?

To me, they would if they had exactly the same brains as us but just devoid of any "lights on" inside. My impression is that there is nothing really in biology that suggests we couldn't explain our behavior entirely in terms of the mechanics of brains, at least in principle. — Apustimelogist

So then you don't think consciousness has any bearing on anything? It is epiphenomenal?

i'm not sure if I'm reading you right. Are you talking about P zombies? In which case, I don't think they would make those exact same kinds of claims. I fon't see any reason to think beings that never had consciousness would ever fabricate the idea that they did. They'd be automatons. I suppose they could evolve to look like us, but they wouldn't have much in common with us.

I believe we have been thinking about consciousness, defining it, incorrectly. Most of what you said doesn't apply to my thinking.

My position is that consciousness is fundamental; a property of every particle, just as properties like mass and charge are. What does that mean for particles? Here are some quotes...

In this article, Philip Goff writes:

Panpsychism is sometimes caricatured as the view that fundamental physical entities such as electrons have thoughts; that electrons are, say, driven by existential angst. However, panpsychism as defended in contemporary philosophy is the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, where to be conscious is simply to have subjective experience of some kind. This doesn’t necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as thoughts.

Of course in human beings consciousness is a sophisticated thing, involving subtle and complex emotions, thoughts and sensory experiences. But there seems nothing incoherent with the idea that consciousness might exist in some extremely basic forms. We have good reason to think that the conscious experiences a horse has are much less complex than those of a human being, and the experiences a chicken has are much less complex than those of a horse. As organisms become simpler perhaps at some point the light of consciousness suddenly switches off, with simpler organisms having no subjective experience at all. But it is also possible that the light of consciousness never switches off entirely, but rather fades as organic complexity reduces, through flies, insects, plants, amoeba, and bacteria. For the panpsychist, this fading-whilst-never-turning-off continuum further extends into inorganic matter, with fundamental physical entities – perhaps electrons and quarks – possessing extremely rudimentary forms of consciousness, which reflects their extremely simple nature.

In this Ted Talk, Chalmers says:

Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent, or thinking. You know, it’s not that a photon is wracked with angst because it’s thinking, "Aaa! I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light! I never get to slow down and smell the roses!" No, not like that. But the thought is maybe the photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling. Some primitive precursor to consciousness.

In Panpsychism in the West, Skrbina writes:

Minds of atoms may conceivably be, for example, a stream of instantaneous memory-less moments of experience.

I don't like Skrbina's use of "mind" in this way. I think it leads to confusion.


Proximity does not make a group of particles subjectively experience - that is, conscious - as a group. So a chair is not a conscious unit. It's just a group of particles, easy having its own, individual subjective experience.


The things we are conscious of are not what consciousness is. Consciousness isn't awareness. Rather, we experience certain information processing and feedback systems as awareness. We have been saying they are the same thing for millennia, but I don't think they are. That's just how something of our nature experiences itself.

It's not as if any other philosophy of mind can provide more than handwaving by way of explanation, so I'm not seeing how this amounts to more than advancing an argument from incredulity against physicalism. — wonderer1

That's all any theory of consciousness is. And that's playing fast and loose with the definition of "theory". Who is making predictions with their theory, and testing them? Nobody has anything. But, imo, it's the most fascinating topic there is, so here I am :grin:

For example consider the case of yourself listening to music in the sensory deprivation tank, as compared to an identica! version of you with the exception of a heightened cannabinoid level in your blood. The two versions of you would have different experiences, and this is most parsimoniously explained by the difference in physical constitution of stoned you vs unstoned you. — wonderer1

But the question remains: Why does either stoned me or unstoned me have a subjective experience of our condition? Both experience their physically different statuses. But why aren't the physically different statuses simply physical?

I hear ya. I became the moderator of the politics forum at a site I hang out at, because the people were being horrible. If it was not a site I loved, I would have just left. My concern was visitors seeing that crap, and thinking that's what the site was, or at least that the site allowed that. you wouldn't think I would have to make rules that you can't call each other worthless, pedophiles, and whatever else they could think of.

But physicalism can't explain the existence of the experiences in the first place. Why are what amounts to hugely complex physical interactions of physical particles not merely physical events? How are they also events that are not described by the knowledge of any degree of detail regarding the physical events?

Is your idea that, if I knew your brain's unique physical structures in all possible detail, I would be able to experience your experience?

So it seems difficult to see how any system, if it experiences at all, can experience anything but itself. That makes first-person experience not mysterious at all. — noAxioms

The mystery is how it experiences at all. Why should bioelectric activity traveling aling neurons, neurotransmitters jumping synapses, etc., be conscious? There's nothing about physical activity, which there's no reason to think could not take place without consciousness, that suggests consciousness.

Regarding 1st and 3rd person, there is no amount of information and knowledge that can make me have your experience. Even if we experience the exact same event, at the exact same time, from the exact same view (impossible for some events, though something like a sound introduced into identical sense-depravation tanks might be as good as), I cannot have your experience. Because there's something about subjective experience other than all the physical facts.

Here's my usual quotes...

Chalmers presents the problem in Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness:

There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says “I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene”, then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake.

This is a nontrivial further question. This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn’t all this information-processing go on “in the dark”, free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers

And in The Conscious Mind, he writes:

Why should there be conscious experience at all? It is central to a subjective viewpoint, but from an objective viewpoint it is utterly unexpected. Taking the objective view, we can tell a story about how fields, waves, and particles in the spatiotemporal manifold interact in subtle ways, leading to the development of complex systems such as brains. In principle, there is no deep philosophical mystery in the fact that these systems can process information in complex ways, react to stimuli with sophisticated behavior, and even exhibit such complex capacities as learning, memory, and language. All this is impressive, but it is not metaphysically baffling. In contrast, the existence of conscious experience seems to be a new feature from this viewpoint. It is not something that one would have predicted from the other features alone.

That is, consciousness is surprising. If all we knew about were the facts of physics, and even the facts about dynamics and information processing in complex systems, there would be no compelling reason to postulate the existence of conscious experience. If it were not for our direct evidence in the first-person case, the hypothesis would seem unwarranted; almost mystical, perhaps. — Chalmers

At 7:00 of this video, while talking about the neural correlates of consciousness and ions flowing through holes in membranes, Donald Hoffman asks:

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman

In Until the End of Time, Brian Greene wrote:

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. How can a collection of mindless, thoughtless, emotionless particles come together and yield inner sensations of color or sound, of elation or wonder, of confusion or surprise? Particles can have mass, electric charge, and a handful of other similar features (nuclear charges, which are more exotic versions of electric charge), but all these qualities seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience. How then does a whirl of particles inside a head—which is all that a brain is—create impressions, sensations, and feelings? — Greene

In this video, David Eagleman says:

Your other question is, why does it feel like something? That we don't know. and the weird situation we're in in modern neuroscience, of course, is that, not only do we not have a theory of that, but we don't know what such a theory would even look like. Because nothing in our modern mathematics says, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman

Donald Hoffman in this video,

It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman

Donald Hoffman in The Case Against Reality Why Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes, when he was talking to Francis Crick:

“Can you explain,” I asked, “how neural activity causes conscious experiences, such as my experience of the color red?” “No,” he said. “If you could make up any biological fact you want,” I persisted, “can you think of one that would let you solve this problem?” “No,” he replied, but added that we must pursue research in neuroscience until some discovery reveals the solution. — Donald Hoffman

We don't have a clue. Even those who assume it must be physical, because physical is all we can perceive and measure with our senses and devices, don't have any guesses. Even if he could make something up to explain how it could work, Crick couldn't think of anything.

Hi Patterner, it's fun to talk about Northern Exposure! Sadly overlooked. I read somewhere that the show was hard to get for years due to licensing issues with all the music they used to play at the Brick. That was the first time I ever heard a lot of different music on TV. Daniel Lanois springs to mind. — Jeremy Murray

The DVDs came out years ago. With extreme anticipation, I waited for S3E19, Wake Up Call. A great episode. Shelly shed her skin, Maggie meet the were-bear, and the first appearance of Leonard, among other things. And it ended with "Coolin Medley" by The Chieftans. Such beautiful, fitting music for the ending.

And, because of those licensing issues, they had other music on the DVD. I was horribly disappointed.

But now you can watch the show on prime, and it has the right music.

Strangely, Maurice emerged as another upon a recent repeat viewing. They put that guys flaws under the microscope, but he was no caricature. His growth during the episode featuring Ron and Eric's wedding was genuinely moving. — Jeremy Murray

Maurice is something else! Not an ignorant Archie Bunker. Great conversation when he was telling Chris how he felt about his Korean son.

"Chris, no matter how you explain this thing, it's a nightmare. This man is my son. I don't like the way he looks. I don't like the way he talks. I don't like what he eats."

"Well, if it's any consolation, Maurice, you know, your feelings aren't instinctual."

"No?"

"No. It's cultural."

"Well, how the hell could that be a consolation?"

"It's learned behavior."

"So?"

"So, you can unlearn it."

I don't have my copy of Twenge's book handy, and don't have the facility with philosophy that many round here do to pull from ... but it's a pretty modern concept. Where do we see examples of 'self-esteem' in say the works of Shakespeare, for example? The self-loathing of Hamlet is not the inverse of self-esteem.

The rationalistic, westernized notion of the individual seems necessary for discussions of self-esteem? — Jeremy Murray

Maybe it took the rationalistic, westernized notion of the individual to figure out a problem that had been around all along? I don't know. I never considered it.

self-esteem is a pretty modern concept. I don't think it would have applied to Cortez, and doubt that it did for Hitler. — Jeremy Murray

I've never studied anyrhing relevant, but it seems to me it's possible that it was always there, but nobody thought to name it?

I also found Leonard to be a bit of a 'magical native' trope. — Jeremy Murray

Yes. But I don't see that as a bad thing. I mean, he's the wisest one on the show. A lot of them are wise. It might not be as obvious with Shelly, because she was usually taking about her nipples or butt when making her point. But she knew what she was talking about.

Leonard was different than the rest, though. He was always calm. He didn't merely understand wisdom in this situation and that situation. He lived wisdom. It was his entire being. And when you're that kind of person, nothing can ruffle you.

Why is it a negative that a Native American is written to be such a person?

I will always remember watching the episode 'Cicely' as a teen. That changed my concept of storytelling forever. — Jeremy Murray

Yes, brilliant!

The ideal would be for everyone to not be offended, ands ignore it. Then, those who love to offended wouldn't bother trying. It's no fun if it doesn't work.

Of course, that will never happen. So yes, we need moderators. I don't go into most forums here at TPF, so I don't know how bad it can get. What I see isn't too bad. I know which people are going to belittle, and call others names, and I stop reading their posts as soon as they start heating up. Even when I'm not part of the conversation. Why bother?

You're right, of course, that it's not provable either way. The thing is, there's no reason for me to feel anything about my decisions if they are all nothing more than the resolution of interacting/competing/conflicting bioelectric (autocorrect said "buttercream" the first time :rofl:) currents running around the brain. More complex than those damned art things where's you turn it upside down and watch it all settle at the bottom, but just as physical. Why do automotons feel things about something they have no control over? How can we even make a choice we regret if it was the natural resolution of the brain impulses? Why would evolution have selected for us caring about it if it's going to happen the only way it can?

:up: