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  • Classical theism and William Lane Craig's theistic personalism
    An absolutely simple God has no properties of any kind. He can't be 'father' ,son' and 'holy spirit'.
  • Classical theism and William Lane Craig's theistic personalism
    ↪wonderer1
    No, but iI think it shows why both theidtic personalism and Thomism are dead ends.
  • Classical theism and William Lane Craig's theistic personalism
    ↪wonderer1

    Craig's view is incoherent except perhaps if God enters time by accident. But if God willngly enters time, He is the necessary and sufficient condition of time, so time has to be co-eternal with Him, IOW, He does not enter time.
    the same is in fact true, for the Thomist God because He is said to be completely immutable hence, He is the sufficient conditiion of everything apart for Him.On Thomism, the universe has to be beginningless.
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪Alkis Piskas
    Where have I misinterpreted Descartes' writings? I haven't even mentioned Descartes.
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪hypericin


    I agree with you.
    But it still makes me wonder what exactly it is about a human being that makes it individual Will rather than individual Thomas. Which part of Will stays aboard Will and why can't it be transferred to Thomas?
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪Patterner


    But if everything that needed to transfer did transfer, what would be wrong with killing the original?
    I don't know how being dead feels (it may very well not 'feel' at all, but I think, no matter how accurate the duplicate would be, I would be dead.
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪Patterner


    Yes, of course we have to pretend that. But the deeper problem is, if person is duplicaten, which 'part' of this person cannot be transferred to the duplicate?
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪Patterner


    Because I am still alive. Or if you prefer, if thé Roker on the surface gets killed, the Roker on the Enterprise is still there.
    Nobody seemed to care about the human being Riker who was transported dozens of times, and hence, killed and replaced by an identical copy.
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪Patterner


    Because no-one really gets killed?
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    ↪Christoffer


    That may be true, but in that case I sympathize with doc McCoy. I wouldn't be caught dead in a transporter.
  • The Thomas Riker argument for body-soul dualism
    Well, thank you for the replies.
    Let me first tell you that I am an atheist and I am not in fact arguing for the existence of a soul.
    However, I do wonder what exactly identity is.
    Because if I get duplicated (no matter how), is it OK to kill one of the two 'me's'? After all, I am still 'the other one'.
    Now, i do not know about you, but I don't really like the idea of dying and it wouldn,'t comfort me much if I was told a perfect copy of me existed.
    If you truly had the choice, and you were the original you, would you prefer the copy to be destroyed or the original you.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    No, I don't think it's God's job to make sure the world is consistent with logic. If He truly decides what is logical and what is not, every world is consistent with logic.
    In that case, there can be no logical arguments for the existence of God.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪AmadeusD


    Okay then.
    But most theists don't agree with you.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪AmadeusD


    But could He have designed a world where 1 + 1 = 3?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    If an act is good because it is what God chooses, "goodness" is meaningless.
    So, I think one act can be intrinsically better than another. But perhaps there are acts that are intrinsically equally good. So God actualizing A would be just as good as God actualizing B.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪IP060903


    If there is something in the container, it is not simple.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Unless if course, doing B is just as good as doing A.
    Then God should be able to do B. But that would be a contingent choice.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Since "The will to do A" is a contingent property of me as a human being, it is not necessitated by my capacity, but it is still a property of me. Hence "the will to do A" is also a property of God , which, is distinct from God's will simpliciter. But that is the problem. If "the inetention to do A" is not necessary, then it is a contingent property of God, but God, unlike me, cannot have any contingent properties.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    I think the intention to do A is clearly a property of the creator.
    Now if that intention is necessary, we are stuch with a modal collapse.
    I don't see how we can separate God's Will simpliciter from God's Will to do A.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    In philosophy contingent means neither necessary nor impossible. Free Will, if it exists, is not determined yet it is contingent.
    Did God 'freely' choose among the many possibilties that were open to him? If so, His choice, Will, intention or whatever is contingent.
    If not, it is necessary and God could not have decided otherwise.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Contingent means neiher necessary nor impossible..If the intention is not determined, it can be different
    So, if God van have different intentions, those intentions are Parts of Him. And if they are not necessary, they are contingent unless they are impossible.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    But I am not abolutely smple. So, my 'intention' is a contingent part of me. But God's intention can't he contingent since God is identical with His intention.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    But in what way might God have decided otherwise?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    From God's prespective, prior to creation, A was necessary because His "wanting" A is necesary and cannot be otherwise.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    OK, if we live in 'the best thing' that God could have created, then God could not have wanted anything else, which means this creation is necessary.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    If 'at the time when God was about to create' it was possible for Him to create whichever world He wanted, then you deel to be the one 'applying the terms of possibility to something which is necessary'.
    My question is simply, how can something which is necessary' and simple 'want' different things.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Lionino


    As far as I know, Tomaszewski is an advocate of Divine Simplicity.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    So. the Will of God is a property of God and this Will of God is the same, whether A of B is created?
    And God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B?

    How can God make sure A is created instead of B?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    I have been talking about God's Will to create A and God's Will to create B.
    Are they different or is God's Will to create A the same as God's Will to create B?

    If they are different, then they are contingent properties. How can contingent properties be identical to a necessary being?

    If they are the same, how can God have control over whether A of B will obtain,?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Corvus


    I don't think God exists.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Corvus


    If God exists and He is the creator of this world, then He obviously did something, namely creating this world
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    God is simple and immutable, but He can be red of blue?
    The redness or blueness of God is a contingent property. But if God is necessary and simple He is identical to all His properties. But how can a necessary being be identical to a contingent property?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    The claim.is that God is identical to God's Will. But if God Wills A, then God is identical to His Will to create A, while if He Wills B, He is identical to His Will to create B.
    That means there are two Gods
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Count Timothy von Icarus


    Yes, but is what God's wants to actualize necessary or not? Could God have wanted to actualzie B instad of A?
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    The question is: was it possible for God to create B instead of A? The Thomist's answer is yes.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Well, we are not talking about God creating A at t1 and B at t2, we are talking about God creating B instead of A, which, according to most Thomists, is prefectly possible.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover


    Well, I am not saying that God can will conficting things. But God's will to create A cannot be identical to God's will to create B, unless God is not simple or has no control over what He creates.
    A Will, no matter what it exactly is, is intrinsic to a person.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Manuel


    That belief doesn't carry force for me. I am simply assuming it for the sake of the argument.
  • Divine simplicity and modal collapse
    ↪Metaphysician Undercover



    Possible worlds are simply a way of saying if God what could be/have been the case.
    According to most Christians, including Thomists, it could have been that God created a completely different world or even no world at all.
    My question is if God's essence is his existence , how can He end up xiiling to create different things?
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Walter

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