An absolutely simple God has no properties of any kind. He can't be 'father' ,son' and 'holy spirit'.

No, but iI think it shows why both theidtic personalism and Thomism are dead ends.

Craig's view is incoherent except perhaps if God enters time by accident. But if God willngly enters time, He is the necessary and sufficient condition of time, so time has to be co-eternal with Him, IOW, He does not enter time.
the same is in fact true, for the Thomist God because He is said to be completely immutable hence, He is the sufficient conditiion of everything apart for Him.On Thomism, the universe has to be beginningless.

Where have I misinterpreted Descartes' writings? I haven't even mentioned Descartes.

I agree with you.
But it still makes me wonder what exactly it is about a human being that makes it individual Will rather than individual Thomas. Which part of Will stays aboard Will and why can't it be transferred to Thomas?

But if everything that needed to transfer did transfer, what would be wrong with killing the original?
I don't know how being dead feels (it may very well not 'feel' at all, but I think, no matter how accurate the duplicate would be, I would be dead.

Yes, of course we have to pretend that. But the deeper problem is, if person is duplicaten, which 'part' of this person cannot be transferred to the duplicate?

Because I am still alive. Or if you prefer, if thé Roker on the surface gets killed, the Roker on the Enterprise is still there.
Nobody seemed to care about the human being Riker who was transported dozens of times, and hence, killed and replaced by an identical copy.

Because no-one really gets killed?

That may be true, but in that case I sympathize with doc McCoy. I wouldn't be caught dead in a transporter.

Well, thank you for the replies.
Let me first tell you that I am an atheist and I am not in fact arguing for the existence of a soul.
However, I do wonder what exactly identity is.
Because if I get duplicated (no matter how), is it OK to kill one of the two 'me's'? After all, I am still 'the other one'.
Now, i do not know about you, but I don't really like the idea of dying and it wouldn,'t comfort me much if I was told a perfect copy of me existed.
If you truly had the choice, and you were the original you, would you prefer the copy to be destroyed or the original you.

No, I don't think it's God's job to make sure the world is consistent with logic. If He truly decides what is logical and what is not, every world is consistent with logic.
In that case, there can be no logical arguments for the existence of God.

Okay then.
But most theists don't agree with you.

But could He have designed a world where 1 + 1 = 3?

But that is epistemology. God would know what is good, but He doesn't decide what is good, just like He doesn't decide that 1 + 1 = 2, or that square circles can't exist.

If an act is good because it is what God chooses, "goodness" is meaningless.
So, I think one act can be intrinsically better than another. But perhaps there are acts that are intrinsically equally good. So God actualizing A would be just as good as God actualizing B.

If there is something in the container, it is not simple.

Unless if course, doing B is just as good as doing A.
Then God should be able to do B. But that would be a contingent choice.

Since "The will to do A" is a contingent property of me as a human being, it is not necessitated by my capacity, but it is still a property of me. Hence "the will to do A" is also a property of God , which, is distinct from God's will simpliciter. But that is the problem. If "the inetention to do A" is not necessary, then it is a contingent property of God, but God, unlike me, cannot have any contingent properties.

I think the intention to do A is clearly a property of the creator.
Now if that intention is necessary, we are stuch with a modal collapse.
I don't see how we can separate God's Will simpliciter from God's Will to do A.

In philosophy contingent means neither necessary nor impossible. Free Will, if it exists, is not determined yet it is contingent.
Did God 'freely' choose among the many possibilties that were open to him? If so, His choice, Will, intention or whatever is contingent.
If not, it is necessary and God could not have decided otherwise.

Contingent means neiher necessary nor impossible..If the intention is not determined, it can be different
So, if God van have different intentions, those intentions are Parts of Him. And if they are not necessary, they are contingent unless they are impossible.

But I am not abolutely smple. So, my 'intention' is a contingent part of me. But God's intention can't he contingent since God is identical with His intention.

But in what way might God have decided otherwise?

From God's prespective, prior to creation, A was necessary because His "wanting" A is necesary and cannot be otherwise.

OK, if we live in 'the best thing' that God could have created, then God could not have wanted anything else, which means this creation is necessary.

If 'at the time when God was about to create' it was possible for Him to create whichever world He wanted, then you deel to be the one 'applying the terms of possibility to something which is necessary'.
My question is simply, how can something which is necessary' and simple 'want' different things.

As far as I know, Tomaszewski is an advocate of Divine Simplicity.

So. the Will of God is a property of God and this Will of God is the same, whether A of B is created?
And God's action to create A is the very same as God's action to create B?

How can God make sure A is created instead of B?

I have been talking about God's Will to create A and God's Will to create B.
Are they different or is God's Will to create A the same as God's Will to create B?

If they are different, then they are contingent properties. How can contingent properties be identical to a necessary being?

If they are the same, how can God have control over whether A of B will obtain,?

I don't think God exists.

If God exists and He is the creator of this world, then He obviously did something, namely creating this world

God is simple and immutable, but He can be red of blue?
The redness or blueness of God is a contingent property. But if God is necessary and simple He is identical to all His properties. But how can a necessary being be identical to a contingent property?

The claim.is that God is identical to God's Will. But if God Wills A, then God is identical to His Will to create A, while if He Wills B, He is identical to His Will to create B.
That means there are two Gods

Yes, but is what God's wants to actualize necessary or not? Could God have wanted to actualzie B instad of A?

The question is: was it possible for God to create B instead of A? The Thomist's answer is yes.

Well, we are not talking about God creating A at t1 and B at t2, we are talking about God creating B instead of A, which, according to most Thomists, is prefectly possible.

Well, I am not saying that God can will conficting things. But God's will to create A cannot be identical to God's will to create B, unless God is not simple or has no control over what He creates.
A Will, no matter what it exactly is, is intrinsic to a person.

That belief doesn't carry force for me. I am simply assuming it for the sake of the argument.

Possible worlds are simply a way of saying if God what could be/have been the case.
According to most Christians, including Thomists, it could have been that God created a completely different world or even no world at all.
My question is if God's essence is his existence , how can He end up xiiling to create different things?