• Animalism: Are We Animals?
    As if that is the sum total of our achievements…. — Wayfarer

    The analogy holds, any contest or hierarchy we've ever used to put ourselves above other beings has also been of our own invention. To my mind it's really quite a pathetic thing to do, inventing a game just to win it.
  • Animalism: Are We Animals?
    It seems a bit self-congratulatory to invent a concept (like "value", "meaning", whatever) and then pat ourselves on the back for being the only animal to make use of said concept. Might as well brag about being the only animal to play checkers.
  • Pragmatism Without Goodness
    Obviously when a guy like Dawkins denies "design in nature" (if he ever did), he is talking specifically about biological lifeforms, even if technically he does believe everything is natural (including a human crafting a clay pot). From that perspective "the ability to design" is just another funny little trick cooked up by natural selection, alongside the ability to walk on two feet and the ability to digest food.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    I am not really sure what you're trying to to get at here. What counts as intuitive might be debated, but certain statements like "a line of points cannot be simultaneously continuous and discrete," or "2+2=4," can largely be agreed upon. Are you claiming we lack good warrant for believing these sorts of things?

    Eliminativism, in its most extreme form, does violate these sorts of intuitions.     — Count Timothy von Icarus

    What is "these sorts" referring to here? Eliminativists do not reject 2+2=4 or other mathematical a priori stuff, that sort of thing is not in doubt here. It seems you are bunching some intuitions together into a group, but I don't understand the criteria for membership.

    This would be the claim that "you don't actually experience anything, see blue, hear sounds, etc." But does anyone actually advocate this? — Count Timothy von Icarus

    In my opinion, any eliminativist worth the name would of course advocate this. And why not?

    Dennett himself calls this type of eliminitivism "ridiculous," in "Conciousness Explained." — Count Timothy von Icarus

    I don't know that Dennett is an eliminativist, if so I think he is in the closet about it. I've always found him to be strangely diplomatic and "soft-selling" in expressing his views, it makes sense to me that he would disavow what you describe as "extreme". Maybe this partly explains his success, his books do seem to sell.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    Something is intuitive, a noetic "first principle," if we cannot conceive of it being otherwise. 2+2 is intuitively 4. It is intuitive that a straight line cannot also be a curved line, that a triangle cannot have four sides, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

    I didn't realize the bar was set so high, so then all it takes is for someone to claim that they can conceive of something being false, and it ceases to be intuitive? Presumeably the eliminativist has already done this, so are the claims they deny then dethroned? Or are they not included in this "we"?
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    But "things are only extension in space and motion," or "all that exists can be explained in terms of mathematics and computation," are not basic intuitions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

    I'm not sure exactly how you make the distinction between "basic/core" and "regular" (historical popularity maybe?), but those ideas of space and motion are certainly products of intuition.

    It's obvious that if you frame something as "intuition vs X", then X will always lose. But the neuromaniac eliminativist perspective is also the product of intuition, intuition isn't a big happy family to be collectively dismissed or embraced.
  • On delusions and the intuitional gap
    If our core intuitions can be this wrong, and there is "nothing to explain," then I have no idea why we should be referring to neuroscience for explanations in the first place. We only have a good reason to think science tells us anything about the world if our basic intuitions have some sort of merit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

    The problems of phenomenal consciousness are to begin with the result of tension between different intuitions. It's like you have a bunch of witnesses and their testimonies don't add up to a coherent story, one of them has to be wrong. It's no good saying "if you doubt one, you have to doubt them all, so let's just not".
  • Are all living things conscious?
    And I'd would say that at the very least, higher order animals certainly experience fear as they attack when cornered. That is "self preservation" and as the term would suggest it would seem to necessitate a "self" in which to defend. A certain expectation or demand to survive. An "I" that wishes to live on. — Benj96

    In my opinion, your thinking here is the result of rationalizing (as opposed to explaining) animal behavior in comfortable terms. The mechanisms of fear and self-preservation in, um... "higher order animals" I believe can be explained without imparting ideas of "self" on them.

    I do not understand how you make the distinction, but do you not see patterns of self-preservation in what I suppose you would call "lower order" lifeforms?
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    MUI theory states that "perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world." Hoffman argues that conscious beings have not evolved to perceive the world as it actually is but have evolved to perceive the world in a way that maximizes "fitness payoffs". — flannel jesus

    Conceptually at least, it seems we could not be further apart on the issue of perception. I believe we can only perceive the world as it is and argued as much in my thread about Illusionism:

    https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14459/on-illusionism-what-is-an-illusion-exactly/p1

    Critical for me is the distinction between perception, which is pre-propositional, and interpretation, which is the generation of propositions.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    ↪flannel jesus


    Maybe not but it's helpful that you brought it up explicitly. Reading this thread I really felt like I was missing the point of what people were discussing.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    The experience I call "blue", the qualia if you will, doesn't have to be assigned to the things I assign it to. The qualia you experience as blue, I could experience as green. My whole colour wheel could be rotated with respect to yours, and I would still have a fully in tact, self-consistent and useful sensory experience regardless. — flannel jesus

    I am a functionalist about mental properties, so talking about "digust" or "experience" is fine but "qualia" is a good way to lose me completely. I don't believe there is a color wheel to rotate, that idea is a mistake.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    ↪flannel jesus


    This is more of a conceptual distinction, I think what you call an "experience" I would call a "reaction" that is distinct from the smell as such. The smell/sight/sound/whatever is just the sum of information picked up by a sensory organ. So if me and a fly pick up on the same information, it is the same smell, and our different reactions are irrelevant.
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    We can't both be experiencing smells "as they are" considering how viscerally different our experiences are. — flannel jesus

    What would be the problem with just saying the fly, dog or human has a different reaction to the same smell?
  • Is philosophy just idle talk?
    For me philosophy is just an intrinsically compelling activity, I've never concerned myself with its "value" or "importance".
  • Indirect Realism and Direct Realism
    Ok, with this aside, let us define Direct Realism, the thesis that do indeed have direct access to the external world.

    Now let me propose a few arguments for Indirect Realism that I run. Note that all the names I'm giving these are non-standard.     — Ashriel

    Did you forget to write something in between these two paragraphs?

    Based on what you do write I'm not sure what position you're arguing against, surely no-one believes we can see anything without light, eyeballs and other "middle men"?
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    I would add that there are important ways in which consciousness is not an illusion. Emotional, experiential, rational, doxastic content, means something, points toward something true, is important. — NotAristotle

    While we may agree in denouncing illusionism, we clearly have different reasons for doing so. Like I said earlier, there are two tenets to illusionism:

    A) Phenomenological consciousness appears to be real
    B) Phenomenological consciousness is not real

    I reject A while you reject B, that's the difference.
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    A lie is an illusion is it not? Well, what misleads more, the lie or the liar? — NotAristotle

    No, a lie is not an illusion. Not everything that misleads is an illusion, anything can be misleading in theory, even the truth.

    Would you define the "consciousness" you say is not an illusion? (...) Maybe that is an unfair question because consciousness may be undefinable. — NotAristotle

    I don't think it's undefinable, it's just a word that's used a bit inconsistently.

    Consciousness has a functional component, this is pretty much undisputed, it is the functionality that a person loses when someone whacks them over the head with a mallet and they faint. Obviously this is not an illusion.

    But it is also generally taken have a qualitative or phenomenological component. This is the "interesting" part as far as philosophy of mind is concerned, but I think one should keep in mind that it is not the only part.

    why defend consciousness as not an illusion; what's at stake? Why is consciousness not being an illusion important to you? — NotAristotle

    I think illusionism is false and an obstacle to solving major problems in philosophy of mind. It's not like I have a strong emotional stake in the issue though.

    And the viewer of the illusion is the illusion itself. An illusion is fooled into thinking itself to be real. That's a heck of a magic trick! — Patterner

    Like I've told you, I don't subscribe to illusionism, I'm not going to defend the position.
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    ↪NotAristotle


    Leaving aside how negative or positive thinking affects our judgement, I would have to say your idea of an illusion seems too broad. Not everything that misleads us is an illusion, liars are not illusions for example.

    An illusion in my opinion is a kind of appearance. To say that "consciousness is an illusion" is to say that "there appears to be consciousness, but there actually isn't".
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    Negative thinking, patterns of thought, insofar as we identify these things with consciousness, it is easier to see how consciousness is an illusion; it is an illusion just as negative thinking and patterns of thought are an illusion, they are part of a script so to speak. — NotAristotle

    I'd like to hear what your idea of an illusion is for you to conclude that "negative thinking" is illusory. Is positive thinking somehow more real than negative?
  • Are all living things conscious?
    if that's all there is to it, do you mean consciousness is functionality? — Patterner

    That is how I use the word, yes.
  • Are all living things conscious?
    I'm thinking the "what it is like to be..." is due to subjective experience. Kind of the same thing. If I did not have subjective experience, there would be nothing it is like to be me. — Patterner

    I am skeptical of phenomenal properties, so if it were up to me I would strip that out of the definition, thus "salvaging" the word.

    Do you think consciousness is subjective experience, but it doesn't lead to "what it is like to be..."? If not, if you don't think consciousness is subjective experience, and you don't think it is the concept of self, then what do you think consciousness is? — Patterner

    Consciousness also has a functional component, when someone loses consciousnesses they also lose functionality. As far as I am concerned that is all there is to it.

    Apologies if you've told me this before. — Patterner

    No worries, it was many months ago on my thread about illusionism.
  • Are all living things conscious?
    I agree. I like Nagel’s definition in What is it like to be a bat? — Patterner

    I think we've talked about this already, but I don't like that definition at all. Bundling phenomenological properties into the definition kills the word for me.

    I assume you mean taught while interacting with others, which i agree with. I doubt someone raised without the slightest human contact, or interaction from whatever machines kept it alive, would develop a sense of self. Perhaps hearing ideas from outside our own heads is key to noticing self. The idea that there is no self without other. — Patterner

    Yeah pretty much, having a pet dog might be enough even. I think the usefulness of the concept comes from drawing conclusions about others from observing yourself.

    I also don't think having a concept of self is such a special thing, computers have it is as well ("This PC").

    A rock is moved only by external forces. But a living organism is self-moving and self-sustaining to various degrees. — Gnomon

    What about a roomba? They need to crawl back to their recharge station occasionally to sustain themselves.
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    You're asking the wrong person because I have the same question; I don't think consciousness is an illusion. — NotAristotle

    I know, but it seems that from your perspective denial of the reality of consciousness leads to illusionism. Did I at least get that right?
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    I'm not sure I understand the question; I guess I take it as given that an illusion is necessarily differentiable from non-illusion . — NotAristotle

    I agree, but how would you differentiate them in this case? What specifically did evolution do to trick you into believing you are conscious?
  • Deconstructing our intuitions of consciousness
    And, if consciousness really is an illusion, why the illusion? Wouldn't we be better equipped evolutionarily speaking to see the truth; reality as it really is. — NotAristotle

    But how would that "truthful image" even be distinguishable from one that involves the so-called illusion?
  • Are all living things conscious?
    Being conscious and having a concept of selfhood is very different, I'd say many or most animals have consciousness, I mean it makes sense to say "the dog was knocked unconscious", right?

    A concept of self is much more rare and specific, human babies clearly don't have it in my opinion, I would even say it's more of an idea that we are taught as opposed to an inborn attribute.
  • A Case for Moral Realism
    Take an example by analogy: Imagine I gave you a bucket of colored blocks and asked you separate them into piles by color. You pick up a red one, put it in the red pile; blue, in the blue pile; etc. — Bob Ross

    The difference is, these categories do not inform me about color. I already have that understanding from some other source, in other words I already have a formula.

    But imagine if you gave to this task to someone who has no understanding of what red or blue even meant, and you tell them "red means it belongs in the red pile, blue means means it belongs in the blue pile." The person would have no clue what to do, the categories do not help at all.
  • A Case for Moral Realism
    The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross

    Just like how I can separate triangles into one pile and squares into another, and more generally shapes into one pile and non-shapes into another, I, too, can put generous acts into one pile and respectful acts into another, and more generally good acts into one pile and bad acts into another. — Bob Ross

    This seems circular to me, on one hand the categories "inform us" of the particulars of good and bad, on the other the categories are empty ("there is no formula") until we stuff them with particulars.
  • Best Arguments for Physicalism
    Physicalism/materialism is in massive trouble if it can't find a way to get out of p-zombie open-mindedness. — RogueAI

    Being open-minded is a red flag? Why is that? Usually I find dogmatism to be a red flag.

    Indeed, and yet a necessary condition for denying the existence of my mind is the existence of my mind. — RogueAI

    Not really, you can talk to chatGTP and it will deny having a mind.
  • Best Arguments for Physicalism
    I cannot be wrong about not being a zombie. — RogueAI

    "I cannot be wrong", that sounds extremely dogmatic.

    Do you think you're a zombie? — RogueAI

    Sure, why not? At least it is worth considering.
  • Best Arguments for Physicalism
    It would be wrong in doing so, since I'm not a p-zombie. — RogueAI

    You are, given a physicalist view of human beings. Insisting that you are not is just question-begging.

    Possibly, but only if it doesn't have mental states of its own. If the alien is not a zombie, it would know mental states cannot be expressed in purely physical terms. — RogueAI

    Would you call everything which lacks phenomenological consciousness a zombie? Are rocks zombies? Why would you assume that an alien had phenomenological consciousness?
  • Best Arguments for Physicalism
    Could the alien figure out, from that purely physical description of my rage-induced red-light running behavior, that I am not a p-zombie? — RogueAI

    You could turn that around and say that given a physicalist understanding of human beings, the alien would conclude that you are a p-zombie, and it would be correct in doing so. Accounting for your phenomenology would be not just impossible but also redundant.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪Banno
    Justification is for suckers, and if someone hassles you over it just give them my name. — Ludwig Wittgenstein
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    That's what they deserve. — Banno

    This I would call making a virtue out of necessity, that you refuse to provide justification has nothing to do with who is deserving of it or not, and everything to do with your own inability to do so.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪Banno
    Yet one cannot wait until our ethical considerations are all settled and our morality derived from a foundation of certainty before one acts; That you choose not to eat babies - to return to your example - shows that you act ethically, and this despite not having the firm foundation you crave.

    What about those of us who are not here necessarily to figure out how to act on a personal level, but wish to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of moral systems purely out of intellectual curiosity? All you're giving them is a gigantic dodge.
  • A Case for Moral Anti-realism
    ↪Banno
    Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"

    But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else.
  • On Illusionism, what is an illusion exactly?
    How are such tokens (historically contingent black glyphs on a white background) even invented or exchanged by the non-inferentially blind (by us, I mean, as opposed to the traditionally blind ) ? — plaque flag

    You mean, how did we invent writing and other means of information exchange? Do you believe that without qualia, the invention and use of writing becomes inexplicable?

    Can you live your life as normal with your eyes closed ? — plaque flag

    I'm not sure what you mean. As far as I know skepticism of qualitative properties does not entail a loss of ability.

    Are you committed to a p-zombie approach to human existence? So that the meaning of your own claims doesn't exist for you first-person ?

    As far as we can say from experience, the world is only given perspectively to different sentient creatures. Denying subjectivity is just denying the being of the world.

    I say this as a direct realist who doesn't think consciousness is more than awareness of this world. I see the world and not the inside of a private bubble.     — plaque flag

    It seems you are "bundling" concepts together in a (to me) arbitrary way, such that denial of one becomes denial of all. I don't remember ever denying subjectivity, consciousness or meaning as useful concepts, if these can only make sense in relation to qualitative properties you will have to explain why.

    But like I said before this topic is a waste of time. — Darkneos

    Ok.
  • On Illusionism, what is an illusion exactly?
    But what I was trying to clarify here is whether you grant (basically) that life/experience involves a 'nonconceptual surplus.' — plaque flag

    To me "experience" is just a functional concept or abstraction. So no, there is no "surplus". And me saying this is just restating what I have already said, are you struggling to just take what I say at face value?

    I think red functions structurally and inferentially in a way that makes knowledge of red possible for those born blind, but I don't think the referent of red is exhausted by or as its role in this structure. — plaque flag

    Well, I think that it is.
  • On Illusionism, what is an illusion exactly?
    I hope I haven't been rude. — plaque flag

    No problem, don't worry.

    I'm challenging what I see as your psychologism (rationality is just rationalization) — plaque flag

    I think only in your case is it rationalization, the way I see it you are pulling yourself up by the bootstraps. You are rational because the norms of rationality compel you, that's like saying you play chess because the rules of chess say that you must play. It's just a cover-up for an arbitrary decision.

    and your functionalism (your version seems to deny the qualitative aspect of experience) — plaque flag

    This though is right on the money. I want to solve the problems of philosophy of mind, the hard problems and so on, and I do believe skepticism of phenomenal properties is the way to go.

    You mention your curiosity. Is that something you feel ? And do you not see color or feel pain ? — plaque flag

    Feeling and sight can be accounted for functionally, so yes I have feelings and yes I see colors. But the way I understand these terms is a bit different from yours, as I think I have already made pretty clear.

    To be honest I think this is a pretty shallow approach you're taking, you're basically just restating a question I've already answered. Rhetorical incredulity is not enough, if you want to show me the error of my ways I need explicit criticism.

    Just so you understand, this is how this line of questioning looks like from my perspective:

    "I heard you deny phenomenal properties, is that true?"
    "Yes."
    "But do you really?"
    "Yes."
    "But do you reeeally?
    "Yes."
    "But do you reeeeeeally?"
    etc.
  • On Illusionism, what is an illusion exactly?
    Overall you seem to be saying that you are an unfree-irresponsible meatbot or the algorithm inside it. You basically claim that pain don't hurt. You also reject the founding claim-constraining normativity of rational conversation.

    Try to see this pose you are offering from the outside. Why should one trust an amoral robot programmed by its environment when 'it' claims to be such an amoral robot ? 'I am a liar.' ' I don't care about truth.'     — plaque flag

    First off, you make it sound like I'm claiming I'm a "robot" and you're a real boy. I don't think you and me are any different really, I've made the decision to trust you despite not believing you really are compelled by the "normativity of rational conversation", based on prior experience and on my observations of your behavior, and I don't see why you can't do the same.

    Second I think we are different in how we conceptualize motivation. I do not care about truth because I am rational, I am rational because I care about truth. Like most people I have curiosity, an irrational appetite or desire to know the truth and to figure things out. But if you do think that me being an erratic liar better explains my behavior, then by all means believe that.

    I don't mean to be rude. I'm just pointing out the strangeness of you offering your opinions with a certain confidence while eroding any possible authority or interest they are likely to have. Like a drunk at a bar, satisfying with something that sounds edgy, 'unsentimentally' numb to the lack of coherence. — plaque flag

    Well I don't mind your appraisal, I just don't see the point to it. It is not enough to just claim that what I say is incoherent, you also have to show it.

    To be clear, I think you do care about truth, which is to your credit. And you are just trying to see around your culture to that transcendent truth by avoiding sentimental attachment to norms that might get in the way of that truth-seeing project. Nietzchean stuff. — plaque flag

    All right, I'll just take that as a slightly patronizing compliment.
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