Bingo. You win the lucky door prize. I have no objection to there being a shared reality, in fact, I think consciousness is collective in nature, even though each of us only ever experiences it in the first person. — Wayfarer

But isn't that a form of metaphysical realism? And is this "collective consciousness" how you conceptualize reality? If so, what does it signify? Is it like Bernardo Kastrups "Cosmic Mind"?

For example? — Wayfarer

Well it's impossible to give you a specific example of pre-conceptual reality, because that itself would involve conceptualization. But I think it is necessary to invoke the idea of a shared reality to, for example, explain how we're having this conversation.

I think that amounts to a kind of illustration, doesn't it? — Wayfarer

No, I don't think it's necessary to invoke the idea of conceptualization in geese in order to explain the behavior you're describing.

I think there has to be a minimal intellectual component in terms of memory, otherwise I don't see how a creature could perceive without constantly forgetting. — Manuel

Of course animals have intelligence and memory, but how does that necessitate the use of concepts? Memories are just impressions made by particular events, for example an animal doesn't need the general concept of a "child" in order to remember that they have children to feed.

They very likely have some primitive concepts. I don't think it makes much sense to postulate a creature having perception absent some minimal amount of conception. — Manuel

I think that is a very strange claim, why are the use of concepts necessary for perception? I would not invoke conceptualization for any reason other than to describe the use of syntactic language, which is an ability only humans and arguably one or two other animals have.

Thank you for such an extensive write-up. My question is, do you not believe there is some component of the world/reality that, even if it is not captured in some particular concept, is still singular and shared across all these "constructed worlds"? And if so, wouldn't that also make you a kind of metaphysical realist?

But no to the suggestion that matter can be observed without any conceptualization at all. — Manuel

So you believe non-human animals are all engaged in conceptualization? Or that they do not observe anything?

So are you just making the trivial claim that reality can be observed and conceptualized in different ways, or for that matter observed without being conceptualized at all?

I am saying that each animal species (ants, birds, tigers, whatever) interpret the world the way each species does — Manuel

They interpret the same world in different ways, in other words?

Thank you, I'm sorry for leaping in without due diligence.

Is there any term you would accept as referring to what we observe prior to generating propositional knowledge? Like "pre-conceptual reality", for example?

I don't know what else to say other than to ask why you don't think the examples I give suggest that we see the same things animals do. — Janus

Maybe you would have better luck if you were to say that all animals observe the same reality instead of saying they observe the same "things", since to @Wayfarer and @Manuel that seems to necessarily imply that other animals conceptualize reality in the same way we do (which is clearly not your intended meaning).

we are so far from being on the same page as to make responding pointless. — Janus

It doesn't surprise me to hear you say that! My entire problem with your view as on philosophy is that it makes discourse pointless. To make progress, you would have to be willing to question assumptions which your interlocutor does not agree with, but it seems that is just not an option for you. You are what I would call a dogmatist.

It doesn't stop there, though—the most salient question for me then would be "how best to live?" — Janus

That is strange, because asking that question involves a lot of presuppositions, chiefly that there are better and worse ways of living. So it seems after you realized you barely know anything you proceed to ignore that realization and just believe whatever you like?

The only potential universally held assumption (or is it a realization?) that I can think of is that we know and can know very little. — Janus

The important thing isn't to know, but to assume. Assumptions are fine as long as they are not questioned, that's why only universally held assumptions are acceptable within a discourse.

Once this is realized we still need to work with provisional hypotheses in order to live — Janus

"As the example of Socrates shows", living isn't the goal of philosophy.

I would include as rational persuasion both practical and pure reason — Janus

I have no idea what persuasion through "practical reason" looks like.

You speak as though that purported "end goal" is a given. — Janus

I'm sorry for implying that, it's just how I've personally always seen it. Philosophy is of course an activity, people might have different goals in doing it, I just can't understand what they are.

How would any philosophical truth ever be demonstrable such as to gain universal assent? — Janus

You'd have to show the truth to be a necessary consequence of a universally held set of assumptions. But well, I didn't literally mean "everyone", just everyone who participates in philosophical discourse.

Discussion would still allow for folk to be influenced by others. — Janus

What is desirable about "influence" per se? I mean that word runs the gamut from peer pressure to lobotomy. What is desirable to me is only the possibility of rational persuasion.

The question was posed to J. — Janus

Yes sorry, I didn't see that at the time. What matters to me though is that it's a reasonable question to ask.

Well, for those presupposed to doubt it, there are plenty of grounds for doubt. For those predisposed to believe it, there are plenty of grounds for belief. — Wayfarer

In other words the believer and the doubter are both justified? This is very perplexing to me, I wouldn't feel comfortable doubting a justified belief or vice versa.

"To each there own philosophy" I say, because that takes proper account of human diversity. Would you have it any other way? — Janus

I certainly would. I mean, the theoretical end goal of philosophy is for everyone to believe the same thing, that thing being the truth. In my opinion this idea of private justification instead promotes a static kind of diversity, where a bunch of dogmatists each stay in their respective camp and engage in discourse only performatively.

Science typically provides no such axis, as it is generally assumes that the universe is devoid of intrinsic meaning and/or value, so a claim to 'higher knowledge' is often challenged on the grounds that there is no objective justification for it.

For example:

what do you mean by "highest"? Most comprehensive or overarching. most critical, most meta-cognitive? Or most spiritual, most enlightening, wisest?
— Janus — Wayfarer

In this case a more innocent framing would perhaps be that Janus is asking questions because he doesn't understand what you mean? The way I see it, what you're saying is that you shouldn't have to explain yourself because we would automatically understand you if only we hadn't grown up in scientistic western society.

I don’t think Conze says or implies that. — Wayfarer

To me he very clearly implies it, but I guess I can't insist on my own interpretation.

The purpose of my quoting the Edward Conze text was simply an illustration of the idea of there being a higher truth - something for which I am generally criticized for suggesting. But to get down to basics, this is because I don't think our culture possesses a vertical axis along which the description of 'higher' makes any sense. — Wayfarer

This is such a strange way of framing what you're doing. Of course if you want to introduce people to a new idea ("the axis of quality") you must be prepared to justify it, this is quite normal. Saying you are "criticized for suggesting" your ideas makes it sound like you're being persecuted, is that how it feels to you?

And of course it would be so nice if your ideas were culturally embedded in your society so you didn't have to argue for them at all, a lot of us probably wish for that.

Well here is a critical difference in what Conze is saying and what Plato is saying:

there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge — Plato, The Republic

Whatever happened to the "rare and unordinary faculty" of perennial philosophy?

I hope you understand, that what it is that I find "bleak" in Conzes text is not the idea that philosophy requires effort or that some people are better at it than others, but the idea that it is a hopeless endevour unless you belong to a privileged class of people.

That was an excerpt. The entire essay is Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels, Philosophy East and West, 1963. — Wayfarer

Thank you, but does the additional context modify the meaning of the quote in any relevant way?

Aside from Conze, the principle of monastic lineage in Buddhism and other spiritual traditions assumes the transmission of insight. — Wayfarer

Well I'd like to discuss his text, so let's not put him "aside". But either way, if there really is such an unbroken lineage this could be explained by sages being replaced by other sages without any muggles ever being elevated to sage-hood.

I think you're very much viewing it through the lens of the rejection of dogmatic Christianity and its 'blind faith' — Wayfarer

That's quite presumptuous, I think my reading is pretty straightforward. You clearly have your own preconceptions about Buddhism and the like, maybe you're viewing the text through that lens?

Or in insight. That was, for instance, the basis of the Buddha's authority - one which was never imposed on others — Wayfarer

I'm having a really hard time telling if this is your interpretation of Conzes text or just you laying out your own opinions. I think Conze makes it very clear: insight can not be transmitted or taught to people who lack it. Instead the best we get is submission to a charismatic sage, who we trust to guide us despite our inability to understand the underlying principles of their teachings.

If you think Conze is saying something else, I'd like to hear your reasons.

Those insights are communicated to the student by the teacher. As well as what is learned by their deportment and presence. — Wayfarer

Ok, well, I understand now that is what you believe, but it really is not what I think Edward Conze is saying in the text you quoted. He is talking about wise men with a "rare faculty" whose teachings are based on authority, not personal understanding.

Of course it's radically un-PC for liberal democracy — Wayfarer

Teachers teaching their students is not particularly "un-PC". Neither is the idea of trusting authorities for that matter, but I grant you that it might raise eyebrows in a philosophy forum.

It would be bleak if you take such a bleak view. If you were a piano student, presumably you would select a teacher who was an expert in teaching piano, and you would admire and hope to emulate excellent pianists. — Wayfarer

This is not at all what I took Conze to be saying in your quoted text, the so-called sages here are not "teachers", they can't teach you the truth any more than a person with vision can teach a blind man how to see. They have insight that they can't communicate to lesser minds, all we can do is submit to their authority as presented through charisma.

I recognise that it is something often exploited by the unscrupulous to exploit the gullible — Wayfarer

Yes there is clearly a problem with putting so much faith in a "charismatic" authority, but aside from that it's possibly the bleakest thing I've ever read as far as philosophy is concerned. I've always thought of philosophy as a personal pursuit of knowledge so to speak, the idea that it's a hopeless effort unless you belong to a chosen elite is quite depressing. It's yet another field where we the plebs must defer to the experts, like we already do with scientists, doctors, lawyers etc.

(...) true teaching is based on an authority which legitimizes itself by the exemplary life and charismatic quality of its exponents. — Wayfarer

I have to ask, is this what you yourself believe?

As if that is the sum total of our achievements…. — Wayfarer

The analogy holds, any contest or hierarchy we've ever used to put ourselves above other beings has also been of our own invention. To my mind it's really quite a pathetic thing to do, inventing a game just to win it.

It seems a bit self-congratulatory to invent a concept (like "value", "meaning", whatever) and then pat ourselves on the back for being the only animal to make use of said concept. Might as well brag about being the only animal to play checkers.

Obviously when a guy like Dawkins denies "design in nature" (if he ever did), he is talking specifically about biological lifeforms, even if technically he does believe everything is natural (including a human crafting a clay pot). From that perspective "the ability to design" is just another funny little trick cooked up by natural selection, alongside the ability to walk on two feet and the ability to digest food.

I am not really sure what you're trying to to get at here. What counts as intuitive might be debated, but certain statements like "a line of points cannot be simultaneously continuous and discrete," or "2+2=4," can largely be agreed upon. Are you claiming we lack good warrant for believing these sorts of things?

Eliminativism, in its most extreme form, does violate these sorts of intuitions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What is "these sorts" referring to here? Eliminativists do not reject 2+2=4 or other mathematical a priori stuff, that sort of thing is not in doubt here. It seems you are bunching some intuitions together into a group, but I don't understand the criteria for membership.

This would be the claim that "you don't actually experience anything, see blue, hear sounds, etc." But does anyone actually advocate this? — Count Timothy von Icarus

In my opinion, any eliminativist worth the name would of course advocate this. And why not?

Dennett himself calls this type of eliminitivism "ridiculous," in "Conciousness Explained." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know that Dennett is an eliminativist, if so I think he is in the closet about it. I've always found him to be strangely diplomatic and "soft-selling" in expressing his views, it makes sense to me that he would disavow what you describe as "extreme". Maybe this partly explains his success, his books do seem to sell.

Something is intuitive, a noetic "first principle," if we cannot conceive of it being otherwise. 2+2 is intuitively 4. It is intuitive that a straight line cannot also be a curved line, that a triangle cannot have four sides, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I didn't realize the bar was set so high, so then all it takes is for someone to claim that they can conceive of something being false, and it ceases to be intuitive? Presumeably the eliminativist has already done this, so are the claims they deny then dethroned? Or are they not included in this "we"?

But "things are only extension in space and motion," or "all that exists can be explained in terms of mathematics and computation," are not basic intuitions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure exactly how you make the distinction between "basic/core" and "regular" (historical popularity maybe?), but those ideas of space and motion are certainly products of intuition.

It's obvious that if you frame something as "intuition vs X", then X will always lose. But the neuromaniac eliminativist perspective is also the product of intuition, intuition isn't a big happy family to be collectively dismissed or embraced.

If our core intuitions can be this wrong, and there is "nothing to explain," then I have no idea why we should be referring to neuroscience for explanations in the first place. We only have a good reason to think science tells us anything about the world if our basic intuitions have some sort of merit. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The problems of phenomenal consciousness are to begin with the result of tension between different intuitions. It's like you have a bunch of witnesses and their testimonies don't add up to a coherent story, one of them has to be wrong. It's no good saying "if you doubt one, you have to doubt them all, so let's just not".

And I'd would say that at the very least, higher order animals certainly experience fear as they attack when cornered. That is "self preservation" and as the term would suggest it would seem to necessitate a "self" in which to defend. A certain expectation or demand to survive. An "I" that wishes to live on. — Benj96

In my opinion, your thinking here is the result of rationalizing (as opposed to explaining) animal behavior in comfortable terms. The mechanisms of fear and self-preservation in, um... "higher order animals" I believe can be explained without imparting ideas of "self" on them.

I do not understand how you make the distinction, but do you not see patterns of self-preservation in what I suppose you would call "lower order" lifeforms?

MUI theory states that "perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world." Hoffman argues that conscious beings have not evolved to perceive the world as it actually is but have evolved to perceive the world in a way that maximizes "fitness payoffs". — flannel jesus

Conceptually at least, it seems we could not be further apart on the issue of perception. I believe we can only perceive the world as it is and argued as much in my thread about Illusionism:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14459/on-illusionism-what-is-an-illusion-exactly/p1

Critical for me is the distinction between perception, which is pre-propositional, and interpretation, which is the generation of propositions.

Maybe not but it's helpful that you brought it up explicitly. Reading this thread I really felt like I was missing the point of what people were discussing.

The experience I call "blue", the qualia if you will, doesn't have to be assigned to the things I assign it to. The qualia you experience as blue, I could experience as green. My whole colour wheel could be rotated with respect to yours, and I would still have a fully in tact, self-consistent and useful sensory experience regardless. — flannel jesus

I am a functionalist about mental properties, so talking about "digust" or "experience" is fine but "qualia" is a good way to lose me completely. I don't believe there is a color wheel to rotate, that idea is a mistake.

This is more of a conceptual distinction, I think what you call an "experience" I would call a "reaction" that is distinct from the smell as such. The smell/sight/sound/whatever is just the sum of information picked up by a sensory organ. So if me and a fly pick up on the same information, it is the same smell, and our different reactions are irrelevant.

We can't both be experiencing smells "as they are" considering how viscerally different our experiences are. — flannel jesus

What would be the problem with just saying the fly, dog or human has a different reaction to the same smell?

For me philosophy is just an intrinsically compelling activity, I've never concerned myself with its "value" or "importance".

Ok, with this aside, let us define Direct Realism, the thesis that do indeed have direct access to the external world.

Now let me propose a few arguments for Indirect Realism that I run. Note that all the names I'm giving these are non-standard. — Ashriel

Did you forget to write something in between these two paragraphs?

Based on what you do write I'm not sure what position you're arguing against, surely no-one believes we can see anything without light, eyeballs and other "middle men"?

I would add that there are important ways in which consciousness is not an illusion. Emotional, experiential, rational, doxastic content, means something, points toward something true, is important. — NotAristotle

While we may agree in denouncing illusionism, we clearly have different reasons for doing so. Like I said earlier, there are two tenets to illusionism:

A) Phenomenological consciousness appears to be real
B) Phenomenological consciousness is not real

I reject A while you reject B, that's the difference.

A lie is an illusion is it not? Well, what misleads more, the lie or the liar? — NotAristotle

No, a lie is not an illusion. Not everything that misleads is an illusion, anything can be misleading in theory, even the truth.

Would you define the "consciousness" you say is not an illusion? (...) Maybe that is an unfair question because consciousness may be undefinable. — NotAristotle

I don't think it's undefinable, it's just a word that's used a bit inconsistently.

Consciousness has a functional component, this is pretty much undisputed, it is the functionality that a person loses when someone whacks them over the head with a mallet and they faint. Obviously this is not an illusion.

But it is also generally taken have a qualitative or phenomenological component. This is the "interesting" part as far as philosophy of mind is concerned, but I think one should keep in mind that it is not the only part.

why defend consciousness as not an illusion; what's at stake? Why is consciousness not being an illusion important to you? — NotAristotle

I think illusionism is false and an obstacle to solving major problems in philosophy of mind. It's not like I have a strong emotional stake in the issue though.

And the viewer of the illusion is the illusion itself. An illusion is fooled into thinking itself to be real. That's a heck of a magic trick! — Patterner

Like I've told you, I don't subscribe to illusionism, I'm not going to defend the position.

Leaving aside how negative or positive thinking affects our judgement, I would have to say your idea of an illusion seems too broad. Not everything that misleads us is an illusion, liars are not illusions for example.

An illusion in my opinion is a kind of appearance. To say that "consciousness is an illusion" is to say that "there appears to be consciousness, but there actually isn't".

Negative thinking, patterns of thought, insofar as we identify these things with consciousness, it is easier to see how consciousness is an illusion; it is an illusion just as negative thinking and patterns of thought are an illusion, they are part of a script so to speak. — NotAristotle

I'd like to hear what your idea of an illusion is for you to conclude that "negative thinking" is illusory. Is positive thinking somehow more real than negative?