- I went back to read this. I agree with the conclusion:

...Logicians have an answer to the above charge, and the answer is perfectly tight and logically consistent. That is part of the problem! Consistency is not enough. Logic should be not just a mathematically consistent system but a human instrument for understanding reality, for dealing with real people and things and real arguments about the real world. That is the basic assumption of
the old logic.

But I think Kreeft is working with a caricature in the earlier parts, as he has a tendency to do:

...The conclusion ("Lassie is a dog") may be true, but it has not been proved by this argument. It does not "follow" from the premises.

Now in Aristotelian logic, a true conclusion logically follows from, or is proved by, or is "implied" by, or is validly inferred from, only some premises and not others. The above argument about Lassie is not a valid argument according to Aristotelian logic. Its premises do not prove its conclusion. And common sense, or our innate logical sense, agrees. However, modern symbolic logic disagrees. One of its principles is that "if a statement is true, then that statement is implied by any statement whatever."

He is falling into equivocation between validity and material implication. Modern logic agrees with Aristotelian logic in saying that, "It does not follow from the premises." That a material conditional is true does not mean that the consequent can be drawn, and if Kreeft tries to draw the consequent when the antecedent is false, the modern logician will rightly accuse him of failing to respect the conditions of modus ponens. I think Kreeft is involved in word games here, but in his defense he might say that the modern logician is involved in word games with his word "implies."

This principle is often called "the paradox of material implication." Ironically, "material implication" means exactly the opposite of what it seems to mean. It means that the matter, or content, of a statement is totally irrelevant to its logically implying or being implied by other statements.

Oh, Kreeft knows full well that "material" is contrasted with "formal," and that content is formal, not material. :roll:

Logician: So, class, you see, if you begin with a false premise, anything follows.
Student: I just can't understand that.
Logician: Are you sure you don't understand that?
Student: If I understand that, I'm a monkey's uncle.
Logician: My point exactly. (Snickers.)
Student: What's so funny?
Logician: You just can't understand that.

:grin:

The relationship between a premise and a conclusion is called "implication," and the process of reasoning from the premise to the conclusion is called "inference" In symbolic logic, the relation of implication is called "a tnith-functional connective," which means that the only factor that makes the inference valid or invalid, the only thing that makes it true or false to say that the premise or premises validly imply the conclusion, is not at all dependent on the content or matter of any of those propositions, but only whether the premise or premises are true or false and whether the conclusion is true or false.

I agree that material implication has problems, but if you want a tidy, "algorithmic" system, then these sorts of problems are inevitable.

- Okay, thanks for that. And I put in some additional leg work for your argument in the other thread.

But is something accidental if it not only could have but should have been forseen? — Pantagruel

Yes. No one would say I intentionally killed someone by drunk driving if they knew for certain that I genuinely did not foresee the serious possibility of killing or injuring someone by drunk driving. For example, a severely cognitively challenged person who gets their hands on some alcohol and ends up drunk driving probably isn’t capable of foreseeable (sic) the obvious possibility that they may injure or kill someone. — Bob Ross

Note that the cognitively challenged person is not capable and therefore, for Pantagruel, would be causing an effect accidentally.

In practicality, most people cannot get away with claiming they did not foresee it (because we do not believe them) or, if they can, we hold them responsible for their negligence (as opposed to their intentions). — Bob Ross

I think you two are talking past each other. Pantagruel is saying that we can at times be held responsible for unintended consequences. You seem to agree, and you rightly call this 'negligence.'

I could try to make the critique more precise, although the only person on these forums who has shown a real interest in what I would call 'meta-logic' is .

Every time we make an inference on the basis of a contradiction a metabasis eis allo genos occurs (i.e. the sphere of discourse shifts in such a way that the demonstrative validity of the inference is precluded). Usually inferences made on the basis of a contradiction are not made on the basis of a contradiction “contained within the interior logical flow” of an argument. Or in other words, the metabasis is usually acknowledged to be a metabasis. As an example, when we posit some claim and then show that a contradiction would follow, we treat that contradiction as an outer bound on the logical system. We do not incorporate it into the inferential structure and continue arguing. Hence the fact that it is a special kind of move when we say, “Contradiction; Reject the supposition.” In a formal sense this move aims to ferret out an inconsistency, but however it is conceived, it ends up going beyond the internal workings of the inferential system (i.e. it is a form of metabasis).

Now suppose we draw out the argument for ¬A:

• ((A→(B∧¬B))
• ∴ ¬A

This is a covert metabasis. It is a metabasis that is not acknowledged to be a metabasis. This has to do with the contradiction, (B∧¬B), which is interpreted equivocally as both a proposition and a truth value (“false”). The difference between a truth value and a proposition is flubbed because what is posited is purely formal, and can never exist in reality (i.e. a contradiction). In order to affirm such a proposition as being true, we must affirm something which could never actually be affirmed, and thus the formal logic here parts ways with reality in a drastic manner. Normal logical propositions do not contain contradictions, and therefore do not require us to do such strange things!

You could also put this a different way and say that while the propositions ((A→(B∧¬B)) and (B∧¬B) have truth tables, they have no meaning. They are not logically coherent in a way that goes beyond mere symbol manipulation. We have no idea what (B∧¬B) could ever be expected to mean. We just think of it, and reify it as, "false" - a kind of falsity incarnate.* Is this then a critique of truth functionality? Maybe, but I want to say that truth functionality can have value where contradictions are not allowed.

* A parallel equivocation occurs here on 'false' and 'absurd' or 'contradictory'. Usually when we say 'false' we mean, "It could be true but it's not." In this case it could never be true. It is the opposite of a tautology—an absurdity or a contradiction.

-

Edit:

We can apply Aristotelian syllogistic to diagnose the way that the modus tollens is being applied in the enthymeme:

• ((A→(B∧¬B))
• ∴ ¬A

Viz.:

• Any consequent which is false proves the antecedent
• (B∧¬B) is a consequent which is false
• ∴ (B∧¬B) proves the antecedent

In this case the middle term is not univocal. It is analogical (i.e. it posses analogical equivocity). Therefore a metabasis is occurring. As I said earlier:

* A parallel equivocation occurs here on 'false' and 'absurd' or 'contradictory'. Usually when we say 'false' we mean, "It could be true but it's not." In this case it could never be true. It is the opposite of a tautology—an absurdity or a contradiction. — Leontiskos

Now one could argue for the analogical middle term, but the point is that in this case we are taking modus tollens into new territory. Modus tollens is based on the more restricted sense of 'false', and this alternative sense is a unfamiliar to modus tollens. This is a bit like putting ethanol fuel in your gasoline engine and hoping that it still runs.

Note that the (analogical) equivocity of 'false' flows into the inferential structure, and we could connote this with scare quotes. (B∧¬B) is "false" and therefore the conclusion is "implied." The argument is "valid."

((a→b)∧(a→¬b))↔¬a is valid — Lionino

My point is that it is a vacuous instance of validity, more clearly seen in the form <((a→(b∧¬b))↔¬a>. It is formal logic pretending to say something. As I claimed above, there is no actual use case for such a proposition, and I want to say that propositions which contain (b∧¬b) are not well formed. They lead to an exaggerated form of the problems that has referenced. We can argue about material implication, but it has its uses. I don't think propositions which contain contradictions have their uses.

This is perhaps a difference over what logic is. Is it the art of reasoning and an aid to thought, or just the manipulation of symbols? I would contend that one reason we know it is not merely the manipulation of symbols is because the rules are not arbitrary, and I am proposing the well-formed-formula rule as yet another non-arbitrary rule. Unless I am wrong and there is some good reason we need to allow for propositions to contain internal contradictions?

I am concerned that logicians too often let the tail wag the dog. The ones I have in mind are good at manipulating symbols, but they have no way of knowing when their logic machine is working and when it is not. They take it on faith that it is always working and they outsource their thinking to it without remainder.

↪Michael
I guess you're asking what "obligation" is supposed to be adding to the act of uttering a promise. — frank

And the rest of us would simply ask what a promise is supposed to be without the inclusion of obligation.

As I said above, it makes as much sense to ask what the turning on of the light is supposed to be adding to the act of turning on the light. You could think of a promise as an act prolonged through time, just like the turning on of a light. To promise to do something without directing yourself (by binding yourself) to the fulfillment of the promise is like reaching to turn on a light without turning on the light. "I reached to turn on the light, but it makes no difference to my act whether the light turns on or not. If it does, it does. If it does not, it does not. It's indifferent with respect to my act."

Your points about the difference between two versions of contradiction was interesting and I was thinking about it then got sidetracked in reading the back-and-forth. — Moliere

The original question was, "Do (A implies B) and (A implies notB) contradict each other?"

On natural language they contradict each other.

On the understanding of contradiction that I gave in the first post, they do not contradict each other, and their conjunction is not a contradiction.

On the understanding of contradiction that you gave in the second post, their conjunction is not a contradiction, but their conjunction does contain a contradiction (as showed).

It is that contradiction contained within the conjunction that bubbles up and creates all of the strangeness, and it is worth noting that this contradiction is a direct result of the idiosyncrasies of material implication; they are only logically consistent on account of material implication. It has been some time since I studied formal logic, but I would want to say something along the lines of this, "A proposition containing (p∧¬p) is not well formed." Similar to what I said earlier, "When we talk about contradiction there is a cleavage, insofar as it cannot strictly speaking be captured by logic. It is a violation of logic" (). My idea would be that (p∧¬p) is outside the domain of the logic at hand, and to try to use the logic at hand to manipulate it results in paradoxes.

But I'm sure others have said this better than I, and the principle of explosion is in fact relevant here insofar as it too relies on the incorporation of a contradiction into the interior logical flow of arguments.

6 pages too many on this thread. — Lionino

Perhaps. :lol:

Yeah, looking at OP at least, I can see how there's ambiguity there: whether material implication, or some other meaning, was meant isn't specified in the OP and so whatever meaning was meant there's still ambiguity there (which may explain some of the divergence here that I'm surprised to find) — Moliere

Right, and note also the way that Flannel confuses the conditions of a material implication with the principle of explosion beginning <here>.

The part where "A" is used as a variable is what made me jump to propositional logic. — Moliere

I gave an example of using "A" without material implication earlier, "Supposing A, would B follow?" ().

Your points about the difference between two versions of contradiction was interesting and I was thinking about it then got sidetracked in reading the back-and-forth. — Moliere

I think that is a central point, which Lionino was the first to make explicit on the first page of the thread. It goes back to the uncertainty of the asterisk in my first post, as no one has set out the exact way that the two versions relate. The simple account, which I have set out, is that to contradict is to negate, and what it means to negate depends on one's logical context. Tones was assuming a truth-functional context where negation is the reversal of the truth table.

- Yes, I think this is right.

I keep thinking about my aversion to "∴ ~A" ().

The most basic objection is that an argument with two conditional premises should not be able to draw a simple or singular conclusion (because there is no simple claim among the premises).

I had not been following the line in the thread stemming from your claim, but 's proof fortuitously gave me an inroad, and his proof has nothing in particular to do with material implication.

So then we have (p→(q∧¬q)), and I think your question immediately arises:

Can anyone think up a real world example where you would point out that A implies both B and not-B except for saying something along the lines of:

"A implies B and not-B, therefore clearly not-A." — Count Timothy von Icarus

But I would press further and wonder whether we ever do say things along those lines, in a strict sense:

The way you would usually use it in any sort natural language statement would be to say: "Look, A implies both B and not-B, so clearly A cannot be true." You don't have a contradiction if you reject A, only if you affirm it.

This is a fairly common sort of argument. Something like: "if everything Tucker Carlson says about Joe Biden is true then it implies that Joe Biden is both demented/mentally incompetent and a criminal mastermind running a crime family (i.e., incompetent and competent, not-B and B) therefore he must be wrong somewhere." — Count Timothy von Icarus

This actually runs head-on into the problem that I spelled out <here>. Your consequent is simply not a contradiction in the sense that gave (i.e. the second clear sense of "contradiction" operating in the thread). I don't think (p→(q∧¬q)) ever occurs (in reality). This is obviously related to @Janus' critique. I want to say, "Yes, if that proposition were true, then ¬p would follow, but it is never true." Hence Lionino's point, which is elementary but essential:

...and "imply ¬A" as [meaning] the proposition being True means A is False. — Lionino

Which goes back to a central question. How are we interpreting the OP? In my sense or in Moliere's sense?

...I should also note that Tones gave an argument for ~A in which he attempted to prove it directly, without going through Lionino's equivalence proof. This is an acceptable argument by basic logical standards, but I have always had difficulty with argument by supposition. What does it mean to suppose A and then show that ~A follows? This gets into the nature of supposition, how it relates to assertion, and the LEM. It also gets into the difference between a reductio and a proof proper. The point is one I had already made in a post that Tones was responding to, "You think the two propositions logically imply ~A? It seems rather that what they imply is that A cannot be asserted" ().

Still, as I conceded to Lionino, I think his equivalence proof suffices to show that we can draw ~A if the proposition is true. It just seems that it is never true.

and when the OP is in the Logic sub-forum it makes sense to default to trained logic — Moliere

@Janus' point applies to logic as well. Formal logic is parasitic on natural logic, and "logic" does not mean "formal logic," or some system of formal logic. A lot of folks around here get into trouble because they can't see beyond their own logical system. Tones even mistakes natural language for his own system, and normatively interprets natural language in terms of his system.

And to read Flannel Jesus' posts is to realize that he did not intend the OP in any special sense. I see no evidence that he was specifically speaking about material implication.

EDIT: Also, I ought say: I think it's a good story for highlighting a problem in rationality. That's the real conversation. — Moliere

That's sort of where I disagree. See:

I think it's a good story to highlight how we can get into a bind about decisions if all we do is follow some rules in the mode of obedience to them — Moliere

The idea is: Don't be an Ass. — Moliere

The idea here seems to be that it is a good rhetorical device. It is a good parable or lesson. Indeed, it was originally crafted as a rhetorical satire. Fine, I can see that. I can see the "lesson." The problem is that what is good as a parable or lesson or sermon is not good as being conducive to impartial reasoning. Philosophical examples are supposed to be conducive to impartial reasoning. Satire and lessons are designed to beg the question, philosophically speaking.

The other problem here is that those who appeal to this example are literally paying philosophical honor to a satirical mockery, hence the irony that, "The joke is on us." The image is meant to mock Buridan's theory of moral decision, not to be conducive to impartial philosophical argument. It is meant to be ridiculous, not instructive. Or rather, it is only meant to be instructive insofar as it is seen to be ridiculous. It is highly incongruous that today we take up the piece of satirical mockery as if it is a perfectly good philosophical example, and the problem that I have seen is that those who wield it fail to understand how it begs the question, as a lesson.

Edit:

Which antecedents? — Moliere

Aristotle, Al-Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, Bayle, and Leibniz — Leontiskos

It's not a misinterpretation. To say that P is contradictory is to say that P is a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Here's some help for you from the dictionary:

Merriam-Webster - Contradictory
(Adjective): involving, causing, or constituting a contradiction
| contradictory statements
| The witnesses gave contradictory accounts of the accident.
(Noun): a proposition so related to another that if either of the two is true the other is false and if either is false the other must be true

So you're wrong whether we interpret it as an adjective or a noun. You don't seem to have a great grasp of natural language.

First, take out 'would' since subjunctives unnecessarily complicate. — TonesInDeepFreeze

It's like talking to a computer. "Get rid of that natural language, you're confusing our processes!"

Sue claimed "It is not the case that B follows from the supposition A" — TonesInDeepFreeze

You're still involved in ambiguity. In order to know what Sue denied we must know what Bob affirmed. As noted in my original post, your interpretation will involve Sue in the implausible claims that attend the material logic of ~(A → B), such as the claim that A is true and B is false. Sue is obviously not claiming that (e.g. that lizards are purple). The negation (and contradictory) of Bob's assertion is not ~(A → B), it is, "Supposing A, B would not follow."

- If you look at the antecedents of "Buridan's Ass," you will note that none of them use an animal as the example. The reason for this is clear: animals do not demonstrate anything regarding rationality or free will given the fact that they are not generally taken to have rationality or free will. Wikipedia's very first sentence begins the strangeness, "Buridan's ass is an illustration of a paradox in philosophy in the conception of free will. It refers to a hypothetical situation wherein an ass (donkey) that is equally hungry and thirsty..." Huh!? Free will? An ass?

I suppose one might say that the example limps with respect to rationality and free will. My question is: what is the worth of this example which limps with respect to the very things in question? There's a really, really good reason why Aristotle, Al-Ghazali, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, Bayle, and Leibniz talk about human beings and not asses. Did Jean Buridan ever talk about moral determinism in this way? I somewhat doubt it, as no one seems to be able to produce the source.

Wikipedia gives us the answer:

Later writers satirised this view in terms of an ass which, confronted by both food and water, must necessarily die of both hunger and thirst while pondering a decision. — Buridan's Ass | Wikipedia

It's satire that many simply haven't noticed is satire. Perhaps the original idea was that Buridan failed to account for the freedom or dynamism of the will, hence the ass. But now it seems that the joke is on us. :nerd:

I take 'the contradictory statement is P' to mean that P is a contradiction, as a contradictory statement is a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

And I already corrected your misinterpretation in <this post>.

But maybe you mean it is a contradicting statement. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I'm glad you finally figured this out and even came up with your own fun way of describing it in English. Now you should go back and reread the original post, using what you have learned about your misinterpretations.

To help you, @Janus' point about natural language is something like this:

• Supposing A, would B follow?
• Bob: Yes
• Sue: No

Now Sue has contradicted Bob. The question is, "What has Sue claimed?"

Your answer is incorrect. — TonesInDeepFreeze

You don't even understand what is being said. :roll:

You changed the sentence. Here is what you wrote: — TonesInDeepFreeze

No, I was there giving an answer to the question at hand.

"If lizards were purple then they would be smarter" is not a contradiction — TonesInDeepFreeze

I give up. Go read Lionino's first post on the first page. He explains the two basic senses of contradiction operating in the thread.

I know of no context in which that sentence is a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The question at hand is, "What is the contradiction of, 'If lizards were purple then they would be smarter'?"

There are two separate matters: negation and material implication. — TonesInDeepFreeze

The negation of a material conditional will be different from the negation of an if-then statement in natural language, and my post was highlighting that difference.

Or as I said earlier:

Given the way that common speech differs from material implication, in common speech the two speakers would generally be contradicting one another. — Leontiskos

no - the consequent can only be affirmed as true IF the antecedent is first affirmed as true. It's THAT that is not the case here. — flannel jesus

"Who are you, who are so wise in the ways of science?"

Put it together: ...therefore the consequent cannot be affirmed as true in this case. Therefore the consequent does not "follow."

- On explosion the consequent "follows" in the sense that it can be affirmed as true. That is not the case here.

if you phrase "A -> B" as "from A follows B", then if A is false, you can say "A -> anything", from A anything follows — flannel jesus

It does not follow; it is moot. According to material implication (A → B) is true if A is false, but B does not follow given that A is false. We cannot derive B. That's why A is false in this case, because we cannot arrive at the contradiction of (B ^ ~B).

From falsehood, anything follows. Have you ever heard of this? — flannel jesus

I don't think the principle of explosion is quite the same as material implication. It's kind of the opposite. We are running from a contradiction, not running on a contradiction. See and .

Okay:

Another example is that someone might have a sudden and uncontrollable sneezing fit when driving and fail to see the pedestrian on the crossing and run them over and kill them. They will still be punished even though it was not their fault in any moral sense. — Janus

Supposing someone has an unforeseeable seizure, would they be punished in this case?

You are conflating the legal with the moral. If someone drinks and drives they are being negligent. If their ability to focus on the task of driving safely and/ or being physically coordinated enough to do it, is sufficiently impaired by the alcohol and they are unlucky enough to kill someone, they will not be excused and will be prosecuted and punished to a far greater extent than if they had not killed someone. — Janus

I agree.

From the point of view of the law concerning negligence, they have committed a greater crime than if they had merely driven without incident, but this doesn't seem right from a moral standpoint. Call this moral luck (or unluck). — Janus

Fair enough.

So I have to apologize. The quality of your recent posts has not been problematic. I was thinking about the earlier ones and I was trying to respond to too many different threads. Sorry about that. :yikes:

Still, I do not see how I have conflated the legal with the moral (although I do think the legal order is within the moral order).

Again, a contradiction is a statement and its negation. If there is a contradiction then you could show that both a statement and its negation are implied.

Again:

"if lizards are purple, then they would be smarter" and "if lizards are purple, then they would not be smarter" is not a contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

But the difficulties of material implication do not go away here. You are thinking of negation in terms of symbolic logic, in which case the contradictory proposition equates to, "Lizards are purple and they are not smarter." Yet in natural language when we contradict or negate such a claim, we are in fact saying, "If lizards were purple, they would not be smarter." We say, "No, they would not (be smarter in that case)." The negation must depend on the sense of the proposition, and in actuality the sense of real life propositions is never the sense given by material implication.

The reason we keep material implication is because we like truth functionality.

Which is, compared to your citations, a poor translation (apparently). Irregardless, if I take it that his second sentence is a definition (and not an assertion that about what nobility think), then: — Bob Ross

I don't think yours is a bad translation. The point is that Aristotle is setting out the meaning (or at least his working meaning) of 'good' in that phrase. In colloquial terms this is a kind of definition. Scholars will argue whether it is a properly Aristotelian definition, or whether it should be translated into English as 'definition'. Regardless of those debates, Aristotle won't take up the use of a central term without giving some kind of explanation of what he means by it, and that is where he does this with 'good'.

'The good' refers to what is supremely and ultimately good — Bob Ross

But this is where Aristotle disagrees with Plato. Aristotle thinks there is no Platonic Form of the Good.

If I assume he means to define "good", as opposed to "the good", as "that which all things aim at", then this seems like an incredibly inadequate definition... — Bob Ross

I mostly want to save this debate for another day. What I will say is that 'good' is notoriously difficult to define, and that Aquinas goes about the psychological angle in this way:

Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." — Aquinas, ST I-II.94.2

The difficulty with defining 'good' is that it ignores our subjective/objective distinction and it can act as a grammatical modifier of pretty much anything.

- Thanks, that was well put. :up:

People want a contractor who will build them a house; they don't want a contractor who will not build them a house. — Michael

And you think it is possible to claim that one of the contractors is more reliable without at the same time saying that he is more likely to fulfill his obligations?

The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their contract then they are to be jailed". The judge then rules that I did not fulfil the terms of my contract and so orders the bailiffs to take me to jail.

Again, the existence of some supposed obligation is utterly irrelevant. — Michael

You are recasting the entire social sphere. Your "promises" and "contracts" are not real promises or contracts. Your "penalties" are not real penalties. Your "debts" ("owes") are not real debts (although you slipped there for a second). For example, a contract involves a promise to fulfill what one says they will fulfill, and the penalty that may follow is a real penalty, not just someone forcing you to randomly do something you'd rather not do. I think your error is quite similar to Anscombe's, noted above, in that the occurrence of natural debts is being overlooked in favor of a purely positivistic legal conception.

You think promising involves saying and intending to do something in the future, with no regard to the fulfillment of that thing. You admit that the promise either is or is not fulfilled, but you deny that the promiser has any obligation to so fulfill it. This is wrong. To promise and to intend are two different things. We intend to do things in the future all the time, but it does not follow from this that we are making promises. Banno got at it earlier:

↪Michael So this tells me only that you will not be held to your promises.

OK. You are not a man of your word. — Banno

What does it mean to give one's word, or to make a promise? Here is Aquinas:

A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; [...] Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. — Aquinas, ST II-II.88.1 Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?

In his reply to objection 1 he addresses your claim directly, namely the claim that a promise is nothing more than a purpose or intention.

Why is it bad to go back on promises, not only for others but also for oneself? It is bad because it is to be a shitty man, in the same way that to continually try to do something and fail at it is to be a shitty man. "By promising he directs what he himself is to do for another," and someone who continually reneges or simply fails in his promises is a failure. He is unable to direct himself. He is unable to do what he promises—and yes, also intends—to do. To fail to understand why promises involve obligations is a bit like failing to understand why reaching out to turn on the light involves turning on the light. "If it turns on, it turns on. If not, not. It has nothing to do with my reaching out." :scream:

Your bizarre ideas also undercut any notion of debt. On your view if you borrow a shovel from your neighbor you have no debt to him, you do not owe it to him to give it back; or if you tell your girlfriend that you will marry her then on your view you have no obligation to marry her. If you didn't then the engagement would mean nothing at all! And when you renege on your contract to build my house you owe me a debt. The thing imposed for breaking a contract is a penalty, not merely a consequence; and when you fail to fulfill a promise or a vow, what you subsequently owe to the other party is more than what you originally promised, because by breaching their trust you incur an additional debt. This is why, why you stand up your girlfriend at a restaurant, she has a right to be angry with you rather than simply sad because she lost out on a meal.

- I will come back to this, but I want to present a different angle before I go:

• Leontiskos: What if a contractor in your area was known to never fulfill his contracts. Would you contract with him for a house?
• Interlocutor: No, because the house would not be built on time.
• L: How do you know that?
• I: Because the contractor is not reliable.
• L: Why is he not reliable?
• I: Because he does not fulfill his contracts.
• L: Is not he unreliable precisely because he fails to fulfill his obligations?
• I: A contract is not an obligation.
• L: If you are happy with receiving the penalty as a settlement then you would not need to view it as an obligation, but if you want your house built on time then it would seem to be an obligation. If reliability in doing what he says he will do is not reliability in his obligations, then what is it? And if you decide against him as a contractor on the basis of his unreliability and inability to do what he said he would do, then what exactly is it that your decision is based on? What is the per se thing about him that makes you choose someone else? Someone else who always does what they promise to do?

The terms of the contract simply say "Michael is to build the house or pay a fine". The law simply says "if someone does not fulfil the terms of their contract then they are to be jailed".

Neither the law nor the contract depend on the existence of obligations, and so arguing that obligations don't existence is an irrelevant argument. — Michael

Well, if you don't like the word 'obligation', then instead of trying to convince the judge that you have no obligation to fulfill your contract you should convince him that you need not fulfill the contract and that you need not be punished. After all, why must you fulfill the contract? Why must you be punished? Why must you do what the law tells you to do? Why must you do what you said you were going to do when you signed the contract? Why must you be held to your word? Surely the judge would have little to answer you.

I can say whatever I want. I doubt it would convince a judge. The contract states that if I do not build the house then I am to pay a fine. The law states that if I do not pay the fine then I am to be jailed. So I build the house, pay a fine, or go to jail. Unless I have very good lawyers, I have to choose between one of these outcomes. — Michael

Well, suppose your judge is a good philosopher, and he admits that laws cannot be premised on non-existent realities. And really, wouldn't any logical person affirm the same? So why not explain to the judge that you agreed to the contract when you signed it, but you disagree with it now? Do you think you would have a plausible argument to convince an impartial judge? Do you think you have good arguments to convince him that there is no metaphysical basis for obligations, and therefore obligations cannot exist, and therefore you do not owe me $25,000? If your arguments are sound, then why not apply them in real life?

I can do all of that. And then I will presumably face some further punishment. — Michael

But why? Why not reason with the authority and explain to him, like you did to me, that you intended to fulfill the contract when you signed it and now you've changed your mind? If you are not obliged to pay the contract, then surely you are not subject to further punishment...?

I don't understand the relevance of the question. — Michael

Earlier you told me that you honestly believe that you can just change your mind and decide not to fulfill a promise. Why can't you just change your mind and decide not to fulfill a contract? Why not just tell the authority that you've changed your mind and decided not to fulfill the contract?

For not doing what I was contracted to do. — Michael

Did you tell him you changed your mind and reneged?

As in, "If I don't build the house on time then some authority will fine me."

This is true if in the terms of the contract. But this proposition does not entail "I ought build the house" (or "I ought pay the fine"). — Michael

And so presumably after the deadline, "I owe you money," just means, "Some authority will fine me if I don't give up the money."

Why is the authority fining you?

I was thinking of it in terms of the conditional "If X doesn't happen then Y will happen", and that this proposition does not entail "I ought X". — Michael

Hmm? What are X and Y?

Right, by "owe" you mean "obligated to give you the money"? Again, you haven't told me what it means to be obligated to do something. I just either do it or I don't. — Michael

Well, you are the one who told me that you owed me the money. What did you mean when you affirmed that proposition?

Well I can certainly change my mind and not give you the money, and then face whatever punishment follows. — Michael

So if you change your mind and renege, do you still owe me the money, or not?

Yes. — Michael

When I say that you owe me $25,000, why couldn't you just say, "I changed my mind," like before? ()

He didn't do what he was contracted to do and so as per the terms of the contract (or the law in general) he is penalized.

That's all there is to it. I don't understand what this additional thing – the "obligation" – is, or what part it plays. — Michael

Take a contract. You tell me that you will build me a house in a year, and if you don't complete it in that time you owe me $25,000. The year completes and the house is not completed. Do you owe me $25,000?

That depends on what you mean. Here are two propositions:

1. Promises exist
2. People promise to do things — Michael

I am curious whether you think contracts exist. If no one is obliged to fulfill a promise, then surely no one is obliged to fulfill a contract? You will say, I think, "There is a penalty but no obligation." But then what is the one who breaks contract being penalized for? Is there something he failed to do?

- I was just being honest about my assessment of your state of knowledge regarding this topic. Maybe I am wrong, but it seems obvious to me that you don't understand this area well enough to opine on it, and I am simply not going to waste all of my time correcting elementary errors regarding things like the notion of negligence.