To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Coming back to this, I think it's basically right, except that I think Klima sees that bracketing as bound up with parasitic reference. That is, for Klima when one refers to another's thought object—a thought object which is outside of one's own universe of thought objects—one is engaged in parasitic reference. But as I said just above, I don't really like the way he uses the words "property" and "description" to convey this bracketing in section 4. Regarding the quote from Roark:

[The atheist] does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

In Klima's terms, there is a parasitic understanding of what the theist is referring to, but there is no possible candidate in the atheist's universe of thought objects to which this thought object would correspond. On Klima's view, for the atheist to even have such a thought object in his own universe of thought objects would require the process of concept acquisition.

Else, if we want to isolate and scrutinize the idea of parasitic reference, then perhaps we should ask whether one can achieve what Roark (and Klima) are trying to achieve without recourse to the notion of parasitic reference. I mostly think that one cannot do so. Nevertheless, it may be that parasitic reference is necessary but insufficient to account for the intricacies of disagreements over Anselm's proof, which gets at the difference between questions 1 and 2 <here>.

I thought section 5 was helpful in filling out section 4. By the time Klima finished the quote from Gaunilo I thought his case was quite strong.

Aquinas’ response to Anselm in the Summa Contra Gentiles is quite interesting. On the one hand, it is of the weaker “question-begging” form that we spoke about earlier, given that it does not directly address Anselm’s proof. On the other hand, it is quite different from the other similarly weaker replies that we have seen. In particular, Aquinas’ approach takes the dialogical nature of the exchange as being fundamental, as opposed to the idea that Anselm has simply transgressed an inferential law (e.g. “no-existence-from-words,” which is reminiscent of “no-ought-from-is”).

Let’s compare the standoff between Anselm and Aquinas to the earlier standoff between the theist and the atheist:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• Anselm's thought is humanly thinkable
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought a greater is thinkable
• Anselm's thought is a thought
• Therefore, Anselm’s thought is not what it claims to be

We could also phrase the two options this way:

• God is that than which a greater cannot be thought
• That than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought not to exist
• Therefore, God exists

• For any thought object a greater is thinkable
• ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is a thought object
• Therefore, ‘That than which a greater cannot be thought’ is not thinkable

(Note the inverted commas within the second premise and conclusion, which in some sense are themselves the whole issue.)

So for Aquinas someone could simply hold the premise, “For any thought a greater is thinkable,” in a way that overpowers Anselm’s argument. Indeed, Aquinas himself may hold the premise in this way.

But there is still an important cleavage or equivocation between Anselm and Aquinas insofar as the mode in which Anselm’s thought refers is equivocal between the two of them. This doesn’t map exactly to Klima’s parasitic vs. constitutive reference (unless one reads Klima’s parenthetical remark on constitutive reference in a special way – a remark that may have been added for this specific issue). The essence of this difference is this: Anselm would not see himself as referring to God constitutively with his definition, at least if by “constitutively” we mean that he would think that the thought conceived exhausts or comprehends God. Put differently, Anselm’s thought is ultimately pointing to the limits of thought qua thought, not thought qua Anselm (or whichever individual is doing the thinking).

When Klima glosses Aquinas in terms of one’s “universe of thought objects,” a bit more clarity is brought to the issue. Note that what Klima is assuming both in this and when he splits the horns of Anselm’s dilemma is that there is more than one level of thought objects, which on Klima’s view are conceived as intentional. That is, we have our universe of thought objects, and we also have knowledge of the other’s universe of thought objects, and these two universes do not occupy the same intentional space. This is how the atheist can think about Anselm’s thought object as necessarily existing without committing to its existence.

Thus I would depart from Klima when he claims that for the atheist Anselm’s thought lacks a certain property or description, and prefer instead to say that it contains the same property or description under a different intentional mode. If it did not contain the property of necessarily existing under this secondary intentional mode, then the atheist would be unable to see why the theist sees Anselm’s thought as necessarily existing (and in fact in some ways he does see why and in some ways he does not). Note that in most cases the difference of opinion is self-consciously accounted for by a disagreement on some premise, but in this case it isn’t quite that simple (because a “meaning-postulate” is not inherently contentious or truth-apt). (Cf. )

I really liked the quote from Gaunilo, which is highly reminiscent of Newman’s Grammar of Assent. And there is plenty to be said on the final paragraphs about concept-acquisition. But I will leave it there for now.

It is worth noting how the medievals think in terms of argument, intention, and one’s interlocutor, and how this extends even to notions of reference. It is in this way that Aquinas asks whether one can reject Anselm’s argument while avoiding inconsistency, rather than imposing a paradigm of logic or thought onto the proof itself (except insofar as Aquinas and Klima permit the atheist a mode of reference that Anselm does not grant, but there is nothing particularly idiosyncratic or system-based about this move).

Part 5. Conclusion: Parasitic Reference, Natural Theology and Mutual Understanding

(Expedited for the impatient.)

In this final section Klima reads his notion of parasitic reference, which he sketched in section 4, into Aquinas and Gaunilo’s responses to Anselm’s proof. He begins by saying that parasitic reference is especially important in cases of basic beliefs, including religion (and non-religion) of all kinds. He then brings in Aquinas along with the idea of one’s “universe of thought objects.” After that he brings in Gaunilo and the “conceptual buildup” that is required for real dialogue and the possibility of changing one’s mind through that dialogue.

(It is a bit of a wonder that Klima does not reference Newman’s real vs. notional assent in this section.)

The first few sentences of section 5:

Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon. The most sensitive cases are, of course, those that involve people’s most basic beliefs, such as religious belief. Accordingly, parasitic reference is a phenomenon to be seriously reckoned with not only in dialogues between theists and atheists, but also between people of different religious faith. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 5

The existence between a real thing and a mere object of thought can be had by thinking of having an ice cream sundae, or a sail boat, or a Porsche, or anything else you might consider pretty great, and contrasting its mere mental existence with what it would mean to really have it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, it's pretty basic. A real Porsche is greater than the idea of a Porsche. I haven't seen anyone present an argument against this.

In some cases, someone uses the wrong name and their intended reference is still communicated clear as day. That's how these examples usually work, by setting up scenarios where both the intended reference and what is referenced according to convention (and the difference between the two) are readily apparent to any competent speaker of the language. In which case, if both intentions and conventional meaning are clearly communicated, why try to claim only one is signified? Why not both? Language is redundant and people do things like point because its a clear sign of intentions that will overcome errors in convention. It's a false dichotomy to suppose that words either signify a speaker's intent or they signify according to convention, but never both, so "simply" is the key word in your last sentence. But no one outside of a joke character in a children's book has ever proposed that words "simply" mean what is intended by them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, you give great clarity to this. :up:

To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I was thinking the exact same thing when I was looking at section 5. Let me open that up so that everything is on the table and then come back to this...

- That's fair. You've definitely shed a great deal of light on the book, as have @Wayfarer's synopses. It has helped to orient me to what it is all about. :up:

Roark has his own critique. I would have to look at it more, but on first glance his main counter seems too strong. He argues that the atheist should be happy to allow that they are only engaged in parasitic reference because the theist's definition requires a framing that at least allows for the possibility of liar's type paradoxes. However, showing the mere possibility of paradox is far weaker than demonstrating a paradox. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Roark's paper is quite good. When I saw that it was hosted on Klima's page, I checked and found a response from Klima (both of which are now linked in the OP). Especially helpful is the way in which Roark gives additional explication of Klima's basic ideas (in sections 1 and 4 of Klima's paper).

He is good at putting his finger on things. The "ambiguity" he tries to untangle is something that I had also noticed, and in particular, for me it manifested in the way that the word "can" functions in Klima's rendering of Anselm's thought concept. His pointing up of the Modest "genie" is also perceptive, along with the "conceptual closure" that accompanies it. And Klima is quite familiar with the Liar's Paradox, even through the medieval Buridan (see for example his chapter, "Logic without Truth: Buridan on the Liar"). ...There are pretty strong themes of univocity vs analogy running though the exchange, particularly when we get into questions about the relation between the object language and the metalanguage. This is especially interesting given that Klima's expertise is Buridan and the late medieval period, which was quite comfortable with univocity.

In fact the question I posed to you about how one is to untangle God's existence from an acknowledgment of God's existence gets straight into the follow-up exchange between Klima and Roark, which makes sense since it was Roark who gave you the idea to phrase it that way.

For now I am just going to quote something simple from Roark that may help shed light on section 4, and which is also related to the question I posed to you:

And so we are now situated to appreciate the dialectical weight of the proper conclusion of Klima’s argument, as it was specified in Section 3. The consistent atheist should be quite comfortable admitting that one cannot think of God as a mere thought object (i.e. as existing only in the intellect) when one conceives of God under Anselm’s description. In fact, we ought to regard Klima’s argument (properly understood) as a way of making this point explicit insofar as it derives in a formal way from the Anselmian concept of God the impossibility of thinking that He does not exist in reality. So when the atheist denies that God exists, he is not saying of the thing than which nothing can be thought greater, that it (conceived as such) does not exist; rather, he is saying of the thing that the theist (mistakenly, by his lights) thinks of as that than which nothing greater can be thought, that it does not exist. He does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. After all, he is an atheist, and to think of anything as that than which nothing greater can be thought requires thinking of it as an existing thing. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9

It's simple. You appear to think that omnipotence is the greater. That in order to be the than which & etc., the than which & etc must be omnipotent. But I conceive of a being that has no need of omnipotence, and that being the greater. — tim wood

Then premise (1) does not involve omnipotence for you. So what? As I said:

(This subject is interesting because a lot of new forms of theism reject omnipotence. But does that mean they would find Anselm's first premise incompatible with their God?) — Leontiskos

-

As to the good or morality, your being must be absolutely good and moral, yes? — tim wood

I addressed this in my . If you want to talk about Anselm's argument, then you have to address that. If you don't want to talk about Anselm's argument and you just want to argue against God, then there is probably a thread for that. (No, of course I don't think that being powerful and being moral are incompatible, and so when I think of Anselm's concept I don't have to choose between the two. I want to know if you and @kazan really think you have to choose between the two.)

Some questions regarding section 4:

1. Is parasitic reference coherent?
2. Does parasitic reference adequately account for the atheist’s position?
3. Does this mean that Anselm’s proof can be sound for the theist while being unsound for the atheist?


I think parasitic reference is coherent in general, but I am not yet convinced that it adequately accounts for the atheist’s position. Consider:

But then, the same thought object may be intended also by another mind, which may not endow the same thought object with the same properties, i.e. it may conceive of the same thought object, but not as having the same properties.

…

The atheist, however, can then think of the same thought object, but not think that the description applies to it, whence he is not forced to conclude to whatever valid implications the description may have concerning that thought object. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4

What is unclear is how the thought object is related to its properties. That is, if the atheist is thinking of a thought object with different (intentional) properties, then why should we think he is thinking of the same thought object?

Anselm himself brings this up, and Klima echoed Anselm’s concern:

Anselm claims that when the Fool said in his heart: “There is no God”, he could do so only because he did not know correctly what he was speaking about […], as he simply did not understand the word “God” properly. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Anselm is giving a dilemma: Either you are thinking of something other than God or you are thinking of God (as I have defined ‘God’). If you are thinking of something other than God, then you can deny its existence but you have not denied God’s existence. If you are thinking of God, then you cannot deny his existence on account of my proof.

Klima’s parasitic reference attempts to split the horns of the dilemma. Klima thinks the atheist can think about the same thought object and yet, “not endow the same thought object with the same properties,” or, “not think that the description applies to it.” Isn’t Anselm just going to say that if he is thinking about an object that can be thought not to exist, he is not thinking of the same thought object?

Along similar lines we have a form of ampliation entering in here. The atheist takes the thought object and understands that existence attaches necessarily to this thought object, but he nevertheless brackets or prescinds from this existence-description.

Another question: what is it that explains the difference between parasitic and constitutive reference insofar as these two forms of reference differ with respect to whether one is committed to perceived implications of the thought?
(This is presumably where Roark wants to talk about "conceptual closure," which Klima also speaks to in his reply to Roark (both of which have now been linked in the OP.))

Part 4. Intentional Identity and Parasitic vs. Constitutive Reference

In this section Klima appeals to his intentional theory of reference in order to provide the atheist with a way to think about the same thought object that Anselm’s theist is thinking about, while simultaneously rejecting the idea that the theist’s description applies to that thought object.

He begins by situating the theory in the context of Russell and Kripke; he then draws our attention to one of Kripke’s examples, then fiction, and then guessing games. After that he claims that the theory “sidesteps the problem of trying to find criteria of intentional identity in terms of the properties thought objects have.” He goes on to compare this “parasitic reference” to “constitutive reference.” He then finishes by bringing this theory to bear on the question of the atheist who rejects Anselm’s argument.

Here are the first few sentences:

At this point, however, we have to notice that precisely the theory of reference outlined earlier as being implicit in Anselm’s argument offers the atheist a way out of his predicament. According to this theory, we should recall, what determines reference is primarily the intention of the speaker, whence it may be called the intentional theory of reference. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 4

- So are you saying that if someone wanted to be great, they would have to choose between being powerful and being moral, because to be powerful is to lack moral constraint and to be moral is to lack power? Put differently, "The greatest thing is powerful and the greatest thing is moral, but something cannot be both powerful and moral, therefore the greatest thing does not exist." Is that about right?

(I think this gets at @tim wood's point as well.)

He could clearly articulate the two different sentiments behind both systems of values. However, to become political platforms, both must manifest within the same global digital medium, adhering to its structural fields, temporalities, and rules of engagement. — Number2018

Well, one could argue the point of whether those specific conceptions actually do manifest concretely in political platforms. In the U.S. the two-party system makes it easier to map, but one could conceivably argue that the Republican Party is not conservative and the Democratic Party is not progressive (in Reno's senses). But I think there is something right about applying that conservative/progressive lens to the political sphere, given the way that permanence and change are fundamental aspects of life.

The dictates of this medium inevitably transform any system of values into a populist mode of expression. — Number2018

But why? If for Laclau (as also for Reno) populism is a revolutionary desire for change from the status quo, then why must any system of values be transformed into a populist mode of expression?

and Trump’s second administration can serve as an experimental setting for this. So far, MAGA seems to function as a façade for the vast concentration of executive power, which is where it reveals its affinity with the enactment of a 'liberalism of open, liquid society.' — Number2018

Well first, can a empty signifier function as a façade? And if not, then it seems that MAGA must be more than an empty signifier. But perhaps you are not claiming that it is MAGA per se that is the empty signifier?

Second, for the sake of argument let's say that MAGA is all about concentrating executive power. Still, what does that concentration have in common with "the enactment of a 'liberalism of open, liquid society'"? Trump seems to be using the power of the executive to do just the opposite, and all concentrations of power seem to have a conservative bent (in the sense that they want to maintain that power - they want permanence qua power).

In regard to Rödl militating against the mind/not mind opposition, perhaps a closer example of concordance with Wittgenstein is in the Blue Book where solipsism is said not to be an opinion. — Paine

Hmm, okay. So Rodl is just telling us "what anyone always already knows." He need not jockey among "possible contenders of a true condition." He is above that, no? He wants to eclipse that whole debate.

It is a relevant brief account of recent U.S. history. I would just add that what you refer to as ‘oligarchy’ is likely an extremely complex agglomeration of political, bureaucratic, and corporate groups and forces. We do not know its exact structure and mechanisms, but it seems reasonable to assume that the ‘oligarchy’ progressively augmented its power and its detachment from the ‘demos.’ — Number2018

Yes, that is definitely true.

Your understanding of Laclau’s theory is quite similar to mine. He provides an elaborate conceptual framework for understanding the rare and precarious events of democratic eruptions.It is a valuable contribution to the discussion of our political realities, avoiding partisan clichés, stereotypes of mundane language, and biased media coverage. Another challenge is the incredible speed with which the political landscape shifts and the rapid alteration of related narratives. Who remembers Brexit or the COVID pandemic today? It is also quite frustrating to observe the reflections and commentaries of most of pundits and academics. Many of them seriously argued that Trump’s election marked the revival of Nazism in the U.S. or he constituted a genuine threat to democracy. — Number2018

Agreed. Good points.

So, I believe that Laclau does not sufficiently elaborate on the affective component of the populist process of 'constructing internal frontiers and identifying institutionalized 'others.' His book was published 20 years ago, and he could not have predicted the ubiquitous spread of the 'woke' attitudes and the overflow of various aspects of populist phenomena. — Number2018

Right, and this is reminiscent of Girard's work on the scapegoating mechanism.

I don't know quite what to make of the 'woke' phenomenon, nor am I certain how it relates to populism. If Reno is right, then an age when the bourgeoisie sees themselves as being progressive (change-oriented) and in solidarity with the demos/poor is an age of decadent progressivism, which is an inflection point when the tide begins to turn. It may be that the high-flown ideology that populism is now resisting goes hand in hand with the 'woke' phenomenon.

Surely a perfect God, or at least one "than which &etc, would not have unnecessary or superfluous powers, so omnipotence directly implies something to be omnipotent about - something, a task, that needs doing for something to be perfected. And only God can do it, and thus thereby Himself obliged. — tim wood

"God is omnipotent, therefore he is obliged to do stuff (and anyone obliged to do stuff isn't as great as someone who is not obliged to do stuff)."

I don't follow this reasoning at all. Is there an argument behind it?

- Thanks Kazan. Good to know that there are others paying attention. :up:

- It is not a "kindness" to hijack the thread and skip to section 4, but refrain from skipping to section 5.

Part of this thread is experimental: are we allowed to have focused reading groups that move at a consistent and controlled pace? Will moderators honor an OP that wishes to do this? If not, then obviously a thread like this is not worthwhile to conduct, and this sort of endeavor is not possible on TPF.

- Not even 36 hours have elapsed since we began section 3. I have reiterated my desire to move slowly, in large part so that those who do not have as much time still have an opportunity to participate. Not everyone has time to write dozens of posts a day, as you do. I don't see why it is so burdensome to average two days per section. It's great you're enjoying the thread so much, but to be so impatient as to ignore the OP while constantly writing posts that don't engage with other users at all is a bit strange. I suppose if you don't care about engaging with others then there is no need to move slowly and encourage participation. But in that case what you need is a diary, not a discussion forum. Or Twitter, where you just spam out content and no one reads anything. I figured the Reading Groups section was for reading things as a group.

(And the fact that you haven't even been been reading carefully is rather ironic here. For example, that you did not even understand that the proof was a reductio until it was explicitly pointed out to you. That's what happens in a fast-paced thread: you "read" a proof, argue about it for 26 days, and then on day 27 you figure out that it was a reductio and the entire analysis was hopelessly confused.)

- I'm glad you found the lecture interesting. I don't think the lecture had much to say about Trump. If I recall, the only reference to Trump was a reference to Trump's wall as a conservative symbol, although there is likely an implication that Trump's re-election was driven by the sort of conservatism Reno defined.

I liked his points about conservatism and progressivism being relative and non-ideological (and populism being neither inherently left nor right). That is, conservatism values permanence and progressivism values change, and apart from that core the doctrines are all historically contingent. Thus a doctrine will not ultimately be a sign of conservatism or progressivism, unless that doctrine is viewed under the aspect of permanence or change. To take an example, slavery was a progressive issue during the Civil War, but now it is a conservative issue. We view anti-slavery laws as a permanent fixture that ought to be conserved.

So on to Part Four. — Banno

Are you trying to take over the thread entirely? No, we will open part four tomorrow. You can remove your post or I will appeal to the mods.

By who? Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass is a joke, like Molière's Imaginary Invalid. "Language is used for communicating intentions" does not entail "words mean whatever a speaker wants them to mean." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ding ding. :100:

I have some radical conclusions that I'm exploring, but I don't believe Quine is there as much as serves as an entryway into what I'm thinking. — Moliere

Okay, right. We are on the same page then. :up:

Thanks for posting this -- I was beginning to wonder if I'm entirely wrong and I believe that this is basically what I've been arguing for. — Moliere

This came up earlier, but you seemed to be arguing something rather different. For example:

What is Quine's intended conclusion? I don't think it is as radical as is being assumed. In a 1970 paper he says that the gavagai example is very limited, and demonstrates the inscrutability of terms rather than indeterminacy of translation of sentences. — Leontiskos

Quine may be saying little more than that terms are inscrutable apart from context ("holism"). — Leontiskos

The first is that theology has shown that the concept of god can be made consistent; — Banno

Well, no. He says that one could point to the tradition "showing." Obviously such arguments need to be shown to one who has never seen them. Klima does not think the atheist possesses arguments he has never encountered.

The third, the familiar insistence that all that is assumed is that one can conceive of god; ignoring premise 3. — Banno

I have no idea where you find that idea in the quote. He is saying that even if contradiction is granted for the sake of argument, this still does not undermine premise (1), and in that case we would have to move to premise (2) (because that is where a contradiction becomes uncontroversially problematic). As I said:

This occurred in ↪this post of mine and explicitly in its final paragraph. — Leontiskos

Klima offers the fool a rhetorical exit — Banno

He is summarizing the Anselm-Gaunilo exchange, and this is transparent in the paper.

There are those who think that what a word means is what the speaker intends it to mean, and nothing more. So if the fool intends "four sided shape" by "triangle", then that's an end to it, and communication simply fails. — Banno

Except that's not what Anselm or Klima say at all, so this looks to be another strawman from someone who has been desperate to cast aspersions from their very first post. :roll:

But of course there is such a justification, which can be seen in the ongoing conversations and interactions amongst us; — Banno

Which is exactly why Anselm uses an ongoing conversation to clear up the equivocal term, and why Klima summarizes the same move.

I'll not reply to this directly. — Banno

That's pretty much par for the course, as all you've managed in responses to criticisms is, "I won't repeat myself." Clarifying one's argument is dangerous, after all. Better not to say too much.

Perhaps not, but here the error is set before you. — Banno

No, it's not. The possibility of error is set before you. That was the whole point.

You are equivocating between things like error and possibility of error, or between a proof of a contradiction and a gesturing towards a contradiction. This bears on the "honesty" you just spoke of.

Roark has his own critique. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Roark is getting into complicated questions of whether Klima's quantificational formulation accurately represents Anselm's proof. This is somewhat important because in order to understand that formulation one must understand that Klima is attempting an accurate representation of Anselm's proof. On the other hand, assessing the interpretation can quickly become overly complicated. Sticking for the moment to section 3, Roark's critique has to do with the - exchange, namely with sub-inference (a):

(4) R(g)
____(a) M(g)(g)............................[2,3,4, UI, &I, MP]
____(b) (∃y)(M(y)(g))....................[a, EG]
(5) (∃y)(M(y)(ix.~(∃y)(M(y)(x))).....[1,b, SI]

Without closely reading Roark's lengthy assessment, my sense is that the logic here is attempting to indicate that the suppositional (2) is at the nub of the problems in (a), (b), and (5). Or rather, (a) and (b) are an extension of the problems with (5) (and (2)). It is possible that Roark draws the same conclusion but at the same time argues that this way of looking at it deviates from Anselm's original. In any case, he clearly thinks there is a coherent interpretation.

These sorts of wrinkles are why we want to also keep an eye on the natural language version.

(Note that Roark's page numbers refer to the book chapter version, linked in the OP.)

I want to draw some connections between section 3 and what has already occurred in this thread (note that I did not read section 3 beforehand, and was not manipulating the thread to achieve these overlaps). Taking section 3 in chronological order:

Choosing the first alternative would amount to claiming that God’s concept is contradictory. [...] In any case, in Anselm’s argument the concept of God to bevemployed is adequately specified by the first premise, and the atheist would probably be hard pressed to show that the description “that than which nothing greater can be thought of” is self-contradictory. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

See 's post for this notion of contradictory concepts; see my replies pointing out that no contradiction has been shown/proved (, ).

At this point, however, the atheist may shift the burden of proof by saying that even if this description does not seem to contain any prima facie contradiction, it may well be contradictory. By way of analogy, he may bring up the description: “the greatest prime number”, which, on the face of it, does not appear to be contradictory, so it seems to refer to the greatest prime number. But, as we know from Euclid, the assumption that there is a greatest prime number leads to contradiction, so the description cannot refer to anything. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

Banno has been engaged in this "shifting of the burden of proof" all along, and has directly parallel to the argument from the greatest prime. Perhaps the clearest attempt to shift the burden of proof was , "Accordingly it is not incumbent on the fool to show that one of the premisses must be false; but only that it might be false." Banno's posts have been entirely dependent on this notion of possibility, e.g. "Might be wrong," "May be wrong," "No guarantee."

, , and make similar arguments against the concept, having to do with omnipotence or unlimitedness.

Second, he can say that a contradiction, if derivable at all, could be derived from this description only with the help of other assumptions, just as in the case of the greatest prime. But, unlike the case of the greatest prime, these auxiliary assumptions probably need not be accepted as true. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

I made this move in contending that the greatest prime number (or real number) has no clear parity with Anselm's first premise, as I think the may/might's also indicate ( and elsewhere).

Finally, concerning Anselm’s argument one can also say that the premise attacked by the atheist does not even require that Anselm’s description should be free from such implied contradictions. For the premise requires only that one can think that God (under Anselm’s description) exists, which one can do even with the greatest prime, until one actually realizes the implied contradiction. So the burden of proof falls back upon the atheist, if he wishes to challenge this premise. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

This occurred in of mine and explicitly in its final paragraph.

---

So, since [the atheist] denies that the description applies to any thought object he can think of, he just does not have such a thought object in his mind, while he perfectly understands what is meant by this description. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 3

This is an interesting idea that stays very close to Anselm, and it also bears on Quine. Namely, if one is to say, "X does not exist as a concept," then what is being referred to by X? Is it possible to understand a description without having such a thought object in one's mind? This goes back to my .

This also highlights the way that Klima differentiates objections to premise (1) from objections to premise (2). The idea is that the atheist might say that even if (1) manages some kind of quasi-concept, that concept is never really or fully present in the intellect a la (2).

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2. There is a sleight of hand from ens rationis to ens reale, somewhat hidden here but brought out in Free Logic by the invalidity of a move from Ti to E!i. — Banno

If one reads the first section one sees that such objections have been preempted. See:

We actually saw this play out two days ago in the midst of a discussion on Mario Bunge, who admits of conceptual existence and who treats existence as a first-order predicate. A response was as follows:

[...]

That is, the assumption is that Bunge must be working with two mutually exclusive subclasses, at least "in effect." This is the sort of objection that Klima has in his sights. How does he address this objection?... — Leontiskos

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4. The argument relies on a substitution within an intensional context, at line (5), that is not justified. — Banno

This is an assertion, not an argument.

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If it be insisted that He is omnipotent, that implies that He can do anything, implying that there are things to be done, implying that of the things to be done, they are at present in an unperfected state needing to be perfected, implying God a kind of glorified maintenance man obliged to go about perfecting what needs to be perfected. Omnipotence, then, straight out implies an imperfect God and an imperfect creation, contradicting any notion of a perfect all-everything being. — tim wood

I think the error is, "He is omnipotent, which means he can do anything, which means there are things to be done, which means that he is obliged to do them." Those last two (bolded) interferences both look to be false, and particularly the last one.

- Great post. :up:
Hopefully Roark's response can serve as an additional sounding board as we move along.

Can one ever totally eliminate the possibility of error? Is "error is possible," without pointing out any clear error a good counter to other demonstrations? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right.

Right, and this perhaps touches on the theological concerns that came to the fore during the Reformation, that only doing what is best would somehow be a limit on divine sovereignty and power. I personally think this sort of concern doesn't hold water. Defining freedom in terms of potency leads to contradiction (e.g. the demonstrations at the opening of Hegel's Philosophy of Right) and so the notions that lead to a renewed salience for Euthyphro dilemmas in the early modern period seem to simply be flawed. This is relevant inasmuch as people claim that God is "unthinkable" due to these supposed "paradoxes." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and the claim is a little bit odd insofar as it involves the idea that "greatest" entails contradiction via two or more contradictory attributes. That is of course arguable, but it doesn't strike me as a promising approach.

This is related to your point about unlimitedness, at least in the case of bad forms of unlimitedness. For example, if to be unlimited is greater than to be limited, then Anselm's thought must be unlimited. But if certain forms of unlimitedness are not greater, then we arrive at a similar paradox.

We could also consider abductive arguments. There, we might have strong reasons to affirm the existence of something. It would be unreasonable to deny it. And yet this is also not a demonstration that it exists. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and I think we also want to draw a conceptual distinction between the natural language formulation and the quantification theory reductio formulation. A reductio is intrinsically less constraining than a simple demonstration.

Indeed, we might say that a demonstration that shows that God exists in the same manner as both our conceptions of God's existence and the real existence of all other things would be guilty of equivocation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, interesting point. The first response might simply say that an analogical notion of existence is available here. But in the second place, the proof itself will mandate the level of existence-univocity in play. So for example, if Anselm's reply to Gaunilo's island objection succeeds, then the form of existence at stake in Anselm's proof is sui generis (i.e. it applies only to the greatest thing, and not to e.g. the greatest island).

(But I am not going to delve too deeply into strictly theological objections such as this until we have finished the paper.)

Part 3. The Atheist, Who is Not a Fool — Leontiskos

As I read it, this section is meant to drum up the possibility of a dialogical impasse between the atheist (who opposes Anselm's proof) and the theist (who accepts Anselm's proof). Towards the beginning of the section Klima writes:

Anselm’s retort, that the Fool’s denial was possible in the first place only because he is truly a fool, thoughtlessly mumbling words he himself does not understand, leads us directly to the crux of the very possibility of a dialogue between the Saint and the Fool, or put in less biased terms, between the theist and the atheist. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

He then tries to develop "requirements of rationality" that could "avoid a complete breakdown of communication." Then at the end of the section he caps the tempest in the teapot so that it might retain its potency:

But even without these moral implications, it seems that the theist now may justifiably claim that, as a result of his denial, the atheist just rendered himself unable to think of a humanly otherwise thinkable thought object. By denying the existence of God the atheist will never be able to think of the same God as the theist, whose conception of God logically implies the existence of God, as Anselm’s proof shows. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

(I have noticed an underlying theme in some of Klima's work, namely an attempt to make commensurable what others view as incommensurable.)

The dialogical impasse is as follows, in the form of, "One man's modus ponens is another's modus tollens":

For the theist/proponent:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• Anselm's thought is humanly thinkable
• Therefore the atheist (who can think this thought) is unwilling to think it

For the atheist:

• If Anselm's thought is thought, then God exists
• God does not exist
• Therefore, Anselm's thought cannot be thought (because it is not humanly thinkable)

(We could also phrase this in a more subjective way as intimates, by making the first premise, "If Anselm's thought is thought, then God must be acknowledged to exist.")

In Klima's own words, the conclusion of the theist's modus ponens is this, "it seems that the theist now may justifiably claim that [...] the atheist just rendered himself unable to think of a humanly otherwise thinkable thought object."

Notice that if the atheist is unable to think Anselm's thought, then there is an infinite gulf of a sort. The theist and the atheist cannot help but talk past one another because they cannot think the same thought, and for Anselm this is the atheist's fault because the atheist is stubbornly refusing to think a humanly thinkable thought.*

I think this is the shape of section 3, but obviously I skimmed over the entire body of the section, which is where some of the more concrete wrestling between the theist and the atheist takes place. I want to look at that tomorrow since it so closely resembles some of the argument that occurred earlier in this thread.


* This charge from Anselm may seem outlandish, but I think it does happen quite commonly in everyday life. Namely, people will intentionally misunderstand so as to avoid an undesirable conclusion, and oddly enough this can even go on below the level of the conscious mind. So I don't think the charge is crazy. But in order for Anselm's charge to hold up at a philosophical level we would have to say that every atheist is intellectually dishonest in this manner, and that is much harder to sustain. We might then say that Anselm's charge is possible but implausible, considered as a categorical claim.

All of this is interesting in its own way, but it reminds me of the adage, "Hard cases make for bad law." If Rodl is to subtly critique the various conceptions of thought on the basis of not properly capturing self-consciousness, and if he is going to do his darndest to capture this notion of self-consciousness with perfect exactitude, will this hyper-focus on self-consciousness produce a reliable anchor for thought? Or is it a hard case that makes for bad law? Because it seems that the response of any of his interlocutors could simply be, "Our approach may not be able to handle the minutiae of self-consciousness, but it provides a much firmer foundation than an approach that is hyper-focused on, or hyper-accommodating to, the subtleties of self-consciousness." So perhaps Rodl thinks that his approach will improve on these other approaches even apart from questions of self-consciousness, or that properly understanding self-consciousness and fitting our theories to that understanding will be the key that unlocks the box containing what has previously remained hidden. And of course Rodl does not say, "I think I am Pandora," but would his interlocutors agree?

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Good, and let's remind ourselves what Rodl means by "validity": He's not saying that "I judge p to be true" means that it must be true. We can certainly be mistaken in our judgments. He means, "If it is true, then it is valid to so judge." — J

"p is valid, and by that I mean that if p is true then it is valid to judge it true." Or, "I judge p to be true, and by that I mean that if p is true then it is valid to judge it true."

It surely must be more than that. Presumably Rodl is saying that what some separate into a second-order act is already contained in the first-order act, and validity cannot be merely a non-committal conditional, "If it is true..." (because the second-order act was more than a non-committal conditional). Presumably validity involves the notion that it is in fact true, even if this is not infallible.

I was listening to a lecture by Rusty Reno and he describes populism in a pithy way as follows:

Populism emerges when a significant sector of the population rejects the political leadership on offer. — The Conservative Mind with R.R. Reno: At the End of Liberalism - 57:38

I thought the lecture was quite good. It speaks to Trump populism indirectly:

Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. So, it shows that we should affirm the existence of God, on pain of being fools or misologes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's a fair and interesting way of reading it. :up: I need to think a bit more about section 3. I'm just trying to catch up on some replies.

However, this itself does not prove "that God exists." We could consider here Brouwer and other's objections to the use of proof by contradiction in existence proofs in mathematics. So, there is a possible distinction here. And perhaps, having taken the conclusion in this way, we could dismiss some of the criticisms re "proofs cannot demonstrate existence," (what about existence theorems?) or "existence simpliciter must somehow be assumed somewhere in the premises" (I think it's fairly obvious that it isn't in Anselm's formulations though). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, I am following what you are saying here. But the difficulty is that affirmation of existence separates from existence, or something like that. Right? If the argument proves that we should affirm the existence of God without proving that God exists, then how does that work? Or do we want to take a half-step back and say that it proves that the atheist cannot deny God without proving that we should affirm the existence of God? (But that seems to fall away from Anselm.) So how would we address these difficulties?

"existence simpliciter must somehow be assumed somewhere in the premises" — Count Timothy von Icarus

I said this earlier:

The wonder of Anselm's proof is that it does something that we think it should not be able to do, and it is very hard to say why it is wrong, or at least to say why rigorously. At this point the argument looks to be sound. It is valid and there are no premises that are clearly or demonstrably false. — Leontiskos

So I don't see that objection as necessarily weak, but it is not a "close argument." If the strongest arguments attack a premise or an inference, then this sort of argument does not meet that criterion, and is a form of begging the question. So I guess it is weaker than an argument which actually addresses the proof itself, but it isn't irrational. I definitely think this form of begging the question will need to be considered at some point, perhaps as we move away from more precise critiques.

(I should note here that all of @Banno's attempts have been of this "weaker," question-begging variety. His claims that he has addressed or disproved premises are simply false. He himself knows that the conclusion he seeks to prove is that (1) involves a contradiction, and he also knows equally well that he has not produced that proof. In my opinion Gaunilo's island objection comes much closer to doing this than Banno's arguments have.)

I'm going to have another look at section 3 and the Proslogion.

Omnipotence is the greatest power. It doesn't follow it is the greatest good or knowledge. God is traditionally conceived as being the greatest everything, so all other things being equal and omnipotent God would be greater than a God whose powers were limited. — Janus

Well this is related to what said about the notion of unlimited (although it is more precisely about power than general unlimitedness). Do we think that a being which is omnipotent is greater than a being that is not? Because maybe someone would say, "If it is an evil being then the omnipotence would make it lesser, not greater." And of course no one thinks it is greater to be evil than to be good, so presumably it would not be an evil being, but the idea brings out your difference between moral (?) goodness and and a form of greatness which prescinds from the moral.

But I tend to think that (1) produces the thought of an omnipotent being, and presumably we are agreed on that?

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Just like Zeus, eh? Btw, do you stop to think about what omnipotent means and implies? Is omnipotence the greater thing? — tim wood

Do you think it isn't? Do you think premise (1) does not bring with it omnipotence?

(This subject is interesting because a lot of new forms of theism reject omnipotence. But does that mean they would find Anselm's first premise incompatible with their God?)

On the argument, there seems to be a few issues. The first is "greater than." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't find this controversial when applied to existence. See my reply to Wayfarer:

To contradict this is to say that a thought object is not thought to be greater in virtue of its being thought to exist. Or simplified: fiction is as good as the real thing - a fiction that is in fact realized is no greater than an unrealized fiction (where both are thought objects). — Leontiskos

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But we might suppose that such a concept is hard to fully take in. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is the concept of (1) "unlimited"? Not per se. And are you pointing to instances of "unlimited" that would not be considered great or even good? Because if so, then that kind of unlimited would not filter through the ampliated (1). If someone is thinking of a form of unlimitedness that they don't take to be great, then they aren't really engaging (1). Or at least it seems so to me.

that the argument could suffer from a premise that is not as well known as its conclusion — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is an interesting objection, and one which Klima does not canvass. But if you are depending on the notion of infinity/unlimitedness then I'm again not sure it necessarily filters through (1). Nevertheless, separated from that dependence the objection could still have merit.

This is relevant in that infinite, unlimited being is often called upon to ground metaphysics. The claim that this is "unintelligible" while putting forth "it just is, for no reason at all" as the root explanation for everything is more than a little ironic, particularly when the ad hoc appeal to brute fact is paired with eliminativism or deflationism re causes, such that everything "just is" and explanation seems to be little more than a hallucination resulting from inexplicable constant conjunction in the first place (isn't this just epistemic nihilism with extra steps?) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure. A lot of people are bringing up more general arguments for or against God, and if "unlimited" detaches from the first premise then this would be an instance of that. I am trying to stick close to the paper at least until we've finished the final section. But maybe "unlimited" does derive from the first premise and I'm just not seeing it. For me (1) does bring with it the, "si enim comprehendis, non est Deus" (which is why Banno's "objection" that there might be something greater than what is thought is so poorly aimed). And there is a component of unlimitedness in that, albeit of a particular variety.

Part 3. The Atheist, Who is Not a Fool

I want to open up the third section for anyone who wants to move on. Those who want to keep looking at earlier sections are of course welcome to do so.

In this section Klima takes a step back from Anselm's proof and catalogues some of the different ways that the theist and the atheist might argue for or against Anselm's proof (indeed we have seen in this thread some of the very approaches he outlines). Following Anselm, he tries to zero in on "those basic requirements of rationality that the Fool seems to fail to meet." My impression is that this section of the paper is an intermediate link that doesn't do a great deal of work in itself. It seems to be setting up the problematic that section 4 will address. Further, it is perhaps easing us into a meta-analysis in which the tools provided by section 1 can be brought to bear.

Note that when Klima speaks of "the next argument," he is referring to chapters 3 and 4 of Anselm's Proslogion, which follow upon the argument that Klima formulated in section 2 of the paper. Anselm is there using the conclusion of the proof as a premise in a second argument which reinforces the conclusion that God indeed exists. It seems that this second argument doesn't add much to the first, and more than anything is meant to clarify the outcome.

Again quoting the first words of the section:

It seems, therefore, that all that Anselm’s proof requires is that modicum of rationality which is needed to understand a simple descriptive phrase, to reflect on what the description implies, and to conclude to these implications concerning the thought object one has in mind as a result of understanding the description. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 3

Note: This thread has attracted some fervent atheists who are strongly predisposed to opposing Anselm’s proof. These atheists should be forewarned that when Klima uses words like “Saint” and “Fool” in this chapter, he is trying to stay close to Anselm’s language in the Proslogion. At this point in the paper he is still engaged a close commentary on the historical proof itself.

- Pulling in quotes from a different thread in order to make it appear as if something was said here? To make it look like the "this thread" from Janus' post in a different thread is a reference to this thread we are in? You're a straight up liar, aren't you Banno? You're literally willing to go around lying through your teeth to make yourself look good. That's pretty psychotic, man. :down:

(a) M(g,g) God can be thought to be greater than god. This is a valid deduction - it follows from the premises. There is the obvious problem of god being thought to be greater than himself. If you are happy with that, then all is fine, but if this strikes you as a bit rich, then this might well be treated as a reductio, showing that at least one of the premises is on the nose. — Banno

You are going to embarrass yourself again by going so fast and not taking enough care. (a) is the root of the reductio itself, for (b) contradicts (1), and yet (5) is what in fact maps to Anselm's argument, not (b). Klima explicitly tells us that, "(the intermediate steps (a) and (b) are inserted here only to facilitate recognizing how an actual derivation might proceed)." What he is doing is presenting the same argument twice, once in natural language and once in standard quantification theory. (a) and (b) are meant to help explicate the space between (4) and (5) in the quantification theory rendering.

Or more simply: you imply that Klima wants to reject (2) and keep (a). That is entirely wrong. In fact he wants to reject (2) because of (a).

I will have to respond to the rest later.

I'm pretty sure you know enough logic to know that truth and validity are not the same thing. — tim wood

The wonder of Anselm's proof is that it does something that we think it should not be able to do, and it is very hard to say why it is wrong, or at least to say why rigorously. At this point the argument looks to be sound. It is valid and there are no premises that are clearly or demonstrably false.

At this point in the thread I want to limit myself to what I call "close arguments," (or close objections), namely objections which stay close to the proof itself. These are basically arguments that attack a premise or an inference, or that try to stay very close to the interlocutor's paradigm. I don't find any of the close arguments convincing. So far, Banno's "close objection" is the one that stands out in the thread, but at the end of the day it looks to me like he is doing little more than gesturing towards the idea that the definition itself might be contradictory.

(I see that just now managed to read the argument more carefully, thus for the first time recognizing that it is a reductio.)

I'm sure that later on there will be opportunity to talk about objections that do not stay close to the proof, such as Aquinas', Kant's, or Frege's.

- Haha :grin:

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- I like Janus' answer. I know you think the early Christians did not believe that God exists, but luckily we don't have to discuss that theory in this thread.

You can just assume basic, colloquial dictionary definitions for any words we are using.

Thus this God can have, on this construction, no fixed aspect at all, and since everything that exists in reality has some fixed aspect, it must be that God does not exist in reality. — tim wood

Well this looks like an argument against God, and I'm struggling to see how it derives from "this construction" (namely Klima/Anselm's definition of God). In any case, most theists would agree that God does not have fixed aspects. To use your descriptors, he is not tall, short, big, or small. So that seems fine.

Further, it is adduced without proof that objects in reality are greater than objects of thought. Yet lots of things are clearly greater as objects of thought than as instantiated in reality. E.g., two, justice, love, The American Way, and even God himself. — tim wood

Okay, so here you are disputing premise (3). Let's take one of your examples: justice. Suppose I have a thought of <justice in Massachusetts>. This thought is in my intellect but it is not in reality. But now suppose that the thought of <justice in Massachusetts> is both in my intellect and in reality (i.e. there is truly justice in Massachusetts). Is not this second thought greater than the first?

(A little different from the paper since we are flubbing "can be thought to exist," but that's probably fine for our purposes.)

And finally, as a being conceived - in any way whatever - He must be conceived by a conceiver. And who might that be? It cannot be God. Me? You? Banno? We will all have different conceptions; does that mean different Gods? — tim wood

Yes, this is an interesting objection, although it does not critique any particular premise of Klima's argument.

I guess I don't see why the definition in (1) must be exhaustive, as if our conception exhausts that than which nothing greater can be thought (indeed, were it exhausted it presumably could not be what it purports to be). Nevertheless, there could be conceptions which are not only different but also contradictory. Presumably the theist would here reply that the conception is not infallible. For example, if my argument about justice succeeds then an existing thought object is greater than a non-existing thought object. But other predicates may not be so easy.

The other question is this: how much would we disagree on what is greater? If contradiction and not mere difference is required, then there must be substantial disagreement on what is greater in order for the premise of the objection to succeed.