- Haha :grin:

-

- I like Janus' answer. I know you think the early Christians did not believe that God exists, but luckily we don't have to discuss that theory in this thread.

You can just assume basic, colloquial dictionary definitions for any words we are using.

Thus this God can have, on this construction, no fixed aspect at all, and since everything that exists in reality has some fixed aspect, it must be that God does not exist in reality. — tim wood

Well this looks like an argument against God, and I'm struggling to see how it derives from "this construction" (namely Klima/Anselm's definition of God). In any case, most theists would agree that God does not have fixed aspects. To use your descriptors, he is not tall, short, big, or small. So that seems fine.

Further, it is adduced without proof that objects in reality are greater than objects of thought. Yet lots of things are clearly greater as objects of thought than as instantiated in reality. E.g., two, justice, love, The American Way, and even God himself. — tim wood

Okay, so here you are disputing premise (3). Let's take one of your examples: justice. Suppose I have a thought of <justice in Massachusetts>. This thought is in my intellect but it is not in reality. But now suppose that the thought of <justice in Massachusetts> is both in my intellect and in reality (i.e. there is truly justice in Massachusetts). Is not this second thought greater than the first?

(A little different from the paper since we are flubbing "can be thought to exist," but that's probably fine for our purposes.)

And finally, as a being conceived - in any way whatever - He must be conceived by a conceiver. And who might that be? It cannot be God. Me? You? Banno? We will all have different conceptions; does that mean different Gods? — tim wood

Yes, this is an interesting objection, although it does not critique any particular premise of Klima's argument.

I guess I don't see why the definition in (1) must be exhaustive, as if our conception exhausts that than which nothing greater can be thought (indeed, were it exhausted it presumably could not be what it purports to be). Nevertheless, there could be conceptions which are not only different but also contradictory. Presumably the theist would here reply that the conception is not infallible. For example, if my argument about justice succeeds then an existing thought object is greater than a non-existing thought object. But other predicates may not be so easy.

The other question is this: how much would we disagree on what is greater? If contradiction and not mere difference is required, then there must be substantial disagreement on what is greater in order for the premise of the objection to succeed.

I see your point; but I am thinking that wouldn’t the ‘being alive’ be a result of those parts interacting with each other properly? Viz., if you give a dead person an organ transplant and get their neurons to start firing again and what not then wouldn’t they be alive? A part of the physical constitution of a thing is the process which is has (e.g., you can have an engine with all the parts in the right place and yet it isn’t burning fuel [i.e., on], but if you know how to start it up then it starts working properly). — Bob Ross

Well, suppose life is just the result of an accidental collection, such that when the parts are in place there is life. So as an analogy, if my jigsaw puzzle is complete, then there is life. If I take away one piece or another, then there is not life. On this view life is somehow structural.

For Aristotle you need more than just parts. You need a whole. And maybe "parts interacting with each other properly" is enough to represent that whole.

Your engine counterargument is interesting, though. Certainly Aristotle would say that the car is an artificial whole, not a real or organic whole. What this means in part is that the parts are not just interacting with one another. They are interacting with a whole of which they are a part. This is why we say, "I see with my eyes. I walk with my legs. I punch with my fist. I think with my brain." The parts are relating to some whole that is employing them and on which they rely.

Here is Ed Feser discussing change: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sl3uoCi9VjI starting at 25:15. — Bob Ross

:up:

So it is something like the actualization involved in the normal force that upholds a desk on the floor, which is more than what we think of as change or motion. Gotcha, that makes sense.

Yes, but by ‘motion’ the medieval’s and pre-medieval’s meant any actualization of a potential and not locomotion. If you think about it, this would make sense; since for Aristotle (and Ed Feser) God keeps us in existing right now: they are not arguing merely for a being which started the locomotion at the beginning of the universe (or something like that). That would require this idea of a “hierarchical series” which is a per se series of composition which is analyzed in terms of what causes each thing to remain the same (e.g., Ed Feser likes to use the example of H20: the atoms that make up that molecule don’t themselves have any reason to be H2O—something else actualizes that and keeps it that way [and its the keeping it that way that seems to break the law of inertia]). — Bob Ross

Okay, I have a better sense of what you are saying now.

- Thanks Paine. Another very lucid and helpful post. :up:

Thus the soundness of the concept of a c-proposition depends on there being this structure to the thought of someone who uses a sentence to make an assertion: thinking it correct to use the sentence in the way that she does, she thinks that a c-proposition is true at the context in which she uses it. — ibid. page 30

Some overlap here:

Accordingly, linguistic expressions refer to what their users intend by them to refer to in a given context, that is, what they think of while using the expression either properly, or improperly.8 So referring was held to be a context-dependent property of terms: according to this view, the same expression in different propositional contexts may refer to different things, or refer to something in one context, while refer to nothing in another. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof

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The question becomes, on what basis does that "structure of thought" involve verification from what is presumed to exist outside of it. At that point, I do not see it as a matter of how "Pat" or "Quenton" choose what is happening. — Paine

Yes, I think I am just barely understanding what you are saying here. Is it something like the idea that c-propositions, if true, demonstrate that there is significant bleed between force and content? Or does the new distinction's newness simply conceptualize the territory differently without in any way reordering that which force/content takes for granted? Is there any continuity between the force/content distinction and the new distinction?

A general point to note: within the premodern metaphysical vision, particularly in Neoplatonism and Christian theology, being was understood as a form of plenitude—what the ancients called the Pleroma, the 'fullness of being'. From this perspective, being is not a neutral or arbitrary descriptor, but an expression of fullness, goodness, and actuality, compared to which non-existence or non-being is a privation or deficiency. — Wayfarer

Yes, and this bears on premise (3):

(3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellect — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2

To contradict this is to say that a thought object is not thought to be greater in virtue of its being thought to exist. Or simplified: fiction is as good as the real thing - a fiction that is in fact realized is no greater than an unrealized fiction (where both are thought objects).

Also worth noting that for the medievals, arguments for God’s existence were devotional as much as polemical — Wayfarer

This is true. But I would add that they are philosophical as much as they are devotional or polemical. Moreso, I would say. That is, Anselm is trying to engage in rigorous thinking, and this comes out when one reads him.

The ontological argument, in this context, is not merely a logical proof but an intellectual prayer — Wayfarer

Yes, it is a way in which one approaches God, and in that sense there is a measure of reverence involved. Anselm does not take it to be inconsequential or unimportant, as mere "logic chopping" might be.

So I'll set aside Leon's endless requests to repeat myself and take the criticism of (1) as read. — Banno

And moving on is fine, but I want to highlight that this objection of yours is precisely the sort of Quinian question-begging that Klima wanted to offer an alternative to in the first section of his paper:

He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing. — Banno

("If there is no guarantee of existence, then conceptualization is not possible.")

But if the thought of god is not coherent, then (2) collapses. — Banno

This is a repetition of your objection to (1).

(3). ∀x∀y(I(x)∧R(y)→M(y,x))
This says that for any x and any y, where x is in the intellect but y is real, y can be thought greater than x. This requires some attention, because it is mainly here that the presumption that god exists slips in. It's sitting there in plain sight, in that we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing, and here the presumption that that greatest thing is real. — Banno

If one wants to object to (3), they need to provide an objection to (3). They can't say, "If we allow this, then God exists. But I am an atheist so we can't allow it." That's begging the question.

Beyond that, remember Klima's point in section 1 where Gaunilo mistakenly takes Anselm to be saying that "we have it that from (1) that there is a greatest thing."

Even if we admit (1), why shouldn't we just suppose that the greatest thing can be conceived of, but not be real? Why could it not be the case that the greatest thing can be imagined, and yet might not exist? — Banno

That is precisely what the argument does. (2) supposes that the greatest thing can be conceived of but is not real.

But before starting, am I to understand you have no problems with it? — tim wood

Klima claims that the proof is valid, and it looks to me that he is correct.

Then this thought object cannot be quantified in any way, for to be quantified entails that another, greater, can be thought. And this here is fatal. Need we go on? — tim wood

I see you saying, "This thought object can't be quantified, and that's fatal." I'm not sure I understand the objection.

What a prat. — Banno

:roll:

Your animosity towards me leads you to simply gainsay my every point. — Banno

You are here projecting your own difficulties. For example, when I asked you a question we both knew the answer to, you decided to lie instead of tell the truth. And when I asked you to remove the misrepresentative dollar signs etc. from your "quotation" of "Klima's proof," you simply refused to do so, even though you know that one should not insert random symbols into quotations of others (regardless of how they got there).

And that shit gets old, Banno. The desire to accurately quote one's interlocutors seems like a sine qua non for engagement on a philosophy forum.

But as it seems the thread was also about Anselm's proof, I opted in. — tim wood

Fair enough. Anselm's proof is definitely a big part of the paper. I tried to highlight that in the OP:

Its focal point is St. Anselm’s famous proof for God’s existence, although that proof is not what the paper is ultimately centered on. — Leontiskos

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God, it appears, is by Anselm reckoned as that than which & etc. And that seems a matter of definition and presupposition - thus not proved. — tim wood

As I said earlier, in section 2 Klima gives his formulation of Anselm's proof "in a natural language argument, and then in quantification theory" (). Banno has been focusing on the latter, but presumably a lot of people would rather talk about the former. Here it is:

By the meaning of the term,

(1) God is the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater

Now suppose that

(2) God is only in the intellect (i.e. God is thought of, but does not exist)

But certainly

(3) any thought object that can be thought to exist in reality can be thought to be greater than any thought object that is only in the intellect

And it cannot be doubted that

(4) God can be thought to exist in reality

Therefore,

(5) Some thought object can be thought to be greater than the thought object than which no thought object can be thought to be greater [1,2,3,4]

which is a contradiction, whence we have to abandon our supposition that God is only in the intellect, so he has to exist in reality, too. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 2

(A link to Anselm's original work was given <here>.)

So do you find any problems in Klima's natural language formulation of Anselm's proof?

That's an example of ampliation, where we use natural numbers to reach beyond themselves. — Banno

What is your idea here? Is it that ampliation has to do with "reaching beyond themselves," and so that if something is reaching beyond it is ampliating? I am not following why you think this is ampliation.

He defines god as the greatest thing that can be thought of, and there is no guarantee that there is any such thing. — Banno

Again, if we needed a guarantee that something actually exists before conceptualizing it, then every being of reason would be a being. Then we could in no way think about what does not exist.

g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) does not work becasue there might simply always be some y such that y is greater than x. — Banno

I think Klima and Anselm would say, "Yes, of course there might always be some y such that y is greater than x."
(That is, the thing-being-thought need not be greater than everything that in fact exists. This even seems like a theistic truism.)

But Leon, this is not a candidate for the greatest number. That's the point. It's the first (defined by "min") of a whole new sequence of numbers greater than any natural number.

Similarly, no sooner do you think of a being greater than any other, than you can think of a being greater than that individual. The series need have no end. — Banno

Okay, then I misunderstood what you were saying. But I still don't see that you have an argument against the concept. Read my last paragraph <here>, where I grant the idea of a proof against a greatest number (even though you haven't provided such a proof). That is: even if one has a bona fide proof that the concept does not exist in reality (i.e. is not a being), it does not therefore follow that the concept itself does not exist (i.e. that there is no being of reason/entia rationis).

The discussion of whether the concept "the greatest number" can be a real concept even without existing in reality is directly parallel to the points that Klima makes in the first section of the paper. This is not irrelevant.

And you misrepresent my saying that the parsing of his argument, the formatting, was ugly as my saying that the argument was ugly. — Banno

Not at all. You went out of your way to call Klima's argument ugly, which is eristic. And when I pointed out that you mis-quoted Klima and included all sorts of symbols that do not occur in his argument at all, you refused to correct your misrepresentation (a number of times). If you don't want to be here, that's your call. I would rather interact with people who accurately represent their interlocutor's arguments and correct blatant errors of misrepresentation when they are made aware of them. (For the umpteenth time, why the hell does your quote of Klima contain dollar signs, quotation marks, and the "registered trademark" symbol? No such symbols are present in his formulation of Anselm's proof.)

He is specifically advocating not becoming involved in the sort of discussion now occurring here, that the parties 'should not seek sheer “winning” in a debate'. — Banno

Rather, Klima thinks debating and argument is crucially important, particularly with respect to fine and concrete points. This is what we are doing right now.

Eristic is always a problem, but if you look at your early posts in this thread I think you will find no other posts exhibiting more eristic than those. One of them does nothing more than accuse Klima's argument of being "ugly."

Without taking some time to wrestle with Anselm's proof one has no sense of the problems and intricacies involved. We have a whole forum of threads full of 30,000 foot pontifications, typed out in a Twitter-esque flurry of keyboard strokes. Let's do something different in this thread. Besides, the "free for all" will come in due time. Is working through a paper really such an undue burden? Do we always have to take a position on a paper before we read it carefully?

(This thread is also meant to have a low barrier to entry, in the sense that right now anyone could read a handful of pages and jump into the thread. They don't have to read a book or know a whole tradition before contributing meaningfully. They don't even have to read an entire article. That low barrier to entry is crucially important if different traditions are going to engage each other rather than merely talk past one another.)

Concepts that contradict themselves. — Banno

But you know full well that you haven't demonstrated a contradiction:

good reason to think that it is not possible — Banno

Good reason != contradictory proof

Let’s look at ampliation in relation to Banno’s objection:

But that it was essentially the same conception of reference that was at work in his mind when he formulated his arguments in the Proslogion is clearly shown by his insistence against Gaunilo that his crucial description “that than which nothing greater can be thought of” is in no way to be equated with “greater than everything”. It is precisely the ampliative force, recognized as such by 12th-century logicians, that is missing from the latter, and is missed from it, though not described as such, by Saint Anselm in his response to Gaunilo’s objection. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

Let’s consider three different options with respect to the greatest number:

• First: "The greatest number"
• Second: "The greatest number one can think of"
• Third: "The number than which no number can be thought to be greater"

For the moment let’s stick with the first and second options.

So suppose @Banno and @Count Timothy von Icarus are on a game show where they are asked a question, and they both have to answer the question within two seconds. If they were asked a question about the first option, “What is the greatest number?,” there would be no answer.

But what if we take a particular instantiation of the second option? “What is the greatest number you can think of?” With two seconds to answer, @Banno says x and @Count Timothy von Icarus says y. In fact as long as x != y one of the two numbers will be greater than the other, and either @Banno or @Count Timothy von Icarus will have won the round.

Similarly, children (or adults too) might play the game, “What is the greatest number one can think of?” We can imagine the dialogue:

• One hundred
• One million!
• One billion
• One billion plus 1
• One billion times one billion
• 2 undecillion (the number of rubles that Russia fined Google)

Eventually someone might offer an analogy as an answer to the question: < x:∞ :: 0.999… : 1 >
(Whether or not we think this makes sense)

Similarly Banno offers the following, a worthy candidate:

ω:=min{x∣x is an ordinal and ∀n∈N,n<x} — Banno

Now in the game show and in each of the children’s answers, the concept, “The greatest number one can think of” is operative. That is precisely the concept they are using to formulate their answers. So the idea that there is no such concept looks to be mistaken.

The fact that “thought” is incorporated into option 2 in a way that it is not incorporated into option 1 is a form of ampliation. “Thought” is part of the option itself. To talk about option 1 instead of option 2 would be a form of equivocation which avoids the ampliation. Indeed, option 2 represents a concept which produces determinate answers when engaged, but which has no determinate answer of itself. Nevertheless, each of the determinate answers it produces when engaged does have a form of determination qua the thought of the engaging individual (namely it will represent something like a personal limit on number knowledge).

Now suppose someone believes that they have a proof (say, from mathematical induction) that there is no greatest number (or else greatest prime, which is more fun). In that case they will believe that option 1 represents a contradiction (via their proof), but the question of the status of the concept is still an open question (given the fact that not everyone possesses such a proof, valid or invalid).

Will someone be good enough to provide as an aid to navigation a simple proposition expressing exactly what they think Anselm proves? — tim wood

Anselm's proof is for the conclusion that God "has to exist also in reality."

And the same service for Gyula Klima's paper? — tim wood

In order to understand what a paper contains one must read it. That's what we are doing. We are reading the paper. We are on section 2 of 5. Once we finish the paper we will be positioned to answer the question of what the paper is about. You can't say what a paper is about before you have read (and understood) it.

So I would be happy to talk about your first question regarding Anselm's proof, but as to your second question, I do not think we are yet positioned to answer it. In fact the second question ignores the OP and seeks an understanding of the paper before we have even moved on to section 3. I think it is good for philosophers to take their time in this way - to not draw their conclusions until all of the arguments and sections have been examined. Until all of the pages of the book have been read. In any case, that's what I want to do in this thread.

And so far I am only looking at premise (1), no further. We can go on when this bit has been understood. — Banno

The problem with objecting to the two-place predicate M()() in premise (1) without looking at premise (3) is that premise (3) is the crucial place where that predicate is actually doing work (and it is therefore the locus for understanding the predicate). You are effectively objecting to a possible way that M()() might be used, and the response is, "The place where Klima uses it is premise (3), and if his usage in premise (3) does not contravene your stricture on a possible way that it cannot be used, then the objection to this possible misuse of M()() has nothing to do with Klima's formulation of Anselm's proof."

One of the points I made is that Klima does not make use of the "ampliation" in (1), and he ought. — Banno

That's a remarkable claim. Why don't you think he is making use of ampliation in (1)? And how ought he have made use of it?

Yep. Concepts that contradict themselves. Like "The largest number". — Banno

Why does "the largest number" contradict itself? It seems to me that ω produces an infinite loop, not a contradiction.

So you want me to flesh out your concept of god for you. — Banno

Your objection relies on the idea that some concepts cannot exist even as beings of reason (entia rationis). If you can't flesh out that idea then the objection goes nowhere, given that the whole thrust of section 1 is that for Anselm a being of reason need not be a being (simpliciter).

Gaunilo of Marmoutier took this approach by positing an "island greater than which none can be conceived," in order to try to show that Anselm's argument can be used to demonstrate the existence of all sorts of things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, and I actually think Klima's interpretation vindicates Anselm's reply to Gaunilo. I added a link to Anselm's Proslogion <here>, and the header will get you to the appended parts with Gaunilo.

But in my opinion Banno is doing something a fair bit different. He is saying something like, "There is no greatest-number-concept; and a greatest-thought-concept is a lot like a greatest-number-concept; therefore there probably is no greatest-thought-concept; and therefore Klima/Anselm is not allowed to define God after the manner of a greatest-thought-concept." Or similarly, "A child might think there is a greatest number, but there is not a greatest number; therefore the child never had the concept of a greatest number in the first place." Banno is engaged in a form of concept denial, which he would need to flesh out.

(And it is worth noting that Banno's objection is much closer to Russell and Quine than Gaunilo's is.)

But I think real problem for ontological arguments is that they are unconvincing. I don't think anyone has been converted by an ontological argument, or that many people of faith feel their faith significantly bolstered by such arguments. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I actually know philosophers who find the argument convincing, but they lack prejudice in an abnormal way. Someone without prejudice who encounters an argument that they cannot find fault with will accept the conclusion, or at least be greatly troubled by it. But that's rare.

I haven't generally found Anselm's argument convincing, but there are presentations which are undeniably beguiling.

The move from ens rationis to ens reale only works if we already accept that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being. — Banno

But the proof at hand does not assume that, and it nevertheless succeeds in drawing the conclusion. It does not assume that "existing in reality" is a necessary property of the greatest conceivable being. There is certainly no premise to that effect. So you have to deal with the proof. With the paper. If the paper is right then the theory you have on paper turns out to be wrong.

(I think a lot of this comes back to the way you simply overlook Klima's "ampliation".)

So you can't just write g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) without a problem, becasue it may be that there is no greatest individual. — Banno

It sounds like you're saying that we can't have a being of reason if it isn't a being. Or in other words: we can't think of what doesn't exist. "X doesn't exist, therefore we cannot think of it." This is what section 1 addresses.

But of course Klima has no premise which says that there is a greatest individual.

But if you manage that, you have the analogue of the transfinite numbers - no sooner have you defined g as the greatest, and then you can bring to mind something greater than g, and the problem repeats itself.

So even as there is good reason to think that it is not possible to make sense of "the largest number", it is difficult to see how to make sense of "the greatest individual". — Banno

So you are disputing (3), then? Because that is precisely the premise that bears on how the "greater than" predicate cashes out.

-

IF the argument is valid, and it shows that something exists, then that must be assumed in the argument somewhere. That's how logic works. The problem isn’t just that the argument assumes its conclusion, since as Tim pointed out all valid deductive arguments do that. — Banno

Then I will quote this for the second time today:

(Some of my own philosophical arguments have been accused of something very like ‘begging the question’ – I concede the phrase was not used – simply because they were formally valid arguments for a conclusion the accusers thought was false. Their reasoning seems to have been something like this: if the conclusion of an argument can be formally deduced from its premises, then that conclusion is, as one might put it, logically contained in the premises – and thus one who affirms those premises is assuming that the conclusion is true. As R. M. Chisholm once remarked when confronted with a similar criticism, ‘I stand accused of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent.’) — Peter van Inwagen, Begging the Question

(The quote is from a book on ontological arguments.)

The argument becomes "God exists therefore god exists". — Banno

Do you say that such a thing is begging the question, or not?

I think it's worth taking a moment to say something here:

I'm gonna Pontifications from 30,000 feet again. The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. The task for the logician is to find out where.

They must do this because existence cannot result from a deduction. It can only be presumed, either in the argument or in the interpretation. — Banno

To be sure, it is not clear that the definition g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) can be made coherently... — Banno

The trouble with the 30,000 foot view is that everyone is right in their own book at 30,000 feet, as it's just a matter of so-called (see my bio quote from Hadot on this point). Thus the atheist sees an argument for God's existence and he knows it must be wrong. He sees the conclusion and he infers things about the premises. All he is doing is begging the question (even though it is sometimes practical to beg the question).

The same sort of thing is happening here:

...it is not clear that [it] can be made coherently... — Banno

Okay, but that sounds like a hunch, much like, "It doesn't smell quite right to me." "It's not clear it can be made coherently." At this point the engagement with the text is minimal (and I will get to the elaboration). "Not clear it can be made coherently," is not a substantive objection to a premise.

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere in the argument. — Banno

This is also very similar to the question-begging atheist:

1. All valid ontological arguments beg the question
2. This is a valid ontological argument
3. Therefore, this begs the question

But how does the inductive (1) get to be so strong? And even beyond that, what is "an ontological argument"? As the very first sentence of Klima's introduction implies, that whole label is anachronistic. Certainly Anselm would wonder how one can know that a whole bundle of loosely-affiliated arguments are known to be faulty a priori.

Similarly, the argument, "Some beings of reason are not beings (simpliciter), therefore this being of reason is not a being (simpliciter)," doesn't cut. Klima acknowledges that not all beings of reason are beings. Why think that Klima's (g) is relevantly similar to the idea of a largest number in the first place?

So there is not a lot of rigor in these blanket approaches, and this is why I want to get away from the 30,000 foot view. Luckily, Klima helps us get down to concrete points.

I was wrong about the paper. Sorry for being so stubborn and impatient, and for unnecessarily derailing the thread. — Banno

Cool, thanks Banno. I guess we're on the same page that quoting someone accurately or inaccurately makes no difference. Syntactical "formatting" is just a sideshow. Obviously you won't mind that I changed some of the "formatting" of your post. :up:

On my computer screen Klima's html version reads as follows:

(1) g=dfix.~(∃y)(M(y)(x))

Or if we look at the official book chapter, linked in the OP:

g =_df ix.~(∃y)(M(y)(x))

(where in both cases i = the descriptor)

g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x) — Banno

That is what Klima writes, is it not?

I am wondering why <this post> of yours is misrepresenting Klima? Why does it contain symbols and steps that do not appear in Klima's paper? Don't you think we should represent his argument accurately?

I did fix the ugly: g:=ix¬(∃y)M(y,x). I asked you if it was acceptable, and did not yet get a reply. — Banno

Your misrepresentation is still there: (1) g=dfix.~($y)(M(y)(x))
(As well as the other lines of the proof where similar problems occur)

That post of yours is the first place in the thread where Klima's formalization of Anselm's proof occurs, which is why I would like it to be accurate. It is a thread on Anselm's proof, after all.

The generic flaw in ontological arguments is that if they are valid then they assume the conclusion somewhere int he argument. — Banno

Are you just saying that ontological arguments beg the question? This is a common charge that Klima is aware of. But it must be demonstrated that someone has begged the question. It can't just be asserted.

So the argument will not be of much use in convincing non-theists. — Banno

I am amused that you claim to have read the paper.

But Banno, if you want to do analytical philosophy, this is a thread for it. That's why I made it - because all these folks think they want rigorous analytical philosophy. Well, this is it. It requires reading, patience, careful thought and interpretation.

No. Kids will ask wha the highest number is. Takes them a while to see that there isn't one. — Banno

Okay, so you're not actually objecting to step (2) of the proof?

Notice that the existence (as a thought) of such an individual is here just assumed. — Banno

Klima is explicit that step (2) is a supposition and that step (1) is a definition, so I'm not sure what you're attempting to disagree with.

What a mess. So god is not the thing greater than everything, but the thing greater than the thing greater than everything. — Banno

We can come back to this, but you seem to be missing the ampliation entirely. The key point of the paragraph you here quoted is the ampliation on "thought," so the fact that your assessment leaves out thought entirely is strong evidence of a misinterpretation. This common misinterpretation is precisely why Klima included that paragraph along with the buildup on ampliation.

Might be. — Banno

Well can you go back and fix your misrepresentations of Klima? If you are going to call his argument "ugly," at least give his argument instead of some weird symbols that do not occur in his paper.

What? Those are the symbols in the HTML text you linked. — Banno

Maybe check the book chapter version above. Your web interpreter may be misinterpreting the html encodings (although that would be a bit surprising - I still think it is a copy/paste encoding error).

- Good. This is what I mean by "engaging the paper." Pontifications from 30,000 feet are something that should only come after we've worked through the paper, in the "free for all" phase.

($y) — Banno

As above, Klima gives (∃y), not ($y).

In fact, much of your quote is a misrepresentation of what Klima writes in the paper. You were presumably copy/pasting without checking to see if the output was accurate. A bit more care would be welcome, given how much people struggle with formal logic even before you start incorporating symbols like $, ", ®.

Consider an analogous argument defining the highest number as that number which is higher than any other number. The definition is fine, except that there is no such highest number. — Banno

You are saying the number does not exist, but you also require that the thought object of the number does not exist. Is that what you are claiming? That there is no thought object "the highest number"?

Or: that there is no thought object of God as defined by Klima?

Damn, that's ugly. — Banno

"What Is It Like to Be a Troll?" by Banno with a preface by Thomas Nagel.

followed the guidelines — Banno

You haven't engaged with the paper at all, so clearly you're not managing to follow the guidelines.
Or in other words: you're derailing another thread, like you always do.

In what way? — bongo fury

In the way that quantification brings with it ontological commitment.

Not necessarily, but the claim wants explaining. What is meant to be wrong with the slogan, and what has the doctrine of quantifiers being second order predicates got to do with it? — bongo fury

Quine is meant to be part of the background for common contemporary interpretations of Anselm, but some of the connections get made throughout the first section. See for example footnote 6:

6 W.V.O. Quine: “On What There Is”, in: Quine, W.V.O. 1971. p. 3. By the way, it is interesting that Quine apparently never asked himself: to whom does the name “Wyman” refer? — nobody? — then how do I know that Wyman is not the same as McX? For despite the fact that nothing in the world “wymanizes”, let alone “mcxizes”, Wyman and McX are quite distinguishable imaginary characters in Quine’s paper: Wyman, e.g., is introduced to us as a “subtler mind”, than McX. As we shall see, these questions are easily answerable on the basis of the theory of reference advanced in this paper. Not so on the basis of Quine’s. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

The three dogs are you, me, and the pooch. — Moliere

Does "pooch" refer to the three of us equally? Do you see how if I adopt your methodology we will be unable to communicate?

I'd call you a sly dog in order to demonstrate that "dog"'s referrent isn't fixed by convention — Moliere

I've only said that reference is fixed by convention about a dozen times now. Even within our conversation I have said it a number of times. Here is one example:

Right: the (conventional) association between Truman and 'Truman' is already "affixed" before the true sentence is uttered. — Leontiskos

-

but it's not like conventions make reference factual — Moliere

If I can know your intention then I can know the "fact" of what you are referring to. And to say that we can never know someone's intention seems a bit crazy.

What I take from this is that it doesn't need to be one or the other, verbal communication can contain information about and reference both things and the speaker's intentions about things. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I think this is a key point.

But if the alignment of determinate intentions is possible, then I think there is a strong sense in which reference must be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and when we teach someone a new language we are teaching them about the intentional relations that attach to words (namely, the intentional relations of a language community via convention). I think a big part of the problem is that this tradition flowing from Russell can't understand or incorporate intention. It is as easy to talk about reference apart from intention as it is to talk about cars apart from engines.

See Klima's, "Three Myths of Intentionality vs. Some Medieval Philosophers."

To even make the inscrutability argument, one has to assume that determinate intentions exist, so that one is given, but then it obviously seems possible to communicate them as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Definitely. :up:

This whole thread has largely been a bouncing between the two poles of "obvious/tautological" and "absurd/incoherent." What this indicates is that, on a natural reading, Quine was simply wrong. Or else, he said some strange things because he was reacting to and critiquing a very strange idea about reference. But since the thread is not interested in that context, we are left with the idea that Quine was either saying something obvious or something incorrect.

Hell, even poorly trained dogs can communicate well enough to direct our attention to what they view as a threat. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:lol:

Quine, as a nominalist, would rather not encourage any similar assumption about a predicate. — bongo fury

Right, ergo:

Consider now Quine's insight, on which the quantifier account is based, that it is bound variables rather than singular terms that carry ontological commitment. To implement this insight, Quine simply eliminated singular terms from the language. — Ontological Commitment | SEP

So back to your original quote of Klima:

[Russell's] account, coupled with the Kantian-Fregean idea of existence as a second-order predicate, i.e., a quantifier, quite naturally leads to Quine’s slogan: “to be is to be a value of a bound variable”.[2] — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 1

My understanding is that you are saying Quine rejects the idea that existence is a second-order predicate, and therefore Klima is mistaken in his claim, "[this] quite naturally leads to Quine's slogan..."

Now I don't quite see how your quote from Quine substantiates this, for he literally says, "[The doctrine] is also espoused in my own first book." Regardless, it makes sense to me that Quine would not want to call the quantifier a second-order predicate per se, but that he would nevertheless admit that it does bear on existence in a second-order manner. And in any case, Klima has tied "existence as a second-order predicate" to a Kantian-Fregian confluence, not to Quine, so I don't find the claim about Quine in Klima.

Or am I misunderstanding the motive for your quote? Are you instead affirming Quine's intimation that proposing existence as a second-order predicate lacks coherence?

Ultimately Klima is going to propose existence as some kind of first-order predicate, and he is going to outline an idea which was very well developed in the medieval period, namely an idea that differs from Quine (but also Meinong) with respect to ontological commitment, and Kripke with respect to reference.

Part 2: The Proof

(Here is a link to Anselm's Proslogion for those interested.)

In this section Klima formulates Anselm's proof according to the principles of the first part of the paper. He gives this formulation in a natural language argument, and then in quantification theory. I will again quote the first paragraph:

With this understanding of Anselm’s conception of the relationship between existence and reference we can see that his argument constitutes a valid proof of God’s existence without committing him either to an ontology overpopulated with entities of dubious status or to the question-begging assumption that the referent of his description exists. In fact, we can see this even within the framework of standard quantification theory, provided we keep in mind that in the context of Anselm’s argument, this context being an ampliative context, we should interpret our variables as ranging over objects of thought, only some of which are objects simpliciter. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 2

Though supposing we were in this room and there were three dogs — Moliere

But you've changed the scenario. There is one dog, not three. Or do you think it is not possible to have a room with one dog? So you've reiterated the problem that elicited my question to you:

"There are no fixed referents," vs, "We could be wrong some of the time." Do you see how the latter does not justify the former? — Leontiskos

You claim that there are no fixed referents, then you say that we could be wrong some of the time (which doesn't justify your claim); and then you repeat the whole thing by refusing to talk about a room with one dog and insisting on talking about a room with three dogs. As I said:

Presumably we all agree that words signify by convention ("nomina significant ad placitum").

So then a token like J-o-h-n will be indeterminate if there is more than one person named John (or if our interlocutor knows more than one person named John).

If that is all that is meant by inscrutability of reference then it strikes me as trivial. — Leontiskos

- So is the idea that Quine is here implicitly abandoning this doctrine that is "espoused in my own first book"? Is Quine here abandoning his idea that, "to be is to be a value of a bound variable"?

But I won't be defending this at any length as an alternative. — Banno

Odd to continually bring up things that you aren't willing to support or defend. It's almost like you're just a bored old man who wants to stir up controversy and is uninterested in doing actual philosophy. You just snipe from the bushes and then flee into the woods.

Try to make it past the first sentence before finding an offending whole two words that "render the paper obsolete." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the Troll hath arrived, as anticipated:

I will make a thread that includes the topic of intentional reference/identity sometime in at least the next month. It will be a reading group, so trolling will not be tolerated. — Leontiskos

Banno polled the recent fads in Anglo philosophy and found that Kripke is more popular than Russell. If he had managed to read past the first sentence he would have learned that the paper actually spends more time on Kripke than Russell. But for Banno to read a whole sentence is a remarkable event that should be celebrated. Would that philosophy moved beyond fad-following.

First, even if one supposes that Klima, being a medieval specialist, absolutely cannot be well acquainted with modern philosophy of language (dubious) — Count Timothy von Icarus

Note that the book in which this chapter is contained was published in 2000. Alongside primary sources, Klima's secondary sources for modern views are from the 1980's and early 90's. Which means that he is 10-15 years ahead of the epoch that Banno remains stuck in.

Gyula Klima is Hungarian, and began his philosophical career in Hungary. Clearly he is more familiar with figures like Kant and Frege, who have a much wider reach than the parochial set of Anglo philosophers from the mid 20th century. But upon moving onto the Anglo-American scene Klima no doubt began to encounter this philosophical descendant of Logical Positivism which encloses Banno's horizon.

The relentless grind of progress, eh. Philosophical ideas certainly have short use-by dates in our day and age. — Wayfarer

Even old as he is, Banno may live long enough to see all of the philosophers he believes to be so important forgotten in the same way his Hare has been forgotten. Even Banno's big names like Wittgenstein and Kripke are virtually unknown outside of the English-speaking world. So there is more than a little irony here - like the man scoffing at the out-of-date fashion of others while wearing bell-bottoms with a choker.

Why? I'm not making McDowell's argument. If you think he has a case, then you can make it. — Banno

Because you said:

The "Need" McDowel sees to "distinguish the experience" suggests a profound misapprehension of Davidson's much more subtle argument. — Banno

So you want to critique and call out McDowell while simultaneously avoiding giving any substantive account of what you think McDowell is saying. If Pierre-Normand doesn't even have a clear account of what you are accusing McDowell of, how is he supposed to engage with the content of your accusation? :chin:

The other technical part of this section concerns "ampliation":

According to this conception, in an appropriate ampliative context we can successfully refer to what we can think of according to the proper meaning of the terms involved. But thinking of something does not imply the existence of what is thought of. Thus, in the same way, referring to something does not imply the existence of what is referred to, or, as the medievals put it, significare (‘to signify’) and supponere (‘to refer’) ampliate their object-terms to nonexistents in the same way as intelligere (‘to think’, ‘to understand’) and other verbs signifying mental acts do.[14] — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding - Section 1

The idea here is that we can think about something without thinking that it exists, so why can't we signify and refer without presupposing existence? The medievals are very interested in argument and the natural way we use language. If we are to mount compelling arguments we must be able to do in a technical sense what we already do quite naturally in everyday settings, namely we must be able to reference thoughts, theories, suggestions, postulations, etc., in order to apply the rigors of argument and reason.

In a source from footnote 11 Klima begins with a simple argument:

(1) Bucephalus is dead
(2) What is dead does not exist
Therefore,
(3) Bucephalus does not exist
Therefore,
(4) something does not exist

In my opinion, this is a conclusive argument for the thesis that something does not exist. As is well-known, however, many philosophers regard this thesis as paradoxical in a way, and, consequently, they would raise several objections to the simple reasoning that led to it above... — Klima | Existence, Quantification and the Medieval Theory of Ampliation

"Bucephalus is dead, and therefore does not exist." When we utter such a thing we are abstracting time away from Bucephalus, and thinking of him in a timeless sort of way. He does not exist now, but he did exist in the past, and in talking about him now we are talking about something that does not exist. This is an example of what the medievals called ampliation, and in this case it is ampliation with respect to time. Cf. footnote 14.

Thoughts?

And the premise you stated [...] is arguably false, and clearly designed for the purpose of that refutation. It looks like a very clear cut example of begging the question to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's how arguments work. You design premises to reach a conclusion. — Leontiskos

A fun quote from Peter van Inwagen:

(Some of my own philosophical arguments have been accused of something very like ‘begging the question’ – I concede the phrase was not used – simply because they were formally valid arguments for a conclusion the accusers thought was false. Their reasoning seems to have been something like this: if the conclusion of an argument can be formally deduced from its premises, then that conclusion is, as one might put it, logically contained in the premises – and thus one who affirms those premises is assuming that the conclusion is true. As R. M. Chisholm once remarked when confronted with a similar criticism, ‘I stand accused of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent.’) — Peter van Inwagen, Begging the Question