- :lol:

- The reason the "morality" of "non-naturalism" cannot affect choices is because this "morality" is by definition undefined. For Michael a "non-naturalist" is just someone who has no idea what the word "moral" is supposed to mean. Anyone who has a definition of the word "moral" thereby fails to be a "non-naturalist." It's basically, "If you have an answer to my question, then you don't have an answer to my question. I'm only accepting answers from those who don't have answers."

So this is one of those cases where someone who doesn't know what a word means can't do things with that word. There is nothing strange about this.

My argument in this discussion is specifically related to the supposed existence of obligations. I have often given examples of "should" claims that do not involve obligations, e.g. "you should brush your teeth", that are not the target of my enquiry. — Michael

Then you need to revise your definition, because you are deviating from it ('Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this"').

The existence or non-existence of obligations does not affect the outcome of the decisions we make. The consequences of eating meat are the same whether or not I have an obligation to not eat meat. — Michael

So why are we motivated to promote the good? Why not just be motivated to promote pleasure? If pleasure happens to be good then this is merely incidental and irrelevant to our considerations. — Michael

It's one thing to refuse to define these things, and quite another to claim that they have no bearing on motivation. Everyone who has an inkling of what 'good' or 'moral' means knows they bear on motivation. If your arguments have led you to a contrary conclusion then you have coined new words that no one is familiar with, and it's no wonder that you are causing a great deal of confusion.

And when I say that I would like it if you were to make others happy I am not saying (either explicitly or implicitly) that you have an obligation to make people happy. — Michael

But you are saying that I ought to make others happy, and that was the point I was at pains to demonstrate. When I succeeded you moved the goalposts and started talking about obligations. Ought/should and obligation are not identical, and if you had used obligation in your original definition to the definition would have been tautologous, and would not have answered his query.

That's not to say that I am necessarily averse to any proposition that includes the word "should". As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed):

Given these propositions:

1a. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2a. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

Perhaps they are best interpreted as such:

1b. I will get rich (only?) if she gives me the money
2b. She will avoid being conned (only?) if she doesn't give me the money

These seem sensible (and true), but of course are clearly not normative. I can accept 1a) and 2a) if they are to be interpreted as 1b) and 2b). — Michael

My edit:

Or: "You should give me money for this bridge." "Okay, here you go!" "You shouldn't have done that!"

Is this possible? Yes, of course. The conman either changed his mind and returned the money, or else the second 'should' was used with a different rationale (ratio). In this case there will be two judgments, one for each discrete 'should'. But 'should' simpliciter pertains to what ultimately should be done, and this is most clearly seen in what is actually wished or chosen. Conflicting options, desires, or interests are naturally adjudicated when we actually make a choice and act. — Leontiskos

'Should' in its most basic sense means what should be done all things considered. So when the conman decides to con he decides, all things considered, that the lady should give him money for a fake bridge. In that case he obviously thinks she should do what he wants her to do (). Your claim that he doesn't think she should do what he wants her to do is simply false ().

As per an edit to my previous comment (that you may have missed) — Michael

I added an edit after I saw your edit.

I have to get going here, but it is worth considering that the thoroughgoing conman does not see his 'ought' judgment as immoral. If he did then certainly your definition would win out.

So what does "should" mean in this context? It certainly doesn't seem to mean that there is an obligation to behave a certain way, — Michael

Here is what I said earlier:

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. — Leontiskos

Perhaps the conman believes she has an obligation to make him rich, but to say that someone should act in a certain way does not necessarily involve obligations. "Should" is a primitive concept, expressing some sort of optimal future.

A key here is that a conman does not believe that (other) people should not be conned. He thinks other people should be conned, and that he should get rich. If he simply thought that people should not be conned, then he would not con. And even a conflicted conman judges that his victim should give him money. He holds this judgment even if he simultaneously believes that he should not con people. This is an example of either akrasia or else conflicted human reasoning; it is not an exception to the rule that when we attempt to influence behavior we involve ourselves in ought/should judgments.

Or: "You should give me money for this bridge." "Okay, here you go!" "You shouldn't have done that!"

Is this possible? Yes, of course. The conman either changed his mind and returned the money, or else the second 'should' was used with a different rationale (ratio). In this case there will be two judgments, one for each discrete 'should'. But 'should' simpliciter pertains to what ultimately should be done, and this is most clearly seen in what is actually wished or chosen. Conflicting options, desires, or interests are naturally adjudicated when we actually make a choice and act.

Your very question has introduced two different senses of "should", else it would be a contradiction to claim that she both should and shouldn't give him the money. — Michael

No, there is no equivocation on 'should' (you are the one doing that).

What we have are two rationales:

1. She should give me the money if I am to get rich.
2. She should not give me the money if she is to avoid being conned.

When the robber acts to influence Bonita's behavior he is acting on judgment (1). It doesn't matter if he is aware of (2). Knowledge of (2) does not preclude (1).

No. In fact he might think that she shouldn't do what he wants her to do because he knows that what he wants her to do is wrong. — Michael

He might think, "She should not give me the money if she doesn't want to get conned," but does this mean that he cannot simultaneously think that she should give him the money?

The conman is trying to influence her behaviour into giving him what he wants. He isn't trying to influence her behaviour into doing what he thinks she should do. — Michael

He doesn't think she should do what he wants her to do?

I am only saying that the one does not necessarily entail the other. — Michael

But the salesman was not merely wanting, he was acting to influence behavior. So too with the husband. In both cases we have cases of people who act to influence behavior on the basis of their desires. Are the salesman and the husband involved in a judgment about what another person should do?

No they do not. They want her to buy a bridge. They don't think she should. — Michael

I didn't realize that wants were incompatible with oughts. When a lazy husband says to his tired wife, "You should grab me a beer from the fridge," is he expressing a judgment about what his wife ought to do? Apparently on your view if he wants a beer then he can't think that his wife should get him one.

I disagree, as I keep saying. If I'm a conman trying to sell you a bridge I don't own I am trying to influence your behaviour into giving me money but I don't believe that you have a moral obligation to give me money. — Michael

Again, "We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved" ().

To use your example, if someone is trying to sell Bonita a bridge, and they are trying to influence her to act such that she buys the bridge, do they possess the judgment that Bonita should buy a bridge?

Well yes, because that's a truism: "ought" and "should" are synonyms. — Michael

Okay, good. So you agree that judgments about how one should act or behave bring with them oughtness.

Next, I think that if one is attempting to influence the behavior of another, they are manifesting an explicit or implicit judgment about how that other person should act or behave. Do you agree or disagree?

Yes. — Michael

Okay, good. You agree that oughtness can be present even where the word is not present.

Now I say 'ought' involves a judgment about how someone should act. It involves a judgment about how someone should behave. Where such judgments are present, the reality of 'ought' is present. Do you disagree?

And in this case an "ought" isn't involved as I keep saying. Here are a couple of sentences:

1. I would like it if you made others happy
2. I would like it if you were to give me your money

In both cases I am trying to influence your behaviour. In neither case is the word "ought" (or the word "immoral") involved. — Michael

I am talking about realities, not words. 'Ought' is a reality that is very often present even when the word is not present. Do you agree or disagree?

That I am trying to influence behaviour isn't that I believe that you have a moral obligation to behave a certain way. — Michael

Then you'll need to revise your definition. We are discussing whether an 'ought' is involved.

No I don't. — Michael

Sure you do. Someone who says, "I would be very sad if you cause them suffering," is obviously attempting to influence behavior.

You need to stop telling me what I believe. — Michael

"Know thyself."

No I'm not. I am expressing how I would feel if you were to behave a certain way. I'm not advising you to do something. I'm not telling you to do something. I am not asserting that there exists some objectively binding moral obligation to do something. — Michael

It is an utterance intended to influence behavior, and therefore it is a normative utterance, pertaining to 'oughts'. You speak because you believe I ought to care how you feel, and 'ought' claims are moral claims according to your post here.

It directly concerns what the alcoholic ought to do despite what anyone might want, or like, the alcoholic to do. I fail to understand how this specific "ought" wouldn't be a moral - or, better yet, ethical - fact: one that thereby regards the notion of the good. — javra

Yes indeed.

↪Leontiskos I'm not sure what you want from me. You're putting words into my mouth and I'm simply explaining that I'm not saying what you accuse me of saying.

I'd like you to pass the salt. I'd like you to meet my parents. I'd like you to donate to cancer research. I'd like you to join the protest. None of this implies that I believe in some objectively binding moral obligation. — Michael

↪Michael - I don't think you read beyond the first sentence of that reply. — Leontiskos

Or, let me be more clear. You used it in the sense, "I'd like it if you pursued happiness and tried to avoid causing suffering." It could also be used in the sense, "I'd like it if you wore my favorite color on my birthday." You can imagine a parent saying both of these things to their child. But the curious thing is that "should" captures the valence of both. Still, when we are talking about morality we are talking about something like the former sense. — Leontiskos

You are advising, and the advice is moral because the precept is coextensive with all of human action. The precept bears on all of a person's actions, and not just some. It is something you believe they should take into consideration always, and not just sometimes. — Leontiskos

-

When I say that I'd like you to be kind to others and make them happy, that's all I'm saying. — Michael

Do you say it in order to influence my behavior?

Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time. — Leontiskos

I think all of these questions are adequately resolved in Aquinas, and that the paradigm shift can be achieved through Peter L. P. Simpson.

But paradigm shifts aside, I think Hanover's starting point is as good as any:

I think this gives short shrift to Mill. Mill's reference to happiness as being the objective of "the good" didn't at all suggest it was a reducible concept, but he was clear that happiness arose from a variety of factors and it was a holistic state that could not be achieved from just finding physical pleasure. I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover

(This may be my last post in this thread. Either way I will be phasing out in the next 48 hours.)

- It does.

You're skimming posts madly and trying to respond in 0.4 seconds. Again, this isn't philosophy. The only time you write a substantive post is when your interlocutor goes offline for a long period of time.

I haven't said "in my opinion you should stop causing suffering". I have only said "I would like it if you would stop causing suffering". These propositions mean different things. — Michael

Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time. — Leontiskos

That may be true when you say it but it's not when I say it. When I say "I'd like it if you did this" I am only saying this. — Michael

"You should stop causing suffering," and, "In my opinion you should stop causing suffering," is the same statement, qualitatively speaking. Fundamentally, 'oughts' simply impinge on the behavior of others. Moral subjectivists can try to impinge on the behavior of others without impinging on the behavior of others, but they will contradict themselves every time.

- I don't think you read beyond the first sentence of that reply.

You ought not eat meat if and only if I would like you to not eat meat? That seems like textbook moral subjectivism. — Michael

You're swapping a biconditional for a definition while simultaneously reifying an opinion into a law. Moral reasoning is perhaps the most subtle form of reasoning accessible to natural reason. You continue to run roughshod over the subtleties.

Should-as-opinion differs from should-as-fact. In morality we have and share opinions about what is true, just as we do in other fields. Just as in other fields, opinions do not establish truths. Still, when you say to someone, "I'd like it if you stopped causing suffering for others," you are simultaneously saying, "You should stop causing suffering for others." You are sharing an opinion about what is (morally) true. You are advising, and the advice is moral because the precept is coextensive with all of human action. The precept bears on all of a person's actions, and not just some. It is something you believe they should take into consideration always, and not just sometimes.

Is this premise true?

1. "You should do X" is true iff I'd like it if you did X

According to moral realists it's not. According to (some) moral subjectivists it is. I'm assuming moral realism, not moral subjectivism, for the sake of this argument. And you've previously argued against moral subjectivism so I presume you believe that the premise is false. — Michael

I believe the biconditional is true. I am a moral realist. Why do you think it is false?

Or, let me be more clear. You used it in the sense, "I'd like it if you pursued happiness and tried to avoid causing suffering." It could also be used in the sense, "I'd like it if you wore my favorite color on my birthday." You can imagine a parent saying both of these things to their child. But the curious thing is that "should" captures the valence of both. Still, when we are talking about morality we are talking about something like the former sense.

(Again, I am swimming against the stream of your Kantian inheritance.)

I don't say that we should. I only say that I do, and that I'd like it if you did too. — Michael

What's the difference between saying "I'd like it if you did X," and, "You should do X"?

I promote happiness because I enjoy it and because I have empathy for others. Moral considerations do not factor into my decision making at all. — Michael

Why is empathy non-moral?

I'm trying to explain that it doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering. — Michael

I think you're saying, "It doesn't matter if it is immoral to cause suffering, and I am going to do my best to prevent suffering."

Morality in the fundamental sense is about how we should act (and, derivatively, why we do act). You think we should act in a certain way (seek happiness and avoid suffering) and yet you refuse to call this predilection "moral," even though any definitions of "moral" that you provide entail that your predilection is moral. Of course, you usually refuse to define it whatsoever, falling in with Moore's non-committal approach.

But I would say that if you think we should pursue happiness and avoid suffering, then you are likely some sort of hedonist. You just won't fully commit because you can't answer Moore's Open Question.

Then "this is immoral" means "one ought not do this".

I don't care if I ought or ought not promote happiness or if I ought or ought not cause suffering. I'm going to promote happiness and avoid causing pain either way. — Michael

I would say that those who promote happiness believe that happiness ought be promoted, and given your definition here that would mean that happiness is moral. Is it possible to promote something while not believing that it ought be promoted? When I do something it is because I think it should be done, especially when it is something I've deliberated about.

And if you say that there are moral 'oughts' and non-moral 'oughts', then your definition must be faulty.

@Michael - Good post.

There's an ambiguity in your proposition that "he could argue that pleasure is good". Are you saying that "this is good" means "this is pleasurable" or are you saying that pleasure happens to have the property of goodness? The former is naturalism, the latter is non-naturalism. — Michael

Yes, I realize there is an ambiguity, and I'm glad you brought this up. As I alluded to @Hanover, if the conception of goodness is monistic then we either assume that one ought do what is good and we simply end up arguing about what 'good' is, or else it is not assumed that one ought do what is good and the focus on goodness is a red herring. But neither of these necessarily involves making morality the product of natural science. Pluralistic notions of good similarly have nothing to do with non-naturalism.

I think it important not to get too caught up in the particular labels used. If you prefer, rather than use the labels "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" we can use the labels "Type X" and "Type Y". — Michael

Okay, good.

Given that I believe that it is immoral to cause suffering, what follows if suffering is immoral and what follows if suffering is not immoral?

If "this is immoral" means "this causes suffering" then part of my question would contain a logical contradiction: my belief that it is immoral to cause suffering would be true by definition, and so we cannot even ask what would follow if that belief was false. — Michael

Agreed.

But if "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering" then there is no such contradiction and so the question is coherent. — Michael

Coherent but still confused. This is the better question:

Now given the assumption that "this is immoral" doesn't mean "this causes suffering", what does it mean to say that it is immoral to cause suffering? — Michael

The difference between these two questions is a very important part of this thread. One question pertains to implications, another to reasons. That suffering is moral/immoral implies that causing suffering is permissible/impermissible. But the second question presumably asks why it is immoral to cause suffering. You want to know how to answer the second question on a Moorean ethics, namely an ethics that possesses no definition of what is moral or good. In my opinion the crux of this Moorean account is this lack of a definition, not opposition to reductionism (or opposition to naturalism, either).

On some accounts we cannot define the proposition "it is immoral" in any simpler terms. However, given that such claims are intended to be normative, I am assuming that "this is immoral" just means "one ought not do this". At the very least this definition allows us to avoid having to explain why we ought not be immoral.

This then entails that the proposition "it is immoral to cause suffering" means "one ought not cause suffering" (and the proposition "it is moral to seek pleasure" means "one ought seek pleasure"). — Michael

So if someone says it is immoral to cause suffering they mean that one ought not cause suffering, but this does not tell us anything about whether they are a Moorean or a reductionist (a "Type X" or a "Type Y"). That question depends on the "why."

There are other conceptual problems at play, here. The good and the moral are not the same thing, and Moore is concerned with goodness. Second, "it is moral" does not mean "one ought seek pleasure." It usually means, "the seeking of pleasure is permissible." Morality has three categories: impermissible, permissible, and obligatory (and arguably a fourth: non-obligatory). In any case, you are problematically trying to shoehorn morality into a binary scheme where the impermissible is the contradictory of the obligatory, and this is mistaken.

Given that I believe that one ought not cause suffering, what follows if it is a fact that one ought not cause suffering and what follows if it is not a fact that one ought not cause suffering?

The problem I see is that nothing follows in either case. The existence or non-existence of such obligations is inconsequential. It is true that if one ought not cause suffering and I cause suffering then I have done something I ought not, but so what? What is my motivation to obey obligations? — Michael

Good: motivation. A motivation and "what follows" are not the same, unless we are consequentialists. These are two separate questions, and they cannot be conflated. Anglo philosophy has been trying to fight the hegemony of consequentialism for almost a century now.

Here is how I want to phrase your project:

1. The moral is either monistic or pluriform
2. If it is monistic then it must respond to Moore's open question
3. If it is pluriform, then what is the reason or motivation for moral obligations?

And this is actually what I think is the more accurate version:

1. The moral is either defined or undefined
2. If it is defined then it must respond to Moore's open question
3. If it is undefined, then what is the reason or motivation for moral obligations?

You are interested in (3). As far as I'm concerned, you are Socrates, inquiring into the form of the good, desiring an account instead of examples.

(Note well that I chose to use "moral" instead of "good," and that this could become a problem.)

- My point was not that there was only one, but that "embarrassing numbers" is an overstatement, not in evidence. Augustine is lamenting literate, rhetorically skilled Christians who attracted audiences. These are not large in number.

This quote doesn't make much sense except there having been a context where Augustine was under the impression that there were an embarrassing number of Christians who aren't such critical thinkers. — wonderer1

1. @Hanover is simply correct that figurative interpretations have been accepted since ancient times.

2. You claim is not in evidence, for Augustine spoke of an "ignorant individual." Not a lot of folks have time to drum up strange theories, then or now (but especially then), and before the printing press books were extremely costly.

3. Low-hanging fruit is not unique to Christianity. For example, the Enlightenment clarion call of "Sapere Aude!" turned quickly to, "Oh shit, the masses are way dumber than we realized."

That is disanalogous. — Bob Ross

No, it is analogous. Your disjunctive syllogism has saddled you with a square circle.

I am not going to have time to engage this much going forward, but let me say one last thing. The point here is that if you possess moral truths, and these truths are susceptible to reason, then you should be able to convince others that they are true. Yet to convince someone of something, properly speaking, involves utilizing supra-subjective rationality. If a proposition were not susceptible to supra-subjective rationality, then one subjective individual would not be able to convince another that it is true. Perhaps they could convince another who fortuitously shared their non-truth-apt axioms, but they would not be able to convince someone without this good fortune. Further, if something is not rationally demonstrable, then it is not universally knowable and thence not universally binding. Shorter: if your position is not rationally knowable, then it is not binding.

But the non-naturalist isn't a moral skeptic. He's a moral realist. — Hanover

In this thread @Michael is playing moral skeptic.

The point is that Moore is interested in goodness and indirectly interested in naturalism. Even if Moore's question were resolved, my contention is that this would in no way resolve Michael's inquiry in the OP. For Michael the definition of good will not suffice to provide rationale for moral 'oughts'.

And no one is an essentialist anymore. It's like so yesterday. — Hanover

I also wear bell-bottoms and a cape while smoking a pipe.


Anyway, this is a good line for the thread:

I don't follow why Mill is a naturalist but Moore not. — Hanover

Michael was asked who holds the theory he is critiquing ("non-naturalism"). He said Moore. But it is hard to see why Moore is supposed to be a non-naturalist, or what that term even means.

I am an essentialist, but my concern here is that even if we found the magical formula for goodness, @Michael would immediately, given his approach in these threads, say, "I admit that X is good, but why should I do/seek what is good?" I do not object to Moore agonizing over what 'good' means, but the moral skeptic would in no way be satisfied even if Moore were successful. They would say, "Well now we have obtained the commensurability of goodness, but we still don't have 'oughts' or morality." "Non-naturalism," as Michael conceives it, is inherently groundless and irrational.

I'll quote Moore's Principia Ethica — Michael

Okay, thanks. But see my post <here>. Moore's reductionist critique was met with supervenience theories of good (e.g. Hare). Your OP ignores the fact that this critique is no longer relevant. No one is saying that good is reducible to just one thing.

It is in defining goodness in terms of some natural property – in this case, pleasure – that makes it an ethical naturalist theory. And then, according to Moore, deriving the normative claim that we ought pursue pleasure commits the naturalistic fallacy. — Michael

As long as a hedonist does not purport to derive his 'ought' from natural science, he is not a naturalist. He could do this in two ways: he could argue that pleasure is good, but that its goodness is not an object of natural science, or else he could independently claim that the oughtness that attaches to pleasure is not an object of natural science. In either case he is not a naturalist, and all hedonists I have encountered deny that their valuative/obligatory premises are the product of natural science.

I think you are misreading Moore's argument as overdetermined. The so-called "naturalistic fallacy" depends on his Open Question about the ambiguity of goodness. If that ambiguity fails then the fallacy charge also fails.

---

He describes "the good" as having a variety of objectives, and so it is pluralistic, unlike saying the good = that which increases the most pleasure, which would posit a monistic, essentialist definition of "the good. " — Hanover

But what does monistic/pluralistic have to do with naturalistic/non-naturalistic? The idea is perhaps that good motivates, and if an easily identifiable and unified reality is good, then a straightforward (and exclusive) 'ought' will flow from that good (and this is called "naturalism" for whatever reason). Contrariwise, if goodness is pluriform and the various manifestations are irreducible, then the competition between goods can never be satisfactorily resolved and there will be no straightforward 'ought.' Instead there will be a set of 'oughts' that cannot be adjudicated.

Still, I don't know what in the world this is supposed to have to do with naturalism. In this case it would seem to have more to do with whether 'ought' disputes are ultimately adjudicable. Supposing that pleasure were all there is to good, this would not mean that ethics all of the sudden becomes part of natural science. Why is it that if I say pleasure is the only good, I am a naturalist, but if I say honor is also good, I am not? Presumably a monistic scheme would only be naturalistic if natural science could measure and quantify its monistic conception of good. It appears to be a question of commensurability, not naturalism.

That would make my degree in Philosophy all the more impressive. — Michael

You can't manage to answer a three-step syllogism and you expect me to believe you have a degree in philosophy? When it comes down to it all you are able to provide are arguments from authority, and this is a problem even ignoring the fact that you are misreading the authorities.

- You remind me of a Biblical fundamentalist who only accepts the KJV. You have your sacred Wikipedia and SEP along with your idiosyncratic interpretations, and you refuse to consider any other source, even the primary sources for your sacred document. You may have never read an actual philosopher in your life.

Hedonism is an example of ethical naturalism. — Michael

No it's not, and I just gave you an argument for why. Are you able to address arguments?

1. According to Hedonism one ought pursue pleasure and avoid pain.
2. That one ought or ought not do such a thing is not accessible to natural science.
3. Therefore, Hedonism is not naturalistic.

I'm not saying that the natural sciences study the normative value of pain and pleasure. I'm saying that pain and pleasure are natural properties. — Michael

According to basic ethical theories, such as hedonism, they have normative value. Given that the normative value of pain and pleasure are not the object of natural science, basic ethical theories are not naturalistic according to your definition of natural.

And it's not even clear what it means to call them "natural properties." As far as I'm concerned the natural sciences cannot even demonstrate that qualia like pain and pleasure exist. Moore was never able to define what he meant by "natural," so these problems are not surprising.

Moore, as explained in that quote in my previous comment, and also from his open-question argument: — Michael

The aspect of Moore that you are honing in on was rejected, even in English-speaking moral philosophy. Hare showed this most clearly. Thus we can all agree that Moore was wrong about this:

Thirdly, Moore held good to be an independent property that stood on its own, like the property yellow or red, and that was identifiable as such. But this could not be the case. A comparison between good and yellow showed that good was always dependent on other properties by reference to which it had to be understood. For instance, it is clearly legitimate to say that x and y are exactly alike save that x is yellow and y is not. It is not legitimate to say that x and y are exactly alike save that x is good and y is not. If x really is good while y is not, this can only be because x and y differ in some other respect. If x is a strawberry it will be good, say, because it is red and juicy, and y will be bad because it is not. — Peter L. P. Simpson, On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas, p. 4