1. If a) it is the case that one ought not eat meat and b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

2. If a) it is not the case that one ought not eat meat but b) I believe that it is the case that one ought not eat meat then c) I won't eat meat.

The practical implication of each b) is each c), but I can't see what the practical implication of each a) is. — Michael

It's very odd to talk about the "practical implication" of truth.

When a human being makes a decision of any kind—moral or otherwise—they always do so for a reason. For example, "The Earth is X distance from the moon because of the parallax measurements I collected."

Now when one says they ought to do something, they have made a decision, and there is a reason for their decision. The reasoning process involves apprehended truth (i.e. that which is apprehended to be true). For example, if the apprehended truths of the parallax measurements are true, and the apprehended truths of the logical inferences are true, then the Earth will be X distance from the moon, and this will inform the amount of fuel needed for a trip to the moon. Or in other words: if the calculations are correct then the conclusion will be correct.

Perhaps this whole thread could be boiled down to a single question, "If you are an ethical non-naturalist, then what is the reason for your 'ought'?" "You say we ought to do such and such, but why ought we?"

That's not an inherently bad question, but I don't think anyone has managed to figure out to whom the question is addressed. Is the "ethical non-naturalist" you have in mind a character in a fiction or a non-fiction book?

If success means accomplishing your aim, and your aim is to do what you think is best for yourself, then I don’t see how this isn’t an example of success in this case. But maybe I am missing something. — Beverley

Can you aim at something that you can't miss? If I can't miss then I sure don't need to aim. To aim at a target implies that one could miss.

I cannot think of a situation where someone would do something purposefully against their own best interests at the time as they see it. — Beverley

Yes, but morality is not purely about intent. We aim at what seems best, and sometimes we miss. When a hunter is pulling the trigger he believes the bullet will hit its mark. If the bullet misses its mark then he knows he was wrong. He will say, "I thought I was right, but I was wrong."

They're practical implications of having the belief. I'm asking about the practical implications of that belief being true.

If eating meat is immoral and I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat.
If eating meat is not immoral but I believe that eating meat is immoral then I won't eat meat. — Michael

"If CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming and I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

"If CO2 emissions are not causing a severe acceleration in global warming but I believe that CO2 emissions are causing a severe acceleration in global warming, then I will attempt to reduce CO2 emissions."

It's almost as if we act on what we believe to be true, rather than on what is true independent of our beliefs. Remarkable. :meh:

3. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion. — Michael

I think you misunderstand (3) because you think it means that humans act independent of their beliefs.

non-moral features (e.g. pain, harm, suffering, etc.) — Michael

You beg the question by assuming that these are non-moral features. And you won't tell us what you mean by "moral," so the whole thing's a bust. It's pretty obvious that you think all features are non-moral, and that there is no such thing as a moral feature.

And I'm not necessarily saying that therefore ethical non-naturalism is false. I'm only saying that if it's true then I don't understand the motivation to be moral. — Michael

I'm with . I don't think you understand ethical non-naturalism. You need to find an actual moral theory and critique it, such as Kantianism. You seem to be constructing an incoherent moral theory in your head, which no one holds.

That's not just a gripe. That's a conversation ender. If you have an ethical position that lacks a definition of "ethical," then why should it come as a surprise that the position makes morality irrelevant? — Hanover

Yes and yes. :up: This point keeps popping up like a weed.

Wouldn't that mean that everyone is morally successful, since everyone does what they think is best for themselves? — Beverley

Can there be success without the possibility of failure?

This only works though, if you believe it is impossible for people to think self destructively, or in a way that is not in their own best interests. If you thought otherwise, would there be a way of arguing for the existence of immorality? Maybe, but I think it would be tricky. — Beverley

Error is a difficult concept in general. When someone finishes a math problem they think they have the right answer, but they may have the wrong answer. Believing that something is true does not make it true. While falsehood is easy to identify, pinpointing error and culpability is more difficult, whether in math or morality.

In any case, I think most everyone recognizes that it is possible to act and choose in ways that are not in their best interest. Anyone who has experienced regret should recognize this.

In other words, morality is doing what you think is best for you. — Beverley

If morality is doing what one thinks is best for oneself in the moment, and everyone always does what they think best for themselves in the moment, then immorality and moral error are impossible, as is moral success. But I don't think this is a common view of morality, and those who hold to such a view certainly have nothing to argue about or discuss.

But is moral error, or just error, the same as immorality in the sense I was mentioning? I guess I could kill someone in error, or I could kill someone thinking it was a moral thing to do, but afterwards realize that I was wrong. But if being moral is about doing what is best for you, then making an error is not trying to not be moral, and therefore, it cannot be immoral, can it? — Beverley

The idea is that, if morality is doing what is best for oneself, then one can act immorally (err morally) if they fail to do what is best for themselves. Assuming they did not intend to fail in this way, their immorality would be unintentional and yet real.

What is "best for oneself" is usually conceived of as an objective target that can be hit or missed, such that one must refine their understanding over time in order to truly act in their best interest.

This lawyer does this everyday. It's what he does for a living. He tries to screw people over. — frank

I'd say, "Don't hate the player, hate the game." The U.S. legal system is inherently agonistic, where the judge plays a more passive role than would have been the case in older English common law, and lawyers tend to take center stage (@Hanover can correct me if I'm off). But this is also why representation is provided if necessary. It has its pros and cons.

Thing is, it's pretty hard to craft a perfect legal system. What is your solution? Don't allow companies representation? Make lawyers pass a morality test? See if Plato's Form of the Good would be interested in coming down to Earth to decide all cases personally?

This conversation is pretty stupid btw. — Hanover

I'm just trying to figure out if there is such a thing as immorality. If being moral means doing what is good and best for you, and by extension, that is good for others, then being immoral would mean not doing what is best for you. I'm not sure I'm convinced that this exists or is possible. — Beverley

Right. There is an interesting exchange on this very topic between two groups of philosophers. See my post on a different forum for links to the three papers in question (link).

The idea is essentially that even on a strict consequentialism moral error is possible, but perhaps only in retrospect or else in an especially subtle way. But there are a lot of different ways to answer such an argument... Most theories would say that ignorance plays a role, where one believes they are doing what is best but in fact they are not, and ignorance of what is truly best is a significant moral culprit in the immoral act. For Socrates in the early dialogues ignorance would have been the sole culprit.

If you are new to moral philosophy I would not recommend this thread, as it is excessively complicated and will probably only confuse you!

BTW, sorry if I made a mistake with the quoting thing on my last comment. It was unintentional; I'm just getting used to the site. — Beverley

No worries. A helpful thread may be, "Forum Tips and Tricks - How to Quote." In general when you use the text selection quote shortcut, it is often better to separate outer quotes from inner quotes, especially if you want a link automatically added to each quote. When you quoted me and Michael simultaneously in a single text selection, it only linked to my quote and his quote got subsumed into mine. But some of this is personal preference. :smile:

Welcome to the forum. See also: "Welcome to The Philosophy Forum - an introduction thread."

Nothing detrimental will happen if I disobey an obligation and nothing beneficial will happen if I obey an obligation. So why should I care about such an obligation? — Michael

The question of whether all 'oughts' pertain to punishment and reward is interesting (), but the more fundamental question at play is whether there are 'oughts' which are not driven by inclination or even motivation. This is a more universal question, as it affects non-consequentialists, and your line of reasoning occasionally and imperceptibly dips into this deeper probing. The more superficial line assumes a modern view, where human action is inherently selfish. Kant is influenced by this modern view but he is always attempting to surpass it, and so the problem with Kant (and our modern inheritance) goes deeper than this superficial line.

The existence of the obligation has no practical implication. — Michael

Not all morality is consequentialist. The deeper problem of Kantian morality is not related to implications, but to grounds or reasons. Here is how I put it to J privately:

We always act because we are inclined to act, and this holds even of our highest acts. So for Kant to divorce the moral part of life—or any part of life—from inclination looks to be a non-starter. I think this is a large part of what Simpson has in mind, and the first few sentences of his article reflect this. — Leontiskos

Here is how Simpson puts a similar point:

Kant only secures the nobility and freedom associated with morality at the cost of shifting both into a sphere that lies completely beyond human grasp. The free acts of the will that constitute moral goodness and moral choice are beyond human explanation and comprehension. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble, p. 16

So you are latching onto something legitimately problematic in Kant. But the ascendancy of Kant and of his morality comes late in history. For an Aristotelian like myself it is a strange aberration. Yet you refuse to conceive of morality in a non-Kantian manner, and so instead of identifying a flaw in one very localized moral theory, you falsely conclude that all of morality is inherently flawed. Whenever someone tries to draw you out of the Kantian whirlpool, you respond, "You're speaking about pragmatic matters, not moral matters," where "pragmatic" means non-Kantian and "moral" means Kantian.

(Or else you can't see past consequentialism and a selfish psychology and I am giving you too much credit.)

You are confusing something being rationally justified for me in the sense that it wouldn’t rationally justify you in the same circumstances with my position that indexically it is rationally for everyone. But since it is indexical, it can rationally justify me without justifying you if you aren’t in the same circumstances. — Bob Ross

Is rationality different for me and for you? When you provide an argument you are assuming a common standard of rationality, and you are assuming that validity and soundness are the same for you and your interlocutor. Rational justification is similar.

The point here is, "Because I believe it," is not a rational justification (for you or for anyone else). If you think moral claims are truth-apt and some moral claims are true, then you will have to do better than "Because I believe it" to justify the truth of these claims.

Which premise are you contending with? — Bob Ross

I have explained multiple times that I am contending the conclusion of your disjunctive syllogism.

For example, if you said, "I have reason to believe the car is not black, and I have reason to believe that the car is not not-black, therefore I have reason to believe that the car is neither," I would point to your conclusion and give arguments for why it is incoherent.

You may say it is my 'belief' that it is immoral not to eat the meat, or to eat it, but, if morality is linked to survival, then eating the meat means that both myself and my sibling survive, and hence, are moral. — Beverley

In the same post you quoted from I also said, "(although not everyone on each side agrees with one another about the nature of the moral proposition)."

The point here is that "moral" and "immoral" are not univocal terms. They mean different things on different moral theories. This is actually one of the big problems with @Michael's approach: he presumes that "moral" is a straightforwardly univocal term while simultaneously refusing to give his definition or account of what it means.

So depending on one's reasons for abstaining from meat, exceptions may or may not be allowed. My hunch is that for many vegetarians such a moral rule is not exceptionless. It is possible for moral rules to come into conflict, and the robust moral theories are able to account for and deal with these conflicts. The conflict you raise is an especially strong one (survival, or the limit of "in extremis").

But Michael is concerned with the Kantian form of morality, which tends to be exceptionless (cf. ).

It's all a bit of a mess. — Banno

Yes. Once the thin film of the thread is peeled away all that remains are utterly strange moral assumptions that are continually reasserted. It doesn't seem to be going anywhere.

That's not a thing. — frank

Feel free to attempt to address the argument:

Morality is about how humans should act, and humans act in light of their beliefs. Therefore a moral truth is brought to bear on reality via belief. — Leontiskos

What you're saying is in line with moral antirealism. — frank

Nope. Banno and I are moral realists who recognize that moral truths have an effect via belief. Actually I would say that all moral realists believe this. I have no idea where you guys are getting your strange ideas about the different categories of moral theory. @Michael's claim that only ethical naturalism can have "practical" effects is another of the strange ideas.

You're pointing to the practical outcome of believing in moral realism, not the practical outcome of the existence of objective moral rules. — frank

Truths have an effect on the world by being known by minds, and this is especially true with moral truths. You and @Michael are attempting to speak about the effects of truths independent of belief, which is an especially odd approach when it comes to morality. Morality is about how humans should act, and humans act in light of their beliefs. Therefore a moral truth is brought to bear on reality via belief.

Of course I grant that it is easier to speak about the truth, say, of gravity in a manner that circumvents human knowledge of that truth. But moral truths can also have an effect in the absence of human appropriation of those truths in the form of knowledge. For example, if we cannot get along with one another, then the human race will end as a consequence of nuclear war. Those who believe it is morally important to provide for the continuation of the human race will take this (hypothetical) moral truth into account.

@Michael sees moral disagreements and he seeks a way to overcome them, to stand over them with a quasi-infallible method of moral adjudication (including a faux confidence about which claims are moral claims and which are not). But such an approach is like chasing the horizon or searching for the edge of the Earth. All knowledge is, in a certain sense, non-infallible, including moral knowledge. There is no Gods-eye moral position, at least in this life.

Either eating meat is immoral or it isn't. — Michael

True.

Some people believe that eating meat is immoral and some people believe that eating meat is not immoral. — Michael

True.

One of these groups is right and one of these groups is wrong. — Michael

True (although not everyone on each side agrees with one another about the nature of the moral proposition).

What are the practical implications if the former are right? What are the practical implications if the latter are right? — Michael

The practical implications have to do with eating, harvesting, and producing animals, as I already noted.

I can't see that there are any in either case.

Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, those who believe that eating meat is immoral probably won't eat meat and those who believe that eating meat is not immoral probably will eat meat. — Michael

Your word here, "regardless," is the source of the fallacy you are working with. Disagreement does not mean that no one on either side is acting in good faith. In fact the empirical data disproves your thesis, for there are those on both sides who become convinced that they were wrong and change their minds, and this obviously has "practical" (moral) implications. Your sentence here is simply false.

It would be as intelligent to say, "Regardless of who is right and who is wrong, those who are epistemological coherentists will act like epistemological coherentists, and those who are epistemological foundationalists will act like epistemological foundationalists." This is sophistry. People act on the basis of beliefs that they hold to be true. People act not regardless of who is right, but rather because of who is right.* This is so in all fields of knowledge. Stipulating by fiat that there are no real convictions about what is true, whether in the realm of morality or epistemology, is sophistical. You are stipulating that all moral reasoning is post hoc rationalization.

(Although we should again note that by "moral reasoning" you mean "Kantian reasoning," and you think any non-Kantian moral reasoning is "pragmatic" reasoning.)

* You will say, "They act on the basis of who they believe to be right, not on the basis of who is right." Yes, of course. Truth is always filtered through belief. There is no simple fact of the matter about who is right. Here below there is no Gods-eye view that is able to sidestep beliefs. We access truth through our minds and through our beliefs.

Could we verify this empirically? What sort of research project would we construct? — frank

Are moral truths the product of empirical scientific research? Do we go to the physicists with our moral questions? In many ways this whole thread is an ignoratio elenchi, and you've highlighted that fact with this post.

You're arguing that moral realists behave differently from anti-realists. Even if that's true, it doesn't answer the OP. It's not the reality of the moral rules that matters, it's the psychology of believing realism. That said, I don't think it's true that moral realists behave differently. Again, it's all psychology. — frank

In that post I was arguing that the intention of the moral realist differs from the intention of the moral non-realist, for the moral realist understands themselves to be responding to a real reality. Michael's separation of effects-of-moral-agents from moral truths was begging the question, assuming either anti-realism or else the unknowability of moral truths. Supposing moral truths exist and can be known (as moral realists hold), then the moral truths have practical effects.

(Again, I am not a fan of this word "practical," because for Michael every effect is practical.)

Moral beliefs certainly have practical implications, in that if people believe that eating meat is immoral then it is likely that less meat is eaten and fewer animals are harvested, but that's not what I'm talking about.

I'm saying that eating meat actually being immoral has no practical implications and that eating meat actually not being immoral has no practical implications. — Michael

The two are connected. Moral realities need to be appropriated by moral subjects, just as scientific realities need to be appropriated by scientific subjects.

For example, if people believe there is fire in the fire pit they will avoid it for fear of being burned. It is the fire itself that ultimately has this effect, and it has the effect by being appropriated by human subjects. For the moral realist morality is parallel, for in that case one is recognizing a moral reality and responding to it. The vegetarian does not create a moral precept so much as respond to animal suffering and factory farming and whatnot, which they hold to be moral realities.

So on the vegetarian account <meat actually being immoral> is the reason one believes meat-eating to be immoral, and is therefore precisely what produces the "practical" effects.

To anticipate your next post, moral realism and ethical naturalism are simply not co-extensive. That one believes there are moral realities which one recognizes does not mean that they are an ethical naturalist or an ethical non-naturalist. And in any case, these terms require more precision given that the is-ought distinction requires more precision.

I don't think that eating meat being immoral has any practical implications and I don't think that eating meat not being immoral has any practical implications. — Michael

But how could you hold such a thing? The obvious practical implications are 1) how much meat is eaten, and 2) how many animals are harvested. These are practical implications, and for many vegetarians they are also moral implications.

Morality pertains to how we act, and therefore all moral precepts will have "practical" implications insofar as all human acts have "practical" effects.

I think there are two moral "lanes," one where morality is transcendent and opaque (Kantianism), and another where morality is transparently rational (consequentialism, virtue ethics, etc.). The OP makes sense with regard to Kantianism, but I don't think it makes sense with regard to transparently rational moralities (cf. ).

This is what happens when you try to run the OP against, say, a form of consequentialism:

I'd say that the consequences of false moral belief will depend on the moral system in question. For example, if a consequentialist holds that killing babies is evil on account of inflicting pain, then the possible world in which the killing of babies is permissible would be a world where babies feel no pain (or where one can kill painlessly). For this consequentialist, the negative consequence of false belief is an increase in pain, or unnecessary pain, or the pain of innocents, or something like that. — Leontiskos

Perhaps a more suitable question for the consequentialist is to explain the difference between these worlds:

1. Causing pain has no moral value
2. Causing pain is morally good
3. Causing pain is morally bad — Michael

I think such a consequentialist would say that (3) is self-evidently true, because to feel pain is to suffer; suffering is undesirable; and what is undesirable should—ceteris paribus—be avoided. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction.

One of the deeper problems that I perceive is the separation between oughtness and motivation, as noted in the other thread... — Leontiskos

Is that a moral claim, or merely a pragmatic claim?

I suppose an ethical naturalist could claim that a moral claim is a pragmatic claim, but how would someone who is both a consequentialist and an ethical non-naturalist explain the difference between those worlds? — Michael

At this point "moral" is actually defined to be that which has no reason. If a claim has a reason, then apparently for @Michael it cannot be considered moral. This is understandable insofar as it is a Kantian inheritance, but at the same time it makes no sense. If moral claims are, by definition, claims without reasons, then the counterfactual test will necessarily fail for moral claims.

Note too that this consequentialist in question is not necessarily a "non-naturalist." I don't see that the naturalism/non-naturalism distinction is overly relevant to this question. The question is whether any given first principle of moral reasoning is rationally transparent or rationally opaque.

- My post to you in the other thread sort of sums up what I think of your emotion-driven approach (). Those who lead with emotion and are weighed down by atheistic shoulder-chips often struggle when it comes to rationality. Again, if Ross is willing to back your strange argument I might respond.

Do you think you can prove me wrong? — wonderer1

Sure, but I won't bother to do so unless @Bob Ross commits himself to your position, namely that there is parity between the rational justification for an object's height, and the rational justification for a moral claim. If he honestly thinks that both of these things are similarly unjustifiable, then I will consider responding to your post. If not then I will not consider it worth responding to.

Such black or white thinking. I presume you have some belief about how tall you are. How is that belief rationally justified? — wonderer1

You don't even believe one can be rationally justified with regards to the height of an object? lol...

Again. It is rational justification for me if “I believe that one ought not torture babies” but not for you. — Bob Ross

Rational justification doesn't work that way. Propositions are true or false. Conclusions are rationally justified or they aren't. "True for me," or, "Rationally justified for me," is a nonsense assertion.

Again, if your moral claims do not even pretend to possess rational justification, then clearly your moral system is ridiculous. Your disjunctive syllogism has led you to an incoherent position.

Edit: The way out of this silliness is to recognize that there are certain universal and/or objective values, such as "suffering is bad" or "suffering should be avoided" (). Even Hume recognized this.

P3: To value something entails it is not an end in itself. — Bob Ross

Eh? If we cannot value ends, then how can we value means?

The other problem here is that you do not actually arrive at Kant's maxim. For example:

The formula is thus: one should never treat a person as solely a means towards an end, but always (at least) simultaneously an end in themselves—i.e., FET. — Bob Ross

Presumably you also hold to: <To value something entails it is solely a means towards an end>. Thus, on your view, no end in itself can simultaneously be used as a means to an end.

I’m sorry but I’m not going to read 20 different papers to try to understand your position. Would you mind giving, in you own words, an answer to my question? How do you justify your belief that no one should torture babies? — Michael

I don't think you're a serious interlocutor and I've explained in detail why I am not interested in engaging you.

You keep asking Bob Ross to rationally justify his claim. You must do the same. — Michael

This is a thread about moral subjectivism, not moral realism. Please stay on topic.

This is a thought challenge where I try to form the perfect commandment for anyone that isn't religious. — mentos987

To offer a criticism: why do you think your commandment is perfect? What do you mean by that word, "perfect"? I think your commandment would be helpful unto personal growth and lessening general misery, but I don't have a reason to think that it is perfect.

Assuming that knowledge is (at minimum) justified true belief, what is the justification for the belief that no one should torture babies? — Michael

;

If I say “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun” is a moral judgment that is true in virtue of the belief, then you will say I am question begging. — Bob Ross

Do you actually believe that moral claims are true in virtue of beliefs? That is the question. I don't think you even believe yourself.

It is the same reasoning that leads you to believe that “I feel pain” is infallible makes “I believe one ought not torture babies” infallible: they are self-referential. “I believe I feel pain” is not self-referential: it is a belief about a fact about one’s current state of pain or lack thereof. “I feel pain”, in the sense I think you are talking about, is self-referential: if I have it, then I have it: it isn’t referring to something else, like ‘I think 1+1=2’. Same thing with moral judgments. — Bob Ross

But, "No one should torture babies," is not self-referential. It is referring not just to oneself, but also to 8+ billion other people.

Ok, so, at the end of the day we are talking in circle because you keep asserting “beliefs have nothing to do with the moral judgment’s truthity” and I assert the opposite. To resolve this, instead of looping around and around, we need to provide arguments. — Bob Ross

I have provided an argument: "Because I believe it to be so," is not a rationally justifying statement.

I would have to convince you that you shouldn’t torture babies... — Bob Ross

If this is so then your response is not a (rational) justification. It does not rationally justify. Beliefs do not rationally justify moral claims. You admit that more is needed.

(by means I have described in length in the OP) — Bob Ross

Again, if something is truth-apt then it can be argued for directly. Your OP presumed that it can only be argued for indirectly and accidentally. It seems that you do not believe such claims are really truth-apt if they cannot be argued for directly and/or rationally justified.

“No one should torture babies” seems an awful lot, within the context of what you are saying, as expressing something objective, which obviously moral subjectivism cannot account for because it doesn’t think those exist. If you mean “I believe no one should torture babies, and that justifies me in stopping people from torturing babies”, then, yes, my theory can handle that just fine. — Bob Ross

Yikes. :groan:

Either the proposition, "No one should torture babies," is true, or else it isn't. Your belief can't make it true. You know this. Or you will upon further reflection. If you have no way to rationally justify a claim, then it is otiose to call such a claim "true." This whole "subjectivism" approach assumes something like the idea that beliefs, in themselves, can make moral claims true, and this is patently false. Such approaches are non-starters.

I sent J the following in the course of a discussion we are having, and I thought I would post it here as well given its relevance:

Since these and the like consequences follow from the fear theory, it is hardly surprising that people should look for some other way to ground the ideas of obligation and of wrong. Such another way is supposed to be provided by the appeal to duty. Here the idea is that one should obey the rules and respect others’ right because it is one’s duty so to do. This duty is not dependent on the presence of any fear or self-interest, nor does it oblige only those who are afraid. It obliges everyone without exception, including especially fearless tyrants. For this reason the duty in question is said to be categorical and to bind categorically. The most readily intelligible statement of it is still the Kantian one, that one should treat others as ends and never simply as means. To treat people as ends is to respect them as creators of their own world and not to reduce them to instruments for the creation of one’s own world.

Doubtless it is true that the obligation to treat people as ends in this sense is commonly regarded as categorical and binding on all. In particular, the obligation is not held to vary according to the varying presence of some motive or passion. The fearless, for instance, are not excused from the obligation by their fearlessness, nor are their violations thereby any the less violations or any the less wrong. The problem with the appeal to duty is not that it fails to capture the categorical character of obligation but that it fails altogether to explain and justify this character. All it does is assert that the obligation is categorical. It does not tell us why it is categorical, nor does it tell us why the obligation is an obligation. If we were to ask these questions, all we would be told is that we are bound because we are bound, that we should obey because we should obey, and that disobedience is wrong because it is wrong.

I am not exaggerating here. Kant himself speaks about the categorical imperative in almost these words.[9] At any rate, he says that the foundation of the categorical imperative, or what makes it into a command we are obligated to obey, is that it comes out of the wholly incomprehensible ground of our noumenal freedom. We cannot penetrate further into its obligatory character than that, which is to say we cannot penetrate into it at all. Of course, Kant would deny that just because we cannot say why disobedience to the categorical imperative is wrong, or what its wrongness consists in, therefore we do not know that it is wrong. On the contrary, he says, we know full well that it is wrong, and we know this because the phenomenon of its wrongness is given to us directly in our ordinary sense of duty. But this does not help. We may be able, by turning to the phenomena, to assure ourselves that there is such a thing as wrongness or doing wrong. What we want to know, however, is what this wrongness amounts to, and Kant tells us nothing on that score. The categorical imperative is not an answer. It is only a sophisticated way of refusing to answer. ‘You ought because you ought,’ is all it says. A tyrant or a devil could easily avail himself of this command. Besides, we are hereby brought back to the same problem as before. The idea of wrongness has not now been explained but explained away. It has been reduced to the idea of being forbidden. At all events, to say, on this theory, that something is forbidden because it is wrong is to say that it is forbidden because it is forbidden.[10]

The trouble with this categorical imperative of duty is that it is far too categorical. The ‘ought’ has been so absolutized that it has been severed from any foundation in the good and knowledge of the good. It can only be obeyed blindly, if at all.[11]

[...]

…The first alternative, the Hobbesian alternative, appeals to the good of self-interest and the second, the Kantian alternative, appeals to an imperative that commands independently of any good, self-interested or otherwise. Neither alternative has turned out to be acceptable. The defect of the second was its failure to appeal to any good. The defect of the first was its appeal to a self-interested good. The obvious solution is to appeal to a good, but to a good that is not self-interested. The good appealed to must be an other-interested and other-directed good. In short, the good of others must become a primary and direct object of our action, and not a secondary and indirect one. Such a good will, because it is a good, ground an obligation and, because it is an other-directed good, ground an obligation to be other-directed and not self-directed. Thus it will, at the same time and by the same fact, avoid both the Kantian and the Hobbesian defects.

[9] Groundwork, GS, vol. 4, p. 401; see also Essay 2 above.
[10] Cf. the problems Euthyphro gets into with Socrates over the definition of piety and impiety in the Platonic dialogue of that name. See also Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil, part 5, and Genealogy of Morals, where this morality of the ‘ought’ is presented, so to say, as the fear of the slave pitched at the level of an ideological scream.
[11] See Essay 2 above. This same criticism of Kant was classically made by Max Scheler in his Formalism in Ethics, pp. 190-94. It is repeated by John Crosby, in his The Selfhood of the Human Person, p. 209. — Peter L. P. Simpson, “On Doing Wrong, Modern-Style,” in Vices, Virtues, and Consequences, pp. 66-8

That’s true — Bob Ross

And the point here is that opinions about vanilla ice cream are not moral judgments.

A belief never makes a moral judgment true. — Leontiskos

Why? Doesn’t me believing vanilla ice cream tastes good make it true that my stance is that ice cream tastes good? — Bob Ross

That's not a moral judgment, as you just admitted.

All reasoning for why a proposition is true is fallible; so I am not sure what you mean here. — Bob Ross

Your point depends on infallibility. You want to say that there are beliefs that are true simply in virtue of themselves existing. My point was that while infallible judgments do exist ("I feel pain"), they are not beliefs. We do not say, "I believe I feel pain." An infallible judgment is a matter of strict knowledge, not belief.

You would be wrong about that if you actually don’t believe it; — Bob Ross

I would be wrong whether or not I believe it. Belief makes no difference.

The statement “I love yogurt” can be true relative to me and false relative to you, because we need to know who we are referring to by ‘I’. — Bob Ross

Yes, and we are talking about predications regarding others, not predications involving only oneself. That's the whole point! "No one should torture babies," is not like, "I love yogurt." "I have brown hair," is not like, "Everyone has brown hair."

If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others. — Leontiskos

This is a straw man: if you disapprove it for everyone, then you disapprove it for everyone. Obviously, if you only disapprove of yourself doing something, then, of course, you don’t necessarily disapprove of it for other people. — Bob Ross

How is it a strawman when you agree with my claim entirely?

What do you mean by “personal/subjective reasons”? I would say that some propositions are made true in virtue of beliefs we have—e.g., “I believe people shouldn’t torture babies”, “I like chocolate ice cream”, etc. — Bob Ross

So then you think this is a rational exchange:

• Leontiskos: Why should I not torture babies?
• Bob Ross: Because I believe you shouldn't.

You are just begging the question with “justificatory force”: sure, I don’t approve of forcing someone to eat chocolate ice cream, but if I did then I wouldn’t have a problem with—hence approval/disapproval. — Bob Ross

Of course I am not. Does or does not the claim, "Because I believe you shouldn't," justify the question at hand? Either your belief justifies your claim or else it doesn't. If it does justify it then a perfectly rational Leontiskos would respond, "Ah, wonderful response. I am now convinced. You have justified your claim." I am concerned with what is rational and what is irrational.

The point here is that we have a moral claim that we know to be true, such as, "No one should torture babies." If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such a truth, then moral subjectivism is an inadequate moral theory. If moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify any universal moral truths, then moral subjectivism is a preposterous theory. If—as seems to be the case here—the moral subjectivist is able to do nothing more than assert their own personal beliefs, then clearly moral subjectivism is unable to rationally justify such truths.

You seem to be trading on the obvious truism that all our judgements are mind-dependent to draw the unwarranted conclusion that all existence must be mind-dependent. Existence and judgement are thus unjustifiably conflated. — Janus

Yes, quite right. :up:

For the classical realist the extramental world can be known in itself precisely through the rational, perspective-grounded mind. — Leontiskos

'I promise to give you a pie", uttered without. duress and so forth, places the speaker under an obligation to provide the pie. It brings about the obligation. — Banno

Indeed. I think John Searle's paper on the topic is quite good: ' How to derive "ought" from "is" ' (The Philosophical Review, Jan., 1964, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58). (link)

Is the best we've gotten, though. Im unsure you caught what i was trying to say.
I agree with you, in principle, but there has not been any account which does what you're positing to establish the truth of any moral statement. — AmadeusD

See:

The point here, though, is that belief qua belief is insufficient to justify moral claims.

I should say, this isn't true, and to the high, high statistical degree in which is does consist, it's mainly people pretending that they understand the work an expert has done, to accede to the expert's belief without saying as much. — AmadeusD

Yes, there are arguments from authority. But such a thing is more than mere belief. It is belief + authority.

↪Leontiskos Nice list. Yes, that's the way to proceed, looking at how the words around "obligation" are used rather than just making up a definition. — Banno

Thanks, I agree. I've lost the thread of this thread, and that's probably for the best. :grin: In any case, good posts in this thread. :up: I am reluctant to enter into the fray of these sorts of threads unless I see others arguing for sensible positions.

Is the only coherent justification for moral truth other than divine command presented, though. — AmadeusD

I was arguing that it is not coherent. No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede."

The moral realist will say that you should follow the moral precept because it is true. It is true that you should not torture babies. This route is open to justification and reasoning. Unlike belief, truth is a sufficient reason. A belief matters if it is true, and it is never true merely because it is believed.

If X in “Jane believes X” was “vanilla ice cream tastes good”, then I don’t think you have a hard time seeing why your analogy to math fails. — Bob Ross

But “Vanilla ice cream tastes good,” is nothing like, “One ought not torture babies.” Only from the latter can we infer something about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. According to your own definitions, the former is not a moral statement. Again, the simple fact that someone believes something cannot make anything permissible, omissible, or obligatory. This is all the more obviously the case when it comes to claims about other moral agents, such as the general permissibility of torturing babies.

The belief is what makes the judgment true in moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

A belief never makes a moral judgment true. “Why is it impermissible for me to torture babies?” “Because I believe it is.” That’s simply not a valid reason. No one is obliged to not-torture babies because you believe it to be so.

For example, let’s go back to the “Jane believes ice cream tastes good”: does this belief not in virtue of its own judgment make it true? I think so. — Bob Ross

The example is irrelevant because it is non-moral, having nothing to do with what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory.

But the tangential point is that you are confusing all sorts of things even in this case. “Jane believes ice cream tastes good,” is a third-person proposition, and what you say of it is obviously false. A first-person statement like, “I feel pain,” is infallible, but belief statements are not like this. To say, “I believe I feel pain,” is therefore already confused, and is therefore an unused sort of locution. The same holds with, “I enjoy ice cream”/“I believe I enjoy ice cream.” Infallible statements are usually not belief statements, and to make them so is to stretch the sense of 'belief'. But again, these are non-moral according to your definition in the OP.

I find nothing incoherent with “Jane believes everyone should not torture babies” even though it is only true relative to herself—I would imagine you beg to differ on that one (; — Bob Ross

Of course I differ. On your account Jane utters self-apparent falsehoods. If I said, “Leontiskos believes everyone has brown hair,” this would be a false statement, and particularly problematic insofar as I know that not everyone has brown hair. Saying that it is “true relative to myself” is a non-response. The statement is about people other than myself, and therefore its truth value must take into account more than just myself. Appeals to subjective reasons for supra-subjective claims are insufficient, and therefore irrational.

Cognitive approval/disapproval, — Bob Ross

The same contradiction arises here. If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others. And if I disapprove of it in others without sufficient reason to do so, then I am being irrational. Subjectivist reasons are insufficient reasons. It would be exactly as insufficient to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream because I like chocolate ice cream. This is irrational. Private reasons for public claims are irrational reasons. A public claim requires a public reason.

Look, do you yourself even think personal/subjective reasons are able to justify claims about other persons? The reason it is irrational to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream on the basis of my own idiosyncratic taste is because the putative reason does not have justificatory force for the sort of claim in question. This seems quite obvious, and I would be surprised if you are unwilling to admit it. Your deeper claim seems to be, "Yes, it is irrational. But your moral realism is irrational too, so I am justified in doing this." But even if moral realism were irrational, this would not justify you in doing irrational things.

The problem with @Michael’s approach is that it disregards one’s responsibility to argue for a coherent moral theory and not contradict oneself. Michael has admitted that his own holdings are self-contradictory, but he ignores this fact and instead just argues with everyone. That is, he argues with noncognitivists, error theorists, subjectivists, and moral realists alike. Since his own position is self-contradictory he feels himself at his rights to argue against all possible positions simultaneously. It turns into argument for the sake of argument, a form of eristic. It is the act of arguing against everything without simultaneously arguing for anything, all while ignoring or continually dismissing the fact that his holdings and his approach are incoherent in themselves. I say this is not philosophy, and that is why I do not wish to engage it.