Janus and Banno seem to believe that (2) means the exact same thing as (1), and so that (2) is true only if the proposition “it is raining” exists tomorrow. — Michael

No, I don't think so:

If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara. — Banno

This is a clear affirmation of truth where there is no proposition, and it is the basis of the discussion.

So I assume you disagree with the claim that truth is a property of sentences? — Michael

It depends what you mean by a sentence or a proposition. If I say, "It is true that it is raining," I am not talking about a sentence, I am talking about the truth of the presence of rain. Or else I am using a sentence to predicate a truth.

If truth is a property of sentences in a simplistic sense, then it is uncontroversial that where there are no sentences there is no truth. But we are talking primarily about minds, not sentences.

See also:

But what is at stake here is not reified and accidental propositions as you conceive them. We are asking about the relation between truths and minds. Either you think that there can be truths without minds or you don't. Either you think that there can be truths-about-what-exists without minds or you don't. — Leontiskos

Second, I don't think anyone wants to claim that "most people" had bought into the ethics that flow from "classical metaphysics," even when it was dominant. Due to the technological, political, and economic realities of the time "most people" were illiterate serfs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the key here is that in Plato's time a selfish doctrine was generally recognized as being unvirtuous and immoral. With Machiavelli we begin to see a societal shift towards embracing doctrines of selfishness.* So @J is right that the doctrine is represented in Plato, but the context surrounding that doctrine was quite different. Homer and Machiavelli represent different epochs. Ancient Athenians respected the individual, but they were not individualists.

Do we see the difference? It’s direction of motivation. Even though both persons’ actions have exactly the same consequences, one proceeds toward eudaemonia, the other proceeds toward right action. Kant thought this made all the ethical difference. I don’t completely agree, but laying it out in these terms is helpful, I hope. — J

This is a consequentialist reading of virtue ethics which is not at all in accord with actual, historical virtue ethics. It reads virtue as a means to happiness. It is the modern attempt at recovering virtue ethics that never actually overcame consequentialism.


* See Simpson's, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble."

I think he's saying that the sentence "X will exist" is true but the sentence "X exists" will not be true. — Michael

I think that's the same problem. It would seem that to say, "Tomorrow X will exist," involves saying, "Tomorrow it will be true that X exists."

Similarly:

You are trying to say something like, "X will exist but it will not be true that X will exist." — Leontiskos

Do you want to say that, "X will be true tomorrow," is different from, "Tomorrow, X will be true"? I don't see a proper distinction between the two. — Leontiskos

-

As an example of this, the sentence "language will die out" is true but the sentence "language has died out" can never be true. — Michael

This is commendably clear, but it comes up against the same problem. "Language will die out," implies that there will come a day when it is true that language has died out. Or to put it differently, you are presupposing that language is in some way transcendent; that it can make claims about what is beyond it.

Yet that does seem to be metaphysically possible. — Clearbury

Why does it seem that way to you?

I think, maybe, the problem is the naturalist assumption that the world is inherently intelligible, when it's actually not, because the principle of intelligibility is not internal to it. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think that's a fairly important point. :up:
This is also why a firm grounding for knowledge tends to escape naturalists (and especially materialists).

- Yes, that is a fair way to put it. We also want to ask whether it makes sense for someone to say that X will exist while simultaneously denying that it is true that X will exist. That move highlights the deep end of the truth pool.

As a classical theist I don't think things do exist in the absence of any minds (and particularly in the absence of the mind of God). I think the truth of creation is bound up in its intelligibility, which flows from its creator.

The atheist perhaps wants to say that truth emerges with the emergence of minds and disappears with the disappearance of minds, such that mind is accidental vis-a-vis the natural, as is truth.

So discussions such as this are often veiled theology. — Banno

Discussions in the religion forum are only "veiled" theology for those who don't know where they are.

It is worthwhile to ask whether free will is coherent on a naturalistic view. Approaches like Chomsky's "Mysterianism" are pulling on the same thread.

Philosophers tend to avoid use of ["good"]... — Outlander

Or maybe just Humeans avoid it. Ethicists who do not use the word or concept 'good' are probably not doing ethics at all.

The only way I can think of for “the good you do will also be good for you” to make sense with a single meaning for “good” is simply to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for “good”... — J

Have you noticed that you haven't produced an actual argument for your claim that the sentence is vacuous? You just keep asserting that it is so, without argument.* Timothy follows Aristotle and Aquinas in speaking about health:

When we speak of what health is for organisms generally and what health is "for you," why it is "healthy (for you) to be healthy," we are not speaking of two totally equivocal concepts, nor do I see how this analagous relationship would render "health" conceptually vacuous. — Count Timothy von Icarus

"Doing healthy things makes you healthy."

From memory, Aristotle will talk about at least three senses of health:

• Walking is healthy / broccoli is healthy [Cause of health]
• J's urine is healthy / J's bloodwork is healthy [Sign of health]
• J is healthy [Subsistent health or state of health]

Given that these are three different but interrelated senses, a claim like, "Healthy food will make you healthy," need not be vacuous. Do you have an argument for why you think any of the claims in question are vacuous?

If "healthy" is the same in both instances then the claim is vacuous; if "healthy" is different then the claim is equivocal. That is the argument that seems to underlie your thinking. And the answer is analogical predication: the two terms are neither univocal nor equivocal.

(Note that health is one kind of goodness.)

* Edit: I now see that you did give a Kantian argument here: .

Why do you think the truth is owed in the first place? Even moralists who prohibit lying seldom say such a thing. It's not at all clear what "eroding free will" means, but we very often omit the utterance of truthful statements for the sake of prudence.

- The contradiction is very much present in your posts. For example:

We can say it is true now or we can now say it is true that the planet will still exist when humanity is gone. There will be nobody to speak the truth when humanity is gone. There will be no truth or falsity then if truth is a property of propositions or judgements and there is then no mind to propose or judge.

Existence on the other hand does not depend on minds, propositions or judgements. — Janus

1. "We can say it is true now or we can now say it is true that the planet will still exist when humanity is gone."
   
   • "We can say it?" That is a very weak claim, given the way you are distinguishing between what can be said, what is true, and what exists. I am talking about truth, not what we can say.
2. "There will be nobody to speak the truth when humanity is gone."
   
   • Here you imply that there are truths where there are no human minds.
3. "There will be no truth or falsity then if truth is a property of propositions or judgements and there is then no mind to propose or judge."
   
   • Well are truth and falsity dependent on minds or not? You need to commit to a position.
4. "Existence on the other hand does not depend on minds, propositions or judgements."
   
   • Existence is only knowable via truth. We can't magically speak about existence apart from truth.

If we rely on common intuitions then of course we can talk about truths apart from human minds. But if we consider the matter carefully and think about what we mean by truth, then at least atheists should begin to question themselves. That's to say that the intuition you are pre-critically submitting yourself to is not an atheistic intuition (unless you have some theory about how truth exists apart from minds).

We would paraphrase the statement, and commonly understand it, as saying, "It will turn out to be a good thing for you if you do good things." — J

And you could paraphrase the health statement as, "Your health will improve* if you engage in healthy activities." I don't see any difference.

The point is that we don't say such a thing — J

Rather, the point is that we do. Trying to convince someone to engage in healthy behavior is just an extrapolation of that basic claim, and we do that sort of thing constantly.

If there were no akrasia and we were purely intellectual creatures then perhaps such statements would be useless, but as it happens we are not. As it happens we engage in unhealthy behaviors even though we desire health.

* Or else, "Your health will be robust/optimal if..."

- :up:

A few days ago Peter Singer did an informal interview where he defends moral realism, which is helpful given his atheism:

There is a difference between something's being the case and something being said to be the case. Pretty simple, but apparently not for you. — Banno

You are running in the same circles as Janus. The point has nothing to do with speech. It has to do with truth. You want something to "be the case" where no truth exists, which is incoherent.

No I'm not. I'll try one last time. We can say it is true now or we can now say it is true that the planet will still exist when humanity is gone. There will be nobody to speak the truth when humanity is gone. There will be no truth or falsity then if truth is a property of propositions or judgements and there is then no mind to propose or judge.

Existence on the other hand does not depend on minds, propositions or judgements. — Janus

But we've already been over this. To predicate existence of something is to predicate a truth. Is your claim about existence supposed to have nothing to do with truth? You're not thinking very deeply about this at all, and that's common and even to be expected. You are trying to say something like, "X will exist but it will not be true that X will exist." If we are careful then we cannot set truth to the side before going on to make ostensibly true statements.

- You and @Banno are simply contradicting yourselves. You think truth is and is not dependent on minds. I'm not sure what else there is to say here.

It's coherent to say 'it is true that the planet will still exist when humanity has become extinct'. — Janus

Then you're saying that there will be a truth without minds, if you think there are no non-human minds.

They are not saying the same thing; one says it is true now and the other says it will br true then. — Janus

You still haven't given any explanation of how one can make true statements about the future without claiming that something will be true in the future. These are the same unaddressed issues we faced at the very beginning of the conversation.

Right, the theist might say that God's will and God's judgement are all of a piece. — Janus

The theist need only say that God is or has a mind. Not hard.

- Maybe you should make a new movie where humans are enslaved, and then the protagonist comes along, and instead of trying to free them, merely tries to give them a choice as to whether or not they want to be enslaved. It seems like what you're after. It will be a terrible movie and no one will watch it. :kiss:

The evil is not giving people a choice. — Patterner

No, it's really not. I mean, sure, coercion is evil, but it's not at all the point of the movie. You seem like a liberal or libertarian who has tried to co-opt The Matrix for your own ideology. The Matrix has its limits, but it's much deeper than liberalism. The point in none of the movies is, "Let's give everyone a choice, and once they all have a choice then our goal will have been met." This is explicit in the fourth movie when attempts are made over and over again to get someone to accept a red pill.

Liberalism does not even approach Plato's Cave, and The Matrix is resonant with Plato's Cave.

- If you don't think red > blue then I'm not sure we watched the same movie. The goal of "freeing minds" is not to let them choose between red and blue - it is to free them from The Matrix. Sure they have to choose, but choosing is not in itself the point.

And if you object to a discussion about Cypher because he is not the protagonist, you shouldn't have brought him up. — Patterner

But that's why I brought him up. "You are beginning to look a lot like Cypher here." "Cypher is teh best!" :razz:

If the whole premise of The Matrix is that red pills are better than blue pills, then it's odd to argue from The Matrix that blue pills are the same as red pills.

- Cypher was nowhere near the protagonist. He is presented as an evil character who betrays his friends and chooses a false simulation over reality. I don't know how you can disagree with that.

Btw, it was started to give you a platform for explicitly discussing and defending an idea you often mention in passing, an idea you feel is often rejected out of hand. — Srap Tasmaner

In that case, my difficulty with the OP is that we are trying to get degrees out of the substance/mode binary. Maybe that can be done, but at face value it is implausible. Unless there are only two degrees.

The further purpose was to specifically not reject the idea out of hand and encourage others not to, and to set an example by trying to make sense of an idea I don't naturally have much affinity for, in my own clumsy way, of course. — Srap Tasmaner

And I appreciate that, too.

I find that sort of thing awfully interesting, but this thread is about what sort of existence properties have, whether things that have more property-types have more existence, and whether there's a truer realm beyond this one. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay.

Don't tempt me. I'll start a thread in your honor next. — Srap Tasmaner

:grimace:

Really, though, I've been egging you on to start a thread on logical pragmatism for awhile now. I am willing to oppose that, and you also have a stake in it.

- :up:

- What's odd to me about @Patterner's claim is that it is diametrically opposed to the entire thrust of the movie. He is saying that the Architect and the blue-pill takers are the ones who are right. Such is a different movie than the one that was released. Could Patterner release that new movie and make it plausible and palatable? I highly doubt it.

Now you want to do something a bit more, along the lines that if there are no minds, then there can be no propositions, and hence no true proposition. Quite right. But that again does not change the gold at Boorara. — Banno

How could it not? You want to say that if all minds ceased to exist, it both would and would not be true that there is gold in Boora. On the one hand you say that the truth (or the gold) must "stay the same." On the other hand, you say that there are no true propositions apart from minds.

"It would still be there," is a proposition which you hold to be true. At no point does, "It would still be there," become a non-proposition.

But what is at stake here is not reified and accidental propositions as you conceive them. We are asking about the relation between truths and minds. Either you think that there can be truths without minds or you don't. Either you think that there can be truths-about-what-exists without minds or you don't.

Just so you know, I am not planning to pursue this topic very far with you. I have reason to believe it is not something you want to discuss in depth.

I find this thread dizzying. I don't understand what anyone is saying or why anyone thinks their implicit inferences are valid. We are moving from 17th century theories of substance, to Platonic "degrees of reality," to Liberalism, to metaethics, to philosophical anthropology... If I asked Chat-GPT to write a post on a random topic and then posted it in this thread, I don't see how it could be off-topic. :halo:

Really no idea, at this point, why this OP got started. — Wayfarer

It feels like the Wild West. Or that movie, Everything Everywhere All at Once.

By just as real, I mean that, although the impulses reaching the brain do not originate in physical objects, the experiences of them are just as real. Cypher certainly agrees with me. He knows there is no physical steak at the other end of the impulses hitting his brain. But the origin of the impulses isn't important. What's important is the experience. As you say, he actually prefers, and chooses, the experiences he gets from the impulses that simulate physical things to the experiences he gets from impulses originating in physical things. — Patterner

Which is to say that Cypher thinks that The Matrix is more real than the real world, no? If your measurement is experience, and Cypher thinks The Matrix provides the superior experience, then Cypher thinks The Matrix is more real. That is why I said he disagrees with you (although I took you to be saying that the reality of each is equal, which may be different from what you were saying).

We just know, "don't do that or you will break it." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep, and this goes to @Srap Tasmaner's notion of "degenerate cases" (of, say, the material conditional). If one does not see logic as teleological, then there can be no degenerate or non-degenerate cases.

Note too that formal logic is supposed to involve no rules that require interpretation. But once we introduce "degenerate cases," we have introduced a rule or norm of logic that requires interpretation. This is why formalists dislike the notion of degenerate cases.

I've already addressed this objection — Janus

You haven't shown your defense to be coherent:

I'm not saying X will be true tomorrow, but that it is true now that X will be tomorrow. — Janus

"X will be tomorrow"? What does that mean, other than, "X will be true tomorrow?" As I said above, there are no existence predications which are not truth predications.

When my sister tells my nephew to eat his broccoli, he will push it around the plate. You are pushing the contradiction around in your system, without ultimately addressing it. You want to say that a claim about the future involves no claim about what will be true in the future, and that's not coherent.

Has it? It's used all over economics, pol sci, and other social sciences, e.g. the notion of "utility." It's all over organizational psychology, or other areas of psychology. It's used in biology in the form of "teleonomy" and "function." It's used everywhere in medicine and public health. It even shows up in the pedagogy of physics in the way that the properties of end states make them more likely (sometimes to the point of being, for all intents and purposes, determined) to occur. Even more reductionist biologists like Dawkins feel the need to rely on the idea (e.g. "archeo vs. neo purpose).

As the biologist J. B. S. Haldane observed: "Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her but he's unwilling to be seen with her in public." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. :up: Also logic, for those who don't think it is mere symbol manipulation.

Incorrect. — Michael

You should have read beyond the first few sentences of that post.

Go ahead and explain that. Some of us are uneducated. — Srap Tasmaner

Do you see how the motion of the last train car has more dependencies than that of the first (engine) car?

By the same token an atheist who believes that truth or falsity is a property of propositions, but that existence is not, can consistently say that something will exist, even in the absence of humans. but cannot consistently say that truth can be in the absence of propositions. — Janus

Except "that something will exist" is a propositional truth. So he hasn't managed to speak about existence apart from propositions and truth.

I have to run, but I will address the rest your post in the future.

I assume I get to be a substance in some sense, that I am not less real than my mother was because my existence is dependent on her having existed. — Srap Tasmaner

But her existence is equally dependent on her mother. Arguably, you are less real because you're farther back the line. The train engine is most real. The second car is second-most real. The third car is third-most real, etc. (And now ditch the linear paradigm.)

The idea seems simpler than many are making it. It's basically levels of ontological dependence (whether per se or per accidens). But then apparently we want to make it an extrapolation of Aristotle's distinction between substance and accident, and that's where things become more confusing. Still, the basic idea seems straightforward.

I already explained it. We can say something is true now about what would be in the future. Can we say it would be true in the future absent us? So if truth or falsity is a property of propositions and it is true that the gold will exist in the non-human future do you say it will also be true in that non-human future that there is gold when there are no propositions? — Janus

Do you want to say that, "X will be true tomorrow," is different from, "Tomorrow, X will be true"? I don't see a proper distinction between the two.

In other words I'm suggesting that truth is propositional and existence is not. — Janus

But is there an existence-claim that is not simultaneously a truth-claim? Can we talk about what exists apart from what is true?

Would God be capable of knowing what is true and what is false? — Janus

Sure, God knows the true from the false. A theist could uncontroversially say that even if all humans died, truth would remain.

And why does that make incest impermissible when there's no chance of procreation? — fdrake

I never said it was. I was answering your question about eugenics.

At the very least I would say that is impermissible on account of societal example and norms, but I'm not looking to have that conversation. It would at least require a more nuanced thread.

I'm afraid I don't understand. Are you saying eugenics is never immoral? — fdrake

I am saying that any form of eugenics which falls under the principle set out is not immoral/impermissible. To give you an example of this, when a couple with a genetic disease that will cause extreme hardship to their (future) progeny decides not to procreate, they are engaged in a permissible form of eugenics.

Cue schopenhauer1 in 3, 2, 1...

"Never being immoral" isn't the same thing as "being required not to". — fdrake

We are talking about when eugenics is permissible. Never immoral = never impermissible.

Alright, which forms are eugenics are good and which are bad? — fdrake

I would apply the principle that it is never immoral to abstain from copulation in view of the extreme hardship that would result on the part of the person conceived. Rare diseases and the deformities that can result from incest certainly fall under this umbrella.