I find both moral realism and moral subjectivism to be fairly nauseating, but my own touchstones on the subject of morality are so far removed from these ways of thinking that bringing them in would just derail the thread. — Joshs

I am not surprised that you would pat yourself on the back like this, with no account in sight. It occurs constantly. I find your own thoughts on most subjects to be vacuous, and yes, thread-derailing. For example, your post <here> was one of the most unintelligent things I have read on this forum. I think I'll start my New Year's resolution early by ignoring the vacuous back-patter. :wink:

Anyway, I gave a serious response to your question. — wonderer1

I don't think you managed to address the central question. Do you believe that we ought not hold contradictory positions, or do you disagree?

Your argument was that contradictions inevitably occur, and therefore they are not bad. Wounds also inevitably occur. Are they bad? Should they be avoided? Should we apply bandage and salve, or leave them to fester?

I see the atheist trolls have begun to arrive (, ).

So to say that something is moral is to say that it is just? That just shifts the question to a new mystery. — Michael

I already told you: "interpersonal 'oughts'." :roll:

A3 is a true interpersonal 'ought'.

I'm going to focus on the thing you say is not the focus:

I think we probably should [listen to our conscience]... — hypericin

If you think we should listen to our conscience, then your theory of conscience is normative, and it is a "moral theory" (). You add "probably," but this is the tentativeness that I addressed earlier on:

To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting. It doesn't matter whether we "think," "suggest," "opine," "suppose," "admonish," "argue," "force," et al. In each case the judgment of action is occurring (moral judgment). Tentative judgments are still judgments. Abductive judgments are still judgments (judgments to the best possibility, or judgments from significantly limited information). Judgments which are open to correction or revision are still judgments.

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude. — Leontiskos

Are there moral facts, and if so are they objective? I believe there are, and that they are subjective. You believe they are objective. The goal is a description of what these purported "moral facts" are, and how they operate. "Moral facts" involve "should", "ought", so in that sense they are the focus. But the idea is to describe, not prescribe. — hypericin

But if a theory is using 'ought' in a non-normative way, then it is "denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder" (). 'Ought' is a normative term. Do you really say that 'ought' is a non-normative term?

Further, starting with conscience and calling it a non-normative reality is a fraught way to begin such an account, given that conscience is universally accepted to be the very thing that we should listen to. "People do listen to their conscience, but I am not saying that you should listen to it." It feels like bait in a trap.

Please note that when I spoke about the law of non-contradiction and the first principle of practical reason, I was clear that they are normative/obligatory (). Conscience is an exact parallel, perhaps influenced by my examples, and yet you pivot in the opposite direction and call it non-normative/non-obligatory. In law and morality conscience is thought to be so binding that it is said that an erring conscience binds, i.e. one must listen to their conscience even if their conscience is wrong. This is why "conscience rights" prescind from whether the conscience is right or wrong. Such laws recognize that asking someone to disobey their conscience would be a grave assault on them.

These are your questions, not mine. I think we probably should, but that is not the focus here. — hypericin

But what is the focus, if not 'shoulds', 'oughts', and the "I thinks" of subjectivism?

Yes, people often do listen to their conscience. Conscience is just how one's moral sensibility expresses itself to ourselves. "Listening to one's conscience" means acting according to our moral sensibility. — hypericin

But do you see how you are toeing the line between normativity and non-normativity, which I have complained about several times throughout this thread?

Should we act according to our moral sensibility or not? Should we listen to our conscience or not? Should we follow the majority or not? Is this a normative theory or not? At some point clarity and precision need to be brought to the position you are advocating so that we know what you are saying and what you are not saying. If that doesn't happen then I will try to follow you in one direction or another, and then four posts down the road you will complain that I am misrepresenting your position, saying that it is not normative at all. "The first thing I would want to know about any theory is whether it intends to be normative."

- Okay, so you are saying that it is not that one should listen to their conscience, but rather that people often do listen to their conscience? So we have a sort of statistical idea? Something like, "Lots of people listen to the advice of their parents. I am not saying that anyone should do so, only noting that a lot of people do."

No. I would say not that one should listen to their conscience, but that one does. — hypericin

Is it possible to ignore and act contrary to your conscience?

I think that is a fine description of moral obligation. — hypericin

:up:

In the sense of obligation you described, how does moral subjectivism fail to provide "true obligations", where moral subjectivism is defined as "moral values and judgements are personal, but are deeply informed by both enculturation (moral training) and moral instincts (empathy and a sense of justice/fairness)." — hypericin

Well, here's the dilemma again:

If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then [...] If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then [...] — Leontiskos

You said:

Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost.

Also, I'll note that anti-realist theories seldom if ever intend to be normative. — hypericin

You say that a subjective conscience morality is normative, but that anti-realist theories (including subjectivism) seldom if ever intend to be normative. Is your subjective conscience theory intended to be normative?

The first thing I would want to know about any theory is whether it intends to be normative.

(I don't think @Banno or myself have been equivocating between theories about morality and moral theories; I think it is the subjectivists who are doing this. Therefore I would like them to be candid about whether their theory is intended to be normative.)

I have rewritten the OP to reflect the developing changes in my moral subjectivist view as I have conversed with many people on this forum: the original OP is at the button titled ‘Original OP’ for archive purposes. The purpose of the revamped edition is to provide a full defense of moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

You shouldn't just rewrite the OP and the title of a thread after 30+ pages of discussion. I'd say this shouldn't even be allowed, but I realize the forum can't currently enforce edit-timers. I'd suggest changing it back instead of giving the mods a headache with strange cases like this. If you want to rewrite your OP from scratch then make a new thread.

(This is a great real-time example of an 'ought', by the way)

Do you think it is a moral failure for people to have inconsistent beliefs? — wonderer1

"Things which we know (or believe) to be bad or evil are things that we know we oughtn't do." We know it is bad or evil to simultaneously hold contradictory propositions, and therefore we know we ought not do so. Whether one wants to call this a moral failure will depend on their definition of moral. I have given two definitions, one which would apply and one which would not.

What do you think?

Thanks for pointing it out: now rather than just some random thought I have some questions and readings for figuring out the questions! — Moliere

Sure. :up:

Interesting!

So clearly there are some differences in thought on willpower, at least if we take your reading of Aristotle and my reading of Epicurus as a starting point of comparison. At least this seems to me to be a clear point of disagreement in how we're thinking right now. — Moliere

Yes, well those comments about willpower were not really Aristotelian, haha. I was just applying my own notion from common sense. I suppose I would want ask, if willpower is just an inclination, then why do we give it a special name? What is distinctive about it?

Speaking specifically about Aristotle, this question of the will gets tricky. In some ways it would be safe to say that for Aristotle a dog pursues its desires through its mobility, its five senses, etc. The human being, in addition to these, pursues its desires through reason. So Aristotelians sometimes speak of the will as the "rational appetite," or the "appetitive reason," or something like that. In any case, it is the aspect of the human being which is bound up with desire and "movement."

Hrrrm... I'm wondering to what extent that their theories of happiness are also at odds, or if it makes sense to say that Epicurus' theory of happiness is an activity -- but a different activity. Your assertions have caused doubt in my understanding of Aristotle, though, so I acknowledge that I'd have to do more homework to make an assertion either way here. — Moliere

For Aristotle virtue is a disposition towards acting well, and to act well—to exercise one's powers and faculties in an optimal manner and towards the proper goals—is to be happy. Someone who possesses the dispositions (virtues) but never exercises them is not happy.

I'm wondering to what extent we could make the claim that ataraxia is a state of mind or an activity -- I know that the passive/active distinction was shared among philosophers at the time, but I'd have to go do homework to feel confident in making an assertion either way. — Moliere

Yes, that would be interesting to know.

b) (as suggested by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward categorical imperatives is vacuous, and — Michael

You could think of obligations in terms of punishment and reward if you like. "If you do that you will suffer," or, "If you do that you will regret it." I don't think this captures the full sense, but it is something.

Then perhaps you could explain what obligations "truly" are. — Michael

Perhaps the answer is that moral language is complex and cannot be adequately explained by a single metaethics. — Michael

Note that in that thread you give a disjunctive syllogism. You say something like, "Obligation could be x, y, or z, but since it is none of those things we are in a pickle" (you speak about "a moral claim's truth conditions").

To me, this is like saying, "The car could be red, green, or blue, but since it is none of those things it has no color." But what if there are other colors? What if obligation is not reducible to descriptive facts, or modal logic (necessitation), or mechanistic science? What if teleology and orderedness exists?

If we accept the is-ought distinction one might be tempted to think that the only possible ground of morality is brute 'oughts'. But what if there are other realities which are neither is/ought, but which ground 'oughts'? I am thinking of something like the nature of suffering. Once we experience suffering and come to understand what it is, then A1 follows, and A1 is an 'ought'. Thus there is a tertium quid between valueless 'is' truths and 'ought' truths.

The response here is apparently, "Well A1 doesn't fit into my categories, therefore I reject it." Of course it doesn't fit into your categories! That's the whole point. Your categories are too narrow, and there are obvious truths which burst those categories.

Well, which is it, do you think? Are they the same or are they different? — Moliere

I wouldn't doubt that they are different, but it is not right to say they are so different that for Aristotle willpower suffices for happiness. He certainly does not think that. I don't know enough about Epicurus to say where the exact differences lie.

And I am saying I don't believe there must be willpower in place for someone to desire change. I'd go so far as to say a person has to want change, but that there are those without willpower and those are the cases in the most need of help. — Moliere

I'd say that to want change is to exercise willpower.

Willpower is an odd concept -- what is it to act against an inclination other than to be inclined this way? And I'd say some people are so abled, so inclined, and some are not. — Moliere

I think that if willpower is anything it is an expression of agency, and to confuse agency with an inclination is not right. The agent and their will is what stands over inclinations.

If they don't go see the doctor, for instance, the doctor can go see them. — Moliere

Perhaps, but in this case we are talking about a fundamentally different reality.

Let me put it this way. For Aristotle happiness is an activity. It is bound up with a person's agency. To say that a doctor could perform a brain surgery and make someone happy is to make happiness a passivity, a kind of imposable state. A contemporary objection to this idea comes in the form of the "experience machine," which would make one utterly "happy" and is nevertheless rejected.

It might be helpful if you substantiate your notion of "obligation". I'm not aware of any normative account where moral imperatives are literally obligatory. If so there would be no moral questions, people would simply act as morality dictates.

Even if morality were a subjective matter, just personal preference, your own conscience carries a normative weight, and violating it comes at a cost. — hypericin

I would say that in the realm of speculative reason there is the law of non-contradiction, which no one directly denies, but which they do indirectly deny. Are we obliged to obey the law of non-contradiction? Yes, I think so. Are we necessitated to obey it? Yes and no. People contradict themselves, but not directly and on purpose. See my conversation with .

The same holds in the realm of practical reason. Things which we know (or believe) to be good are things that we know we ought to do. Things which we know (or believe) to be bad or evil are things that we know we oughtn't do. Are we obliged to obey this first principle of practical reason? Yes, I think so. Are we necessitated to obey it? Yes and no. People do what they believe to be evil, but not directly and on purpose. They justify evil acts by re-specifying them according to some other perspective, and in relation to a highly desirable end.*

So although we know A3, there are nevertheless times when we cause suffering in unjust ways, and when we do this we are "looking away" from, or failing to apply our obligation, just as when someone contradicts themselves they are "looking away" from, or failing to apply the law of non-contradiction. We know that obeying things like the law of non-contradiction and A3 is required of us, but we are nevertheless capable of distracting ourselves from this obligation and carrying out bad acts, in both the speculative and practical realms.


* For example, "[Kant's] own rigoristic convictions on the subject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as "a lie in such-and-such circumstances"). His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it" (Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," p. 2).

Again, I don't know what "moral" means. — Michael

Well, if we define morality according to justice, as the realm of interpersonal 'oughts', then A3 is a moral truth.

I don't know what "moral" means so I can't answer. — Michael

That's odd, given that you have consistently objected that my claims are non-moral. How do you object on the basis of a concept you do not know?

It's pragmatic, sure. So what else is there? — Michael

You spoke of ordinary language. Is, "Do not needlessly cause others to suffer," moral according to your understanding of ordinary language?

And that needs to be explained, not simply asserted. — Michael

I think you're just being contentious at this point. You consistently refuse the burden of proof, refuse to give substantive answers, and nitpick everything that is said.

You say A1 is not 'moral' by the mysterious definition you have consistently refused to provide. What about A3? Is that 'moral'?

A1. Ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for myself
A2. Others are like me
A3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for others — Leontiskos

What does choosing not to volunteer to fight in Ukraine have to do with ethics? — Michael

The idea here is probably that the act involves a moral omission.

Seems inconsistent with ordinary language. — Michael

I should say that I am perfectly open to the definition of morality as justice (i.e. pertaining to interactions with others). Normative justice claims, if you like. I think either definition is fine, but the justice definition is closer to ordinary usage.

Why introduced a new ontological category of "moral" facts? What purpose do they serve? — Michael

Ask Kant.

You seem to be in a position parallel to Corvus, who denies certainty of the "external world" while interacting with it through the forums. — Banno

I think you may agree with me that Kant's epistemology was as impossible as his moral theory, and I would say, with Simpson, that this is no coincidence. Granted, the epistemological problems preceded Kant, but he managed to fit morality into that square circle.

I'm only saying that "pragmatic" and "moral" don't mean the same thing. — Michael

I am repeating myself, but I think the moral and the normative are the same. I don't think there are non-moral 'oughts'. I also don't think 'ought' claims that admit of exceptions are non-moral (hence my "ceteris paribus"). I think consequentialism is a moral theory. I think the Kantian understanding of morality expressed by your thread is vacuous, and I think our culture labors under it needlessly.

I think you need to read Simpson's, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble." — Leontiskos

(I'm probably going to leave it there for now. I'm a bit tired of this fast-food approach to philosophy.)

You're the one who said that not causing suffering is both pragmatic and moral, so I'm asking you what you mean when you say this. — Michael

But you're the one who objected that something cannot be pragmatic and moral in the first place, so obviously the burden is on you. You are the one claiming that there is some distinction. I don't even know what it means to say that something cannot be pragmatic and moral. I don't know what definition of 'moral' could account for such a strange approach.

Else, getting away from Ross' language, I would say moral anti-realism is the idea that, <There are no moral propositions that are binding on all>, or what I count as the same thing, <There are no normative propositions that are binding on all>. — Leontiskos

- What's with these popcorn replies? Are you reading my posts? I said:

I don't know what you mean by 'moral', and I don't think you do either. — Leontiskos

You replied:

But I'm asking about morality. — Michael

What do you mean by it? Apparently you mean <things we should do for no reason at all> (). Are you surprised that you haven't discovered any things we should do for no reason at all?

I accept that I have a pragmatic reason to not cause myself suffering. But what do you mean by saying that we also have a moral reason to not cause myself suffering? What does the term "moral" add? And what evidence or reasoning suggests that, in addition to being pragmatic, avoiding suffering is also moral? — Michael

I don't think you know what you mean by 'moral' any more than Kant did.

Here's the question: Do you agree with me that, ceteris paribus, one ought not cause suffering for themselves? Remember, I am concerned with binding normative propositions (). I don't know what you mean by 'moral', and I don't think you do either.

Did you really mean to write that? — Banno

See:

By pushing further, you are effectively saying, "But what if there is no reason for your moral claim?" ... If there were no reason then the possible worlds could not differ, and the morality in question would be otiose. But there always is a reason. "X is moral/immoral for no reason at all," is not a coherent claim. — Leontiskos

This is the fruit of Kant. :meh:

Kant only secures the nobility and freedom associated with morality at the cost of shifting both into a sphere that lies completely beyond human grasp. The free acts of the will that constitute moral goodness and moral choice are beyond human explanation and comprehension. — Peter L. P. Simpson, Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble, p. 16

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction. — Michael

I started to sketch out a thread relating to your dilemma, but I am finding that I am simply covering ground Simpson has already covered better. Still, here is something I say in that sketch:

Objection 1. [The is-ought problem]

Reply to Objection 1. The way my favorite Thomists address the is-ought problem is by granting the is/ought distinction but denying the fact/value distinction (or something to this effect). It is not possible to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, and the idea that there are brute ‘oughts’ is implausible. But if there are self evident “values,” or teleological realities which also implicate the human mind, then ‘oughts’ will naturally flow from these. And they do. The two arguments in the OP are two examples. Once we know what suffering is we know we ought to avoid it. The same would hold of ‘injury’, which is the more robust concept. — Leontiskos' draft

So let's take an example that more or less grants the modern paradigm (and for that reason I am tempted to strike it from my draft):

• A1. Ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for myself
• A2. Others are like me
• A3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for others

In your other thread you ask if something like A1 is a moral claim or a pragmatic claim (). Let's just leave your notions of "naturalism" and "non-naturalism" to the side for a moment. Why can't it be both? And more fundamentally, do you believe it to be true or do you believe it to be false?

That suffering ought to be avoided should not be a contentious claim. "Suffering ought to be sought" is a sort of synthetic contradiction (). We might choose suffering for some ulterior reason, but we never do (and never should) choose suffering as an end in itself.

What I want to say is, "Let this truth reorganize your flawed system. Your system says that there are no normative truths, but this argument disproves that thesis, and therefore the system is flawed" (). Of course this is very hard for people to do, for it requires overthrowing the entire modern way of doing moral philosophy (and philosophy of mind). Wayfarer was clearly not able to do it in that thread. That's why I offered stepping stones in my earlier post ().

That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction.

I have something like a visceral acceptance of such categorical imperatives but I cannot rationally accept the almost magical, wishful thinking of them. — Michael

I think you need to read Simpson's, "Autonomous Morality and the Idea of the Noble." There are some people in this thread who are laboring under the intuitions of modern moral philosophy without understanding the origins. There are others who are also working from that framework while also understanding the origins, and who possess a bit of skepticism about the approach. My post about Simpson, Diem, et al. was directed to the latter group. The knot needs to be loosened before it can be untied.

- Sounds good J. I'd be curious to hear what you think, either publicly or privately.

Also, very interesting. I have a good number of Catholics friends who are practicing, and as best i can tell, they practice virtue ethics. I should probably say, if their calculations conflict with a piece of scripture they can bring to mind at the time, then that raises obstacles... — AmadeusD

Well, you're affirming the consequent of (1). That one practices virtue ethics does not mean that one denies religiously based ethics.

Granted, that doesn't say much about Catholic tradition... — AmadeusD

I'm Catholic. How do you think we could send atheists to Hell if they don't know right from wrong? :joke:

Interesting. Working through this post and it's references (only insofar as they are directly relevant and retrievable) I got the feeling that I agree with Schopenhauer on the nature of obligations, but didn't think it required any kind of relegation to theology to support. — AmadeusD

So the formalization that has pointed out is in an archived SEP article:

Here is the straightforward interpretation in simple modus ponens form:

(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2a) Religious based ethics is false (at least for her interlocutors)
(3a) Therefore, virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy should be developed.

But one person’s modus ponens is another person’s modus tollens:

(1) If religiously based ethics is false, then virtue ethics is the way moral philosophy ought to be developed.
(2b) It is not the case that virtue ethics is the way to develop moral philosophy
(3b) Therefore, it is not the case that religiously based ethics is false. — SEP | Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe

But the central premise of the argument is something like this:

3. There are no obligations without a rule-giver — Michael

-

Having not read Anscombe, but knowing she was a Catholic, that seems more like protecting the roost than it does actual historicity (which i guess Richter points on half of). — AmadeusD

Not actually, given that Anscombe's thesis is contrary to mainstream Catholic tradition, and she inevitably knew this. Ironically, Anscombe is going against Catholicism in this case. But it does look that way to the uninitiated. I think this provided two important motivations for Anscombe to write a very tight article and argument, for she would have to defend herself on two fronts.

Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"

This remains for me the central and most troubling article in Ethics. It's what drove me to virtue ethics. — Banno

That thread looks interesting, but instead of resurrecting it I am just going to make a one-off comment or two here. I was looking through a few things and I found a book by Duncan Richter, Anscombe's Moral Philosophy. In chapter three he comments on this debate, and I will just point out one or two things that popped out at me.

He notes that several philosophers have drawn attention to Anscombe's antecedents who have made very similar claims, two being Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein:

Every ought is . . . necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward. . . . But if those conditions are thought away, the concept of ought or obligation is left without any meaning: and so absolute obligation is certainly a contradicto in adjecto. . . . Putting ethics in an imperative form as a doctrine of duties, and thinking of the moral worth or worthlessness of human actions as the fulfillment or violation of duties, undeniably spring, together with the obligation, solely from theological morals, and accordingly from the decalogue.[42]

42. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality, trans. E. Payne (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), 55-56, quoted in Roger Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, in O’Hear, 75-93, 77, note 7. — Schopenhauer criticizing Kant

“what does the word ‘ought’ mean? A child ought to do such-and-such means that if he does not do it something unpleasant will happen. Reward and punishment. The essential thing is that the other person is brought to do something. “Ought” makes sense only if there is something lending force and support to it—a power that punishes and rewards. Ought in itself is nonsensical.”[50]

50. This is Wittgenstein according to Friedrich Waismann in Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, trans. Schulte and McGuinness, Oxford, 1979, 118, quoted in Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’ ” The Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 20-41, 32-33, note 10. — Wittgenstein

Richter argues that there are important instances of early non-religious philosophers who maintain strong obligations, including Aristotle and Cicero. Richter is arguing in large part from scholarly authorities, but I think he is surely correct. For example:

To conclude: Anscombe’s conceptual thesis is based on an historical claim—that the moral Ought is a Christian product. Cicero’s On Duties demonstrates that this is false. Analogues of the modern moral concepts antedate Christianity. Her argument for giving up the moral Ought fails since it is founded on factual error.[54]

54. Charles Pigden, “Anscombe on ‘Ought,’ ” The Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 40. — Charles Pigden

I think this is a rather important point. Richter's book is sympathetic to Anscombe, so after admitting that the argument has force, he says:

...But Anscombe’s thoughts on the cause of the problem are speculative. Her main claim is that contemporary philosophers use words such as ‘ought’ in bad ways. Nothing about Cicero can disprove this. If Anscombe is making much the same claim about ‘ought’ as Wittgenstein made, after all, then it is noteworthy that there is nothing historical in what Wittgenstein is reported to have said. It is true that Anscombe’s history is questionable (I am not saying that it is wrong). It is not true that this matters much except to historians and, perhaps, Catholic propagandists (of whom Anscombe was undoubtedly one). But if the best defense that I can offer of Anscombe’s history is that it is irrelevant to her main point, then we should perhaps return to that point. — Duncan Richter, Anscombe's Moral Philosophy, ch. 3

He of course goes on to explain her "main point."

Anscombe is a careful thinker and writer, and I think she could be defended in various ways, but the point for our purposes is that, although her dilemma is pressing, her historical thesis is flawed. The second paper by Peter Simpson that I referenced is meant to identify the historical lineage of just this sort of dilemma, which is acute for the modern tradition ().

(This is also very much related to 's older thread, particularly the quote above from Schopenhauer.)

I apologise :P

At least i now have some understanding, and grasp what i'm denying :sweat: — AmadeusD

No worries. :smile: The difficulty is that SEP is trying to take all sorts of significantly different views and fit them into neat categories. To some extent this works, and to some extent it doesn't. We've become hung up on the edge cases, and I would say needlessly. Michael is interested in the taxonomy, but in general I would prefer just focusing on the views that participants actually hold.

Ok. That all makes sense. It's sounds like more of a long term project than a thread, hence the large bibliography. — Banno

Right. I don't really expect anyone to engage those ideas here. I mostly wanted to have something to point to when people ask me about the crux at the heart of Anscombe's paper, and this seemed as good a place as any other.

By the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't objective/absolute/intrinsic/inherent/unconditional/categorical or however you want to phrase it. — Michael

I would say that, by the very substance of anti-realist metaethics, obligations aren't obligatory. If the anti-realist theory intends to be normative, then this makes it incoherent. If the anti-realist theory intends to be merely descriptive, then it is denying the existence of true obligations and substituting some faux placeholder. Folks in this thread flip back and forth between those two options, wanting to have their cake and eat it, too; to have obligations while simultaneously holding that nothing is truly obligatory.

I think the problem is that you have a realist conception of the meaning of "ought" that you (rightly) find incompatible with an anti-realist conception, but your seeming suggestion that anti-realist obligations aren't "real" obligations is begging the question. — Michael

Remember when you yourself made the same point I am making? See:

We can also defend this with reference to Wittgenstein. In our ordinary language use, as understood by any competent speaker, when someone claims that one ought not X we understand them as attempting to express an objective fact. As such, moral subjectivism is inconsistent with ordinary language use, and so it must be that if moral statements are truth-apt then either moral realism or error theory is correct. — Michael

-

The only possible meaningful obligations are those that are conditional on some relevant rule-giver. Asking why one ought obey this rule-giver is a meaningless question given the actual meaning of "ought". — Michael

I don't think so, but you are free to develop this.

I agree with @Banno that glancing blows on moral realism are occurring. I gave my account earlier:

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. — Leontiskos

Else, getting away from Ross' language, I would say moral anti-realism is the idea that, <There are no moral propositions that are binding on all>, or what I count as the same thing, <There are no normative propositions that are binding on all>. Of course, I haven't insisted on this definition in the thread, but each time these equivocations occur I point to it. It may not divide things up in quite the same way, but I think it helps get at what we are actually interested in discussing.

I think this may help avoid these strange ideas where "ought" is entirely redefined, or what is said to be "obligatory" is very clearly non-obligatory. Meta-ethics is, in part, about what 'ought' means, but it is very obvious that it does not mean, "Society says not to" (). You yourself have agreed with this: .

This thread is fast becoming inane. I suggest you take your recent, thoughtful post and start a new thread, perhaps setting out your thesis in a bit more detail. — Banno

Yes, but the first thread I drafted when I arrived was on this very topic. The post was more or less finished, but I realized I wouldn't have time to actually field a thread on the topic so I postponed, and the same holds now. So that post can just be a placeholder and/or a point of reference for those who desire a way to circumvent Anscombe's argument in Modern Moral Philosophy.

I have thought of trying to pare it down to make it a smaller and more manageable thread, but these topics attract so many replies and knee-jerk reactions that I would almost prefer a back-alley discussion - haha. In any case, maybe over Christmas break I will try to set out a simple sub-thesis.

↪Michael Ok. That was not clear. — Banno

Because the 'ought' requires scare quotes: <'One "ought" do X' is true when everyone believes it's true.>

It is a kind of definition or stipulation: <"One ought do X" iff everyone believes it's true.>