A better reason for claiming that incest should not be considered as permissible is that the conditions for consent to it don't make that much sense, the hypothetical scenario in the OP is not representative of the scenarios where incest occurs. It's a bit like saying that murder is permissible since there are conditions in which killing is permissible. — fdrake

This presupposes beforehand that there is something wrong with it. We don't worry about "conditions for consent" when it comes to neutral acts.

You have to be really careful using principles like that, because as written they provide support for eugenics. — fdrake

The prohibition on incest is a form of eugenics, and that's okay.

The argument here that better logicians have made includes a condition, namely the condition that no procreation is possible (e.g. a couple that is infallibly known to be sterile).

- So we have a duty to bring about uniquely bad lives?

(I'm leaving this thread now :grimace:)

I really don't understand what you're saying. I'm saying those inside the Matrix are having real experiences, are facing real choices, and are making real decisions. — Patterner

You said:

I think living in the Matrix would be just as real as living in the real world. — Patterner

Who agrees with you?

Not Morpheus, Trinity, Neo, etc. Not Cypher. He thinks the Matrix is better than the real world, but not "just as real." Not the people who choose the blue pill - they have no way to compare the Matrix to the real world. And presumably no one at all who takes a red pill would say that the Matrix is just as real as living in the real world.

So what basis do you have to say that it is just as real?

It's willful engagement in behavior that is likely to produce an unsafe condition of elevated likelihood for birth defects. "Life is better than no life" would not be a way to justify drinking alcohol during pregnancy or competing in a boxing competition while pregnant. Why would it be any different in this scenario? — Outlander

:up:

Agree, I think; correct me if I have this wrong: by metalogical I take you to mean a logical "move" (such as MP) that is not identical to its truth function. — NotAristotle

Yes, something like that.

If all valid arguments use the material conditional, arguments with some false premises could seem to still have a true conclusion.

But this seems wrong, at least to me. If any premises are false, a valid argument will result in a conclusion that is necessarily false, according to my non-standard understanding of validity in an informal context. — NotAristotle

<A valid argument with a false premise will result in a false conclusion>

That seems intuitively correct. This may be close to what @Count Timothy von Icarus was fishing for. The idea is that valid arguments preserve falsity, and not just truth.

But in fact this does not turn out to be correct. For a counterexample, <All bugs are mortal; Socrates is a bug; Therefore, Socrates is mortal>. More generally, explosion will yield truths and falsehoods alike.

were you to exclude [F, F] as a degenerate case — NotAristotle

This paragraph is unclear to me, but the degenerate case of the material conditional that I am thinking of is [F X]. [F F] does not strike me as degenerate.

What is at stake here is a direction of evaluation. "The antecedent is false, therefore the conditional is true," is parallel to, "The premise is false, therefore the argument is valid." It is not the value of the conclusion that is at stake, but the validity of the argument (which has to do with guarantees regarding the value of the conclusion).

In any case, I am not sure I agree that an argument is MP in any formulation, as putting an argument in terms of MP would seem to lead to the result that every argument had an "infinite regress" of premises. — NotAristotle

I think every argument does have an "infinite regress" of premises in that way. This is just to say that logical inference (modus ponens) is not capturable in formal or truth-functional language. Trying to capture it in that schema results in an infinite regress.

More simply, modus ponens can be thought of as "follows from," and every inference relies on the notion of "follows from."

In the quote you provide, what are the modes referred to? — Srap Tasmaner

From @Wayfarer's source:

For the philosophers we will discuss, at the very deepest level the universe contains only two kinds or categories of entity: substances and modes. Generally speaking, modes are ways that things are; thus shape (for example, being a rectangle), color (for example, redness), and size (for example, length) are paradigm modes. As a way a thing is, a mode stands in a special relationship with that of which it is a way. Following a tradition reaching back to Aristotle’s Categories, modes are said to exist in, or inhere in, a subject. Similarly, a subject is said to have or bear modes. Thus we might say that a door is the subject in which the mode of rectangularity inheres. One mode might exist in another mode (a color might have a particular hue, for example), but ultimately all modes exist in something which is not itself a mode, that is, in a substance. A substance, then, is an ultimate subject. — 17th Century Theories of Substance | IEP

The mistake you are making is failing to notice the difference between "is true" and "would be true". It is true for us now that there would be gold etc., even if all percipients were wiped off the face of the Earth. That is not the same as to say it would be true that there is gold even if all percipients etc. — Janus

That is a very thin attempt at an explanation. What are the two putatively different claims, how are they different, and which one am I supposed to be making?

Actually it surprises me that being a theist you don't believe it would still be true because God would be there to know it. — Janus

Banno makes that statement as an atheist who is presumably not assuming non-living minds (whether or not God counts as a non-living mind).

The circularity is, interestingly, a result of the structure of the argument, not because of any specific premise. — NotAristotle

Yes, but I think that all arguments are, structurally, modus ponens. This goes back to the earlier point about whether all arguments are modus ponens, or whether all arguments utilize a material conditional. Tones is claiming that the metalogical inference uses a material conditional, and is not merely a modus ponens, and that this is why he thinks inconsistent premises automatically* make an argument valid.

1. If MP could be false, then RAA could be false.
2. But RAA is not false.
3. Therefore neither is MP. — NotAristotle

You're right that the conclusion utilizes modus tollens, but here is the way that modus ponens is operating metalogically:

• (1 ^ 2) → 3
• (1 ^ 2)
• ∴ 3

When I deny that the '→' in the first premise is a material conditional, what I mean is that no legitimate metalogical move is available whereby the degenerative uses of the material conditional are utilized. It is only the logical connector needed for a modus ponens, not a material conditional in its full degenerative sense. So there is no permissible metalogical argument as follows:

• (1 ^ ~1) → 2
• ∴ 2

* Note that "automatically" is my word, not Tones'. Let us preempt his quibble.

Is it viciously circular? — NotAristotle

See my post <here> and the excerpt contained therein <here>.

The effect issue is sort of ancillary. The issue is that 1 only follows from 2 given elements of logic that seem to be more a bug than a feature—that do not comport with common standards of "good reasoning." — Count Timothy von Icarus

In Aristotelian terms, we would say that (1) is a proper accident of validity. It is not the essence of validity, and yet every valid argument will possess the character of (1).

As Priest says — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: That's what I've been saying for months. :smile:

Now, what is now orthodox comes out of people being uncomfortable with where logic had been previously, fixing perceived problems, so if those moves were properly motivated, others attempts for satisfactory resultions seem like they should be too. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't know if I quite followed that.

I think the degeneration of logic has a lot to do with what said.

The others don't need a rewrite. They go back and forth, themselves in either setting. And their decisions are real in either setting. — Patterner

The fact that they refuse a rewrite and Cypher desires it just shows that the experience of the one who takes a blue pill is different from the experience of the one who takes the red pill (even within the Matrix). And yet you seem to say that there is no difference.

And I doubt consciousness/mind of one environment could go back-and-forth between entirely different environments, and remain the same. It possibly could not go back-and-forth at all. — Patterner

Yes, perhaps.

Cypher, presumably, thought there was no possibility of surviving other than the path he chose. But he could not live with the guilt of that choice, so wanted to be rewritten. That's incomprehensible to me. Being rewritten, giving up your consciousness/mind/self, is as good as death. The last moments before being rewritten couldn't feel any different than the last moments before the blade of the guillotine hits. — Patterner

No, I don't think so. Cypher would want his rewrite whether or not the betrayal had occurred. In fact if you follow the plot, the betrayal is the cost of the rewrite, and thus the desire for the rewrite is prior. But "rewrite" may be the wrong word altogether. He just wants to forget that the real world exists. He just wants to rewrite history, such that he took a blue instead of red pill. Forgetting something is presumably not death.

If anyone could prove the existence of God, there would be very few atheists. — Hyper

There are very few atheists.
Therefore, God exists.

:naughty:

But I wouldn't want to be rewritten. Trinity, Neo, Morpheus, and all the rest were themselves whether in the Matrix or out. — Patterner

But Cypher is the only one who agrees with you. He wants to be rewritten to forget about the real world (and also his betrayal). You're really opting for the blue pill, are you not? One must choose before they know the difference between the Matrix and the real world, and that is why Cypher needs his rewrite.

If you were a sadist in the Matrix, you wouldn't be a saint when you unplugged, or vice versa. — Patterner

Maybe. The Matrix is a simulation, so it really depends on how accurate the simulation is. But I don't know why anyone would want to live in a simulation.

The Matrix is shot through with religious imagery, and implicit in much religious imagery is the idea that a new level of agency is itself awakened with conversion or enlightenment or whatnot. So it's not generally true that one's agency or capacity is equal in both worlds. In fact there is supposed to be a radical difference in all sorts of ways.

There is something essentially elitist about philosophy... — Tom Storm

I wonder if philosophy is too sprawling an enterprise... — Tom Storm

There are lots of niches in sprawling enterprises, and when everyone can set up shop in their own niche and be the resident expert there, pride finds root. This even extends to the question of whose niche gets to construe the topic at hand. It's no wonder that posters are at their best when they write an OP and are forced to creep out of their niche.

We might say, "1 is simply a consequence of 2." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that's right. I think you've got the horse pulling the cart.

I mentioned quia demonstrations vs. propter quid demonstrations earlier. Supposing that the two definitions do rightly overlap, it would seem like 1 would be a quia demonstration (going from effects backwards), while 2 actually gives us the "why." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't see this as relevant. I don't see that propositional logic has a causal or metaphysical direction in any obvious sense. For example, why think that (1) would be a quia demonstration? Because the "effect" of a valid argument is the necessary relation between premises and conclusion that (1) captures? It's hard to see this as an "effect" in any strict sense.

1. An argument is valid when it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false; — Count Timothy von Icarus

On the standard (non-Tones) interpretation of (1), I would say that this represents a kind of static, non-directional construal of validity. It's about possibility space, not primarily deducibility. On this standard reading of (1) I think (1) and (2a) are coterminous, are they not? I think (1) properly captures a necessary formality of valid arguments; I just think Tones interprets it badly. On the standard interpretation, there is nothing mistaken about (1).

This all comes from the conversation that emerged after you insisted that NotAristotle needs to follow a rule:

The rule is completely unambiguous:

If P v Q is on a line, and ~P is on a line, then we may put Q on a new line. — TonesInDeepFreeze

That characterization is a good example of logic-as-symbol-manipulation, and @NotAristotle's difficulty had to do with the nature of logic or inference. This question of "symbol manipulation" is therefore quite relevant to the question of how to understand validity vis-a-vis explosion. Burying your head in the sand and refusing to address the heart of the issue is not a great look.

So, if you can't list any other than me, then we may infer that you meant me. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I actually said, "When I wrote it I wasn't sure whether you fit the bill or not." So no, not primarily you.

But you left it open, thus it is insinuation. But you don't have the integrity to say who you mean. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Rather, you asked for information that you would misuse and I did not give it to you. I only gave you the information that pertained to your person.

To maintain that I don't think logic is mere symbol manipulation, it is not required for me to say what logic is. To maintain that basketball is not mere players' statistics, I don't have to tell you what basketball is; whatever it is, I know that it is not mere players' statistics. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Pretty amazing how many miles you will run to avoid a simple question.

Who did you mean ? If you won't say, then I'll take it you don't have the guts to say, as you are sneaky insinuator. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Paranoid, much?

TonesInDeepFreeze: I don't think acetone is merely oxygen. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Not a great analogy, to say the least.

Leontiskos: What else do you think is in acetone? — TonesInDeepFreeze

The formula for acetone is (CH₃)₂CO. Notice how simple that was.

- Three posts on this? Have a drink, or take a nap or something.

It's mathematics without the math. :roll: — jgill

Incidentally, this is my mother's favorite kind of mathematics. :smile:

Why do you get to keep ignoring my question? Why do you think you are entitled to an answer to your question?

• Leontiskos: There are folk in these parts who drive Toyota Camrys.
• Tones: I certainly don't drive a Toyota Camry!
• Leontiskos: What kind of car do you drive?
• Tones: :zip:

When you wrote, "There are some logicians in these parts who view logic as mere symbol manipulation", who were you referring to? — TonesInDeepFreeze

When I wrote it I wasn't sure whether you fit the bill or not. Time to answer my question:

If you say that logic is not merely symbol manipulation, then what do you say it is? — Leontiskos

The conflict, if it is a conflict, between secular and sacred readings of traditional and pre-modern culture, is also a factor in Buddhist modernism. It's a sort of tectonic plate. — Wayfarer

Interesting. Do you have a link to an article?

By the way Book 1 of Awakening from the Meaning Crisis has just been published. — Wayfarer

:up:

When you wrote it, you were referring to unnamed photographers. Was I one of them or not? — TonesInDeepFreeze

Is photography mere photon manipulation?

I don't know if you fall into that group. It's hard to spot photographers. They disguise themselves, blending into their environment. That's why I am asking you a question. You have disavowed such a view in the past but I don't understand what alternative route you purport to take.

- :lol:

- I'm working on figuring that out with my question to you.

Surely. I suppose a traditionalist way of putting it, would be the relationship of scientia and sapientia, which don’t conflict, but have a different focus. It’s one of the things I admire in Aquinas, with this view that science and faith can’t be ultimately in conflict — Wayfarer

Yep. :up:

-

we also understand that there is a difference between disputes over matters of interpretation and personal attacks. — Fooloso4

Well, there is also gate-keeping and axe-grinding:

It’s because there’s a kind of unspoken prohibition on certain topics or attitudes in the consensus view. I’m reminded of a clause in the founding charter of the Royal Society of London, which explicitly prohibited the consideration of ‘metaphysik’ on the grounds that it was in the province of churchmen, not natural philosophy as such (and in those days, one really had to stay in one’s lane.) — Wayfarer

But to be fair, in this case Wayfarer asked you about metaphysics and mysticism.

I think living in the Matrix would be just as real as living in the real world. — Patterner

You're on the way...

Which is why I'm sceptical of the suggestion that philosophy and science are the same in essence. — Wayfarer

I guess I don't see science and scientific objectivity as separate from philosophical virtue, even in the realm of "reality as lived." It seems like a lot of the same virtues underlie both philosophy and science.

For example, the sage and the psychologist hopefully possess scientific virtues of objectivity and neutrality. As you say, there seems to be a connection between wisdom-detachment and scientific neutrality. The way Buddhism is associated with a scientific aura is perhaps on point, for the Buddhist is often seen as bringing a scientific rigor to psychological introspection (and the same would hold of the desert fathers).

- :up:

I’m reminded of a clause in the founding charter of the Royal Society of London, which explicitly prohibited the consideration of ‘metaphysik’ on the grounds that it was in the province of churchmen, not natural philosophy as such (and in those days, one really had to stay in one’s lane.) — Wayfarer

That doesn't surprise me, but it is interesting.

(I learned of Eric Perl’s book Thinking Being from John Vervaeke’s lecture series Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. As you know, he is attempting to critique some of these naturalist assumptions from within a naturalistic perspective and what he has called ‘transcendent naturalism’.) — Wayfarer

Yep, I like Vervaeke. Though I don't know him too well.

The excerpt from Perl is relevant to @J's interest in Kimhi, who also takes a point of departure from Parmenides' Poem. The context Perl gives is helpful.

Today's culture often deprecates metaphysical claims, especially those that verge on mysticism or spirituality. — Wayfarer

Not being divine beings they do not presume to know anything about matters of divine wisdom or a reality that transcends reality hear and now in our comfy cave. — Fooloso4

You sort of walked into that one, Wayfarer. :wink: I think the grammatical and spelling mistakes are an indicator of what your thesis does to Fooloso's temperament. :grin:

I do not trust your ability to understand and present either what I am saying or what ↪Michael is saying. — Banno

It's fairly obvious that you don't understand what Michael is saying, but you're slowly coming along. I see you've now made it to my post <here>, repeating what I have already said. This is all related to your misunderstanding of the unjustified/unjustifiable distinction.

Not saying you've done it deliberately but I think you have phrased that in a way that is misleading. The way I would put it is: "It is true that even if all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else were undisturbed, that there would still be gold in Boorara."

...

So, yes I do think we can make truth-apt statements about unperceived events. The alternative, that truth depends on knowledge, seems absurd to me. — Janus

Well, the traditional thesis is that truth depends on mind. See, for example, 's post.

I don't see that you've changed Banno's claim. Here are the two claims:

• It is true that there is gold in Boorara. If all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed, then it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara.
• It is true that even if all life disappeared from the universe, but everything else were undisturbed, that there would still be gold in Boorara.

Your, "It is true that," extends to the whole sentence, including the consequent. We are talking about whether it would still be true that there is gold in Boorara. Metaphysics of truth is inevitable here. Even if we talk about, "Whether there would still be gold in Boorara," we are still talking about truth.

Your argument is presumably something like this, "If three humans exist and there are no other minds, and one person dies, then it is still true that there is gold in Boorara. The second dies, and it is still true. By induction we should hold that if the third dies, it will still be true. If the truth was not affected by the death of the first two people, then surely it will not be affected by the death of the third."

But on the other hand is the argument that truths only exist where minds do. Truths are not free-floating entities, existing independently of minds. I actually don't know of any philosophers who try to set out a metaphysics of truth while ignoring this principle. There are plenty of different theories for why something would remain true if all humans died, but they all have to do with non-human or non-individual minds (including especially God). Our Western logos-centric inheritance fits very well with our current intuitions, largely because our current intuitions have been shaped by that inheritance. Aquinas can simply quote Aristotle, "The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), 'The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect'" (ST).

The intuition that truth is not limited to or generated by humans is what has caused all cultures to posit deeper minds and grounds of intelligibility that are operative in creation. Secular anthropocentrism has deprived itself of these explanations, and it seems to largely be at a loss when it comes to the metaphysics of truth. It is hard for such a tradition to consider the question of whether truth presupposes mind, because the question inevitably leads away from secularism. What is at stake here is the relation between mind and the material world, and to be honest, materialists/physicalists have never really known what to make of truth. It defies materialistic categories (which is why it is associated with mind and intellect).

(In responding to Pinter we should limit ourselves to talking about perception, and not fall into the trap of talking about truth and minds. To do otherwise is heavy-handed. We need only say that what is unperceived can still exist, not that truth would exist without any minds.)

Banno will confirm whether or not this misrepresents his view, but in any case, it is my view. — Janus

Banno is stubborn, but you can still see him trying to adjust his view. For example:

This by way of separating what is true from what is known to be true. Again, that a proposition is true is a single-places predicate, "P is true"; but that we know it is true is a relation, "We know P is true". Same for what are commonly called "propositional attitudes"; a name that marks this relational aspect. — Banno

He has not reckoned with the question of how a "single-places predicate" would exist apart from minds, or why "everything else undisturbed" disturbs foxes but not truths. Banno is usually not up for these deeper questions.

You seem to be falling into a common form of sophistry, as follows:

<absurdity> = "It is possible for truth to be unknowable in principle"

1. Realism → <absurdity>
2. ∴ ~Realism

There is nothing wrong with giving this reductio against realism. The sophistry comes here:

"Realism is_def <absurdity>"

When you try to define realism as <absurdity> you deprive the realist of the opportunity to dispute (1), and this is a form of sophistry. Note too that you haven't been able to find a single example of a self-proclaimed realist who accepts your definition of realism, or would at least sign on to <absurdity>. initially volunteered himself, but now has distanced himself from your definition (as I predicted he would).

- Well, thrash metal was not idiosyncratic if we limit ourselves to the 1980's, but I am thinking in terms of centuries and millennia. It helps prevent one from falling into fads.

If the existence of objects is mind-independent then the truth of “the object exists” is mind-independent such that it could be true even if it is not possible, in principle, to know that it’s true. — Michael

That's not a characteristically realist view. Realists have not historically claimed that because objects can exist apart from minds, therefore truth exists apart from minds. Nevermind the odd add-on about truths which are unknowable.

You have a particular way of construing metaphysical realism vis-a-vis an abstruse knowability debate. It doesn't follow from this that Realism = Believing in unknowable (or unjustifiable) truths. And you won't find sources on Realism that claim such a thing. My quote from the SEP article on Realism is but one example.

There’s a reason that Dummett, the man who coined the term “antirealism”, framed the dispute between realism and antirealism as a dispute about the logic of truth. — Michael

You give a curious definition of antirealism (that no one on this forum would recognize precritically), and then define realism over and against that definition. This is wrong in the first place because realism "wears the pants," not antirealism. It is wrong in the second place because "antirealism" is not identical with Dummett's view, much less a secondary branch of that view (see section 7). It is wrong in the third place because non-realism is not simply anti-realism:

Non-realism can take many forms, depending on whether or not it is the existence or independence dimension of realism that is questioned or rejected. The forms of non-realism can vary dramatically from subject-matter to subject-matter, but error-theories, non-cognitivism, instrumentalism, nominalism,relativism, certain styles of reductionism, and eliminativism typically reject realism by rejecting the existence dimension, while idealism, subjectivism, and anti-realism typically concede the existence dimension but reject the independence dimension. — Realism | SEP

So, at the very least, we should be antirealists about cats in boxes. — Michael

...Because if you think the question of whether the cat is in the box is a verifiable question, then in Michael's terms you are an "antirealist." And if you are a "realist" (in Michael's terms) about cats in boxes, then you would have to say that "The cat is in the box" is both unverifiable and nevertheless true.

No one uses the terms "realism" and "antirealism" in this way. Such extremely idiosyncratic usage is unhelpful. In favor of his strange definition, Michael cites a single sentence buried in an SEP article on Fitch's Paradox of Unknowability. But if we look to SEP (or any other reputable source) for this question, we do not find Michael's definition:

There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table’s being square, the rock’s being made of granite, and the moon’s being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter. — Realism | SEP

The OP's definitions were much more accurate, mapping the two general aspects of SEP:

1. There exist objects that are mind-independent.

2. We can grasp the features of objects external to our mind... — Sirius

These are references to Aquinas' epistemology of assimilation, which I have no doubt you know considerably better than I do. But the salient point is, it undercuts the idea of 'mind-independence' in the sense posited by naturalism. Why? Because the pre-moderns did not have our modern sense of otherness or separateness from the Cosmos. (I know this is very sketchy, but I think I am discerning something of significance here.) — Wayfarer

Yes, that seems right to me. Good quotes.

But note that for the Thomist intellectual knowledge depends on an immaterial intellect. You could construe the moderns as estranged from the cosmos, or you could construe them as materialists. Probably both approaches end up in much the same place.

But in remedying modern epistemology, one could move in a Christian/theistic/transcendent direction, or a Hindu/pantheistic/immanent direction. In the former, Western tradition, the human is both within and beyond the cosmos, as a kind of mediator or steward for the transcendent God. Thus for Aquinas there is an important sense in which the intellect stands over and surveys the cosmos in much the same way that an eagle stands over and surveys the landscape. But the angels do this more completely, and man is the strange mixture or meeting point between angels and matter.

My line of thinking here is if we know something, then at least in that respect we are not deceived. I think the change in outcomes with respect to the thought experiment has to do with emphasizing doubt over certainty -- rather than looking for a certainty that I cannot doubt, and so cannot be decieved by even the evil demon the process of looking for certitude requires I already know things that are uncertain.

To kind of do an inversion here on that line: In some sense we could say that if we accept the certitude of the cogito then we must also accept the certitude of the before-after, and so the self is not this indivisible point-particle that thinks. — Moliere

Is everyone on the same page that Descartes gives an argument for his existence from doubt? (link) Some, like , seem to be missing this. The "shift from certainty to doubt" is not Sartre, it is Descartes, and it is not a shift from certainty so much as an avenue to certainty.

Taking Descartes at face value in the Meditations we end with knowledge of self, God, and world. So the doubt is surely methodical rather than radical. — Moliere

But think about why Descartes responded so vehemently to Gassendi when Gassendi made a similar claim. What you are saying is, "Descartes' wrangling with skepticism wasn't real; it was just a charade." If it wasn't real, if Descartes did not really descend into skepticism and really come out, then his meditation is completely worthless. "Descartes came back up with knowledge, therefore he never seriously entertained skepticism," is a really problematic way to assess Descartes' meditation, and Descartes explicitly rejects this problematic/cynical reading.

We have only each other to talk to, whether it leads it to anything, whether we hope it does, we're all the company we have. — Srap Tasmaner

This is an odd thing to say in the context of Socrates, is it not? Socrates paid more heed to his daimon than to any man.

I'm not even sure it makes sense to say, "Philosophy is about conversation, not reality, because it is rooted in Socratic skepticism." First, all conversation is about something, and that "something" is some kind of reality. If someone is not interested in any realities then they will apparently not have conversations. In a similar way, a hardened skeptic would not engage in philosophical conversation at all. The one who engages in philosophical conversation must at least believe that his interlocutor has the ability to shed light and show him something new and previously unknown (or vice versa).

Well, that's a broader academia problem, and I think it is often even worse in other fields... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yep. But I'm wondering, "What is the corrective?" Contemplation? Truth over disputatiousness?

I like some of the late Thomas Hopko's ideas on this, who I believe was in your Church. One paraphrase is in my bio, "Don't label him; say he's wrong. And don't just say he's wrong; say why. And don't just say why; say what you think is right." That puts a nice ceiling on disputatiousness. Elsewhere he says that one should never give their opinion unless they are asked or have a duty to do so (this is reminiscent of something like the desert fathers - a kind of spiritual practice). Then elsewhere he says something to the effect, "Showing that your brother is wrong does not make you right. Showing that your brother is a sinner does not make you righteous." Perhaps those can function as a starting point for correctives.

But then when it comes to practice it's sort of the polar opposite, because in the earlier period a great deal of the thinkers are monastics whose entire lives revolve around practice. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Or also active Orders (Dominicans, Franciscans), or geographically centered thought-movements (University of Paris, University of Naples, etc.).

---

I think Socrates and most philosophers since are committed to the idea that there is an ideal convergence point, involving rational inquiry, where we can reach consensus based on what is the case, not simply on "how it looks to us." — J

But the Socrates (or Plato) of the Republic is doing more than this. Here we specifically examine the difference between knowledge and "how it looks to us." Our modern talk about convergence etc. would be foreign to Plato, but I see him advocating a positive doctrine about knowledge that is meant to be independent of what Athenians, or anyone else, think of it. — J

Good points. :up:

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You seem to have come around on this:

Great philosophy is very much concerned with research. The fact that it does not partake of anscientific method of research doesn’t invalidate philosophical methods as less rigorous , ungrounded or mere conversation — Joshs

(The point was never that we shouldn't read others.)