it hasn't been proven that the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true. — Michael
Need it be 'proven' in order for you to know it? — creativesoul
Does it? I mean justificatory regress has to stop somewhere, right? Why not right there? — creativesoul
There's your resolution regarding the dissonance. — creativesoul
That's the very thing being discussed.
1. A categorical imperative is just "one ought not X".
2. A hypothetical imperative is "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Z will happen."
I cannot rationally justify the truth of any (1), and yet many seem to be true. It's something of a cognitive dissonance. — Michael
I would not like to be around folk who do that shit. — Banno
One ought keep one's promises.
And this because a promise just it the sort of thing one ought to keep. — Banno
What relevance is that? Is liking or not liking to be around folk the measure of obligation? — Michael
Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"
I think that "queerness" is not easy to establish -- or, at least, is as hard to establish as "not-queer". I don't know how we get to a place where we know, or are even able to judge, what queerness is. — Moliere
Ethics is about what we do, and so it does not rest on argument but on action. — Banno
↪Banno
Not at all. But this is where Wittgenstein was heading - that at some stage the justifications have to end, and we say: "This is what we do!"
But why must it end there? This seems like fleeing from battle while declaring your victory. Admitting that your belief is just an arbitrary dogma gets you points for honesty but not much else — goremand
Because at some stage one must act.But why must it end there? — goremand
...as if, upon coming across a puppy-kicker, you would be able to convince them of the error of their ways by your brilliant philosophical argumentation. No, you get the bugger arrested. — Banno
One demonstrates the reality of the world by interacting with it, hence the reality of ethical statements by enacting them....appeals to the stone... — Michael
That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction.
I have something like a visceral acceptance of such categorical imperatives but I cannot rationally accept the almost magical, wishful thinking of them. — Michael
That's the exact problem. "One ought not kick puppies" seems meaningfully true and yet the concept of categorical imperatives seems vacuous. I don't know how to resolve this contradiction. — Michael
Objection 1. [The is-ought problem]
Reply to Objection 1. The way my favorite Thomists address the is-ought problem is by granting the is/ought distinction but denying the fact/value distinction (or something to this effect). It is not possible to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, and the idea that there are brute ‘oughts’ is implausible. But if there are self evident “values,” or teleological realities which also implicate the human mind, then ‘oughts’ will naturally flow from these. And they do. The two arguments in the OP are two examples. Once we know what suffering is we know we ought to avoid it. The same would hold of ‘injury’, which is the more robust concept. — Leontiskos' draft
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