Logical pluralists seem to argue that different contexts require different logics and this seems to be determined by the kinds of reasoning or the goals of inquiry involved. — Tom Storm
Logical pluralism takes many forms, but the most philosophically interesting and controversial versions hold that more than one logic can be correct, that is: logics L1 and L2 can disagree about which arguments are valid, and both can be getting things right. — SEP | Logical Pluralism
Sounds fair. Is there a risk with pluralism that one might simply select the logic one wants to suit ourselves? How do we determine which logic is appropriate for a given situation/problem? Sorry if this is a banal quesion. — Tom Storm
Not one logic, but many. — Banno
Here's how I would start a thread about logic. I would post the dilemma of Meno 80b. I would basically say that if that dilemma can be overcome then logic exists, and if it can't then logic does not exist. Per Rombout, someone like Wittgenstein doesn't think logic exists. But the thread would not use the word "logic," for that word is an equivocal quagmire. — Leontiskos
On the one hand, it's a ridiculous point because you can't *say* one word on top of another -- gotta say them in order. But on the other hand, spoken language is pretty much always accompanied by gestures, so you can imagine an accompanying gesture to convey the "on". On the third hand (the gripping hand), this won't work over a telephone. But on the fourth hand, language is spoken in person long long long before telephones, and pretty damn long before writing. And even writing has its own story, a little different from the story of speech. — Srap Tasmaner
Well, no, I didn't, — Banno
Have you ever noticed that when someone sets out a state of affairs, they do it by setting out a statement?
It's far from obvious that states of affairs are helpful, rather than just yet another thing to puzzle over. — Banno
Well, yes. What a statement sets out is a particular situation in the world. Do you then have three things, the true statement, the situation in the world and the fact? Or are we multiplying entities beyond necessity? — Banno
Folk are welcome to talk about states of affairs, but might do well to remember that they are a turn of phrase, not a piece of ontology. — Banno
SO how does a state of affairs differ from that which a statement sets out? — Banno
The analytic school of philosophy is the dominant way of doing philosophy, nowadays. — Shawn
When the grid goes down, the crypto-heads will discover the difference between gold and crypto as a store of value. — fishfry
Even if they are low quality, which I don't think they are, a lot of crap is allowed here. — T Clark
Hence, lounge. — fdrake
Beyond that, the forum is full of opiniated fluff and vague assertions. I don't know why Carlo Roosen is being singled out. — T Clark
I did. A cyst is not a person. — Banno
Generally, there are thousands (at least) of cryptocurrencies, and there will be thousands more created in the future. The barrier to creating them is quite low. Given this, are cryptocurrencies truly scarse? — hypericin
Scientific investigations of how we perceive already, to some extent, presuppose the a priori modes by which we intuit and cognize objects, being that we must study the intuited and cognized version of our own representative faculties, and so the Kantian question is still very much alive and puzzling. — Bob Ross
Let's take the words of Albert Einstein as an example — Michael
Heh. I taught my phone "Kimhi" but it ignored me this time. — Srap Tasmaner
(A) "Dogs are nice"
and on the other
(B) "For all x, if x is a dog, then it is nice."
We just need a neutral word for the relation between (A) and (B), and, if you start with (A) and recast it as (B), we need a neutral word to describe what you're doing there. Maybe you believe you are "revealing (A)'s logical form," and maybe you don't. — Srap Tasmaner
This bypasses my question, and doubles down even. It is assumed "virtue building" such as a program that one might enter into as an Aristotlean or Stoic or whatnot, would seem to be a freely chosen philosophy that one is intending to follow. A culture seems to be something one generally falls into, though one can take it on too. — schopenhauer1
What if one is about virtue-building but isn't following any particular program, just their own.. Is that culture? — schopenhauer1
Is the practitioner of a philosophy and an individual acting under the enculturation of a subgroup's culture the same thing? — schopenhauer1
Is there a substantive difference or is it all culture all the way down? — schopenhauer1
But they haven't paid their dues! We've earned this, by banging our heads against Kimchi. Oh sure, they'll join in *now*, for the fun part, but where were they when we were slogging through the mud, I ask you. — Srap Tasmaner
Here again, this may not contribute to a neutral presentation of (2), but I have to treat language as being first for communication and other uses come after. — Srap Tasmaner
All I'm arguing for is slowing down the moment of schematization so that we can see frame-by-frame what's happening, regardless what we say about how before and after are related. — Srap Tasmaner
Worth also pointing out that it is far from clear what "thoughts" are, yet the term is used with gay abandon throughout Martin's paper. — Banno
I didn't follow your reasoning that turned my "not necessarily" into an even bigger "necessarily not". I do hope this was clearer. — Srap Tasmaner
All of this agnosticism about (3) depends on being able to formulate (2) neutrally. — Srap Tasmaner
second, clarity is obviously negotiated between speaker and audience, and thus our practices of making better, clearer arguments arise from the efforts of ordinary speakers — Srap Tasmaner
It's a fantastic invention — Srap Tasmaner
So is culture akin to addiction in that it is a mechanism whereby free will is limited to an extent? — schopenhauer1
But can't certain cultural customs be immoral? — schopenhauer1
For such a person—and they are common—I would ask why we must accept the premise that cultural realities cannot be criticized. — Leontiskos
This is essentially my question :D. [...it] is more of an axiological question — schopenhauer1
Ok, so how do you know which is attributed to which? Should it be condemned if it is cultural, or is culture sacrosanct? To what extent?
...
Let's say that culture was not at all in the picture, and you disapproved of someone's individual habit.. But then you realized that that habit was actually part of their culture. Does the disapproval change? If so, why? — schopenhauer1
But it's also, WHEN can we distill that it is cultural vs. other factors? — schopenhauer1
I mean a classic example here is gang culture in the US. This is tied with so many things- racial oppression, socio-economic oppression, and cultural aspects. One side of the debate regarding gang culture is that it is a cultural problems. A prominent conservative historian, Thomas Sowell, traces it back to Southern white redneck culture, that ultimately gets traced back to England. Nonetheless, he seems to see it as more of a cultural circumstance more than socio-economic. Others would say that it derives from socio-economic circumstances of simply being poor. If you are poor, and discriminated, these are the activities that a subgroup might tend towards.. — schopenhauer1
Not at all. — Srap Tasmaner
And that means what we say about logic is what we say about a certain approach to reasoning and language, a certain way of taking it, but we need not think we are saying anything fundamental about language or reasoning itself. — Srap Tasmaner
(I've started the Martin paper, so I expect we can talk more about that soon.) — Srap Tasmaner
At what point (if any) can we distill cultural factors for why groups act a certain way versus socio-economic or political factors? — schopenhauer1
Can one be a "culturist", meaning can one morally be "against" certain cultures, or should people be tolerant of all cultural aspects, whether you agree with them or not? — schopenhauer1
I rather have it an investigation on when one can reasonably blame a "cultural" trait, if at all for a negative aspect of social living. — schopenhauer1
I don't want to just rush to deny that this is so, but all we have so far is the typical philosopher's gambit: "And by 'assertion' I don't mean assertion in the usual sense, by 'force' I don't mean force in the usual sense, ..." — Srap Tasmaner
is said to express a complete thought, that can be true or false, by fiat, by stipulation — Srap Tasmaner
Is it any wonder that his logic looks more like a branch of mathematics than anything else? — Srap Tasmaner
And that means what we say about logic is what we say about a certain approach to reasoning and language, a certain way of taking it, but we need not think we are saying anything fundamental about language or reasoning itself. — Srap Tasmaner
Oh -- there are dots I didn't connect there. — Srap Tasmaner
But what if that's wrong? What if language never comes anywhere close to expressing a complete thought because that's not what it's for? What if language is all hints and clues and suggestions because the audience shares the burden of communication with the speaker? — Srap Tasmaner
So I don't think it's helpful to think of utterances as having a content that can be "extracted," nor is it helpful to think they have or lack some stereotypical force. — Srap Tasmaner
What pisses me off most about the choice debate is the insincerity of the antagonists. — Banno
Whatever "rational" grounds you might have for believing in naive realism, it is incompatible with physics, biology, neuroscience, and psychology. — Michael
Resist. — Baden
This will not end well. — Banno
plagiarism — bongo fury