No, my presupposition is that the two bodies of work are two aspects of the same thinking, and that we must use each side to better understand the other. — Joshs

That's interesting, because most people in your position seem to try to use Heidegger's academic work to explain away the writings, beliefs, and decisions of Heidegger's which are unappealing.

In any case, I don't see how the problem goes away unless one argues that Heidegger's academic work is inherently contrary to the unappealing aspects, and that he simply failed to recognize the way in which his philosophy precludes antisemitism, or Nazism, etc. A tall task.

If as responsible readers we are charged with the task of using the public record and scattered diary fragments to illuminate the meaning of his published work, and vice versa, which of these two sides of Heidegger’s life do you think deserves the most attention in clarifying the ‘true’ intentions of as careful and complex a thinker as Heidegger? — Joshs

But your presupposition is that the two bodies of work are in conflict, and that we therefore must choose either one or the other. Why think that? On my (admittedly limited) view, the two are not in conflict.

When attempts to excuse Heidegger on the basis that he was an intellectual and not a moralist, he seems to implicitly commit himself to the view that Heidegger's academic work is largely non-moral, and is therefore not contrary (nor favorable) to the moral evils of Nazism. This approach also does not see the two bodies of work as conflicting.

It had better hold water, or else the concept of human brilliance needs to be done away with. — Joshs

But that's just what the Nazis said, "Look at this brilliant man who strongly approves of our project! Surely our project is worthwhile given his approval."

Disentangling the two is not as easy as Heidegger's students would wish.

Making the decision to abandon or accept Nazism certainly is a moral choice, not an intellectual one. [...] Werner von Braun the father of modern rocketry doesn't seem to have problems with his good name. — Pantagruel

That's because rocketry and philosophy are not the same thing. You seem to be implicitly admitting that Heidegger's work is like rocketry, and has no moral worth, no?

Two centuries ago slavery was a social norm widely embraced and even more widely tolerated. So whom from that time period should we exempt from moral censure? — Pantagruel

There were plenty of Germans in Heidegger's time who did not fall for the Nazi foolishness, and if Heidegger is to be held up as a paragon of human brilliance I don't think this argument holds water.

I don't have much of an opinion on this matter, not being overly familiar with Heidegger. There are caricatures on both sides. I don't think there is a simple answer to be had, but given Heidegger's stature, his strong support of the Nazi regime casts a indelible shadow on him.

The article is paywalled on the links I found, so I guess we will have to take your word for it. — Banno

Here is an accessible version: "Kripke and Wittgenstein: Intention Without Paradox," by Paul Moser and Kevin Flannery.

As I'm reading Fine a definition is necessary, because Fine accepts the argument that if something is not necessary then it is not essential, but necessity is not sufficient.

Or, if we're going by way of Aristotelian essence, then I'm not sure "sufficiency" is the conceptual mark we should be using at all (hence my divergence into Aristotelian causes for determining whether something named has an essence at all) — Moliere

Yes, this is correct. Your care is appreciated.

Freewheeling a bit, I would say that for Aristotle the purpose of a definition is twofold: to denote an essence, and to distinguish things from each other. These are related, but the latter has more to do with scientific taxonomy than the former. If two real definitions are identical (and correct in describing the essence) then the "two" things that they define are just the same thing. If two things are different then they will have different essences (and different definitions). I would want to say that the idea of sufficiency has to do with this second, taxonomical motive (i.e. the nominal definition should distinguish sufficiently).

Fine's article is very subtle, and the very fact that you can "run" essentialism on modal logic means that his argument is tangential to essentialism. He's not wrong, but I don't think it will be fruitful for someone trying to understand essentialism for the first time to get lost in that abstruse debate.

A definition is a true description of an essence, which is a property which is explanatorily prior to other properties, including the necessary ones (like the Singleton Socrates). — Moliere

Yes, but more concretely, things like risibility, the capacity to learn grammar, and delight.

Leontiskos do you accept the argument that if some predicate is not necessary of a name that then that same predicate is not an essence of the name? (only asking because then we could add to this list to say that essences are necessary, though there are necessary predicates which are not essential) — Moliere

Yes, you are right about this.

The question about explanatory priority is a good one. "Explanation" (or "cause") usually translates aitia, for example:

We think we understand something simpliciter (and not in the sophistical way, incidentally) when we think we know of the explanation because of which the object holds that it is its explanation, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise. It is plain, then, that to understand is something of this sort. And indeed, people who do not understand think they are in such a condition, and those who do understand actually are. Hence if there is understanding simpliciter of something, it is impossible for it to be otherwise. — Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b9 (Chapter 2), tr. Barnes

Barnes gives a rather long explanation of why he translates "explanation" rather than "cause". To simplify, I would say the term spans both ontology and also linguistics/theory, such that the twofold purpose above is attainable.


I was looking around for freely accessible material on this topic. I did find something which is free, even if its accessibility is questionable. The article is technically arguing for realism against nominalism, but it also spends a good deal of time on definitions:

Let us return to the honey bee example to make our point. With some study (and or a good Oxford dictionary) I could come to know in a fairly rigorous manner that a honey bee is defined as “a stinging, winged insect that collects nectar and pollen, produces wax and honey, and lives in large communities/colonies.” In this definition, the genus is insect meaning an arthropod with six legs and one or two pairs of wings. An arthropod is an invertebrate with segmented body, an exoskeleton, and jointed limbs. ‘Stinging, ‘winged,’ ‘collecting nectar and pollen,’ ‘producing wax and honey,’ and ‘living in large colonies,’ are differentia which distinguish the honey bee from other members of the same genus, and are taken from the categories of action, quality, and possession/habit.[74] Having these attributes (secondary beings) is the cause of some individuals (primary beings) in nature being honey bees. When I run into such primary buzzing beings, I know them with a very high degree of accuracy, through [this definition]. What is key is that, any time one has predicated a definition of a honey bee in the field, which is an expression (λόγος/logos) of his understanding it in itself and as distinct from other animals and species of its own genus. . . — Daniel Wagner, The Logical Terms of Sense Realism, p. 53

Wagner defines differentia earlier. They are essential attributes which differentiate from other things in the same genus:

“Difference” is an essential attribute added to the genus and constituting the species (e.g., ‘with three equal sides’ differentiates the equilateral from the isosceles and the scalene). — Daniel Wagner, The Logical Terms of Sense Realism, p. 27

- Good posts. :up:

No — Vera Mont

Aye.

So where now? — Banno

Now I'll leave you to it. :victory:

Becoming part of a larger whole really does confer meaning. I should think this is empirically demonstrable. I see you've given some rhetorical protestations to this idea in the thread. Do you have more than rhetoric?

I would have said that our discussion of essences commenced here: ↪Leontiskos; — Banno

This must have been a typo given the referent of the link.

For my part the discussion of essences and definitions never had anything to do with Fine's article. I only mentioned Fine's distinction a few times in the belief thread, before we started talking about essences and definitions. It seemed clear all along that you were not committed to the modal view that Fine is addressing ().

I don't think one can read Fine as rejecting modal accounts of essence, so much as refining them. Otherwise one would be rejecting the conception of essence as necessary and sufficient... — Banno

But modal logic does not have a copyright on the word "necessary." To speak about a modal account of essence is not to speak about any account of essence which utilizes the concept of necessity. Here is an example of fdrake making the proper distinction:

So it seems that he believes there's some subset of the necessary (possible worlds sense) truths which are necessary (essential) to an entity's being. — fdrake

I'm not sure how you could construe "X making a claim on Joe," as, "Joe receiving external validation." Solipsism renders life meaningless.

- Very interesting. This seems to be common. A generation without children, without religion, without patriotism, etc. There is nothing to make a claim on them.

I don't see much by way of an argument in favour of essences, a reason that we need take them into account. — Banno

Was it intended to? Remember that the discussion of essences and definitions was transplanted from a different thread at your request, and was never motivated by Fine's article (link). Fine's article is critiquing the received modal account of essences. He is saying, "A is a better [account of essences] than B." :wink:

Anyway, given that the discussion has moved away from the Fine article I might leave this topic where it is. — Banno

I also want to leave the topic, but it never "moved away from Fine's article." It was never about Fine's article in the first place.

I think I can see what you mean there. Though I read it the other way - how Fine is using the vocabulary of essence makes meaning "thingly" or "concrete" - puts the locus of sinigication/expression closer to the described object or act. Like the essence of Socrates is constrained by who Socrates was. — fdrake

That's fair. I suppose I was thinking more of reference than Fine's article. For example, apparently for Russell or Donnellan if the referent of a name does not exist then the speaker is denoting nothing. Similarly, according to your article from Gareth Evans, Kripke's target and Kripke's response both possess a strong focus on objective uniqueness. For the theory which he targets, the speaker must have a unique description if they are to denote; and for his own "theory" a causal explanation is meant to safeguard the uniqueness of the referent.

So we see these objective impositions: that a referent must exist in order for a name to denote; that a speaker must have access to a unique description if their name is to denote; and that a causal explanation is the proper way to identify a unique referent.

For the Aristotelian I should think that there is a much stronger emphasis on intention and a kind of subjective encounter with the object. For an Aristotelian like Anscombe, there is no reason why the referent of a name needs to exist in order for denotation to occur. For Strawson the idea that the speaker must have ready access to a unique and accurate description is a non-starter. I'm not even sure the Aristotelian account of cognition is going to allow for the level of objectification that someone like Kripke seems to desire. This tangential disagreement about reference may relate to significantly different accounts of knowing.

- You're welcome :up:

Perhaps contrary to most of the discussion so far, I also think this discussion is almost orthogonal to how reference works. The intersection might be somewhere in the region of Evans' critique of a causal theory of reference that sees no place for predication or contextual cues in referring behaviours. — fdrake

Interesting. Thanks for the links. :up:

I think you can productively read it in the following manner - things have natures which constrain and partially determine how they behave. When you describe such a thing or process, that means setting out that nature in an act of understanding it. The understanding of the thing or process determines which properties we express as necessary to it, that which it could not be understood as it is without. — fdrake

I like how you said this, and especially the emphasis on the act of understanding. It seems like a recognition of the subjective aspect of the act of understanding is what is being overlooked in some of the opposing viewpoints.

Sounds good, I will revisit this text as well in the next few days.

What did I say exactly that is wrong and why? — Alkis Piskas

You said this, as pointed out:

Modus tollens logic is of the form "If A, then B. Not A. Therefore, not B." — Alkis Piskas

I explained why it is wrong here: . Modus tollens denies the consequent (B), not the antecedent (A).

You mixed up the inference of modus tollens with the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Modus tollens denies the consequent, not the antecedent.

I should think that creativesoul won the debate, if only because Banno construed his own position in the form of a particularly bald tautology. That and it seems that Banno has capitulated in the meanwhile.

But the curious thing is that I tend to think Banno's position is correct—the non-tautologous variety. I would want to render propositions this way:

1. All beliefs are intellectual.
2. All that is intellectual is propositional.
3. Therefore, All beliefs are propositional.

Third, I am not convinced there are non-propositional beliefs... I tend to think that implicit beliefs are propositional. For example, if I am driving and I brake when a child runs into the street, I am acting on the belief that, “If I brake I will not hit this child,” even though this belief is not explicit or formulated or conscious. Admittedly the thinking would not need to be discursive or consciously carried out. It is fast thinking, but it nevertheless involves a mental act. — Leontiskos

Obviously I am not thinking about propositions in terms of statements, for I am including unformulated affirmations or acknowledgments. But regardless of the conception of propositions, there seems to be a substantive disagreement with @creativesoul here.

- So let it be written, so let it be done.

Being — Mikie

...

Awareness

To be conscious or cognizant of.

Consciousness

Intellectual awareness.

Thinking

The ordering of ideas.

Time

The viscosity of succession.

Sensation

The perceptible acting of a physical object on a subject.

Perception

The awareness of sensation. Also used metaphorically with respect to cognitive objects.

Mind

The seat of that which thinks in a discursive manner.

Body

That part of the human being which has extension.

Good

That which is in some way desirable.

Happiness

What all men seek.

Justice

The rendering of that which is due.

Truth

The adequation (or correspondence) between thought and thing.

True. Still, I’m sure you use these words like anyone else, and usually mean something by them. So that’s what I was asking for. If a kid would ask for your own take on these terms, would the answer be “it depends on use” or would you have some (albeit provisional) answer? — Mikie

If the current fashionable state of philosophy is to answer with a slogan like “it’s how it’s used,” I think we’re in real trouble. — Mikie

“Philosophy is not x, but more y.”

An explanation of what something “is” or isn’t— that’s dealing with meaning, and is a kind of definition. — Mikie

All good and important points. :up:

Yes, of course all material definitions are nominal. But if you don't admit the existence of [definitions] then you cannot say that A is a better X than B. . . — Leontiskos

So if we take your interpretation of Searle then we get, "B(L, f(a)) is a better construal of belief than B(L,p)." Once we understand what a real definition and a nominal definition are, then this is just to claim that the nominal definition B(L, f(a)) better approximates the real definition of belief than the nominal definition B(L,p). If there is no real definition, then there can be no approximation or comparison. — Leontiskos

(Two years since previous post)

If beliefs attain definite content absent the formation of statements which describe them at the time, why would the content of those beliefs depend upon hypothetical objects which are made later? — fdrake

Quite right. Good post. :up:

If someone restricts intentional state content to declarative sentences' propositional content (eg, making beliefs only target propositional content or propositions) it removes both the character of that content and the means of its interpretation. — fdrake

Another good post. I will have to read you on something I care more about. :grin:

EG, if I claimed that my partner makes me feel a special way and I called it "blimblam", and I described it as a composite of homeliness, horniness, care and calm. You'd know how to use the word. It's not my blimblam thoughts and sensations that are doing the work in the setting up the use of the word, it's leveraging the public criteria we share that characterise the use of those sensations and feeling words we both already know. — fdrake

Aye.

If you're going to do a debate you should agree on a motion. All key terms in the OP's question are vague, and each of you can use that to hedge.

[...]

If you continued like that, Banno could assert his definition of belief, you could assert your definition of belief, and there's a strong chance you'll both address none of the other's points and retreat to hedges. — fdrake

Prophecies are always better when they are written down. :lol:

fdrake seems to be in the way here. Bring it. — Banno

Famous last words.

I wonder if mysticism isn't just a more sophisticated version of this very human desire to encounter certainty. I have no doubt that many mystics are certain about their experiences, what I do doubt is any need to accept their subjective experience of certainty. — Tom Storm

Nowadays mysticism is often proffered as a method to adjudicate knowledge claims, particularly in relation to religions. Yet I think it is becoming widely recognized that the error in this sort of thinking overlooks the fact that mystical experiences are highly conditioned by antecedent beliefs. Thus such a view grossly oversimplifies the relation between the experience and the belief(s). They claim that the experience explains and justifies the belief, whereas it is plausible that the exact opposite is occurring, and in any event the belief conditions the experience (even if it does not explain it).

To take an example, a Buddhist may have an experience where their identity dissolves into nothing, and a Christian may have a very similar experience where they feel united with God (and some dissolving or dissociation is also involved here). An older theory would say that the two experiences are identical, different inferences are drawn based on the belief system, and some inferences are more rational than others. Yet a more recent, more nuanced theory shows that very often the experiences themselves are notably different, and that they tend to cohere with the antecedent beliefs of the practitioner. Further, it is not at all clear where the experience ends and the so-called "inference" or interpretation begins.

It seems to me that mysticism is valuable, but as far as public adjudication goes it is a dead end. Its value lies elsewhere.

A certain amount of transparency with oneself may be beneficial and it may not that once this achieved there may be less need to argue one's position. However, ongoing interaction, such as on a philosophy forum, may be useful for fluidity in thinking and ongoing modification of ideas in the light of new perspectives and development of knowledge. — Jack Cummins

Yes, there is something interesting about philosophy as fulfilling a need versus philosophy as abundance or overflow, and the various shades of both. Argument and philosophical dialogue can be a crutch; it can be a response to a legitimate need for investigation and intercourse; it can be a genuine and unselfish sharing; and sometimes it can even be the consequence of an overflow of our grasped participation in the intelligibility of creation.

Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I.II.Q2.A6

Well, I sometimes suspect that the capacity to giggle might be more common than the capacity for rationality. — Banno

One way to cash this out is to say that risibility or the ability to learn grammar supervene on rationality, and it is rationality that belongs to the essence because it is explanatorily fundamental. Thus a human being is not defined as "A risible animal" or "An animal capable of learning grammar," but rather, "A rational animal." This contains and explains the others.

Aquinas claims that, in a similar way, delight supervenes on happiness, for happiness is essentially the possession of a fitting good and not the possession of delight, and yet delight always follows upon and attends happiness such that they appear indistinguishable.

I should point out yet again that it is one thing to disagree with some real definition and another to disagree with essentialism itself. The latter is much more contentious and difficult, and would seem to involve the claim that no properties are explanatorily prior or posterior.

I have been wanting to come back to this:

Socrates: It is a method quite easy to indicate, but very far from easy to employ. It is indeed the instrument through which every discovery ever made in the sphere of the arts and sciences has been brought to light. Let me describe it for your consideration.

Protarchus: Please do.

Socrates: There is a gift of the gods---so at least it seems evident to me---which they let fall from their abode, and it was through Prometheus, or one like him, that it reached mankind, together with a fire exceeding bright. The men of old, who were better than ourselves and dwelt nearer the gods, passed on this gift in the form of a saying. All things, so it ran, that are ever said to be consist of a one and a many, and have in their nature a conjunction of limit and unlimitedness. This then being the ordering of things we ought, they said, whatever it be that we are dealing with, to assume a single form and search for it, for we shall find it there contained; then, if we have laid hold of that, we must go on from one form to look for two, if the case admits of there being , otherwise for three or some other number of forms. And we must do. And we must do the same again with each of the 'ones' thus reached, until we come to see not merely that the one that we started with is a one and an unlimited many, but also just how many it is. But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number. It is only then, when we have done that, that we may let each one of all these intermediate forms pass away into the unlimited and cease bothering about them. There then, that is how the gods, as I told you, have committed to us the task of inquiry, of learning, and of teaching one another, but your clever modern man, while making his one----or his many, as the case may be----more quickly or more slowly than is proper, when has got his one proceeds to his unlimited number straightaway, allowing the intermediates to escape him, whereas it is the recognition of those intermediates that makes all the difference between a philosophical and a contentious discussion. — Plato, Philebus, 16c, translated by R. Hackforth

Can you say more about what this means?

Maybe I can give a superficial reading as a foil. There seems to be an association of "unlimited" with the act in which we "cease bothering about them." This clause seems to almost indicate an endless process of investigation and inquiry: "But we are not to apply the character of unlimitedness to our plurality until we have discerned the total number of forms the thing in question has intermediate between its one and its unlimited number." What follows, then, is that the philosophical discussion is aimed at inquiry, perhaps endless, whereas the contentious discussion presumes that insufficient inquiry was sufficient, and then attempts to wield the product of that inquiry in various ways.

Does that get at it in part? One thing I wish to better understand is the method itself, the moving back and forth between the one and the many.

In fending off the arguments, ↪Leontiskos is obliged to take extreme measures. Hence "If the definition of Thales is stipulated to be "the man who fell into the well," then Fred is Thales". His approach cannot envision, let alone articulate, the possibility that Thales did not fall into the well, because for him "Thales" is exactly "He who fell into the well". I hope others will accept that "Thales might not have fallen into the well" is a clear enough English sentence that might even have been true. — Banno

But you missed the point, which is that your construals are the ones requiring extreme measures. We don't generally stipulate definitions in the way you are presupposing, and so my antecedent is abnormal precisely because it reflects your approach ("If the definition is stipulated to be...").

Specifically, I was replying to your claim:

Suppose that the only thing we know about Thales is that he fell into a well. On the descriptivist account, "Thales" and "The fellow who fell into a well" are synonymous, then on your view "The fellow who fell into a well" is what we mean by "Thales" — Banno

This is completely wrong on my view, but if we accept it then Thales is Fred.* When I say, "The only thing I know about Thales is that he fell into a well," I am not committing myself to your synonym, nor am I committing myself to the view that "The fellow who fell into a well" is what we mean by "Thales". I think these claims of yours are altogether strange and wrongheaded. You seem to be significantly misunderstanding the meaning and intention behind the phrase of a novice, such as, "Isn't Thales the one who fell into a well?"

But his logic has been superseded. Leontiskos has attached himself to the descriptivist view, and thus to the supposed utility of Aristotelian logic he holds dear. He has taken the next, predictable step, when Kripke shows your argument to problematic, attack the character and authority of Kripke (↪Leontiskos). — Banno

First, when you talk about descriptivism you are talking about Russell. You (and Kripke) are arguing against a phantom that I do not hold to.

Second, my point about Kripke is that I accept his authority no more than you accept Aristotle's. So when you cite him and simply expect to receive assent, you should check yourself. I have no respect for Kripke (and Frank's recent thread attests to the reason why). Neither do I have any special disrespect for him, and as I pointed out, the view you are here attributing to him doesn't even seem to be his. But the deeper point is that if you think Kripke is right then you have to argue for him. You don't get to merely cite him. I am doing the same with Aristotle.


*

Thus, rather than a metaphysical extravagance, a more definitional concept of essence is attuned to the practicalities of language use in a manner a modal logical characterisation must be blind to.

Ultimately that blindness comes from severing the connection between the target of the definition and how it seamlessly dwells in the world - beyond the words, its essence. What it means to count as a bachelor is different from what it means for a bachelor to count as an unmarried man. — fdrake

Thanks, great post. Related:

There is nothing archaic or 'metaphysical' about the doctrine of real essences: that doctrine merely supposes that among the properties of substances and stuffs some are explanatorily basic, others explanatorily derivative. — Introduction to Posterior Analytics, by Jonathan Barnes, p. xiii

It seems to me that the lack of a teleological cause might be a basis for making this claim -- basically anything which is a natural kind would participate in all four causes. — Moliere

You can definitely think about it in terms of teleology. That may be the easiest way to do it. I was just trying to point out that Aristotle doesn't think about it solely in those terms, although it does play a significant part.

So if we think about it in terms of teleology (final cause), then we can see that a hammer or a horse-and-rider does not have a final cause. It is not ordered to anything in particular. It will not "go in some direction" left to itself. It seems to me that this is a perfectly good starting point for thinking about substances. An olive and an olive tree, on the other hand, do have final causes. The most obvious final cause of an olive is its orderedness towards an olive tree.

I'm going back to the four causes because it seems to me that hammers have a definition, and so I would have said that a hammer has an essence on that basis from my understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence. — Moliere

It is true that if something has an essence then it has a definition. Trouble is, we are using "definition" in a loose sense (and therefore we are also using "essence" in a loose sense). Such loose usage is fine as far as it goes, but it does make things confusing if you are trying to grasp Aristotle. For Aristotle if we wish to speak strictly then the hammer has neither an essence nor a definition.

If we want to speak more strictly then we could talk about an understanding of a hammer. One who uses a hammer has an understanding of it and a conception of it, even if they are unable to set out that understanding in a formal description.

(the strange thing here being that the basic materials participate in teleology by having a proper place to be in the stack... which clearly goes against how we understand matter to operate today) — Moliere

You would have to say more on this.

I take it your beliefs are Aristotelian-inspired, but since you're also saying "for Aristotle" it seems you may also be thinking about your account as different. — Moliere

Yes, I am trying to stick closer to Aristotle in this conversation than I am wont to do in my general philosophical inquiry. I don't think I actually disagree with him on these topics, however. A large part of it is that we are deviating from Aristotelian usage, and I am trying to accommodate the different usage.

I am afraid that in practice we feel that the burden of proof rests with the statement that is farthest from common sense. — Jedothek

This is basically correct. The burden of proof is on the claim that is contentious or contrary to the prevailing consensus, and this could also be expressed in terms of common sense.

this criterion is sloppy, sheeplike, and depressing — Jedothek

No, it's not, and there's an important point at play here. In philosophy today people like to follow Descartes and think that everything ought to be crystal clear and perfectly certain. They think <Conclusions ought to be apodictic; but deriving the burden of proof from prevailing consensus is not apodictic; therefore this is an incorrect way to derive the burden of proof>.

This is a completely wrongheaded way to think about precision. Not everything is or should be apodictic, and the burden of proof is one of those things. The burden of proof is itself little more than a loose convention with respect to debate and dialogue. It cannot be ascertained in an apodictic way; it is not susceptible to a high degree of certainty; it is not a very important concept in the first place; and it is itself just as sloppy as notions such as consensus and "common sense." Simpler: if the burden of proof were not a sloppy concept, then it would require a non-sloppy alternative; but the burden of proof is a sloppy concept.

We must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our statement as the subject before us admits of; for the same degree of accuracy is no more to be expected in all kinds of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft. — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.iii

Yes, great points. I think what you say is fairly accurate.

If hammers don't have essences, then what does? And on what basis are we to exclude tools from having being (or, perhaps they have being, but no essence?)? — Moliere

Yes, for the Aristotelian they would have being but no essence.

I'm a bit pressed for time today, but for Aristotle the fundamental issue is that a kangaroo has an essence whereas a hammer does not, and this is because only the first is a cohesive thing (substance) with its own proper mode of being and acting (and this also includes teleological considerations). A hammer is an aggregate of substances thrown together for a human purpose.

A simpler example would be a horse-and-rider. A horse-and-rider is not a substance, and it has no essence. Instead it is a composite of two substances (a horse and a human rider). We can talk about the essence of a horse-and-rider in an analogical way, as if it were just a single thing, but technically this is not quite right.

I am not opposed to talking about the "essence" of a hammer or the "essence" of a named individual, just so long as we do not forget that for Aristotle there are no such essences. More broadly, it makes sense for the Aristotelian to say that the human has being in a more primary sense than the hammer does; or that the name attached to a perceptual 'description' is more primary than the name attached to the conceptual 'description' (and that the latter should take its cue from the former). Such a distinction may seem quite odd to the modern mind, but it may also be at the root of some of these issues.

I just did a quick search for Kripke on naming, to refresh myself. Google returned some class notes on the topic, which I skimmed (link).

[Kripke's] argument counts against the view that the meanings of names are given by their associated descriptions, but not against the view that the reference of a name is fixed by its associated descriptions. — Nd.Edu Lecture Notes on Kripke

From the skim it seems that Kripke wants to say that proper names and definite descriptions do not have the same meaning (and this is something I have acknowledged multiple times). He tries to provide a causal alternative to "description," and his alternative seems problematic and unimpressive.

He also seems to think that the name and the description come apart in a very significant sense, and on this I disagree. If the reference of a name is fixed by its associated description, then the claim that the name and its description can come far apart involves the claim that the name and its reference can come far apart, which I think is mistaken.

The most recent thing I have read on Kripke (by philosophers who I actually take to be authoritative) spells out his misunderstanding of intention, and I can't help but wonder if the same flawed view of intention is on display in this realm (link). He apparently wants to talk about names in an objective way, apart from the subjective intentions of the speakers who are using the names. If so, this is a mistake similar to the one I <pointed out earlier>.

It may also be worth noting that I am not using "description" in any specialized sense, and that Banno introduced this term, not me. I would want to say that, primarily, names are associated with objects of perception, and that the rigidity of names pertains (primarily) to the uniqueness of such perceptions. This is why I think my example about identical twins is much more interesting than Donnellan's example about Thales. Names which are not associated with perception-"descriptions" are derivative in relation to this more primary use of names.

Your supposed reply begs the question by supposing that "Thales" sans description does not refer to Thales. And yet, "What if every description we have of Thales were wrong?" is clearly a question about Thales. — Banno

The reason I am not begging the question is because I am giving arguments. Arguments such as the following require a response:

Suppose, ex hypothesi, that the novice has no description of 'Thales'. If this were so, then what in the world do you propose they would be asking about when they ask about 'Thales'? In that case they could not be asking about a man, because if they were asking about a man then 'Thales' would have a description. They could not be asking about a previously existing thing, because if they were asking about a previously existing thing then they would have a description. They could not be asking about a name from their textbook, because if they were asking about a name from their textbook then they would have a description, etc. — Leontiskos

Suppose that the only thing we know about Thales is that he fell into a well. On the descriptivist account, "Thales" and "The fellow who fell into a well" are synonymous, then on your view "The fellow who fell into a well" is what we mean by "Thales" — Banno

If the definition of Thales is stipulated to be "the man who fell into the well," then Fred is Thales. We have then given Fred a second name. If the definition of Thales is stipulated to be "the man who fell into a well and who is referred to as 'Thales'," then on your account Thales does not exist, because no one matches that definition. Hence my point about predicates (1), (2), and (3). You don't seem to have a clear account of which parts of the description are thought to be necessary and which are not.

I hope it clear that in this case Thales certainly exists, but we do not have to hand a description that sets him apart, he has no "essence", so it seems, and yet we can still talk about him. — Banno

But it seems very obvious that when we use a name we are talking about something, and that if we don't know what we are talking about then we can't use the name in any meaningful sense. You don't seem to be taking this fact of experience into account. It can't simply be ignored.

The deeper problem is that your specifications are mistaken. When someone talks about Thales they are not defining him as "the man who fell into the well" (i.e. they are not assigning that as the one necessary property of Thales (along with existence)). If they were doing this then Thales would just be Fred. When someone talks about Thales they have a large number of predicates in mind, some of which are necessary and some of which are not. If historical existence is a necessary predicate then it is a real name; if not it is a formal name. To simplify and avoid the debate of the OP, we can simply say that the nominal definition aligns with the necessary predicates.

But first things first, you must specify which are necessary and which are not, instead of making wily assumptions on that score. Mistakes about necessary predicates will be decisive in undermining the speaker's intention; while mistakes about non-necessary predicates will not be. The kind of mistake will depend on the kind of predicate, as assigned in the speaker's intention. (E.g. Whether a name is formal or real will depend on what the speaker intends with respect to the existence-predicate.)

A consequence of this is that one might specify a possible world in which the characteristics that supposedly set out the essence of that individual do not apply. Nevertheless, what they do not apply to is that same individual. — Banno

If Kripke thinks that an individual can be identified without a description then he is hopelessly confused. On my reading he does not think this, but it is apparently an implication you wish to draw out.

As far as I can see this solution dissolves the supposed problem. Much ado about nothing... — Janus

:up:

In the OP I said people crave it, and I definitely still believe that - even if they do not know it. — ToothyMaw

Okay.

It is usually just so-and-so is evil, too extreme, too centrist, too censorious - and no one provides practical solutions, even if those solutions are just favorable tradeoffs. — ToothyMaw

Yes, I can see this as well. I suppose the difficulty is that if we are to go beyond "duty for duty's sake" then we are effectively required to proffer a moral argument, and this is difficult in the midst of such strong skepticism.

You claim that a novice asks about Thales while having no description of Thales. I pointed out why you are wrong and I gave a number of different arguments to that effect. In response you provide nothing at all.