Regardless, we have to distinguish the type of use that establishes the meaning of a word from the type of use that is a fallible act of predication. It's not entirely clear which kind of use is in play when we say that acts which promote flourishing are good. — Michael

The first very crucial thing to note is that definitions are also fallible. In order to understand the meaning of a predication, one must understand the meaning of the words within the predication, and when one fails to do so their false definition(s) will prevent them from understanding the meaning of the predication, and will also then prevent them from judging the truth of the predication. Once the terms of the predication are understood, the predication is understood, and can be judged true or false. So it is not only the predication that is fallible. In these dialogical contexts it is as often or more often the terms that are the problem.

1. A three-sided shape is a triangle
2. This plastic object is a triangle

Whereas (1) is true by definition, (2) isn't, and so (2) is possibly false. If (2) is false then looking at that plastic object isn't going to help us determine the meaning of the word "triangle". — Michael

This is not a bad example for my point. A plastic object is never a triangle. A triangle is a three-sided polygon, or plane figure. Or, "a three-sided polygon that consists of three edges and three vertices." A plastic object, not being a polygon or plane figure, is never a triangle. The reason someone might think a physical object is a triangle is because your definition is false, or at least ambiguous given the ambiguity of "shape."

Now in some ways I am quibbling, but the point is that our definitions are often less accurate than we suppose.

But this does seem problematic. We often say that people of other cultures (with their own language) have different moral values. How can this be unless relevant words share meaning across languages but are used to describe different things?

Perhaps it's more accurate to say that we use the word "good" to describe things that we ought do and the word "bad" to describe things that we ought not do. This is somewhat supported by the etymology of the related word "moral", from the Latin "moralis" meaning "proper behavior of a person in society". Other languages have their own words used the same way. We just disagree on which things we ought and ought not do. — Michael

I am not a moral (cultural) relativist, so I reject your premise.

The point here is that if two people disagree with respect to a predication, "X is good," then they are either disagreeing about what good is or else they are disagreeing about what X is. Your Arabic case is just another example of this.

As far as I can tell, the argument behind positions such as yours or hypericin's is fairly simple. "There is a great deal of disagreement about whether X is good; therefore there is no correct answer to the question."

Yes, but I would say my OP doesn’t really support that; but I do support it. — Bob Ross

Okay.

That’s true. Yes, we do seek flourishing. However, I would say, by default, we are only motivated (usually) towards the lowest Good, which is egoism (i.e., my flourishing). I am not sure that we are, by default, motivated towards the highest Good, which is universal flourishing. Only after grasping the good, intellectually (to some extent), do we acquire motivation towards the highest Good. — Bob Ross

So a fairly basic way to overcome the egoist's objection is to recognize that there are common goods, the benefit of which is in our private interest. Think of the mother who nourishes her child and sees the good of her child as her own good; or the father who finds his own good in the good of his family, or the soldier who makes sacrifices for the good of his nation, which is his own good. A bright dividing line between "my good" and "others' good" does not exist in reality. People regularly (and without intellectual recognition) come to recognize others' good as their own good. It is solidarity or incorporation, and it flows from our social nature. Like bees, humans thrive in community; their flourishing is bound up with the flourishing of others, and to deviate from this is to deviate from a pre-critical mindset. Or in other words, Hobbes was wrong when he tried to redefine the human being in terms of selfish individualism.

Well, they are not, and that's not going away soon, anymore than my ideas are going to be adopted soon. — schopenhauer1

It's really nothing like your ideas. If the government funding fails then you revert to lower quality, dirt roads, as are already common in countries without substantial government utilities. Cars run on dirt roads, don' cha know.

Well, then let me list you all the stuff from the OP that goes along with automobiles. — schopenhauer1

So we've established that the automobile system is not a centralized, top-down, government-run system like your mass transit system. We've established that the infrastructure for cars is more serviceable, more flexible, and massively cheaper than your mass transit system. But now your response is, "Oh, but look at my OP." Well I already responded to your OP. I will even remove the sentence you half-addressed by saying that other people would pay for it with a progressive tax scheme:

...I don't find much rigorous argumentation in the OP. It looks like a quick attempt to think up as many problems with cars as you can, and this is then followed by a quick plug for mass transit, John Lennon-style. Most of it has nothing specifically to do with cars. Pollution? The trains you are so fond of once ran on fossil fuels, and the cars you dislike now run on electricity (and there are all sorts of problems with electric vehicles too). [...] It is unprincipled to apply most of these things to cars and to nothing else. The other problem is that I see no attempt to understand the impact of cars as a whole, namely by juxtaposing the cons with the pros. — Leontiskos

The correct title for your OP is, "Trains are better than automobiles," but even then it is in need of proper argument.

That is false.. depending on the country I guess. Most roads are funded by state, local, and federal taxes. — schopenhauer1

That doesn't mean they can't be funded otherwise, or that they need to be of the quality you have in mind. Consider:

Roads always existed. Either trails for walking or leading livestock comfortably, cobblestones for carriages or other wheeled mediums, etc. — Outlander

A dirt road where I live handles pedestrians, bikers, horses, ATVs, carriages, motorcycles, cars, RV's, buses, and semi-trucks. One time I even saw a Ferrari (on the paved road, admittedly)!

And when the cheaper system of roads breaks down because society hits a depression, it is still serviceable to a large extent. The quality of the roads diminishes at that point, but the transportation system doesn't collapse as it would with a rail system.

I just think you overlook that roads are simply a hodgepodge version of the same thing. — schopenhauer1

But they're not, because roads are cheap enough to be built by private parties. Small counties can afford roads but not trains. Where I live many of the roads are dirt. My car gives me access to the entire continent. It drives on roads of all different kinds, made by all kinds of different communities and people.

The kind of taxes, banking, and security that go to public transit, or even a private company is not the same as incurred when owning a car. — schopenhauer1

Okay.

This is evil sounding to conservative politics, so go on trying to show the downsides... — schopenhauer1

You have an expensive idea you want other people to pay for? Nah, I'll just quote it and let it stand there awkwardly: :razz:

In other words, I don't mind it being taken from a progressive tax base rather than personally from my bank account. — schopenhauer1

I don't mind fees to a private company to maintain it. Besides, do you think that "public" is really just "public"? It's always been public contracted to private with public and sometimes combined with private funds. Everyone gets their cut. You can have your Ayn Randian proprietors and shareholders ripping people off or the government getting their share, I guess. — schopenhauer1

The problem isn't merely economic, although the cost of trains is certainly prohibitive to private parties. The problem is that in order to go anywhere I am at the whim of your centralized thought-child. What you have in mind is centralized, government control of the mobility of the entire nation.

I'm trying. Hard to imagine a train track running down the road in front of my house. Would it stop at every house? Or make a reservation and the train will stop at your house. — jgill

Maybe it would only stop if there is someone waiting at the stop. And maybe you could pull a cord to alert the engineer that you want to get off at the next stop.

...It's like we're groping in the dark for the concept of a bus.

This sounds so much better than having my car available anytime, and easily drivable to the Walmart about three miles away. Much better to wait for the neighborhood train. — jgill

Damn. I get blamed for everything. — jgill

:lol:

Just more frequent trains... In a perfect world, there’d be tons of train cars. — schopenhauer1

The secret to a band: more cowbell. The secret to a society: more trains.

You can have door to door transportation in a skyscraper IF you install elevators while you are building the tower. If you have to add elevators after the tall building is finished, elevator shafts and elevator systems become prohibitively expensive. Same thing for a city, to a large extent. One of the difficulties the met council's light rail system had was digging up all the infrastructure that was under the streets on which the light rail would run. It had to be either moved or upgraded so that it excavation wouldn't be needed in the intermediate future. Neither elevated rails nor burrowed tunnels get around all problems. — BC

Interesting!

The truth is, we missed the boat a century ago. We dismissed trains and we staked our future on autos, trucks and highways. Yes, it was a bad idea. — BC

Yes, perhaps. But now you have me thinking of boats.

Regarding the OP, I don't think countries that were built on cars will be converted to rail systems. Any problems with cars will be addressed in a piecemeal fashion, as is naturally already taking place. Population-dense urban areas already make use of rails. It is not only a matter of addressing foreign infrastructure, but also of trying to fit a rail system to a car geography. It would be like replacing the riverboats with cruise ships in a country of streams and rivers. The automobile has created a country of streams and rivers, at least in the U.S.

Are you aware of what you are saying here? Where do you live? — jgill

In the city, where food magically appears in the grocery store. :smile:

Imagine if more money was put into mass transit. Bullet trains, underground subways. Imagine if every city had worked out a way to transport people where anyone living in a metro area was never more than five minutes away from a stop for mass transit. Imagine a world where there were so many various train routes going from city hub to city hub, there wouldn't even be a need for highways. Imagine if one's personal or commercial goods were moved from various tram-like / light rails along with cable cars that could be connected right to a drive way to a residence. — schopenhauer1

Imagine all the unintended evils that would accompany such a thing. :razz:

...I don't find much rigorous argumentation in the OP. It looks like a quick attempt to think up as many problems with cars as you can, and this is then followed by a quick plug for mass transit, John Lennon-style. Most of it has nothing specifically to do with cars. Pollution? The trains you are so fond of once ran on fossil fuels, and the cars you dislike now run on electricity (and there are all sorts of problems with electric vehicles too). Taxes, banking, security, etc.? They apply to everything, not just cars. It is unprincipled to apply most of these things to cars and to nothing else. The other problem is that I see no attempt to understand the impact of cars as a whole, namely by juxtaposing the cons with the pros.

The problem with such technologies, in my opinion, is mass transit. Mass transit, whether in the form of cars or trains or airplanes, will cause the problems you are concerned with. So should we reduce the need for mass transit? Perhaps, depending on the costs associated with such a move. But this would lead to a more communal form of living, with less travel, globalization, etc.

And I think the big elephant in the room is autonomy and subsidiarity. You have conceived of mobility as tied inextricably to the State within a centralized, top-down system.

Correct. — Bob Ross

I think you are on the right track. You seem to be proffering something akin to virtue ethics.

So acts which promote flourishing are good because we have historically used the word "good" to describe acts which promote flourishing? This seems to be a kind of constructivism: moral facts are established by the conventions of our language use. — Michael

This is a strange interpretation. It seems to me that he is simply defending his definition of 'good' by recourse to use. Ross is saying that acts which promote flourishing are good because that is what 'good' means, and we know what 'good' means by looking at the way the word is used. If you think the word means something else, then you should say what you think it means.

You seem to have decided, a priori, that the good and the moral can have nothing to do with motivation. You say things like, "It doesn't matter if X is good or moral, because I will do it or not do it regardless." But if @Bob Ross is correct in saying that the good has to do with flourishing, and flourishing bears on motivation, then of course we must be motivated to seek the good. In that case your a priori assumption simply turns out to be mistaken.

↪Leontiskos I've read that but I can't see where it's actually explained what "good" means. It only seems to say that good is a "transcendental" and so not reducible to some natural property. There is mention of "desires", but it clarifies that it's not that something is good because we desire it but that we desire it because it is good.

So all I get from this is that "good" is supervenient and desirable. It still seems that "good" is undefined. How am I to distinguish "good" from some other supervenient and desirable property? Even if it's the only supervenient and desirable property, unless "good" means "supervenient and desirable" it is as-of-yet undefined.

Am I just misreading or misunderstanding the paper? — Michael

This seems fairly close. Note that we are talking about pp. 11-13 of the paper. Simpson provides various related definitions on those pages. We could define good as that which supervenes on being vis-a-vis desirability.

Aquinas will state this in various related ways. For example:

Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present. — Aquinas, ST Ia.Q5.A1

The distinction here is between what is according to thingness (res) and what is according to idea/thought (ratio). So as Simpson illustrates, just as truth is that which supervenes on being vis-a-vis judgment, so goodness is that which supervenes on being vis-a-vis desire. Both judgment and desire are matters of thought/idea, and so the distinction between being and notions like truth or goodness is only introduced by way of thought/idea. That which does not recognize judgment does not recognize truth; and that which does not recognize desirability does not recognize goodness.

- :up:

My position isn't that words have no meaning. My position is that the have no essences. If my position was that words have no meaning, why would I be arguing with words?

Your criticism here has nothing in particular to do with moral terms, but it has to do with all terms. That is, you're not just saying I can't define good and bad, but I can't define anything, including "define." — Hanover

You are quite forward about being unable to define good and bad, and so I am focusing on those. Usually someone who cannot define good or bad does not go on to depend on those words in their philosophical or moral theories.

I am not following what your point is here? Are you implying that I am being arrogant in my definition of the good? — Bob Ross

No, the very fact that you revise your ideas and write long posts is evidence that you are not approaching these topics glibly.

Likewise, the universal, or highest good, is when everything in reality is acting in harmony and unity to flourish; — Bob Ross

Okay, so you think goodness is act-centric, but you are thinking beyond human acts.

It is here. — Wayfarer

Ah, yes. So the context is abstruse Medieval Christological debates, lol. Of course, I think your question is more general:

I think the term 'individual substance' is rather odd, don't you? Shouldn't it be an individual being or an individual subject? This use of 'substance' is one of my gripes about philosophical terminology - I've often pointed out that it originates with the Latin translation of Aristotle's 'ouisia' as 'substantia', thence the English 'substance'. But 'substance' in ordinary usage means something utterly different to the philosophical 'substance'.

I'm sure those learned in Aquinas and philosophical terminology understand this distinction but it seems to me to result in a very unfortunate equivocation between the philosophical and ordinary meaning of the term, such that the meaning of the quoted passage really sounds decidedly odd.

Any thoughts on that? — Wayfarer

If my memory serves, a substance is a kind of standalone thing in which properties can inhere. An individual substance (supposit) is a real particular substance, as opposed to a species (e.g. this monkey as opposed to the universal species monkey).

As far as I can tell, ordinary English usage is not altogether different, and only shifted along the lines of a particular, common metaphysic (of materialism). See: Merriam-Webster, substance.

Regarding your question about 'being' or 'subject', I suppose I would want to know what a non-individual being and a non-individual subject are supposed to be. The universal sense of 'substance' is clearly non-individual, but it's not clear that we have non-individual senses of these other terms you want to substitute.

Which is not right, either, but nevertheless conveys the original idea of 'ousia' better than 'substance'. After all, we have learned an astonishing number of things about material substance: the periodic table, the standard model of physics, the list is endless. What do we know of 'spiritual substance?' Why, it's a mere fiction, a hangover from medieval theology, the ghost in the machine. That's the substantive point. ;-) — Wayfarer

Ousia/substance is not inherently spiritual. Elements, plants, and animals are equally substances. Aristotle's starting point is always material things.

There are different places where I believe Moore's Open Question has been adequately addressed. One is, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy and St. Thomas," by Peter L. P. Simpson.

<Here> is a link to a thread dedicated to the topic.

This view is that the good is an abstraction of similar acts such that it turns out to the be equivalent to essentially 'flourishing'. — Bob Ross

In large part, yes. The difficulty is that when we get to fundamental words and concepts they become more difficult to understand. "Being" is the grand-daddy example. Understanding what such words mean requires a highly competent philosopher, and I'm afraid Moore and Wittgenstein are far from that. Point being: these are difficult questions which must be approached with a large dose of humility. The fact that so many on TPF approach them arrogantly explains why their answers are so confused and superficial.

Now the first difficulty to note with the notion of goodness is that it is neither act-centric nor human-centric. There can be good acts and good humans, but there can also be good dogs, and good bridges, and good airplanes, and good sunshine. So we must first avoid the conflation of 'good' with 'moral' or even 'prudent'/'skillful'.

Perhaps he might ask, "Are Thrasymachus and I dwelling in the same cave?"

But Aristotle addresses Plato's Ideas at various points, including Metaphysics I.6.

(The difficulty here is that Plato would never have said that to Aristotle. The allegory of the cave is not primarily a means of dialogical argument.)

Moore doesn't say that morality "has no essence" (whatever that means). Moore says that moral terms like "good" are undefinable. This contrasts with naturalist theories that claim that moral terms like "good" can be defined in one or more other terms, such as "pleasurable" or "healthy". — Michael

It's the same thing, and my point of departure here is @Hanover's interpretation:

It relates to ↪Hanover's opinions about Moore's Open Question. — Leontiskos

The issue here is that Hanover (and others) seem to think that using an undefined term poses no problems. I think it poses enormous problems, and that it is directly related to these intractable problems of metaethics. If terms like 'goodness' or 'morality' are indefinable then your objections must be granted a fair bit of weight.

Hey Leontiskos, I perused the Thomist blog you linked to. I have a specific question on something I read there: — Wayfarer

Sure, but what blog are you thinking of? I want to make sure I understand the context of that quote.

(Of course Michael is right that the term substance goes back to the Greek and not merely to the French, but a Greek context is a bit different from a Latin context for understanding such utterances.)

...but that's not because we're so clever, but it's becasue essentialism is false. — Hanover

I am asking whether you think Banno's claims commit him to essentialism, and secondarily, what you take essentialism to be.

What I don't think though, is that there is some special X that all moral acts must have to be moral. It's entirely possible that act A and act B are both moral, but they lack any similar ingredients.

As with my DSM psychological definition I provided, maybe to be moral we must have 25 of 8,000,000 possible ingredients. That would allow for thousands of moral acts to not share a single common ingredient, meaning we don't have any essential ingredient at all. And I'm not committed to 8,000,000. We may learn it's 8,000,001 upon further review. — Hanover

Okay thanks, that's clear enough. So you don't think there is anything that is a moral sine qua non. Presumably you also don't think moral or immoral acts necessarily have anything in common.

When you say "part of the essence of morality,"... — Hanover

What I meant is that apparently for @Banno if someone causes needless suffering then they are acting immorally. In thus establishing a sufficient condition for an immoral act, he has committed himself to a claim about what morality is, even if he has not defined morality in its entirety. He has a partial definition or a partial essence of morality.

When you say "part of the essence of morality," are you envisioning (1) multiple essences that establish morality or are you envisioning (2) an essence having more elemental components. — Hanover

Neither. If you were talking to Socrates you would give examples of immoral acts and he would complain that you need to instead give him the definition or account of morality, not mere examples. Banno, in giving a reason for his moral claim, involves himself in a particular account of morality. I am saying that, whether or not that account is complete or incomplete, it is an account.

Apparently you would tell Socrates that the things you call "moral" actually have nothing in common. "Moral" is just a word you use to group unlike things in a rather illogical way. Of course this isn't how language works. We don't group things under a single univocal concept if they do not have something in common.

By arguing essentialism, you just challenge my creativity, meaning you throw down a definition and then you ask me to come up with a counter-example to the definition. — Hanover

No, I think this misses it. For example:

What I'm suggesting is that not-causing-harm is not the essence of morality. I can probably envision an instance where I must do harm to be moral, as in when self-defense becomes necessary. — Hanover

In doing this you would merely be offering a counter-account, a counter-essence. In providing an alternative definition or understanding of morality you do not thereby sidestep essentialism. It is a strange caricature which says that essentialists don't argue about essences.

But the proximate question here is whether your idea of "25 of 8,000,000 possible ingredients" is essentialism. To be honest, I think the proportion is too miniscule to count as essentialism, but I also doubt that it captures morality. The other difficulty here is that properties are not necessarily discrete or quantitative, and if you actually attempted to follow such a program I think you would soon find significant commonalities among the 8,000,000 ingredients. You would find that Socrates was right after all.

Aquinas cites both the Digest of Justinian and Aristotle in defining morality (justice) as the rendering to each one his due (link). All such philosophers and jurists then go on to elaborate the implications of morality, but I think the definition is correct. So for example, if we treat someone in a way that they do not deserve to be treated, then we are acting immorally.

What's interesting here is that while @Hanover is an anti-essentialist and I am an essentialist, it seems to me that we would both agree that your position is essentialist (). It doesn't have to do with what you "consider the issue in terms of," but rather with what your position involves and entails. It strikes me as self-evident that someone can fall into a category without realizing that they fall into that category. Essentialism is a prime example, but another would be the folks around here who eschew metaphysics while simultaneously engaging in metaphysics.

I am curious to know whether @Hanover would see your position as essentialism, because there are various nuances to be had, but again, this is probably a topic for another thread. Something that we could come back to at a later date.

One wonders why. — Banno

Not this one.

And if it is not problematic, then please, set it out for us. — Banno

Essentialism is the idea that realities have determinate and knowable forms. — Leontiskos

---
Added:

I mean, I spent a fair bit of time on this in past threads, including the thread containing the honey bee example given above ().

But we can ask a rather simple question. If someone believes that immorality pertains to the causing of suffering (), then must they not simultaneously hold that not-causing-suffering is part of the essence of morality? I think they must, and I think @Hanover would agree with me. It makes no sense to claim that morality has no essence and then to go on to claim that morality has to do with not causing suffering. You can call this an essential property of morality if you like.

So it would seem that not only are you an essentialist with respect to morality, but also that your essentialism is substantive insofar as Michael and Hanover (and Moore) disagree with you on precisely this point.

I'm impressed to see ↪Bob Ross doing such a re-think of his ideas, this present version is quite an improvement on previous renditions. — Banno

Agreed.

And I'm not sure how it fits in with the topic. — Banno

This is why:

It seems close to Moore's intuitionism. I don't see how induction could fit int he way Bob suggests; he seems to want a notion of evidential support, while rejecting naturalism, which I can't see working. — Banno

interprets Moore's "naturalism" as essentialism.

Trouble is, it's remarkably unclear what an essence might be; which is odd, considering every thing supposedly has one, and moreover it is in virtue of having one that each thing is what it is... — Banno

I think the reason people balk at essentialism is because they have imbibed caricatures. Essentialism is the idea that realities have determinate and knowable forms. If morality has no determinate and knowable form, then moral claims will inevitably be vacuous, as believes. @Hanover/Moore's position that morality has no essence and yet moral claims are nevertheless meaningful seems to make no sense.

Note that you yourself, when pressed, supply a starting point for the form (essence) of morality:

You probably want to ask how we know it is true, and my own answer is that it's a consequence of the hinge proposition that one ought so far as one can avoid causing suffering. — Banno

Folks around here are apt to call this approach of yours "naturalism," and I think @Hanover rightly observes that what is meant by this is essentialism (and the starting point for this is any theory of moral realism which is not intuitionism). Your understanding of the essence of morality is bound up with causing or not-causing suffering, and this remains true whether or not that exhausts the reality of morality.

@Bob Ross, when pressed, gave a similar answer:

I see the good as simply acts which promote sovereignty, unity, and harmony; and I acquire this by induction or perhaps abduction of acts themselves. So, sure, it is the essence of 'the good'. — Bob Ross

So if we ask the question, "What is morality," we receive a number of answers:

• Michael: Morality has no essence/definition, and therefore can have no effect on reality.
• Moore: Morality has no definable essence, but is known by intuition.
• Hanover: (Seems to more or less agree with Moore)
• Bob Ross: Morality has no formula. ...Well, maybe it does. It is "caring about life." "... or maybe it is the promotion of sovereignty, unity, and harmony." (work in progress)
• Banno: Morality at the very least has to do with the causing of suffering.

It's a bit hard to get moderns to see what is meant by essences, and to see how they are used continuously, but this ongoing discussion of morality provides an occasion for perceiving it.

Suppose that rather than things having essences, our minds recognize certain 'signatures' in things. Is there a good reasons to think that 'there are essences' is a better way of understanding things than, "our minds recognize patterns'? — wonderer1

I think essentialism is a fundamental question. In this case it would simply be resituated as the question of whether the patterns are really in the things or merely in the mind. Yet the word "recognize" indicates the former.

Alternatively, there is the question of whether a recognized pattern is accidental or essential, and whether any property is essential. This pertains to species rather than to individuals qua individual.

But note that Hanover's example of clinical depression is an objective pattern that must have an essence. Again, one could deny that clinical depression exists or is knowable, but once these are admitted then it will be recognizable via a determinate form or "pattern."

The relation of nominal definitions to real definitions (and accidental properties to essential properties) is rather complex. See for example, "Aquinas: We Can't Know Perfectly Even the Nature of a Single Fly (and Related Texts)."

Non-essentialism doesn't suggest words have no meaning. — Hanover

But I never said it did.

I have fatigue and loss of energy? Am I depressed? — Hanover

Not according to the definition you gave, no.

Could this prescriptive definition not be universal? Might the way it's used vary by context, where I say I'm depressed just because I'm mildly upset, yet I don't meet this definition? — Hanover

There are equivocal uses of words, yes.

The point is, use varies by context and users don't even require a single consistent attribute of a term to anchor its meaning. — Hanover

I would say that essentialism is more about concepts than words. That is why I went on to say, for example, "Intentionally, concepts need to be specified." Everyone knows that words have equivocal uses and definitions. Yet the nub is really about realities, not concepts, which is why I expanded a third time in that first post.

We talk about what things are like, not what they are, which is what an essence is. — Hanover

No, I think we talk about what things are. "That is a tree," does not mean, "That is like a tree." We can speak metaphorically, but the literal sense of language is simply not metaphorical. Metaphor would be redundant and meaningless if the literal sense of language were metaphorical.

An essence for Aristotle is the what-it-is. See, for example, the honey bee example given here: .

Okay, and I think the meaning of 'essence' has become confused or brittle, so that may be part of the problem. — Leontiskos

If something exists and is knowable, then it has a determinate form and, therefore, it has an essence. We can know essences to a greater or lesser degree. If clinical depression exists and is knowable, then it has an essence, and the definition from the DSM is attempting to set out that essence. The idea that some words have equivocal senses is an ignoratio elenchi, unrelated to the question of essentialism.

With morality some think it doesn't exist (e.g. Michael) and some think it is unknowable, and for either of these positions it would not have an essence. But I'm not sure what it would mean to say that morality exists and is knowable but has no essence. Apparently when TPF users claim that there are no essences, what they mean to say is that it is hard to nail down essences. I grant that it is often hard to nail down essences, but I think everyone implicitly or explicitly acknowledges their existence; namely that there are existing realities with determinate and knowable forms.

Admittedly, I meant to raise this topic as a sort of bookmark for future conversation, for it is mildly tangential to this thread. I am going to tag @Banno as well, since he was my original interlocutor on this question. I don't have time to start that new thread right now.

I don't really have a problem with noting the essences of things, as I view it as a useful abstraction of entities in reality for the sole sake of analysis. — Bob Ross

Okay, and I think the meaning of 'essence' has become confused or brittle, so that may be part of the problem.

I see the good as simply acts which promote sovereignty, unity, and harmony; and I acquire this by induction or perhaps abduction of acts themselves. So, sure, it is the essence of 'the good'. — Bob Ross

Yes, or at the very least it is what we would call a nominal definition, an attempt at locating the essence of the good.

I would say we can induce 'the good' as, most generally, acts which care about life to the maximal extent possible; and 'the bad' as the negation of it. — Bob Ross

That's fine. At this point you have a definition or an essence.

I think this is an important topic generally, especially on this forum. It relates to 's opinions about Moore's Open Question. It relates to Moore's understanding of so-called "naturalism." It relates to and Anscombe's despairing of the moral landscape.

It's sort of interesting how modern philosophy has attempted to do without essences, but really you can't do without them. Linguistically, words need to have meaning. Intentionally, concepts need to be specified. And when studying realities that are given, or "objective," or "natural," one is studying something with a determinate form that must be explicated if any sort of meaningful investigation is to take place. The modern abandonment of essences is a train gone off the tracks, and many contemporary philosophers are waiting by the centuries-old wreckage, train ticket in hand. I basically agree with Lloyd Gerson that such an unmitigated abandonment of Plato's basic project isn't really worthy of the name 'philosophy.' It's no wonder that our moral thinking is so deeply confused when, as a matter of principle, it is claimed that notions like 'good' or 'moral' have no essence at all.

- :up:

Thanks. Read it. I see the argument but I'm not sure it matters. I still believe there's something interesting and useful in the agnostic atheist category. I'll mull over it. — Tom Storm

As I said in my first post (and also in the post you are responding to), "agnostic atheist" is an intelligible term. It's just not the same as "atheist."

I don't use Reddit, but the atheist I encountered years ago pointed me to that thread, and it is very good. In fact there is no comparison between that thread and the low-quality nonsense in this thread (including things like 's childish posts and ad hominem).

I am in no doubt about my lack of belief. I am certain/confident that the gods I am aware of don’t exist. The Abrahamic, the ancient and the Hindu. But I cannot talk to versions of God I have not heard of yet. — Tom Storm

Then I would say you are an atheist with respect to the Hebrew God and an agnostic with respect to unknown gods, or something like that. Yet if you believe that all of the gods you are aware of are non-existent, then you are an atheist by the traditional definition.

People in most cases should be allowed to choose their preferred appellation. — Tom Storm

I am not much interested in people who redefine words to have idiosyncratic meanings. It defeats the purpose of words.

I personally think the idea that an atheist is someone who doesn’t believe the proposition that gods exist is a vast improvement on those who say, There Is No God. — Tom Storm

I would recommend reading the Reddit article I linked earlier, written by an atheist. Many years ago I argued with an intelligent atheist on this topic, and we disagreed. Some years later he messaged me and told me that he had been convinced of my position (regarding the meaning of atheism), and that that Reddit article is the thing that did it for him. He said he was less defensive when the arguments came from an atheist than from a theist.

In some ways this is merely about the meaning of words. There is no word for a mere lack of belief in God. As I told the OP, "agnostic atheist" seems like a fine way to describe such a person. Yet the reason 'atheist' does not mean such a minute and strange thing is because words have substance, and this idea of lack of belief has very little substance. There is nothing inherently combative about believing that some thing does not exist. Combativeness in this case pertains only to one's subjective dispositions.

Agreed, and I also think it's become fashionable to make the non-committal assertion, "I lack the belief in God's existence". — Relativist

Right. Richard Dawkins became popular, atheism became fashionable, atheists started debating with theists all over the place, and then atheists found that it was easier to argue when they don't have any burden of proof, and thus there was a popular attempt to redefine the word 'atheism' to connote a mere lack of belief. It is a superficial but also an uninteresting position.

Am I going to sort each into each pile 100% accurately? Probably not. Does that take away from the plentiful evidence that the categories do exist? Certainly not. — Bob Ross

I agree that there are good and and bad acts, but metaethics does not stop at this point. If one has no reason for why a given act is good or bad then their metaethical view does not go very deep.

I believe a God of religion does not exist. Not just "absence of belief" - that's for wimps ( IMO- no one should make this noncommital claim). I also believe unicorns and fairies don't exist. — Relativist

Yes, quite right. In my opinion the error is a matter of fear, philosophical confusion, and an ignorance of the English meaning of the word "atheism." Humpty-Dumptys are running around having words mean "just what I choose them to mean," all in order to bolster a position for the sake of polemics.

From the perspective of an educated atheist, see: https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/2za4ez/comment/cs3ci0s/

The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross

How does one know which actions are categorized under each category?

And (2) as well. — Hallucinogen

Yes, possibly but not necessarily.

But what about "agnostic atheism"? When we look at the definition that self-described agnostic atheists give themselves, we find it isn't any different to agnosticism. Many atheists insist that atheism is "just" lack of belief in God, but that's agnosticism. — Hallucinogen

I think linguists have done a good job showing that atheism in the ordinary sense means more than a mere lack or absence of belief.

Yet there are self-described atheists who claim 1) to lack belief in God's existence, 2) to have no rational justification to assert that God does not exist, and 3) to have no disposition to believe that God might exist. This differs from agnosticism vis-à-vis (3) and it differs from ordinary atheism vis-à-vis (2). Thus the differentiation is intelligible even if the position isn't entirely coherent or sturdy.

As discussed, they won't be adding new functionality and we'll have to move to another platform. — Jamal

Oh yes, I remember, although I wasn't sure if it was public. I was just joking with @Hanover and his penalty box musings. :smile: