I have no idea how to get this through to you lol - I misspoke. I walked nothing back. Given that I entirely overlooked where I misspoke you took my claim for something it wasn’t. — AmadeusD

Well, if it was purely accidental then my point remains instructive. But we have been talking about the torture of babies for days now, and I would be surprised if you have consistently misunderstood that claim to be about only oneself, and not also about others.

Note that you had already staked out the same position earlier (). There you claimed that it was justifiable to get angry at others who behave in a way you deem incorrect. In that case it was also obvious that we were talking about the behavior of other people.

What does it mean for the rules of chess to be "true"? Can a games rules be "false"?

The rules exist. The may be followed, broken, or ignored. But how exactly are they "true"? — hypericin

The truth in question was the claim, not the doctrine. "According to the rules of chess, one cannot move pawns backwards." Sorry - sloppy writing, I admit!

It will perhaps come as no surprise that I agree with . In 's thread the question arose of whether 'shape' is a mind-independent reality. My argument was that boulders treat cracks differently than canyons whether or not any minds are involved:

The second point, regarding shape, is that if a boulder rolls over a small crack it will continue rolling, but if it rolls into a "large crack" (a canyon) then it will fall, decreasing in altitude. This will occur whether or not a mind witnesses it, and this is because shape is a "primary quality." A boulder and a crack need not be perceived by a mind to possess shape. — Leontiskos

The point is that objects have existence in themselves and exercise causal powers independently of anything we do or know. We have to do certain things in order to learn that there is a flower and that it has four petals, but the flower with four petals exists whether or not we learn about it.

Nice, thank you mate. Really appreciate the grace. It's been a really cool thread. — AmadeusD

I don't mind if you retract statements or mistakes, but it is worth noting that the point at hand was not insubstantial. You tried to affirm a moral claim while denying that it involves a norm. I pointed out that, in effect, moral claims involve norms. After that you saw that the norm was attached and backed away from the claim, due to the norm. The more fundamental point here is that moral claims and moral norms are all around us. Avoiding them would be like avoiding CO2 and only breathing oxygen. "We should not torture babies," is a moral claim, but so is, "He should not have cut me off in traffic." We are social creatures, and as such we are constantly judging actions.

Which of these don't you agree with:
(By "Doctrine", I mean any doctrine, system of thought or belief, ideology, etc. ) — hypericin

Okay:

Claims can be about doctrine, or about reality, or both. ($\checkmark$)
Doctrinal truth is independent of truth in reality. ($\unicode{x2718}$)
Claims can therefore be:
Doctrinally true, but false in reality. ($\checkmark$)
Doctrinally false, but true in reality. ($\checkmark$)
Doctrinally true or false, but have no truth value at all in reality. ($\unicode{x2718}$/?)
Doctrinally empty, and true or false in reality. ($\unicode{x2718}$) — hypericin

The form in English of doctrinal and reality claims is identical.
Therefore, people are apt to get all this wrong. They may confuse doctrinal claims with claims about reality, or mistake doctrinal truth with truth in reality. — hypericin

I tend to think you are digging around in the grave of Logical Positivism. I don't think people are often confused about this matter. It is only very seldom that we speak about doctrinal claims qua doctrinal. Do you have any examples:?

"One cannot move pawns backwards" — hypericin

For me the problem with this Logical Positivist-esque approach is that it reifies judgments and propositions. You are trying to read that as a material, intent-independent sentence, when in fact it is not. The material sense creates an ambiguity, but in the context of organic intent the meaning is, "According to the rules of chess, one cannot move pawns backwards." This is about the "doctrine" of chess, which is itself a part of reality; and it is true.

Edit: Changed comma to semicolon in last sentence.

I fucked up. I apologise. That is not my claim. We good? hehe — AmadeusD

Sure, fair enough. :up:

I really don't care how we got here. — AmadeusD

We got here when you tried to agree to a commonsensical claim that we should not torture babies, and then I pointed out that the claim is inconsistent with your position, and now you've slowly and painfully walked it back. So now you agree with me: you do not hold that we should not torture babies, because your presuppositions do not allow it.

I have clarified this multiple times, at much pain (linguistically). i think this. I don't think it about anyone else. — AmadeusD

Then you would not agree to the claim that "we should not..." 'We' = 'Myself and other people.' Like I've said all along, your claim contradicts your position.

But by all means retract the claim. I assume this is what you are now doing?

I don't make that claim. — AmadeusD

I already provided the quote where you agreed to the claim. Here it is again:

In my case, I do think this — AmadeusD

I make no such step. I think it's probably better that other people don't routinely do that, but that's only a comment on my own discomfort. I say literally nothing, and claim literally nothing, about how others should behave. I have thoughts, sure, but I refuse to(tbh, am not motivated to either) conclude anything. I inform my own actions. No one else's. And i don't, unless by incident. I suppose one could say 'norm' OR 'norm for me'. And yeah, it's normal for me not to want to torture babies. That doesn't extend to anyone else (again, other than the fact that it actually is normal, rather than normative, to not do that). — AmadeusD

I addressed this in my post to you <here>. Judgments need not be enacted to occur. To judge that, "we should not torture babies," is to apply a norm to people. Even if it is not applied externally, you are still applying a norm in your judgment. If you do not apply norms to others, then you cannot agree with that claim. Instead you might say, "I should not torture babies, but this 'should' does not apply to others."

I just can't see an issue with this. If your principles are applied only to yourself, you are making no attempt whatsoever to enforce them. You are not making judgements or proclamations on actions per se, but on your actions. — AmadeusD

Sure, but the claim involves the word 'we'. It's a rather important word within the proposition.

But, I would say, within my metaethical framework, the reason I agree with you is not because there is a fact of the matter: it is because what we both consider “worthy” of imposement is similar to one another. They are both tastes (to me), but one hits towards my core morals and the other seems negligible. Why? I can’t give you a full account of my psychology, but I would guess it is a bit of biology, sociology, nurture, and psychology that motivate me towards finding that a reasonable assessment. — Bob Ross

If you agree that there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and not wanting babies to be tortured, then what is the difference!? How does a taste become justifiably imposable? You claim they are exactly the same, and you treat them entirely different. You claim they are tastes, but you treat them as laws. This is irrationality at its finest.

So I don’t think you should find it that controversial when I say I would impose my belief that one should not torture babies but no the vanilla ice cream because I value the former simply so much; just like how you value moral facts so much that you will impose that taste on other people. — Bob Ross

Nope. I say, "This is a moral truth [a "fact" if you prefer], and therefore I treat it as a moral truth." You say, "This is a taste, but I do not treat it as a taste." My action matches my perception, whereas yours does not. Even if someone wants to say that I am irrational (because they believe my perception is mistaken), they would have to admit that you are significantly more irrational, because you do not even act according to your perceptions. You have a sort of first-order irrationality going on.

I would find them “unreasonable”... — Bob Ross

Good, and why are they unreasonable?

What is incoherent about any of that? Please explicate two propositions which I affirm that you find to be incoherent. — Bob Ross

It is irrational to impose tastes; it is irrational to hold that there are non-objective truths; it is irrational to treat two alike tastes entirely differently; it is irrational to claim that rationality is a subjective matter. Your thread is overflowing with irrationality. When faced with a contradiction in your thinking you try to defend it, and seven more pop up.

Fair enough. I don't really know enough about your position to say much, and I may not have enough time for that anyway, but I suppose there is one thing that could be said. You distinguish the pragmatic from the moral (in law). Ross distinguishes the psychological from the moral. I think this sort of separation is part of the problem, and it comes from being in the shadow of deontologists like Kant.

Earlier I gave you an account of moral judgment, "To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting." This can be pragmatic or psychological, but it is still moral. The whole purpose of law is moral, because it is meant to influence behavior.

Or in the other thread I spoke of the claim that "we should not torture babies." You replied:

In my case, I do think this, but i dont think it's a norm — AmadeusD

First, note that it is a principle of action. Now when a principle of action is applied, it becomes a norm. That is, the one applying it is utilizing it as a norm or standard, which is being applied to persons and their actions. So to say, "I think we should not torture babies, but I don't think it's a norm," is a contradiction (or else the English language is being used in a highly abnormal and unconventional manner). Else it is the claim that it is only a tentative norm or a watery norm. But just as tentative judgments are still judgments, so too are tentative norms still norms.

To be honest, then, I think the "moral subjectivist" lacks self-knowledge. They are trying to have their cake and eat it too, and this comes out in various ways. One such way is by applying or maintaining a principle of action and refusing to call it a norm. Another is vacillating on the question of whether they are within their rights to project their subjectivity onto others. The more precise problem, in my opinion, is that "subjective" and "objective" are much less precise words than the so-called "subjectivist" recognizes, and this leads to odd claims and presumptions.

Hi Leontiskos, thanks for making this point, it is crucial. It is precisely here that I am an error theorist. People go around all the time making doctrinal claims as if they were correspondence to reality claims. Pick any ideology, religion, political system, etc., you want, and you will find people talking about it as if they were claiming things about reality. When in fact, they are making doctrinal claims about and within a certain framework of beliefs. This is in fact a basic cognitive error, and it is for the clarification of errors of this sort that philosophy exists in the first place.

Moral claims absolutely do not escape this, as much as it might hurt the feelings of those making them. Moral claims are simply impossible without a moral doctrine within which they exist. And this moral doctrine itself, unlike the claims made within it, is not truth apt.

The larger philosophical question is, what claims do escape this? — hypericin

I think you missed my entire point, because I agreed that doctrinal claims are "correspondence to reality" (truth) claims. I think you are putting the cart before the horse. Truth in the primary sense is not tautological, and systems are secondary realities. Propositions are primary. Everyday language is not a logical system. Analytic philosophers have basically built a pretty house and then pretended that there is no reality outside of it. Systems are contrived, not basic. Truth is a great deal more wild and unwieldy than the analytic philosopher's domesticated schema can account for.

So the category error is yours, for the truth-claim is not a system-claim. It is not a framework-claim. It is a metaphysical claim, and there is no contextualizing framework or system for truly metaphysical claims. Modern philosophy has dug itself into a rabbit hole by claiming that metaphysics and metaphysical claims are impossible.

Here is something I wrote elsewhere:

It is such a strange and deep-seated malady of analytic philosophy whereby intelligence is reduced to computation and truth is reduced to tautology! Some philosophers have become so preoccupied with their systems that they seem to have forgotten that reality exists at all. Their Tower of Babel always ends up crashing down, and this occurs at approximately the same moment that the average person understands truth better and more clearly than they do. Truth is arrived at by judgment, not primarily by computation or syllogism or system. Judgment always comes first and precedes the others. The terms, the premises, the first principles, the inferences, the realities at stake—all of it is first subjected to judgment. There is no magic way to circumvent judgment and truth in the realest, most primary sense. In real life there are no axioms, only first principles that are either true or false. The suspension of judgment that putatively applies to axioms is but a useful fiction.

The same problem that occurs in moral epistemology also occurs in natural epistemology. The initial judgments that connect reason to the real world tend to elude analytic philosophers and “empiricists.” Hume ends up undermining not only morality, but also natural science. A truncated understanding of intelligence leads to a truncated understanding of reality. If intelligence were only computational, a matter of combining and separating, synthesis and analysis, then empiricists like Hume would be justified in their strange conclusions. But it is not. It is also comparison; comparison of things to one another and also comparison of ideas to things and to reality, whence the ideas are true or false. The most basic act is not even comparison per se, but rather affirmation and denial (the recognition and assertion that something is or that something is not). The simplicity of affirmation and denial precedes discursive computation and also grounds it, giving it meaning and purpose. If there is no truth in non-discursive reason, then there can be no truth in discursive reason (unless we substitute truth for a formalism, but this is not truth).

Else, take my post <here> and replace "theory" with "system" and "fact" with "proposition." The same point holds. There is no automatic rule that systems must be met with systems, or that systems are more fundamental than truths. I think it is quite the opposite.

(Of course there are exceptions, moral approaches which are system-fundamental. Utilitarianism comes to mind, where a systematic abstraction grounds the moral conclusions.)

Firstly, it isn’t immutable. I have the taste that everyone should not torture babies, and that could very well change (although I doubt it) in the future.

Secondly, it is not ‘universal’ in any objective sense. I subjectively commit myself to trying to universalize my goal.

Think of it this way. Imagine that we programmed an AI such that they had the sole goal all the time of trying to convince and ultimately stopping people from torturing babies. All else being equal, that people shouldn’t torture babies is not a fact, the AI just has this ingrained taste. Now, does this change the fact that this AI is trying to universalize their taste? Not at all. You seem to omit this option in your analysis. — Bob Ross

Okay, that was a useful clarification. The thrust of my point is this: Why are you trying to universalize a taste that is not universal in any objective sense? If moral subjectivism is the claim that moral judgments are idiosyncratic (flowing from subjectivity), then the evangelistic moral subjectivist is attempting to impose idiosyncrasies.

Again, I think there is a relevant difference between ice cream preference and the belief that no one should torture babies. Imagine there were someone who went around, everywhere, trying to convince everyone that chocolate was the best ice cream, and if they saw anyone eating any other flavor they would violently prevent them from doing so. I ask them, "Do you think there is some objective reason everyone should only eat chocolate ice cream?" They respond, "No, it's my personal and subjective taste, but I just go around trying to persuade and even force everyone to eat only chocolate ice cream." And they take this to be a reasonable answer to my question. What would you say? Is that anywhere near reasonable? I think the proper word for such a person is "vain." They want everyone to have the same tastes that they do.

To be clear, I grant that your 'moral subjectivism' is probably not a form of moral realism, but I do not grant that it is coherent. It requires one to do things like impose idiosyncratic beliefs, or speak of judgments that are true and yet not objective.

Fair enough -- if what I'm describing is, in fact, Aristotelian then the distinction between the thinkers isn't as important to me as the line of thought itself.

Let's say that this emphasis on willpower is a common belief, that I have heard it attributed it Aristotle's psychology (in the sense of having authority due to Aristotelian roots), and that I believe this is a bad way of thinking about how human beings change their behaviors. It seems what you're saying is that this is an incorrect way of understanding Aristotle, so fair enough -- then I misunderstand Aristotle. — Moliere

Sure. There may be some differences, but I tend to think you are overstating them. The Aristotelian tradition is not at all will-centered in my opinion. Of course that doesn't mean that it might not involve a greater emphasis on the will than Epicureanism.

Why would you disagree with "total inability"? Isn't that the actual problem case that I'm talking about? From the perspective of the doctor, at least, the one who gets themselves to the AA meetings and undergoes change because they realize they have a problem and they need help -- that's the case that's already solved itself. From the perspective of the Epicurean doctor the person who doesn't attend the meetings, that cannot stop themselves from pursuing anxious desire -- those are the cases that need the most help. — Moliere

I am saying that the person who doesn't go to the doctor will never be cured, and no one who sees a doctor has a total inability. In the general case I think there needs to be some baseline of willpower in order to seek the cure in the first place. I want to say that the doctor-patient relation is synergistic.

The question is not whether moral statements are truth-apt. They clearly are.

The problem is, are the moral systems against which moral statements are true or false themselves truth-apt? Here I think not. — hypericin

I think there are a number of problems with this post, but let me just focus on the most basic. As outlined by @Michael and others in the other thread (link), moral truth claims adhere to a basic sort of correspondence theory of truth. At least this is how I mean them. You are thinking in terms of a formal systems notion of truth. It’s an equivocation on what “truth” means. For example, we can call the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity a tautology (“truth” in the formal systems sense), but that is not how Catholics mean it. We do not mean, “If you accept our axioms then this follows tautologically.” We mean, “This is true, it correctly describes reality.” A moral claim works the same way. The claim is not, “If you accept my system then this follows,” but rather that the proposition itself is true (and if your system can’t handle it then you need an upgrade).

A system or context can condition the meaning of a proposition, but the proposition itself is ultimately true or false depending on how it comports with reality. The primary bearers of truth are therefore propositions, not systems.

it's not a lack of willpower, though a presence of willpower would surely make the doctor's task easier, it's that this person requires something more than willpower (given their total inability in that regard). — Moliere

I think you are describing Aristotelian continence. The value of continence does not reside in the idea that willpower suffices for happiness.

Again, for Aristotle the route for the depraved person is <depravity $\to$ incontinence $\to$ continence $\to$ temperance>. I have been presenting it as the idea that willpower is necessary (but not sufficient) to move from depravity to temperance.

The only thing I disagree with is "total inability." They must be able and willing to undergo the painful cure, and this requires willpower. More than willpower is needed, but without willpower they cannot be cured. Those with a total inability would not commit to the cure, attend the AA meetings, etc. Again, temperance is the goal, not continence, and temperance is not a matter of willpower. For Aristotle continence is not even a virtue, because it is not good in itself.

The overemphasis on willpower is presumably a descendant of Puritanism.

I have to note that, because I am a moral subjectivist--so when my view is just subtly excluded from consideration... — Bob Ross

"Moral subjectivism" seems to be one of those terms that is hopelessly vague and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the fact that you affirm that there are true moral judgments, and that these judgments are universally applicable, would seem to move you out of the "moral subjectivism" category by most definitions of that term. In other words, your "universalism" forecloses "subjectivism," and moves you into what is clearly moral realism.

For example, you think that we should not torture babies, and that this moral norm applies universally and unchangeably. Therefore you are not a subjectivist. Moral subjectivism cannot achieve unchangeable universality, at least as commonly understood.

I have no problem with this, I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

So if there were an intersubjective agreement that it is permissible to torture babies, then it would be permissible to torture babies? Does the wrongness of torturing babies change with the opinions of the day? This is what you are committing yourself to.

Welcome, . :smile:

What would you think about a visceral uneasiness is calling it 'true'? I don't know whether my behaviour is correct. It's the best i can envisage. I feels awful to claim that as truth. Any comments there? — AmadeusD

I think it's a cultural problem. In the West we are culturally (and morally) conditioned "not to judge others," and therefore we are uneasy with moral judgments. But it seems to me that this is unhelpful because moral judgments are unavoidable. Then there is the additional philosophical problem of grounding moral judgments, which is also particularly Western.

There are some people who try to obey this conditioning, and try to at least never act on the basis of their moral judgments (of others). That may be possible (and it may not be), but I think it's unhealthy either way. The way forward seems to be the virtue of humility. Embrace moral realism while simultaneously embracing humility. Form and enact moral judgments in a way that is neither brash nor shortsighted. Like truth, morality is best accepted willingly and arrived at via persuasion. Once it is admitted that moral propositions are truth-apt, persuasion becomes a possibility. Morality is largely social, so it is in everyone's best interest to know moral truth and to move forward in unison, with argument and dialogue to the fore.

You are a legal professional. Law is the most practical form of morality, and it is a social reality. As a society we agree that certain actions are impermissible and we lock people up for decades in prisons for carrying out these actions (things like murder, rape, pedophilia, etc.). I hope there is some certitude that these actions are actually wrong! (I don't mean to open up the law-morality debate. Again, I am defining a moral judgment as a judgment of a person's action.)

Anyway, sorry for the snippy post earlier. These morality threads drive me a little crazy, and therefore I try to limit the number of my interlocutors.

(Awhile back I drafted a thread on why all acts are moral acts, or at least all interpersonal acts. It seems there might be some interest if I ever get around to finishing it.)

I think I have pinpointed the crux of our disagreement (and let me know what you think): it is twofold. Firstly, you believe that someone is a moral realist if they accept #3 (i.e., “There are at least some true moral judgments.”), whereas I believe one needs to accept all three prongs of the thesis (that I outlined before). Secondly, you believe that there is it is illegitimate to impose a taste on another person. — Bob Ross

It seems that I did somewhat misread your three conditions, but you already agreed to my own definition:

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. — Leontiskos

With respect to the first point, I think this is just wrong, in the sense that this is not a standard definition of moral realism. The contemporary view holds those three prongs, which makeup of the moral realist thesis in its most generic form, and rejecting even one of them entails anti-realism. If you think that #3 (and I would presume #1 as well) are all that are required to be a realist, then, by your definition, I am a realist. I simply do not agree with the semantics. — Bob Ross

No, I don't think so. According to the standard view, someone who accepts objective moral values is a moral realist. What source are you using?

Again, my definition pertains to the bindingness of a moral prescription, and you agreed to that definition. Are you withdrawing your agreement?

I wholly agree: moral subjectivism agrees with moral anti-realism insofar as it also affirms there are true moral judgments — Bob Ross

I assume this is a typo and you meant to say "moral realism."

Nope. I affirm that “I believe thou shalt not torture babies”. — Bob Ross

"I believe the proposition, but that doesn't mean I think it's true." This is the sort of sophistry that has led me to avoid your threads on these topics. Anyway, let's just go back to the definition that I already gave and you already agreed to, because that was constructed so as to avoid these sophistic responses.

it makes no difference if morals are truth-apt and there are true moral judgments if those judgments express something non-objective. — Bob Ross

This all goes back to the bindingness I have already brought up. Your moral judgment depends on a moral norm. If others are not bound by that moral norm, then what in the world gives you the right to force them to obey it? If the moral norm does not objectively apply to their actions, then why are you applying it to their actions? This claim of "subjectivism" is ad hoc, and that is what I disagree with. Enforcing moral norms that you claim are not binding is irrational, even if it is called "subjectivism."

I take an internal sense of 'true' to entail a certitude that I don't apply to my moral judgements. — AmadeusD

I think my same point applies to the question of truth, as judgments always relate to truth. But if you want to say that "true" means "true with a high degree of certitude," then you are of course able to say that one or more of your moral judgments are not "true" in that sense. In any case, this seems to go right back to my point about tentativeness.

She seems to conflate 1 with 2 and 3. — schopenhauer1

She is saying that wokeness results in all three, but that (1) is the most important thing to oppose. (3) is not even a contention of the article except insofar as the ACLU historically attempted to avoid it.

She seems to assume that legal organizations cannot take on preferred political sides in constitutional law cases. For example, doubtful you will see the Heritage Foundation taking on various leftwing causes. — schopenhauer1

I don't think there's any evidence for such a claim. The whole argument flows from the specific nature of the ACLU, namely its relation to civil liberties and its historical opposition to communist logic. Andrews is surely aware that the argument would not work against any and all legal organizations.

This is one of the essays in the print edition of the journal. It's not a blog post. I don't think you read it carefully enough.

Can it be the case that, at the apex of my considerations(judgement), a certain behaviour appears moral/immoral, and so I enforce that judgement to the degree that I am acting on it toward other people, and yet am open to their response motivating or informing an adjustment in my judgement? — AmadeusD

To judge an action is to hold that it should have occurred or should not have occurred, with reference to the person acting. It doesn't matter whether we "think," "suggest," "opine," "suppose," "admonish," "argue," "force," et al. In each case the judgment of action is occurring (moral judgment). Tentative judgments are still judgments. Abductive judgments are still judgments (judgments to the best possibility, or judgments from significantly limited information). Judgments which are open to correction or revision are still judgments.

The posts of yours that I have read always contain something like, "Well, the judgment is abductive so it isn't really a moral judgment." That's not right. It's still a moral judgment, it's just a moral judgment formed or acted upon with less certitude.

does the same thing when he says that he only thinks that others should not torture babies (and he thinks this independently of others' beliefs, and he will act to prevent them by force if necessary). His claim here is something like, "I only think, I don't know, therefore I am not a moral realist." This is incorrect for the same reason outlined above. A tentative moral judgment is still a moral judgment, and I would further argue that a moral judgment that one is prepared to act upon decisively is not a particularly tentative judgment.

- Right, and if we are forced to choose between Hanover's and Joshs' account, Hanover's should win every time. Theories which undermine the most well-known facts are bad theories, and exceptions do not always disprove the rule. Just because there are cases where perception diverges along cultural lines or somesuch, does not mean that perception is inherently divergent. The example of the infant is helpful because it approximates a baseline.

- I'm just saying that if you treat both "preferences" in a significantly different way, then you must hold that there is something significantly different about them. I'm leaving it up to you to do the math.

As an aside, this thread has become sophistry-ville. :confused:

Correct. I never claimed that, I said, "I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you." — Bob Ross

Then you think people should do what they are in no way bound to do, which is a contradiction. Your statement is a perfect example of a moral judgment, and you are even introducing the notion of truth.

I am not saying that you should be convinced that you shouldn’t be doing X because I think you shouldn’t be doing X: I am saying that I am going to try and stop you. — Bob Ross

Why would you try to stop someone from doing something which is not objectively wrong (i.e. something that is not wrong for them or for all)? (Of course it makes no difference how you try to stop them.)

This is patently false. Moral anti-realism is the denial of one of three things:

1. Moral judgments are propositional (moral cognitivism).

2. Moral judgments express something objective (moral objectivism).

3. There are at least some true moral judgments.

Denying any of these lands you in moral anti-realist territory. Denying just 1 lands you in moral non-cognitivism; denying just 2 in moral subjectivism; and just 3 in moral nihilism.

You have attempted to define moral realism such that it is ‘anyone who imposes a moral standard’, which includes subjective and objective standards, and this is just not what moral realism is at all. Perhaps you are presupposing that standards are always objective, then clearly I am not a moral realist since I impose subjective ‘standards’. — Bob Ross

Your beliefs and your actions with regard to torturing babies constitute a moral judgment (3). Your claims are "subject-referencing prescriptive statements," for you are prescribing how other subjects ought to act. This isn't rocket science. You enforce your belief that no one should torture babies, and therefore you are a moral realist. This is the contradiction I have been pointing to: you are a moral realist while simultaneously claiming that moral realism is false. You can't just run around encouraging/arguing/forcing others to act in certain ways and claim you are not a moral realist.

More concisely, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a moral judgment, and one that you affirm to be true.

- :up:

I see it more that she was using the ACLU to say that legal organizations that promote free speech should take all cases. — schopenhauer1

I think this is an important mistake in reading the article. She says just the opposite:

Is the solution to urge the ACLU to return to neutral liberalism? That seems unlikely. It would be strange indeed for conservatives to take up the cause of liberalism now that its former champions have abandoned it. Even if it were possible to rediscover neutral liberalism as a cross-ideological common ground—and it is not—conservatives would still be better off pursuing other theories of law based on concepts closer to their tradition, such as the common good.

There is one means of restraining the woke that we all can insist upon, liberals, originalists, and integralists alike, and that is a return to professional standards. — What Happened to the ACLU? by Helen Andrews

In my opinion you are focusing too heavily on the ACLU. The ACLU isn't central to the argument. But I literally kick myself off the internet in one minute, so that will have to be sufficient for the time being... haha

- Thanks for that. I am not a legal professional and my point is broader. If such acts as were charged with sedition in wartime (e.g. distributing the leaflets in Abrams) are now protected by free speech in the U.S., then I do not see how a book attempting to abridge the free speech of ballerinas would not be protected. Of course I grant that if the book sets out plans for a coup d'état then it would be illicit. I wasn't reading anything that extreme into your comments. My assumption is that the means the book prescribes are not themselves blatantly illegal.

Okay fine, it is a rather political article. My memory had failed me. :lol: Still, there are deeper layers at play which I appreciate.

I don't have the article right in front of me. Did she cite specific examples of that happening with the ACLU? I think she did, but I can't remember the details. I believe someone was dropped, right? It seemed to me the article was more lamenting what the ACLU used to be about mid-century. But I do remember her explaining the fiduciary argument. I just don't remember the egregious examples, other than the organization has become generally taken over by the "woke" politics that many academic/legal institutions have become — schopenhauer1

I think the ACLU is a set piece, used in the early part of her article. My interpretation is that the article is proposing a strategy for addressing "wokeism," and the ACLU served as a useful example. It is the idea that upholding fiduciary duties and professional standards is a better approach than the more recent debates on liberalism, communism, and integralism.

The one instance she provided of (1) seems to have been here — schopenhauer1

Others include the Dobbs leak, investment firm quotas, racial Covid supply rationing, medical ethics and malpractice, and things related to attorney-client privilege.

Left-wing hostility to the basic rules of the game culminated in the Dobbs leak. Supreme Court deliberations and decisions have always been protected by the strictest codes of confidentiality. In May 2022, in an unprecedented breach, an unknown person leaked Justice Samuel Alito’s draft decision overturning Roe v. Wade to reporters at Politico. The identity of the leaker has not been discovered, but the logical motivation would have been to spook one of the moderate conservative justices into changing his or her vote. A professor at Yale Law told a reporter that he assumed the leaker was a liberal “because many of the people we’ve been graduating from schools like Yale are the kind of people who would do such a thing. They think that everything is violence. And so everything is permitted.” — What Happened to the ACLU? by Helen Andrews

That may be legally tricky actually depending on the modes of enforcement your book called for. — AmadeusD

I don't think so. Not after Holmes' dissent in Abrams won the day.

I get it. I'm on board with that, but I think we have to look at it as a series what we mean by "abandon fiduciary duties".

If we mean
1) A specific lawyer is doing things like dropping their clients or misrepresenting them in court intentionally, then this is an obvious flagrant violation of fiduciary duties.

2) An organization chooses to no longer represent "free speech" on all sides that used to do that. Less egregious, but agreed that it is troublesome that it has shifted to only taking on leftist causes and not ANY speech, free or otherwise. But technically, if it is not part of the government, it can decide to change policy. I don't necessarily agree with it, but it is more about how the organization is deciding to take on cases at that point, which oddly enough, is their "right" to do. — schopenhauer1

I'd say she means (1). The argument she makes pertains to expertise, vulnerably entrusting yourself to an expert in a sphere in which you have extremely limited knowledge. She gives the examples of doctors, lawyers, etc.

Indeed, correct. I guess I mean problematic at what degree it reaches. At what point is it actually affecting other people's rights? I would say at the point that judges actually take those positions and agree with it and make it part of the common law in which case hopefully it could be appealed and overturned. — schopenhauer1

Sure, but at this point you have moved from considering legal rights to considering natural rights, and it is here that legal precedent and even positive law itself becomes less relevant. That's a much larger conversation.

But thanks for reading. I kept forgetting to post it, so it is inevitably belated. Oh well!

That whole online publication seems pretty conservative, so it makes sense it was a conservative article. — schopenhauer1

I think a close read would disabuse this stereotype. It is a conservative article, but not in the way you seem to imagine.

I actually don't think this at all contrary to what I eluded to here — schopenhauer1

True, but her point isn't so much that the left should be liberal, but rather that the ACLU should not infringe civil liberties. It's a tighter and less partisan argument. She is more or less conceding that the left need not be liberal. The whole conclusion is, "Even if the left wants to abandon liberalism, it should not abandon fiduciary duties."

My broader point was, what if the speech you are representing is trying to silence the other points of view in the name of X (religion, tradition, hate, etc.)? That is a tricky one to defend, no? — schopenhauer1

I think our approach is summed up in the adage, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." If the ACLU examples in question were dealing with conflicting civil liberties, then I think this question would be more relevant. The Westboro example would then be more appropriate.

For example, I could write a book that argues for a change to the first amendment, restricting all ballerinas' rights to free speech. The book is protected by the first amendment. It is not legally tricky.

Okay, let me say something to your point...

So far, it's not been addressed very well. Moral statements are instances of a subject expressing their taste as a universal rule. What makes this not true? — AmadeusD

Because it's not binding and therefore provides no defense for the imposition of moral claims. Unless Ross was trying to resurrect the bogey of Hare's universal prescriptivism, which he was almost certainly not attempting to do. Those who hold the type of emotivism you are describing do not generally also hold that moral statements are binding. Taste does not bind, and is not the stuff of argument. To say that the moralist is expressing a taste is to make an excuse to ignore them.

- Take care

- Sorry, I've read enough of your exchange with Banno. I don't think your position makes a lick of sense, and I think you are only engaging in hand-waving when met with the contradictions in your thought. It looks to be an exercise in evasion. If that's how you treat contradictions, then there's really no reason for me to try to lead you to another one. So yeah, "Keep working on it," I suppose.

Well, I can agree and disagree with this very conservative account of things. — schopenhauer1

Freedom of speech has not traditionally been a particularly conservative issue. Indeed, it is very much a liberal issue.

I agree that organizations promoting free speech must be impartial, but we have to be careful what that means. In the US, the Supreme Court defines speech. They have defined things such as hate speech and "inciting speech", speech that causes a "clear and present danger". And those are there for a reason. — schopenhauer1

I don't think much care is required when we are talking about censoring books. The Supreme Court criteria for impermissible speech is incredibly stringent, such a shouting 'fire!' in a crowded theater (beginning with Holmes' dissent in Schenck v. United States). The Court recently reaffirmed that hate speech is permitted (Matal v. Tam, 2017).

I agree that organizations promoting free speech must be impartial... — schopenhauer1

The difficulty here is that organizations promoting free speech should promote free speech. The reason the ACLU is making their new hires delete official tweets is because the tweets are opposing free speech.

That being said, the article is right in the fact that this can happen on the left as well as on the right. — schopenhauer1

I don't find your overtly political reading of the article a propos. It is not controversial that the ACLU should not censor speech. The ACLU readily admits this. I think the article is about the homogenization of leftist causes, even where this homogenization creates institutional incoherence (e.g. the ACLU); it is about the difference between rule of law and equality under the law; and finally it is about the trump card of fiduciary duties, which existed long before liberalism and communism. Andrews is basically saying, "The left is obviously content to snowplow liberalism out of the way, but we really should put our foot down when it comes to fiduciary duties."

I think you should not torture babies, irregardless of whether you think you should not torture babies, and if that is true then I should be trying to stop you. Where’s the inconsistency or incoherence with that? — Bob Ross

I am thinking of moral anti-realism as the idea that, to use your own words, <There are no "subject-referencing prescriptive statements" that are objectively binding on all>. So if you think that, "Thou shalt not torture babies," is a prescriptive statement that is objectively binding on all, then you are surely not a moral anti-realist. Now we usually speak about objectively binding statements as true statements, but I'm not especially interested in the moral cognitivism debate, which I think is misguided. I'll leave that debate to the side.

Values are not morals: they are our subjective tastes of what we hold as worth something. I can value vanilla ice cream, and you not so much—irregardless of what the moral facts say. Now, imagine there’s a moral fact such that ‘one shouldn’t torture babies’ and you catch me in the act of torturing a baby: you cannot impose the moral fact without simultaneously imposing your taste that I should value moral facts. — Bob Ross

Answered here:

"Chocolate ice cream is the best," is a preference. Perhaps you construe, "Do not torture babies," as a preference as well. The difference is that when we see someone torturing a baby, we prevent them; whereas when we see someone eating vanilla ice cream, we do not prevent them. — Leontiskos

-

If you say “hey! You shouldn’t be doing that because it violates this moral fact!”, and I just say “why should I care about moral facts?” — Bob Ross

But I am not the one saying anything; you are. That's the whole point. You are the one enforcing a prohibition on the torture of babies. Why must we all obey your so-called "taste"? What makes it special? You are the one on the bench, here. You are the one engaged in moral realism. Whether you can square this with your rhetorical utterances remains to be seen.

Edit:

I think moral realism sometimes paints the false narrative that, even under that metaethical theory, we cannot impose tastes on one another; but I can provide a parody argument, which equally applies to moral realism and anti-realism, which illustrates how false this notion really is. — Bob Ross

You are presumably saying, "The moral realist imposes his tastes, so why can't I impose mine!?" First, the notion that the moral realist is imposing tastes begs the question at hand. Second, tastes are not imposable by their very nature. When we talk about a taste that's part of what we mean. Third, just because your opponent engages in a practice you believe to be arbitrary does not give you license to engage in arbitrary practices, and this is particularly true when you are in the process of criticizing the supposed arbitrariness. Fourth, if you are imposing a moral standard of any kind then I would say you aren't a moral anti-realist. The moral anti-realist eschews objective moral values just as much as they eschew objective moral "facts".

Hrmm, not if the cure is making you happier, I'd imagine.

Or here we are -- if you withdraw consent then this is just a failure on the part of the doctor to administer the cure. "Fault" here not in an ethical sense, but rather in an exploratory sense -- if we find a person who is resistant to the cure then we have more to overcome. — Moliere

But aren't cures almost always painful? And won't patients need to accept and tolerate pain if they want to be cured? I don't track your idea that the cure will be painless, or that a doctor treats a patient without any cooperation on the part of the patient. I mostly think that Epicurus will require Aristotle's continence, unless perhaps he has a cure the likes of which the world has never seen!

(Churches require continence as well, e.g. Romans 7:21-25)