Forgive me. I get your drift. However ways of life, unlike propositions about them, are not true or false. But they can be validated by or founded on facts which are articulated by propositions; those propositions need to be true if they are to do their job. — Ludwig V

I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. Ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated.

In one way, you are quite right. However, I am puzzled why there appears to be no end to the argument about the existence of God and inclined to think that the possibility of such an argument is an illusion. — Ludwig V

"God exists," is a proposition, and there is no "the" argument for it. There are lots of different arguments for and against the existence of God.

But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument.

Wittgenstein articulates the concept of "hinge" propositions — Ludwig V

I think hinge propositions are another example of the confusion I outlined, insofar as they involve the claim that non-truth-apt axioms entail truth-apt propositions.

and then there's Presuppositional apologetics - Wikipedia — Ludwig V

Another example of the confusion, in my opinion.

All I'm saying here is that there are alternatives to hammering round the ancient necessary proofs and empirical arguments. — Ludwig V

My point is that no "way of life," "hinge proposition," or, "presupposition(alism)" is immune to propositions and facts. I would say that the erection of such immunity is based on the confusion that I outlined <here>.

A lot of this goes back to what I said about the relation between the true and the good, for ways of life are predicated primarily upon goodness and yet are not separate from considerations of truth.

See for example Article 17 of the GDPR.

I would suggest that in general it should not be allowed — unenlightened

As I understand it, in some jurisdictions users have a legal right to have their posts and identity removed from the website if they so wish. Most forum software make it possible for administrators to do a full deletion for this reason.

Welcome to the forum. Excellent first post. :up:

So, this argument somewhat resembles an argument given by Ed Feser in his book Five Proofs for the Existence of God which he names the "Neo-Platonic Proof." — CaptainCH

See Bob Ross' post , where he gives a reference to Feser.

If you were to be the recipient of God’s grace and forgiveness, that was entirely up to God. — Wayfarer

Coincidentally, in the homily this weekend the priest talked about this. He noted that he encourages the bride and the groom to memorize the vows, yet that some do try to memorize them but then mistakenly say, "Take this ring as a sign of my love and fidelity," whereas the words in the Catholic ceremony are, "Receive this ring as a sign of my love and fidelity." He was riffing on reception as active, which was also a big theme of the Second Vatican Council. The difference between reception and passivity (and also between taking and receiving).

(never mind the dour Biblical verse 'God is no respecter of persons' Acts 10:34) — Wayfarer

Lol - Acts 10:34 means that God does not play favorites:

And Peter opened his mouth and said: “Truly I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every nation any one who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him.” — Acts 10:34-35, RSV

The point here is that God is not like the judge who gives you an unfavorable verdict just because he dislikes you, regardless of what you did or did not do. The context is that Cornelius is acceptable to God even though he is a Gentile. There are problems with reading the KJV in a contemporary idiom. :razz:

- I saw you say that! I found it interesting. It's something I will have to consider further.

- I wasn't following his posts very carefully, but my hunch is that it might be unrelated to the discussion itself. Maybe he just felt that he was spending too much time on TPF and made a strong decision to leave.

- A dramatic exit!

Logical, mathematical and empirical truths are "one for all", not so much metaphysical "truths". — Janus

That's nonsense, and evidence for this is the fact that you put 'truths' in scare quotes. You yourself know that you are not talking about truths when you talk about things that are not true for all.

The idea that there are metaphysical "truths" that are not truths makes no sense at all. Why do people on TPF keep peddling this nonsense? Why don't they just admit that they don't believe metaphysical claims are truth-apt? That's what the moral antirealists do, and at least their claims aren't facially incoherent.

The notion that a metaphysical proposition is true but not true for all is just as incoherent as the notion that 2+2=4 is true but not true for all.

How would we differentiate it? It looks a lot like set theory to me. — Moliere

In set theoretic terms, one thing we could say is that every species is a subset and every genus is a superset. Another difference is that the species/genus schema is not predicated on the bare particulars of modern logic. That is a nominalist innovation. See for example the last quote provided <here>.

Because, for him, the genera are real. When he moves up the chain there's no such thing as a black swan, for instance. It's different from mathematical induction in that it's about concretes, but it's like mathematical induction because the sets are real and the induction is thought to apply to all cases, which is what secures the claim to validity. Also, since I'm thinking about these as sets, where a genera is only a more general set than some given species, so I think he quite literally thinks the world is structured like his categories. There's still a basic material, but it requires some form -- like a cause -- in order for something to be real. This makes sense for him because ultimately where we end up is in a finite universe which is produced by the mind of God thinking himself into being. So the categories are a part of our world, and not just our experience, and certainly not just a way of ordering our thoughts. That's why there wouldn't be any invalidity in moving up, inductively -- the categories have an essence which makes it to where there's no problem making an inference from the particular to the general. — Moliere

I'm wondering if you can make sense of that bolded portion? "Aristotle's induction would be valid given his presupposition of X, but since X is false it is invalid." It actually seems that if your account is correct, then what is at stake is not induction at all, but rather a disjunctive syllogism. In that case it is only a matter of determining which "category" the phenomena in question belongs to, which is much different even from mathematical induction.

But I think I understand your general thrust. "Aristotle looks at one swan and sees that it is white. Then he looks at a second and sees that it is white. After doing this 100 times, he infers that every subsequent swan will be white, and that's like mathematical induction."

That's intelligible, but I just don't think it's what Aristotle is doing. It's what Hume understands by induction, not Aristotle, which is why I pointed to Hume at the beginning of this chapter of our conversation. Aristotle's view is represented by the essays I linked <here>.

Simplified, Aristotle is basically saying that familiarity breeds understanding. If we become familiar with swans then we will begin to understand swans. There is no guarantee for Aristotle that there are no black swans. There is no Humean induction.

Basically because we can always be wrong when we follow a procedure of induction it's never valid -- there is at least one case where the inference could be false, where we are mistaken about the object we are talking about, so it fails to the basic definition of validity. — Moliere

I think recently said something that parallels your basic error in this. With Hume you think analysis is possible and legitimate but synthesis is impossible and illegitimate. Aristotle's epagōgē ("induction") is a matter of synthesis; of moving from the particular to the universal. Sime helpfully identifies the false assumptions underlying anti-synthesis thinking, but it is also worth noting that no one actually believes Hume, not even himself. No one actually believes that familiarity does not breed understanding, and no one believes that there are no truths about species. If Hume were right then we could not even say that swans can fly, or that swans can honk. For the Humean there is no possibility of saying, "We can't know that swans are white, but we can know that swans can fly and honk."

I think post-modern skepticism re grand narratives, and a more general skepticism of logos's capacity for leading human life, has a larger impact on popular culture that is often acknowledged (through a variety of pathways, particularly its effect on the liberal arts). I'd argue that it is this skepticism that makes truth threating (rather than empowering) for democracy. That is, truth and reason should make democracy more secure, but in this climate the two come into conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Can you say more about why post-modern skepticism makes truth threatening?

When faced with tensions between duty and personal pleasure or self-aggrandizement, reasonableness is not the sort of principle that gets people to do the hard thing, especially not when that means taking on significant risks. For that, you need a sense of thymos, arete, and pietas, all the old civic virtues. — Count Timothy von Icarus

A good point.

Certainly, thymos can lead to great evils, but it also leads to great goods. That's Plato's whole point. Logos needs to rule through thymos. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Where could I find this in Plato? This is the sort of thing that I tend to think Simpson neglects in his critique of liberalism.

Because “goodness as rationality” hinges on individuals’ separate systems of ends, a fully common good and ultimately the (ontological) “common or matching [moral] nature” (1971, 523; cf. 528; 1999, 459; cf. 463) on which it must be founded cannot be said to exist within Rawls’s liberal paradigm. — Mary Keys - Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good

Excellent. :up:

Rawls has a "thick" theory in some respects, but this conception of the common good is thin. I don't think it's thick enough to support the demands of civilization in the long run, although it might work well enough for a while, especially for a civilization with economic and martial hegemony already in place and an existing culture it can draw on for values. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Simpson would add that Rawls himself admits that he is incapable of adjudicating in favor of Western values over any other value system. His project is a working out of the axioms of Western values without being in any way able to justify those values. This is similar to Keys' point.

"Physicalism" is a very common contemporary view that is usually recognized to be a form of materialism. It seems to me that all sorts of people believe this stuff. See for example Baden's thread, "The Empty Suitcase: Physicalism vs Methodological Naturalism."

I think Materialism is a metaphysical ideology that came about due to mainstream society overlooking synthesis and intepreting science and the scientific method, which only concern analysis, as being epistemically complete. Consequently, the impossibility of inverting physics back to first-person reality, was assumed to be due to metaphysical impossibility rather than being down to semantic choices and epistemic impossibility, leading society towards a misplaced sense of nihilism by which first-person phenomena are considered to be theoretically reducible to an impersonal physical description, but not vice-versa. — sime

Excellent. :up:

I think when @Count Timothy von Icarus talks about "smallism," he is basically talking about the idea that reducing wholes to parts is a legitimate move, but synthesizing parts into wholes is not. Or else that only the former is explanatorily or epistemically useful.

If materialism is, as you assert, a popular and intuitively attractive view, then I don't find your characterizations of it plausible. — SophistiCat

So apparently you find his characterization unattractive. Do you have some reason why you think it is unattractive?

I'm a bit cautious about a general claim about all religious claims. I don't exclude the possibility that some, even many, may be truth-apt. But I do think that an important part of religious claims are interpretations of the world that are the basis of various ways of life and practices and that those interpretations are not truth-apt. The same applies to secularism and atheism. — Ludwig V

I would lay out a general principle that addresses all sorts of things on TPF.

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice.

For example, if S is the "way of life" of theism or atheism, and P is a proposition like, "God exists," then we have a case where a way of life is truth-apt. If P is true, and yet is made false by a way of life, then that way of life is to that extent false.

It would be hard to overemphasize how relevant this is to all sorts of things that are said on TPF. For example, fdrake gets at something very similar when he resists the notion that a stance is simply "upstream" of facts:

Nevertheless Alice's beliefs have not been formally refuted in accordance with only the logical principles of their connection, she would need to change a stance defining principle - trust AI more. Which would be a belief about which methodologies are admissible. But that would render discoveries, facts, results - methodology - as potential changes for the admissibility of methodologies, and thus undermine a stance's construal as "upstream" from facts and matters of ontology. — fdrake

When Pierre Hadot emphasizes the way that ways of life and discourse are mutually influencing, he is crucially aware that latter also influences the former.

,

Here is a silly example. Suppose someone is a dog speed pluralist. All dogs are capable of running at the same top speed.

In response we could point to the same dog at a young age, a prime age, and an old age, noting differences in speed. We might point to differences in speed within the same litter or breed. We might point to differences between breeds (size, breeding purpose, etc.). We could easily infer that given the way that speed varies over an individual dog's life and between dogs of the same breed, therefore speed will also vary between breeds.

This is obvious, but I want to say that scientificity is not a great deal less obvious. There is a generation of people that really like egalitarianism, and they project it everywhere. Yet the simple fact of the matter is that almost nothing in nature or in life is equal. Therefore sweeping generalizations of equality are almost always wrong, such as, "All the sciences are equally scientific."

As to , I see this as a moral confusion more than anything else. "If we don't say that all the sciences are equally scientific, then we are being immoral," or, "If truth exists then some people will be wrong, and it is to make others wrong." What is needed is a way in which to be intellectually honest without being immoral.

(, I will come back to this post of yours)

Okay, that's a good start. It seems to me that, given your substantial notion of science, pluralism among the sciences will not hold.

I could give an alternative argument for this view. Do we agree that sciences can progress (and possibly regress)? For example, do we agree that the field of molecular physics fulfilled your criteria better in the 20th century than in the 19th century? If so, then it seems that molecular physics was more scientific in the 20th century than in the 19th century, and therefore scientific pluralism does not hold between 19th and 20th century molecular physics. We simply cannot say that both were equally scientific.

The next step isn't so hard. It's just the idea that that difference between 19th and 20th century molecular physics is also possible between different contemporaneous sciences, and in all likelihood inevitable. Scientificity ebbs and flows within fields and between fields. How could it be otherwise?

My thesis here is that pluralism will begin to fail insofar as 'science' begins to mean anything substantial at all. — Leontiskos

intellectual honesty should disabuse one of the idea of "one truth for all" — Janus

If we are intellectually honest then we do not talk about "truth" if we are subjectivists. "The same truth for all," is vacuously true, and follows from the notion of truth itself. If 2+2=4 is true then it is true for all, not just for some. That's what truth means. *sigh*

The intellectually honest naysayer needs to start admitting that they don't think religious claims are truth-apt. They can't have it both ways:

I think religious claims are truth apt. That may be the elephant in the room here. — Leontiskos

And so none of this discussion of ‘what is faith’ is necessarily about God or a religion. And further, relegating faith to belief without reason or incorrigible choice, only misunderstands faith (or far too narrowly construes it), and misunderstands the role of evidence and reasoning, and consent, and how people are called to act in everyday practical situations all of the time. — Fire Ologist

Yep. :100:

Which is fine, I've just been avoiding committing to some major difference between the natural sciences and the human or social sciences, because I've been trying to clarify ― or insist upon or defend or something ― that there is some genuine continuity, that the political scientist is as much a scientist as the physicist. — Srap Tasmaner

But look at this argument: <One scientist is as much a scientist as another; therefore all sciences are equally scientific>.

I have been trying to raise the elephant in the room: Does "scientific" mean anything at all? (Or else "more scientific" and "less scientific"?) Does "pseudoscientific" mean anything at all? Is there any strategy for learning that is not scientific?

I think you've given those questions short shrift, to say the least. In fact you've mostly just ignored them.

Note too that the descriptions of science you have given seem to contradict your claim that there are non-scientific ways of knowing. For example I asked:

Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning? — Leontiskos

You responded:

Surely. Given the distinction between knowing that and knowing how, it stands to reason there's a difference between learning that and learning how... — Srap Tasmaner

And then a few sentences later, you effectively contradict your, "Surely," and seem to say that science is a(ny) strategy for learning what can be known (and therefore there are no non-scientific strategies for learning):

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. — Srap Tasmaner

If you think this account is mistaken I would challenge you to begin with my question, "Do you think there are non-scientific strategies for learning?," and try to find a clear answer in your responses.* Namely, a clear example or description of non-scientific strategies for learning.

This manner of confusion is indicative of the sort of pro-pluralism I find on TPF. Someone really wants pluralism among the sciences, but then it turns out that they have enormous trouble giving a meaningful definition of science. What I find is that the pluralist has a tendency to make the words they use meaningless. My thesis here is that pluralism will begin to fail insofar as 'science' begins to mean anything substantial at all.


* That same question was asked again towards the end of . Both questions did not seem to receive a clear answer. Else, if a non-scientific strategy for learning is one which is non-reflective or non-critical, then apparently there are some sciences which are less scientific than others. It looks to be uncontroversially false that each science is equally capable of recognizing its own mistakes.

I don't think that's true. You've inferred something I didn't imply. — T Clark

Did you read the third sentence?

Unless we want to say that science has an end which has nothing to do with determining what is "ontologically" true? — Leontiskos

- :up:

- :up:

In math we can form an induction which is valid by starting with a particular case and then proving that it holds for all cases so that the individual number, say n=0, holds for all n +1, and so on. — Moliere

Well, it's not that a number holds for the iterative set, but rather that a relation or function holds for the iterative set. But yeah, that's close.

But with Aristotle I think of his categories more like trees in set theory where the trees are increasingly wider sets that encompass the lower sets as their species — Moliere

I think that's right but it seems different from mathematical proofs from induction.

so there are individuals, but then sets become individuals, and we can make inferences about the world because these sets aren't just a means for us to organize our thoughts, but rather are depictions of the world as it is — Moliere

Right, though a species is not a set if we wish to speak more carefully.

so that the induction which takes place from an individual — Moliere

Here is the crux of what I question. "Aristotle places an individual into a species via induction, therefore he is involved in a mathematical proof from induction."

Why do you see what you describe of Aristotle's method as "mathematical induction"? Because I could give a very simple argument, using your own premises, to show that it is not: <Mathematical induction is logically valid; Aristotle's induction is not logically valid; therefore Aristotle's induction is not mathematical induction>. Hence you are simultaneously claiming that Aristotle's induction is and is not mathematical induction (because you keep saying that it is, and yet you deny that it is valid in the way that mathematical induction is valid).

Does this make any sense at all? — Moliere

It's an argument, which is exactly what I've been asking for. :up:
So yes, it makes sense, although I am not convinced that it is correct.

Agreed. Given that, I guess I don’t see what you were trying to say in your previous post when you wrote “…once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense.” — T Clark

Well, a method without a goal would be like fishing without fish. Or , "no true ontological positions, only methodological ones," seems to posit methods without goals or ends. Unless we want to say that science has an end which has nothing to do with determining what is "ontologically" true?

Great post. I will have to come back to this when I have more time. Let me say just one thing:

I think the above is largely correct. However, the question then is: "why do people now think truth is incompatible with democracy?" A very robust appreciation for democracy existed in the United States in the early 20th century without an embrace of this sort of pluralism, without any apparent conflict.

...

There is, up through the early Cold War, a "cult of the Founding Fathers" that tends to present them in terms not unlike how the ancient Greeks saw figures like Solon. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Could part of it be that the United States was explicitly formed as a republic and not a mere democracy?

After all, what does Benjamin Franklin say when he emerges from the Constitutional Convention, which moved the U.S. from the Articles of Confederation to a Constitution?

• Powel: "Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?"
• Franklin: "A republic, if you can keep it."

The Articles of Confederation were a more thoroughly democratic form, and the natural question asks whether the move away from that can manage to be a republic without falling into a monarchy. Thus, arguably, the recent epoch you identify is more bound up with democracy than the former epoch. I think we have seen a resurgence of democratic thinking in the last few decades.

When I was talking about method, I meant something consistent with this definition: Method - a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art. — T Clark

But disciplines and arts have ends; goals. There are no methods without ends and goals.

it's when I found I could make mistakes that I knew I was onto something — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, good. That could sum up my thread, "Argument as Transparency."

but I think we know they are, and have to be, braided together continually — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, there is a very old Aristotelian tradition which holds that speculative and practical knowledge are intricately intertwined.

In science, the intent is to get the hows right so that you can produce thats reliably; — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, very good. Science is the reliable procedure for producing thats.

Yeah I think there's a trick to that story, that it does mean it's too hard to sight-read. — Srap Tasmaner

You could say that we know how to play Coltrane's solos simply in virtue of recording and replaying them. But of course humans can also reproduce them. Asian musicians seem to be very good at that sort of reproduction. Jazz musicians might be characteristically bad at that kind of reproduction.

in jazz, the intent is to take the thats you can get your hands on to improve your ability to how. — Srap Tasmaner

The difference of artifice does come into play, here. Think about a new musician who learns "blue notes" (such as a ♭5 or a ♭3 in a major key). Or else think about the cultural transition to blues when those forms of dissonance became popular. In such cases the "theory" that is being studied is in many ways a theory of cultural appreciation, and this applies to jazz a fortiori.

As a 20th century guy, I find this worrisome and downright offensive. But I can't deny what my ears are telling me. — J

I'd say the trick is played when we dissociate the music from the source. For example, before recordings you could only ever listen to music live, and at that time there was no possibility of dissociating the music from the source. The source and the music were inseparable, and the source was relatively well-understood. There is a qualitative philosophical difference between sound-patterns produced by humans and sound-patterns produced by machines, and we might just want to call the first music and the second sound-patterns. Of course at the end of the day the machine is produced by a human who wants it to produce music, and so the gulf will never be complete. And none of this means that you will always be able to tell the difference with your "eyes closed."

I think the article misses how appeals to pre-modern tradition also figure into this though. The crowd around Trump really likes their ancient Rome memes. So does Musk. There is "Red Caesarism," etc. These elements tend to be far more communitarian, and are openly critical of libertarianism, and even sometimes critical of capitalism. Tariffs are and a push for autotarky are actually not out of line with this way of thinking. This is a tension within the Right that is out in the open, not something that is ignored.

Movements like Generation Identity in Europe are in some ways more grounded in national epics like the Nibelungenlied, the Poetic Edda, the Iliad, and ancient political theory than in modern liberalism/libertarian ideology. More Beowulf, less Ayn Rand. Certainly, they rely heavily on these sources for aesthetics, and these are romantic movements where aesthetics is given a very important role (e.g., a film like 300 might have more currency than many political dissertations).

It is certainly true that these movements often cannot abandon certain classical liberal precepts, and that this arguably makes them incoherent, or at the very least opens them up to grifters and abuse. But I do think there is more there than simple opportunism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is spot on. :up:
In the first episode of Tom Holland's podcast, "The Rest is History," he points to the same parallels between pre-modern political regimes and a number of 20th and 21st century figures, including Trump.

I think what is happening is that libertarianism is being blown out of proportion in order to produce a larger target. I could buy Musk as a libertarian, but not Trump or Peterson. I think the leftist tends to fasten upon libertarianism, given that it is the most potent antagonist on his horizon. Other antagonists then get lumped under that label.

Which is just to say maybe that this internal contradiction actually seems to me to be more of an open civil war in the Right (also one that tends to pit the young communitarian traditionalists against the older individualistic liberals), and these figures, being broadly popular, are just nexus points for this conflict. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would only add that this is a fault line which overlaps many different political identities. The individualist/communitarian bifurcation is something that most Western political identities wrestle with to one extent or another.

Good post.

And you're quite sure that rhetoric is sincere, in light of the acts? — Vera Mont

At this point anyone who thought Musk's rhetoric about the national debt was insincere has been proven wrong beyond any shadow of a doubt.

An interesting thing is that if you look at hit pieces on Peterson, the things he is being criticized for (e.g. obscurantistism) are precisely the things that made him a successful academic and could easily make him a "brilliant theorist" if he held more orthodoxly (in the context of the academy) left wing positions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't accuse Peterson of obscurantism on the whole, though he does lapse at times. He's basically an academic Jungian who has answered a cultural need and in the process become exceedingly popular. As he ventures further from home and gets further out over his skis his errors become more noticeable. The content he is engaged in is done better by others like, say, Charles Taylor. But figures like Taylor do not engage or possess the popular culture in the way that Peterson does. If we compare Peterson to figures like Taylor then Peterson loses, hands down. If we compare him to other figures in popular culture, especially in the long-form video world, then he is far above average.

Peterson is one of those who are forging a new path or Type, namely that of the academic who abandons their post and becomes a cultural commentator within the popular culture. In the ancient sense these cultural commentators and movers should be called politicians, for they are primarily concerned with political (and ethical) life and redirecting the interests of a democratic population. I suspect that we will see more individuals move into that sphere. They are reminiscent of the academics who stopped publishing academic books and started publishing popular books, but in this case platforms like YouTube make the lecture and dialogue format distributable at scale.

Another:

God is equally near in all creatures. The wise man says in (?) Sir­ach: God has set his nets and lines out over all creatures, so that we may find Him in any of them: if this net [full of creatures] were to be cast over a man, he could find God there and recognize Him. A master says he knows God aright, who is equally aware of Him in all things. I once said, to serve God in fear is good; to serve Him in love is better; but to be able to grasp the love in fear, that is best. For a man to have a peaceful life is good, but for a man to have a life of pain in patience is better; but that a man should have peace in a life of pain is best. A man may go out into the fields and say his prayers and know God, or he may go to church and know God: but if he is more aware of God because he is in a quiet place, as is usual, that comes from his imperfection and not from God: for God is equally in all things and all places, and is equally ready to give Himself as far as in Him lies: and he knows God rightly who knows God equally [in all things]. — The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, Sermon 69

In fear? Yep. In pain? Yep. In Genghis Khan? Yep. In Nazism? Yep.

I wonder if there are really no true ontological positions, only methodological ones. It's not what is real, it's where and how do we look. — T Clark

I would say that once we understand the meaning and also etymology of "method," we find that the idea doesn't make much sense in light of thousands of years of linguistic development. It would be a bit like saying, "There are really no fish; there's only fishing." If there's nothing to see then there's no need to look.

In short, I tend to think social scientists are doing the best they can, and if we are right to have less confidence in their results than in the results of physics or chemistry, it's not because their work is less scientific, but a basic issue, first, of statistical power (lack of data), and, second, of the enormous complexity of the phenomena they study. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, this looks like a great overview. It seems like you are building on what you said earlier, namely that the natural sciences are easier and the social sciences are harder. Specifically, we might say that they differ with respect to the difficulty required to achieve an equal level of certitude and reliability. You say that the difference is accounted for by the fact that social scientists lack data in comparison with natural scientists, and that they study more complex phenomena than natural scientists. You also imply that the social sciences which study the present are studying moving targets, which is harder. All of that makes good sense, even if it is not incontrovertible.

Would you say that the natural scientists are also doing the best they can? Because someone might say that if we expend an equal amount of effort in two different fields, and the first field yields much more knowledge than the second, then the first field must be more scientific than the second (thinking all the while in ceteris paribus terms, of course).

The pluralism I'm inclined to defend is twofold: one is Goodman's point about the sciences that are not physics getting full faith and credit; the other is the communal self-correction idea. The latter rests upon the simple fact that others are sometimes better positioned to see the flaws in your work than you are. That presents an opportunity: you can systematize and institutionalize scrutiny of your work by others. Two heads are better than one; two hundred or two thousand heads are better than two. There are some practical issues with this, well-known shortcomings in the existing peer-review process, for instance, but the idea is deeply embedded in the practice of science as I understand it, and I think it has proven its worth. — Srap Tasmaner

I would not object to the idea that two heads are better than one, but I could very well object to the idea that every "scientific" field should get "full faith and credit." Still, I would have to know more about what you mean by those two claims.

Why might we not have as much faith in "soft" or social sciences? Because the ROI is not as reliable. Why might we not give as much credit to "soft" or social sciences? Because where it is harder to demonstrate correctness, it is easier to fudge results. I really do think the social scientist requires more intellectual virtue than the natural scientist, given the fact that laziness and malpractice will be harder to detect in the social sciences. Peter Boghossian's remarkable experiment comes to mind.

Now someone might say, "If a science is less reliable and certain than mathematics or physics, then it is not reasonable to expect the same level of reliability and certitude from that science. Faith and credit therefore need to be adjusted for the social sciences." This is true, but I would make two points. First, this might in itself be enough to justify a claim that the social sciences are less scientific. Second, this does not invalidate the objections to faith and credit. Both considerations must apparently coexist.

By now it seems obvious that we must ask what we mean by "more scientific" and "less scientific." This is a particular problem in our age because "scientific" has become an honorific, and we tend to see discrimination in allocating honors as undemocratic. So what do we mean by "more scientific" and "less scientific," or just "scientific" in general? As a foil: the extreme pluralist might say that every discipline is equally scientific and we are not allowed to question anyone's scientificity. That looks like a dead end where "scientific" comes to mean nothing at all. And if we are to admit that "scientific" means something, then we run the risk of acknowledging that some things are more scientific than other things.

My instinct on this front is to link science with knowledge and to say that where there is more knowledge—quantitatively or qualitatively, potentially or actually—there will be more science. Or that where there is more potential for knowledge there is more potential for science (or else that where there is potential for knowledge there is a scientific domain simpliciter). This is also etymologically apt given that scientia was the highest or strongest form of knowledge. Of course this approach requires holding several different criteria in balance.

I think honestly the similarities are only skin deep, and the processes of knowledge production in the two approaches differ dramatically. — Srap Tasmaner

This would be one ready way of exploring what is meant by "more/less scientific," at least if we agree that pseudoscience is less scientific. I myself don't think it is that easy, and your earlier point that some disciplines will uncontroversially check all of the "science" boxes whereas other disciplines will not seems to jibe with the fact that what counts as a pseudoscience will vary a bit from person to person.

Surely. Given the distinction between knowing that and knowing how, it stands to reason there's a difference between learning that and learning how. Acquiring a skill is a kind of learning that might here and there overlap with a scientific approach ― experimenting is what I'm thinking of ― but we would expect plenty of differences too, and the intended "result" is quite different.

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known... — Srap Tasmaner

So to be clear, are you saying that science has to do with knowing-that, and non-scientific strategies for learning have to do with knowing-how? Even though there is some minor overlap?

I think I'm okay with restricting science to a strategy for learning what can be known, and I also want to say it is something like the distillation of everything we have learned about how to learn what can be known. Science itself is a how, not a what. And that also means that we can learn more about how to learn things, so there's no reason to think the methodology of science is fixed. — Srap Tasmaner

"Thus, a science is primarily the habit of soul, a speculative virtue of the intellect... Secondarily, a science is expressed in words and written down in text books" (Paraphrase of Aquinas).

- What do you mean when you say "mathematical induction"?

- Interesting. :up:

This ecstatic reorientation is the very essence of the "movement" toward divinity, for, as Meister Eckhart says again and again, the more we are here in this world of constructed values (one may care very much about General Motors, say, invests, works for, manages affairs for, and so on: but does GM really "exist"? Not really. It was conceived in a pragmatic desire, entirely abstract in the Real events of people's affairs. — Astrophel

On the contrary, Eckhart would say that God is in General Motors, and that the one who says otherwise does not understand God. The one who cannot find God where they are has mistaken God for something else:

God is in all things. The more He is in things, the more He is out of things: the more in, the more out, and the more out, the more in. I have often said, God is creating the whole world now this instant. — The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, Sermon 18

But, yes. I wouldn't bother to say something here unless I had at least some reading, experience, or knowledge that relates. — Moliere

Okay, well I'm glad to hear that.

Fair questions.

The posterior analytics deals with induction, by my memory. And I want to add that I think Aristotle's notion of induction is not the same as induction today. But I grant you that I didn't give the specificity you asked for: My reading is certainly rusty.

I feel we're getting closer here now, though, in terms of not talking past one another. — Moliere

Yes, well in general when you use a term like, "Aristotle's induction," I need to know what you mean by that if I am going to respond in an intelligent way. That information could be supplied by a reference to a primary source, a secondary source, or by your own explanation of what you mean.

I think Aristotle's method -- Lavoisier I think didn't invent a method as much as adopted one -- is to review what has been said, demonstrate its strengths and weaknesses, then show his conclusion.

And, on top of that, Aristotle had empirical verification for his conclusions. — Moliere

Okay, fair enough.

For his "view of induction" -- I listed the sources I did because I thought thems would explain it... but maybe not. I can tell you in my own words, though, since that's more relevant to our conversation: Aristotle views induction about objects in the same way we view induction about math. — Moliere

Eh, well how do we view induction about math? When you say that I think of inductive mathematical proofs, which do not remind me of anything in Aristotle. So I'm at a loss again.

Since there are no other categories he is able to say "this is what that thing is. this is its being" -- but over time we've found that his methods are, while a good guess, not quite right either. — Moliere

What is wrong about them? If you aren't specific about what is wrong about his method, then I don't see what use it is to claim that his method is wrong, especially when talking to an Aristotelian.

He thinks that the world is harmonious. As I read the metaphysics, at least, all of being is within the mind of God thinking himself. Being is God thinking himself into being by thinking, and the categories apply because we can, through empirical research that climbs up, discover the essence of things. — Moliere

This sort of stuff is too vague for me, Moliere. That last sentence is a doozy.

Now, I could be very wrong in my interpretation, but since you asked for how I understand Aristotle's notion of induction I'm giving an attempt at answering that more clearly. — Moliere

Okay, and that's a good starting point. Thanks for that.

When one critiques a thesis it is crucial that they give a clear exposition of the thesis they are opposing. Here is an example from Aquinas:

Objection 2. Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above (II-II:24:1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

Reply to Objection 2. To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill. — ST II-II.27.2.ad2 - Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?

Rewritten:

• Objection 2: Acts belong to the same subject as the habit. The habit of charity is in the will, therefore the act of charity is in the will. But the will tends only to good. Therefore the act of charity tends to the good and is in the will, and is therefore an act of "good-will."
• Reply to Objection 2: It is true that the act of love is an act of the will that tends to the good, but love involves a union that goodwill does not denote (i.e. love involves a sort of mutual communion, whereas we can act with goodwill towards someone with whom we have no communion or friendship). Or: Where there is love there is goodwill, but where there is goodwill there is not necessarily love.

Do you see how the objection that Aquinas presents has its own clarity and logic? That it can be followed and understood? That it possesses a coherence that allows room for a proper reply in turn? That's exactly what needs to happen when someone critiques a position, such as Aristotle's. They need to set out a clear and reasonable account of Aristotle's position, and then critique that position in turn.

I'm thinking about the physics, the metaphysics, on the weather, the prior analytics, the posterior analytics, parts of animals, and de anima.

The prior and post analytics serve as his epistemology -- how he goes about making inferences. One by deduction and the other by induction. His treatises on weather, the soul, and the parts of animals too serve as examples of Aristotle applying his epistemology to the world at hand. The physics serves as a precursor to the metaphysics in that it is both a particular and general science since it deals with the topic of change, itself an entry into the study of the most general categories. — Moliere

I mean, that's impressive if you've read all of that. I sure haven't.

I know you've read him and know him -- that's why I thought him a good example for us, and didn't think there'd be anything controversial in comparing his method to modern scientific methods and noting that they are different in what they are doing and arguing. — Moliere

Different in what ways? And what is his method? I asked for your source for your ideas about "Aristotle's view of induction," and you literally pointed to seven different works without giving any specific references. That doesn't help me understand where your ideas about "induction" are coming from.

Yes. Aristotle I'd say I'm most familiar with, and the bit of Kripke we've been referencing in this conversation is something I've read here on the forums. Lavoisier's contribution to science is his meticulous work on making precise instrumentation, which I gather is a clear difference between what both Aristotle and Kripke are doing.

Now, readings get rusty and I make mistakes. But I'm not just using these just because -- Kripke got added to the mix, but Aristotle/Lavoisier is one I've just often thought through as a good comparison for finding a difference. — Moliere

Okay, fair enough. I am not familiar with Lavoisier so that reference isn't informative to me. So you are saying that Lavoisier worked with precise instruments and Aristotle did not? That is the difference I see you pointing to.

When you say this it seems like I must not know how to make a real argument, to your mind. — Moliere

Yeah, given the number of invalid or altogether absent arguments, I don't think you are very strong on argumentation.

I'd rather say that arguments don't reveal truth as much as serve as a check to ourselves -- ah, yes, there I messed up, that inference can't be quite right. — Moliere

So arguments don't reveal truth and we just go around throwing seeds "and see what happens"?

My advice would be to try to understand argumentation better. An argument has a starting point (premises), an ending point (conclusion), and a path from one to the other (inferences). If you aren't providing those to your interlocutor, then there's simply no way for them to engage your philosophical beliefs. For example:

But neither he nor we can make induction a valid move that secures knowledge. — Moliere

That's an assertion. It contains no premises, no inferences, and no conclusion. It is opaque. It is probably just a reference to Hume, but if you want it to be more than an opaque assertion, then you have to explain why you think it is true, or where it is supposed to come from.

- Gotcha. I think there are pretty significant differences, to the extent that equivocations may be occurring (between "knowing that" and "knowing how" or "experiencing"). For example:

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? There's factual knowledge of the objective world, which Mary in her black and white world can learn, and then there's experiential knowledge of the inner world (of what it's like to see red), which Mary, in her black and white world can't learn. Is experiential knowledge a JTB? — RogueAI

Why think that perception is knowledge at all?

I would say that intention should guide us, such that if someone purports to know something, then we can treat it as a knowledge claim. Someone might claim to know via perceptions, but claims of perception are not the same as claims of knowledge, because perception is not the same as knowledge. "I perceived that the house is red," is not the same as, "I know that the house is red."

Of course we can say that someone does not, "Know what it's like to see colors," but this is a semantically varied sense of "know."

...but I am digressing:

Aren't there two kinds of knowledge? — RogueAI

I think you are basically correct. I would phrase it this way, "Even if we consider know-how a kind of knowledge, it does not follow that all knowledge is of this kind."

Science is also generally thought of as universal knowledge. But in complex systems, it is often the case that what seems like a universal relationship is subject to change after passing various tipping points. We deal in "moving landscapes" in more complex fields. For instance, several "laws of economics," revealed themselves to be merely tendencies which existed within the economic, political, and technological environments that existed in the first half of the 20th century. We discovered that they were not truly universal towards the end of the century—that sort of thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, very true. :up:

For another example, with biology, we have to consider the possibility of extraterrestrial life, life based on a molecule other than DNA, perhaps even non-carbon-based life. This throws a wrench into claims to universality.

This is a problem, although I think information theoretic approaches shed light on a solution by way of returning to the conception of science primarily in terms of unifying principles that explain (and virtually contain) many particular causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, and therefore upon encountering non-carbon-based life we might recast our findings as relating to carbon-based life.

But, my particular opinion is that these issues... — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's interesting. I think you may be right in an academic sense. But I would want to lay a lot at the feet of democratic culture. I think most people like pluralism because they like democracy, and truth is always a threat to democracy insofar as we accept the modern notion of liberty as liberty to follow one's passions.

On the other hand is the idea that truth brings with it coercive imposition, which threatens the dignity of each human to choose for themselves. Either way, I tend to view the motive as moral more than speculative, especially for the non-academic masses. ...Of late the forum has been ringing with threads relating to liberalism.