I don't know. Is solipsism a framework, or the state of reality, or both? — Harry Hindu

For the realist realism is not merely a framework; and for the solipsist solipsism is not merely a framework. To say "both" would require the adherent to claim that their own framework (e.g. realism or solipsism) is superior to other frameworks. I suppose they could do that, but it seems like the very idea of a "framework" would impede them.

Is the framework that supports the realism of other minds and their contents context-de/independent? — Harry Hindu

By calling it a "framework" I think we are already presupposing that it is contextualized, aren't we? I think realism presupposes that not every knowledge-claim is reducible to a framework, or is even able to be captured by framework-talk.

No, history isn't a soft science. — Moliere

Oh, that's an interesting claim. I will have to come back to this, but you said you agreed with Srap, and he clearly takes history to be a social science:

When you turn to the social sciences, there are additional impediments to a scientific approach. The sciences of the past (history and archaeology) face unavoidable limitations on what can be observed... — Srap Tasmaner

That's the most proximate reason I assumed you would accept history as a social science.

preach to his choir — Harry Hindu

Yes. I think it is a kind of preaching, which is why it is so resistant to argument, exchange, objections, questions, accurate representation, etc. Preachers who cannot find a receptive audience might end up preaching to themselves in PMs. Privately talking about how the people who object to their preaching are benighted.

I wouldn't describe this as "coming from without" though — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sure, and neither would I.

For instance, when a man cheats on his wife, even though he wished he hadn't (giving in to an appetite/passion), we say he has suffered from weakness of will, and perhaps even that his act was not fully voluntary. Whereas, when a man doesn't cheat on his wife because he sees this as truly worse, we don't say that he suffers from "weakness of passion." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think this is because of the difference between receiving and doing that I pointed out. Your word "suffer" is similarly passive. Passion/passio/pathos are all etymologically related to suffering. If an action is something an agent does, then a passion is something an agent endures. Similarly, if I use a shovel to move a pile of dirt, then the shovel is active and the dirt is passive. The shovel is moving and the dirt is being moved.

They are also something we can have more or less control over, through the cultivation of habits (virtues/vices) and the will's ability to overcome the passions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I want to say that, at least in general, we only "control" the passions indirectly. For example, you can't just make yourself angry with the snap of your fingers, even though you can just snap your fingers. A passion is not an action. Snapping your fingers is an action; anger is a passion. In order to get angry you need to perceive injustice, and we cannot directly command ourselves to perceive injustice. We can make ourselves angry by doing things like searching out injustice, or focusing on injustice, or magnifying our perception of an injustice, but this is all indirect.

Passions pertain to passivity; actions pertain to activity.

Here's Aquinas, maybe more than we need:

The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. — Aquinas, ST I-II.22.1 - Whether any passion is in the soul?

I think soft sciences, whatever we happen to include ( and could argue about if we wanted), are just as scientific as the so-called "hard" sciences. — Moliere

Okay, but isn't history a "soft science"? If so, then by your own concession history must be just as scientific as any other science. And yet you've said otherwise...?

has argued over a number of posts that the soft sciences or social sciences are also sciences. What do you make of those arguments?

Oh, an argument? If science were history then they would be in the same department at the university. They are not in the same department at the university, therefore science is not history. — Moliere

Okay, well that is certainly an argument. :up:

"science" (what are we including under that heading...?) — Leontiskos

So I have never heard of a university with a science department. "What are you studying?" "Science." "Hmm?"

I mean, many universities offer a Bachelor of Science degree in history, so what do you make of that?

In other words, by using PM it's easier to avoid the masses who disagree with you, allowing you to escape into a fabricated world of illusion, with a close buddy. Avoid the distractions which reality forces upon you, and really build your own little dream scene.

When I want to escape into my own little world of creativity, I just pm myself. It's all done in the privacy and secrecy of my own mind, commonly known as thinking.

What's with the need for a buddy in your private and secret world of creativity? Do I detect a little insecurity? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you've hit it. Especially in the context of @Banno's recent attacks on religion, his accusations of authoritarianism, the growing acknowledgement that his favored mode of Analytic philosophy is deficient, etc. He makes accusations, the accusations backfire, and then he takes to PM. His problems are self-generated.

So I am worried that your scenario already assumes the thing that we are supposed to be proving. Obviously if we're thinking of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City, and St. Louis does not have the standard that Kansas City has, then that standard is not overarching. The question has already been answered. — Leontiskos

I actually worry about that too, especially with the stuff about translation that I posted. — Srap Tasmaner

I offered what I see as a non-question-begging way to approach the question <here>. Consider now another.

What does @J want? My guess is that if you asked him another simple question, such as, "You want people to avoid authoritarianism. What, precisely and concretely, are you asking them to abstain from?," he would again have no answer. Be that as it may, it is easy enough to point to the kernel of this thread and what @J (but perhaps not @Banno) is ultimately opining on.

So if someone wants a world with low ERBs, but they also want a world where people reason together, then the asymptote of rule 3 will not be ideal. (This is literally one of the fundamental conflicts in J's thought). — Leontiskos

He wants at least two things: niceness and the possibility of growing in knowledge as a community. Prescinding from @J's premise of truth as intersubjectivity, the question is about how and in what ways the two values of niceness and intellectual rigor ought to coexist.

This is closely related to Aquinas' ST II-II.60.4 - "Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?" This is a kind of limit case or paradigmatic question regarding the topic, and it is closely related to the discussion about the relation between truth and goodness from earlier in the thread. It relates to the so-called "principle of charity," yet without the thoroughgoing vagueness and ambiguity that "principle" inevitably carries.

It's actually worth quoting the article in full, given that it is so relevant and perspicacious. What Aquinas says here is offered as fodder for argument, as always. It may or may not be correct, but at least it is providing real arguments and attempting to answer the question at hand:

Article 4. Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

Objection 1. It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since "the number of fools is infinite" (Ecclesiastes 1:15), "for the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth" (Genesis 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that." Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.

Objection 3. Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, "I feared all my works." Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one's neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.

On the contrary, A gloss on Romans 14:3, "He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth," says: "Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense."

I answer that, As stated above (Article 3, Reply to Objection 2), things from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person's wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Reply to Objection 1. He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Reply to Objection 2. It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because "the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil," as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect's perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3. One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above. — Aquinas' ST II-II.60.4 - Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

(It is worth noting that if Aquinas' position requires religious premises—and it may well do so!—then it remains to be seen how such a position could be justified without those premises. This is another irony of this thread, which is anti-religious in spirit. But I digress...)

A feeling is an activity? — frank

:up:

Or more generally, "A passion is an action?"

A feeling is generally seen as something that happens to us, whereas an activity is generally seen as something we do. To define feelings as activities is a bit like saying, "Internal things that happen to us without our doing anything are things that we do."

When there is an impasse such as this, I would say that what is needed are formal arguments, with explicit premises and conclusions. That's why I have been doing this in many of my recent posts. If you want to give formal arguments I think we can continue. If not, not.

(I saw that a post of yours disappeared. Just so you know, I did not report it or even have a chance to read it. A moderator may have simply taken the initiative.)

The above caught my eye. Given that you believe humans have the same nature, and by this you apparently have in mind a powerful facility to understand the world from the other’s point of view ( linguistic, cultural, scientific), what sort of explanation is left in order to account for profound disagreements concerning ethical, epistemological and philosophical matters ( not to mention day to day conflicts with friends and family members)?

It seems that what is left falls under the categories of medical pathology, incorrect knowledge and irrationality, and moral failure. Is this characterization close to the mark? — Joshs

No, it's really not close at all, beginning with the idea that human nature is the ability to understand the world from someone else's perspective. I don't think that's what human nature is, although human nature includes that (which is why we answer arguments and questions).

If someone thought the only thing humans have in common is the ability to empathize, so to speak, then the opposite of what you hold would follow: there would be no possibility of disagreement; there would be no possibility of distinguishing one's own perspective from another's. There would be one lump of merged view, one over-mind that does not distinguish persons. If all we could do was empathize (so to speak), then there would be no possibility of disagreement at all.

Contrariwise, if we could not say to someone, "You are wrong,"—whether for moral reasons or for some other reason—then we would simply not be intellectual beings with individual views who are able to grow in knowledge and understanding. This so-called "compassion" ironically snuffs out all contexts and perspectives, which is yet another reason why the "contextualism" counter involves non sequitur.

Oh, not by choice -- not a priori -- but a posteriori I started to note how they're different.

It's certainly odd. I recognize that what I say is odd. — Moliere

Well they have something in common and they have something that is different. The question is whether the difference excludes historical study from being scientific, and we would need arguments for that thesis. Obviously the assumption that historical study is altogether unscientific would help preclude the possibility that there is some common thread between history and "science" (what are we including under that heading...?), but that's precisely the sort of assumption that needs to be argued.

I agree. That is the important contribution of the analytic school to the philosophic enterprise. Rigor. — Fire Ologist

mortis. :wink: — Wayfarer

:lol:

The Analytic is analytic. He is a knife: he cuts. He is very good at dividing, separating. He is not good at ...really anything else. So yes, he dissects, criticizes, and accuses; but he is evidently unable to construct, synthesize, or build up. Too often he is someone whose skill with a knife is over-developed, and whose skill elsewhere is underdeveloped.

Insert caveats about shared perspectives, bias and reasoning here. — fdrake

I.e. echo chambers, for people who refuse to engage those on the open forum who question their positions and suggest that they might be wrong. I think this is a very large caveat in the OP's case.

PMs can be great, but when they are being used to limit counterarguments one would prefer to avoid I think they are a poor choice, and a poor use of storage space. Gossip is also a very relevant issue, here, related to echo chambers.

Jamal, any chance of closing this thread, here?

Seems an appropriate point. — Banno

@Jamal, I would prefer that the thread stay open. Banno keeps making his bed. Why not let him sleep in it? <Here> is his newest iteration; his newest bed which will similarly disintegrate and which he will also eventually ask to be closed. He is making threads that are little more than excuses to crap on other members; he craps freely; he refuses to engage; and then he asks for the threads to be closed. I want to say that this habit of "thread"-making is a problem.

I think you successfully show that we can't make a sharp distinction between moral and non-moral norms such that anti-realism closes the door on only the former, and that people always act morally in the sense that their acts might be subject to moral scrutiny (which I think is a bit of a trivial truth). — goremand

Okay, thanks.

I don't quite understand how this gets us to the claim that people all have (implicit, I assume) moral beliefs. — goremand

Do all people make non-hypothetical ought-judgments?

I would like to know if you're even interested in justifying a particular set of norms (rational, moral, whatever) rather than just proving that they are implicitly assumed. — goremand

I wouldn't try to justify some to someone who doesn't see that they are already making others. Does that make sense?

The irony, as I have pointed out before, is that this thread is rooted in a self-contradictory moral accusation. It says, “It is morally impermissible to be so certain that one then accuses others of being wrong; I accuse those who do this of being wrong; and I am certain that they are wrong.” This is bad enough even before the rider is attached, “And I refuse to give arguments for my accusations, or offer 'due process'.”



What you are doing here is very similar. You have decided to ignore me because you think I should not treat any “witness” as “hostile,” even if they are hostile. Such a decision to ignore is inevitably based in an overarching standard, namely one regarding the treatment of witnesses. So in this thread, your exclusionary practice is oddly enough a position taken with respect to the OP. You are another person who excludes and attempts to shame those you disagree with (both directly and through inflammatory insinuation), even though you claim to deny the very standard that such a practice depends upon. This is self-contradictory. You are of course welcome to try to shame me based on your selective readings, but you cannot at the same time eschew the overarching standard that such shaming presupposes.

This is why the promoters of the thesis that there are no overarching standards end up as tyrants. It is because that extreme form of self-righteousness is inherently tyrannical, with an inherent double standard (“There are no overarching standards, but nevertheless my judgments are absolute, beholden to no standard!”). When someone like @Count Timothy von Icarus, @Fire Ologist, or myself tell another that their position is wrong, we provide the standard upon which our judgment is based, and to which appeal can be made. Hence truth and standards are the very things which prevent tyranny. The reason we are happy to answer questions and consider objections is because our will is not absolute.

This is the difference between tyranny and rule of law. In a tyranny you get locked up because the tyrant said so, and the tyrant is beholden to no overarching standards. Where there is rule of law you get locked up on the basis of a standard, and if you can show that the standard does not apply then you will not be locked up. Only where there is tyranny is there no recourse; only where there is tyranny can someone simply say, “Don't bother defending yourselves. [My will is absolute].” Similarly, only where there is tyranny is there a self-elevation above rational discourse, where one says, “I refuse to answer your questions and engage your objections, but I will at the same time pretend and act as if I have done so.” This latter is tyranny even when it is covered over by a thin veneer of politeness.

The ironies of this thread are endless.

You should be ashamed — Srap Tasmaner

Consider a story

You see a thread about two different ways to do philosophy. Looking closer, you find that the subtext reads, "The right way to do philosophy and Srap Tasmaner's way to do philosophy." Soon enough it becomes clear that the premise is even simpler, “Srap Tasmaner is an authoritarian.” This isn’t surprising to you, given that the duo who produced the thread has been consistently doing this sort of thing for over a year now.

So you enter the thread and push back, also giving arguments and asking questions with respect to the thesis. The duo refuses to consider your arguments or answer your questions. For 22 pages they even stonewall a premise of your most basic argument, namely <p v ~p>. So the duo won’t consider your arguments, they won’t answer any questions, and all the while they maintain their thesis, “Srap is an authoritarian.” At one point one of them actually says, “My answer to your questions is, ‘I don’t know.’ And you’re still an authoritarian.” A banana republic. Splendid.

But then someone who is more serious enters the thread: someone who agrees with a speculative thesis that the duo believes supports their moral thesis. He is willing to hear your arguments and answer your questions. He is not neutral, but he is at least genuinely trying. You point out some of his non-neutral presuppositions, and he tries to reconfigure his analogies. He is intent on turning a blind eye to the moral nature of the central accusation and wants to keep to the speculative thesis. That’s fine. At least he is answering questions and exchanging arguments. He is the first person to do that on the duo’s behalf, and he is offering the first real arguments for anything resembling the thesis of the thread.

Then he sees you give an argument for why the duo are themselves authoritarian.* He takes umbrage, refuses to continue, and says, “You should be ashamed.” All because you argued that someone was an authoritarian. Imagine how fucking crazy that would be. :meh:

(In the end you think wryly to yourself, “Maybe I should have just called them authoritarian instead of arguing the point. Surely that’s what makes all the difference.” :grin:)


* What you mistakenly took me to be explaining I have indeed explained elsewhere in the thread.

"the problem with J" — Srap Tasmaner

Much like your strange claim that I was concerned with pseudoscience in this thread, this claim is similarly lacking in accuracy. None of the posts you reference make any mention of @J. I certainly don't think he is a "hermeneuticist." I had in mind those who explicitly appeal to "philosophical hermeneutics."

Nevertheless, it is quite natural to opine on what @J believes when he refuses to answer question after question, and also to opine on why he constantly refuses. It's no coincidence that human systems such as courts have remedies for that form of evasion. The solution is simple: @J merely needs to engage in philosophy and answer the questions posed to him. To engage the members of the forum. That is a guideline here, after all. As is the guideline against "evangelization," such as the incessant opposition to so-called "monism."

(See also )

So I'll not be participating in this thread anymore. Fire Ologist and @Leontiskos, I think you should be ashamed of yourselves.

@Leontiskos, back when I was a mod, I would have warned you pages ago to cease your relentless attempts to diagnose "the problem with @J". It's inappropriate. It's disrespectful. And in my view it's a violation of the site guidelines, but none of the other mods have ever been as committed to reining in this sort of behavior as I was. — Srap Tasmaner

I think that's nonsense. From your very first post you've had a biased read on the whole discussion. The strawmen you've relied on and your inflammatory language throughout is indicative of this (e.g. "juvenile," "unserious," "policing," "stuck," "imprisoned," "anxious," "baggage"). Your whole concept of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City begs the question, as has been pointed out. And you haven't even acknowledged the other ways to consider the question. But it is convenient that you won't have to confront that growing laundry list now, isn't it?

I am disappointed to see this silliness from you. @Fire Ologist said it very well:

I’d be allowed to treat the witness as hostile to the court.

And then the Judge would force you to answer “are all narratives acceptable or not?” The most liberal progressive judge would demand, “in my court, on my record, nothing proceeds until you answer, or the charge that you say ‘all narratives may be true’ stands. You swore to tell the truth in my court and now we see you can still say anything you want, possibly giving no meaning to the ‘truth’ you swore, since you won’t answer the question and think it doesn’t matter.” — Fire Ologist

And in my view it's a violation of the site guidelines — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, insofar as I think moderators ought to address the way that @Banno and @J make accusations and insinuations before prevaricating and hiding in the bushes, thread after thread.

This thread is a testament to what happens when the targets of catty, moralizing sniping confront the snipers, and it turns out the snipers have nothing of substance to offer.

I am beginning to think that as soon as they see an end in sight, they feel the need to back track, take a turn, or just stop moving. — Fire Ologist

It's .

Ends, like foundations, are anathema to the purely analytic philosophic enterprise. And sets a standard that cannot be met, namely, deconstruction without construction. — Fire Ologist

I mostly agree, but I would say that Analytics do hold to a standard of consistency. Hence the between two self-described dissectors in the thread.

@Banno tends to become "aimless" whenever he tries to move beyond a criterion of consistency, as he is doing in this thread.

If there are many, then we cannot know who shares our form, and so we cannot know that we are playing a language game at all. — Hanover

Yes, and we certainly cannot know that we are playing the same language game as someone else.

There are certain assumptions that need to be made for it to be the case that all general epistemic principles (or any at all) must require a standpoint outside any paradigm to achieve. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the work you did can be utilized elsewhere, which is why I keep bringing it up. Don't we all agree that data should not be falsified? How did we do that? Did we all have to step outside ourselves in order to recognize it, grab hold of the truth, and hold on tight as we stepped back inside ourselves? How were we all able to recognize that standard even though some of us live in St. Louis and others live in Kansas City?

What I find funny about the "hermeneuticists" I have encountered is that their practice shows them to be looking for a "view from nowhere," even as they speak against it. They attempt to float above the fray with endless qualifications and contextualizations, and to what end? They clearly think that they are approaching some kind of objective view. My approach is much different, it is, "Cut out the fat and just give me an argument for what you believe to be true." Jump into the water right where you are and start swimming. That's how you get somewhere. It's no coincidence that many of the folks who fret day and night about frameworks and contexts and all the rest of it are remarkably bad at giving and recognizing arguments. That sort of dancing can become an excuse for avoiding arguments; a way to "rise above" without getting your hands dirty.

Yeah, that's one of the points I wanted to make. There are certain assumptions that need to be made for it to be the case that all general epistemic principles (or any at all) must require a standpoint outside any paradigm to achieve. I don't think those are good assumptions though. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. :up:

Consider Plato's "being ruled by the rational part of the soul," as an epistemic meta-virtue. The basic idea that, ceteris paribus, one will tend towards truth... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree. I've been pondering misology, and the way that the passions can hijack the reason.

For example, if someone wants to never admit they're wrong, then might achieve that by holding that every narrative is equal, including their own. They might avoid clarity in conversation, avoid being "put on the record," avoid answering questions, etc. All of that is great if you want to ensure that you will never be proven wrong. Opacity in general is a great help. But this is all passion-driven. The desire to never be wrong, or to never be shown to be wrong, is derived from the passions, not the reason. It's not at all clear how one can argue against such passions.

Though "science" in scare quotes makes me think you have something else in mind, and the examples are not persuasive. — Moliere

I just find it odd to separate scientific study from historical study. This bears on the discussion of "scientificity" from <another thread>.

I wonder most about where Banno said in the OP “perhaps we need both.”

I’d say we certainly do. No one ever says something meaningful about the world without both. (But I can hear the police sirens again… — Fire Ologist

I think that's right. Those darn sirens. :smile:

In general I wouldn't define it onone way or the other but would leave it to the particular referent (the particular case of incommensurability) -- but I do think the more interesting case would be when we say "No, not even one strand relates but the referent is the same"

For this I just go to science and history -- they both speak about "the world", but in their own particular idioms and ways of making inferences. They both mean "reality", and they mean it in a realist way such as "reality outside of my particular opinions about reality, but rather what the best methods/values which produce knowledge say"

At least that's the example which impresses me the most... — Moliere

There is simply no argument here to the effect that "science" and history have no common thread.

It'd be foolish to say either scientists or historians don't know anything because of the universalization of the standards of science or history exclude the other. Much better to shrug and say "I'm not sure how these guys relate -- perhaps we don't translate one into the other, but are about the same thing, and so demonstrate different facets of the same reality" — Moliere

We can say that "science" and history have a common thread without saying that either "scientists" or historians don't know anything. Similarly, saying, "I'm not sure how they relate," says nothing about whether there is a common thread.

I'm afraid these are all invalid arguments.

We've already seen a common thread between "science" and history, namely, "Do not falsify your data."

Given my best take on reality, it looks to me like it's impossible to arrive contextless and baggage-less . . . But I'm happy to add those qualifications. — J

Leaves open the possibility or at least hope of baggage free observation. — Fire Ologist

Yes, "I believe there is an overarching standard absolutely precluding contextlessness, but I could be wrong." So @J believes in an overarching standard. That he thinks he could be wrong is neither here nor there, since no one is claiming infallibility.

The objection here is, "That's not a 'standard', that's just how reality is!" Again:

The central contention of the thread can still be denied even if there is no view from nowhere, so long as there is a common thread running through the entire domain of “contexts.” The quintessential example would be the principle of non-contradiction (PNC), which is not merely a psychological principle; it is something that we both can and cannot choose to obey or disobey. It is not merely elective or optional, and yet it is nevertheless normative. This is precisely to the point, given that the “real ambiguity” I spoke about exists because we are talking about “exclusion” from the rational community, and it is not at all clear that one can opt in or out of the rational community. — Leontiskos

I want to say that the question of this thread is bound up with the question of whether we all have common aims, or more precisely, common ends. — Leontiskos

@Count Timothy von Icarus is not a police officer going around saying, "You're now in the jurisdiction of Venezuela, and therefore you're beholden to this Venezuelan law I have here in my pocket!" He is engaged in a Socratic move, "Although you don't know it, you just contradicted yourself. And if you think you don't care about contradicting yourself, then I will show you that you really do care about it."

Well, actually I meant the opposite.

I can put it another way: it's a question of whether the subject who judges things like narratives and paradigms and cities is thick or thin. In the thick conception, the subject comes with a history, a culture, a worldview, all that relativist business; in the thin view, he comes armed with rationality.

It's in that sense that taking the subject as a quite abstract rational judge is treating them as starting over each moment, entirely without the sort of baggage we all actually have. — Srap Tasmaner

It seems to me that no one in the thread is claiming such a thing, but you anticipate this objection:

I think Count Timothy von Icarus is especially interested in being in position to tell someone that they *should* put down some baggage they're carrying. The grounds for saying so would be (a) that this particular burden does not help you in making rational judgments, and (b) that Tim can tell (a) is the case by exercising rational judgment. (Stop thinking you need to sacrifice chipmunks to the river every spring so it will thaw, would be a typical Enlightenment example.)

I'm not sure how close that is to your view (or if it is in fact Tim's), but that's the sort of thing I imagine is on the table when people say they want an overarching standard. — Srap Tasmaner

First I think it is quite important to note the initial claim. @Count Timothy von Icarus did not start a thread saying, "I want an overarching standard." It is the other way around, where @Banno started a thread after private conversation with @J, opposing overarching standards.

Be that as it may, let's suppose someone claims that there is an overarching standard and that Jake has violated it. Does it follow that the person has a thin and not a thick conception of paradigms, or that Jake is being asked to put down baggage? I don't see why it would. All that is needed is a common thread running through every paradigm, from which the standard can be derived. The paradigms can be as thick as you like.

Do we agree that one can coherently say "I don't know"? — Banno

You're welcome to say "I don't know" when presented with ' question about whether all narratives are equal or some narratives are unequal. But if you really don't know the answer that question, then it is odd that you would write a thread claiming that dissection-narratives are better than discourse-narratives. You can't maintain your OP here while simultaneously saying that you don't know whether some narratives are unequal. :kiss:

Here is how I would approach the topic. First, read to Banno, beginning with the words, "I concede..."

What I do there is identify a common aim that Banno and I share within that conversation. I want to say that the question of this thread is bound up with the question of whether we all have common aims, or more precisely, common ends. Let me be very explicit about how this relates to the central question: if we do not have common ends, then there is no overarching standard; if we do have at least one common end, then there is at least one overarching standard.

(Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II.Q1 - Man's last end)

Oh, so as in -- one standard that was there before the paradigm shift and one that was there after the paradigm shift such that we know that the new paradigm is better than the old paradigm due to the standards external to the paradigms of evaluation? — Moliere

Sort of. It's asking if there is a common thread between the two paradigms, given that each paradigm is made up of many different strands.

My intention was absolutely to treat it as an open question. — Srap Tasmaner

Understood.

I actually worry about that too, especially with the stuff about translation that I posted.

I want, on the one hand, to leverage the recognition that people do not start from scratch every moment of their lives, but to avoid suggesting -- what is clearly false! -- that change is impossible. — Srap Tasmaner

Okay. I suppose I can see how that recognition has leverage with respect to the central question, namely insofar as the premise which says we start from scratch would invalidate the possibility of an overarching standard.

Ultimately I think we need to give arguments for or against the central thesis of the thread. It seems like you're trying to present things that stay perfectly neutral with respect to the central thesis, but nevertheless elucidate the question. I think it is often possible to do that, but it is very difficult in this case. I actually think gave a pretty definitive argument, providing an example of an overarching standard. Perhaps everyone already agrees that the standard he presented is overarching...?

If I wanted to try to straddle the neutrality fence, then I would present an image that pertains to bindingness or beholden-ness. Such as, "Is this a question of Venezuelan jurisdiction or is it a jurisdiction-less question?" I struggle to see any way in which the example about St. Louis and Kansas City has even the capacity to support the position which holds there to be overarching standards. I could manufacture some possibility, but it will look weak given that predetermined setup. In other words, the very notion that someone would posit an overarching standard which says that someone must move from St. Louis to Kansas City is pretty outlandish.

Hey you're right! I suppose it's all one big thread to me. We all end up saying the same things in every thread, myself included, though I keep trying to have new ideas... — Srap Tasmaner

No worries. :lol:

I think that was Count Timothy von Icarus's phrase. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I added this in an edit:

...Count has spoken about pseudoscience, but I take him to be speaking analogically, and I do not take him to be interested in that question per se, apart from the parallels it has to the more central question. — Leontiskos

I see the pseudoscience question that @Count Timothy von Icarus has raised as an analogy for something that would be more generally considered beyond the pale.

It's whether there are overarching standards we are beholden to and can rely upon when judging the worth of a narrative (all the etc). — Srap Tasmaner

Okay, excellent. Thanks for setting this out. I agree. :clap:

All I was trying to do is see what such a thing would look and act like when you are already committed to such a narrative, when you already live somewhere and the question is not the abstract "Where should one live?" but the more concrete "Should I move?" — Srap Tasmaner

This makes the assumption that the person's starting point is not beholden to the the standard, no? It's a bit like, "Well I live in Brazil and I could move to Venezuela, but I'm going to have a look at the Venezuelan laws to see if it would be a good idea to move."

So I am worried that your scenario already assumes the thing that we are supposed to be proving. Obviously if we're thinking of moving from St. Louis to Kansas City, and St. Louis does not have the standard that Kansas City has, then that standard is not overarching. The question has already been answered.

This is really, really helpful, for I believe it highlights precisely what @J has been doing all along. It also shows how easy it is to get leverage on such things when someone just answers simple questions simply.

They are, quite clearly, self explanatory — AmadeusD

That's sort of your answer to everything. You very seldom give reasons or arguments for your positions. That's a problem when you're on a philosophy forum. Know that I am simply not going to continue responding to your posts if they do not present any arguments or reasons for your claims.

I was diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder on the 5th of March 1998. My parents told me to ignore the psychiatrist and not take the prescribed medications. I didn't listen to my parents. I trusted my psychiatrist and took the prescribed medications. 27 years and 3 months later, I am still struggling with depression and all the side-effects of the prescribed medications. I have gone from 65 kg to 98 kg as my medication causes weight gain. My mental illness has ruined my physical health, education, career and relationships. I often wonder how my life would be if I had listened to my parents instead of my psychiatrist. — Truth Seeker

One way we improve is by identifying mistakes and then resolving to change. What do you see as your mistake in this instance? What is the thing you wish you had done differently?

Ideally you want to identify something that is more than surface-level. So you shouldn't look back and say, "I shouldn't have taken medication, and therefore I now resolve to not take any medications." Or even, "I shouldn't have taken psychiatric medication, and therefore I now resolve to not take psychiatric medication." You want to identify something deeper than that.

The case you give is tricky because you were stuck between the authority of a medical professional and the authority of your parents, both of which have a strong purchase on you. Ideally you should start with smaller changes and less difficult questions if you want to improve your ability to make choices. "Small steps," as they say.

A book that might help, "Prudence: Choose Confidently, Live Boldly."

More simply, Aristotle's advice would be to identify people who you believe make good choices, and emulate them. Also consult and associate with them if at all possible.

Q7. Is there some standard that is being followed both before and after a paradigm shift? — Leontiskos

Yes. Though they need not be the same standard. — Moliere

To be clear, "some" = "one."