You are not making any sense. Nothing will be interesting to someone who both dismisses criticism, and can't put together coherent thoughts.

This isn't a 'me' problem, Constance.

Well. If red is part of the light spectrum, and certain things reflect that range, and we're capable of detecting that range, that's how we see red things. light — creativesoul

This struck-out seems an empirical correction, to me. It's significant to how we conceptualise, though.

They would be reflecting that range even if we were not looking. — creativesoul

They would. And if you want to say they are still Red, in the absence of experience, I then require something else to refer to the experience. Seems simple enough to me... They clearly are not the same thing, so we shouldn't refer to them by the same term. I would not want to say they are Red, in that context at least and possibly, at all (depending on whether or not I decide on some stringent version of this that I like better than others (such as a new word for stretches of the light-spectrum that aren't number ranges)).

I presume you're in agreement with his view as shared here in this thread. — creativesoul

I'm not sure we're totally aligned, but I think i'm much closer to his position than others trying to (ironically, given the post above this) equivocate between a spectrum of light, and a mental experience.

Sure seeing a red pen is not equivalent to a red pen. Moreover, seeing red is not equivalent to red. <-----that's a problem as well. — creativesoul

In the Indirect Realism thread, I noted this issue (that I think is linguistic) and posited a better form(in my opinion):

We look at objects;
We perceive the reflected/refracted/whatever light;
We see the images our mind puts together for us to make sense of the first two.

This seems to adequately delineate what i think are three distinct aspects of what we colloquially refer to as "seeing a Red pen" (content arbitrary - we're just using that example in the exchange).

Rather than claim that the pen is reflecting the red part of the visible spectrum causing us to see red, you'd rather say that there is no red part of the visible spectrum, rather there are certain ranges that cause us to see red. — creativesoul

This makes sense to me, yes. It seems a pretty good description of what's actually happening rather than some formulation of "how i think of it". I'm not suggesting you are claiming one or the other here, just clarifying.
If red is just a part of the light spectrum (x to x frequencies) that's fine - but it means our epxerience of it is something else. If we're just singularly referring to different things, I'm unsure there's a solution other htan to adjust the language to note that. Though, to my mind, that's the case. The numbers which represent the range on the spectrum are what they are. The experience which is (usually, under 'normal' conditions) triggered by objects which reflect that range can't be the same thing. So, personally, i have no issue with things how they are - they seem to encapsulate the way i think about it as well. Though, this is going to obviously influence how much weight i put on either side of the coin.

Hmm? We could, by analogy, call the code white which causes the white image, but it is the image on the screen that is white, not the code. — Leontiskos

While i understand that you've removed what was a problematic formulation, this boils down to the same problem.

What is making that image white? Is it that "it reflects xxxx under normal circumstances"? Well, no. It is the light itself... So, the question is weirder now.
But for either the light, or a reflective surface of X property/ies, normativity is doing a lot of work there, and it also does not describe what we're trying to describe in any way. I find this a real problem. It may simply be that colours cannot be described other than by way of examples being generalised.

:up:

Then how do you not confuse a stubbed toe with a headache? — Harry Hindu

The same way you don't confuse the car on your left from the car on your right: the direction of stimulation is extremely influential on how we perceive the stimulus. Throwing one's voice is a good example of where this is writ large - despite there being no voice coming from the direction one perceives (when on the receiving end!) - that is what one perceives. We can even be tricked about hte direction stimulus is coming from. Not being able to locate an itch is another perfect example. "I can't put my finger on it" has developed out of this experiential norm.

On-point to your comment, your internal depth perception is what creates the experience of distance - not the distance itself. It is your mind interpreting it which is why perspective can get really fucked up really quickly in the right physical circumstances. The mind does what it thinks it should be doing. It is not veridical in the philosophical sense.

I should say, if your argument is in line with Banno's hand-waving idea that we can somehow magically see things veridically, despite that being in direct contradiction of hte science of perception, I'm unsure we'll get far - which si fine, just want to avoid you wasting your time here if so.

Hard to respond nicely. The bottom line is this: you really don't demonstrate any knowledge of the issues. Yet you have opinions. This is a very bad situation.

No offense intended to Americans, really. Just pretentious people and the hobgoblins of their little minds...... unless, that is, you actually have something to say about metaethics. — Constance

I see you have chosen to do nothing but slide further into ad hominem(and this time, it's outright racist). I am, again, not surprised. Please don't be surprised when you're treated the way you behave. It seems you're not even reading the comments you're responding to...

I am neither American, nor live in America. — AmadeusD

science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist

No, and that's fair but not quite relevant. My point is the clear contradiction in the two quotes i put forward. If the above is your position, then the second of those quotes needs to hold while the first needs to be let go. We cannot know anything about hte intrinsic nature of things = we cannot know there is an objective world out there. I take no position, for the sake of this discussion, just point out the break in the line of thinking there. You can't have both, basically.

I should point out that when I stub my toe, I feel the pain in my toe, not my head. — Harry Hindu

No, you don't. You feel the pain in your mind. Pain doesn't obtain in the cells of your toe. This kind of confusion is not unsurprising, or without its reasons, but is clearly wrong. A toe does not feel pain without a mind.

has a property of redness — Leontiskos

That is definitely not what "this pen is Red" means, or what a specialist is explaining. The specialist explains that Redness doesn't reside in the pen - redness is an experience triggered by the properties of the pen. The is how most experiences work. Why would colour be different? Joy isn't in a dog, or a child. It is triggered in me by the properties in those things. Similarly with satisfaction due to say symmetry. The symmetry isn't satisfying - my mind is satisfied by the properties instantiated in the symmetry. Symmetry is a good example, because we're usually visually fooled into the experience of satisfaction by symmetry. Actually symmetry is very rare in the world, but our minds 'create' the experience when triggered by certain external properties. They can't refer to the experience - they are the basis for it. Are we trying to create a circular relationship?

Consider two pens, a red pen and a white pen. Is it your claim that there is no external difference between these two pens? Or: that the only difference between the two pens is something the mind projects into the pens? — Leontiskos

It's neither. THe difference in teh pens is their respectively ability to reflect wavelengths of light. Unless you're equating the visual experience of Red as a 1:1 match with 430 THz of light, I'm unsure what's being posited... And if that is being posited it may be worth leaving off this discussion.

How can I experience colour!? What if I never experienced red colour, and you asked me for a red pen? I would feel a big feeling of anxiety in my chest because I would not know what to hand you. But I know that pens are for writing. Why do you want it red? Choosy boy. — javi2541997

Yes, this is a profound issue with claiming Red is 'out there'. If it were, the description would pick it out from the world. But it doesn't. It picks it out of experiences which is why we don't all agree on what Red is (or, at least, what shades come under the banner). If Red is only in the experience, then your anxiety is, while misplaced imo, reasonable. The problem of other minds rears it's head...
But, I did note somewhere (i think anyway lol), that Red as 'out there' is optimal, in the sense that it allows us to actually refer to it without consistent skepticism. Every now and then something comes aong with the blue/black white/gold dress phenomenon though, and somewhat brings this to light.

I also had a realization last night: My right eye is significantly worse than my left. It cannot perceive colours as brightly or as saturated as my left eye, and it also perceives objects as smaller than does my left eye.

Which one is 'correct'? Is 'worse' the right word? I have no idea, but i like the bright saturation of my left eye more. But it feels artificial now, like saturation level on a television.

What’s the ‘free miracle’? — Wayfarer

Where i put that, I just mean to indicate that we don't know (which ironically, is Carroll's view, elsewhere) and 'miracle' is a placeholder for whatever the answer is...could think here of the breathe-in-breathe-out view of the big bang, but we don't know whether or not that's the case. It would solve the 'miracle' is my point. Anything that answers the question is the 'miracle' until it's found. — AmadeusD

Please take notice, AmadeusD, That after reading your post, twice, I find nothing at all that is responsive to the idea you quote. Do read this thing you wrote, and ask: Did you address, or even mention, the claim made in the quote to target for criticism? What does Sartre have to do with it? Self involved, preening narratives?? These are just words thrown.

You do sound like someone who posts on social media a lot. Ah America, the vast land of the mostly unread! — Constance

Let's work through this:

1. I am in no way surprised;
2.

continental philosophy is rhetoric only. — AmadeusD

- you said literally nothing of substance. I doubt you could tease apart what you meant from all this. It appears whenever challenged, you just blurt out more vaguely-philosophy-sounding lines probably taken from other's texts. It's nonsensical (the quote i responded to). So, I have responded to it directly;
3.

What does Sartre have to do with it? — Constance

- find it extremely unlikely you can't see what Satre has to do with a criticism of Continental philosophy - that would be bizarre, given your reliance on it but ignore if you want;
4.

self-involved, preening narratives — AmadeusD

- this is the form of the majority of Continental Philosophy, on my view - again, a direct response to the obvious nonsense you've written - it is self-obsessive and devoid of any openness or willingness to be discussed. Granted, I've been dismissive - you haven't attempted to defend yourself philosophically, so it's quite easy to do so;
5. This is my 'social media'. I would avoid ridiculous ad hominems like this, particularly when you are dead wrong;
6. I am neither American, nor live in America. Once again, do not make ad hominem assertions when you are A. on the lower end of clarity, and B. clearly wrong (my bio would have stopped you from this one).

Please avoid devolving into comments about me rather than my comments. I have stuck to commentary on your comments. I'll do so again:

On order to take metaethics seriously, one has to look, not to the concept, the understanding's counterpart to the living actuality, but to just this actuality. — Constance

This is risibly incoherent, and means nothing. As noted, rhetoric is hte language of the Continentals. You've used that form, and it's glaringly devoid of any substance. Let's look at a couple of other passages from yourself:

so in the "argument" of our ethical lives is upended by evil. — Constance

But God, divested of the usual anthropomorphic features and all the absurd narratives, reduced to its essence, remains, as does the authority it possesses. — Constance

The only way I can confirm such an idea evil is a privation would be to ignore the direct evidence of suffering. But is this reasonable? I do think it right that ordinary lived life is a privation of certain possibilities, among which are positively extraordinary and important in ways impossible to assimilate into familiar assumptions. — Constance

These are assertions with no logical, or practical support in your comments. Your conception of "evil" is such that it is a self-evident truth. This is.. to put it mildly... ignorant to 2000 years of thinking on the subject.

And this line about 'God' is pure nonsense. It makes absolutely no sense other than to say that when you, personally, think about God and choose not to imagine a Human embodiment, you get the same Character as would any other conception of God (the omin's, the dictatorial ethical norm etc...). This is bizarre, to say the least, and philosophically, I would say, embarrassing.

The bolded (and surrounding quote) is akin to a random word generator given the prompt "use some big words". This one doesn't even make grammatical sense. And while i accept there may be a typo, the lack of coherence in the majority of your comments leads me to believe that is not the case..

:

I would appreciate if my thread didn't turn into a discussion around someone else's nonsensical pet theories. — Lionino

That's fair.

Well, yes. It's not my position, to be clear.
But if you're invoking something which does not have duration or, at least, has a different sort of duration (think multi-dimensionality, i guess) then the two 'sets' could, in theory, proceed without interacting (which would cause one, interrupted duration as I see it).

The basis for this breaks down into Humean skepticism nevertheless.

I agree, it's a better model, but a model nonetheless. I don't think it gets closer to any kind of certainty. We're just saying "Okay, let's run with it until we stab ourselves".

On his conceptions, that level of awareness isn't quite required to instantiate consciousness. But this just circles back to the definition problem :lol:

If there is no gap between two instants of time then they lay on the same point. Is this correct or not? — MoK

Another version of why this is incorrect:

A pencil exists at the same instance in time, all along it's length. But that's a continuum, not a set of discreet points appearing at a particular point in time.

different people use different definitions of "consciousness" without clarification. — T Clark

Yes sirr. Huge problem in conversation. But, with enough good faith, I've not found this to be an obstacle as such. At least if you work out that you're talking about two different things, two conversations can be had. Apt here, as one could mean the description you've given (which, I think the problem adheres to, as stated by Chalmers) or the state of being aware of something. The second is useless for this arena, so it's hard to talk at cross-purpsoes once that's established.

It doesn't necessarily apply just to humans or even our near relatives. — T Clark

For sure. Chalmers thoroughly treats this and eventually has to go to that weird proto-panpsychism type of thinking to get a 'by degrees' system that would account for 'consciousness' we see in the world.

Mor-or-less but there is a baked-in continuity that would be missing on a bare conception of "moment - moment - moment" where dashes are arbitrary distinctions. I think the idea is that the interceding 'parts' of the process are the 'reason' for time passing, or some such. That you could having 'something' between two points of 'time'. Which is otherwise pretty baffling as an idea.

Yes - i was just pointing out more clearly this extends in both directions. Dismissing is probably the thing to be guarded against though, i guess, rather than twisting oneself in circles over a nonexistent problem. At least that can be fund, and have auxiliary benefits.

Searle, on the other hand, just doesn't do his job in several areas based on vibe. He literally handwaves away serious issues. That, I think, is a worse outcome. Not enquiring, worse than erroneously enquiring.

Philosophy in a nutshell. :wink: — Tom Storm

Yeeeeah boi. LOL. Except maybe Graham Oppy.

bourgeoise dictating their views to the proletariat because they deem themselves wiser and more worldly. — I like sushi

But...but...they are?

Certainly makes more sense - But i seriously doubt this formulation of soviet Russia.

I doubt it. — Shawn

Which bit?

The rest of this lands in the same category as I assessed in the OP.

Soviet communists were really sincere about their intentions of improving the life of every individual, the collective, that is. Moreso, than any other political system communism was concerned with such an ethos. — Shawn

That does not seem to be either the purpose (other than the (practically speaking) arbitrary claim that it is by various parties) or the outcome. I'm unsure the bolded can be supported in any fashion that isn't fantastical. Particularly as the underlined undermines it. They aren't the same thing.
Perhaps this was the problem.

we should not take all this stuff too seriously — BC

ding ding ding ding ding ding.

is generally hard to overwrite — BC

Seems so, but I've always found this claim dubious. I think it's hard to accept that your view needs rewriting. I don't think rewriting it is difficult (scary, though).

My thoughts are that this is the type of high-school philosophy that leads one to fall into a life of activism instead of growing up into a functional adult.

Those are, clearly, biases. But truly, I see nothing in this that needs any discussion. One eg of why:

If it has been collectively decided to aim for happiness on an collective level, then what meaning could individual happiness mean to anyone? — Shawn

This sentence is a many-more-steps version of "I know you can be underwhelmed, and overwhelmed - but can you just be whelmed?" (technically, you can, but in practice there's an obvious gap that the word doesn't fill because its incoherent).

You could treat that quoted question 'technically' and say something about the relation between an individual and their surrounding collective. But this would do nothing but explain the grammar.

fair enough! I like that :) Thank you mate.

You keep taking the time to treat me like I'm an idiot, and I keep proving you wrong. Is this ever going to change? — Philosophim

I believe somewhere in that insecure mess of a brain of yours — Philosophim

I can practically see you sulking as you type the words out. — Philosophim

If you got over yourself — Philosophim

have a humble conversation — Philosophim

INteresting.

It just seemed that you were framing emotional dispositions as the grounding for moral choices rather than there being no moral choices. — I like sushi

Oh, okay, I see what you mean. That might be a language issue - Emotional dispositions are the only possible grounding for moral choices. But that lives within the vagueries of "moral decision" so probably cannot be adequately defined (in either direction).

Moral (Right for Your Perspective) and Ethical (The Right Objective Implementation). — I like sushi

But this misses that Emotivism is a meta-ethical position. It says that human Ethics are dispositional. That framing Ethics as something objective, under which we must argue for our chosen source (God, Ayn Rand, deontology, utilitarian calc etc...) is wrong ethically. Ethics inform morals - so this ethical position means that all moral choices are in response to one's emotional state which is in turn in response to a moral proposition. You can't have a meta-moral system to explain this, because that's just ethics. And the "ethics" is that it is right to ascribe moral positions to their underlying emotional states. I'm unsure more needs to be said here, but feel free to pick it apart.

For what it's worth, I think people are ethically wrong to enforce their ethical position if their position entails an objective moral outcome. Strange, I know.

Not a Skittles fan, huh? Taste the rainbow, except the rainbow has no colors. — creativesoul

To me, nothing you've used to object to the position has any effect on it. You're, in all cases, bringing the mental phenomenon to a physical fight. The only reason a Red skittle is Red, is because my mind creates a red experience for me in response to a(in this case, a very specific) frequency of light reflected of a cooked sugar surface. It isn't in the Skittle. THat's, again, bizarre.

Just off the cuff absurd conclusions following from the idea that color is nothing more than a mental/psychological event. — creativesoul

Explanation: Nice, thank you
Relevance: None, unfortunately.

It detects what we've named "red" and programmed it to pick up on, based on the frequencies we have decided are the 'red' spectrum pursuant to the experience of Red. Nothing to do with with the frequencies themselves representing anything in experience — creativesoul

I'm also not entirely un-open to the idea that a machine could have 'mental events' in some form that delineates 'mentation' from 'consciousness'. There are bacteria who can react adequately to their environment (and show what would be considered unnatural coherence in those reactions) without any consciousness - but perhaps we have to give them mentation to make sense of it. Idk. It is distasteful to me, but I can't find a reason to just say "No, not that".

There is a further point, and all of your objections rely on it's facticity: the reality that we cannot point out Red without experiencing it. The only reason we could announce that a programme has 'created' Red is because the experience we have corresponds with what we call Red elsewhere. And this was programmed into the software based on the prexisting version of the same correspondence. It is all derived from experience.

There is no part of any of these discussions where colour obtains without experience. I get the feeling this is going to just end up with erroneous exchanges about language use.

When you go to find a trajectory, you still rely on Newtonian mechanics. Is it wrong to rely on things that are sturdy and well-built? — kudos

Not at all, but as you'll have picked up, this is not how i view Hegel :P

Your last paragraph is the same type of muddled i'm getting elsewhere, so I'm unsure how to respond. It seems like a mess of words asking senseless, redundant questions. This isn't meant to be rude - It's most to illustrate that, given my opinion of Hegelian thinking (and my position that it can be shown to be nonsensical) we're not going to get far :P

The range we've named "red" cause us to see red, but there is no red in the range. — creativesoul

No. It causes (in general terms) the sensation we take to be caused by the range on the spectrum. That sensation is termed 'Red'. There is no red in the spectrum. Arguing that there is red in the spectrum is bizarre. If you're not doing so, I am not quite understanding the objection.

Also, if these several string-posts are in response to someone, I'm not seeing hte intermediary posts so sorry if anything is incoherent for that reason. If its just me, also sorry lmao.

Frequencies of light are not color... according to those I'm arguing against. — creativesoul

Yes, that is why my response is a bit of an objection. "colour" formally, is the experience of (sorry, caused by, in most cases) such and such light frequency. That these very rarely vary independently doesn't instantiate a 1:1 match.

My point about the scanner is that it cannot detect colour. Colour is an experience.

I think we're all a little bored and narcissistic. Some of us think /pretend that actually means something. Most of us realise it's a nothing.

As to the rest of your post, it seems to rely on Hegelian concepts that I find totally incoherent:

The finitude of I becomes visible, and approaches the truth of was what we began with, and we experience the circular idea and its universality. — kudos

This says nothing, as far as I can tell. This is just some words describing nothing anyone could put a finger on. "visible" makes no sense here, "the truth of what was" makes no sense here, "we experience the ... idea" makes no sense here, "universality" is out of hte blue.

To be sure, I think Hegel was an eloquent idiot. But that doesn't affect the lack of coherence here.

That's not doing any lifting at all. A scanner can match frequencies of light based on a human programme of light=experience tables.
This doesn't help the problem..

The Scotsmen want their truth back.

Fantômas - Delirium Cordia.

Something of a Magnum Opus for the band. Roughly speaking, the album charts a patient's experience of surgery in a delirious state, rather htan waking consciousness.

which will be coming due to the use of AI. — wonderer1

I don't expect you to be other than analogous to a flat earther when it comes to this subject. — wonderer1

If only there was an emoji to represent eyes being in the back of one's head.

I disagree. For instance, I don't need to know what is happening on the slopes of Mount Everest right now to believe there are some definite events happening on the slopes of Mount Everest right now. — Apustimelogist

I'm not quite seeing where this relates to the contradiction noted? (response to bold below this all)

If we literally cannot know anything about hte intrinsic nature of things, what you think or believe has precisely zero bearing on the potential question: How could you possible confirm that:

there is an objective way the world is — Apustimelogist

If:

science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist

These are directly in opposition, as best I can tell. The example you gave doesn't seem to approach the problem in any way... Premeptively, if i've missed something key, apologies.

Response to the bolded: That's true - but to be correct you'd have to solve the above. And given you're making a pretty absolute claim here for science establishing a mind-independent, objective world outthere beyond experience.

Similarly, science cannot tell us anything about the fundamental "intrinsic nature" of things beyond experience. — Apustimelogist

I think this is true - but then whence comes:

there is an objective way the world is and the mind is embedded within that — Apustimelogist

These seem to run into each other quite violently...