I think what's trying (imo, quite badly) to do is point out that your argument (i.e how you would assess the question yourself) is inapt for much of a pregnancy.

I realise it's likely you will side with the mother regardless, But i think that's what he wants you to admit.

If the idea that is that, stepping back, in the round, the mother takes moral priority, does this include up to the anticipated date of birth? Timothy nearly got there, point out a human is also a clump of cells.

But there is obviously also a difference between a blastocyst and a fetus. But also, a fetus and a baby. Which means what to your version of the argument? The reason most want an 'essentialist' account of personhood is to demarcate at which point a 'clump of cells' gets moral priority (you may bite the bullet of late-term abortion. I don't, so this isn't obvious to me). This is because we don't make decisions 'in the round' or 'stepping back'. We make them on the actual facts (i.e how far along is this fetus at hte time the abortion has been proposed).

then you need a very robust "theory of error" to explain how it's the case that thousands of skilled philosophers think otherwise, — J

Not at all. Their output makes vaguely more sense - which is not enough to shift the burden on to me. They provide no access to clarity - it's usually fairly pained interpolation, from what I see. Trying to rescue nonsense. If my response to those philosophers is the same (and aligns with basic psychosocial habits, imported into this field) as my response to the fundamental writings, then I need explain nought, but that this(being the above psychosocial habits mentioned) explains it (for me, obviously). A lot of people thought Mein Kampf was a great book.

I'd also point out that there are the same number, if not more philosophers, on the side of perhaps not taking Continentals that seriously, for the reasons I've given. I'm unsure that rejection of a modern turn on a millennia old practice requires much explanation, beyond "Well, you're doing something else, now".

I believe I've missed a joke.

Neither of these apply to your title. You're welcome.

hat I've learned from this conversation: — ucarr

Is, unfortunately, that flowery language intended to refer to proper concepts and ideas, lacking wholly in substance, will be argued for ad infinitum in the face of clear evidence of hte above. Politeness apparently does not help in this endeavour, nor does direct application of rationality and reason. Trying to figure out someone's ideas when their language is purposefully ambiguous, contradictory and deceptive is probably a waste of time.

That's not true, at all. Men creating a zygote tethers them to a legal requirement that can be absolutely life-destroying for a man who did not intend the zygote to be created.
I don't think they should be off the hook, to be clear, but this is wrong.

The etymology of 'agnostic' leads directly to the definition i gave "Not-knowledge". A-gnostic. I hear what you're saying, but these are attempts to use language to get past the problems I'm putting forward. You can disagree with these definitions, if you want to, and go on the merry-go-round a few more times. And I'm not even knocking that - but you want to make an argument. So let's get to it...

to knowing about reality. — Hallucinogen

to not knowing. It's not a commitment anymore than thinking you could know is. And that's, essentially, present in all other takes (deism, theism, atheism). So, can't really argue with the premise, but the idea that this somehow weakens the position is not right on my view.

s such, defining agnostic in that way makes it unlike how agnostic is used in the broader sense, to not have a commitment to some belief. — Hallucinogen

This is how Atheism is used in the 'broader sense'. This is quite well-established by the multitude of arguments about it between the leading theists and atheists from the late 90s to today. 'misuse' of the words, according to those who adopt them, is the central problem in discussions of this sort. I am trying my best to avoid the ambiguity you find to be helpful here. I realise several pages of several threads have gone over this in the last year, and I stand by my takes with full confidence there. The words need to be clear, and there is a clear, non-overlapping way to use them without ambiguity. The etymology would lend itself to those uses.

What I was asking you is — Hallucinogen

I answered what you asked. What you've said here is just a slightly more elaborate version of hte same question. Your conception of 'theism' is wrong, on my account, and doesn't capture what 'theism' represents. It would also capture deism. So, if hte entity you're talking about is something more akin to the 'New Age' conceptions - "the force of love", "the creative power of hte universe" etc... It is, definitionally, eternal and all-powerful, but is not at all theistic. So, there's no contradiction here that I'm able to ascertain.

An omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity is either inherently theistic or not, why would it be unlikely that an atheist would believe in such? — Hallucinogen

The bold doesn't bear on the non-bold here, at all, in any way. The reason an atheist is hardly taken to believe in a deistic God (of some kind - make it super-vague if that helps) is that an atheist is far more likely to be thinking rationally and wanting evidence instead of settling for an inference in comparison to a theist, or deist who (as I understand) must be making a rather large leap to their conclusion, no matter how far rationality got them. And that's all that can support deistic or theistic beliefs, imo (well, I say inference - I do also mean 'inference from intuition' or something similar - one's deeply-felt passions can infer something is hte case, but only infer on no other evidence).

Unfortunately, I am always left with a really sour taste upon being handed anything that comes with a 'you have to wait until you click with it' type of disclaimer.
I find the relatively standard Continentals, all, plus Haabermas, who have been mentioned in the last page, not only unclear in terms of writing (i find that fairly easy to get through) but totally unclear as to what's actually being posited or 'argued for' in a lot of cases. Hegel being a pretty notable exception, I mainly just conclude that most of his more fundamental ideas are rubbish.

Maybe i've not given it enough time - but it seems to me that "You just don't get it yet" is the underlying notion here, which also tends to come when you don't like th same music as someone else :P

Doesn't make sense. Atheism is the denial or lack of belief in the existence of God. Deism is belief in God that doesn't intervene — Hallucinogen

No, not quite. Deism is belief in a pervasive force of creation. Some resort to the Gaia version of this when they want to personalize it, but it has not personality, the way a 'God' does.\\\

That's agnosticism. — Hallucinogen

No. This has been gone over so many times, it's really disappointing that you're throwing this line out. Agnosticism is the position that we can't know whether or not God exists. Atheism is the abstinence from belief in a God or Gods. Atheism is more of a non-position. This might be why what you're saying makes little sense, as it may not applicable to the terms you're using.

Do you think you can be an atheist and believe in an omnipotent and eternal non-contingent entity? — Hallucinogen

If it's not a theistic one, then by the lack of definitional restriction, yes, you could. Seems highly unlikely, but sure. But, given your take on atheism and deism, it seems perhaps you want to define it out, on your terms. Fine. Doesn't work for me, in those terms.

"Objects of experience" or 'aspects of understanding or judgement'? Perhaps an example or two would be helpful. — Janus

I suppose that just depends on what way you're comfortable presenting hte notion. I mean to say that there are things that exist outside of minds, and things that exist only within minds. Something like an 'intention' or numbers, or the complex network of inter-related memories and partial memories that create a specific state of mind... Things that can't be pointed to, in any way, basically. I think it's completely coherent to say that these things are real, in the way Banno uses the word a few posts ago, and that they do not 'exist' in the way something would want to exist while not being experienced by consciousness.

though I might say that morality defined thusly (or perhaps very similarly) is the kind worth discussing. — Dan

Ok, bingo. Thank you (no impugning - just that this answers me directly).

"big history" is a great enemy for the Libertarians among us hahaha.

do such people exist? — Shawn

Do you mean to ask whether there are members who have never posted? Seems like you've answered that one!

Personally, my issue with Stoicism is that 'when it fails', there's not a way to reason yourself back to it. It's a mental state. I think the tenets (moderation etc..) are laudable, but they are states of mind rather than goals that can be effectively aimed at, I don't think.
It can take years of practice to alter ones habitual responses to life's foibles. That said, I'm something of a stoic myself. Heuehuehu.

Indifference doesn't seem to me apt. Acceptance seems more reasonable. Indifference still amounts to some form of ignorance in the face of most challenges. Dispassionately attacked the problem seems a bit more apt, and I can't rightly call that indifference. My habits are mainly around creating psychological buffer zones. Nought else seems apt for this task.

I wasn’t aware that one needed to know and care if he was being treated morally. — NOS4A2

Now you are. Morality is strictly to do with how we treat one another. A Zygote is not a 'one another'. This is probably the only intuition of Banno's I think needs no defense. This just, as noted, leads to some hefty bullet-biting.

What facts are vague? I ask because we actually know a lot about zygotes. — NOS4A2

At what point the zygote becomes a 'person', or variably 'baby', 'a human' etc... etc... These are the 'facts' on which most people's positions rely(i have excluded those absolutist positions that are doctrinaire rather than reasoned) and they aren't stable or lets say 'complete' enough to objectively inform us of anything within that grey area as to why we would place the flag 'there'. Yes, we know a lot about zygotes and their development, but which way-point would you choose? It sounds like for you it's conception. Others might be implantation, heartbeat, viability, pain reception among others. But none of these are hard-and-fast in terms of telling us when a 'person' comes into being (or, when that might be morally relevant). I can only really understand taking conception to be the salient point if one is to be, lets say, overly cautious, because of the above indeterminacies. If you're not copping to that, I'm unsure how to make sense of it. But this doesn't seem to me a moral question, anyway. It's similar to saying "well, I can't figure out the precise moral facts, so I'll give it a wide berth". I can't see a real problem in that, other than tryig to make others assent (which you're not doing, so that's fine).

In fairness, 'interesting' has no moral valence. It is interesting, historically speaking. But this is a digression. I would just have made this point to uCarr to make it clear he is using terms in a way no one else would in these contexts.

Every single one of you were zygotes. Luckily no one treated you with such disregard. — NOS4A2

We wouldn't know, or care. That's not a moral consideration.

The vagueness of the terms used to describe it and the arbitrariness of the acceptable time to kill indicate this. This is because the position lends itself to incoherence. — NOS4A2

None of this is the case, and the quote you responded to points each out. There is no incoherence. There's just potentially uncomfortable bullet biting.
THe 'vagueness' of the terms doesn't exist. The facts are vague. The terms refer to them. This is no point at which a zygote 'becomes a person'. It does not exist. It occurs somewhere in the grey area and any position has to choose an arbitrary point here if that's what the view is based on.
(though, its very, very much worth noting that 'arbitrary' is not apt here. There are reasons which very much restrict what's acceptable on most views except absolutists ones (i.e killing an infant is also fine, or there is no form of contraception which is acceptable).

Conceptual analysis would be useful if it produces clarity, and it is arguable that clarity should help us to live better than confusion. — Janus

See my comment a couple above yours (assume you have, just using a figure of speech).

Clarity seems to be the biggest difference between the two 'camps'.

Hmm. I see. So, ethics must be a bi-directional consideration (i.e if we are to act, only acts related to other moral actors matter?) Novel - and I'm sympathetic.

This is my premise — ucarr

It isn't a premise. Once again, you do not know the words you are using.

blooming creation leads to sensory overload for human unless he filters out, morally speaking, what's excess beyond what his brain can handle — ucarr

This is senseless. It literally does not mean anything of value to the conversation. It's a claim, across three non-related concepts ('creation', 'sensory overload' and 'morality'). You have not adequate made sense. I'm not sure what else to say - it's not that I disagree; it literally does not make sense and I'm find it really hard not to think you're simply ignoring this so as to not necessarily admit you're waffling (there is precisely nothing wrong with waffling, if you are clear that this is the intention - but even after asking you several times you cannot even distill a point in your claims).

I know my sampled reality is a sham replica standing in for the actual state of affairs of the world, but its the best that I can do in the way of acknowledgement, so I'll stay the course of my jury-rigged reality with as much integrity as I can muster. — ucarr

What are you talking about? You are just constantly saying wildly divergent things with no connection whatever to your substantial points, again, misusing words, violating categories and consistently refusing to be direct. What do you want to talk about????

cosmic logic — ucarr

Again what are you talking about? COSMIC logic? This is profoundly unphilosophical.

I very, very much appreciate your candor and respect through the exchange - I have tried my best to be (personally) gentle, if conceptually rough. So, I really appreciate that.

AmadeusD, I know I have a better chance of winning the lottery than persuading you with anything I write. — ucarr

My dear, dear uCarr, this is not in any way a problem from me. You are entirely failing to make any sense. There is a reason we're not following you well, and it is not our comprehension of stubbornness. I've now, over several days dedicated more than two hours of my time to respond to your posts. I am clearly looking for something substantial, and to suggest otherwise as you are here indicates some sort of dishonesty on your part. Perhaps trying to avoid the charge of making no sense?

IN any case, I also look forward to further! THank you :)

LOL.
I think I'm still curious as to why you, Banno, think there's such a stark ethical difference between the embryo and the person (i assume you're using the concept - not a person of some example that could be given). I agree, but I don't see why it's being put forward as somehow inarguable. Both positions rely on intuition. You say 'apparent', but obviously not to all. So, curious. We certainly agree, even in detail, on what ought be done here from different principles.

If you'd steelman the position, we could avoid these diversions. — Hanover

Not sure what you're asking, or what 'diversion' you're pointing at? What position are you wanting steelmanned? I haven't given 'a position'. I've solved hte problem of identifying a heap. And its not even interesting. Onward...

You can't see how ridiculous it is to say that you agree that it is relevant, but insist that it must be objectively relevant? — Banno

Well, that isn't what i've said. Your position seems to assume not exactly that it must but that it is and that anyone holding those values in, lets say, a different order (hierarchically) is morally suspect. That's just like.. your opinion, man. I'm sure you don't actually disagree (as your question seems to indicate). But, you're acting as if it is objectively relevant. It's just the top of your hierarchy (and mine, coincidentally. But hte only reason I'm pointing to our agreements in this is to avoid your less charitable replies because you can't bring yourself to understand disagreement very well).

Don't discount your view about how you want things to be. — Banno

Definitely. That's not what's an odds, in my little comment. With some small differences, we likely want things to be roughly similar in this regard. Though, I find it quite painful to center myself when thinking about how others 'ought' to be.

Those who think the worth of a bag of cells outweighs that of an adult human are wrong. — Banno

"On my view" would do you a world of good. But, i hear your point and it explains you well. No sarcasm or anything else, there. It's good. Though, this does make me want to ask - surely you're aware that 'the worth of' the two things isn't relevant if you're making decisions on principle (deontologically) alone. I take it those who use the 'sanctity of life' arguments without divinity are on that ground.

I say they are wrong. You and ↪AmadeusD apparently agree, but refuse to put it in those terms. — Banno

Correct. I agree that God people are wrong to believe in their God and the surrounding commitments. But that's not a moral statement, is it? Where I would say, if I held the view "abortion is wrong" its a moral statement.

Even if they were the same, an identity is not empty, nor is it a contradiction. — ucarr

This shows me clearly you are not on the ball. THe are two separate objections, based on the two possible avenues you could claim to be running in. Neither actually works for you, and hte above once again, runs the two together which is exactly what I am pointing out causes a contradiction. So, you're doubling down on 1) denying the contradiction, and 2) adhering to the contradictory form. As before, bizarre.

two different parts of a unified whole — ucarr

No. As also already pointed out, point-blank, without wiggle room - one is the whole is one is a part of that whole. So, again(getting tired of this), you aren't understanding your own claims sufficiently to present them.

Love and War are two sets, both of which contain marriage, home, family and community as members. The members are doubled by symmetry across two countries. — ucarr

I can, somewhat, get on board with the initial conception here, but the underlined is a total non sequitur and doesn't do anything for us. Countries aren't 'real' in the sense needed to divide or inform an abstract 'set' as you want to be doing. That said, I reject the conception of those sets. Your formulations make no sense to me, provide no criteria and are just picking out random, badly-defined (and, in your world, completely stretched, unrecognizable) terms. So, even if you're going to invoke language-use to support some of these readings (acknowledging when you get to it, your argument might be interesting) no one but you, it would seem, could assent to what you're trying to say. This explains why It isn't making any sense, and is almost impossible to follow. The fact I still have this question:

What are you wanting to talk about here?

Tells me you're being insufficient in your attempt to present whatever it is. You're genuinely waffling through most of these replies and I hope there's a point inhere somewhere, as I've now spent much time trying to point out what appears to me intractable issues in what you're doing. Can you perhaps only try to answer that singular question above? It is still not in any way clear what you want to talk about. The closest I can get is statements like this:

The lack of restraint about events and outcomes in the non-living world becomes charged with emotional and, later, moral value when events and outcomes are perceived by sentients. — ucarr

But this is both counter to reality, presupposes several moral 'facts' which I would contend don't, and can't exist, and wants a transitive relation between moral agents and pre-existing states of affairs. This cannot be so. What moral agents do in light of states of affairs can. Those states, however, have no moral charge, worth or indication. They cannot. They are not moral.

And again, the motivation of those who claim that the bag of cells has such value that it must be privileged above the woman carrying it are suspect. They overwhelmingly tend to hold these views becasue they wish to remain in agreement with their invisible friend. They hypocritically support capital punishment. They refuse to provide for the needs of the economically disadvantaged, who are the very people most at risk. They exhibit misogyny and authoritarianism. These facts are supported by repeated demographic studies. — Banno

Are you entirely sure hte move you want to make is to talk about hte aggregate of the vulgar, rather than the arguments actually at hand? I don't disagree with you at all, regardless of the studies - they seem the only arguments that one can rely on for that position to me too. But, I'm not seeing any of htem in this thread, I guess. And once again, I'll point out:

the interests and preferences of the person carrying are much more apparent than those of the zygot or cyst or foetus — Banno

Isn't objectively relevant. I agree that it's relevant, but that's because I agree that its relevant. If I didn't, it wouldn't. And in that situation, there's no real 'argument'. They are two intuitions butting heads, surely.

In reverse:

That wont solve the problem of disagreement, which is, in fact, the problem (i.e not having a precise point to rely on isn't a problem, if we were all to accept the grey area is "up to her" as it were). Arguments (and murders) about abortion in the grey area will still occur.

If you have a heap of rice consisting of 10,000,000 grains, you're not properly approaching hte problem.

If you have a heap of eight grains of rice, the proper point at which is becomes a heap, is when at least one grain is no longer on the surface, and is entirely supported by other grains. It is that grain that you're looking for. Not all sorities can be resolved in this way, certainly. But this one can, and I knew it would be example :P

the Sorites paradox — Michael

Just a random note on this: You can find criteria for a heap.

n order to continue your attack, you have to attack my defense quoted above. You have to show why my thesis is still contradictory, even in light of my defense. — ucarr

I've already directly responded to it. Having shown, by pure juxtaposition, that your two claims are either empty, as they are the same claim, or literally contradict one another, I need do nothing else.

Philosophers who are arguing for direct realism are not always at odds with the science. The comment is directed at those hereabouts insisting that they are. — Banno

Yes, fair. I think that's what I'm groking from your directions (plus some further digging). It doesn't quite shift my position though, as that wasn't quite the motivator for it in the way it seems to be for Michael (although, I'm quite sympathetic there). I don't need direct realists to be in conflict with the science for my position to hold philosophically, I don't think. But it helps, where I can use it.


:up: It is, at this point, feeling that way

I think part of the problem is that some here think that "I see a tree" and "I directly see a tree" mean the same thing, when in fact the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see". — Michael

Yeah. I think it fairly clear (and this from canvassing hte use of 'direct' in all contexts I'm aware of it's usage in) that using 'direct' to cover a literally indirect method of access (we can invoke the Shadow idea, on top of pretending we're Direct Realists proper to illustrate why this is so) is not helpful. But, if the case is such that this means its a 'misuse for a better cause' as it were, and resolves teh problem by accepting this 'indirectness' but not admitting it separates us from the world... fine.

A man is a person who so declares himself to be and a person is who society declares them to be. — Hanover

Do we really want to leave such a social institution to the (let's be honest) whims of a particular class of people who share a political bent? I'm not sure this makes for any good. That may not be quite what you're saying, in that post, though.

There's no such thing as the essence of personhood — Michael

I think this is intimately tied with (as if this is novel, lol) this:

what a human is depends on how we use the word "human", and how we use the word "human" is a contingent fact about the English language, open to change. — Michael

However, a plain reading would intimate there are two things being talked about here. That there can be a 'person' without being a human - something another poster (forgive me for not recalling) bit the bullet on (Echarmion perhaps?) and was willing to call Whales, Dolphins and some speculative others 'persons' without invoking 'human'
This would probably solve the intercessions I'm seeing between people's usage of these words.

Next, we need to understand what in the world we want the words to pick out. 'Human' could be pretty easy, without giving us the discomfort of 'killing humans' because in that phrase, 'humans' includes 'persons'. It shouldn't, to make the moral conversation clearer and easier to digest. So 'human' could easily be some "being which is alive and is constituted from human DNA" (this would capture clones, too).

If, by 'person', we want something like Banno's way of thinking - that there are psychological criteria which can either be met, or not met, then a 'person' could be quite easy to distinguish (perhaps not to test, though) among humans. But finding criteria, re: gestation, as to when a 'human' becomes a 'person' is almost sure to give us those discomforts avoided above - as noted elsewhere, it would mean an infant could be readily killed in service of the greater good (lets say, financially) for the 'persons' involved in the decision.
But, clearly, this just leads to the stupidity of hte entire attempt to cohere views: We just feel differently. No criteria are good enough to shift someone's moral conviction about an act. The language can't help. Banno probably can't conceive genuinely thinking the 'rights' of a fetus could outweight those of an adult woman (i happen to agree, but can conceive otherwise) - NOS (or others) probably can't conceive how anything could outweight an 'innocent life' (notice there's no 'human' or 'person' here - but it means not killing any animals, ever, for any reason, as they aren't moral agents).

So why are we trying?

There are many obvious facts of human life that are pre-science. There are also newer scientific facts. How do you purport to know what way I supposedly want these facts to "fall prey" to philosophy whatever that is even supposed to mean? — Janus

Can’t see how. Science is a method not an institution, in my sentence. “Upon investigation” might be a better term there and I misspoke. But in any case, ignoring that problem, I can’t make sense of what I said now anyway in relation to your post that I replied to. Sorry about that

Are you saying that philosophy is obvious and science is not? And that philosophy’s role is subservient to the facts that science discovers? — Joshs

No, not quite. But clearly philosophy about “things” that doesn’t adhere to the facts as science finds them (perhaps I mean “which does not obey the laws of nature” can’t be of much use. Philosophy needs to deal with the same facts science provides, I guess, to be helpful to humans who cannot but obey them. Pretty new thought so it might simply be crap

Sure LOL. The weirdness I find so interesting there, would be - can the clone be 'more aged' than the (eventual) person from which the clone came? That's very interesting, if it's possible.
There's no weirdness like that with the skin cell.

I think the best philosophies are those which are most in accordance with the facts of human life. — Janus

Most 'facts' of human life are not obvious enough to fall prey to philosophy, in the way you want. Surely, philosophy's main role (at least now, post-religion) is to investigate the 'facts of life' as found by science, say.

I've underlined the first sentence in your quote directly above. It's the gist of your argument for refuting my two quoted statements at the top. — ucarr

It is not an argument. Your phrase contradicts itself. I've had to say nothing at all. Simply quote you. It's getting really boring working through your misunderstandings.

As you can see, by my definition of Love and War, marriage, home, family and community are directly linked to Love and War. — ucarr

Bizarre mate. Not my circus.

making the same claim about each statement, namely that they are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences is not a contradiction because the two claims, in actuality, are about the same thing — ucarr

They are not. Are you even paying attention?

the attributes of two parts of one unit — ucarr

No, they are not. One is talking about hte 'unit' and one is talking about a discreet part of hte Unit. They are not analogous, and cannot be read-between. In some cases, the same will be able to be said about those disparate things, for other reasons. Something being 'robust' could be true of both options, for instance.

ere is a unit articulated into two parts — ucarr

And so they are contradictory. Two parts. Not one. Two. They cannot maintain the same role in your position. This is plain.

are not contradictory. — ucarr

They are, though and you did not show otherwise, in any way. Your specific use is what's making htem contradict one another. Not their inherent properties. As noted, its possible to refer to disparate, but related objects, with the same atrributes - but you cannot assign an attribute of totality, to a part of that which is 'total'. "Love and War" cannot be referred to in the same way as whatever parochial elements your shoehorning into that phrase. Attributes of the whole cannot also be assigned to their parts, because they are literally different things.

Its the combination of the two parts that refutes your ascription of contradiction because contradictions cannot combine. — ucarr

No, it supports it. Abysmal work.

By my definition, Love and War both include: marriage, home, family, community. If this is true, then they can't be contradictory when defined as I've defined them. — ucarr

That is contradictory, already. If both are defined in the same way, they are the same thing and cannot be spoken about as in contrast (which you are doing - this is why your use is what's causing the contradiction). I get the feeling you're trying to do this on the fly, rather than having fleshed anything out before having to meet these objections.

Can you show that, during WW2, it was not the case that there were married couples, homes, families and communities in both America and Germany? An example supporting your argument would have to show that in one country there were marriages, homes, families and communities whereas in the other country there were anti-marriages, anti-homes, anti-families and anti-communities. — ucarr

Sorry, but this is irrelevant and absolute nonsense. Nothing here has anything whatsosever to do with my objection. You seem to not be able to understand the really basic tenets being discussed. You refuse to define your terms, you refuse to acknowledge the shortcomings of whatever it is you're trying to say, and you don't even have a clear, coherent point to make. Its really, really difficult to keep interacting with something tha tis just a mess.

I appreciate this, but this misunderstands what the 'objection' is trying to do. Disagree, as you have, for sure.
But It is no help to simply say science takes one view, and philosophy takes another, though this is obviously true. In discussion, trying to make them cohere seems a reasonable thing to try to do. That said, it probably doesn't butter any bread for what you're saying, just seemed worth noting.

As regards the SEP article, that conclusion on follows if you accept the writer's positions. If you refer to 3.3.1 of that page, it seems pretty clear that what's being done is recasting the indirect realist in a way that it can be subsumed under an extended version of 'direct realism'. I don't really have a problem with this. It allows for what (I think, anyway) my position is and I'd claim indirect realism of some form.

That said, if this page is read in conjunction with the Sense Data page several issues presented actually somewhat fall away. For instance, where it treats Robinson's more recent takes on Sense Data, none of the objections go through: The empirical fact that light takes X time to reach us from objects which no longer exist can't be beaten in the way a lot of 'indirect' perceptual takes can be. There's no philosophical fanangaling which can make a star exist at the time the light reaches our eyes without seriously altering the definition 'exist' (or, importantly, that can make colour inhere in the surface of an object. There simply is nothing but intuition to this). The conclusion is quite telling, in contrast to the one you've quoted:

"Finally, although treatment of color as a primitive property that literally inheres in sense data (whether such data are considered to be surface portions, mental objects, or third things) is not widely favored, it is also true that, metaphysically, there is no settled home for phenomenally experienced color. The endeavor to account for the phenomenal characteristics of objects and their properties is ongoing."

This either contradicts, in some indirect way, that conclusion that there's no longer a debate between the two views (because, indeterminate) or it requires that we're talking about both positions within a concept that can include both. And that may be something more akin to a language problem, the way you seem fairly committed to. However, the conclusion above makes it quite clear: there is no theory which accounts for experience from objects without pretending our perceptual systems aren't as tehy are. Hence, the dichotomy between the scientific, and philosophically-inclined versions of hte discussion. Luckily, neither page gives any logical conclusion on the positions. Rather, several and IBE's it's way to something of a consensus. All very well.

To me it’s no weirder to say that a skin cell is a human than it is to say a fertilized egg is a human. — praxis

I think, for me, the problem is that a skin cell comes from a 'living human', but a Zygote hasn't reached that stage. What are you cloning? Obviously, they're the exact same process genetically, but practically speaking, cloning a Zygote is extremely weird given we have no 'person' to which the 'clone' could be subsequent at that point.
With the skin cell, we do. Point not missed, just found this interesting.

the scope of 'what is real' far exceeds the scope of 'what exists'. — Wayfarer

I have to say, this is entirely intelligible to me and (linguistically) solves a problem I've had for some time - there are clearly non-physical objects of experience. They are real, but do not exist. Thank you for clearing this up for me so succinctly.

I have to say, looking at the writers who are considered under each head, its clear that one camp is after clarity and the other is not. That seems the most obvious difference.
When Satre can be (colloquially) counted amount your group, you've got problems.

In the above quote you make a claim about my statement. Can you show that my statement is a contradiction? — ucarr

It is self evident. See:

I think love and war are two broad categories that encompass most of the important experiences humans have — ucarr

Is in contradiction to the very next phrase:

Likewise, marriage, home, family and community are broadly inclusive of the important human experiences. — ucarr

You cannot have both stand in the same symbolic role. They are contradictory (though, admittedly, indirectly so).

This would be an argument supporting your claim. — ucarr

It wouldn't. But this has become relatively par-for-course in this exchange. The above is not an argument. Its literally highlighting what you've said. There is no further being imparted than your own words. You seem to misunderstand a lot of words you're using...

it invalidates your logic with an alternative interpretation establishing my example as a counter-example: — ucarr

No, it doesn't. It doesn't even brush up against an attempt to do so. It's waffle. Sorry to say. My position (in that regard) does not involve counter-examples of anything. There was no example to begin with. Again, totally misunderstanding words you're using. UNless you're suggesting you have provided a counter-example to your own example? I can't see how that helps though, as the example was irrelevant and did nothing to support your cliam. I see you've now simply turned that onus on me. Extremely poor form. All i need is your own words, so I can meet the challenge, but this is backward.

Fair enough - very much respect that. Thank you!

As I've already stated, love and war are both about marriage, home, family and community. They share a large region of common ground — ucarr

No they don't. I've been explicitly clear that this is simply not hte case, and so none of your arguments, supposing this, can go through.

There is, sorry to say, not a lot of substance in anything you're saying here. For instance:

They stand apart on the issue of their approach to fellowship; love does nog partition fellowship; war partitions fellowship into good and evil, with both sides demonizing the other. — ucarr

This is muddled, nonsensical, rambling attempts at bringing yourself into some kind of focus after failing to make any consistent claim. I am sorry uCarr, but there is nothing to be responded to, other than pointing out the massive inconsistencies, inaccuracies and parochial claims being made.