Is that, like, yes, both? — bongo fury
No. As explained, I am saying that a 'self' and an 'original work of art' are not comparable on a
conceptual level, regardless of what might or might not be criteria for each. I then detailed why the criteria aren't related, so they can't be compared (imo). I hope that's clearer..
but evidently you don't bother read through? — bongo fury
No idea what you're referring to. Everything I've said is relevant and seems pertinent at the time I commented it.
Ok, and you don't think the same is true of personal identity? — bongo fury
No, and I don't think you do either. There's nothing that contains 'Napoleon' unless we make assumptions as between bodies and minds. The teletransporter shows this clearly, as it isn't 'your' body on the other side, and its obviously not 'your' mind. But it is hte 'mind of you', so we need to figure out where 'Napoleon' the
person exists. It is clearly not in the body, and we don't know what a mind is. So... we're a bit stuck. That's not the case with the piece of art. If you're simply stipulating that, for you, a 'self' is, in fact, a confluence of mind and body in a single, recognizable-over-time entity, that's fine. I just don't think, (and it seems the discussion over a century has found this) that will hold up to many counterexamples.
We have to establish criteria beyond that? I don't follow. — bongo fury
In what does a 'self' consist? This is the central, clearly-still-in-the-air, crux of this and other considerations. If we already knew, point blank, what a 'self' was, the thought experiment could only possibly tell us whether we were happy a clone was wandering about after we die. But that's not how it runs.
ou wouldn't seek to convince me I was deluded by pointing to evidence of provenance contradicting my claim of bodily continuity with Napoleon? By asking me to reconcile that claim with historical evidence of my more recent birth in South London, e.g., etc? — bongo fury
This leapfrogs the question. This is absurd, if your conception of a self is as above. But that concpetion, generally, isn't satisfying when run through these thought experiments. I highly recommend reading Reasons and Persons if you've not. This position is relatively well deconstructed and made obviously unfulfilling or unhelpful beyond describing a widely-held intuition in clear terms.
Given the above, the answer is no, that makes less sense now, but I understand more why you're saying it
:)
It's the premise of the OP. — Patterner
The OP vaguely mentions that its 'like star trek'. This thought experiment is from Derek Parfit. Including the problematic versions.
I don't think there's any need for the thread if the person walking out on Mars does NOT think he's me. — Patterner
You seem to have crucially missed, or reversed, the key that makes this senseless: It doesn't matter what
he thinks. What do
you think? You already know the guy is a 'replica' in the colloquial sense. You knew that before you went in. For you, the you who in real-life knows you have no clones running around - is that an acceptable 'you'? For me, there wasn't a 'me' to be continued, so I don't really need to decide. But its key that person B's opinion is irrelevant. They have been given an artificial worldview, basically. Born at 34 (or whatever age).
and is indistinguishable from me — Patterner
This isn't quite true, once the person is aware they are on Mars. They now have a different set of memories (though, almost identical) to you. And that will just continue to diverge as time goes on. Even arguments that get a 'self' out of the transporter can only maintain it for a literal instant.
If the original is not destroyed, then the copy is more obviously not the original, regardless of how these things are defined. — Patterner
No, not quite. This was run by Parfit and called the branch-line case where identity is considered to be 1:
x rather than 1:1. There's no reason, unless you take a soul, to assume this person isn't you. They are
exactly the same at the instant they appear (again, beyond this, fail, due to the above). If they have literally the exact same everything, including psychology then there's just two of you. The source and biography are exactly the same. You walked into the machine. They walked into the machine. All is well.
I still reject this, because I think either there are two 'you's, which means one cannot be identical with the other (there are two... its not possible) or there is no self to continue, so 'you' didn't even exist to begin with. It just seems everyone has an underlying assumption about what 'self' is and it exactly this, and in what it consists, that we're trying to drill down on with the thought experiment.
If the idea is this guy, B is 'not you' in the "different atoms" sense, then you must feel it is your bod which continues your self. That is highly unsatisfactory to me. If your mind was in my body, it wouldn't be 'me' in the sense you seem to be getting at (apologies if I'm misunderstanding your version of 'self').
My self is the experience of this body, with these senses; this brain, with these memories; etc. The continuity of self is due to the memories. — Patterner
But this would make B obviously and inarguably you, at the instant they appeared?
How do I know that, if my atoms are separated, I no longer exist? — Patterner
Based on the above, obviously you don't exist. You have no memory or experience and there's no continuity.
This is a genuine question, are you just working through these intuitions as we go?
I suggest if it were this simple, the answer would be quite obvious: Many people can be you. B is you, and you are you. Does this not seem unsatisfactory to you?
I think there is a difference between two things being identical and two things being the exact same thing. — Patterner
That's true, but this is, I think, about what Identity
actually is. My response to this initially was always to move to your 'exact same thing' and reject that B
could be me, on any conception other than a Soul being sent through space. I think this sidesteps the question though. Even if
exactly me is hte only 'me' in the intuitive sense, there is no reason to think that two people can have that exact same experience. Is that identity? Yeah, shaky to me too, but its worth considering beyond resiling into the 'exact same' version imo. Technically, 'identity' means we can't have two, and they be the same. The issue is that a 'self' may not operate as a object does and could violate that.