I was unable to read your article, unfortunately. You claim that value cannot be quantified, but the question arises: why should value be quantified or ranked in the first place? If the goal is to choose the least of evils, this approach is known as utilitarianism. Are you criticizing utilitarianism?

Theoretically, if objects were seen as having consciousness it could be argued that they need to be treated with greater respect. — Jack Cummins

Dogs clearly have consciousness and even will, as they can follow human commands, sometimes against their own desires, as some studies have shown. However, people who consume animal meat, for example, rarely consider or respect the consciousness of animals. If we often disregard the consciousness of animals for practical purposes, what are the chances that we would respect the hypothetical consciousness of rocks or other objects?

He argued that, in a crowd, the individual loses his personal identity and becomes a single collective psyche. We later see these ideas developed by Freud and Jung. — Alonsoaceves

Not only that. This judgment is more like the later work "The Psychology of the Masses." I even recommend reading the first work, "The Psychology of the People."

First of all, I want to say that I was not impressed by the approach of the author you cited. "Realism vs. idealism” in their presentation is a mixture of ontology and epistemology, while phenomenology and existentialism, in principle, work on a different plane.In my opinion, this classification of ontological approaches was obviously carried out by the author for educational purposes. For me, as the author of the topic, it does not matter where the lovers of classification will place me. Creating something new is a process of going beyond any existing classifications, at least I want to believe in it.

As for your comments:

Husserl's phenomenology is certainly that of ontological idealism, where any belief in the world's independent existence is put aside to focus on human experiences. — RussellA

Heidegger's Dasein is also about ontological Idealism. It is about "being-in-the-world", in that we are not detached observers of the world but embedded in our experiences. — RussellA

The text you provided says:

...Although insofar as Neo-Kantianism was a reaction mainly to absolute idealism it could not entirely reject epistemological arguments of the kind that had traditionally led to idealism, especially in its Kantian variety. Hence idealistic tendencies can be found in Neo-Kantianism too, and Martin Heidegger’s later version of realism can be interpreted as a response to the idealism in Neo-Kantianism....

....In so-called “continental” philosophy, we might suggest, the main alternative to the idealism of the nineteenth century and lingering tendencies to idealism in both Neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology has not been any straightforward form of realism, but rather the “life philosophy” (Lebensphilosophie) pioneered by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1916), then extensively developed by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and, without Heidegger’s political baggage, by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961).... https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

In my opinion, this is written quite accurately and agrees with the comment:

Heidegger’s Idealism puts into question the priority of mind, reason and consciousness, associating all of these with the Cartesian subject, which is still operative in Kant and Hegel. Dasein is more radically in the world than any notion of a conscious subjectivity perceiving objects can convey. — Joshs

In my opinion, we have gone too far, wandering in all sorts of classifications or approaches. Before you is the text of my work. Did you like it or not like it? What do you agree or disagree with? Destroy my arguments or approve them. My text is here precisely for this

There are two distinct lines of enquiry, the ontology of being within a Realist framework and the ontology of being within an Idealist framework. — RussellA

Provide a link to the person who made this classification and where you can read more about it

I was just wondering how we can approach the ontology of being, something that is external to our language and thoughts, without using language or thoughts. — RussellA

The question of how to approach the ontology of being that which exists beyond language and thought—is a central one in philosophy, since language and thought inevitably shape our perception of reality. However, a number of philosophical traditions, both Western and Eastern, suggest that being can be accessed through direct experience that transcends conceptual and linguistic structures.

In the West, phenomenology, developed by Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, offers ways of understanding being through intuitive, pre-reflective awareness. Husserl, for example, proposed the method of epoche the suspension of judgments about the world in order to focus on pure phenomenal experience. Heidegger, for his part, in Being and Time emphasized the importance of Dasein (being-in-the-world) as the way in which being is revealed in immediate experience rather than through abstract reflection. Kierkegaard emphasized the existential leap of faith that takes one beyond rational analysis to the authentic experience of existence.

In the East, similar ideas can be found in Buddhism and Taoism, which emphasize overcoming dualistic thinking and linguistic categories to achieve direct contact with reality. In Buddhism, especially Zen, meditation practices are aimed at achieving a state of "emptiness" (shunyata), where conceptual differences between subject and object disappear, allowing one to experience being in its purity. Taoism, through the teachings of Lao Tzu, offers the concept of Tao as the unnameable basis of being, which is comprehended not through words or thoughts, but through intuitive adherence to the natural order of things. These traditions converge in the belief that language and thought, although powerful tools, limit our understanding of being, and that only through practices that go beyond them—whether phenomenological contemplation or meditative absorption—can one approach the true ontology of being.

In my opinion, the consensus that red is red for everyone is sufficient for everyday life. Let's look at the consequences: (although this seems a bit pragmatic), but based on the fact that green usually has a calming effect, while red has a somewhat stimulating effect on everyone, including, for example, insects, we can safely assume that red is equally red for everyone.


For example:
Elliot, A. J., & Maier, M. A. (2007). Color and psychological functioning: The effect of red on performance attainment. Psychological Science
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17324089/#:~:text=Red%20is%20hypothesized%20to%20impair,outside%20of%20participants'%20conscious%20awareness

Both are valid concerns, but I'm more inclined to focus on how our predictability is being exploited. I'm not saying social physics isn't useful, but I'd prefer to see applications that go beyond profiting from our behavior. — Alonsoaceves

Is state activity itself a form of profit? Is creating harmony in society a privilege reserved for the elites? However, it is through technology that today's state management takes place. There are remarkable works such as Le Bon's "The Psychology of the Crowd" and Lippmann's "Public Opinion." These two books have played a significant role in shaping our understanding of public opinion management.

"Oh, gentlemen, what kind of free will is there in arithmetic, when only twice two makes four? Twice two will make four without my will. That's what free will is." (Dostoevsky)

Let's say I enjoy tickling a pebble. But will that stop a person from grinding a thousand cute pebbles into powder to obtain a chip for an iPhone?

What would change in our way of being if we were to think of things as possessing consciousness?

Thank you for the excellent essay! I'm so glad to read a contemporary author who doesn't succumb to the trendy currents that proclaim the "death of the subject," which is typical of movements like Object-Oriented Ontologies or Meillassoux's correlationism. On the contrary, you defend the subject, and I completely agree with your position.

It seems to me that today, the subject has become an incredibly fragile construct that is frequently under attack, and therefore, it needs philosophical protection now more than ever.

In this regard, I have an idea I'd like to share. What if we were to view this historical path not as a change of participants (subject-God-object in premodernity, then subject-object in modernity), but as a change in the methods of knowledge acquisition?

In premodernity, the primary method of knowledge was religion: knowledge was given through divine revelation.

In modernity, this method was discarded and replaced by objectivism—the belief in an independent reality knowable by reason. As Nietzsche said, "God is dead, and we have killed him."

Today, when we see the limitations of objectivism but can't return to religion, we find ourselves at an impasse. This is where radical ideas like the "cancellation" of the subject arise.

What are your thoughts on whether this view of the history of philosophy is justified?

To me this suggests that the human being ‘I am’ identifies themself as a being in the world, ‘I am that’. This informs the personality which reflects on what it is (It is that which it is). Which results in when that personality is acting in the world, it acts as a thing (that thing it realises it is)*. But this personality is its own interpretation of itself, so is never actually being itself. It is always its own idea of what itself is. It is always acting out (as if on stage), what it thinks it is, or would be. This means that what is experienced as the self is all the baggage from the past, being projected into the future. A future which is anticipated to be a continuation of what happened in the past. — Punshhh

This is very important. This is exactly what I am talking about at the start: Not "what I am," but "how I being." It is in this act that our above-mentioned reflections are realized: Substantia is not a noun. Being is not a noun. (which, in my opinion, is a given for languages that do not require a copula)

Is it possible to identify a process? Rather than identify, it is more accurate to compare. Compare, but not with a thing, but with a process.

Asking about "how I being?" we must have something as an example, an image, a template. In this way, one of the key signs of being (which I will propose later) is realized - involvement. That is, something can be itself only on the condition that there is something else or different, from which I deduce that any existence is impossible in a single instance, but is something exclusively in relation to another (Being together).

Based on this, the act of self-identification with something is meaningless. You can compare your process with another process, finding similarities or differences, but they are always different processes, separate processes, but interconnected processes

I had to make some simplifications to explain things to Russell.

How can you speculate about the ontology of being without using language or thought? — RussellA

This was the starting point for my article.

In no way — it’s all speculation, in the sense that any scientific postulate is, at its inception, a conceptual construct accepted without direct proof, but rather on the basis of its explanatory and predictive power. For example, the law of conservation of energy and momentum holds true in the overwhelming majority of observed cases, yet in certain quantum systems these laws are formulated differently or have limited applicability. The same applies to many fundamental notions of modern physics, including descriptions of particles and fields that cannot be directly perceived by our senses. If one assumes that the absence of direct verification renders a concept “nonfunctional,” then by that logic we would have to discard a substantial portion of theoretical science.

We simply ask: “What if it’s not at all the way we think it is?” — and then proceed to test the persuasiveness of the arguments for self-contradiction, falsifiability, and so forth, employing every known epistemological tool at our disposal.

I probably won’t surprise you by saying that I am neither a philosopher by profession nor by my initial education. Only now, after many years of working in my field, am I trying to earn a philosophy degree, seeking to substantiate my ontological intuitions, using this forum, among other things, as a tool for development. I am a lawyer, or more precisely, a specialist in legal proceedings (or, more broadly, a specialist in the process of law enforcement). Since my student days, when out of five hundred people in my cohort I was the only one who chose the direction of legal process rather than substantive law, I have always been more interested in how something works rather than what it is made of. Apparently, this inclination has unconsciously carried over into my philosophical pursuits.

It seems to me you are confining “being” to the realm of linguistic tokens and mental concepts, and therefore discussing only our representation of being, not being itself.

But philosophy has long asked whether there is an ontological reality — “what is” — that exists independently of language, mind, or concepts.

If you reduce being to a concept in the mind, you’ve already answered the question in advance: it exists only as a mental construct. That’s a legitimate position, but it’s not an inquiry into being — it’s an inquiry into thought.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology.

I have already told you above, and I will tell you again. I am not diminishing your reasoning, because it is correct within your paradigm. You are talking about epistemology, but I am talking about ontology.

Before talking about the dynamics of concepts, I’d like to clarify: what exactly do you mean by “being”? Do you equate it with the linguistic meaning of the word, or with a concept?

I believe that these findings have a direct impact on the things that we have discussed with you in other topics.

For example:

Then there's the added confusion around the word 'substance'. As you might know, 'substance' in philosophy means something quite different from 'substance' in everyday use. The philosophical term originated with the Latin translation of Aristotle's 'ouisia', which is much nearer in meaning to 'being' than to our word 'substance'. Essentially, for Aristotle, substance is the underlying reality that persists through change. A substance is a combination of matter (the potential to be something) and form (the actual, defining essence of that thing).The translation was actually 'substantia', meaning, that of which attributes can be predicated.

So the upshot of all of this, was that Western culture adopted this rather oxymoronic conception of 'spiritual substance' or 'thinking substance'. Whereas, the ability to manipulate analyse and exploit material substance, the main occupation of science and engineering, proceeded brilliantly. So when modern people talk about 'dualism', it is usually something like Cartesian dualism that they have in mind, even if they don't know any details of how that originated or really what it means, And besides, they will say, the idea of 'thinking substance', which they will equate with 'soul', is an outmoded concept. Everyone knows, they will say, that mind is what the brain does, the credo of scientific materialism. — Wayfarer

Some people ask, "What does your ontology give me?"

The answer is: EVERYTHING.

The way a person understands themselves, for starters.
If you reconsider the foundation on which everything is built, won't it change the superstructure?

Here's what the AI found on this issue in deep analysis mode:

Greek Ousia and the Verb "To Be" (Einai)
The origins of the philosophical tradition, as is well known, lie in Ancient Greece. Here, the central term for designating essence or substance was ousia (οὐσία). Its etymology is of crucial importance: it is derived from the present participle feminine ousa of the verb einai (εἶναι), meaning “to be” or “I am.” This direct grammatical connection between the philosophical concept of “what a thing is” and the act of “it is” constitutes a unique intellectual foundation.
This connection implies that the concept of ousia is not an external abstraction but is deeply rooted in the very act of being. The nominal form ousia (a noun) carries the active, dynamic force of the verb (action). This suggests that for Greek philosophers, the starting point for reflections on being was inseparable from its living manifestation. Aristotle employed ousia in his Categories, defining prōtē ousia (πρῶται οὐσίαι), or primary substance, as a concrete, individual thing (e.g., “this man”), which serves as the ultimate subject of predication and the fundamental essence of reality. According to Aristotle, all other categories—qualities, quantities, relations—are ontologically dependent on this primary substance (Aristotle, Categories).
Latin Substantia and the Loss of Connection
A critical conceptual divergence occurred with translation. The term ousia was rendered into Latin as substantia. Substantia, in turn, derives from the verb substare, meaning “to stand under” or “to support.”
This substitution was not merely an innocent choice but a profound conceptual shift. The transition from a term tied to the verb “to be” (ousia) to one based on the metaphor of “standing under” (substantia) fundamentally altered the philosophical intuition about the nature of reality. The word substantia encourages thinking in terms of an underlying stuff or a bearer of properties, a fixed substrate, rather than a living act of being. This is the very “starting point of mistranslation” we sought to identify. This translation gave rise to a centuries-long intellectual habit of seeking a stable, unchanging foundation beneath the veil of a changing reality.
Historical context confirms this. Philosophers such as Boethius (ca. 475–526 CE), who translated Aristotle’s logical works, played a key role in shaping the Latin philosophical vocabulary. Following his translations of Porphyry’s Isagoge and commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, a Latin tradition emerged that, for seven centuries, remained underinformed about Greek philosophy. This tradition was forced to develop its own vocabulary and concepts based on these foundational translational choices (Boethius, Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories).
Finally, this conceptual divergence was definitively cemented in early Christian theology, particularly in debates about the Trinity. The use of the term homoousios (“consubstantial”) and the subsequent distinction between ousia and hypostasis required a strict, technical definition of “substance” that was entirely detached from its Greek, etymological roots. This theological dispute transformed the concept of a static substance into an unquestionable dogma, firmly embedding it in the cultural and intellectual foundation of Europe.

Incidentally I might mention that 'substance' in philosophy is more properly 'substantia', 'the bearer of predicates', than 'substance' 'a material with uniform properties'. The philosophical term 'substance' is actually a different word than the everyday English word 'substance'. Of course this is common knowledge to students of philosophy but it doesn't hurt to repeat it from time to time. — Wayfarer

This is a wonderful comment that led me to the following reflections:

The key Greek concept of ousia was a noun derived from the verb einai (“to be”). This etymological connection lends it a dynamic connotation, closely aligned with “being” or “existence” (Aristotle, Metaphysics). In contrast, the Latin translation substantia was derived from the verb substō, literally meaning “to stand under” or “to be the foundation of something.” This translation has been deemed inadequate, as it “reified” or transformed the dynamic act of being into a static “something” that “stands under” things as their foundation (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics).

In my view, this conceptual shift had profound consequences for the entirety of Western philosophy. Instead of exploring being itself as an event or process, metaphysics became preoccupied with the search for a static, indivisible “substance”—an unchanging foundation of reality. A striking example of this is René Descartes’ dualism, which divided the world into two independent substances: the thinking substance (res cogitans) and the extended substance (res extensa) (Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy). This pursuit of a fixed, foundational “thing” underpinned many philosophical systems. Martin Heidegger, critiquing this tradition, argued that the translation of ousia as substantia lost the original, dynamic meaning of ousia as Being, leading to the “forgetfulness of being” and its reduction to the realm of beings (Heidegger, Being and Time).

Thus, the historical precedent of translating ousia as substantia serves as evidence for my hypothesis, going beyond mere speculation. This case demonstrates how linguistic form can transform a dynamic process into a static entity, creating a dominant paradigm that process philosophers, such as Hegel (Phenomenology of Spirit), Whitehead (Process and Reality), and Deleuze (Difference and Repetition), had to consciously overcome over centuries.

Incorrect translation is not a separate problem, but, as I believe, a consequence and confirmation of my main idea. He demonstrates how linguistic features, in this case the obligatory use of the bundle "to be," can predetermine fundamental philosophical concepts and direct metaphysics towards the search for a substantive basis, which then had to be consciously overcome.

We can illustrate the problem of “mistranslation” with the example of Parmenides’ statement: “Being is, non-being is not.” In a language with an obligatory copula, this phrase sounds like a final statement fixing being. In contrast, the translation of the same phrase into Kazakh and Chinese, suggested at the beginning of our discussion, completely changes its meaning: “Becoming is, non-becoming is not” (Bolý bar, bolmaý joq) or “The Way exists, the non-Way does not” (dào yǒu, fēi dào wŭ). These translations turn a statement about a static entity into a dynamic statement about a process and a relationship. This is a clear example of “mistranslation” as a conceptual act, not a grammatical error.

↪Astorre The Latin 'substantia' was used as the translation for the Greek 'ouisia'. But 'ouisia' is a form of the Greek verb 'to be', which has very different implications than what 'substance' conveys. See this heading. It is directly connected to the OP in my opinion. — Wayfarer

Thank you, this is a great starting point for additions to the work.I dug up some stuff here, I'll share it later

Mary knows that in the future she will know new things, even though she doesn't know what these new things will be. — RussellA

Mary doesn't know that her reality has changed. After reading the book, she may learn that there may be another reality, different from her own reality. Or she may not learn, if she is convinced of her ideas and does not allow others (and perhaps she will start praying to her black-and-white deity)

But Mary may also like Abay, who claimed that the world may be colorful, but we, black-and-white inhabitants, all see it in black and white. How can Mary imagine this if her life is black and white? Perhaps she will start asking Abay questions on a black-and-white forum, demanding that Abay explain how she can understand colors with the help of her black-and-white thinking.

And so she tries to knock out of Abay how to do this, but Abay cannot recommend anything to her (since he himself understands that there is no methodology that allows this to be done), saying that she confuses Understanding with Essence.

In fact, no one can know if there is reality itself of which one's own reality is just a part. — RussellA

This is the common point where solipsism, radical skepticism and phenomenalism, and in a milder form, Kantianism, meet. The difference between them is whether they believe that external reality does not exist at all, or merely admit that we cannot know whether it exists.

Baudrillard added to this the idea of a world of "hyperreality" in which simulacra (copies of non-existent originals) replace reality.

Incidentally I might mention that 'substance' in philosophy is more properly 'substantia', 'the bearer of predicates', than 'substance' 'a material with uniform properties'. The philosophical term 'substance' is actually a different word than the English 'substance'. Of course this is common knowledge to students of philosophy but it doesn't hurt to repeat it from time to time. — Wayfarer

I speak English at the level of: gossiping with a neighbor. Reading a tabloid newspaper or traveling is enough. When I write here, I first write in my native language, then I have to translate it with a translator, and then proofread it in English and check what I wrote with a reverse translation. Thus, I cannot take into account the subtleties between substances. In my native language, there is no such difference in spelling, since the word substance is most likely originally understood in Russian in a philosophical sense. In everyday life, we use the word "veshchestvo". But, thanks for the clarification

Yes, I agree. In fact, RussellA, just now pushed me to another thought.
Let's say we have confirmed: The world is not static and does not consist of substance. It is dynamic and eventful. Then, the question arises, how to know it? Let's take phenomenology, returning to the things themselves as they are given. The method is good, but it essentially records the world in new frames.. Phenomenology allows us to clear our judgments from previous experience. Cleared. And again took a picture.

It turned out very interesting. The world is not a picture, ok. But how then to know it? What do you think about this?

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality. — RussellA

Your "own reality" is not reality itself, but your idea of it. Human perception is limited: the eye does not see bacteria, the skin feels the wind, but does not determine its exact speed or temperature. We invent tools to expand the boundaries of the senses - and ontology and epistemology are such a tool (in the broad sense).

If we consider an object only as a fixed "snapshot", we narrow the possibilities of cognition. According to the main idea of my work, language itself - through grammatical structure and, in particular, the copula - inclines us to such fixation. From this follows a logical proposal: to think of an object not as a completed entity, but as a process. This changes the very framework of research and the way we interact with reality.

Then, in this case, when I am thinking about my own reality, which comes first, epistemology or ontology. — RussellA

What is primary depends on where you look from

It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality — RussellA

It is logically (rationally) that we can admit that what we know is incomplete, because we cannot know everything (due to limitations). This is how science often works: something is first presented theoretically, and then confirmed experimentally.

But there is no normal way to talk about “being” qua being. When we talk normally, and make our topic “being”, we impose things in the topic that obfuscate and cover up what we are trying to say. — Fire Ologist

Here is what Heidegger wrote on this subject: “The meaning of the word ‘being’ is the most general and at the same time the most empty. But at the same time it is consistently used in every speech, and we supposedly know what it means – until we are asked about it.”

I agree with you.

It seems to me that you are mixing phenomenal perception (direct/indirect realism) with processuality (becoming). Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world - and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language, and not on the epistemological perception of reality. In the example you give, "Socrates seeking truth" remains a "snapshot". The abstract definition of a philosopher ("seeking wisdom") itself is static, since it describes a role, not a dynamic. In my approach, processuality is a continuous becoming, as in Dostoevsky ("to save oneself every moment"), Abai ("science of Zhol") or Buddha (anicca), where being flows and is not fixed even in abstraction. That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism.

BUT. All that has been said does not in any way diminish the presence of a processual approach and processual understanding in the West. Moreover, I am not saying that the West is necessarily substantial, and the East is necessarily processual. The main hypothesis was that language simply contributes to this. But this does not mean that a philosopher born in London is doomed to substantialism, and one born in Beijing to processualism. As we see, and I emphasized this in the previous answer - the East and the West mutually influence each other and, being in this involvement with each other, they mutually become and continue to do this and right now (in my opinion) we are doing exactly this. This is great

That's a really sharp observation, and it's certainly how it might appear to a non-native speaker at first glance. The reality is a bit more nuanced.
In Russian, constructions often express a state through the subject's experience or the givenness of that state, rather than through possession. When we say "Мне холодно" (literally "To me is cold"), "Мне грустно" (To me is sad), or "Мне весело" (To me is cheerful), we're using adverbs of state. This doesn't mean "cold is attacking me" or "I'm becoming an object of external force." Instead, it describes an internal sensation, answering the question, "How is it for me?" (Or, "How do I feel my current state?"). The subject here is the experiencer, not an active possessor or a passive recipient of impact.
This difference is key:

As you mentioned, in German: I have a state. (Emphasis on possession and control.)
In Russian: A state is given to me / I experience a state. (Emphasis on givenness, experience, and immediate perception.)
Does This Influence Respective Philosophies?
I can't state definitively that it does, but it's certainly thought-provoking. We were recently discussing phenomenology, and this connects quite well. To some extent, this Russian emphasis on givenness (like "мне холодно," "мне кажется" - "it seems to me," or one-word impersonal sentences like "смеркается" - "it's getting dark") resonates strongly with phenomenology without the formal method itself.
What I mean is, quite seriously, when a Russian speaker says "мне холодно," they're subconsciously sharing how they're living through that experience. In fact, I remember studying phenomenology myself, and as a native Russian speaker, it took me a long time to grasp what was fundamentally new about it compared to my everyday experience. Perhaps this contributes to forming a mindset where the focus is on perceiving what's happening rather than on actively owning one's body as property.
I must stress that I can only judge this from my own experience. If you happen to have a native Russian speaker nearby (there are many around these days, thankfully! ), just let them read this and compare their feelings with mine.

I don't know if it's intentional or not, but now you've come to compare Russian and European romanticism in literature, which is even more radical, as you put it, than Dostoevsky's. I provided references to Russian writers and philosophers at your request to support the ideas of processualism. However, I don't want to compare anyone's quality or level. My goal is to offer a new perspective in ontology. This was achieved by highlighting the linguistic differences. If, in the current situation, intelligent people start measuring themselves in terms of literature or philosophy, like the average person, then who will we have to rely on? Politicians measure economies, the military measures the size of missiles, writers measure their works, and philosophers measure their philosophies. I don't think I chose this approach. What if we stop proving and try to have mutual respect? The world is not a snapshot. Being is not a substance. What is impossible today will become commonplace tomorrow.

I agree "is" does not seem to distract from the "what", which is more pure. Whatness. Without distraction. Simply present. Letting the being continue breathing and not packing into a stagnant what through sentence structure. — Fire Ologist

Again, very interesting, congratulations. Of course this is to just tease the meat of the findings, but I find the research/evidence does allow for an astounding perspective, particularly how the classic philosophical framework is seemingly baked into the language. — Antony Nickles

Thank you for your interest and support. I was pleased with both the interest and skepticism of other participants, the approach to further analysis, and the development of ideas. Unfortunately, I did not have time to respond to all the comments, I am only now sorting them out.

Do you think we can discover something new by changing the perspective in this way?

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes — RussellA

Interesting theory. From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. If you cover the entire Eurasian continent and pave the way from India to Great Britain, you get a spectrum from hot and sensual to cold and analytical.

And yes, I just asked AI:

In Hindi, domes are obligatory, while in Bengali, Odia, Tamil, domes are either absent or optional.

What's even more interesting: Buddha lived in Northern India. At that time, the main languages of the region were Prakrit languages - colloquial dialects derived from Sanskrit, as opposed to the literary Sanskrit used in Vedic texts.
The most likely language that Buddha spoke was Pali or the closely related Prakrit of Magadha. Pali became the language of canonical Buddhist texts (Tripitaka), since it was considered close to the spoken language of Buddha. Magadhi was the main dialect of the region where the Buddha preached.

Copula in Pali:
In Pali, as in other Prakrits, the copula is the verb असति (asati, "to be"), derived from Sanskrit asti. In the present tense, the copula is often used in statements of identity or quality: for example, "सो भिक्खु असति" (so bhikkhu asati, "He is a monk"). However, in colloquial speech and some contexts, the copula could be omitted, especially in descriptive sentences: "सो भिक्खु" (so bhikkhu, "He is a monk"), which is similar to Russian ("Socrates is a philosopher") or Kazakh ("adam aqyldy").
In the past tense, the copula is obligatory: "सो भिक्खु आसि" (so bhikkhu āsi, "He was a monk"), as in Hindi (thā) or Russian ("there was a doctor"). Pali also uses constructions without copula to express states or qualities, especially in philosophical texts: "सब्बं अनिच्चं" (sabbam aniccam, "Everything is impermanent"), where the copula is implied but not explicitly stated.

I know of two cultures which have been claimed as thinking radically differently about being, presence and purpose in comparison with Western approaches. Heidegger singled out pre-Socratic thinkers like Heraclitus and Parmenides as understanding becoming in a fundamental way that was derailed when Socrates, Plato and Aristotle shifted the focus on beings and truth as correctness, and Western thinking has followed suite ever since. It didnt matter to Heidegger whether a language like Russian was missing the present tense copula or not. What mattered was what kind of philosophical and religious literature was produced within those languages without the copula. If the simple absence of the copula in a language predisposes their culture toward modes of thought which avoid the trap of fixing becoming into being, where is the evidence of this in their philosophical writings? — Joshs

I am not aware of any Russian philosophers who directly linked the absence of a copula in the language to a different approach to understanding reality. Perhaps someone has mentioned this, but it is unknown to me. However, I can speak about the distinct approach of Russian philosophers to being. (For them, as for Heidegger, the presence or absence of a copula in language was not significant.)

I will try to explain what this distinction entails in the context of our discussion. This is a very interesting topic, and I would like to start with Dostoevsky, although he was not an academic philosopher, his literary works are considered philosophical.
Dostoevsky viewed human being as a process tied to freedom and moral choice, rather than a static essence. In Notes from Underground (1864), the protagonist—the underground man—rejects rationalistic determinism, symbolized by the “crystal palace,” a utopian idea where human behavior is predictable and subject to the laws of nature. He asserts that human being is defined by free will, even if it leads to irrational or self-destructive actions: “Man needs… only independent volition, whatever it may cost and wherever it may lead.”. "Eh, gentlemen, what kind of free will is there when it comes to arithmetic, when only twice two four is in use? Twice two will be four without my will. Is this what free will is?"
(https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/can-dostoevsky-still-kick-you-in-the-gut)

In The Brothers Karamazov (1880), Elder Zosima teaches that life is a continuous process of spiritual becoming, where each moment of choice brings a person closer to or further from God: “Every moment one must save oneself.” He describes being as a movement through time, shaped by love and responsibility.
For Dostoevsky, being is not a fixed state but a dynamic process of struggle, doubt, and spiritual becoming. Each moment of choice shapes a person, making their existence open and unfinished. This resonates with the idea of “living in becoming,” where being is not a sequence of fixed “snapshots” but a dynamic process tied to will and responsibility.
The Russian-Ukrainian philosopher Grigory Skovoroda, in his work Narcissus, viewed being as a triadic unity of the macrocosm (the universe), the microcosm (the human), and symbolic reality (Holy Scripture). He emphasized that being is a process of uncovering the invisible divine nature, not a static essence.
Nikolai Berdyaev clearly distinguished between “being” and “existence” in works such as The Philosophy of Freedom (1911) and The Meaning of the Creative Act (1916). He argued that being is tied to spiritual freedom and creativity, while existence refers to the material, objective world subject to necessity.
Similarly, the works of Alexei Losev (1893–1988) reveal ideas of the processuality of being. For example, in his multi-volume History of Ancient Aesthetics, Losev reinterprets the Platonic eidos as a dialectical process rather than a static form. He writes: “Eidos is a becoming form, a living dialectic of matter and meaning” (Volume 1, section “Platonic Eidos”). For Losev, being is not a fixed substance but a process of interaction between form, matter, and the subject, where every thing is constantly transformed through its meaning.
Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. It is often tied to the religious and mystical traditions of Orthodoxy. Unlike Western philosophy, which, starting with Descartes and Kant, focused on rationalism, systematization, and substantialism, Russian thought leans toward processuality, intuitiveness, and ethical reflection. Russian philosophers such as Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Alexei Losev, Grigory Skovoroda, and Fyodor Dostoevsky (as a thinker) often viewed being as a dynamic process tied to freedom, creativity, and spiritual becoming, rather than a static essence.
Undoubtedly, there were other Russian philosophers who thought in the context of substantialism, but those I have listed are studied in universities as having had the greatest influence on Russian philosophy as a whole.

To complete the picture, I will give an example from Kazakh philosophy
Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904) viewed being as a dynamic process of spiritual and moral improvement. In "Words of Edification" (for example, the 25th word), he emphasizes that a person must constantly develop through reason, labor and morality: "Reason and labor are the main qualities that an ideal person must master." His philosophy emphasizes the continuous movement towards enlightenment, overcoming ignorance and achieving harmony with society and nature. In poems such as "Spring" or "Summer", nature is depicted as a changeable, living force, reflecting the process of becoming a person and society.

For Heidegger, the process of being is an analytical disclosure of Dasein through care, where the subject exists in "abandonment" and is directed towards death. This is a more abstract and universal approach, without drama or ethical passion. The Eastern approach is more emotional, spiritual, connected with personal ethics, with a development that may be erroneous but humane.

Were these works inspired by the absence of a copula in the language? I don’t know. In any case, I am unaware of any works that explicitly state, “We have no copula, therefore we are processualists.” Is my idea speculative? Perhaps. But then what philosophical intuition is non-speculative?

It may be argued that the words used in language are more metaphorical than they are literal, if you get my drift, and it is the nature of the metaphor that there is no essence, statis or fixity of meaning. — RussellA

I also want to say that it's quite possible the very framing of the question, the very premise, might be a kind of speculation or a misunderstanding on my part. This is precisely why I published it here—so that philosophers or simply native speakers could offer guidance, direction, or challenge my ideas.

At the same time, I want to share with you that by starting from this premise, I was able to arrive at something new in the subsequent chapters of my work.

If we stop fixating on essence and separate the concepts of sushchee (existent) and bytie (being), we can arrive at some interesting conclusions. The very notions of bytie and sushchee in Russian are something different. To exist (sushchestvovat’) simply means to be in a state where your attributes do not change by your own will (a stone lying on the ground, a tree growing according to its program, or an AI operating by an algorithm). To be (byt’) is something more than mere existence. It's roughly what happens when something can change its attributes at its own discretion (a prime example is a human, but not necessarily only them).

I write in more detail about the attributes of sushchee in my work. In due time, I will share all of this, so as not to lead the current conversation too far astray. But these intuitions came from the very feeling that byt’ and sushchestvovat’ are two different things.

Being, in my opinion, is not just a snapshot or a sequence of snapshots that can be captured. Yes, it can be done and it can be described to an external observer in this way. And it will be scientific and substantiated and very Western. But being is something more. It is what makes it possible to capture, film or feel. To live in becoming.

I think you're saying phenomenology is a kind of fraud. I think it is in some cases, but ontology is an empty building in my mind. Nobody lives there, and it's fairly important to me that it stay that way. — frank

No, it is not so clear-cut. I believe that phenomenology has given the very possibility of philosophically rethinking the Western approach to understanding the world.

Eastern traditions proceed from the direct experience of being: be it "awakening" in Zen, "liberation" in Vedanta or "the path" in Taoism. This experience can be paradoxical, but it is considered reliable without rational justification.

The Western mind (especially since the New Age) was brought up in the paradigm of rationality, analysis, proof, so phenomenology is like a methodical path back to the intuitive. Through descriptions of intentionality, the "life of consciousness", the horizon of meaning, it makes possible an approach to this Eastern "self-evident".

Phenomenology is like an intellectual bridge, with the help of which the Western mind was able to come to a contemplative, immediate, "Eastern" way of perceiving being. At the same time, it remains Western in its style of thinking: it seeks a path through awareness, not through the rejection of consciousness.

For example:
Husserl: epoche - "removing" attitudes in order to see things as they are. Zen: shikantanza (just sitting) - full presence without analysis.

Heidegger: Gelassenheit - letting go, allowing to be. Dao: wu wei - non-action as a way to correspond to the path.

Wittgenstein emphasized the ambiguity of the verb “to be”. He denied there was such a thing as identity, reasoning that i) to say two things are identical is nonsense and ii) to say one thing is identical with itself is to say nothing.

Frege distinguished different meanings of “is”.
1) Identity – Bachelors are unmarried – have the same meaning
2) Copula – Plato was Greek – one characteristic of the subject
3) Existence - There are cats – some things exist
4) Generic class - A horse is a four-legged animal – several characteristics of the subject — RussellA

I think I understand what you are talking about and it intrigues me.

But here comes a very subtle point: although we imply identity, existence or generic class, nevertheless we kind of fix it in reality, indicating that it IS.

To be honest, I cannot imagine how the copula is thought of by a native speaker who has been using this language (for example, English, German or Greek) since birth, but for me, since English is not my native language, and my native language is Russian, this is perceived as an indication, confirmation, disclosure of content and fixation in reality itself.

For example: The cat is black. In Russian I will say "koshka chernaya", simply adding an adjective to the noun, just two words without IS. In Kazakh it will sound "мысық қара" similar to the Russian language.

The copula Is is added in Russian, but only when talking about tenses: past: "koshka byla chernaya" (the cat was black); in the future: "koshka budet chernaya" (the cat will be black). In the Kazakh language, everything is exactly the same, only the word order changes. "Mysyk Kara Boldy" (the cat was black); in the future: "Mysyk Kara Bolady" (the cat will be black).

I understand your idea, but I am talking about the need for fixation in being in Western languages, which, as I assume, is reflected in the very feeling of the world: Something is possible only when it is fixed. Hence these metaphors about our life being like a film on film (like a series of frames), but each frame separately is as if IT IS, it is fixed.

Probably, I could not express my thought in such a way as to emphasize its content. I did not object to the clarification that Heidegger was not a substantialist. I said that the very attempt to search for who Heidegger was is connected with the search for Heidegger's substance, which we do willingly or unwillingly.

I spoke about as a general property of philosophical discourse, where even attempts to talk about becoming remain within the framework of the substantialist habit.

As for the place of the subject and where the world is heading, I ask you to wait a little, all this will happen, but later. Everyone who responded to my work gave me many new human views, and secondly, hope that what I write about ontology will be interesting to the reader. This discussion is precisely what contributes to my text becoming more academic. And this encourages me to work further.

I was truly thrilled to see how vividly and thoughtfully you all responded to my work, "The Language of Philosophy."

As I read through the comments, I had a thought: they not only added new dimensions to our conversation but, and this is the most amazing part, they affirmed my main idea far more powerfully than I could have imagined!

I wrote about how the grammatical structure of language, especially the verb "to be," pushes us to search for a static, unchanging essence. And here's what I saw in our discussion: when I suggested we move beyond this and think of being as "becoming," we all, time and again, reverted to that familiar logic.

When RussellA and Count Timothy von Icarus cited the Italian verbs "essere" and "stare" or Heraclitus, you weren't, in essence, moving away from the concept of "being," but merely finding its different forms—permanent and temporary. The core ambition remained to define "what is" or "what was."

When Joshs and frank debated whether change is possible without rest, I saw a fascinating, yet ultimately still an attempt to reduce the dynamic of "becoming" to two fundamental, "substantial" categories—rest and change. This is the search for the basic elements that constitute being.

And even when Joshs spoke about Heidegger, who, as he correctly noted, grounded "is" in the event of "unfolding," this was, in essence, an effort to find that very first principle, that "root" of our being.

Our entire discussion, paradoxically, became a living illustration of my work.

We weren't just discussing my idea—we were proving it in practice, involuntarily demonstrating how deeply ingrained our habit is to search for "substance" when we talk about being. This realization struck me so profoundly that I simply had to share it.

My observation is by no means a criticism. Rather, it's about how, without realizing it, we continue to operate within this very paradigm of searching for the primary substance. The very format of our discussion is built on this: "M. said: A is B." "K. replied: Is A really B? For example, philosopher M believes that B consists of D + E, but E cannot be a part of A..." and so on. Substantialism, objectivism—this is a reliable train that has allowed us to travel into space and communicate with each other from thousands of miles away. But have we become happier, more friendly, more joyful? And if we consider what is happening in modern ontology (Object-Oriented Ontology or correlationism) and science (the constant refinement of AI, which is increasingly used as a weapon rather than a friend and assistant, and which is developing at an incredible speed), a doubt arises: is this train heading in the right direction, or is it a direction where there will be no room for the subject?

Your comment highlighted a very interesting point that I wasn't aware of, as I don't speak Italian. With the help of AI, I was able to examine the grammatical constructions using essere and stare, from which I've found that:

Sono arrabbiato (I am angry) vs. Sto arrabbiato (I am in a state of being angry). The first sentence can be perceived as a more fundamental characteristic of a person's identity, while the second is a temporary, transient mood.

In Russian, this is expressed as: «Я злой» (I am angry, i.e., always angry) or «Я злюсь» (I'm getting angry, I am in a state of anger).

Another example: Come sta? (How are you staying/being?) is a standard greeting that focuses attention on the current moment of one's well-being. It is not a question about "who you are" (Chi sei?), but about "how you are situated" (Come stai?).

One might think there's no difference, as English also has the verbs to be and to become. However: To become in English describes the process of transitioning from one state to another. For example, "The caterpillar becomes a butterfly." This is a verb of change, not a verb of being in a state. And the verb to become is not used as a linking verb in just any sentence.

Similarly, English has the present continuous tense (am/is/are + V+ing), which describes an action happening at the moment, not a state or a quality. It is used like this: "I am writing a letter"—this is an action, not a state of being.

BUT! Let's take the greeting, "How are you doing?" Is this an action or a state?

All of this points to the following:

One cannot radicalize the assertion of being as process for the East and being as static for the West.

The existence of such distinctions in the Italian language suggests that it is natural for humans to feel both a certain sense of the processuality of being and its static nature.



As Count Timothy von Icarus correctly observes, there are indeed works in Western philosophy that discuss processuality, and I don't dispute that. I'm arguing that the very act of thinking about processuality requires a conscious effort to break free from the pattern of substantialism.

You're absolutely right to point out those philosophers. However, while processualists existed (and had a significant impact), they were in the minority. The dominant paradigm was, and remains, substantialism. To speak of process, one had to deliberately step outside of this paradigm, and that was not an easy task.

The influence of processualist philosophers is undeniable, but they were working against the current. Philosophers who thought in terms of an unchanging essence and substance had a far greater impact on the broader worldview: Parmenides, Aristotle, for whom substance was the foundation of reality; René Descartes with his ideas of the substances res cogitans and res extensa.

It is this tradition that, I believe, created a pattern of thinking that influenced European languages and, as a result, philosophy itself.



Here is what I write about the hypothesis of linguistic relativity in another chapter of my work:

The previous analysis of the linguistic structures of various cultural traditions revealed a diversity of ways of expressing (or not expressing) being and entities. This diversity, manifested in the grammatical features of languages - from the Indo-European copula "is" to its optional nature in Russian and its absence in Turkic and Chinese languages - emphasizes the variability of ontological perspectives rooted in language. However, this observation requires strict methodological reflection in order to avoid hasty or unfounded conclusions. The assertion of a fundamental difference in ontological attitudes, for example, between Western and Eastern traditions, cannot be accepted without further in-depth analysis. Language, as E. Sapir and B. L. Whorf noted in their hypothesis of linguistic relativity, can influence cognitive and philosophical categories, but the extent of this influence remains a matter of debate. Conclusions about the direct determination of thinking by language require caution, since cultural, historical and social contexts also play a significant role and language changes dynamically. Language is constantly subject to change and formation. It follows that one should not blindly rely only on the “feeling of the word”. Nevertheless, the phenomenological approach to linguistic differences, which presupposes living these differences as a direct experience, opens up new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of being. The very feeling of recognizing the fundamental differences between languages is significant for us. The value of such an approach lies not in establishing universal patterns, but in the possibility of rethinking familiar ontological categories through a change in perspective.

Thank you for your interesting and varied comments! I am glad that my work touched you! Unfortunately, I was unable to participate in the discussion, but I will try to answer everyone as I study your comments.

That is, the life of the body is the actuality of our soul as a spiritual essence. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would like to express my full agreement with this approach.

When I think about this, it seems very strange. The tradition that tends most towards literalism ends up also paying the least attention to concrete instantiations of the faith. And yet maybe it makes sense in a certain way. In the Anglophone context, ethics if often thought to be the main substance of the Church. But this is often paired with a view of ethics as sitting entirely outside nature as command. Likewise, a view of God as primarily will, and of notions of nature as a potentially nefarious limit on that will, would tend towards demoting nature in a way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am a parishioner of the Orthodox Church. But I send my friends who profess Orthodoxy and do not understand it, who just want to pray a little or listen to a sermon, to a Catholic church and they like it there better. Those who have visited a Catholic church then share their impressions of the simplicity and clarity of what is happening. Those who have visited a Catholic church are happy with the lack of pretentiousness, as well as the lack of the need to stand on their feet the entire service, listening to something in an incomprehensible Old Church Slavonic language (inherent in the Orthodox Church).

And they just like it, and personally I think that in religion it is very important that it finds a response in you