So you're saying that tithing is a moral issue because others say so? It's arbitrary? That doesn't seem to help your argument much. — Harry Hindu

How so? I'm arguing that science can determine the answer to moral problems, not that science can decide what words we use to describe what type of thing. Science doesn't decide that the tall thing with leaves on is going to be called a 'tree', but neither does philosophy, it's just the evolution of language. The fact is that some decision has to me made about tithing because the issue exists. What we call it is irrelevant, we could call it a 'fligitybit' issue, if you like.

Exactly. No one's goals are affected by your choice of color of hat. If it did affect others goals, then it would be a moral issue. That is my point - that organisms have goals. Tables and hats do not. — Harry Hindu

Fine, moral issues are those types of decision which might affect another organism's goals. I have no problem with that definition, we're still on language here though, you're still just describing the family resemblance that groups together all the types of decision we call Moral. We could take your word for it, or we could ask everyone in the world what types of decision they would use the word 'moral' to cover and use some sort of standard deviation around the mean for our definition. None of this has the slightest impact on how we actually make such decisions (ethics).

There are plenty of other species that have in-fighting and they have been around longer than humans. Males in many species fight (sometimes to the death) for territory and mates. — Harry Hindu

Yes, but I'm not one of them (or at least my current theory is that I'm not, and said theory has yet to be falsified), so I don't see how this is relevant. I'm not trying to claim that the answers science would give us to moral dilemmas would also apply to Lions.

There is no scientific theory that tells us which person you should save. — Harry Hindu

There absolutely is, that's the point of ethical naturalism (or at least my specific brand). The way we want to feel after certain decisions is a natural fact determined by evolution, and the means to obtain that feeling is a logical cause/effect system which scientific experiment can determine the probable relations wthin. Therefore science absolutely can tell us which person to save, the one which experiments have shown will provide us with the feeling which experiments have shown we are bound to want.

There are only theories that explain why you saved one over another (you share more of your genes with the person you saved as they are a family member, or if they are both strangers, you save the one with the least amount of risk to yourself). — Harry Hindu

No, there are not only theories why, there are theories about what the consequences will be and how we will feel about those consequences. There are also theories demonstrating what feelings we wish to obtain and which we wish to avoid, thus we can determine which action's consequences produce the feelings we wish to obtain.

It's really simple. You right away defended the following quote by Putnam: — Caldwell

Putnam was arguing against Scientism, I wasn't defending his quote I was arguing that it was unfair of him to characterise the definition he gave in a pejorative way. The entire exercise of this post is one of being critical of quotes I read.

You right away defended the following quote by Putnam:

"science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective" — Pseudonym

as merely Realism, without providing an argument that the line points to Realism. And that makes it okay to say? Not quite. This is a philosophy thread. You need to explain why you think that's just realism. — Caldwell

Again, if you actually read the whole post rather than just picking a fight, you'll read that just two paragraphs later, the summary of the post is to ask the question - "How does Scientism differ from either Physicalism or Positivism such that it deserves it's own name?", not to make the claim that it doesn't, which is just how it seems to me, not a philosophical claim. The entire post is a question, not a claim.

Since you're enquiring though, to me the idea that science is the only method that can give knowledge is simply a methodological, pragmatic, tool that the Physicalist will want to use. Physicalism infers objective reality, and science investigates objective facts. The fact that, for the Physicalist, other metaphysical assertions can be made, doesn't alter the conclusion that none of them could constitute objective knowledge without falling into the realm of science. But that's just the way I see it. As I said, the post is a question, not a claim. If you think that there are ways of holding a physicalist position but which don't imply that science is the only route to actual knowledge, then I'd love to hear them, that's the point of the post.

You admitted under those conditions that not only you've had experience, but you could articulate it or communicate it. Did you have to wait for science to explain it to you and for you? — Caldwell

I don't understand this point at all, are you seeing 'Science' as men in white lab coats with bunsen burners? I held theories when I was a child, theories which I tested against the real world. Most of them turned out to be wrong on testing. What's not scientific about that? In so far as an 'explanation' is not the same a s a description, then yes, I did have to wait for science to explain my experiences, until then they were just experiences with no objectively verifiable cause.

I'm more than happy to learn something new. Could you explain how this famine was a result of colonialization? And more specifically, how did it result from capitalism? — frank

The main cause of the famines listed by Ajit Ghose's study were the Raj's implementation of free-market pricing on corn which meant that as corn became more scarce, prices went up such that the starving farmers in their millions could not afford it. At the height of the famine, the two most affected provinces (where nearly five million people starved) were actually net exporters of wheat. Capitalist free markets were actually buying (what was to then) cheap wheat from starving peasants who couldn't themselves afford it.

Harsh Mander, includes in the list of causes - colonial rack-renting, levies for war, the expansion of export agriculture, and neglect of agricultural investment.

Mike Davis, in "Late Victorian Holocausts" adds that export crops directly imposed by the Raj displaced millions of acres that could have been used for domestic subsistence, and increased the vulnerability of Indians to food crises.

The Indian famine was not the only example of this policy of exporting cheap often non-subsistence product from the colonies whilst the native population starved. Some estimates put the total death toll from the imposition of colonial export crops at 50 million.

Notwithstanding the fact that growing products for export in a market free to set prices according to supply and demand is pretty much the definition of capitalism, I don't see why you're asking for a direct link. Are you suggesting that Communism itself has as its doctrine that the leader of any revolution should kill their opponents in the millions? If you're blaming Communism for the actions of states which happen to be communist, then why are you not prepared to blame Capitalism for all the deaths that have taken place in states which just happen to be capitalist ones? On equal terms (deaths from avoidable cause which take place under the respective governmental styles) early capitalism outstrips the death toll of early communism by millions.

If we assign those deaths to capitalism, we still don't have quite a holocaust there, with a holocaust being a unit of mass death equalling about 6 million people. Those victims should be remembered, but they don't make it to the top of our list of human failures. Communism sits squarely in that position. This isn't controversial. — frank

It absolutely is controversial. For a start, there's all the data above, which I've given in different formats several times now but which you seem to insist on ignoring. You've glossed over that fact that the advertising and commercialisation of cigarettes happened almost entirely in capitalist countries and has the highest death toll of any single anthropogenic event ever. But even with specific reference to the massacre of native tribes, you're forgetting that each massacre (whilst below holocaust size on its own) was carried out by one of the same few countries (England, France, Belgium, Germany), so to be a fair comparison, to all the communist atrocities (which you have taken as a group) you'd have to add them all up - All the tribal massacres put together, all the famines and epidemics caused by trade policy and land-grabbing, all the deaths cased by the advertising and sale of cigarettes, all deaths in wars aimed at securing resource supply. All added together. That's the death toll of capitalism by the same metric as you're using to count those of communism.

Change the metric, and you still don't have Communism on top. The biggest single event death toll was probably the Taiping Rebellion at 40 million (nothing to do with communism). If you're going by single country it's easily Great Britain who have to account for hundreds of individual massacres, famines, epidemics and wars directly the result of colonial policy. If you want to look at individuals (or small groups) then it is the chairmen and board of directors at British and American Tobacco who we now know had full knowledge of the harm cigarettes did, but carried on advertising them nonetheless. I'm struggling to see what convoluted set of caveats and exclusions you're using in your attempt to make Communism come out on top of the world's most deadly ideas.

Deaths from colonization? That was primarily accomplished by diseases spread by travellers. Measles has no ideology. — frank

Just as one example, the Indian Famine of the late 19th Century, caused directly and with full knowledge by British colonial policy, killed 29 million.

The rest add up across the world. Over half a million Native Americans killed directly in wars, Australian aborigine massacres probably totalled the another half a million, each African colony almost without exception has its massacre if not several. Then there's slavery...

it's easier to pin deaths on communist regimes because records are left from the time and we know actions that resulted in depopulation were deliberate and in line with communist party policies. — frank

... and there's the 22,000 children UNICEF on estimate die every day, directly as a result of poverty much of which is laid at the door of capitalist trading policy, colonial history and disastrous Western political interventions.

It's not easier to pin deaths on communist regimes, it just suits the right-wing agenda to do so.

It is a different matter, of course, to claim "I don't merely believe that P, I know that P." — Arkady

I expect that's what he meant. He's a good physicist, but he's not a very good philosopher (in my opinion). I don't think he's got used to how careful one needs to be with words when answering philosophical questions.

No matter our level of justification or certitude in making an affirmative claim, our statement boils down to saying (even if only tacitly) "I believe such-and-such." — Arkady

Absolutely, I really can't see any other answer, but that doesn't make all claims equal, not does it rule out fair use of the word 'know', it's just a word after all, like any other word it describes a collection of things similar enough that we can mostly agree they can be denoted by a single term. We don't need to all agree, nor do we need to have the answer to every borderline case in order to use the term.

I think the models that are most successful in science are squarely in the middle of the class of beliefs we call 'knowledge'.

Be patient. — Harry Hindu

Sorry.

How is tithing a moral issue? Why would you choose to tithe, or not? — Harry Hindu

Tithing is a moral issue because it is an example of that class of decisions most people agree to label 'moral'. What I'm interested in as an ethicist, is what properties the members of that class share. It the same as the class 'animal' is that class of object which have a non-walled cell. A zoologist studies the things in this class. We could argue about what 'should' be in and out of each class by means of similarity, and that argument will never be conclusive, but the decision we make in moot cases does not tell us anything about the class, only language. The thing is, despite this ambiguity no-one thinks choosing the colour of my new hat is a moral decision and no-one thinks a table is an animal, so we usually have enough agreement on terms to be going on with.

So, how would I choose?

1. I want to maximise the feeling of well-being I get from living in a mutually supportive society. This is not something I've decided to want, I just find I do. I also find others feel this way too, so any conclusions I draw from my investigation of the best way to achieve this might be useful to others. On examination, I can see how such a feeling could have evolved (mutually supportive communities would out compete those with in-fighting), so I'm happy that this feeling is not something superficially conditioned into me. (I can explain why this matters if necessary).

2. Given that I want what I want, I then have to employ rational thought to the evidence that I have to arrive at a solution. This is where science helps.

It is when the individual goal comes into conflict with the goals of another that a moral issue arises, or when you are deciding which path to take that will maximize your happiness. — Harry Hindu

Yes, that's one way of looking at it.

The fact remains that in terms of scale of destruction, communist regimes have no equal. — frank

Did you not read the statistics I summarised? The largest loss of life by a huge margin caused by deliberate human activity was the advertising and commercialisation of cigarettes. 79 million dead and still counting. The second largest (depending on estimates) was the colonisation of land occupied by tribes with a significant history of isolation, possibly up to 50 million depending on sources. Communism is at least third, and that's taking it as a whole. Just one single act of free market capitalism has killed more than every act of communism across the world put together.

This presumption of yours is itself a philosophical position, and one which many philosophers of the past would have disagreed with you (these days I think your view is much more popular). If you hold that science can answer all Philosophical questions, one might expect you to claim that this position of yours is at least testable by scientific method. — PossibleAaran

No, not quite. It's a philosophical position, but it does not follow that saying science can answer all the questions of philosophy requires me to show scientific proof that it is right to hold this belief. I just do hold it, it is a brute fact that I find myself faced with. I haven't decided to believe this, it was never a question, any more than "what's the best colour in the world?" whilst technically phrased as a question, is a meaningless one.

That's what I mean by saying that all philosophical questions ultimately end up with a statement of belief, rather than an unequivocal answer. That assertion I do have scientific evidence for - My hypothesis is that all philosophical questions end up requiring a fundamental statement of belief, my test is to look through all the philosophical questions that have ever been asked, my hypothesis has yet to be falsified because I have yet to find a philosophical question which has an unequivocal answer not requiring some belief statement. It's not the best theory in the world, and it needs a lot more testing, but it is definitely scientific, by the definition I'm using.

You think that science cannot provide such reasons, and that Philosophy can't either. As I pointed out above, this is itself a Philosophical position, and so, unless it is one you arrive at by "the method of science", whatever that turns out to be, then your claim that science can answer every philosophical question turns out to be in conflict with other views of yours. — PossibleAaran

As above, It's a perfectly legitimate scientific theory which is falsifiable (the presentation of a scientific or philosophical 'answer' that is objectively agreed upon) and yet to be falsified (there is no such answer). Questions such as whether objectivity means anything are themselves philosophical question which themselves cannot be answered and again, my proof of this is simply that they have not been answered.

I think that's right, but I'd also insist that Philosophy can do that too if Philosophers set their minds to do it. — PossibleAaran

This is the really interesting bit, completely off topic, but I'd love to hear how you think this would happen, are you just hopeful, or do you have a theory as to how? Don't worry about the off-topicness, I don't think anyone's reading this any more.

Which contemporary philosophical questions can be answered by scientific methods? All of them? All of the ones that can be answered at all? You tell me. — PossibleAaran

Yes to "All the ones that can be answered at all". I'm Paraphrasing from Alex Rosenburg's book here; Why are we here? - No reason, What is the nature of reality? - What physics says it is, Is there free-will? - Not a chance, Why should I be moral? - Because it makes you feel better than being Immoral. He's deliberately being glib, but the idea expounded in the rest of the book, is that these positions can be supported, either by scientific theories, or by fundamental beliefs which simply occur to us as brute facts and over which we have no control.

I'm still not sure what you mean by "Ethical Naturalism" and so I have no idea whether it can really be tested by scientific theory. One view going under that label today is the view that the phrase "morally good" ordinarily means something like "maximizes well-being". Vague as this still is, it would be empirically testable. Ask people what they mean by "morally good" and see what they say. Since a large part of the world is still religious, however, I greatly doubt that they mean anything like this by "morally good". But I don't think this view about the meaning of words is what you meant to defend. — PossibleAaran

Absolutely, you're getting the idea, although I sense you're just being charitable and don't actually agree with it. The sort of thing you're suggesting is exactly the way naturalists think that science can answer these questions. The only refinement I would make is that we all know people lie through their teeth when asked about personal matters like morality. I would design the experiment to see how people behave in controlled situations designed such as to best elucidate what they really believe, not just what they say they do.

I could actually envision a fantastic debate where the participants debate over the method itself. What is the 'best' method for endeavoring to seek knowledge of non-linguistic creatures' mental ongoings(thought and belief)? — creativesoul

Yes, I think that would be an interesting debate, but of course the first argument would be about the appropriate way to measure 'best' and you'd be lucky in the topic of animal minds got a look in.

This is the trouble with philosophy done on a forum like this (although it's endlessly fascinating to read). In academic philosophy, very few, if any, papers are written defending Idealism against Realism, or transcendentalism against naturalism. Mostly, it is people who agree on the project they're working on, be that naturalism, Idealism... whatever, and they're debating the best way to progress that argument.

I think the only way to have a meaningful debate is to restrict entry to those of a particular philosophical persuasion. You'd have to specify exactly which framework, which philosophical project you're working on and then debate how to do that job.

As an example, I'm a fairly hard Naturalist (if that hadn't become obvious already), so one of the challenges of the naturalist project is consciousness, how to reconcile what we subjectively experience with a naturalistic understanding of the material cause. So I might frame a debate about animal mind as - Within Naturalism, how can we best describe the way animals' minds work to further explain conscious experiences? You can replace naturalism with whatever your preferred philosophical project happens to be.

I just heard an interesting interview with Alex Rosenburg (professor of philosophy at Duke University) in which he says that he's decided to start accepting the term 'scientism' to describe his naturalistic philosophy in the same way that the homosexual community accepted the pejorative term 'queer' to take away its power to insult. Seems to me to be a good way to handle such prejudice.

Quote? — gurugeorge

"The decimation of Native Americans was a result of diseases accidentally brought from the Old World, they weren't murdered by Whitey." - gurugeorge

" ... violence is part of the story, but a relatively minor part." - gurugeorge

"... most property comes via inheritance and exchange, and if you trace it back to its origins, it's some form of original acquisition out of the state of nature." - gurugeorge

As if those in power do not relinquish it voluntarily... — unenlightened

Indeed, but what stood out for me looking at the figures, was how the genocides were eclipsed by the famines. Simple inequalities of resource distribution still killed more people than any of these regime change initiated slaughters, but then that does sound a little left-wing ... just... trying to resist... the inevitable urge to murder thousands of people...

Wikipedia (my favourite philosophy textbook apparently) has lists of mass killings from all sorts of anthropogenic causes, together with mean, lower and upper bounds of the estimated death toll. It makes for interesting reading.

Communist states feature highly in both massacres and deaths from avoidable famine. Fascist states have committed the largest single atrocities. Colonialism features most highly if you take the upper estimates (estimates are wide because no-one really knew the starting population). But they're all outweighed quite significantly by the advertising and commercialisation of cigarettes at a massive 79 million.

I wonder if a complete ban on cigarette advertising has figured highly in JPs agenda?

it wasn't communism, as far as I know, that led the US to pretty much wipe out native people. They were in our way, — Bitter Crank

Have you not read @gurugeorge's comments in the other JP thread (The politics of responsibility). Apparently early Americans didn't massacre the native population at all, they just all died mysteriously but completely unsuspiciously shortly after voluntarily handing over their land. Those damn commies however...

Yes, we may well differ at that point, but a relaxing change to have agreed with someone thus far. I do think that we can say with some certainty that you and I will have the same gut feeling about moral motivations, because you and I are both human and it does seem to be the case that humans are remarkably similar at these basic levels. Unfortunately advertising works, hypnotism works, auto suggestion, any number of other mind trick and psychological predictions. They all work because basically we're all pretty similar. Morality is one of the many areas which are complicated by the addition of environmental and rational factors so it's much harder to test directly, but given that most things tested that way seem to be fairly homogeneous, I don't see why the gut feelings guiding our morality would be any different.

Its the same with art, music, food, sensory pleasures... Given the range of things it's theoretically possible to like, the range of things most people actually do like is remarkably narrow.

Just to play devil's advocate, although I agree that saying most of tradition is superfluous will require quite some weight of evidence to convince me, anthropologist Clive Finlayson has described in human prehistory one of my favourite social theories. Society is divided into conservatives and innovators. In times of stability, conservatives dominate and innovators are marginalised, nothing needs to change, and conservatism is easier than innovation (takes less brain energy and it is less risky). When the environment is changing, however, innovators dominate. It is at these times tradition may well be thrown out of the window.

many people might let the fact that one of the potential victims is gay affect their judgment. Reason might be the factor that made them reconsider this. Or is that what you were saying? — T Clark

Yes, that's why I put that example in, for interest. By my belief, the same moral motivation would be at play in a society which hates gay people, as one which treated them equally. The only difference would be the society of homophobes erroneously thinks that's being gay is a non-arbitrary reason. Once they find it that it is indeed arbitrary, it will cease to make a difference. To me, the underlying moral that you shouldn't consider people less worthy for arbitrary reasons is just a gut feeling most people have, nothing rational about it.

My stats is definitely a bit rusty, but at 45 million with a confidence level of 95%, I think it comes to 600. Are you sure there's not been any non-random sequences?

The probability of getting a non-random sequence of numbers should be very small (but non-zero) whereas the probability of getting a random sequence should be very large because there are so many more random sequences than there are non-random ones.

In the sample we have (all lottery draws ever) the results are - random sequences 100%, non-random ones 0%. These are very close to the results we were expecting. 0 is very close to 'extremely small' and 100% is very close to 'extremely likely' so there's nothing odd there.

Of course, the larger our sample gets with the number of non-random sequences still at zero, the more suspicious we should be, but depending on the actual figure for non-random sequences, we might need an absolutely huge sample size before we reach that point.

You could then carry out a Chi squared test to see if the sample matched a normal distribution and if it didn't, there may be some other variable at work.

Do you think the measure of the validity of that issue can be ascertained scientifically? — Wayfarer

To the extent that it can be ascertained at all, yes. Hypotheses can be formulated, based as much as possible on existing knowledge, and these can be tested. Where that can't be done, it's anyone's guess, we might as well toss a coin.

Doesn’t warrant hysteria but the fact remains. — Wayfarer

But this is obviously not just about facts. JP is not presenting a history lecture, he's making a political argument, so what matters is not the veracity of his facts, but the validity of the argument he draws from them.

So saying that communist regimes have had bad records on mass murder is just emotive rhetoric without the firm argument that all left-leaning politics will lead to communist regimes of the type previously seen.

Ironically, its a fairly Marxist interpretation of societal change to say that anything has an 'inevitable' direction.

The "how" part of the OP was about method. How do, could, or would we acquire such knowledge. — creativesoul

Sorry, I should have been clearer, the 'how' I was referring to was the one in the question title... how non-linguistic creature's minds work. What would be a satisfactory answer to the question 'how?' here. I could, for example say "by storing and exchanging neural states". Does that answer the question how they work?

Then I think more work needs first to be done on what would constitute 'knowledge' in this respect, otherwise I think the debate will simply dissolve into one about knowledge. Both sides will bring exactly the same arguments only one side will claim this constitutes knowledge and the other that it doesn't.

I think the issue here can quite easily be expressed in terms of the Trolley Problem. I agree with T Clark, that our morals derive irrationally, but that rationality can help guide them.

To put this in terms of the Trolley Problem, as NKBJ, is asking - who we choose to run over might be a rational problem, why we care is an emotional one. Why are no answers to the problem that we should choose to run over the one with ginger hair? Why is it not considered a dilemma if one of the potential victims recently insulted us? What about if one of the potential victims is gay, does that change things? Of course none of these things are problems for the rational brain to consider because these questions have already been solved by the basic emotions.

Of course it's wrong to value some people as less worthy on the basis of something arbitrary like hair colour. The rational brain didn't need to get involved, that's just what morality is.

I don't intend to ban your view from Philosophy. — PossibleAaran

No, I wouldn't want you to think that I thought that of you personally, I'm just arguing against the pejorative use of the term which seems to me to be aimed at dismissing the position by means other than mature argument. I hope that's clear.

I'd be interested to see, though, any convincing example of science answering traditional philosophical questions. — PossibleAaran

OK, so we need some definitions and caveats first.

1. Some philosophical positions are belief statements, not questions. So when I say science can answer the questions of philosophy, I am making that claim on the presumption that if you keep asking 'why?' somewhen you will end up just making a statement of belief. I don't think science can solve that problem, nor do I think philosophy can. I've yet to hear a convincing argument that such a problem can ever be solved by any means. What I believe science can do, is push back the amount of belief statements which need to be made.

2. There does seem to be some issue with the idea that 'science' is just a method (the scientific method), and this leads to all sorts of problems with the argument. Science is clearly not just a method otherwise there could be no possibility of understanding analytical works like those of Kuhn. Science is clearly a thing that people do such that it's practise can be investigated,but philosophically we need to define it. So when I say science, I mean the scientific method as defined by Popper, and its close relatives.

3. What constitutes 'The questions of philosophy', is obviously arguable and I don't think anyone has made the claim that science can answer absolutely any question you throw at it with a yes/no answer. I think we have to accept that some questions don't have an answer. Obviously science cannot answer those, but I do think a scientific approach can determine which questions are of this sort.

3. The argument is that science can answer the questions of philosophy, not that it already has. I will give you some examples of the sort of thing I think used to be philosophical questions which science has answered, but I really think the interest now is in questions which remain unanswered, should we investigate those by the scientific method or not?

That being said, one simple example of science answering a question of philosophy is the question of what the universe is made of. This used to be very firmly in the realm of philosophy. Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Democritus... All had theories about what the universe is made of. Science has models which make accurate predictions about what the universe is made of, and it is making progress in refining and expanding those models.

When you say "Ethical Naturalism", what exactly do you mean? There are several things which go under that name. None of the views I associate with that label are ones which can be established by scientific experiment. They are all argued for Philosophically, and so it may be that this debate about Harris is a distraction from the main topic. — PossibleAaran

The argument for ethical naturalism and the moral arguments presuming ethical naturalism are two entirely different things. Harris focuses mainly on the latter, although he does briefly allude to the former. I should say, at this stage that I'm basically a deconstructionist when it comes to author intent. I'm only interested in what the ideas within a text could mean, not what the author actually intended them to mean, so I'm not claiming here to represent Harris's view, only to present a view I think derives from what he has written.

Im guessing that once ethical naturalism is presumed, the reason why science can determine moral actions is pretty obvious and so the sticking point will be how science argue for ethical naturalism in the first place.

There are several different ways, but a full exposition of each would be of topic. This is supposed to be about why people are derogatory to those who think science can answer philosophical questions. That fact that I'm already being asked to rigorously defend any claims scientists make to that effect is indicative of this attitude. Idealism might, for example, be rigorously interrogated before any philosophers consider agreeing with it. It is not rigorously interrogated just to justify its right to be considered a valid theory. Within the scope of this discussion, all I have an obligation to do is demonstrate the idea of science answering philosophical questions is valid, not that it's right.

That being said, the idea, with ethical naturalism, is that it can be demonstrated by falsifiable theory, that most humans simply are the way ethical naturalists describe them. Of course there are exceptions, but there are exceptions to the rule that animals eat in response to hunger, but that doesn't prevent it from being a scientific theory.

I've raised this issue elsewhere recently, so I'm not sure if you will have encountered them, apologies for the repeat if you have, but surely we already have an epistocracy? Why else are children not allowed to vote? If anything @tim wood's idea is more fair, as a particularly well informed and educated 14 year old could vote, whereas at the moment we have a system where it is simply presumed that they're too stupid to make a rational choice. The result is we have a democracy obsessed with house prices and tax at the expense of securing our children a future.

Oh, and I can't read either. Mind you, I suppose if I can't speak it pretty much follows...

your stance doesn't even meet the minimal criteria of meaningfulness - of sensical speech — StreetlightX

Well, I didn't see that coming, now I'm too stupid to even speak. No mention of hebetudinous though.

You might be interested in the work of Paul Bloom, who I think covers something of what you might be getting at. I agree with Wayfarer that it's a bit unclear what you're saying, but Bloom's book "Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion" argues that most of the time our Empathy (feeling how the other person is feeling) gets in the way of our compassion (desire to act in such a way as to reduce the suffering of others). Not being able to handle the pain of actually empathising with millions of victims and so just 'switching off' is one such example. Is that the sort of thing you mean?

science can answer questions of philosophy — Pseudonym


I am not sure if you actually claim this Pseudo — PossibleAaran

Yes, to be clear, I would make that claim, particularly in the fields of mind and ethics. Despite SLX's protestations that I explain every position I hold with a doctoral length thesis otherwise I'm not to be taken seriously, I don't actually think an exposition of why I hold those beliefs is appropriate to the thread topic, suffice to say I do not take them for granted, I have thought about them and accept that they are ultimately beliefs. I simply require that beliefs are not overwhelmingly contradicted by objective evidence, but again, I accept that that position itself is just a belief. What I object to is the insulting suggesting that it is not even 'allowed' for someone to hold those beliefs.

I've always thought of Philosophy as the examination of opinions and assumptions which are usually taken for-granted. — PossibleAaran

I don't think that's a bad thing, but it seems pointless to me unless there is some conclusion at the end of the process, and presuming there is, some of the things thus examined must end up passing the test. The authority of science (in certain areas) might well be one of those things that pass the test surely?

He just assumes a kind of Consequentialism and then uses science to work out consequences. That isn't using science to answer philosophical questions. That is assuming an answer without reflecting on what it means or trying to justify it, which is just what I defined Philosophy as not doing. — PossibleAaran

I don't know if you've read Harris, but his work is built upon quite a firm foundation of Ethical Naturalism that goes all the way back to Aristotle (in some form). It's really not just 'assuming 'consequentialism', it's building on the work of those who have argued in favour of it quite persuasively, which is surely all any philosophy can do. Also, I agree with most of what Harris has to say, except that I'm broadly a virtue ethicist. I don't really find the consequensialism necessary to the point he's making about science and morality. It could equally be applied, as Phillipa Foot does, to which virtues it is necessary to cultivate.

By the way I didn't say philosophy as 'comfort'. I don't mind the idea of philosophy as 'consolation', since that phrase has a distinguished history going all the way back to Boethius. But I draw the line at 'comfort'. Plus I think notions like 'purpose' are much richer and more open than consolation. — andrewk

Yes, the term consolation works better because it actually avoids some of the more heroin-like philosophies which offer a certain 'comfort' in the face of chaos. I think my personal line would, however, be crossed by 'purpose'. The trouble with 'purpose' is it is future-set and that opens up too much possibility for excuse; "your reward's in heaven, don't worry about the state of things now", "yes, the revolution/war will bring death and destruction, but it's all for a grander purpose". I can see the benefits, but the risks are too great for my liking.

You'll need to define 'know' and 'how' It think before this question can get anywhere.

Are we going to accept a model capable of prediction as being 'knowledge', or are we going to go down the rabbit-hole of requiring even more of that model before we accept it under the term?

The how, is even more problematic. Would a causal explanation be an answer to the question 'how'? If we knew that a Lion's mind processed stimuli in a certain way, is that a satisfactory description of how a Lion's mind works?

Is the model falsifiable?

If not then Hawking is doing philosophy, not science when he engages with such a model. Which makes his claim that philosophy is dead look rather confused. — andrewk

I agree entirely, it is an act of philosophy to say that philosophy is dead, but I don't see this as any more contradictory than Wittgenstein's 'ladder'. Not all philosophical statements can be true without making each one pointless (unless we accept your 'philosophy as comfort' idea, which I will come back to), not all philosophical statements can be false as that would itself be a philosophical statement and so paradoxical (again, we could argue about whether that's actually a problem, but let's presume it is for now). So that leaves us with the inevitable conclusion that some finite number of philosophical statements are true/valid/useful, whilst others are not. I can't see any logic which prevents that finite number from being one, which means that making a philosophical statement about all other philosophical statements in not itself a contradiction.

Some philosophers do indeed debate in the way you describe, even (unfortunately) on this forum. I see such an approach as misguided and unhelpful. I don't think there is any useful role for the word 'wrong' in philosophy, and I think the way that some academic philosophers have lost sight of the role philosophy plays in giving meaning to people's lives is most unfortunate. — andrewk

I think I broadly agree with you here. I think it's a reasonable role for philosophy to provide people with a story to explain (by which I mean, make consistent) all the otherwise disparate and chaotic experiences they have through life. I think we have a great need for things to be consistent and fairly simple, so that we can feel like we have some chance of predicting the future, whereas in reality, things are very complex. Philosophy can provide that story to take the edge off the chaos.

Where I would disagree though, is that all philosophy then is on an equal footing. I think that the experience of clinical psychology is generally that taking people's word for what comforts them best is not a sound way of helping others. If I asked a Heroin addict what he wanted and simply took his word for it, without applying my own critical thinking, would I really be doing my duty by him? Surely he'd answer that he wanted more Heroin? It's the same with the comfort people get from certain philosophy. I don't thing here would be the right place to go into specific examples, but could you agree that it is at least conceivable that the comfort some people feel from some philosophies might actually cause them more pain in the long run? If that's the case, like the heroin addict, is it not a social duty to try and replace such philosophies with ones we believe are less harmful?

I've had enough of this, if all you're going to do is spit bile, I've no interest in discussing with you. If this is the standard of debate exemplified by a moderator, it's a disgrace.

Theism is acceptable, phenomenology is acceptable, PoMo is acceptable. They each have their own way of arguing and their own matching notions of evidence. To be part of the stable of philosophies, they only have to pass some minimal critical thinking standards.

Science is then that part of philosophy which has become dominant as its particular kind of rigour has proven its value socially. And I agree that also - as reductionism - has often proven itself anti-social. — apokrisis

I heard an interview with Dan Dennett recently in which he argued that Philosophy nowadays should really contain none of these schools, that theism was it's own thing (unsurprising fro Dennett), phenomenology and the like can be subsumed into psychology (not all of which is scientific, which is important if it is to be a broad enough container), semantics into linguistics etc.. Philosophy's job, he argued, was to act as translator, to allow these various modes of investigation to speak to one another, to translate what has been said in one field into the other so that they might benefit from each other's insights.

I quite like that approach, and I think that science hearing a little more from some other fields might help with it's anti-social tendencies, but it's not going to happen if the other fields don't want to hear anything from science.

You missed out callous and brazen. Those especially amused me. I could only read that bit in the tone of a communist Chinese denunciation of the Western bourgeoisie. The hyperbole dial cranked up to 11. — apokrisis

Oh yes, how could I have missed those gems. I'm wondering if the stock of abusive terms has been entirely used up yet, or if we have more to come... I'm offering 3:1 on 'mindless' and an outside 10:1 on a use of the archaic 'hebetudinous' turning up in the next post, if you're interested in a virtual gamble.

So, you did have senses. — Caldwell

Yes.

As a child? — Caldwell

Well as a child I could articulate it because I had learned how to talk.

Where's this line of questioning going? It seems a bit random, some insight into where you're heading might help.

One of my very favourite Hawking quotes:

“The human race is just a chemical scum on a moderate-sized planet, orbiting around a very average star in the outer suburb of one among a hundred billion galaxies. We are so insignificant that I can't believe the whole universe exists for our benefit. That would be like saying that you would disappear if I closed my eyes.” — Wayfarer

Yes, one of my favourites too, though I suspect for very different reasons.

He might have found out by now ;-) — Wayfarer

A little in poor taste.

The "vitriol" is a phantom projection of your own defensiveness, I would say. I certainly haven't felt any vitriol — Janus

Have you read the thread? I (and scientists typically associated with 'Scientism') have been labelled - vacuous, closed-minded, toxic, cancerous, disingenuous, infantile, barren, callous and ignorant. How on earth are you not reading vitriol?

There are countless possible understandings of the human situation. — Janus

So how does one critique a philosophy then? If there are countless understandings that must mean there's at least one for every person on the planet, and you've stated that philosophy's aim is to produce this feeling of understanding, then how can any philosophy be better than any other?

Yet that's exactly what happens in academic philosophy. No-one starts a paper with "all those previous ideas were great, but here's another one you might like". Literally every philosophical movement has begun by either rejecting entirely previous approaches, or by pointing out what they consider to be flaws in it. But how can there be flaws unless they've checked the entire population to find that absolutely no-one obtained a feeling of understanding from it? I'm finding it hard to marry your idea of the aim of philosophy with the actual way it is practised in academia. Are the two very different?

no will to understand the obvious — Janus

I don't understand this bit, what is it that is 'obvious' and how can one require a will to understand it if it is obvious? the two seem logically contradictory to me. Something which is obvious is surely defined by the fact that it does not require any effort to understand it?

And again you are asking that it should be demonstrated that philosophy progresses in the way you think science does — Janus

How are you getting that I've asked that? I asked "...if you think philosophy can show progress in something I can understand as being useful". Where in that question is any instruction about what philosophy 'should' demonstrate? I'm just asking if it can.

And I'm sorry if I insulted you by suggesting you were 'touchy' but for clarification, this is exactly the sort of thing I meant. I'm just asking some questions about philosophy and you're interpreting each one as an attack on it, a demand that it should do this or that, when I've not used any demanding or pejorative terms. It just seems odd that would interpret my questions as demands, that's all.