That is not a point. It is an assertion. And it is unsupported by any argument. Hence it is not worthy of anybody spending any time considering it. — andrewk

I don't think that's fair. The book 'The Grand Design', in which the "philosophy is dead" statement was made, goes on to explain Hawking how feels the answers to questions like "why are we here?" are correctly answered by a deductive nomological model. The answer to why we are consists of a theory as how things like life come to be and then the conditions of the universe which one 'plugs in' to such a theory. Many people disagree with the deductive nomological model, and it has a number of problems, but that's not sufficient to say that no-one can rationally reach the conclusion that they still believe it is correct, and if they do reach such a conclusion, then a supporting argument in favour of the statement that science can answer questions of philosophy would be science answering some of the questions of philosophy, which is exactly what Hawking provides us with in the rest of the book.

Further, it is an assertion that is observed to be wrong, as many people have been able to find answers to the questions they had about existence, through philosophy. The fact that Hawking has not was a problem for him, not for anybody else. Now you may say that the answers people have found are 'subjective', or 'illusory', or 'meaningless', but that's beside the point. They found answers that were helpful to them, that gave them greater peace of mind, acceptance, sense of purpose, or whatever else they were after. So for them, philosophy served its purpose. — andrewk

No, the fact that the answers may be illusory is not beside the point. Hawking (to my knowledge) has never claimed that philosophy doesn't serve any purpose at all, so the fact that it comforts some people cannot be used to disprove his assertion. The ontological argument comforts some people, so is any philosopher claiming it is in error wrong to do so because they've missed the point?

If the the purpose of philosophy was to comfort people, then why do philosopher debate their theories using rational analysis. Why do they use terms like 'unpersuasive', 'invalid', even just plain 'wrong'. Refer me to a single philosophy paper assessing a text on the grounds of its ability to comfort people and I will concede the point, other wise it seems like it's one rule for other philosophers to criticise each other's work, but when a scientists tries to do it they move the goalposts.

If the 'purpose' of philosophy is to comfort people, then show me a paper marked on its ability to do so. Show me a critique of Kant complaining that it's not very comforting. Or is that just an assertion, without an argument to back it up and so not worth anyone's time considering?

Finally, an insightful response not filled with bitter resentment.

I agree that the over application of Newtonian reductionism is a big problem. As is the excessive use of 'survival of the fittest' and a massive failure to acknowledge the biases and statistical failings of modern science.

But none of this changes the basic position, as JJ Smart put it, that metaphysics should be based on science as our best model, despite its failings.

Personally, I'd like to see more work on information theory as well as a more holistic science, as I think that is the only way to reign in the metaphysical woo surrounding quantum physics, but until then we certainly are not going to improve on a flawed and biased science by throwing our hands up and saying we might as well just believe anything.

You have understood the human situation when you have an understanding of it. — Janus

Right, so what does having an understanding of it look/feel like?

is true that Camus' understanding is more comprehensive than Aristotle's for the very obvious reason — Janus

I didn't ask how, I asked 'in what way', what constitutes the progress?

demanding that philosophy must justify its value to you by showing that it satisfies the same criteria that you believe gives science its value. — Janus

Who's demanding anything? I'm just asking. Yes, I'd like to know if you think philosophy can show progress in something I can understand as being useful. If it can't, fine, you don't need to get so touchy about it.

And that is because the short answer to the question 'What is scientism?' is that it is a term of abuse. — unenlightened

That's like saying the answer to the question "what is Idealism?" would just be "it's the name of a school of philosophy", end of discussion. I can guarantee you that if I posted that question it would lead to a wide discussion about the history, principles and criticisms of Idealism, not just a semantic explanation of the use of the term. I think the full post gave a perfectly clear account of what aspects of the use of term I wanted to discuss, so I'm not seeing the leap to trollishness just from the title.

And if no one espouses a philosophy, no one is in a position to seriously explicate it. So what is left to talk about except the personal failings of the contributors? — unenlightened

If Scientism is just a term of abuse, which I was quite clear I already knew in the first sentence of the post, then what is left to discuss is why, which is the question I asked.

and set up future discussions rather more carefully with a substantial topic. — unenlightened

No, that's not it at all. If the topic were insubstantial, it would have simply received little interest, it's eight pages long. We're it simply of low quality, it would have been deleted (I've seen other go that way). I'm open to alternative explanations for the vitriol in virtually all of the responses I've received to any suggestion that science can answer questions of philosophy, but at the moment it's hard to move away from the glaringly obvious explanation, that people are scared it just might be right.

I think I decided last time I looked at it unscientifically that this was a troll thread — unenlightened

So in addition to being vacuous, closed-minded, toxic, cancerous, disingenuous, infantile, barren, and ignorant, and I'm now also a troll?

so far there is no 'evidence' that you have for a moment thought about, or understood the specificities of philosophy. — StreetlightX

Good start, so what would class as evidence that I had thought about or understood the specificities of philosophy, whilst maintaining an ability to reach the conclusion that it is mostly meaningless? Or are we still stuck on the idea that everyone who disagrees with you simply must have misunderstood something?

mean, there is simply no way to take seriously, for example, the idea that 'science=objective' and 'philosophy=subjective'. — StreetlightX

I don't think I ever said that, if I did you'll have to remind me of the context.

What is your theory of the object? What is your theory of the subject? Do you even have one? Or again, are you employing these empty terms that have nothing but a (implied and untheorized) value valence to them, and drawing conclusions based on that fake veneer of meaningfulness? — StreetlightX

Again with the condescension. You ask disingenuously if I have a theory and then proceed with an attack on my intelligence on the unsubstantiated assumption that I haven't. My theory of the objective/subjective divide is a fairly unremarkable one based on (but not entirely explicated by) the idea of signs increasing the probability of an object being part of mind-independent reality. Signs such as intersubjective agreement, logical consistency etc. Yes I'm aware there are other positions and complexities but I find those positions less persuasive. Am I going to have to suffix everything I say with that sentence now in order to avoid accusations of dogmatism?

Because, as with most of your terms, you simply haven't discussed or explained their use. — StreetlightX

Again you still haven't explained to me how it is that you are able to use whatever terms you like without any explanation, yet I must add a short thesis to each word proving to you that I've thought about it.

It's sheer disingenuity to speak for 'fostering useful investigation' while literally denying legitimacy to entire swathes of human understanding. — StreetlightX

No, its an absolutely necessary logical conclusion. If there is to be such a thing as 'useful' or any judgement at all (which you seem to agree with, by dismissing Scientism) then it is simply an inevitable consequence that some methods will come out worse.

What kind of meta-ethics is implied in a question like this? — StreetlightX

Ethical naturalism.

What kind of thing would ethics have to be in order for science to bear - or not to bear - upon it? — StreetlightX

The term given to a particular type of motivation or reasoning, both of which can be seen and measured in biological organisms.

total insensitivity to them. — StreetlightX

You haven't even asked me them yet, where exactly do you get off attacking me personally, I'm interested in the discussion but I'm finding the personal insults quite offensive.

I like to think that I'm making or rather promoting claims about useful ways of thinking about knowledge, ways that can be pressed into the service of different needs, depending on different motivations — StreetlightX

OK, so what classes as useful? If philosophical ideas are judged by their utility, then how are you deciding that (for example) the idea that science can determine morality is not a useful one?

what does and does not count as evidence is of course, precisely a philosophical and even perhaps historical issue of which you remain entirely unreflective about. — StreetlightX

Again, you're simply imposing your worldview here, because I have a view about what constitutes evidence that differs from yours I must be 'unreflective', I must, through my own inadequacies, have missed something. Is the idea that I might well have reflected long and hard on these matters but simply reached a different conclusion to you so hard to accept?

Again, all these words you think you're using as self-evident - knowledge, evidence, meaningfulness - these are things you seem to think you understand, — StreetlightX

But you've used exactly the same words in your posts. We're back to this condescending insistence that whilst you're free to use such terms in whatever context you see fit, and it's simply implied that you'd be amenable to other interpretation, my use of the terms in a similarly loose, colloquial must be the result of ignorance.

you wield that carelessness unthinkingly to make invalid claims, over and over again. — StreetlightX

So now claims are back to being valid or invalid. So when I ask that philosophical positions validate their claims we get this wishy-washy, "not even really a knowledge claim", different methods for different enquiries kind of relativism, but when claims are made about philosophy itself we turn to strict rhetoric 'invalid', 'nonsense', 'wrong', 'misunderstood'. Such defensiveness does not foster useful investigation.

You're making claims in the public domain though. You're not saying "for me, knowledge is of this, or that, sort" you're making a claim about what knowledge actually is (or rather what it isn't), including what I and the likes of Dawkins 'should' accept it as being, so what I guess what I'm asking is why should I believe you.

I'm hold a belief that means I require some form of conflicting evidence to dissuade me from any belief I hold. I'm also of the view that philosophy is about making persuasive arguments. So to me a philosophical argument that (for example) Heidegger says something meaningful (contrary to what I currently believe, would either contain some evidence of meaning, or an argument that I should be dissuaded from my beliefs by some other method (and then a demonstration that Heidegger satisfies that method).

What you've provided here are some more people giving an account of what they 'reckon' is the case. I don't really understand what process you think that forms part of in making your argument more persuasive.

Okay, so give me an example situation that represents a moral dilemma. — Harry Hindu

Whether to give a tithe to the poor might be an example, I'm not sure where this is leading, obviously you're not thinking I'd be unable to come up with a moral dilemma, so maybe I'm missing your point here?

What do you mean by the environment and our genetics producing the concept of what is 'right'? If all we needed were genetics and environment, wouldn't that mean we would always be 'right' in everything we do? — Harry Hindu

No, knowing what is 'right', by the definition ethical naturalists give to the term, is not the same as doing what is right. The ethical naturalist position is that the we have, by evolution (or simply by our 'nature' in an Aristotelian sense) a range of urges/desires. These are neither complimentary, nor mutually exclusive, since they have evolved without purpose, they just are. Some of these desires represent the types of objective we have called ethical, others don't. So it's entirely reasonable that, given the range of environmental stimuli and the ranges of desires (responses to stimuli), one might experience a desire to both alleviate the suffering of someone in your community (by giving a tithe) and a desire to hoard you possessions (by not giving a tithe). This is not judged or given a value, it's simply something that's going to be the case, and the claim is that science can (eventually) simply demonstrate that it is the case.

Now the issue is, can you have both? Can you maximise the satisfaction of your desires. again this is not the objective because it 'should' be, it simply is, like it or not, you're a biological machine and you're going to do what you're going to do. Again, the theory is that science can (eventually) answer that question. If we know what sorts of thing really satisfy the desires we seem to have, the extent to which they do so, how long such satisfaction lasts etc. then we can derive strategies which maximise satisfaction.

I still don't see where the relationship between what is right and wrong and science is other than science being able to explain what it is — Harry Hindu

Because 'what is' is all there is.

Is human survival and procreation a good thing? It may depend on who else you ask in the rest of the animal kingdom, or even in the rest of the universe for that matter. — Harry Hindu

Human survival and procreation is whatever we decide to call it. It is certainly a desire in humans, whether you prefer to think of it as by our nature or by evolution. The ethical naturalist position is that all the desires we've called 'good' are a subset of all the desires we have, we will desire them without any further motivation, as will we desire all the others. The argument of someone like Harris, is simply to further say that, given this position, scientific investigation is the best tool to help us maximise these desires.

I can't work out if we're just talking past one another, or if you're simply unwilling to engage in any epistemological questioning. I'm not asking that you defend phenomenology, I'm asking that you defend the many claims you've made to the effect that phenomenology (just as an example of an epistemological approach) has something meaningful to say, and with such authority that anyone making epistemological claims without engaging with it, is so wrong they don't even deserve an argument.

In making a distinction between phenomenology and phenomenologism, you're implying, it seems, that the belief that something is a way of making claims to knowledge is acceptable whereas the belief that something is the only way to make knowledge claims is a joke, something so untenable as to be deserving of ridicule.

But this falls foul of a point similar to that which Michael Friedman makes about Positivism. You must accept one of three positions; either all epistemological methods are valid, or none are, or some are and some aren't. If the first is the case, then we can make no knowledge claims at all, as every method of deriving them is equally valid. If you like this approach, fine, but what would be the point in requiring that Dawkins read Husserl, he may as well ask my Grandma. If you accept the second, then we can make no knowledge claims either, and still Dawkins need not read Husserl. This leaves us only with the last (which you seem to imply above). So then if only a finite number of epistemological claims/frameworks are valid, what is preventing that number from being one, such that phenomenologism would be an entirely reasonable position to hold.

Ah, back to this again.

All my quotes are just nicked blindly from the Internet and (and you know this how? Oh yes, because I disagree with you, therefore I must be an idiot, I forgot), whereas all your quotes... no wait, I forgot again, you don't need to provide any quotes because you don't need to provide any support for your argument, it's just so obvious to anyone who isn't ignorant.

I have to do all the explaining and you just sit there and say "wrong" to everything without any explanation.

How about, just for a change, you lay out why you think believing in the validity of the intuitive moment is not essential to gaining meaningful knowledge from phenomenology and I'll sit back and enjoy just telling you you're wrong without any explanation? Then we can swap back again, hell we could play this all day... Or we could actually try to have a discussion about the ideas without resorting to insults.

Unless you're prepared to raise some kind of argument that isn't just an appeal to authority, and have that argument interrogated by someone who might even disagree with its fundamental premises, then I've no interest in continuing this 'discussion' (for want of a better word).

Where do you get this nonsense from? Since when was phenomenology defined by 'the premise that intuition delivers knowledge'? — StreetlightX

"He then identifies intuition as the original phenomenon that leads to the concept of truth itself" - Introduction to 'The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology' - Emmanuel Levinas

Husserl first calls attention to the intuitive givenness of experience, especially that of
perception. He finds an ‘absolute ground’ in it - Hursserl's second lecture in the Five Lecture Series 1907.

"Is it not the first aspiration of this type of philosophical approach ... in which man and his universe emerge by direct intuition, both certain and indubitable" The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology

Or, if you prefer a more lay approach...

"An important and still largely unexplored claim of Husserl's is that any logically consistent meaning can in principle be subjectively fulfilled, more or less adequately, by a unified intuition, such as an act of continuous perception or intuitive imagination"

"...the structure and other essential features of the meaning in question can be read off from the respective mode of intuitive fulfillment"

-IEP

Or more lay still ...

"Husserl's method entails the suspension of judgment while relying on the intuitive grasp of knowledge" - Wikipedia

Take your pick.

One can only be ignorant of a topic if it contains facts to be ignorant of. I cannot be ignorant about dragons because there are no facts about dragons to be unaware of. I do not have to read every mythology involving dragons before declaring them to be most likely non-existent.

Taking phenomenology as an example (seeing as it was raised, by another post as being a subject Dawkins should 'know' about). If one accepts the premise that intuition delivers knowledge, then there is something to 'know' about phenomenonolgy, but if one rejects that premise then there is no more knowledge there than there is knowledge of dragons in a fairy tale.

As I asked in my response to another post, if Dawkins is required to understand phenomenology before making statements about knowledge, why is Satre not required to understand evolutionary biology before making claims about existence?

I see, so you're not interested in answering the question, you just popped by to insult my intelligence, and then make an ad hominen argument that if people as stupid as me support Scientism that means it mustbe rubbish.

OK, job done.

Question - how do those who dismiss Scientism pejoratively support their claim?

Your answer - Well how do those who argue in favour of Scientism support their claim?

"No you say first..."

"No you first..."

"No you first..."

We used to argue like that in primary school.

Basically, Pseudonym, you’ve joined a philosophy forum with the express and sole aim of declaring that philosophy is meaningless — Wayfarer

So my posts about children's rights, free-will, consciousness, ethics, abortion, belief, responsibility politics... All somehow attempting to undermine philosophy are they?

And what if whole swathes of philosophy are meaningless, what discipline exactly would discuss that possibility? Pretty much every major movement in philosophy has to some extent branded the investigations of other movements as meaningless. The idea that some portion of philosophical investigation is meaningless is a perfectly well-respected philosophical position.

I think this kind of scientism does more to hurt and diminish science than any philosophical critique could. It belittles not just philosophy, but science itself, which becomes tainted by a colonizing and imperialist rot that exists nowhere in its actual practice. — StreetlightX

Yeah, so still no actual argument then?

You're the one making the psuedo-positive claim that only science can answer 'the questions of human existence', without elaborating... — StreetlightX

Have you read my posts, or just presumed you know what I'm saying? I'm arguing that the theory of those accused of Scientism (in a pejorative sense), deserves to be taken as seriously as any other position in philosophy. The arguments to which I refer answer and elaborate those issues at great length. I'm not making the arguments themselves, I'm making the argument that they do not deserve such disdain.

I don't see why it is so unreasonable to ask (of those who dismiss Scientism) why they do so, which means the request implicit in the question is for you to support your claim (that scientism is meaningless), not for me to support my claim that it isn't.

If that's not a question that interests you, if you're happing just dismissing it as meaningless without debating the justification, then fine, just don't take part in the discussion. But I'd rather you didn't try to steer the post to an off-topic debate about how Scientism justifies its claims. Start another post, by all means and I'd be happy to comment. This post is about how those who dismiss Scientism pejoratively support their position.

How beautifully self immunised. "What you're saying is meaningless and I don't even have to present an argument to support that because one cannot argue against the meaningless"

As I said, stuff you like = meaningful, stuff you disagree with = meaningless.

Did you not notice that I answered precisely the same question as was put to Quine with precisely the same answer, almost word-for-word?

So in a post limited to a few sentences the statement that the main questions in philosophy are what is there and how do we know what there is, is neither infantile nor amateurish. Apology accepted. Or did you expect me to write an entire canon of investigation in response?

Oh no wait, I forgot the golden rule that when a famous philosopher says it its very meaningful and sagacious, but when someone you disagree with says it its infantile and amateurish.

From an interview with Willard Van Quine (1977):

Interviewer: "What would you say were the main questions in philosophy?"

Quine: "What is there, and how can we know what there is?"

Quine's an infantile amateur is he?

We'd need to ask some anthropologists. — andrewk

No, we just furiously type whatever we 'reckon' don't we?

So no actual argument then? Just repeating the same ostracising bullshit. What I say is meaningless because you don't agree with it, what [insert philosopher here] says isn't meaningless because you do. Unless you have a definition of what is meaningful other than your own personal preference?

Yet these apparent 'questions' are nowhere formulated by you, — StreetlightX

I wasn't aware that they were in much doubt. What is there? How can we know what there is? What ought we do? Pretty much covers the basics of ontology, epistemology and axiology.

There's no apparent evidence that science can answer any moral questions — Noble Dust

There's no apparent evidence that there's a God, does that justify a pejorative use of the term religious, the derision of any arguments to that effect and the exclusion of anyone who thinks there is from philosophical discussion?

What's more, why are you talking in the language of 'evidence' all of a sudden? If your acceptance of a theory is on the basis of whether there is sufficient evidence then you've already joined the club, welcome.

Religion gave birth to science, broadly. — Noble Dust

That's a bold claim, do you have any evidence for that, or are we switching back to discussing what we 'reckon'? I'm finding it hard to keep track of the constant changes in requirement. When religion and phenomenology are discussed we seem only to require 'intuition' and a sage-like nodding of the head to approve it. When others not 'in the club' make claims we seem to revert to needing evidence.

Perhaps in future you could preface your propositions with some kind of label to that effect, then I know whether I can provide counter arguments from intuition, or if I need to provide empirical evidence.

the understanding of philosophy so far demonstrated by pseudo is so poverty stricken that it's hard to take much of what is said here seriously at all - not to speak of science itself. — StreetlightX

Classic. "X doesn't agree with me, therefore he must have failed to understand my ideas".

If you have an actual argument then make it. This is a forum, not a private members club; unless I've mistaken the intention here entirely, it is not do demonstrate, by exegesis, the breadth of one's library in order to gain approval.

The point someone like Hawking is making is that the whole of philosophy is unnecessary in answering the questions humanity has of its existence. You can't answer that charge by saying that one should demonstrate a better understanding of philosophy, that would be begging the question. The answer to the question of whether philosophy has anything meaningful to say cannot be contained within the Canon of philosophy without first assuming that philosophical investigation can produce a meaningful answer to the question.

So if all you came here to do is whine about how 'misunderstood' philosophy is, then I think you've made your point. If you actually wish to put the effort into making a persuasive argument that it has a meaningful contribution to make that scientists do not, then I'd be interested to hear it.

The overarching aim has always been to understand the human situation. — Janus

So what does 'understand' mean in this context? How does one judge when one has 'understood' the human condition?

In what way has, for example, Camus, understood the human condition significantly more than Aristotle. If philosophy has been heading in the direction of better understanding the human condition for 2000 years it should be a fairly straightforward task for you to demonstrate the way in which the progress has been made.

Science is heading in the direction of making new models of reality which make better predictions about it. The model of a round earth made better predictions about navigation than the model of a flat one, simple. So what might be an equivalent example demonstrating the 'direction' of philosophy?

So taking philosophy for example, what would be some of those aims?

Really? So what would you say their aim was?

This seems like a silly thing to say, when you make claims to authority yourself: — Nop

The difference is that I've associated authority with a position I've attempted to explain. You just said that the point was untenable purely on the basis that modern philosophy says so,with no attempt to argue the case. The reason why this frustrated me is because I don't agree that modern philosophy finds the position untenable, but I'm unable to form an argument to that effect because you've not told me how you've reached that conclusion. I'm not saying don't ever mention which philosophers have shared your views that would be ridiculous, I'm saying don't just say it must be wrong because 'philosophy' says so.

As to the whole issue with engagement, you seem to have missed the point of what I'm saying, so I'll try again. Phenomenology is not necessarily a thing. Husserl thought it was a thing, so did many other thinkers, but many thinkers didn't. We're not obliged to engage with every concept that anyone has ever thought of in order to present our own world-view. I honestly haven't the faintest idea what you think phenomenology has got to do with what Dawkins has said (because you haven't told me, as above), but presuming you present an argument demonstrating how phenomenology is an alternative to Dawkins' ideas, it doesn't follow that he must engage with it in order to be taken seriously. I'm certain his ideas on religion conflict with Christianity, as they do with Greek mythology, shamanism, the specific animism of every tribe in the world. Does he have to carefully explain how each one is wrong before making any statement about religion?

I don't recall reading any papers where Satre engaged with the latest neuroscience before expounding his own version of existential phenomenology.

I hope I don't offend you in this, it's not my intention, but I personally would get more out of the discussion if you could refrain from appealing to authority but rather lay out why you think the counter-arguments are persuasive. Just saying a point is "widely considered to be untenable" or "not taken seriously" doesn't really interest me. I'd be interested to hear why you personally find the ideas untenable or facetious though.

That said, I don't think my criticism of Heidegger relies on equating meaning with propositional content. I expect propositional content from a text claiming to impart some useful theory. Maybe you read Heidegger as poetry, in which case I've no complaints, but it's rarely taken that way, it's presumed that Heidegger is imparting some insight, so I expect to read a proposition there and I find none, hence the words have no meaning relative to their intent.

it shows that Dawkins thinks from the unquestioned premise of Empiricism, and having no insight on Phenomenology — Nop

I think this shows some of the presumptions in accusations of Scientism. Why would you presume that Dawkins thinks from the "unquestioned" premise of empiricism? We don't talk of Berkeley as writing from the 'unquestioned' premise of Idealism, we just accept that he's an idealist. We don't dismiss Quine as all his philosophy comes from the 'unquestioned' premise of Physicalism. So why is Dawkins' empiricism such a problem?

By concluding that he has no insight into phenomenology, you're sounding like your saying "if he doesn't agree with me, he must have not understood it properly". Maybe he's decided that phenomenology is an unnecessary part of his model of the world?

You still seem to be presuming that the language of philosophy is necessary for modelling reality and its just not. It's one way of doing things, there are others.

To put it another way, saying that there needs to be a movement demanding we do not kill for no reason is like having a movement advising that we eat when hungry. Yes, there are some people who do not eat when hungry, there are people with eating disorders who will not eat even though they are hungry, but we do not need a movement to advocate eating just because of a minority whose faculties are not working properly for whatever reason.

Where is there in science a commitment to the sacredness of every individual life, — Wayfarer

I don't think it's present in that form, but I don't think it's present in Christianity either, the crusades are pretty much proof of that. I think what science tells us is that we don't take the killing of another human lightly (which is about as far as Christianity could make any justifiable claim). With science though, it's not telling us we should, it's telling us that we do (together with defining the causes of those rare circumstances where people don't).

Do you think there are scientific reasons why one ought to treat people equally, or care for the poor and sick? — Wayfarer

No, I think there is scientific evidence that we do (in most cases), and there are scientific methods for analysing our efforts to do so to see which work best. The issue of whether we 'ought' is only relevant presuming free-will, and I do not.

I did say "many consider" rather than claiming a universal truth, but I'm certainly one of those many people, as is Bertrand Russell, for example, so it's not just an uninformed opinion.

I can't speak for Russell, but by it I mean fairly straightforwardly that words do not come to actually 'mean' anything to me, in that they seem to have no propositional content.

I do subscribe fairly closely to an analytical approach to language. Language is a tool we use to help groups with disparate beliefs communicate. It simply fails to work if it is too subjective. Where I differ from Positivists with regards to language is that I don't think it needs to be fixed to predicate logic, only that it needs to be objectively negotiated, not freely redefined without consideration.

That raises two questions ;

Why do you think a belief that science can answer questions about, for example, morality is religious, but a belief that it cannot is not?

Do you think, then, that the pejorative use of the term is something which should be admonished, or that it's OK to treat any religious belief within derision. Or maybe for some reason a religious belief in science is reprehensible but a religious belief in God is OK?

Well, the headline question maybe. The main bulk of the investigation though was why the term was used pejoratively. I don't yet have a clear understanding of that.

Roughly speaking I think that's true by definition. Science is the investigation of that which is objective. I think the only grey area might be, as Quine has already pointed out, the classification of objectively measurable objects (and the classification of those classes, and so on). Thus mathematics is potentially objective, insofar as it is set theory based. But even to this point Quine was adamant that further excesses of mathematics were subjective, and issues like Russell's Paradox raised problems even for the objectivity of mathematics as we currently know it.

Personally, and I think it is the information, not the objects which are objective, uniting both mathematics and quantum physics, but that's far from a falsifiable theory as yet.

What can be said with some certainty, I think, is that no other field has a better claim to objectivity than science.

But when you first experience anything, where did that come from? — Caldwell

My senses, translated into thoughts by my brain.

As a young child, what did you experience and how did you articulate it? — Caldwell

The world; and I didn’t articulate it because I hadn't learned how to talk.

I'm not sure where you're going with this.

I'm not sure what point you are trying to make by that comparison. If Elle MacPherson said she didn't think people should read books they haven't written themself, that's no less an opinion than the Professor of English Literature at Cambridge. No knowledge of literature provides anyone with an answer to the question of what books people 'should' read.

This is something which crops up a lot on philosophy, the constant switching between objectivity and subjectivity depending on convenience. Philosophy is about providing convincing arguments, it is entirely subjective, in the same way as English literature. If a philosophy professor wanted to offer their opinion as to what they thought the speed of light might be, they would, quite rightly, be told to shut up, but it is not the same the other way round. There is no 'right' way to think about morality, there are just more or less persuasive arguments. No one's comments can be said to be 'ignorant' because there is no body of knowledge to be aware of, only a body of opinion. If I wish to voice an opinion about the beauty of a sunset is it necessary for me to have first read what everyone else has said about sunsets?

I sympathise with the desire to filter new ideas by some heuristic, and if that rules out unremarkable physicists who wish to contribute to philosophical questions then so be it.

I'm really not sure though that philosophy is the sort of subject one could reasonably be asked to have 'investigated' prior to comment. The history of philosophy is so blindly aimless that to suggest there is some canon of work leading incrementally up to the positions held nowadays in some subject is stretching the point.

Nobody confuses their mental state and/or behaviour with their genitals. — Michael

I don't know, I can think of a few footballers who do.