"Common" begs the question. — gurugeorge

No it doesn't. Land, water, air, natural resources are all either "common" assets or taken by force. Unless you are advocating taking possession of things by force, then there are such things as common assets.

They're pretty major and intimidating to the people who were subjected to them. — gurugeorge

Good, that was the intention I think. If you're going to spout some racist bullshit dressed up as some socio-political theory, then you'd best be prepared for some pretty intimidating displays of hatred. People do, quite fairly, hate that stuff. It's caused not only years of violent oppression in America, South Africa an India, but also the deaths of six million Jews. I think a few scuffles is an extremely polite response in the circumstances.

Why are you sneaking "incontrovertible" in here? I didn't use the concept. — gurugeorge

Because without it being incontrovertible, it is you who are attempting to shut down debate. If it's not incontrovertible, then it is just informed opinion. Why are people who have a different informed opinion to you deserving of "contempt" exactly?

And some minor college sub-rules and a handful of scuffles do not constitute an attempt to "silence" the thinkers you mention. In fact none of them were involved in any of the cases you cite, so I will ask again, where is your evidence that any of the thinkers you have listed have had any serious attempts made to "silence" them?

If a dog could feign a happy tail wag in order to fool another dog so as to achieve some other purpose, then we would have the start of a symbolic or abstract level of semiosis. — apokrisis

Try;
Mitchell, Robert W.; Thompson, Nicholas S. (1986). Deception, Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit.
Byrne, R.; Whiten. A. (1991). Computation and mindreading in primate tactical deception. In Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. Whiten, A. (ed.). pp. 127-141. Cambridge: Basil blackwell
Byrne, Richard; Whiten, A. (1985). "Tactical deception of familiar individuals in baboons (Papio ursinus)". Animal Behaviour. 33 (2): 669–673.
Byrne, Richard; Corp, Nadia (2004). "Neocortex size predicts deception rate in primates". The Royal Society. 271: 1693–1699
Simmons, R (1992). "Brood adoption and deceit among African marsh harriers, Circus ranivorus". Ibis. 134: 32–34
Bugnyarf, T.; Kotrschal, K. (2002). "Observational learning and the raiding of food caches in ravens, Corvus corax: is it 'tactical' deception?". Animal Behaviour. 64: 185–195
Byrne, R. and whiten. A., (1991). Computation and mindreading in primate tactical deception. In Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading.
deWaal, F., (1986). Deception in the natural communication of chimpanzees. In Deception: Perspectives on Human and Non-human Deceit. Mitchell, (ed.). pp. 221-224
Kirkpatrick, C., (2007). Tactical deception and the great apes: Insight into the question of theory of mind,"
Byrne, Richard; Whiten (1985). "Tactical deception of familiar individuals in baboons (Papio ursinus)". Animal Behaviour. 33 (2): 669–673.
Wheeler, Brandon (2009). "Monkeys crying wolf? Tufted". The Royal Society. 276: 3013–3018
Miles, H. L. (1986). How can I tell a lie? Apes, language, and the problem of deception. Deception: Perspectives on human and nonhuman deceit, 245-266.

I would need to think about and determine whether all the items you list are proscribed by the natural law — Thorongil

WTF! Who put you in charge of what things are proscribed by natural law?

One of the things that is pissing me off about the comments on this thread is the absolute certainty that a man of forty could not have good intentions towards a girl of 17. A lot of men and women live with people a lot younger than they are. — Sir2u

Absolutely, I personally know a couple with a twenty one year age gap, a ex-student and a teacher at college. They are happily married and have been for the ten years I've known them. They have a wonderful little girl who is doted on by both.

Even though pregnancy is a huge concern of mine, the mental affects a 40+yr old man having sex with my 17 year old daughter would be far more lasting. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Far more lasting than an unwanted pregnancy? I really don't think you'd have any psychologist back you up on that assertion.

I think you are mistaking a "utilitarian perspective" with a "Parents perspective". — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Right, so your argument is that the age of consent should stay where it is because you "as a parent" want it there. Well I "as a parent" don't. That's not how we do ethics.

if it affects another in a bad way, the law most certainly does intervene. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

You've shifted the goal posts, we're not talking about if it affects another, we're talking about if it affect themselves. The only harm we're considering here is the harm to the teenager themselves. Your arguing that the law should be used to prevent them from harming themselves psychologically, I'm asking you why you do not consider the same should be the case of adults who have proven themselves to be bad decision makers. Why do we not have laws preventing known alcoholics from buying more alcohol? Why do we not have laws against fast-food, coffee, adventure sports, fast cars...all areas where people have demonstrably made bad decision which have resulted in serious harm. What is it about sex in young adults that you want to single out for the harm it may cause?

If my 17 year old chose to have sex with someone who was 40+yrs old, I would be looking to put both of them through a therapy of choice. He could go to jail and she would go to counseling to try and get to the root of why she is looking for comfort in the man my age, not her age. — ArguingWAristotleTiff

Yes, but you still haven't explained why, other than repeated assertions that you personally wouldn't like it and that it might harm the child psychologically. Overbearing parents have been proven to harm children psychologically, requiring years of therapy to overcome, shall we throw them in jail too?

I haven't denied that animals are capable of signaling in quite complex ways, but any assertion like the one underlined would need to be supported by strong argument. — Janus

It is supported by strong arguments. 20 years of scientific research into animal communication. Thousands of recordings analysed and matched to very subtle behavioural clues as to the mental states of the animal involved by people far more qualified to make such judgements than you or I.

Notwithstanding the above, I take issue with your anthropocentric assertion that it would need to be supported by a very strong argument. Why? Why is it not the case that the idea that human beings are magically endowed with some special powers unavailable to other animals is the one requiring a 'very strong argument' to support it?

it would be a perversion of the term "belief' to say that she therefore necessarily believes that the sky is blue. — Janus

The whole point of this discussion is about the meaning of the term belief. To suggest anything would be a 'perversion' of the term begs the question. We're asking what the term means, we cannot dismiss options on the grounds that they would be a 'perversion' of what the term means in the middle of such an investigation, it makes the whole matter pointless. If you already know for a fact what belief's are then why are you taking part?

I don't think it is plausible that a percipient could form such an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity. In any case how could we ever know that they were able to formulate abstract concepts in the absence of symbolic language? — Janus

These two statements are self-contradictory. In the first you claim that it is not plausible that something could form an abstract concept in the absence of linguistic capacity, then you state that we would know whether they had or not anyway. Well if the second conclusion is true, how have you formed the first other than through anthropocentric prejudice.

The whole argument seems to be of the form -

"Animals can't form beliefs because they don't have language"
- "But animals do seem to have a language capable of communicating abstract concepts such as beliefs"
"They can't have"
- " Why not?"
" Because animals can't form beliefs"

It is significant that in your second paragraph above you place "believe" between inverted commas; it seems to show that you are not counting it as fully fledged belief. — Janus

No, the use of inverted commas indicates that the term has a disputed meaning, I'm acknowledging that we do not agree on it.

Also, no amount of neuroscientific research can show that consciousness is an epiphenomenon; that will always be merely one among other possible interpretations of the results. — Janus

Absolutely, that;s why I am always (well...usually) careful to make the claim that "There are evidence-based theories which suggest that free-will and the self are both illusory and are not what we think they are". Suggest, not prove.

What I objected to was your trying to claim that it was "not knowledge". I honestly know of no better description for knowledge than a falsifiable theory which is based on existing justified beliefs and against which there is no overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Such is the theory that free-will and conciousness are illusions.

Thus, consciousness is needed to make physical reality meaningful. — Wayfarer

Here he's providing his opinion on what makes an observation meaningful, he's not making anything like the claim you're making, that concious observation is actually required to "actualise the potential". All those potentials were quite happily "actualised" well before the evolution of conciousness.

This is because science naturally assume a realist attitude; but that is precisely what is at issue in this whole topic. It is the reason that the particle-wave duality and so on are large, unsolved problems in philosophy of science, as I understand it. — Wayfarer

I understand that, but you keep shutting down the opposing stories as if they had some kind of world-dominating agenda. Other people do not agree that these unsolved problems are best solved by inventing some spiritual woo, they think they can be solved whilst maintaining realism, there are theoretical solutions to the problems of quantum physics that maintain physicalism, there are even interpretations that maintain determinism. No-one's trying to "push an agenda" against all the evidence as you so frequently portray it, people are just trying to fit the evidence into they way they see the world.

If more people see the world through physicalism than through your brand of spiritualism, then tough. You're going to have a hard time getting your opinions taken seriously. Same went for the likes of Galileo the other way round 400 years ago.

But my indecision in these areas doesn't affect my claim with respect to abortion. — Thorongil

Of course it does. We've agreed that there are circumstances under which the morality of killing of an innocent person needs to be justified. The very fact that you are undecided about euthanasia, no matter what your 'leaning' demonstrates that other factors need to be considered. Were that not the case, there would be no deliberation necessary, euthanasia would be automatically morally wrong, end of discussion. But there is a discussion, you have taken other factors into consideration, so let's discuss those factors, rather than ignore them in favour of some moral absolutism that isn't really there.

I haven't quite made up my mind on that issue, — Thorongil

Right, so it is either untrue to say that all killing of another person is automatically murder, or untrue to say that all murder is automatically morally wrong (if, for some reason, you want to define murder other than by its legal definition).

Either way, there are circumstances in which the killing of a completely innocent person is not automatically morally wrong.

Which means that, if you want to make an argument that abortion is morally wrong, it is not sufficient to demonstrate that the foetus is a person, you must go on to say why it is that killing that particular person, in those circumstances, is wrong (like murder) and not ambiguous (like euthanasia).

Murder is intrinsically immoral. Laws don't make it so. — Thorongil

So is euthanasia murder?

Utilitarians are morally decrepit......NEXT! — LostThomist

And to think I wasted so much time in long ethical debates in my career. I wish I'd just come and asked you first.

There is a moral duty not to murder it once alive. — Thorongil

What's that got to do with it? No one's talking about murder.

No, I absolutely agree with objective morality, but you have not demonstrated objectively that once a thing has been identified as a human being it is automatically a moral duty to keep it alive.

consciousness plays a role in actualising the potential through the process of observation. — Wayfarer

"Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory." - Werner Heisenberg,

"Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not." - Richard Feynman

"Was the wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some highly qualified measurer - with a PhD?" -John Stewart Bell

men like to focus on the one issue where their own innocence is assured. — unenlightened

Very insightful comment. I hadn't thought of it like that.

Normal has an ontological and epistemological connotation beyond simple cultural acceptance. Normal against what? — Noble Dust

Well I'd agree, but the only contender might be biological, which is also evidenced by study of ancient remains. How were you imagining we might approach a view of what's 'normal'? Random guesswork, we all have a shout about what we 'reckon' and the most popular one wins?

Further more, I don't care about paleoanthropomorphicaloligal evidence — Noble Dust

No, we can't let evidence get in the way of a good reckon.

That reality is only normal within a modern world in which these things are possible. — Noble Dust

No, infanticide is unfortunately considered necessary in many tribal cultures and paleoanthropological evidence seems to suggest it has been since human culture began, so yes the decision to end a life in the face of interminable suffering is, unfortunately 'normal'.

The ability doesn't suggest the moral. — Noble Dust

I haven't in any of my posts suggested it does. I've merely pointed out that it cannot be taken as given that because a foetus can be considered a human being, it automatically follows that it is immoral to terminate it.

Yes, the decision to end a life in the face of interminable suffering is unfortunately normal (in the sense that it is typical or to be expected). I fully 'expect' that another 6,000 people will make a similar decision next year.

Is there something about that you find funny?

Normal - "usual, typical or expected". What part of the definition are you not getting?

Yes, any time I'm in permanent pain, any time my life would almost certainly be one of suffering, any time I'm in a state where there is no-one to care for me and I have no sense of what the world is, no hopes or feelings, then yes, you may terminate me. 6,000 people a year in the UK unfortunately make that decision for themselves, it's a perfectly normal decision to make.

It would be far better, and more honest, to simply say one wants to steal from the rich to give to the poor — gurugeorge

OK, so what constitutes 'theft', what marks it out exactly? Does marching into a place with guns and declaring that the entire country and all it's assets belongs to you count as theft? Because that's how literally all property ownership came about, which is the basis of wealth.

You seem OK with theft when it was perpetrated by violence a few hundred years ago and fine with a proportion of the population living fat off the benefits of it, but when a section of the population try to do the same by activism and non-violent protest, they're apparently acting immorally?

So after all that, let's say, for the sake of argument, you have proven that a foetus, at any age is a human being. Now prove to me that killing an innocent human being is immoral in all circumstances. If someone was in terminal pain but could not speak to express their wishes, would killing them be immoral? If someone was in a complete vegetative state from which they were unlikely to revive, would turning off the life support be immoral? You may have your own moral ideas formed by your religion, but these are relatively modern by human standards. Tribal cultures have been practising infanticide for thousands of years on babies they know they cannot care for, and although demonstrably traumatic for the whole tribe, it is justified (by them) on the basis that the life the child could expect would be one of suffering which, if the child could express a wish, they would not want. The fact that modern medicine can offer abortion is massive improvement on the same principle.

You still have some work to do if you want to offer a complete argument against abortion, form a utilitarian perspective, you have to balance the harms, from a virtue ethic you need to show what virtue is being cultivated by bringing a life into the world which is more likely than not to suffer, in deontology, universalizing a principle that all humans must be kept alive whilst it is possible to do so would cause massive problems for the permanently comatose.

So let's have the rest of your argument - the part where you show how, once we've concluded that a foetus is actually a human, that it follows automatically that we cannot terminate it.

I don't think anyone was arguing that animals do not believe in the sense of expecting and being disposed to act; the point at issue seems to be whether such non-linguistic believings are propositional in the sense that linguistically formulated beliefs are, and, in consequence of that, whether or not they should be considered equivalent to linguistically formulated beliefs. — Janus

Cornell University researchers studying Elephant Language since 1986 have concluded "We believe that very complex information is communicated acoustically, including emotive state, physical characteristics, intention, and perhaps reference to abstract concepts."

Prairie Dogs give alarm call which reliably convey predator type, size, colour, speed and direction of a predator, as do several types of primate. African hunting Dogs and Wolves also convey similar signals about threats and opportunities appropriate to carnivores. These activities cause appropriate defensive behaviour. How could appropriate defensive behaviour possibly be taken if the the animal doing the communication does not 'believe' the predator does have the properties it's describing and the listeners do actually 'believe' that too?

Since these beliefs are vocalised, they fall on the same side of the sharp distinction you're trying to make. Yet, these action are not present in only the most intelligent of animals, there is no pattern to their evolution, there's no ecological significance that has been noted. It just seems that in some circumstances there is an evolutionary advantage to vocalising the beliefs about predators/dangers. Is it not, therefore, the much simpler theory to presume that all 'beliefs' are of the same type, human or other animal, and it is merely appropriate sometimes to vocalise them?

In any case, all this is going well off-topic re the thread. — Janus

You're right, if you want to start a new thread, I will answer there, otherwise I may consider doing so myself in a few days, as I should like to try and understand your position better.

OK, then give an account of such a theory and the evidence that purportedly supports it. — Janus

I obviously can't give an account of an entire neuroscientific theory and all the evidence used to back it up on a philosophy forum. Unlike the bullshit that's often peddled here there is a vast weight of experimental evidence which supports the argument, far more than would fit in one post.

If you actually want an account (I'm guessing you don't and you're just being rhetorical for effect), then I suggest you read 'The Self Illusion' by Bruce Hood, which is a good approachable introduction to the subject.

For a brief introduction, there's a slideshare of Rick Hanson's talk on the subject https://www.slideshare.net/drrickhanson/notself-in-the-brain-rick-hanson-phd

If you want a more philosophical approach you could try 'The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self' by Thomas Metzinger.

Susan Blackmore has written extensively about the illusions of both self and conciousness, the argument is laid out in 'Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction'.

Patricia Churchland's “Touching A Nerve: The Self As Brain.” also gives a good account.

The argument is, in it's most basic form, that a wide range of studies such as these (just to give you an example) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S001002770400099X https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jocn.2006.18.9.1586 show that what we talk about when we describe our 'selves' in neither consistent, nor reflected in our actions. Something which does not have an effect on the real world (the 'self' that we describe does not affect our actions), and changes it's properties entirely based on a subjective feeling, is not real. If it were, then Jabberwockies would be real too.

But all that goes out the window if it's simply a fact that (to take the racial angle) Jews are on average smarter than Asians, who are on average smarter than Whites, who are on average smarter than Browns, who are on average smarter than Blacks, and if these groups on average have strongly-genetically-influenced inclinations to different kinds of social interaction, different reproductive strategies, different political preferences, different preferences for how they spend their time, different capacities for deferred gratification, different proclivities in relation to violence, etc., etc. — gurugeorge

Right, so where's the incontrovertible evidence you talked about?

All you've done is listed books and thinkers who've commented on these abhorrently racists and sexist ideas, give me examples of where someone has attempted to "silence" them. Not 'disagree' with them, not say that they are not welcome on private property, not tell them that their language breaches rules of a private company who has every right to set whatever rules they like. Actually attempting to silence them.

As far as I can see,

'The Bell Curve' is freely available on Amazon.

Jonathan Haidt is frequently published, still holds his professional position and has several influential roles in academia.

Steven Pinker and Sam Harris are both tenured academics whose books are freely available and who are frequently published and cited in academic literature.

Jordan Peterson maintains his academic position, he's barely off the television these days and YouTube is littered with his obnoxious ranting.

Thomas Sowell is currently Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, he writes columns for Forbes and has several published books and papers in free circulation.

The Ben Shapiro podcast is downloaded 10 million times each month. Ben Shapiro's ban from DePaul was the result of an incident with a previous incendiary speaker in which two people stormed the stage. If you're seriously suggesting that two people constitute a mass conspiracy, then you're more paranoid than I thought.

David Horowitz is editor of a publish, wide circulation magazine, author of several books still in print and his foundation still sponsors events on campuses across the US.

So where is all this silencing you're going on about?

I was reminded of this study in another discussion about voting ability in the mentally ill, but it's relevant here too. The criteria used in law to decide if a person is capable of making a rational, informed choice is the MacCAT-CR test. When that test is applied to children, about half of 7-11 year olds pass, almost all over 11 year olds pass the test.

On a separate note, check your statistics. Countries with lower ages of consent have lower rates of teenage pregnancies, so if you're really concerned about teenage pregnancy then you should logically be arguing in favour of lowering the age of consent.

You both seem to be arguing from a utilitarian perspective that because some harm can arise from the young adult's actions you (or the law) is justified in acting to prevent that harm.

But this alone is clearly not enough, adults make really bad decisions and yet the law does not intervene. We could, for example ban people from drinking alcohol if they've ever made a bad choice and drunk too much. We could make it illegal to have sex with someone who has had an abortion. We could put anti-social octogenarians under house arrest.

So why don't we do these things, they would be quite certain to avoid further harms. In fact someone whose already had an unwanted pregnancy has proved themselves at least likely to make the same mistake again. More than can be said for the teenager.

We don't do them for one of two reasons, both of which you are both ignoring. Either we consider autonomy to be a right and so it is a duty to maintain it, or, remaining utilitarian, we consider the harms of acting outweigh the harms of not.

So my question to you both is, if you think that a 17 year old should have the full authority of the law brought to bear to ban them from having sex with whomever they choose, then why would you not extend the same ban to those adults who have demonstrated themselves by their actions liable to make the exact same bad decisions that you are concerned the 17 year old will make?

People are not equal in their capacities, capabilities and inclinations. — gurugeorge

OK, so which prominent "Liberal intellectuals" have claimed that "People are equal in their capacities, capabilities or inclinations." I've not heard any myself. I've heard a lot of people claim that race, gender and sexual it are not determining factors in all those things, but not that all people in the world are equal in those properties.

"Attempts." — gurugeorge

I see, what constitutes an attempt, in your view?

Interesting, it sounds to me like they're using a barely modified version of the MacCAT-CR tests. If so, I'm sure they help here, but with interesting consequences. It has been demonstrated, for example, that children above the age of 11.2yrs consistently pass this test.

https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-015-0067-z

Great, thanks.

there are considerable measures and clinical techniques that can ascertain their decision-making process and provide suitable methods to instruct and educate so that they can make informed choices and decisions. — TimeLine

Which techniques are you referring to here, do you have any references to hand?

It is nevertheless a fact that Sam Harris has never worked as a neuroscientist, but as a pop philosopher - and that’s not an ad hominem but a statement of fact. — Wayfarer

The claim of ad hominem does not depend on the attack being a lie, the fact that your assessment of Harris's CV is accurate has nothing to do with it. It's ad hominem because you placed this attack in an argument about a subject matter on which Sam Harris also speaks. You're clearly trying to say that this line of argument is likely to be false because one of it's proponents lacks teaching experience, without paying any attention to all of its other proponents, and you accused him of cherry-picking.

If you have an actual line of argument then lay it out and defend it, please, as many have asked before me, stop making wild accusations against physicalists and then hiding behind long historical anecdotes or ad hominem attacks when you are asked to support your claims. It makes for a very poor discussion, which is what this site is all about.

What? The logical subject is sufficiently similar to the physical object? No, there is a categorical difference between them. They do not have the same type of existence at all. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm saying that the similar things are the properties as contained within the 'idea of the thing' are similar to the properties of the thing. In the same way as a photograph of the Eiffel tower is similar to the Eiffel tower in some important aspects despite being in a different medium (2D paper as opposed to 3D reality). Everyone would still recognise the Eiffel tower from a photograph of it, no-one is going to say "well I don't know what this is at all, the Eiffel tower is a massive three dimensional steel structure, this is a piece of paper with some photographic ink on it, the two thing are completely unalike".
Moreover, everyone would recognise that a photograph of something else entirely was totally unrelated to the Eiffel tower in a way that the photograph of it was not.

The blue prints for the Eiffel tower would represent it even more accurately, despite still being ink and paper rather than three-dimensional steel structure, as would the blueprints for another building be totally unrelated.

So it is with our 'idea of the thing' and 'the thing in itself'. If our 'idea of the thing' comes in some way from 'the thing itself' then it will likely be similar to everyone else's 'idea of the thing' because all 'ideas of the thing' will have had the same cause and so will be similar, like if everyone took a photograph of the Eiffel tower, they might be from different angles or photographic quality, but all recognisably similar.

But if my 'idea of the thing' differs radically from yours, then it is more likely that the ideas have been causes by something other than 'the thing itself' because how could 'the thing itself' cause in us two such radically different ideas? It would be like seeing two radically different photographs and claiming that they were both of the Eiffel tower. Not impossible, but unlikely.

You're still falling into a conflation of domains. Of course acting for reasons is not random; but it is also not deterministic; I can choose which reasons to act or believe on account of. That freedom to choose is just what is meant by free will. — Janus

Fie, so what causes you to choose the option you choose. How could you choose other than the option which seems like the right one? If you're choosing between vanilla and chocolate ice cream, at what point in the process do you tell your brain to choose vanilla, despite the fact that it registers a preference for chocolate? when do you tell your brain to create that thought to tell your brain to do that?...and so on.

Ironically it seems to be you that is falling into a Cartesian dualism in imagining that cogitation and will are ontologically, as opposed to merely heuristically, separate. — Janus

I'm trying to understand your position that genuine free-will exists without dualism, it's a very unusual position. Every philosopher I've ever read on the subject has either been a dualism or a compatibilist, I've never encountered such a view as yours and I don't understand the mechanism you're proposing at all.

Prior events are probablistically, not deterministically, related to subsequent events; that is a way we can understand what we think of as physical reality; it is merely a human understanding, that should not be reified into some ontological absolute. — Janus

So you're suggesting now that states are not probabilistically determined by prior states, that this is only a "human understanding", so what does determine current states of the extensa then?