I thought Bohm's idea was just an inelegant and superfluous attempt to retain discrete particles and a purely objective pre or no-collapse reality. But what is the motivation for retaining this idea given what we know now? — Bodhy

Well, the main motivation remains the same, I think, i.e. retaining the idea that physics is about describing the world 'as it is' also when measurements are not made. Not only for de Broglie-Bohm interpretation(s) (dBB) but for all 'realist' ones.

Anyway, I read of one dBB proponent who give an additional reasoning: for him, dBB has the advantage of making QM visualizable. And visualization has been an extremely useful tool for physicists.

As I said, personally I prefer an epistemic approach but I repsect 'realists'. Even if their interpretations are wrong, I still think that they can give us insights.

Isn't it the case we now have significant experimental refutation of hidden variables, such as Bell's Theory, Legget-Garg inequalities, and Kochen-Specker theorem? — Bodhy

dBB gives the same preidictions as 'usual' QM. No result you mentioned here falsify it. There are more technical difficulties when QFT is taken into account but some proponents insist that a dBB version of QFT is acheavable. Others disagree.

IMO, this takes us some way beyond the traditional positions of monism, dualism, reductionism etc. to some sort of metaphysics which needs a new vocabulary, like the kind of constructivist pluralism I've been talking about here. — Bodhy

Well, the fact that 'taken literally' modern physical theories give us 'pictures of realities' which seem getting progressively weird is a good clue that there is a limitation of our ability to arrive at a conceptual and mathematical description of 'how physical reality is in itself'. This also suggests to me that physical theories shouldn't be taken as 'literal portraits' of the 'external, physical world'.

Hence, physical theories use useful conceptual fictions that can be used to make predictions, applications and so on. These conceptualizations are, therefore, very useful for understanding the regularities of phenomena of the empirical reality. We cannot, however, get 'true knowledge' of the 'external world as it is in itself' (see my references about the 'two truths' and skepticism).

On the other hand, I also do not 'forbid' speculations about the ontology of 'external world'. But I don't think that scientific knowledge can enlighten us about which speculative ontology is the 'right' one.

Ok, thanks for the clarification.

I don't think things are so different in the US, although for some time now there has been ongoing effort in the US to communicate that there is an autism "spectrum". — wonderer1

Well, I sort of agree with that: the difference is not so great, but IMO there is. Anyway, I don't think that Italy is 'late' because of some pecularity of my country. Actually, I think that the main problem is linguistic. Scientific research (included the one in 'neurodivergence') is all written in English. There is simply much more information in the 'anglosphere' than in other areas.

Thinking about this prompted me to take a look at the Wikipedia page for Hans Asperger. Not a very flattering picture. I wonder if Hans Asperger's association with Nazism and eugenics impeded the propagation of his insights. — wonderer1

Yeah, agreed!

I'd be very interested in hearing more, if you are comfortable elaborating. — wonderer1

The way I socialize and my sense of humor are just very peculiar. They are generally appreciated and I am considered somewhat 'original'. This originality is both something spontaneous and an ironic result of my attempt to try to 'fit in' and being more like others. Consciously monitoring my behaviors, thinking about 'what I should say' to be friendly/entertain etc has the result of me being seen as 'original', weird in a positive sense, I would guess (note that I do all of that in a somewhat automatic way, I have an instict to do that...). I don't consider it a negative trait, of course it has its 'perks', but is not something that renders social relations really satisfying.

I can have friendships, having a very good time with others but the a nagging sense of 'alienation' is still present, like say if I belonged to somewhere else. There is a difference in how I communicate, what I consider natural/obvious and so on.

Well, if you want I can share something more 'personal' in PM, if you are interested.

One thing I like about TPF is that I feel comfortable here using whatever vocabulary comes to mind, rather than feeling like I need to consider whether the person I am talking to will see me as ostentatious if I am not circumspect in my use of language. — wonderer1

I fully agree with this. How much I would like that 'real life' is like this forum, lol...

I'm still experiencing occasional PTSD 'aftershocks', but I am much better now. I can't think of anything that has come along so 'out of the blue' and triggered a reaction in me the way that self defense thread did. — wonderer1

I see, I am sorry for that, it must be very difficult to handle.

Refusing to "go over the top" or to open fire when instructed, is an act of cowardice. — Tarskian

Not sure how it is relevant in a discussion about Christianity.

Christianity is deemed to have some responsibility for the fact that Germany lost both world wars: — Tarskian

And this at least in the case of WW2, it has been a good thing, I would say.

Anyway... 'self-defence' doesn't make oneself a 'brute', in my view. If one acts violently only when an existential threat is there, I wouldn't consider that an act of 'brutality'. 'Brutality' is when one kills, oppresses etc in other situations where other means could bring the same result. For instance, I would say that killing unarmed war prisoners is an act of brutality (it is considered a war crime after all), whereas killing during a battle isn't. I don't think that all soldiers are 'brutes' because they are willing to kill in battle. I would say that for many of them violence is only a tragic necessity.

But even any 'theological' defence of 'self-defence' in Christianity is IMO questionable, let alone a defence of being a 'brute'. Frankly, I see even self-defence as problematic if one wants to follow the Gospels, Paul etc

But again I am not sure of what your point is.

Thank you very much for the discussion!

Then, there is the second-order one: Regardless of whether you are yourself a coward or a brute, do you prefer to be surrounded by cowards or by brutes? — Tarskian

'Not being a brute' is hardly the same as 'being a coward'. If 'not being a brute' means to be 'non violent', I hardly see how being 'non violent' is being a coward.

BTW, it is for me unsurpassingly strange how some christians chose to be violent etc when their core belief is that God himself chose not 'defend Himself' and die on the cross. And, say, when Saint Paul reccomended to have the 'same mindset' as Jesus (see my posts above with the quotations). I consider it one of the most disconcerting mysteries in human history.

With regard to explanation, you could equally ask why should there not be universality without reason? — Apustimelogist

Well that's a good question. I don't have an answer for that (I do however think that regularities in nature can be taken as 'clues' for some kind of 'transcendent Reason'... but I won't digress)

Regardless of that, I think however that universality is better explained in some kind of 'holistic' picture than a 'bottom-up' one. But YMMV. After all, none of these two pictures can be 'proved'.

The Bohmian formulation is very closely related to the stochastic one. Effectively The stochastic mechanics momentum / velocities are equivalent to the standard quantum ones. Bohmian mechanics includes very similar kinds of momentum /velocity to the stochastic ones abd then essentially adds extra deterministic particle trajectories on top of it. The way I personally see it, the main difference between Bohm and stochastic mechanics is that the latter eschews this last assumption of additional deterministic trajectories. Without that, the natural way to viee trajectories is stochastic and we see this directly in the path integral formulation of standard mechanics because the paths in this formulation that are used to calculate ptobabilities are the same as the stochastic mechanics particle trajectories. Because quantum mechanics is so bizarre though, it is always assumed these paths in the path integral formulation are not real but purely computational tools. Stochastic mechanics just takes them at face value. — Apustimelogist

Thanks for this. So, the trajectories themselves are determined probabilistically, rather than deterministically. Interesting, thanks.

You can either get accused of being a coward or else of being a brute. Feel free to pick your poison. — Tarskian

Well, as Socrates said ""It is better to suffer injustice than to do wrong" (I don't remember where and if the phrase is exactly this, but I do remember this in one platonic dialogue). Also in the Bible it is said, for instance, "For it is better, if it is God’s will, to suffer for doing good than for doing evil." (1 Peter 3:17, NIV translation). So, yeah, I would say that it is better to have a reputation of being a 'coward' than act as a 'brute'. And I would say that specifically for Christians being a 'brute' contradicts these words: "My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place." (John 18:36, quoted before)

No, "society" doesn't suffer, individuals with POVs do. I make a distinction between mitigation ethics and preventative ethics. Once born, we are in mitigation ethics mode where indeed, we may have to trade greater harms for lesser harms. Uniquely for the procreational decision, we can be in preventative ethics, where absolutely/purely we can make a decision to prevent ALL harm to a future person whereby no drawback (lesser harm) is had for that person. No ONE is deprived. And ANs generally all agree that (unlike your definition of ethics), positive ethics (other people's projects.. like continuing humanity, wanting to take care of a new person, etc.), should not override individuals' negative ethics (rights not to be harmed, non-consented). — schopenhauer1

I agree that 'society' doesn't suffer but individuals do. And I also agree that we should avoid to cause unnecessary suffering, especially when there is no possibility of consent. 'Not intentionally causing unnecessary harm' seems to be a 'regulative ideal' that we should follow.

And yet, I think that as an ethical duty, if you want, we also have a moral obligation to act for the benefit of others. In fact, I think we should act with the benefit of everyone in sight, although of course we cannot directly benefit to everyone due to our finitude - hence I see this as a 'regulative ideal'. The fact that ethics seems to work only when a community of ethical agents is present seems to me that this second regulative ideal is necessary.

It seems to me that these two 'ideals' give us an ethical dilemma, if we accept both as ethical regulative ideals. Of course, if we give the prominence to the first one, it seems that, unless one holds to some kind of religious/metaphysical beliefs, antinatalism would be right. I'm not convinced, however, that the second 'ideal' is 'lesser' than the first. So, it seems to me that antinatalism isn't the 'best' ethical position for both the 'single individual' and 'all individuals'. I would like to find a way to avoid giving 'prominence' to one ideal over the other. But I admit that at least until now, I never found a solution.

I am very sorry for hear that. I hope that you'll be good soon! :pray:

Imo it would only be 'happy chance' if one of the equivalent descriptions could be the case while the other (e.g. conservation laws) failed, but clearly that isn't the case if one follows from the other formally. — Apustimelogist

Fair enough. Here I disagree but I understand why you can argue for that.

I don't think it is simpler imo; because, if these conservation behaviors are properties of individual interactions, and individual interactions can only propagate locally, then there is no reason for me to attribute this as a holistic property of the whole system. The principle applied to the system would be rendered redundant if it holds for subsystems, subsystems of subsystems... right down to local interactions. It would be explanatorily simpler to say that the conservation property holds for the whole system in virtue of the fact it holds at any interaction propagating in some local part of the system. — Apustimelogist

Ok. But what about uniformity/universality of physical laws?
Why, say, do electromagnetic interaction and gravitation seem to behave the same everywhere?
If there weren't any kind of 'top-down' constraints, how can one explain this universality?

Not sure exactly what you mean but stochastically behaving particles (whether classical or quantum) do not have well-defined velocity / momentum in general so in stochastic mechanics velocity fields are constructed using averages regarding particle motion. — Apustimelogist

I meant that in de Broglie Bohm (dBB), the velocities/momenta that one computes in the 'standard way' are not the same as the actual velocities/momenta that the particle have (and when we measure velocities we find the value predicted by QM without contraction with dBB). IIRC, this kind of pecularity of dBB have lead to the objection that 'Bohmian trajectories' are 'surreal' but oddly enough 'weak measurements' displayed them (I remember that about 10 years ago these experiments were taken by some as an evidence against 'standard QM'. But this isn't true...). This objection is of course not a problem for dBB as far as predictions go but it would be certainly strange that when we measure velocities, the 'real' velocity is something else.

It seems that stochastic interpretations do not share this conceptual pecularity. Interesting.

I agree with that. Ethics is born, or created, in between, or out of, two or more people. — Fire Ologist

Right. Also IMO human beings are, so to speak, essentially social. Ethics, in particular, seems to me based on how an individual relates to other individuals. Making an ethical claim by 'abstracting' oneself or another person from the social context seems to me a contradiction.

BTW, I don't think that we must have kids. But I think that the antinatalist ethical 'prohibition' to have kids is wrong. One can choose to not have kids and making arguments for that choices, sure. But saying that it is always ethically wrong to give birth is a different matter.

The first round of testing, even without a very informative diagnosis, was very beneficial for me. The way I saw it then, is that I had been going through life walking into glass walls that everyone else seemed to walk right through. As a result of the testing I was able to get at least a sense of where the glass walls were, and develop work arounds. So I'm inclined to recommend getting the testing, despite it taking some substantial time, and possibly money. — wonderer1

Thank you very much for sharing and for the advice. I am not american but italian BTW, and here it seems that is generally assumed by the general population that 'autism' is always a very, very serious condition. Even 'Asperger's' is seen as something that must be 'self evident' (at least in hindsight) and 'serious'. Forms of autism that are 'not obvious' seem an impossibility.
Of course, this is different for therapists, neurodiversity movements and so on. I think that here we are '10 years behind' the US, so to speak.

I know what you mean about communities. I tend to fade into the background (aside from the occasional smart ass remark) in real life groups. Internet forums, going back to Usenet newsgroups, have been very valuable to me because I can interact at a pace better suited to me. (Although even in internet forums I can often get involved in more discussions than I can really keep up with.) — wonderer1

Curiously enough, I manage to both 'fade away' in 'real life' and be very talkative, sociable, humorous and so on. But even when I am talkative/sociable/humorous I still feel 'out of synch' and in fact I do not do that in a 'ordinary' way so to speak.
Regarding online discussions, yeah, I find generally easier to speak about my interests and make discussions online and I too risk sometimes to spend too much time in them. This is due to both shyness and, so to speak, a lack of motivation to speak about my interests if I am not sure that the other person shares them.

I was telling a friend very recently how reading the book The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace has played a role in my somewhat unorthodox forum behavior. I call it practicing grumpy zebra style center's mind. :wink: — wonderer1

Thanks!

It's been very nice to meet you. — wonderer1

Thank you very much. The same goes for me.

I would say that because Christianity is unfashionable at the moment, anyone can make terribly fallacious arguments against Christianity or Christians and no one bothers to correct them. The thinking is something like, "Yeah, these arguments are garbage, but we know Christianity is false or unimportant anyway, so who cares?" — Leontiskos

Well, yes, there's also that but not only that. And also it is perfectly understandable if christians do not make a philosophical apology for those arguments.

But this isn't an argument for antinatalism. Antinatalism is the view that is morally wrong to give birth. You are merely saying that in some circustances one might choose to not have children.

It seems to me that whatever is conserved is always implied in the described behavior of the interactions. Obviously you might be able to apply these principles as a blanket description of various systems of different sizes and claim holism in virtue of the fact you could be talking about large spatially separated systems. Thinking about it then; for me, I would accept a holistic explanation if say, the forces and displacements in the above link were non-local. But if they are solely local or mediated locally, then I don't see the need for a holistic description. Sure I may not be able to directly explain why these descriptions apply, but if everything interacts only locally then I don't see the need for holistic descriptions. The blanket description for the system would not be distinct from compatible descriptions applied to all the sub-components of a system. — Apustimelogist

Ok, I think I can get what you are sayinh. However, to be fair, it seems to me even in this kind of 'bottom-up' model, conservation laws, symmetries seem like something that happens due to some kind of 'happy chance'. On the other hand, if one considers that, say, the 'universe' as a single 'system' with some kind of properties and derives the behavior of interactions from them the picture is both simpler and less 'fortuitous'. Again, I get that one can say that even those 'properties of the whole' remain unexplained but IMO the picture is simpler. And simplicity seems important.

Regarding the principle of locality (outside quantum non-locality), I get what you mean but I see it as some kind of 'differentiation' principle, so to speak, that itself derives from some kind of global property. I mean, I don't see it as necessarily as a fatal argument.

Based on the Stanford article, I would say the stochastic interpretation manages to fulfil unicity in the sense of: "a single point represents the exact state of a system at any given time" ehich applies to particles but not the wave-function. — Apustimelogist

Ok, interesting. Just for curiosity, but in this interpretation do the 'real' momenta of particles coincide with the 'observed' ones? In de Broglie-Bohm, while the observed position coincides with the 'real' position, this isn't true for momentum/velocity.

Given I've read relatively few posts from you, I don't suppose that image means much to you. However someone who has put some thought into how information processing occurs in neural networks, might recognize that image as pointing towards some substantial differences in thought for the possessors of those different brains. — wonderer1

Well thanks for the interesting info, actually. Anyway as a personal note, I was strongly suspected to be autistic when I was a young kid but I wasn't formally diagnosed (...it's a long story. I am not really interested to getting diagnosed nowadays, although for a 'self-understanding' it would be cool,but for adults the diangostic process is demanding.). BTW, I actually believe that studying the brain can be insightful to understanding our minds. I do not accept physicalism, though.

Now I'm certainly 'less autistic' than Temple Grandin. I can pass as normal enough, and have even had to deal with skepticism towards the idea that I'm ASD on the part of people who know me well. Still, I know what Grandin means, although the social effects have been less profound for me than for her. — wonderer1

FWIW, I also related very strongly with the 'anthropologist on Mars' analogy. I do feel 'estranged', 'out of synch' with others etc. So, I think I can 'get' the feeling (although this 'alienation' can be caused by other factors). I also do 'appear normal' but I do certiainly live in an 'atypical' way, so to speak. I also notice that I 'socialize' in an atypical way etc.
I did in the past read info about autism, took some tests (and actually got scores compatible with autism).
As I said, however, other reasons can explain that and I am not formally diagnosed...

Are we imagining a situation where social interaction between people plays a prominent role? If so, what reason would there be to not expect autistic people in this afterlife to experience a painful sense of being an outsider? How do you imagine things being different? — wonderer1

Well, actually, I only hope that it will be 'good' (and BTW, I am agnostic about that). But even despite my own social difficulties, I recognize that some of the best moments in my life have been when I interacted with people (either online or IRL) and I do have a deep yearning for be part of a comunity (despite often seeking solitude because, well, company is overwhelming, and what seems natural for me is alien for others and viceversa. This 'disagreement' is actually exhausting and can be painful). So, I believe that discomfort/suffering that one can feel due to social interaction is due to contingent causes.
Hence, I believe that if the afterlife will involve a 'communal life' of some sorts this doens't imply that people who have social difficulties right now will suffer.

Well, not sure of your point. If, say, one has no economical problems, would you still think that 'giving birth' is morally wrong?

Also, generally antinatalists argue that 'giving birth' is wrong becuase it is a choice that affects others (in unknown ways) not becuase it undermines our 'self-preservation'. At best your argument is for a personal choice of not giving birth.

You'd have to qualify "foundation" but there are MANY foundational ethical frameworks for which AN conclusions have been drawn or at least "fit into", such as deontological ones (which I hold). Many fall under a negative utilitarian variety. Others are vaguely consequential (environmental ones, probably ones least like the ones I hold). One can even argue for a virtue theory version, that can correspond with Schopenhauer's notion of compassion being THE only real moral sentiment (because it sees everyone as what they truly are.. fellow-sufferers). In this theory, anti-procreation would be a natural course of a virtuous (i.e. compassionate) person. They see what befalls man, and wants to prevent it. In this sense, AN can also be philosophical pessimistic in its foundation. That is to say, there is something INHERENTLY negative about existence that makes it fundamentally never redeemable through social, personal, or political actions. This goes to a vaguely existential understanding of the situation. — schopenhauer1

Well, I see what you mean, but AN makes the claim that 'giving birth is intrinsically bad'. This is an ethical evaluation and quite clearly is incompatible with a 'subjectivist' view of ethics, for instance. Viirtue ethics is probably the best 'foundation' of ethics in general. We might assume that, say, a good action is both good for the recipient of the action and for the agent himself/herself. So, yes, compassion is a good ground for ethics and I agree with Schopenhauer.
It's also compatible IMO with a 'deontological' view: being compassionate is also a duty to both oneself and to others - one should/must seek the good for oneself and others.

'Giving birth' is tricky here because the 'human being' doesn't exist (unless one believes in some kind of existence before birth*, but let's assume that this is not the case). Let's say that we cannot know the 'final outcome'** of the future person life (i.e. if that individual will be satisfied with life or irreversibily unhappy), in this case, clearly we must admit that, after all, we can't say that 'giving birth' is a good act. In this sense I agree with the antinatalists. However, I am not sure if 'giving birth' qualifies as a 'bad' act, even when one considers the future individual.

So deontology generally puts the locus of ethics at the individual level (not all the time, but most.. things like rights/duties). To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. Rather, we have ethical considerations of individuals and their suffering, or right thereof not to be unnecessarily and non-consentingly caused the situations/conditions wherewith (ALL!) suffering takes place. That is not your right to confer for someone else. And there is no symmetrical duties/obligations for creating happiness, especially with understanding that there is no one who exists to be deprived of happiness you would not be thus conferring. — schopenhauer1

Probably, 'deontological' was the wrong word. I believe, however, that ethics itself is intrinsically social. Ethical agency doens't seem to me to make sense without a community. In other words, if, say, 'I act in order to bring the good to myself and to others', then I cannot 'ignore' the presently existent human beings and the human community in general. If one accepts that seeking the 'good' is also a social 'enterprise', then trying to preserve society seems, after all, a 'good' act. If one believes that, clearly there is a contrast with AN.


*For instance, Hindu, Jain and Buddhists believers in reincarnation/rebirth see the 'birth as a human' as something good, precisely because it gives the chance to get better rebirths and liberation. So, if this belief were true, then antinatalism would be wrong.
**As in the other thread, if one believes (as say Christian universalists) that in the 'end' 'all will be well', then of course IMO life would be good for everyone (ultimately).

Christianity is just not good at defending itself. Everybody and their little sister can insult the religion and nobody cares. Well, in that case, I don't care either. — Tarskian

What do you mean by 'defending itself'?? How should religious people defend their religion?

IMO the best 'defence' may be to give an 'exemplary' life. I mean probably the best way for christians to defend their religion would be to lead a loving life and a life of service, i.e. 'carrying the cross' or 'having the mindset of Christ Jesus' as said in the quote in the post above.

Certainly, the fact that, say, historically people have used to make 'forced conversions' and has been imposed violenty probably is also a major motive of the modern crisis of the religion.
Also, in the Gospel of John we read (18:36, NIV):

Jesus said, “My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jewish leaders. But now my kingdom is from another place.”

Also, 'consorship', instead of say, trying to make a philosophical defence against oppoents, has been a disastrous way of 'defending themselves'.

As someone on the autism spectrum, the question arises for me of whether in an afterlife I would be autistic.

If not, then it doesn't seem like it would be me in the afterlife.
If so, and for eternity, I expect I'd think the afterlife kind of sucks. — wonderer1

Well assuming that autism is an essential feature of 'who you are', it might be possible that autism is not a cause of suffering in an afterlife, eternal or not. Not sure why you think it is necessarily bad, unless you think that the 'future life' will be very similar to this life (as I said before, I think that an eternal 'earthly life 2.0' would be bad for everyone, not only for some people)

I have two questions for antinatalists.

The strongest argument IMO for antinatalism (AN) seems to be the one from deontological ethics, i.e. that if we are not sure that life will be a good for the future human being, it's ethically questionable to 'take the risk', especially due to the impossibility of any consent from the future human being ('I cannot chose for others'...).

1) My first question is (especially for those who do not beleive in some 'objective ethics'): what is the foundation of ethics for an antinatalist? It seems that in AN there is a very strong ethical component but if 'ethics' is reduced to some kind of social contract or something 'natural', it seems that AN doens't have a strong justification to be 'better' than others.

2) Also, if one accepts that we also have a 'deontological duty' for others, for the whole human community and if one agrees that 'extinction' of humanity is bad for the whole community then it seems that what the 'deontological' argument for AN leads to is not AN itself but an 'ethical dilemma', i.e. we arrive at a situation where we have two contradictory duties, i.e. we shouldn't decide to 'give life' due to the ignorance/lack of certainty of what that will entail (if we assume that life might be bad in some cases) and the impossibility of consent and at the same time we should, among other things, continue to sustain the whole human community. If all of this is true, why antinatalists think that AN is the best choice?

I wouldn't say that its not like the portait cannot possibly in principle be faithful (where it does not have wrong predictions); but that it cannot tell us anything about reality intrinsically beyond tools that are used by us to essentially anticipate what comes next or came before or what could happen in some scenario. — Apustimelogist

Ok, I see. Yeah, even if the portrait is faithful, it is still a portrait, after all. But IMO the 'weirdness' of modern theories suggests to me that they do not even 'portray' reality. But YMMV.

I feel like my point should be interpretation-independent. — Apustimelogist

Agreed. I meant that in a way non-representationalist interpretations might agree with that.

I disagree. They would still be an inherent part of the descriptions of those interactions, it just doesn't have to be anything more than local to that picture. — Apustimelogist

In a sense, yes, they would describe the behavior of the interactions. But whereas the 'bottom-up' perspective says that conservations law are 'contingent consequences' of the behavior of interactions, the 'top-down' picture (i.e. interactions are more fundamental) says the reverse.

Not entirely sure this is the case. Hard to tell. Imo, the 'holism' can be explained away given that the wave-function isn't real and entanglement depends on local entangling interactions ans locally incompatible observables. — Apustimelogist

I don't see how this isn't some kind of 'non-realism', thought. It seems to imply this rejection of 'unicity', as the article on SEP on Consistent histories uses the term:

But it is contrary to a deeply rooted intuition, shared by philosophers, physicists, and the proverbial man in the street, that at any point in time there is one and only one state of the universe which is “true”, and with which every true statement about the world must be consistent: what is here called unicity. In §2.4, it was argued that because of the noncommutation of quantum projectors, classical unicity must be replaced by quantum pluricity.

Abandoning unicity is certainly a radical proposal, which can only be justified if by doing so one obtains a more coherent and internally consistent understanding of the quantum world, together with a resolution of some of its major problems and paradoxes, such as those described above in §8. In this connection it is worth noting that according to CH the use of a quasiclassical quantum framework, §5, allows one to understand why unicity works so well in the macroscopic quantum world, and hence why its failure in the microscopic domain can be so counterintuitive and hard to grasp. To be sure, there may be other ways of dealing with the quantum mysteries, and it is up to future research to determine whether CH runs into serious problems or continues to resolve the quantum paradoxes to which it is applied. It is also not a foregone conclusion that the quantum Hilbert space, though basic nowadays in almost all applications of quantum theory—quantum foundations is the only notable exception—will continue this leading role or be replaced by something else. Should that occur it would, of course, require the revision or abandonment of any quantum interpretation, such as CH, based firmly on Hilbert space mathematics.

BTW, to answer the OP's question (still I don't see it as relevant), I believe that if a Christian were to convince himself/herself that Chrsitianity is false, then he/she would most likely either (1) choose another religion or become a 'secular Christian', i.e. a non-believer that still follows some ethical teachings and sees the techaings as meaningful. Of course, others might reject completely.

I'm so glad you asked me, because not many people know this. He didn't just carry his cross up the hill, when he got to the top, he was nailed there to it and left until dead — unenlightened

To be fair, that's how Saint Paul himself apparently read the story and he believed that one should follow Jesus' example, at least as he seems to say in the letter to the Philippians (source: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Philippians%202&version=NIV, emphasis mine):

Therefore if you have any encouragement from being united with Christ, if any comfort from his love, if any common sharing in the Spirit, if any tenderness and compassion, 2 then make my joy complete by being like-minded, having the same love, being one in spirit and of one mind. 3 Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather, in humility value others above yourselves, 4 not looking to your own interests but each of you to the interests of the others.
5 In your relationships with one another, have the same mindset as Christ Jesus:
6 Who, being in very nature God,
did not consider equality with God something to be used to his own advantage;
7 rather, he made himself nothing
by taking the very nature of a servant,
being made in human likeness.
8 And being found in appearance as a man,
he humbled himself
by becoming obedient to death—
even death on a cross!

Thanks. I wouldn't call myself a Christian, but I appreciate the story, and hate it when people wilfully distort the meaning or claim the copyright on interpretation. We are surely all God's people, and none are excluded - that's the story. — unenlightened

This is also correct if one takes literally this passage, for instance (source: https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Timothy%202&version=NIV):

I urge, then, first of all, that petitions, prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for all people— 2 for kings and all those in authority, that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness. 3 This is good, and pleases God our Savior, 4 who wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. 5 For there is one God and one mediator between God and mankind, the man Christ Jesus, 6 who gave himself as a ransom for all people.

@apokrisis, @schopenhauer1

Also, another reason why I am not an antinatalist is that I am open to the possibility of an afterlife. I am not sure how the possibility of the afterlife would influence the dilemma of antinatalism (I guess that it also depends on how the afterlife is, if there is one).

Remember I have already agreed that one ought to make responsible choices. One can tell if one is really in a position to do a good job of it. — apokrisis

Well, I didn't mean to say that you thought otherwise. I see what you mean, but I don't think you are answering to the objection.

Even if there is a very small chance that life won't be a 'good thing' for my kid, then, given this uncertainty, how can I justify my decision to give birth? If I give birth on the chance that it will be something bad for him or her, then I have to find some other reason to do it - but note that if a person is a good-in-itself, then I cannot really find it acceptable.

Maybe there is something like a 'deontological' duty to preserve the species. But even if it is were true, then, we have the conflict between two 'ethical duties'. On the other hand, we have to preserve humanity. On the other hand, we have to act towards the future human being as a good in himself/herself. If we choose to 'give birth', we follow the first ethical duty and we accept the risk that life might not be something good to the individual that will be born. If we stop reproducing, of course, we choose to ignore the first ethical duty.

I do see it as an ethical dilemma, BTW. The 'best outcome', of course, would be that humanity never goes extinct and every human being sees and will see their own life as something good. Only in this case, the dilemma disappears. If, instead, it is possible that someone doesn't see life as something good, the dilemma arises.

Personally, one of the reason that I am not an antinatalist is that the above - it is true that each individual is a 'good in himself/herself' but I also think that we have a communal duty, i.e. we also have to act in a way that is good for humanity, which seems to imply that as a community we shall seek to avoid extinction (this doesn't imply that everyone must have kids, of course).

Yes, I don't think so either. My desire to just get rid of an inherent conflict between our direct aquaintance of experience and our descriptions of ontologies in physics. I think there is much less conflict by getting rid of this notion of a bottom to the universe with a fixed set of objects just arranged in different ways. Already, the conflict is weakened somewhat imo if it is emphasized the way that physics can be seen as models or tools that describe or trace functional aspects of the universe rather than intrinsic things. — Apustimelogist

I sort of agree. If we let go the position that physical theories give us a complete description of the 'universe', things change. IMO, we can say that there are 'regularities' in physical phenomena but to 'reify' our descriptions and interpreting them as a 'faithful portrait' of reality is wrong. I think that 'non-representationalist' interpretations of QM have the merit to question this assumption - one can see that merit even if disagrees with them

It's unexplained either way imo. I just am not compelled to commit to the idea that its brute nature requires appeal to anything beyond local dynamics. I don't need to appeal to the whole universe (the only isolated system that exists) to observe examples of conserved quantities from interactions, as implied by conservation laws, in local systems. And I imagine you could say the same thing if the local system was further decomposable so one could focus on what is happening at a single component of it. — Apustimelogist

Well, I think I can see what you mean. But IMO the 'reductionistic' picture takes conservation laws as accidental properties of interactions, whereas the 'holistic' one explains why the interactions behave in a certain way via the conservation laws themselves. In both cases there is no 'full explanation', but IMO the second ontological 'picture' is better.

Yes, it especialliy depends if you interpret the wave-function as a physical object I think. — Apustimelogist

Well, I would say that this is true in a more general sense, i.e. if the quantum formalism gives us a 'glimpse' of how physical objects are.

In the thermal interpretation, as I understand it, the wave-function is a pure fiction. As the 'summary' (found here) says:

This richness of physical properties is not compatible with the notion of a system being purely decomposable into its subsystems in all cases. There are many properties such as a correlators that are properties of the total system that don't arise from properties of subsystems.

Since some properties are assigned to the system as a whole, which can be quite extended, they provide the nonlocal beables required by Bell's theorem. This is a combination of points above. Consider an extended two photon system. This has correlator properties like <AB> that are assigned to the whole system, no matter how extended it is and by the above these properties are not merely a property or combination of properties of any of the subsystems.

I still have to find an ontological interpretation of QM that doesn't have some kind of 'holism', BTW.

Also: is there a percentage under which it is 'acceptable' to take the risk? And, in case, what is the justification for this threshold?

Edit:

If I am not certain that my son or my daughter will be happy, it seems to me that I am accepting a possible tragedy (his or her regret for having been born) as an acceptable price for some good, which is external for them. If I am 'justifying' his or her life (which he or she might not see as a 'good' for him or her) as a mean to a possible 'higher good', it seems that I accept to treat him or her as a mean to an end (let's say also that his or her actions benefit for many people, but they do not percieve any good from that). — boundless

Of course, here I am assuming that this 'regret' is something irreversible, i.e. that this human being would regret to 'have been born' and would not change his or her mind.

So because of this round up error, humanity should end itself forthwith as some kind of supreme ethical act? — apokrisis

Well, I see what you mean. But the decision is not taken by 'humanity' but by individual human beings in their singularity.

If I am not certain that my son or my daughter will be happy, it seems to me that I am accepting a possible tragedy (his or her regret for having been born) as an acceptable price for some good, which is external for them. If I am 'justifying' his or her life (which he or she might not see as a 'good' for him or her) as a mean to a possible 'higher good', it seems that I accept to treat him or her as a mean to an end (let's say also that his or her actions benefit for many people, but they do not percieve any good from that).
I am wrong?

I am very conflicted about this issue, anyway. I am not an antinatalist but IMO this is the strongest argument for it.

If you polled a 1000 people – a proper cross-section of society – how many would say it would have been just better never to have been born than to have lived at all?

I would expect an antinatalist to at least be able to offer this data to show there was any kind of genuine consent issue. — apokrisis

While I am not a committed antinatalist, I'm not sure about the relevance of this objections.

Let's assume for the sake of the discussion, that 99,99% of people are relly happy of their life, despite the fact that death is inevitable, the tragedies that have happened and so on.
There is still the 0,01%, however, that would prefer to 'have never been born'. Their perspective is not 'wrong' only because they are a minority.

Let's say that it there is a vanishing small probability that a human being might prefer to 'have never been born'.
Then, when parents decide to give birth to a human being, they are doing this by accepting the chance, however small, that, in fact, such a human being might regret have been born. Let's say that we do accept that it is indeed a tragedy that someone wil regret his or her life.

Is it really morally acceptable to 'take this risk' for someone else, however small it might be because it is 'small'?
Is it morally acceptable for me to 'give birth' on the chance that my son or my daughter might be unsatisfied with his or her life? If his or her life is good for someone else, even for many people let's say, but would turn out to not be good for his or her, is it morally acceptable for me to give birth?

@schopenhauer1

Yes, when I was thinking about fundamentalness in a different way in terms of how physics doesn't seem to paint a picture where there is a constant, fundamental set of objects at the bottom of the universe which just change arrangement over time. And then thinking about whether this helps some aspects of the hard problem. — Apustimelogist

Yeah, I agree. Regarding the 'hard problem', I am not sure. The problem is that it seems that there are no properties present in the insentient matter (that we are aware of) that might be able to explain in an intelligible way the arising of consciousness.

Not sure I agree. Its a property of the interaction so I wouldn't say it is necessarily holistic, though I would say the two different descriptions were equivalent. — Apustimelogist

I actually agree with this. The 'holistic' interpretation is not forced, but I think it is the most reasonable.

Yes, you can say that 'conservation laws' might arise from the properties of interactions. But 'why'? It seems that if we take this position, then it seems an 'ad hoc' assumption. Why these interactions behave in the precise way that ensures the conservation laws is left unexplained.

On the other hand, if we take the view that conservation laws are properties (or related to properties) of the whole isolated system, then we understand why the interactions behave the way they behave: they are determined by the properties of the 'whole systems'. Also, Noether theorem, as I understand it, supports the 'holistic' view: conservations laws are related to symmetries. Of course, one might ask "but why there are such 'holistic' properties, then?". Well, an holistic framework doens't explain that, probably, but at least it explains something.

I think this is interpretation-dependent imo but I know many people do believe something like this. — Apustimelogist

Agreed. However note that non-locality in entangled systems is due to the fact that we cannot analyse them in separated 'parts', they are at least formally irreducible. Does this 'formal irreducibility' imply an 'ontological irriducibility'? Well, this is an interpretation-dependent question.

Anyway, as I said before, I generally prefer 'epistemic interpertations' as interpretations that inform me about what I know.
On the other hand, the study of 'ontic interpretations' might help us to have a 'glimpse' to what might be 'beyond' empirical knowledge, so to speak. I believe that quantum nonlocality and conservations laws are best understood in a holistic framework. But I would not claim that this amounts to a scientific knowledge.

But IMO, the only systems that can be considered as 'distinct realities' in physics would be isolated systems (i.e. systems in which conservation laws apply). But again, can we give a non-fictional example of an 'isolated system'? — boundless

@Gnomon, I was a bit obscure here. The 'truly' isolated system seems to be the 'whole universe', after all. So, if anything, I believe that the 'whole physical universe' is more fundamental than its 'constituents'.

Geocentrism can be viewed as a matter of perspective, and as such it is neither right nor wrong - it is apt in some contexts and not others. But if you are referring to ancient cosmologies viewed (somewhat ahistorically) as scientific theories, they posited things that proved to be untenable when more and better observations (appearances) became available, and our analytical tools improved as well. — SophistiCat

Well, I agree with that. 'Neither right or wrong' is a good way to put it.
What is common to all geocentric models was the view that the Earth was at the center of the universe and it didn't move. The apparent motion of the Sun in the sky that we see in our perspective (the one we see with our own eyes at least) can be 'explained' by this kind of models. But at a certain point, with different observations showed that in some cases these kinds of models gave wrong predictions. So, the geocentric models were discarded.
But strictly speaking what was 'discarded' was the ontological interpretation of them.

Anyway, while I would phrase differently, I think we are in agreement.

Essentially, there are always definite, objective outcomes but the statistics of the world are oberserver-dependent. This contextuality isn't specifically about observation but the statistical constraints when stochastic systems are coupled (e.g. a measurement device and system bring measured or any other kind of system-environment interaction perhaps). — Apustimelogist

Interesting, thanks.

No, if there is a reasonable explanation. Obviously explanations may seem reasonable or unreasonable to different people. — Apustimelogist

Agreed!

In what sense? I may agree in some sense and have thought about that, motivated by the hsrd problem of consciousness. But may not have been in the same sense you mean. — Apustimelogist

Well, I wasn't thinking about consciousness, actually, but simply about what physical theories tell us.

Consider the case of a system of two interacting particles in newtonian mechanics. In this case, the interaction causes a temporal variation of the momentum in both particles. The temporal variation of the momentum of each particle, however, is exactly the opposite of the temporal variation of the second one, which means that the temporal variation of the total momentum is zero, i.e. the total momentum of the isolated two-particle system is zero. Of course, this can be proved by using the three newtonian laws. But the third law seems ad 'hoc', doesn't seem to have any kind of justification whatsoever if the particles themselves are considered the 'fundamental entity' here.
On the other hand, consider the reverse perspective. The conservation law of the total momentum says that the total momentum of any isolated system is constant, i.e. the temporal variation of the total momentum of the system is zero. But if this is true and if the interaction between the two particles changes their momentum, then these two assumptions imply that the variation of their momentum must be opposite. This perspective is clearly 'holistic': a property of the 'whole system' (the conservation law of the total momentum) 'dictates' how the properties of the subsystems (the particles) behave.
Of course, newtonian mechanics doesn't tell us which 'perspective' is right. But the second has the advantage of being more intelligible. It also implies that a 'physical object' can be quite extended, composite and yet 'holistic' not reducible. And, of course, the same can be said for more advanced theories. In fact, possibly the single truly isolated system is the whole universe. It seems that ontological primacy is given to the whole universe rather than to its 'components' (or in any case, this is true for the 'isolated system').
In 'realistic' interpretations of QM, ultimately it seems the 'universe' is seen as a single quantum object (at least, this is true in de Broglie-Bohm, MWI and the thermal interpretation).

Not only that: in the case of entangled quantum systems, there is a clear indication that what is 'more fundamental' is, in fact, the whole system of entangled objects, and this is not reducible to the subsystems.

This suggests to me that, if I were to choose an ontological interpretation of 'what physics seems to tell me', I would pick a fundamentally holistic perspective. The 'whole universe' is the fundamental object and its 'components' are secondary. Also, in some cases, some composite objects cannot be reduced.

BTW, at the same time, as I said before, I lean towards an epistemic interpretation of QM, because I think epistemic theories, i.e. theories that do not make ontological commitments, better represent 'what I know'. But, if I allow myself to speculate, I think that physics is fundamentally 'ontologically holistic' (of course, in many cases an analytical, reductionistic approach is the right one)

*But on the other hand, it somewhat makes my point. Yes, we tend to be naive realists when 'we leave the house to go to work' and when we are in a dangerous sistuation (and this is useful for our survival and the survival of our species as Hoffman might say) but at the same time we tend to be naive realists even with respect to the apparent movement of the Sun in most our daily life even if such a take is erroneous. But naive realism being 'useful' doesn't imply it being 'truthful'. And we instictively also seek truth. — boundless

To put in another way, in order to function, we are usually 'forced' to live assuming naive realism is true. However, on reflexion, we recognize that we live as if naive realism was true but we generally recognize that it is false.
How much importance we give to this awareness is another matter.

The people were 'bad' but I regret nothing. — Tom Storm

Ok!

Of course - and if I argued that I'd be making a fallacy. I make no claim about higher consciousness as an idea, I was referring to who the subject seems to attract and the innate difficulty (perhaps impossibility) of persuing it a useful way. But I'll leave this to others who are more interested. — Tom Storm

Fair enough. Sorry for the misunderstanding.

I think phenomenology may do away with the need to pars the world into realism or indirect realism or idealism models, but I am not sufficiently versed in the thinking to articulate an argument. — Tom Storm

Well, neither do I. I tried to study phenomenology and I enjoyed some ideas I found. But, unfortunately, I found the language and the exposition too taxing and unclear, so to speak.
BTW, Husserl's 'epoche' I think is quite close to what I was getting at, i.e. 'suspension of judgment' (at least for a transitory phase).

That's fair. I'm skeptical that we can access ontological truths, or that we should we be overly concerned to identify them. I'm content with tentative models of the world, which is all science can provide. But even an idealist becomes a naive realist when he leaves the house to go to work. That's paraphrasing Simon Blackburn. Which comes back to my take on all this. None of it much matters since the world we inhabit can't be denied in practice and for the most part it makes no difference to how we live if we believe that all is an illusion. — Tom Storm

Ok! Well, I agree up to a point. The fact that the 'model' of the 'two truths' is so prevalent (either explicitly or implicitly) suggests to me that there is something very important about it. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the extreme diversity of how that distinction is conceptualized and this can be taken as a suggestion that we can't have a 'true knowledge'.
Personally, I think that even if we are unable to 'discover for ourselves', the distinction between the 'provisional' and the 'ultimate' is important, it's hard to deny how widespread this 'theme' is (as I said with Epicurus and Pyrrho, in ancient times even materialists and skeptics endorsed some version of it), so you can't agree with what Simon Blackburn* says if it is taken as a conclusive criticism. For my part, I try to be as open-minded as possible and go on with the 'search'.

*But on the other hand, it somewhat makes my point. Yes, we tend to be naive realists when 'we leave the house to go to work' and when we are in a dangerous sistuation (and this is useful for our survival and the survival of our species as Hoffman might say) but at the same time we tend to be naive realists even with respect to the apparent movement of the Sun in most our daily life even if such a take is erroneous. But naive realism being 'useful' doesn't imply it being 'truthful'. And we instictively also seek truth.

Yes, Ontology is the most debatable aspect of Philosophy*1. Anything created from scratch is indeed dependent for its existence on the Creator. But I don't see how the self-existing Ontological creator --- what I call eternal/infinite Potential --- could be dependent on the space-time creature. — Gnomon

Yup. That's why I think that the view that the 'Creator' is 'simple' is the right one, independently of the particualr idea of the nature of this 'Creator'. If the 'Creator' weren't simple, then its 'parts' would be uncreated themselves.
The problem is IMO that even panendeistic systems at the end of the day must renounce the view that, for instance, 'we' are 'parts' of the 'Creator'. But if one accepts that the 'Creator' is unchanging, then all change is ultimately illusory.

In order to overcome this problem, I think that something like 'process philosophy' is needed if one wants to save both the 'absoluteness' of the 'Creator' and the 'reality' of change. Heraclitus' probably was the first known attempt in this direction.

n the links below*2, Energy is described as a "property of a system", and Holism is about Systems, not things. So, systemic properties can only be rationally inferred, not physically observed — Gnomon

Not sure how this is relevant. Yes, we cannot take 'energy' to be something real if we do not take the 'system' as a 'reality' that bears the property of 'energy' (the confusion arises when 'energy' or 'mass' is taken as a fundamental substance and physical systems and objects are seen as a sort of 'manifestations' of 'particular configurations' of 'mass' or 'energy'). And yes, 'energy' seems more a 'collective property', so to speak, rather than the property of an individual 'object', when systems of interacting 'objects' are taken into account.
But IMO, the only systems that can be considered as 'distinct realities' in physics would be isolated systems (i.e. systems in which conservation laws apply). But again, can we give a non-fictional example of an 'isolated system'?

↪boundless Thanks for the considered reply and interesting comments. I was connected the New Age movement and the Theosophical Society through the 1980's and into the 1990's, so I am moderately familiar with the thinking. Most of the folk I knew in those days were as anxious, status seeking, consumer obsessed and money oriented as any contemporary yuppie. But I guess the serious thinkers are always in the minority. I have never arrived at a reason to take this kind of metaphysics seriously. True or not, it makes no practical difference to how I conduct my life. I suspect a lot of this comes down to person's disposition. Some of us are unhappy in particular ways that seem to be ameliorated by philosophy and thoughts of higher consciousness. And perhaps some of us ruminate less and are more distractible. :wink: — Tom Storm

I see, thanks for the clarification. I am sorry for your bad experiences.
Anyway, I do believe that it is a case of 'abusus non tollit usum', i.e. even if the bad practicioners, teachers etc were the majority, this doesn't a priori negate the validity of a particular tradition.

BTW, in my previous posts I was however arguing for sonething else: if one rejects naive realism (and here I mean the unsophisticated kind which is IMO the true naive realism, not more 'refined' ones that are actually not naive realism), then one accepts automatically some kind of notion of 'two truths'. Naive realism errs in interpreting pragmatic 'truths' as ontological ones. But this insight is shared by practically everyone that is not a naive realist (even by skeptics). We can interpret what the naive realist take as 'ultimate truths' as 'pragmatic truths', eventualmente if we do not have a position about what the 'ultimate truth' might be.

I re-read your very informative post and, well, I don't think that I am capable to make a counter-argument about the consistency of stochastic models. So, I'll accept that one can make a CFD stochastic model without violating relativity. After all, the non-locality that violats special relativity is a faster than light causal influence*, i.e. a specific kind of non-locality.
Just for curiosity, has been treated the 'Wigner friend' scenario in stochastic realistic models?

*As I said previously, there are also propoents of deterministic non-local realist models that say that their models are not in contrast with relativity. Other than some de Broglie-Bohm proponents, the thermal interpretation of Arnold Neumaier (I am not sure if it is accepted as among the 'viable' interpretations of QM, as it is new and it seems to have a single proponent. It has, however, produced a quite number of discussion among experts on Physics Forums for instance.).

I mean, there is no alternative. There are extreme nonlocal correlations in quantum mechanics; you cannot get rid of the strangeness. — Apustimelogist

Agreed, we have to accept some kind of strangeness. But my question was: do you think that 'physical realism' is undermined by the fact that the 'fundamental building blocks' of 'physical reality' are not spatially separable? I think that Einstein made an interesting point here about 'realism'. I do believe that we have to reject the idea of 'fundamental building blocks' altogether BTW.

I believe that the confusion is also due to an incorrect interpretation of Einstein's 'mass-energy equivalence', which in fact is due to a misunderstading of 'mass'.
It is somewhat instinctive to regard 'mass' as a measure of 'the quantity of matter'. After all, this is the very first definition one hears in middle school (which is of course appropriate for the age). But even in high school, this definition of mass is replaced by the more sophisticated definitions like 'inertial mass' and 'gravitational mass'.

It's unfortunately simple to misinterpret the concept of 'mass' - and, consequentlly, the concept of 'energy' via the 'mass-energy equivalence' - in a substantialist way. But 'mass' and 'energy' are physical properties/quantities, just like 'momentum', 'angular momentum' or even 'velocity', 'acceleration' etc. Any kind of substantialist interpretation of 'energy' or 'mass' errs due to an incorrect process of instinctive 'reification'. Physical objects are not made of mass, energy just like they are not made of momentum or velocity.