So in summary, I agree, if there is no Resurrection, then there can be no Christian religion (faith in one sense). But the Resurrection is itself a matter of faith (different sense here), and it cannot be any other way. — Agustino

Ok! I think it is more clear now, thanks :smile:

I will certainly read with interest your more detailed explanation!

But then, in the negativistic interpretation, Nirvana becomes the real suicide. Shooting yourself in the head is not a real suicide, because you will reincarnate, and in a much worse state than before, it will take you much longer until you can get to the human stage again, from where you can commit the real suicide (Nirvana). I see this interpretation as the essence of the life-denying, impotent, impulse. — Agustino

Yeah, that's why I think the negativistic interpretation is wrong. Seeking Nirvana, in this negativistic view, is seeking solely the ending of suffering (which, in turn, leads to the "end of life"). Personally, despite the fact that in modern times many think that "oblivion=Nirvana", I think that there is enough evidence to say that in ancient times it was a minority interpretation and, therefore, it is more a modern phenomenon. Of course, this does not mean that it wrong by default.
Nowadays, you can read claims (both by critics and by Buddhist themselves) that it is the "orthodox" Theravadin view. I think that they are wrong: the negativistic view was rejected explicitily by Buddhagosa (who, apparently, built the (real) "orthodox" view of the school). Anyway, there are in the commentarial part rare "positive" descriptions of Nirvana, like in that part of the Kathavattu I linked the other day. You can find a translation of a nearly identical "positive" description here at the end of this article: Timeless (Jayarava Raves' blog) (like the other passage, Nirvana is said to be "eternal" here - AFAIK Jayarava is a "modernist" of sorts who does not believe in all supernatural elements). So, unless these descriptions are later interpolations, you actually find somewhat "positive" characterizations of Nirvana. And in the suttas, Nirvana is said to be "beyond reasoning" (in the passage of the Itivuttaka hat I linked earlier) and, frankly, oblivion is not "beyond reasoning" IMO.

BTW, I approached Buddhism because of the "apophatic" approach on Nirvana. I really liked the "negative" language used. Reading the suttas, I was really fascinated by this approach.It gave me a sense of awe and mystery. Theravada Buddhism struck me as the most "rigorous" apophatic approach. Then, when I read that many Buddhists actually interpret the very same passages as suggesting that Nirvana is oblivion, I was somewhat dismayed. Now, I am still a student of Buddhism and I began last year to practice vipassana. I do not consider myself a Buddhist, though.

But... if that cycle had a purpose, then it would have an end. And an end means precisely a death. There can be no end without death, for how can life, whose very nature is change, suddenly come to a halt without ceasing to be life? — Agustino

I see! Let me ask a question, however: do you see Christian Heaven as "timeless"? If so, you can see an "end" as something that is blissful. But, also, note that I was thinking to the "end" of a particular mode of existence, samsara. If samsara ends and, after that, a different (and more blissful) existence starts, then we do not end with a death, but with a "life" with less misery! (of course, I am speculating! No religions that I know have this view).

So I don't think that the perspective of an endless Samsara, which contains both pain and pleasure is necessarily distressing and frustrating. It is like an adventure - you never know what you will find the next time around. It is sort of exciting - once you get to see the big picture, and you stop anchoring yourself merely in your present condition as if this was all that there will ever be. In a way, an eternal Samsara is a good thing - it means that all pain (and pleasure alike) will ultimately come to an end. So if you are suffering now... fret not, it too will end. — Agustino

Well, at times I have similar musings about samsara (well, it is the "lightness" given by impermanence)! After all, now I do not remeber my past lives (assuming that samsara is real). Hence, even if I will suffer in the future, then I will forget it and, maybe, I will be reborn temporarily in a blissful abode. Then, again, I will fall from it. But, with time I will forget it again. So, without memory it seems an adventure. On the other hand, if I had memories of such a long time, then maybe I will get somewhat bored and annoyed from the cycle. I think that the 15th chapter of the Samyutta Nikaya explains it very well. Unfortunately, you will continue to suffer and cause others suffering. Hence, an escape from such a state will be desired. And if I remembered all my crimes, all the enormous amounts of suffering that I caused to myself and to others and so on, I would like to stop it, if there is no way to "control" the whole thing. Again, in such a situation, if we accept that Nirvana has a positive reality, Buddhism is not "nihilistic". In this case, "Nirvana" might be seen as a satisfying end to our "beginingless" stories. Things change, however, if the "negativistic" view is held.

On the other hand, Christianity posits a sure end for all Creation. We do not have to seek a "satisfying end". It will surely end. What we have to do is to "use rightly" the time we have in this lifetime. I think that the view about time and "history" conditiones all others teachings.



Edit: regarding Christianity there are some dogmas that I (for now) cannot accept. For example, the idea of an original/ancestral sin really disturbs me and seems to me very implausible.

Finally, I am here:

To me, this means that you must love God more than anyone or anything else, and relative to your love of God, you hate brother, mother, sister, etc.

In other words, I don't see this "let go" stuff to be the emphasis of the New Testament. The emphasis is rather "be attached to what matters most - God". — Agustino

Yes, here you are right :up: I wanted to stress that "renunciation" is present in both traditions. But, of course, in Christianity renunciation is "used" to avert the mind to "what matters most - God". In Buddhism, renunciation is a value in itself, so to speak.

On the other hand, in Buddhism one should be attached to the Dharma (as well as the Buddha and the Sangha...): one should not get rid of the raft before ending the crossing. So, I think that in a way, there is still a possible (partial) similarity here: in Buddhism before achieving Nirvana, one should desire Nirvana, just like one, in Christianity one should desire God until one "enters" in communion with God. A very important difference is that, in Buddhism the Goal is achieved during life, in Christianity after death. But, you are right here. There is an undeniable difference!

Also, in Mahayana there is the idea that the desire to help others will be fulfilled even after Awakening for "countless eons".

Depends. It's not just being unable to "let go" that causes the pain. There are other beliefs associated with it that are responsible for causing pain. For example, if someone isn't able to "let go" of their desires, then the end of life can be painful and cause distress SO LONG AS the person in question does not see a possibility to fulfil the said desires AFTER death. In this case, a Christian would believe that God will "wipe away every tear", and so they may not feel such pain and distress when death comes, even though they cannot let go of their desires. — Agustino

Agreed! And here we have another important difference between Christianity and Buddhism. If desires will be fulfilled, then one should not fear death. In fact, I think that some biographies of Christian figures show people that are not afraid of death because they have faith. On the other hand, Buddhists Arahants do not fear death because they are "unattached".

Yet, according to Buddhism, to "escape" from samsara one must reduce attachments. On the other hand, in Christianity, Salvation is not "gained" by reducing attachments but by accepting God's Grace. Hence, in Christianity it is love is much more emphasized. — boundless

See, it's only when one sees the endless cylce of rebirths and redeaths as something negative that being unable to let go makes it painful. — Agustino

But... that cycle is endless. Above all, it is endless in the sense that it is aimless. There is no purpose. I think that such a perspective is very distressing and frustrating. If it had an end (in both senses), I could accept to be reborn, to suffer and so on. But it is aimless and there is the idea that we are not in full control, and therefore, we will not be able to get reborn in intended conditions forever. So, even with the best intentions, the idea is that we will sometimes commit serious crimes. So, such a perspective is IMO extremely distressing. On the other hand, if it had at least a temporal end, one could try to remain in Samsara to help others.
Of course, there is also the Mahayana that teaches that Bodhisattvas will be always help sentient beings. But, in Mahayana Bodhisattvas are awakened.

I largely agree with this here - it's also what happens when you stop wishing that things were different than they are. But even that is not a great way to put it. Because it implies that you don't have any wants or preferences (such as preferring that there is no pain). But those wants and preferences, at least for me, still existed in that state. Just that I wasn't "troubled" by the pain. It's difficult to explain. — Agustino

I think that I agree here.

But the resurrection is itself a matter of faith. Afterall, even if you saw the risen Christ, you always have at your disposal alternative explanations. So if you lack faith, if you lack the will to believe, and are instead cursed by unbelief (it's a problem of the will), then regardless of what you see, you will not believe.

So St. Paul is right - if there is no resurrection, our faith (I read this as religion) is in vain. — Agustino

Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

So the resurrection is something that is, by default, not seen. It is rather hoped for. — Agustino

Exactly! But I am still confused by what you said earlier, i.e.:

The interesting thing on this point, is that I don't think there has to be a God. It is sufficient to have faith in Him. Faith transcends the rational, but is not thereby irrational. Having faith will still transform THIS LIFE. — Agustino

If there is no God, resurrection is not possible. So, Paul says that faith is vain if there is no resurrection. Hence, as I see it, Paul says that if there is no God, faith is vain.
So, how can you say that faith is not vain if there is no God and, at the same time, be in agreement with Paul?

Right, so then attachment can be the opposite of aversion, and Buddha's way being the Middle Way would strive to neither attachment to the positive (pleasure, let's say), nor aversion for the negative (pain). — Agustino

I think that they are opposites in the sense that they are two sides of the same coin. If one is attached to a particular pleasant experience, then when it ends and arises an unpleasant one, he/she experiences aversion. So, I see them as very connected. When attachment is absent, aversion too disappears.

See, this I see as a problem. Love does not require positive feelings. I can be very upset at someone I love, or I can be disappointed with them, or even, why not, angry with them. All these feelings do not suggest in the least that I don't love them. Love is rather the choice, or better said, the will to like them REGARDLESS of how I feel. The will not to give up on them.

So in the case of my enemies, I may still feel anger towards them, but only because they are doing wrong and destroying their own souls for example. Or in the case of my son, I may feel upset because he is harming himself. Or just like the Japanese Samurai, I can feel great compassion while slashing my enemies in half. All these actions do not necessitate the absence of love. Sometimes, it may be the loving thing to do to be angry at someone you love. — Agustino

OK! Let me explain better myself. I think that if you love them, then "at the bottom of your heart" you still desire, for them, the good. So, you might get angry but, at the same time, you want the best for them. When I wrote "positive feelings", I meant this. Sorry for the confusion.

So, I mostly agreee with you. I think that only a "negative ethical" approach (i.e. do not do this, do not do that...) in our actions is not sufficient. We also need to develop compassion, love and so on. And, in order to express love we might also get angry.

Regarding the example of the Japanese Samurai, well, that is a somewhat controverted point for me. I am not sure that in this particular example you are right. But I need some time to reflect upon this.

Anyway, as you say, love is, in the highest sense of the word, a disposition where you always want the best for others (which IMO coincides with the full expression of metta (good-will), mudita (sympathetic joy), karuna (compassion)). Sometimes, sadly, I feel that Buddhism, especially Theravada, is presented in a way in which the importance of metta, karuna and mudita is neglected. For example, in the absence of hate we can develop better compassion. But a presentation of Theravada that emphasizes ONLY the "absence of hate", without also give importance to compassion is very wanting. The "negative" and the "positive" sides are both needed. After all, the Dhammapada has the following verse (source: https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/dhp/dhp.14.budd.html):

183. To avoid all evil, to cultivate good, and to cleanse one's mind — this is the teaching of the Buddhas.

I think that the same "unbalance" in giving ONLY importance to the "negative"/"absence" side is at the basis of the position that Nirvana is ONLY the absence of greed, hatred and delusion.

But, of course, differences with Christianity remain also on this point.

Why should being saved from Samsara be this important? — Agustino

Because it is aimless and endless. And, if Nirvana has a "positive reality" of sorts, also to experience the "highest bliss".
In the "negativistic" interpretation of "Nirvana", the ONLY reason to leave Samsara is to avoid endless and (ultimately) aimless.
In the Mahayana one also wishes to escape "samsara", also to be better help sentient beings.

Anyway, I am happpy to see that we agree in many points!

Hi,
thanks for raising again interesting points:-)!

I am very sorry for the delay. Hopefully, I will answer later today!

'Non-attachment' is also a basic theme of the New Testament:

'For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it'. Matt 16.

'If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me' Mark 10

'Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that fail not, where no thief approaches, neither moth corrupts. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.' Luke 12

'Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division: For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided, three against two, and two against three. The father shall be divided against the son, and the son against the father; the mother against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; the mother in law against her daughter in law, and the daughter in law against her mother in law.' Luke 12

All of these sayings are perfectly in accord with the spirit of the Buddhist nikayas. — Wayfarer

Agreed, the spirit is somewhat similar (especially if one considers Mahayana Buddhism)!

I want also to add that many "hard" expressions were typical in that cultural contexts. So, for example, the quote of the Gospel according to St. Luke provided by Janus:

"If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters--yes, even their own life--such a person cannot be my disciple." (Luke 14:26)

probably meant that, in order to follow the "vocation", one should be able to "let go" even of her/his family attachments. Problem is, IMO, that translations cannot capture the intended meaning nowadays. We need also commentaries and interpretations.

I think that it's because 'emotional indifference' is not at all the same as 'non-attachment'. In both religions, there is an understanding that the peace that arises from God's love (for Christians) or realisation of Nirvāṇa (for Buddhists) is such that even the witnessing of terrible tragedies doesn't undermine it. But it doesn't undermine empathy - far from it, in fact. — Wayfarer

Agreed!

When I was young, I had a casual job as wardsman in the casualty ward of a Catholic teaching hospital (called Mater Misercordiae, 'mother of mercy'). The nursing sisters exemplified this quality of 'un-attached compassion'. Several times I witnessed the senior nurse comforting people in terrible states of distress, whose loved ones had just died. I was deeply moved by her ability of 'suffering with' in these cases. Yet she had to then go back to her duties in a very busy suburban casualty ward straight away afterwards. I think that kind of compassion really does require tapping into a spiritual source. Of course, this is what the Catholic symbolism of 'the sacred heart' refers to. You actually find iconographic representations of the same idea in Chinese Buddhism. — Wayfarer

Yes, I think that the "ideal" might be similar. Probably we have a difference in emphasis. This difference in emphasis is IMO linked to the fact that Buddhism accepts samsara and Christianity does not, and, also that Christianity accepts God's Grace and Buddhism (for the most part*) does not. It is very difficult to reduce attachments. Yet, according to Buddhism, to "escape" from samsara one must reduce attachments. On the other hand, in Christianity, Salvation is not "gained" by reducing attachments but by accepting God's Grace. Hence, in Christianity it is love is much more emphasized. While not everyone are able to reduce attachments, everybody, in principle, can love. So, we can understand why in Christianity love is much more emphasized than non-attachment.

BTW, as usual, thank you for the interesting parallelism!

As far as the Buddha is concerned, have a read of the monk with dysentery — Wayfarer

Great find! Thank you :up:


*the only exceptions, that I am aware of, are some schools of Pure Land Buddhism.

It's okay! No problem!

I will be slower in the coming days. So, take all the time you need :smile:

Thank you in advance!

I want to add another similarity between Buddhism and Christianity.

Buddhism places a lot of importance on intention. In fact, intentional actions have karmic consequence (e.g. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/dhamma/sacca/sacca4/samma-ditthi/kamma.html - note that "kamma" is the Pali word for the sanskrit karma). Hence we read in the Vinaya Pitaka (the collection of canonical Buddhist scriptures of the Theravada school that deals mostly with rules of monks and nuns):

On one occasion a monk, feeling compassion, released a pig trapped in a snare. He became remorseful … “What was your intention, monk?”

“I was motivated by compassion, Master.”

“There’s no offense for one who is motivated by compassion.”

("Master" here refers to the Buddha. Source: Suttacentral - (emphasis mine))

Hence, if one is motivated by compassion he can "break" the "not stealing" precept. If otherwise the intention was stealing:

On one occasion a monk released a pig trapped in a snare, intending to steal it before the owners saw it. He became remorseful … “You have committed an offense entailing expulsion.”

(same source as above (Suttacentral) - emphasis mine)

So, we see also an interesting parallel with Christianity, IMO. First, also Christianity seems to suggest that intention plays a central role. Consider for example this passage:

16 “Are you still so dull?” Jesus asked them. 17 “Don’t you see that whatever enters the mouth goes into the stomach and then out of the body? 18 But the things that come out of a person’s mouth come from the heart, and these defile them. 19 For out of the heart come evil thoughts—murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander. 20 These are what defile a person; but eating with unwashed hands does not defile them.”

(source: Matthew 15, 16-20 NIV )

Both religions are against legalistic thinking and excessive attachment to rituals.

IMO, Christianity is dying also because people do not see in it these things in it. In general, people do not see wisdom in religion.

And also, some forms of secular Buddhism by "neglecting" the central aspect of "sila" (morality).

Regarding the OP question, I think that Christianity is not dead.

Problem is that our society, as it has been said also by others, is VERY different from the society where Christianity originated and, therefore, many rituals, symbols etc sound very anachronistic and difficult to understand.

The image of Jesus Christ as the "Lamb of the world" becomes much more meaningful if we consider that in nomadic society of that very ancient times, a lamb was sacrificed in order to protect the community and the herd by the attacks of wolves. The reason behind sacrifices was survival. The danger was real. Hence, sacrifice was done for protection. In the same way, the sacrifice of Jesus aimed to salvation from sin, evil and so on.

Nowadays, we do not (normally) have to struggle for our survival. And we do not protect ourselves, our herd etc by making a sacrifice. So, it is more difficult for us to appreciate that symbolism.

The same, I think is true for many others symbols, rituals, linguistic expressions etc. In fact, when I discussed with two Catholic theologians about these matters, they explained to me these things very well and I began to appreciate their meanings. Besides the cultural background, I think that nowadays there is a communication problem. In those times the meaning was clearer and there was less need to explain things. But nowadays we need also people that are good to explain them.

So, IMO, the crisis of Christianity is in part due to a difficulty in communication.

why we should avoid attachment in love? For example, I love my son and I am attached to him, if he dies, I will be devastated. But I am not afraid of being devastated in that case... I would not want NOT to be devastated. The devastation is the expression of my love, I want to let it happen, why would I want to stop it? — Agustino

Just to clarify what I said yesterday... I think that Buddhists have no problems, strictly speaking with this. I think that they do not find nothing "wrong" in it. However, we should consider also their belief in a "potentially endless cycle of rebirths and redeaths" - in that case they might say that, unfortunately, that if we do not learn to "let go", then we will be trapped in samsara. The ideal is to be both loving and "non-attached" (as I said yesterday, what does that mean I do not really know! BUT IMO in Buddhism "true" non-attachment is accompained by compassion, amity and so on). Anyway, I do not think that a man that is not devasted by the death of a loved one is not loving, necessarily. Of course, being devasted is a sure sign of loving. But not being devasted is not IMO a sign of not loving.

I think that in this respect Christianity is more open to give value to suffering and to all various forms. In fact, if we look to the Gospels we find that Jesus appreciated equally different kinds of love. I think that that Christianity and Buddhism here differ and that maybe the difference is due to the fact that Christianity does not have the dogma of Samsara. Also, in Christianity there is the idea that we are saved by God's Grace and not from our efforts (we have, of course be able to accept it). In many forms of Buddhism there is no "Higher Power" that can "save" us. For example, according to Theravada the Buddha only indicated the Path and we have to walk through it. Of course, the Buddha is seen as an exceptional teacher and it is said that hearing his teachings directly is much more effective than hearing from anyone else. But this is not, of course, the same as Grace. In Mahayana, the situation is different. But I think that Grace becomes very important only in Pure Land, but I do not know that school very well.

As I said, I find this aspect of Buddhism hard to accept. It is quite disturbing, because I find nothing wrong in expressing love by being devasted. I hope to be in that state, too, if such a situation occurs. This because I think that my expression of genuine love would be being devasted. But I am open to other expression of equally genuine love (do you agree with this?). But, I think it is also important to say that if one is not devasted, he or she can be still be loving. (Also, we try to console someone, if is devasted...).

A separate question might be: is it possible to feel genuine love without also suffer? Honestly, I don't know. I am open to an affirmative answer. But, I think that for most people love entails suffering and also I think that in order to "attain" the state where one feels love and does not suffer one needs to learn to love and suffer. If one does not learn that, I do not think that he or she will be able to reach that "state" (if it is possible, of course). Anyway, I think that this idea is present in Buddhist texts. For example, the partially awakened Ananda loves and suffers (and is consoled by his fellow Buddhist disciples and by the Buddha). Does this make sense to you?

Also in some form of Buddhism self-sacrifice can even take the form of self-immolation. This is true especailly for (some traditions at least of) Mahayana Buddhism. But also some Jataka tales (included in the Theravada canon) apparently speak about it, as it can be seen here.

But, even Christianity promotes non-attachment to some extent, I think. In fact, consider this quote of Gospel according to Saint Luke provided by Janus:

"If anyone comes to me and does not hate father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters--yes, even their own life--such a person cannot be my disciple." Luke 14:26 — Janus

So, one must "renounce" to some extent (I think this is the meaning of "hate") even to family. In fact, I find somewhat disurbing this quote, too. I mean, not everyone is prepared to do that. I think this also applies to many Christians!

Thank you a lot for you answers!

That is the point I would like to address. In Christianity, the emphasis is on forming a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. You feel this as a living presence in your life, which naturally results in the development of qualities such as charity, self-restraint, and so on. However - not always. Even Christians who say they have been 'born again' will confess that their inherent negative tendencies (to put it in modern terms) still have a grip on them. Actually Paul laments this Romans 7:14. And I'm sure many a spiritual seeker will have gone through that - I know I do on a daily basis.

In Buddhist practice, the 'agency of change' relies on a different 'energy source'. It comes from clearly seeing and understanding the source of dukkha. Now when that is written out, it's easy to say 'well that's just a dogma'. And it would be, if you only wrote it out, or talked about it. But the point of Buddhist training is to really see how the process of clinging, attachment and craving is giving rise to unhappiness, moment to moment. And part of that, is also the realisation of the true nature, which is the aspect of the being that understands and responds to the teaching (known in Mahayana Buddhism as the Buddha Nature, Tathāgatagarbha). I guess it sounds complicated when you try and explain it, but the crux of it is similar to the Biblical teaching 'you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free'. But that 'knowing' is 'jnana', or direct insight into the cause of sorrow. That is a skill that can be learned and applied.

So developing positive qualities means, the pursuit of the 'three legs of the tripod', which are wisdom (prajna), morality (sila) and meditation (samadhi). Then the 'true nature' begins to manifest. Really a lot of the skill of meditation is learning how to get out of the way of that happening. — Wayfarer

Very good answer. Thank you :up:

I think that the "advantage" that Buddhist has, in this respect, is that one can also do spiritual practice without "believing" in Buddhist "dogmas" or believing that the Buddha was really "fully awakened" (the same goes for other Eastern religions, like some sects of Hinduism and Taoism for example. But Buddhist practice IMO has the least amount of "belief" required to work). On the other hand, I hardly see how most forms of prayer can be useful for non Christians. Of course, there are some exceptions, but generally Christian practices work much better for Christians IMO.

I agree also regarding what Paul describes. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to not fall under the traps of that negative tendencies you mention. And it is quite distressing.

And also, I believe you are right in saying that Buddhism is much more about the "immediate experience" (that's why it appeals to a secular and "skeptic" mindset). Of course, a certain amount to "openness" to "higher truths" is necessary for deepening spiritual practice.

There's some truth in what Agustino is saying, because there's a lot of trendy fashionable Western Buddhism that is indeed platitudes and emotional palliatives. Zizek picked up on the same trend. But, as Rumi said - there would be no fools' gold, if there were no gold. — Wayfarer

True! In fact, I think that Buddhism without rebirth and karma is a palliative of sorts. Or at best, it can become a sort of Epicureanism. But, yes no "true" Buddhism. Theravada (or, IMO better, "Shravakyana") and Mahayana Buddhism are religions of renunciation. The same goes IMO also for Vajrayana even if its practices are more "adaptable" to non-monastic life (I am not fully sure about it, but I think this is true AFAIK). But, IMO, all three have "world-denying" aspects that secular Buddhists do not want to see, so to speak.

There is a lot of truth in that. A large part of the issue is that the tropes and imagery of the Bible hark back to an early agrarian, pre-industrial culture - sheep, fields and religious sacrifices. It is remote from the life and experience of the 21st century. But that is why interpretation is needed. There are still universal truths in the tradition, but they need to be constantly re-interpreted in light of changing circumstances. Obviously 'biblical literalism' is an impediment to that - that leads to fundamentalism and many other conflicts.

Karen Armstrong is a good commentator on this subject, not least because she has the perspective of comparative religion rather than Christian apologetics. I frequently cite of her OP's from a few years ago, titled Should we believe in belief? And it's a very good question. — Wayfarer

:up: very interesting thanks. As you say, too many people simply cannot understand the significance that symbols had in that social contexts. In order to understand we need to contextualize. Otherwise, we cannot understand fully.

Agreed :wink:

But what do you think, in particular, about the points raised by Agustino in this post and at the end of this one? I think I have partly answered to them. But there are some points that indeed are very difficult to answer.

Thank you in advance!

@Agustino, thanks for the insights!

Like Christianity? :P — Agustino

:up: :wink: (thanks for the link! anyway, as you might imagine I meant something like "absorption" as in pantheistic religions. But, I think that Christian "communion"/union with God somewhat resembles it even if the "separation" between God and the creatures remain. I have no idea about what that resemblance might be, however.)

Well, I don't think death necessarily causes suffering, pain and distress, at least for the one dying. But old age, illness, etc. obviously do. — Agustino

maybe death does not cause pain, suffering etc in some cases. But for whoever is unable to "let go", thinking about the end of life is certainly painful and causes distress (meaning if one fears death, then death is certainly linked to suffering).

Also, Buddhists believe in rebirth and, for them, "death" is either Nirvana without remainder or leads to another life marked by old age, illness and so on (which, except for the case of a partially awakened one, means the continuation of a potentially endless cycle of rebirths and redeaths).

At the same time, I think it is possible to, psychologically so to speak, not mind your own suffering. In other words, the suffering is still there, the pain, for example, is still there, but you don't mind it. It's hard to describe this state, I've sometimes experienced it. So I think it is possible to accept life, and see the pains as inseparable from the joys, and say yes to the whole ride, without "extinguishing" yourself as per Buddhism. — Agustino

Well, sometimes I think that "Arahants" dealt with suffering in that way. If you are familiar with the two darts analogy (see: SN 36.6 "The dart" ), where awakened beings are said to not experience mental suffering (and so, I think that you can consider that "total acceptance"). But, the total eradication of all forms of unsatisfactoriness and suffering according to the traditional Theravadin view happens at "Nirvana without remainder" (=death of a Arhat or a Buddha).

Personally, I would like to experience the state that you describe. But, IMO, this also means a reduction of "self concern" or more precisely a reduction of our tendency to strive to control things ("anatta", in a more experiential level, means "lack of control", see Anatta-lakkhana sutta (regarded to be the second discourse of the Buddha)). I think that the effect of "letting go" is roughly the state you describe.

I mostly agree on all these points. — Agustino

Perfect! :smile:

Yeah, I sort of agree, but this point is disputable. Suppose you have a son who is addicted to hard drugs - stuff like cocaine. In one sense, you do want to control him (so that he no longer takes the drugs). I think this desire to control him is, in this case, natural and justified. But the desire to control him will not be JUST for your own good, but also for his (your good is also related to his good, the two are, to some extent, mutually dependent). So in what sense do you say you should be unattached to saving your son? — Agustino

I would say that if you act in that way, you simply act out of compassion, which is very good (with or without "attachment"). In fact, you can act in that way also without thinking about your own good, but only for his (more on later...).

Okay, I agree! How do we go about developing positive qualities? — Agustino

Probably, by trying to do actions that involve them (which means trying to cultivate that qualities actively). Spiritual practice might help to "develop" mindstates that are conductive for that actions.

The interesting thing on this point, is that I don't think there has to be a God. It is sufficient to have faith in Him. Faith transcends the rational, but is not thereby irrational. Having faith will still transform THIS LIFE. — Agustino

Very interesting perspective :wink: ! Not sure that I can understand what you are saying here, but I think that I can even agree with it.

I do not understand, however, how it can be reconciled with the "traditional" position that if there is no resurrection, faith is vain (of course, I am not saying that you have to agree with that perspective but I wonder how you "deal" with this) (see e.g. 1 Cor 15:32 link "If the dead do not rise, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die!”"). In fact, there are a lot of Christian dogmas that I can find very hard to accept and, sadly, no one was able to give me a satisfactory answer to my doubts.

I see, I agree. — Agustino

Good!

Can you clarify what attachment means, and also why we should avoid attachment in love? For example, I love my son and I am attached to him, if he dies, I will be devastated. But I am not afraid of being devastated in that case... I would not want NOT to be devastated. The devastation is the expression of my love, I want to let it happen, why would I want to stop it? — Agustino

Thank you very much for raising this issue. It is a very deep problem. I admit that I have not, in my mind, a clear understanding of what a "love without attachment" might be. Also, I admit that I have not a definitive answer. But let me separate the problem in two parts.

1) I think that "attachment" means clinging to positive experience in our life, in such a way that we cannot accept negative situations (which in my mind means we feel aversion). So, an unattached love might mean that I can accept that, for example, my son chooses a way of life that I would not like for him and I can still love him. Or, that I can be able to have positive feelings even to my "enemies" (i.e.desiring for them happiness and so on...). Note that I do not think that it is completely "right" to say that Buddhas are completely without desire. After all, they are seen as the embodiment of compassion (other than wisdom) and compassion (karuna) is of course a desire. There is also "metta" (loving-kindness). Linked to metta, mudita (sympathetic joy) and karuna, there is the prayer "may all beings be happy and secure", which is after all a desire! But again, what means experientially to love and to be without attachment at the same time? I don't really know! Love and acceptance are somewhat difficult to reconcile.

2) you said that "I would not want NOT to be devastated. The devastation is the expression of my love, I want to let it happen, why would I want to stop it?". This is an excellent question. I think that I cannot find a reason to stop you, because I think that I agree with you. Maybe a possible Buddhist answer is that, there is nothing wrong in it but unfortunately that (alone) will not save you from samsara (honestly, I find this answer as disturbing but unfortunately it has some truth in it...) and in order to "achieve" release from samsara you should accept to "let go" even loved ones without, of course, stopping to love them. But again, stream-enterers* might be extremely sad and therefore I am not even sure of what a real answer might be.
Anyway, I refuse to think that there is something "wrong" in your reaction and you should change it and in fact it is one of my qualms about Buddhism. A strong point of Christianity is that "love" is the highest virtue and there are various way for expressing it. Christianity has the strong point to be able to give meaning and value to suffering. Also, in Christianity we are not expected to change our condition and become somewhat "super-human", but we can give meaning and value to our experiences, actions and so on: something that everybody can do (in a way or an another depending on their possibilities...).

*see how Ananda is described here. I like him in particular, because unlike other famous disciples looks very "human" and I can relate to him much more than the others more "awakened" ones! :smile:

P.S. Note that English is not my mother tongue. Also, some ideas expressed here are not even clear in my mind. So, sorry if I am not clear, enough or if I have made mistakes!

Why are death and decay so bad? — Agustino

They cause suffering, pain, distress and so on. And I think that compassion also means to limit our suffering. If someone is suffering, we should try to help him/her. They are bad in the same way an illness is bad (and therefore we seek to cure it).

I think you mean without personal preferences, but then I see that as dehumanising. How can you be human, if you don't have any preferences? We are human precisely because we can choose, and we choose based on our will, meaning based on our preferences. — Agustino

I agree to that to an extent. I think that "preferences" in a sense are still there, even in "liberated individuals". For example, the last thing Sariputta (the "wisest disciple" in the suttas) did was to "liberate" his mother. If he had no preference, why did he went to free his mother and not an unkwnown person? On the other hand, however, I think he is depicted as "unattached" to his preferences. And non-attachment does not mean "indifference".

But note that in Theravada, the total freedom from craving is gained at Arhant level (full liberation). Stream-enterers (who are partially liberated) can also enjoy "wordly" pleasures, live an "ordinary" life etc. They, however, have abandoned all "self-views". Again, I think that in this radical "transcendence" of the human condition is due again to the belief in Samsara. For Indians it is "normal" that humans can become even more "worthy" than the devas. So, in such a cultural landscape I am not too surprised to see somewhat disturbing ideas.

Sure, it's even called "eternal bliss". But those conceptions are never developed, nor is it clear what "eternal bliss" means, when Nirvana literarily translates as a "blowing out". When you combine this with the doctrine of anatta - no abiding self whatsoever - then it seems to me that things go quite far towards nihilism. Buddhism speaks very clearly against eternalism, and actually also condemns nihilism, but the two condemnations are made because both eternalism and nihilism assume that there is an abiding self to begin with. — Agustino

Yes, anatta seems to point towards that. But, as far as I know, only an ancient school of Buddhism apparently interpreted Nirvana in that way! So, I think that it is not simply "oblivion". Also in the discourses themselves the Tathagatha is said to be "deep, boundless..." (see e.g. the sutta MN 72). Of course we have the "extinction of the fire" analogy, but we have also a "hint" to some "ineffability". Also, there are some hints in discourses like: Udana 8.1 and Iti 43. But, indeed you are correct in saying that both eternalism and annihilationism were criticized for poisiting an "abiding self". So, sadly, the nihilist view has its textual support (and, in fact, you find a lot of people who say that). I do not deny that!

Regarding what is that "eternal bliss", if not "mere absence", I agree that it is not developed. This is meaningful in the "Buddhist soteriological context", because if one "conceives things" about Nirvana, one begins to grasp his concept of Nirvana and therefore can miss Nirvana itself. Personally, I think that "mere absence" can be considered as a "worthwile goal" only if one thinks that anatta means that we do not exist at all.

Anyway, I think that even in Christianity we do not know what the promised "eternal bliss" is! After all, I have no clear idea of "what is like" to be in Communion with God? Or, take for example religions that aspire at "union with God". What does that mean, experientially? So, IMO, the fact that Buddhism does not want to describe Nirvana is due to a strict "apophatic" approach (and yes, I think it is sometimes misunderstood as "oblivion").

I don't see why the "positive" qualities would follow from the mere removal of lust, and the like. To me, it's more like those positive qualities have to be cultivated for themselves. Love, after all, isn't merely the absence of evil. — Agustino

Agreed! Sorry, for the lack of clarity, I did not want to imply that! What I meant is that we can develop positive qualities easier if we remove "negative ones". In fact, Buddhism without the cultivation of positive qualities can become an ego trip IMO.

I want to challenge this. The personality is an integral aspect of loving someone. It is because of one's preferences, in other words, one's humanity, one's fraility, that love is at all possible. It is because I prefer this, over that, that I can be said to like the one. How is it possible to "love others for what they are" when I have no preferences whatsoever? To love them means that I must will to like them... I must will to want them, to prefer them, to choose them. — Agustino

Again, I agree with this. And I think that Buddhism does agree with it. In fact, there is also e.g. "mudita", i.e. "symphatetic joy". As I said before, maybe the problem is not preference or personality but our tendency to "grasp" and not be able to "let go". But, you are right. Even compassion itself is a preference: you want others to feel good and so on. I think that the problem is egoism here, i.e. wanting to control others for selfish reasons.

Anyway, I still like Christianity for the reason you mention here. We are not told to behave in a "god-like" way, so to speak. We can still be "human", with our weaknesses. We do not need to "renounce" the world to achieve Salvation. Hence, we can try to do our best as humans to make the world a better place, to love others and so on. In Christianity one does not have to think in terms of multiple life and, therefore, should try to value this life. So Christianity, as you say, is more life-affirming. Also, Christianity is, in a way, more flexible than Buddhism: a person that has a greater tendency to enjoy worldy pleasures is not "disadvantaged" in the pursuit of Salvation.

On the other hand, if there is no God and we are in a Samsara the situation is different...

Not so much here. I don't think ethics requires meditation and the like. Meditation just helps to clarify perception, but does nothing apart from that. It does not change one's will, it does not bring about a change in one's being or one's character. — Agustino

Again, I agree that meditation per se does not lead to love others. But, maybe it can help to become more effective in our actions. Also, by "ethical teachings" I also meant something like:

"Whenever you want to do a bodily action, you should reflect on it: 'This bodily action I want to do — would it lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both? Would it be an unskillful bodily action, with painful consequences, painful results?' If, on reflection, you know that it would lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both; it would be an unskillful bodily action with painful consequences, painful results, then any bodily action of that sort is absolutely unfit for you to do. But if on reflection you know that it would not cause affliction... it would be a skillful bodily action with pleasant consequences, pleasant results, then any bodily action of that sort is fit for you to do.

(MN 61, Instructions to Rahula)

Sorry for the edit!

I think that anatta can be interpreted in a nihilistic way, sadly. However, in Buddhism there is also the "compassion" side of things that should be emphasized. Maybe also @Wayfarer might share his thoughts. In fact, I am very disturbed by the nihilistic readings of "anatta"!
The same goes for "emptiness".

Hi all,



Personally, I am a "seeker" of sorts and have an interest for both Christianity, Platonism and Buddhism and you actually pointed out my own reservations about, especially, Theravada Buddhism. I think that, however, it is worth mentioning that the worldview of Buddhism and Christianity is radically different, and on this particular issue I think that the influence of the concept of "samsara" is relevant (that's why I think secular Buddhism is not "real" Buddhism).

Basically, all beings in Buddhism are seen as subject to a potentially endless cycle of rebirths. All these realms, however blissful, are impermanent and therefore they are ultimately "dukkha" because they are not free from decay and death. As the story goes, the Buddha sought a solution to this problem, i.e. freedom from old age, illness and death. He abandoned his family to seek a solution to this problem and he found it. An "unawakened" life cannot give a solution to the problem of (repeated) decay and death, and therefore Buddhists would say that he actually gave to his family, after awakening, something that is unvaluable, something that surpasses every joy that can give the "world". As a king he could never give even to his family the freedom of Nirvana.

As the story goes, the Buddha awakened to the "Dhamma" and expounded the four Noble Truths. The first is that there is suffering, given by decay, death, association with the "unbeloved" etc. The second is craving. Note that craving is seen as the cause of the "transmigration". The third Nobel Truth is Nirvana, the end of suffering. The fourth is the Path to achieve Nirvana. According to the "suttas" Nirvana is achieved by being unattached and also without aversion. So, the training leads to see reality with personal preferences, which are said to be rooted in ignorance (avijja), the cause of craving (and ultimately the cause of samsara).

Anyway, it is difficult IMO to render justice to Buddhism in all its various forms. Theravada and Mahayana are very different and in each of them there are a lot of school of thoughts.

I think that there are two main reason why people call Buddhism as "nihilistic". One is that according to them (and also for some Buddhists!) Nirvana is simply the mere absence of conditioned phenomena. The other is its tendency of world-denial.

As I said, some interpret Nirvana as "mere absence". But, I think that it is mostly a modern innovation and not a good one (except for, probably, the ancient Buddhist Sautrantika school). For example, even in the Canonical commentaries (i.e. included in the Pali Canon) there are a few "positive" description of Nirvana as being "permanent" (or even "eternal" albeit "not-self and not pertaining to a self", see e.g. this section of the Kathavatthu, a part of the Theravada canonical Abhidhamma). So even saying that for "Buddhism" everything is impermanent and unsatisfactory, is an over-simplification. Then you have the Mahayana idea that there is the "non-abiding Nirvana", where the liberated being (in this case a Bodhisattva or a Buddha) abides in neither Samsara nor in Nirvana, and therefore s/he "renounces" the bliss of Nirvana for the benefit of all sentient beings.

Anyway, look closer. Anatta means also that phenomena are not under one's control and therefore, egoism leads to suffering. Hence, by removing the concern to oneself, in both Theravada and Mahayana the idea is that one reduces egoism. And in fact, the reduction of lust, attachments, aversions etc are accompained by an increasing of "positive" qualities like loving-kindness and compassion. Detachment also means that one does not see the world with the lens of one's preferences and therefore he might also be more able to love others for what they are (and not under the lens of one's expectations, for example). The Mahayana emphasizes the "compassion" part as well the "wisdom" part, hence "taking care of others" is very important in a Mahayana context. But if there is no "potentially endless samsara" the Theravada's "world-denying tendency" and the Mahayana vows to help all sentient beings lose, in my opinion, their meaning. Anyway, if that belief is not true, Buddhism, howwever, can be very useful to be mindful, patient and so on. Buddhist teachings about ethics are in my opinion very useful to non-Buddhists (for example to do vipassana, samatha and metta meditation I do not think that "belief" is required, except an amount of "trust"...).

Also, Buddhism is not anti-natalist. In fact, the human birth is regarded as "precious" and as an opportunity to aspire to the "Highest" or at least for better future rebirths. Again, it is also important to remember, IMO, that AFAIK most forms of Buddhism regard salvation as due to personal commitment (i.e. Buddhist teachers might teach you the Path, you are free to follow it or not. And also you have to walk the Path if you wish).

Regarding what Buddhists say, well, I think that all religions are subject to very different interpretations. For example, some Christians of them believe that "faith" in the sense of "mere belief" is what lead to Salvation, to "Heaven". And, in fact, according to some Christians all "unbelievers" go to Hell. So, I imagine that even in Buddhism there are a lot of views. For example see theEdicts of Ashoka:, e.g:

Everywhere[2] within Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi's domain, and among the people beyond the borders, the Cholas, the Pandyas, the Satiyaputras, the Keralaputras, as far as Tamraparni and where the Greek king Antiochos rules, and among the kings who are neighbors of Antiochos,[3] everywhere has Beloved-of-the-Gods, King Piyadasi, made provision for two types of medical treatment: medical treatment for humans and medical treatment for animals. Wherever medical herbs suitable for humans or animals are not available, I have had them imported and grown. Wherever medical roots or fruits are not available I have had them imported and grown. Along roads I have had wells dug and trees planted for the benefit of humans and animals.
...

is this "world-denying"?

Also, also many forms of Hinduism and Jainism are as "world-denying" as Buddhism. IMO, the belief in Samsara is the reason behind this "world-denying" tendency in India. But, on the other hand, the same belief can also inspire compassion, non-violence and so on.

Personally, I am interested in Buddhism. But I am highly skeptical of many of its doctrines. And, therefore I have reservations, for example, about the "total letting go of all attachements".

In my view, "anatta" points to the non-objectification of "what is the self" (the "identification" process).
Anyway, I think that "interpentration" is quite widespread in East Asian Buddhist teaching, especially in the Huayan school (see e.g.: this article on Fazang, the third patriarch of the Huayan school. on the IEP), which is based on the Avatamsaka sutra.

:up: thank you for the detailed and insightful response.

If we will resume the discussion in the future, maybe I will be more learned in Aristotle's metaphysics. Now, I think it is too underrated in our time.




Good point! Unfortunately, I am sorry but I have to take a break from the Forum, now.

Anyway, thank you for the interesting discussion!

The issue with "potential" gets more complicated with Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is that no potential can be eternal, therefore there must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. This is how Aristotle denies the reality of "prime matter", potentiality without any actuality (what is sometimes called the eternal flux of the infinite apeiron). A boundless potential denies any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. If such an infinite potential ever existed, it would always exist, and therefore there could not ever be anything actually existing. But this is contrary to what we observe, which is the actual existence of forms. So we must deny the reality of infinite potential, assuming that there is always actuality which is prior to and therefore limits any potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interestingly, both "idealist" and "materialist" philosophies tend to say that the "first cause" (or "first principle") is something that is "simple", has infinite potentialities etc. While I do respect these philosophies (well, after all my username is "boundless", apeiron in Greek), I saw no convincing explanation on how the "world" could arise from this "primordial potentiality". As I said, I know almost nothing about Aristotle, but interestingly here he criticizes exaclty this point.

Anyway, Aristotle's argument is sound. If it is true, then a "double-aspect" is heavily implied.

Understanding this cosmological argument can have a great influence over the way that one understands time. Suppose that the passage of time is understood by us through the analysis of changing forms. The passage of time, in conception, is tied to and bound by the changes in actually existing forms. But we also learn from our understanding of free will and such things that the potential for any actual form precedes its actual existence. This is how ethical determinism is denied, we allow that a form of actual existence comes from the potential for that existence. So any actual state of existence, at a particular point in time, doesn't necessitate the next state, there is the potential for a multiplicity of next states. — Metaphysician Undercover

This could solve the problem that Janus posited, before. From a purely "naturalistic" (in our langauge if we consider only the "changng forms") reasoning free-will is literally impossible. If we accept the view that we are completely "natural" phenomena then free-will is simply illusory (or it is taken as an emergent phenomenon, in a way that is not very convincing).

In this theory, free-will seems well explained.

If we apply this to our understanding of time, we see that this understanding is incomplete because the conception of time is produced from the changing forms, but we have determined the logical necessity for a "potential" which is "prior to" the changing forms. Our concept of time cannot grasp this potential, because it is prior to the changing forms, upon which the concept of time is based. The idea of something prior to time is irrational and contradictory. Now we bring in the cosmological argument which states that this "potential" cannot refer to anything real and therefore cannot account for the real existence of the changing forms, unless it is soundly based in something actual. So we must find the means to give actual existence to the potential, in order to bring it into the realm of intelligibility (potential, as it is, defies the fundamental principles of logic). — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I agree that in this "dual-aspects" (potentialities and actualities) model, our concept of time needs redefinition. If we think about measurements, clearly we measure "time" in relation to the changing form. Hence we need a redefinition.

In your view the universe had a beginning? I agree that speaking about something "before time" is illogical ("before" is a temporal relation and outside time speaking of "before" or "after" is meaningless), but at the same time, to me it seems that this model requires that time had no "beginning" due to the fact that potentialities and actualities cannot be separated.

Right, the two different spaces account for the two distinct actualities. Without distinguishing between them they are conflated and produce the appearance of infinite possibility, or potential. There is nothing actual which "the passing of time" refers to, so it appears as infinite potential. What the cosmological argument teaches us is that "infinite potential" is an unintelligible concept which renders metaphysics and ontology as incomprehensible. Idealists and materialists alike get drawn into the trap of infinite potential as Aristotle demonstrated. The cosmological argument refutes Pythagorean (Platonic) Idealism, in which human ideas are said to be eternal, by showing the true nature of these ideas as having the characteristic of potential, and it also refutes Anaximander's materialism which refers to an eternal chaos, or "aperion", which is matter, or potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that their system have an inconsistency (or at least a "non-sequitur"). Ideas are not separable from changing forms and also changing forms are not enough to explain reality. The undeniable merit of this metaphysics is that it accepts both levels. It might be very difficult (or even impossible...) to make a scientific theory from it (although there are some attempts as you remarked earlier) but philosophically has a very good point: the two "aspects" of reality need each other. This explains nicely the difficulties of both "materialism" and "idealism".

Just for curiosity: do you know online sources that explain well the cosmological argument of Aristotle? I am very curious to learn about his philosophy after this discussion :grin:

Unfortunately I will probably be very busy in the following days, so I will likely have a hard time in keeping up with the conversation. Even this answer is somewhat lacking and I am quite sorry for this :sad:

Anyway, thank you very much for the interesting discussion we had so far :blush: ... and thanks in advance for the reply!

Plato had exposed the difference between those who believe in the logical principles of being and not being as fundamental to reality, and those who believe in becoming as fundamental. According to Aristotle, sophists could argue that becoming, and change, are not real. What is real is describable by "what is", and when change occurs, there is a new "what is". But Aristotle demonstrated how this leads to infinite regress. If "what is" at one moment is other than "what it was" at the last moment, then to account for the change between them, we must posit an intermediate "what is". This would create an infinite regress of always needing to posit an intermediate "what is" between any two different states to account for the change which occurs between them. This is similar to Zeno's paradoxes. So Aristotle allowed for a special category of "potential", to account for becoming and change, and "potential" was designated as having exclusion from the law of excluded middle. He also used "potential" to refer to future things which may or may not occur, and said that it is incorrect to say that there is truth or untruth concerning these things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for this explanation! Unfortunately I do not know much of Aristotle, and in fact I am discovering that what I thought to know about him was very incorrect.

But "potential" has some causal role in change or is merely a substratum? I mean, we observe acts, i.e. changing forms. We assume that there is a "potential" to take into account change to avoid the intermediate "what is" paradox and we call "matter" this "potential".
So, the above question can be rephrased as: are "changing forms" simply an "expression" of "what persists", i.e. matter? If this is true, then I agree with you that this "matter" must be something that in itself has almost no "properties" - hence it is "formless". The property it has is that it can be actualized in all possible "forms".

Now we have the issue of formless matter, pure energy. But this is strictly denied by Aristotelian metaphysics as inherently unintelligible, because the form which matter has is what is apprehended by us. So our observations of temporal continuity is what is provided for by the concept of matter, but if we remove all form from matter, then temporal continuity becomes unintelligible because it's unrelatable to any observations. As much as "matter" represents temporal continuity, and is apprehended by us as such, without a particular form, (what it is), it becomes unintelligible to us. Now under the precepts of special relativity theory we get the claim "time is just an illusion". The problem though is that time is very real, so if we're working under a theory which renders it as an illusion, this will only hinder the progress. — Metaphysician Undercover

...And therefore we need to introduce the distinction between the "potential" and the "actual" into two dfferent spaces. So, in fact, maybe it can be said that SR tends to consider only an aspect of reality, i.e. "pure energy". But in fact if we want to really understand the nature of time, we need to consider both "aspects".

So, if we do not consider the "positive" space then we will conclude that "time does not exist". But, time in fact, contrary to what many physicists think, might be real, after all :cool:

Alice could choose tea over coffee all her life and everyone who knows her could predict this. But I don't think this demonstrates that it wasn't really her choice. — Andrew M

Agreed!

I think conceiving of determinism in an absolute sense (the view from nowhere) does seem to negate agent causality, as you indicate. However my argument is that deterministic theories are only applicable within a context (the view from somewhere). So, for Alice, the context includes her ability to make choices, her perceptual capabilities, her knowledge and so on. She can then use deterministic theories to predict what external physical systems will do. But those theories can't circumvent or undermine the intentional context that they are empirically grounded in. And so we see that when Bob interacts with Alice, his prediction about her choice breaks down and Alice's intentional choice prevails. — Andrew M

I agree that deterministic theories are context-dependent.

What I do not understand however is how can something like "free agency" arise from deterministic processes (or a combination between deterministic and random processes). But as you said, this is normal since no theory has ever explained it :wink:

Yes, I agree with the computability thesis (though not with Tegmark's Platonism). — Andrew M

I, too, disagree with Tegmark's Platonism. But I disagree with computabilism because I think that, for example, the "workings" of our minds cannot be explained in computabilistic terms. At the same time however our theories to be both consistent and complete must be computable. This shows, however, the limits of physics IMO. (and of course I did not mean to "lower" the importance of it with this observation :wink: )

The free will here is that Alice can choose the outcome she wants (and the outcome she wants can change as new information is brought to her attention). I don't see that known (deterministic) theories of physics disallow that, though I would agree they don't explain it either. — Andrew M

To clarify what I meant with the problem of "free will":

I think that the problem with compatibilism is that in fact we do not have a "libertarian" free will which is neither compatible with determinism nor with "randomism" (and I think, neither with a combination of the two, if such a combination is possible). The "effective" free will advocated by compatibilism in fact is not a "real" free will, but simply it is a statement of "unpredictability". If our choices are due to deterministic processes then they are inevitable and ideally even predictable. If our choices are in part due to quantum phenomena then (if Pilot-Wave Theory is wrong, of course) there is a random component but still there is no real "libertarian" free will. Therefore if all phenomena, including our mental processes, volitions etc, are either deterministic or random then "libertarian" free will is impossible. If we allow that instead there is some real free agency then, as I discussed with Janus last week in this very thread (see the end of page 12 onwards), it seems that either free agency has no "physical explanation" or that there are some aspects of reality that cannot be treated mathematically (in its known form) in a coherent and complete way.

Anyway, you seem to agree with me on this point :wink: :

... though I would agree they don't explain it either — Andrew M

P.S.
likely unrelated note, but might be of interest: if I do not err, Max Tegmark suggested that to avoid the constraints of Goedel theorem his "mathematical universe hypothesis" should be modified into the restricted version "computable universe hypothesis". This (and similar things I read some time ago but unfortunately I cannot remeber now), seem to suggest that if there is a "theory of everything" then "physical laws" are computable. And therefore there is not "libertarian" free will of course. Hence "free will", if it exists, seems to imply that we cannot produce a coherent and complete "theory of everyting".

Another example of the qualitative difference is this: In relativity we can always find a rest reference frame for massive particles, but for massless particles the concept of "rest frame" becomes meaningless. I find this point under-emphasized by physicists. In fact it means that - ultimately - we can speak about "flow of time" thanks to mass. If there were no mass, then temporal measurements could not be made (this is why it is said that photons are "timeless"...).

Remember, the speed of light is currently measured as a phenomenon in the negative space, related to objects in the positive space. On the orthogonal lines, the nature of space is actually changing. So if we give more time on the orthogonal line, beyond the range of human perception, to allow light to come into positive space, we ought to allow that distances would change due to the changing space, the distance between the same massive particles would increase. This seems to imply that the actual velocity of a photon would be greater than the recorded speed of light. If we do not allow light into the positive space of actuality, it becomes the infinite possibility, which feeds the notion of time travel. But that's just a basic idea, there are different things to sort out, such as the relationship between different frequencies... — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, but there is no problem now to have a faster than light photon. In fact the reason why there are no tachyons is not simply because they are "faster than light" but because in relativity information cannot travel faster than light. But, if we consider that space is changing etc, then there is no problem with this. Time travel is still avoided due to the fact that space changes. So I prefer the first idea here since time travel is illogical.

Human beings have come to notice temporal extension of being, of objects. This is the continuity of sameness across the orthogonal lines, along the traditional timeline, existence. The continuity of sameness is attributed to mass, and inertia, and this is what we attribute to the determinateness provided by coming to be in the past. As something comes to be in the past its spatial position is fixed and it is passive. So from our perspective, massive objects come to be on the right side of our perspective of the orthogonal timelines, so we see them as passive matter with mass and inertia. They are always on the past side of the zero line present, from our perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, this explains that the "two natures" of particles (waves/fields vs particles) is due to the dual nature of space. Inertia therefore is related to the persistence of particles in time. It is their "substance".

If we go to the other end of the human perspective, we'll find the energy of light. It is always on the future side of the present, from our perspective so we define it in terms of potentialities. Notice that the electron would be in between, and could be viewed in both ways. But let me get to the issue with the current theories involving the speed of light. An object, or particle, must have a fixed place on each orthogonal line in order that it may be engaged in locomotion. Locomotion is the particle's relative position from one orthogonal line to the next. If the particle has mass its position from one line to the next will be orderly according to laws of inertia. And, to fix the particle's position on the orthogonal lines is to give it mass. If it had a position without inertia, its relative position from one line to the next would be random and there would be no way of knowing its position. This is what happens to the photon under current definitions of light. Because the velocity of light is fixed, constant, and it is fixed in the position of negative space, potential, the photon cannot have a position on the orthogonal line. Not only is its position forced to be beyond the realm of human perspective, it is forced right off the end of the orthogonal line. By definition, the photon is not allowed to be apprehended as a determinate passive object, with a fixed spot on the orthogonal lines. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this part is interesting. If this is true then the dualism quantum-classical world can be explained by the mass of the object. In fact we can imagine a mass-limit where all "quantum weirdness" disappears. Actually a drawback of "Copenaghism" is that it assumes this dualism but cannot explain why our world is classical. This is the main reason why MWI and the relational approaches are very popular: QM, for that approaches, is a complete theory at all massive scales.

Anyway there is a deep connection between energy/momenta and space/time. In physics courses it is often stressed that as we study small scales energy becomes gradually greater. Also in the De-Broglie wave-matter theory the higher is the mass, the lower wave-lenght we have. This strong bond between cinematic and dynamical quantities is therefore present both in current theories and this model.

It would not be correct therefore to describe any such interaction as within the positive space. In relation to "real change", activity takes place only within negative space, as negative space moves to become positive. In positive space, the position of things is fixed, as in the past, and the only change is locomotion, which is the fixed position of objects from one moment to the next. So a massive atom may move in relation to another, but this is strictly the locomotion of the massive nucleus. The electron however has an obscured motion because its locomotion (activity as an actual massive particle in positive space) is conflated with its real change (activity as potential within negative space). From one perspective, the electron has a potential position in its relations to the coming into being of massive nucleus, but from another perspective it has an actual position in relation to the coming into being of the photon. From the human perspective, the electron may be described as existing in negative space relative to the nucleus, or as in positive space relative to the photon. We model all real things as changing from potential to actual at each moment in time. This means we must adjust the constancy of the speed of light to allow that photons have actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok... but IMO we can think it in gradual terms. The electron has a "fuzzier" location because it is less massive than the nucleus. This gradation leads us to a quantitative dependance and in principle this dependance can be observed by experiments.

Right, and this association is made through the constant called the speed of light. That is why "length contraction" is such a counter-intuitive concept. Mass is related to density. But under the concept of length contraction an extremely fast moving object would appear to be contracted and therefore more dense, the same mass in a smaller area. What happens to the mass if the object reaches the boundary, the speed of light? I think it's more intuitive to think of an extremely fast moving object as covering more area in the same period of time required for measurement, and therefore being less dense. If a tiny object, such as an electron, or even a photon, actually has some mass, that mass might be spread out over a large area due to the velocity it has. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, this "conflict" might not be a problem for this theory if the experimental results are "saved". In fact that lenght contraction is derived by measurement of distances in SR (and based on the "speed of light" constancy that you discussed earler). This theory instead is quite different from SR in the explanation of the nature of space and time. So again "lenght contraction" is explained as a sort of illusion due to the fact that we do not use the orthogonal timelines.

The concept of energy is actual quite complex. It is defined as the capacity to do work, so it is inherently a potential. A potential must always be attributed to something actual in the form of a property of that thing, or else nothing substantiates, or grounds that potential. That's what differentiates a logical possibility, as imaginary and fictional, from an actual possibility. In the case of energy, the potential is attributed to the activity of an object, as kinetic energy. So activity is a potential, called energy. Beyond this we have potential energy, and this is the potential for a potential. If I understand correctly, potential energy is modeled by fields, so in this case the field mathematics represents the potential for a potential. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a sense I think you are right. While kinetic and rest energy can be thought as the potential of particles (and therefore it is a property of particles in the "actual" space), the potential energy in fact can be thought as a potential of that potential and therefore it can be thought to "exist" in the negative space. Before an apple falls from a tree the apple has (circa, in our frame etc) zero kinetic energy. Once it begins to fall it acquires kinetic energy and once it hits the ground it loses its kinetic energy. We can in fact think that potential energy and kinetic energy are two different concepts. They are both potentials but of different types. Today we tend to think them as more or less "the same" but this tendency might be due to the "craving for generality" to use an expression of Wittgenstein. In fact there are many "types" of energy and each should be distinguished. The conservation of "energy" is in fact a conservation of the "sum" of many different (but very similar) quantities, not the conservation of the same "thing".

As you say, the usual approach is to simply actualize energy, but this is not to stay true to the conceptual foundations and the result is misunderstanding. The problem being that energy was conceptualized as the property moving mass. A moving object has energy, mv^2. When the speed of light was introduced as the limit to velocity, in the way that it was, then energy became simply the property of motion. With the transmission of electromagnetic energy, it is not possible that there is any "thing" which is moving from A to B, there is simply energy that is transmitted. But logically, conceptually, energy is the property of motion, and if there is motion from A to B there must be something moving from A to B. So we say that it's "energy" which moves from A to B, making the predicate into the subject. That is of course, circular logic. If energy gets from A to B, it must be the property of something which moves from A to B. What moves from A to B? Energy. The concept of energy is not really designed for describing what is transmitted by wave impulses. — Metaphysician Undercover

IMO this objection maybe is solved by the reasoning above, i.e. that the different kinds of energy are different concepts that should be distinguished. Therefore "what" is transmitted by wave impulse is different by "what" is transmitted by a moving particle, but we need to count both of them to make a conservation law.

Instead of random, I would say Alice's choice is determined by her (i.e., self-determined) in her reference frame, whereas the outcome can be predicted with certainty in Bob's reference frame. — Andrew M

Well I kind of agree with you. But you have to accept that Alice in her reference frame has "libertarian" free will, which is not strictly speaking allowed by the known theories of physics. But that's exactly is the problem. How can it "emerge" from either random or deterministic processes?

On a relational approach, no contradiction arises since Alice and Bob haven't interacted and jointly considered the specific predicted outcome. But if they did, then Bob's prediction would no longer be certain, since he can only predict the outcomes of isolated systems, not outcomes of the (Alice + Bob) system he is now a part of. So Alice is free to reject that outcome. But Carol, an observer of the isolated (Alice + Bob) system, could still predict the outcome of Alice's choice. — Andrew M

Excellent point, indeed!

Yes. Though it's worth noting that Bob can only predict the outcome of Alice's choice on the condition that he doesn't interact with Alice (perhaps itself a choice). — Andrew M

Agreed! :wink:

I wouldn't go so far as to say that "space" is simply a backdrop for Newton because I think he looked at space in different ways, depending on the purpose of his inquiry. For the purpose of describing the motions of physical objects, space is just a backdrop. But Newton was one of the pioneers in the experimentation with optics, and he proceeded to speculate into the nature of light itself. In this more metaphysical speculation it is evident that Newton believed space to be more than just a backdrop for physics. Although he put forth a corpuscular theory of light, Newton did extensive experimentation with refraction, and I believe he attributed the wave properties of light to something other than the light itself, but to its interactions with an aetheral space. Also, if I remember correctly he posits a type of spatial inversion between matter and light which he claims to occur within the sun. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good point!

Right, so in the space of potentialities, negative space, we cannot accurately say that particles are real. We have to look at positive space to find actual particles. And a real particle will occupy space, and have mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, it seems the necessary conclusion of the theory :wink:

I wouldn't go so far as to make this conclusion either. The problem which I alluded to in the last post is with the definition of "light". It is defined in the mathematics of physics as energy, meaning the capacity to do work, and therefore it is necessarily, by definition, a potentiality. But since it actually does work, then it must get related to physical objects in the cases that it actually does work, and so it must be described in an actual form which can relate to physical objects. This is the photon. — Metaphysician Undercover

Another very interesting point, indeed! to tell the truth I find the usual interpretation of E = mc^2 a bit "wrong". Strictly speaking it does not say that energy and mass are the same, but only that there is an associated quantity of energy to the mass of an object. And in fact, as you say the basic definition of energy is after all "the ability to produce work" - we can say the ability to cause some kind of change - and it is a potentiality. If we take the usual interpretation then everything is a potentiality and nothing is actual. The usual solution of this is to "actualize" energy, while in fact "our" model is maintaining the idea that energy is a potentiality and that mass is an actuality. This is indeed a very interesting point!

Do you agree that an electron has mass, and that it has a variable velocity? Having a variable velocity is directly related to having mass. A photon cannot have a variable velocity, nor can it have mass, due to conventional definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes! There is a qualitative difference between massless and massive particles in relativity. In fact a conosequence of that difference is exactly this different behaviour you are pointing at here!

Interaction is not a problem, because at the far right of the orthogonal lines, all existence must come from the negative space (potentiality). So in this zone, of the very beginning of the present moment, where even massive particles are in the form of potential, interaction occurs. Massive particles are compelled by the forces described by inertia, so they are not very susceptible to interference. However, changes to electrons can affect more massive particles, and electrons can be changed by photons. Even things at the low end of the scale (photons) can interfere with determined massive existence through the medium of electrons and existing instability. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ok... I also had in mind a solution like that in mind. Interaction is between fields. This determines the outcome in the "positive" space. An objection might be made on the fact that photons interact with protons, too. But at the same time protons are made of quarks. So the interaction with the proton is an effective explanation of the phenomenon.


For now I stop here. I know it is an incomplete response. But I need some more time to think about the other things you wrote. Anyway it is a very interesting theory :wink:

Yes the two had apparently a close relationship. In fact there is a lot of confusion about what "Bohmian mechanics" is. Most physicists use that term to refer to the original paper of 1952: the deterministic non-local theory with point particles, the real wvefunction and the quantum potential. In the last twenty years from that work it was derived the "nomological Bohmian mechanics" where the universal wavefunction is treated as simply a "law" (rather than a "real thing", so to speak) and the "quantum potential" has been removed. Among physicists apparently this "kind" of Bohmian approach is the most studied. From the 70's to the 90's Bohm introduced many other concepts with (supposedly) the strong influence of Krishnamurti. In fact concepts like "Inplicate and Explicate order" are found in the later stages of the work of Bohm. Among non-scientists, this approach is what is usually called "Bohmian mechanics". But this later work is not really scientific but philosophical. And much skepticism in the scientific community to Bohm's early and later work also derives from this "metaphyisical" tendeicies later part of his work. Recently Rovelli compared his "relational" interpretation with the work of Nagarjuna and in fact many times "summarised" his views but saying that things are processes, relations, events etc. So, IMO Krishnamurti would be certainly fascinated by RQM (I suggest you the article on SEP or Wikipedia about it).

Well said. I had something of an epiphany when I realised the power of the ‘theory of ideas’ - that ideas are real as possible modes of existence, but are in some sense prior to any and all particulars. I’m still researching it. (You might find an article by Kelly Ross relevant - Meaning and the Problem of Universals. I have read it many times, I don’t agree with all of it, or understand all of it, but I still feel it has a useful interpretation of this question from a contemporary point of view.) — Wayfarer

Thanks for the link. I have already read it too some time ago, but I forgot to re-read it. Anyway I remember that when I read it, I had a similar impression. I take this opportunity to re-read it :wink:

Anyway since we are both attracted by Buddhism and Platonism, I found this interesting sutta, SN 12.20:
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.20/en/bodhi (Ven. Bodhi's translation)
This sutta reads at a certain point:

...whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality...

IMO this means that eternal "truths" are in fact not rejected by Buddhism - as far as we do not understand them as "things". Therefore, I think that "timeless" truths are compatible to Buddhism.

In fact I had a similar experience when I first encountered Plato in high school, when the professor mentioned the "second navigation". So, to be really honest I am maybe more a Platonist than anything else.

Oh, and there’s another web essay that you might be interested in - The Debate between Plato and Democritus, by Heisenberg. It’s the transcript of a lecture. He too comes down in favour of Plato over Democritus, or idealism over materialism: — Wayfarer

Well, I am still reluctant to endorse idealism but I appreciate his reasoning. After all, mathematically the "foundemental thing" is the state in the Hilbert space. Even the wavefunction is actually a "representation" in the position space. This means that we can think the wavefunction as an "aspect", an instantiation of the abstract state. And of course the "outcome" of our measurement can be also thought as an instantiation. So yes, when one begins to reflect on these things then the "strangeness" of the Copenaghen interpretation* begins to become "reasonable", so to speak.

*Also the same could be said of MWI.

I voted "yes" for both but with some "reservations" due the definition of "supernatural".

I think that "reality" is much more complicated than how we normally experience it. At the same time however I do not believe in a Creator. Hence for me the "supernatural" is the part of reality that (normally) is not accessible to us (and because of this "miracles" are possible).

It's possible, but what could it mean to have free will if you could neither experience nor conceive of that freedom, let alone exercise it? — Janus

Well, IMO it is like learning a particular skill. It is not that babies do not have free will, but rather they cannot "use" it. Over time however they learn from experience and they gradually begin to "master" that ability.

Free will could be a result of the soul's temporal development, that is, its advent could be temporal without necessitating that it's origin must be temporal. — Janus

Yes, this is another possibility.

I see no contradiction between the idea that the soul is eternal and the idea that God created the soul. If eternity is the condition for the existence of the soul then the soul is in a sense created by eternity. This is because eternity is greater than the soul; even if the soul is eternal it cannot be the whole of eternity.

I also don't see why we need the notion of God "interacting" with the temporal world. The temporal world could be the expression of God, not something Dre interacts with. I don't interpret Theism as a claim that God "creates the unchanging soul at a certain point"; rather I understand that the soul is created by Dre* from all eternity.

* 'Dre' is a non-gendered personal pronoun I created because I don't like referring to God as 'He' or 'She' — Janus

Interesting! But if eternity means "timelessness" then this implies that we always existed from the perspective of the "temporal world" and in fact this creation coincides with "atemporal causation".

I think of this situation as the eternal being the condition for existence of the temporal. If the existence of the temporal is necessary, though, then the temporal is equally as much a condition for the existence of the eternal. Could the Forms exist without the "changing world"?

As Plato says "Time is the moving image of eternity". We could equally say that eternity is the unmoving image of time. I think the idea of interaction or activity occurring between eternity and time is incoherent. — Janus

Ok, I see your point here but I (respectfully) disagree. But think about Spinoza's "pantheism". According to him all things are "modes" of the single Substance. This means that whatever can happen, happens neessarily. In turn this implies that sub specie aeternitatis both the Substance and the modes are necessary. But even here IMO there is a clear ontological hierarchy: the modes exist because there is the Substance, instead one a mode is destroyed the Substance persists.

This is how I understand the relationship between the Forms and the "changing world". To exist every table necessitates the existence of the Form of the table. The table in the "changing world" is a possible instantiation of the related Form. And in Plato's case there is not even the constraint that all possible "instantiations" must be realized. So since (supposedly) not all possible "instantiations" are actualized then the Form of the table existed in the past, exists now and will exist in the future even if some possible instantiations are never realized. From this IMO it is clear that the Forms have an ontological priority over the changing world.

This means that the temporal does not affect the eternal while the temporal cannot exist without the eternal. And I think that with this in mind we can speak even of "causation".

I would just note that it is the agent herself that is the locus and determinant of her choice, not her will or desires. (As Pierre-Normand explains in his last sentence here.) — Andrew M

Ok, I can be in agreement with this. But at the same time the agent is still bound to make a precise choice. If determinism is true the agent cannot make another choice (ideally it is possible, but it is not possible in reality).

I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently.

In my view, both those perspectives should be taken as equally valid. Which means that whether or not an outcome is inevitable is indexed to the agent considering the outcome, it's not an absolute claim. — Andrew M

Well, the relational approach is very interesting in this issue. But again, the outcomes of choices are either random or deterministic (in the "reference frames" of the various agents) and randomness cannot explain free will. On the other hand, if we allow the existence of libertarian free will in the case of Alice, maybe we can still assume that in Bob's "reference frame" the choice was inevitable. I wonder if this makes sense (if it does we actually solved the problem of "free will" and omniscence using an interpretation of QM :wink: Sometimes life can be very surprising :rofl: )

‘To be, is to be related’ ~ Krishnamurti — Wayfarer

I wonder what Krishnamurti would have thought about the relational interpretation of QM. Probably he would have preferred it over Bohm's.

There is a matter of distinguishing the concept from the thing which it is a concept of. The Newtonian concept of space was derived from an understanding of objects, and the need for a "space" for them to move in. In this way, space is derived from objects, but that's only conceptually, in abstraction. We can look at the relationship between space and objects logically (if there are objects then there is space) and conclude that space is necessary for the existence of objects. Therefore space is prior to objects. Of course the real existence of point particles would defy this principle, but as you say, the trend is to make space a property of what exists, not vise versa. We can look at time in the same way. The concept of time is derived from an understanding of motion and change. It is a generalization. So we can say "if there is change then there is time". This logical process leads to the necessity of positing "time" as something real, but its reality is only apprehended directly by the mind (intuited). But we cannot logically support "if there is time then there is change". So this allows for the proposition that time is prior to change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmm, interesting. Regarding Newtonian space it is interesting to note that "space" is not a "thing" in that model. In fact it is simply the "backstage" of phenomena and in fact if we "remove" objects we are left with "nothing", i.e. simply the absence of objects. In the same way "Newtonian time" is also a "backstage". Space and time in Newtonian mechanics are often regarded as "absolute" when in fact they are simply the "backstage". What is absolute in that theory is simply the measure of distances and durations. But distances and durations are not a property of space or time but are meaningful concepts in the presence of objects themselves. So in fact even in the Newtonian picture the observable "properties" of space are in fact dependent on the objects.
In this model instead space and time are ontologically "prior" to objects. Objects need space and time for their existence. Space and time therefore are not merely an "abstraction" we use to "individuate" objects, but in fact are what allow objects to be "individuable". This is the big distinction between - as far as I understand - Kant/Schopenhauer and Newton. According to Newton space and time have no ontological role, so to speak. Instead in our case and in trascendental idealism space and time are necessary for the existence of objects (or phenomena). With space and time there is individuation.

This is probably beyond my capacity to explain or even understand, but since you seem to have a fundamental understanding of my hypothesis I'll offer some further speculation. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I am very grateful for your effort! Unfortunately, I am not very sure to have really understood this time. So what I wrote might be completely wrong.

Consider Galilean relativity. Motion is determined relative to an inertial frame, but it could be any inertial frame, and the motion is through the medium, empty space. Now Einstein created consistency between Galilean relativity, and the constancy of the speed of light, so light is brought into this conception of space, which allows for objects moving in space. Light is positioned as the boundary to this conception of objects in space, but it is important to note that it is a conception of objects in space, rather than the alternative conception of light, which was waves in an ether. So light is placed into positive space, therefore it can only be understood, under the precepts of special relativity, as an object in space. Now we have a massless non-inertial particle, a photon, and this is a precedent for other such particles to follow in conception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in SR everything we can observe is in the space of objects, not in the space of potentialities. But IMO this was also true in the Newtonian case: in that theory everything physical was "in" the space of objects. But "our" model splits the "potentialities" and "actualities", and therefore seems to take into account the double nature of quantum particles by saying that each aspect of "particles" is "real" in the two spaces.

When we look at a massive object, we see a solid object. But sight sees in the negative space, so we are not really seeing the mass of the object. Mass doesn't really exist as solid objects it exists as tiny particles at the nucleus of the atom, with space between them. So there is space, as positive space, between particles of mass, and the representation of an object of mass as having a centre point of gravity cannot be accurate. Each particle of mass has its own spatial location. The problem is that this space within objects (or between massive particles) is understood by us through the interactions of light, electrons, and other massless particles which is most likely the activity of negative space. So our approach to positive space, using the speed of light as a constant, is through negative space and we have an inadequate understanding of negative space. This becomes more evident if we extrapolate to larger and larger massive objects, like the solar system, and the galaxy. Each planet is seen as a massive object with space between, and we understand and measure this space through the activity of light. But space between massive objects is positive space, and the activity of light is in negative space. So we have basic principles which measure distance in positive space, then we relate the activity of light as if it were moving in positive space, and we derive a speed of light. The designated speed of light is inaccurate because of this conflation of negative space with positive space. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that there is a possible problem here. "Fields" and "potentialities" are properties of the negative space, whereas objects are a property of "positive" space. According to QFT, fields are both of massive and massless particles. If what we said before is correct then for massive particles the interpretation is easy: fields live in the negative space whereas their associated particles live in positive space. At the same time we said that light give us information about potentialities and not actualities. If this is so then photons are in fact not "objects" but in fact "potentialities".

Massless particles are not strictly speaking real. They arise as the projection of light into the "physical space". In fact we need them to make a unitary picture of our perception of the two spaces. With other senses we acquire informations about the physical objects in the positive space. With sight we "see" the negative space, but to have a unitary picture of reality we "translate", so to speak, the information into the positive space. This means that when we look a tree we do not see the "negative" space, but rather we see a fictional projection of what we see (in fact we see the negative space) into the positive space. In fact our "experience" (say for evolutionary reasons) must be unitary and therefore we conflate the two space into one.

The problem is that objects do interact with light as it is an "actual" object. Think about the photoelectric effect. In that case you need to take into account the particle nature of light. While in fact I can think about our experience as given by the "projection" on the positive space of the negative, I do not understand how a physical massive object can interact with a massless one in the model we are discussing. In fact in the negative space we have the interaction of the fields (e.g. QED describes the interaction between an atom and a photon as the interaction of fields, after all) but in the positive space we have the corrisponding interaction between particles. In fact the interaction between, say, two massive atoms is an interaction that takes place in the positive space. Whereas the interaction of a massless and a massive one is solely in the negative space (and the positive we have a "projection" of it).

To derive the true speed of light we must bring light into the positive space, as a particle of mass, having determinate, actual existence, instead of existing as possibilities. But this may be just out of the range of the breadth of the present of human perception, because light appears to us as the possibility for change. So it must be redefined as an actuality and this requires locating individual particles in relation to massive objects and establishing a positioning in this way. This could create the base for the zero dimension line. — Metaphysician Undercover

If massless particles are not real I think that you are right here. The only way to observe "massive light" is to change completely our perception. But this may even not be possible IMO.

The speed of light is now the base speed for activity in the negative space. It is derived from the left hand side of the orthogonal timelines when space has fully inverted and spatial separation at 'the present" has maximized its meaningfulness. As we look toward the source of the orthogonal timelines, to the right, when the inversion of space is just beginning, spatial separation is completely different, allowing for interactions between particles, which if they were related at the other end of the timeline would appear as faster than the speed of light. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems follow from the above reasoning. The fact that we do not observe particles faster than light is because we do not observe light as a massive object. In fact it is because we superimpose observed light in the negative space on the positive space that we observe light as the speed limit. So in fact if we could separate the observation of the two spaces then we might a rather different experience.

No worries. Thank you for the explanation :wink:

Apart from the difficulties you noted, the problem with this solution would again be that a physical cause or determining conditions would be posited for something which, if it is truly what it is purported to be, must be unconditioned. — Janus

Yes! also this is true. Free agency is a real enigma (I think that Kant regarded it as an antinomy for the reason you said here). The simplest "explanation" is to say that we have an "effective" free will, but honestly I find it unsatisfying. Anyway, it is even worth mentioning that it is only partially unconditioned since our "souls" do interact with the "external world". So in fact IMO it is neither "conditioned", if by that we mean it is completely "determined", neither "unconditioned", if by that we mean it is totally unaffected by conditions. It is a true enigma, in fact.

Let's assume that babies do not have free will. But the idea that free will could have an origin in time just is the idea that it is an emergent phenomenon, it seems. Free will in each person's life must have an advent in time; but it does not follow from this that its origin must be temporal. — Janus

We can speculate that babies have free will but are unaware of it. In this case, there is no problem with time. Souls are created with free will as an intrinsic property. It becomes manifest when we gain the "awareness" of it. In this case, its origin is not temporal. In fact it is simply hidden.

Personally, I don't resonate with the idea of beginninglessness. An actually infinitely extended past seems to be impossible, as does an actually infinitely extended future (even though the future could go on forever it could never be infinitely extended). I prefer the idea that souls are eternal. We each have only one temporal life, and that life taken as a whole exists 'all at once', as it were, eternally. Freedom could then be thought to have an origin in eternity. — Janus

Although I am very drawn to Indian religions (especially Buddhism) the notion that the "world cycles" have no beginning (and no end) is a notion that is very hard for me to accept (let alone the idea that my "mindstream" or "soul" has "wandered" since "beginningless" time). Anyway, I do not find that notion incoherent and actually IMO it has its good points.

If we have one temporal life, then I agree that we might have an unchanging "soul" (loosely in this case "my soul" can be defined as what makes me, me). And I agree that a property of the soul may be the fact that during the "temporal" life has the ability of "free agency". We have now two possibilities. The first is that the "soul" is not only unchanging but also "eternal". In this case there is no need to think of a cause for its existence (and its free will). Or we accept for example theism, where God creates the unchaning soul at a certain point (indeed we need "theism" and not "deism", i.e. we need that God interacts with the "temporal" world) with its intrinsic property to have "free agency". (I do not find a "logical" problem with thinking that an unchanging entity might be created at a certain point in time...)

Yes, I think the problem is that we cannot conceive of atemporal causation. This is the problem of ascribing causation to the noumenal which Heidegger, I think, referred to as "ontotheology". — Janus

Well I agree that it is a weird concept (and yes maybe even the world "causation" is misleading). Anyway for "atemporal causation" I mean the idea found in some philosophies where the temporal exists thanks to an "eternal" cause. For example IMO in Platonism there is a "vertical"/atemporal causality due to the participation of the Forms and a "horizontal" causality which happens in time (i.e. the "causal nexus"). Without the Forms according to Platonism no "thing" in this world can exist but at the same time things in this "changing world" affect each other. So in this sense we can think of a double causation.

Hello,

Thank you for your informative reply. Much appreciated :smile:

Actually I am here to learn unconventional ideas and ways to looking at things. So I am really enjoying our discussion :up: I cannot tell you if your model is "right" or not, but IMO it has indeed its good points.

Anyway, I will not be able to write a decent reply until probably Friday, so please be patient :pray:

This is the salient point when it comes to freedom of the will. The conundrum is that our understandings of reality are always couched in terms of causation. When we try to understand freedom of the will, we inevitably try to understand what could cause such a freedom to exist, and the inevitable answer is that nothing conceivably could, because if freedom were other-caused, rather than self-caused, then it simply would not be freedom as it is conceived in the libertarian sense. — Janus

Hi,

Indeed it is a very contentious point. I propose now three "solutions".

The first solution might be thinking "free will" as an emergent phenomenon, like the "phases of matter". But clearly this "emergent" phenomenon is quite strange (for example, I do not think that it is possible to make a mathematical model that describes it).

The second solution is to accept that our ability of "free agency" has an origin in time and that it is impssible to explain it with a natural explanation. In this case we need to assume a "supernatural" origin and a theist might argue that our soul is a creation of God.

A third possibility might be assuming that we are in a situation like the beginningless "samsara" of many Indian philosophies and religions (or something close to it). In this case our "souls" or (as the Buddhist would say) "mindstreams" have no beginning and therefore their "free agency" is beginningless (and therefore has no cause*).

I am assuming you are referring to a cause "in time" and not an "ontological" cause, which is more general and can be atemporal.

P.S. I had some problems in posting this reply. In fact I edited two precedent versions of it and they "disappeared" automatically. I apologize for the inconvenience.

It's a difference of definitions. As I use the term, free will means one can intentionally drink tea rather than coffee because that is what one wants to do. As distinct from situations where that freedom is absent, e.g., when there are no options or when one is forced to do something against their will.

I think that reflects ordinary, pragmatic usage and is not precluded by a universe that evolves deterministically.

It implies that even if you have a completely deterministic description of the universe which predicts I will drink tea, I am not bound by that description. Instead the correctness (or incorrectness) of the description depends on my choice to drink tea (or not). — Andrew M

Yes, that "free will" is certainly possible in determinism. Nobody denies the "phenomenon" of "willing" and that in principle it is possible to choose tea rather than coffee.

On the other hand, if determinism is true then all my choices are inevitable even if there are different options and if is not forced to choose in a way. Spinoza for example thought that "Blessedness" was the result of the realisation of this "inevitability". But in my opinion to have "free will" means that are choices are not inevitable. But it is also true that no theory of physics is compatible with this "type" of free will, not even "probabilism". Again, it is my opinion that this does not show the absence of "free will" but rather this incompatibility shows that our understanding of reality is incomplete.

There are numerous different theories which model reality as waves. Objects are described as disturbances, and interference patterns. They are incomplete, as you say, and there are two directions of incompleteness. We have to account for the cause of the disturbances which we know as objects, and we have to account for the effects of the disturbances, which we also know as objects. The cause being described by forces like gravity, momentum, and such, and the effects being what is observed as actual particles. These wave models might account for seeing, as you say, but to account for hearing, and the other senses, I think we need real moving particles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed!

Yes that's the way I model it in my mind, with two "spaces". One type of space is described by fields and wave functions, while the other type allows for objects moving freely in space. Then I propose that we draw a continuum between the two types of space, connecting them, that they are not really distinct, but one transforms into the other at each moment. This is the change which happens at each moment of passing time, and is allowed for by the time which is orthogonal to our timeline. I like to say, that at each moment of passing time, space inverts. The physical objects, particles which come to be at each moment, have traditionally been modeled as objects moving freely in a static space as time passes, but they need to be represented as features of an active space. Then space is the thing, and the objects are an attribute of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, in this model "objects" are not "active", but passive. It is space that "inverts" and causes the existence of objects. So, it is not that space arises from the interaction of objects (a la Leibniz) or that space is the static "background" (a la Newton), but space is an active agent in reality. Objects are therefore secondary ontologically. We know that Newton was wrong and now most physicists tend to accept the idea that space is "a product" of objects. Instead, it might be the other way around.

I suppose, it's not that the issue of "the subject" is completely irrelevant, it's a matter of determining the position of the subject, what the subject is doing, and how the subject is capable of doing that. All these points are tied together and need to be answered together. We've denied the pure observation point, and allowed that the subject interacts with the material which is being observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed!

I've placed the physical objects, particles, on the effects side of the "field". Now we would need to turn toward the causal side. In my opinion, the field representation is inadequate. That's where I'm disappointed with Bohm, because he leads us directly toward this conclusion, but does not speak it, nor does he present any sort of alternative. Let me explain my misgivings in this way. A physical object, particle, or whatever, must occupy space in order that it be a real object. This principle allows that a particle may be infinitesimally small, but it cannot exist at a non-dimensional point. So there is a need to separate "a particle" which necessarily exists at a multitude of points, from the non-dimensional points themselves, which must be referred to in an effort to describe the dimensional particles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I always had a problem with "point-particles". At best I always regarded them as a very useful approximation. In fact to me they cannot be real: they are simply a mathematical construct (that's way among other things I do not like Bohm's original theory - I mean: still those boring point-like particles :sad: )

It is implied therefore, that we need to give reality to the non-dimensional point, in a manner other than as a particle, such that the non-dimensional point may have causal influence over real dimensional particles. This is why we need to model time as the 0th dimension, rather than the 4th. Perhaps the speed of light could serve as the basis for the 0th dimension. We create a baseline, 0 time, which represents the precise "present", and this is a claim to the point of spatial inversion. On the one side is positive spatial existence, particles which actually occupy space. On the other side is negative spatial existence, and this is represented by mathematical formulae which determine points of causal influence in the positive space. The further step is to determine the activity within the negative space, which is not necessarily limited by the speed of light because spatial existence, and extension itself, is inverted on the other side of zero. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, in the "negative" space, there is no need to have a speed limit. After all we are talking about of potentialities and not real things (so, actually even defining a "speed" in this space is impossible). On the other hand we observe that (except maybe quantum entanglement) every interaction is local (it has a space dependence). So, in the "positive" space we need to take into account this "localization".

Perhaps the speed of light could serve as the basis for the 0th dimension — Metaphysician Undercover

This part is very interesting because speed of light can be both the limit speed of objects and be connected to time. However I have no idea how it might be related to the 0th dimension.

The difficulty with "the subject" is that the human being, in the form of the conscious mind, and free will, is active within the negative space. That is how we have the capacity of self-locomotion. So this refers back to the tinted glass problem, the subject doesn't really have the 0 time observation point, it must be created in hypothesis, and adhered to in order to determine the accuracy of the hypothesis. How the subject sees, or observes, an object is dependent on the type of object which the subject individuates, and this is dependent on the choice of a zero timeline. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "knowing subject" of the trascendental idealists in fact lacks the ability to actively "interact" with its "world". Therefore the analogy I suggested with Schopenhauer is in fact limited.

In fact as you note here even the individuation process is dependent on the actions of the subject. But here we can IMO gather infromation about the tint. In fact we can study how the individuation varies, how the objects vary etc. So, in fact we are not "stuck" in a certain perspective without hope to know other point of views.

I read Bohm's "Implicate and Explicate Order" and I found that there was a deficiency in establishing a relationship between the two, implicate and explicate. If the explicate is what is evident to us, and this is proven to be illusionary, such that we must assume an implicate, then we need stronger principles upon which to found the implicate. So I find that there are two vague and deficient assumptions. The first is in the proposed illusionary nature of the explicate. There is actually a large amount of "reality" within what is taken to be representations or reflections, and this reality must be accounted for. The second, is that since the reality inherent in the illusionary explicate is not accounted for, then the implicate can be whatever one wants it to be, completely imaginary, because it does not necessarily need to relate to the explicate which is void of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I can relate to your point. In fact to use the model of the five senses it only "explains" what we "see". In fact we are now saying that indeed there are "objects", which are not reflections. So Bohm's theory is incomplete in our reasoning.

Yes, I think you've understood what I was getting at quite well. That's the type of reality I propose. I may or may not be looking in the right direction, but this needs to be further developed to expose any deficiencies. I propose that the human consciousness straddles the divide between past and future, and that there is no crisp line of division. At this division between past and future, an inversion occurs whereby potentialities become actualities. The "space" of potentialities is entirely different from the "space" of actualities, so what is happening at the present is that space is changing in this way, from the space which accommodates potentialities to the space which accommodates actualities. I call this an inversion of space, perhaps the inside becomes outside. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am very glad to have not misunderstood, then. It can also be said that in order to know "reality" we must know both the spaces. In this view a lot of metaphysics is "trascended", so to speak. What I mean by this? For example there are those who deny the existence of the potentialities. Instead we are saying that potentialities are an aspect of reality. On the other hand there are those who deny actualities. Again they are wrong. Anyway, both views are partial and incomplete in this model. And in fact to know reality we need to study both aspects. And again we return to the problem of the tint: we need more "means" to study it to have a "right understanding" of it.

We've denied the non-temporal point of division between past and future as unreal, so we assume that the inversion requires time, and is not instantaneous. We have no observational access to this inversion because it occurs as an activity in a time which is perpendicular to our constructed flow of time. The constructed flow of time is a continuous present, whereas the inversion is constantly occurring across the present from future to past. We must therefore take observational data from each side of the inversion to create parallel timelines on each side of the inversion, and use logic to infer the nature of the inversion. So I suggest that we determine which senses receive data on which side of the inversion, and proceed from there. It appears like sight may be an interaction with existence on the side of the present which consists of potentialities, while hearing may be an interaction with existence on the side of the present which consists of actualities. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, if the analysis made until now is correct, that is the way to proceed.

The issue of removing the "subject" is not a real issue. It is a distraction. It is impossible to remove the subject, because this would be an act carried out by the subject, self-annihilation, and this would leave us with nothing, no perspective. If we imagine "no-perspective" then all time and space become one. there would be no individuation of one part of time, or one part of space. But the individuation and identification of objects, events, or anything, requires an individuation of a place in space, and a place in time. So it doesn't really make any sense to talk about these things as if there were no subject, because the existence of the subject is already necessarily assumed as inherent within us talking about these things. To ask questions about whether "the object" disappears without a subject is just to introduce contradiction into the discussion through the back door, because "the object" is something individuated by the subject in the first place. And introducing undetected, contradiction into the discussion, renders the discussion unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, I was only wondering the implications of what we are saying to see if I understood correctly (in fact it is a bit tangential). If there is a subject then time, space and objects are "real". Subject and objects cannot exist "on their own", so to speak. Like in Schopenhauer philosophy all that things exist in relation to the subject.

Also let me explain better what I meant in these sentences:

..if we remove the "subject", the object too "disappears". Well, this reminds me of "neither one nor many" of Mahayana Buddhism (also for that matter Schopenhauer noted a common ground here) — boundless

I was not thinking about an "annihilation" of the perspective or of the subject, but I was trying to make a connection wit what I think I understood of Buddhist philosophy and Schopenhauer. In that eastern philosophy the "subject" is not real. So if we have estabilished that individuation is possible where there is the "subject", then if they are right there is no individuation. Also space and time also are not "real", in this case. But I agree that it is not a part of the model we are discussing, since we are assuming that the "subject" is real to make a theory of knowledge. But I found interesting the parallel :wink:
if you wish you can ignore this part.

MWI says that the quantum states with non-zero amplitude all occur, so that is the level that is deterministic. As I've argued, our everyday ostensive possibilities don't all occur. — Andrew M

True.

Free will isn't incompatible with MWI (or deterministic theories in general). It is the dynamic systems themselves that are driving things, not the equations. The equations merely describe and predict (rightly or wrongly) what the systems will do. — Andrew M

Well, in my understanding "classical determinism" says that we have the illusion of "free will". According to classical determinism and for "Pilot-Wave" theories the future is "fixed" once a set of "initial conditions" are estabilished. If this is true, it is not possible to make "free choices" because in fact everything is determined by the past.
On the other hand we have MWI and we have two possibilities. The first is that "choices" are a "classical" phenomenon and therefore are determined as in the case of "classical determinism". The second one is that choices are a "quantum phenomenon" and everytime we choose the universe "splits". In this case we might argue that there is more room for a free choice but the problem is that all the possible occurence happen as I argued before.

I always had this problem with "compatibilism". Free will requires that the "choice" is not totally conditioned by the past events whereas determinism implies that when the "initial conditions" are fixed (or better: when the state of the system is fixed at a certain time) then all events are "fixed".
On the other hand we may argue that determinism is not completely right in the description of "things" at classical level and therefore, autentic free will can be "saved" (are you suggesting this?).

That’s pretty well how I see it. — Wayfarer

Very well :up:

You'll find a two dimensional time in Itzhak Bars "Two-Time Physics". But mostly the idea is developed by presentist philosophers who see the need for a wide present to account for human experience. How much time does the present consist of? Check out J.W Dunne, An experiment with Time. And in Jack Meiland's "A two dimensional Passage model of Time for Time travel", you'll find a diagram. I just got these names from google searches when I started realizing the need for two dimensions of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for the reference :smile:

The more difficult question is what is that "something" which is occurring at 'the present", and is represented as happening along the lines of t1, t2, t3, etc.. This is the coming into existence of the physical world at each moment of the present. It is represented in cosmology as the expansion of space, the discrepancy of a long time line, crossing many t lines . As I said in an earlier post, large things, the massive objects which we see, must come into existence first, and these are represented in quantum physics as fields, they appear as the background continuity and exist along the line of P1. At the other extreme of human experience, is the tiny objects, coming into existence last, their existence is represented by P2. So you see that there is the entire width of the human "present" separating the fields from the particles, and this is why quantum mechanics is so difficult to understand. This temporal breadth represents a vast unknown area between the mathematical fields, based in the observation of massive objects, and the observations of tiny particles. This allows for theories about strings and loops. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is the case, we can also think that there is a qualitative change in behaviour between various scales. So, quantum weirdeness might originate from the properties of time (and space) at those scales.

(As a side note, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_interpretation the famed mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose held the view that gravity/space time curvature has a special role in the collapse of the wavefunction. I shared this because there is the idea of a "connection" between QM and the properties of spacetime...)

Yes, so we can speculate as to how we create "objects". Let's start with the assumption that what we observe with our eyes, "see", is as close a representation to the continuous existence represented by mathematics as possible. This is what is at the right hand side of the lines of t1, t2, etc., what I represent as P1. The key is that these are not really physical objects, but more like Rich's hologram. Way back in history they would have represent these images as physical objects, drawing them on paper, and producing a concept of space between them, allowing for them to move in time. But there's no real "space" between these objects, because they are all united as the "One", the whole continuous universe. However, it was assumed that they were real physical objects with separate existence, even though they are not. — Metaphysician Undercover

This reminds me strongly of the "Implicate and Explicate Order" by Bohm (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicate_and_explicate_order): I discussed (maily) with Rich about it some time ago in this thread.
But also of "Advaita Vedanta" and Neoplatonism. Also this article https://phys.org/news/2015-05-spacetime-built-quantum-entanglement.html may be of interest.

In this view plurality arises in the "representations" rather than in "reality". In fact, the notion of "reality" itself is challenged. Time and space exist only in the representation. And outside it these concepts do not apply: "reality" is neither spatial nor temporal. And so since discernible objects are possible if and only if there is space, then if space is a representation, then objects must exist only as a construction (like in a "hologram").

Now let's assume that we hear waves in a physical medium, sound. This assumes that there are real physical particles, vibrating in relation to each other. Lets say that this is P2, the existence of a real physical medium, particles vibrating in space. At P1 there are no existing particles, and at P2 there are existing particles. So on each line of t1, t2, etc., there is particles coming into existence, and these particles allow for the existence of sound.


Here is the difficult part. Between P1 and P2 we have an inversion between what is possible and what is actual, the possibility for particles, and actual particles. The inversion is not merely epistemic, because it must be ontological to allow for freedom of choice represented in the actual coming into existence of particles. The inversion is represented epistemically in QM by the distinction between the wave function and particular existence. But each line of t1, t2, t3, extends indefinitely, beyond P2, which represents the human perception particular existence. We have created our conception of "objects in space", from the P1 side of the present, as what we see, along with the possibilities for motion. But there are no real objects at the P1 side, only the potential for particles. The real "objects in space", need to be represented from what is on the P2 side of the present. So to produce a real concept of "objects in space", we must ignore all the visual observations, which are not of actual objects, but of the potential for objects, and produce a conception of "objects in space", particles, which is based only on other senses such as hearing. This is where we find real objects in space, on the past side of our experience of the present, P2, where we cannot see because our visual image is of P2 where there is not yet any real particles. Our current conception of "space" is produced from these visual observations, assuming that what we see is objects, when it is really not what we see, and this does not provide us with a representation of the real space which particles exist in. We cannot see the real particles, so we can only get an idea of how they behave in real space through the senses of hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. And from these senses we can produce a concept of "space" which allows for the real existence of objects, particles moving in space, this "space' being on the P2 side of the present. Our current representation, based in visual observation doesn't allow for the real existence of "objects in space", it is just based in the determining factors which we see at P1, prior to the coming into existence of real particles at P2. — Metaphysician Undercover

And here with other senses "objects" return. So, we "see" the potentiality and with other senses we "feel" actual, existing objects. If this is true then our concept of "space" is mistaken because it is really the "space" of potentialities, rather than actualities. So "reality", thanks to the "two dimensional time" is both a sort of hologram of "potentialities" and a world of real objects. It is not that one is "more or less" real than the other but simply if we consider the totality of our sensations we see both "aspects" of reality. Very nice (I hope to not have misunderstood something... in that case, I am sorry). But...
I might wonder however to what "happens" if there is no "perciever". If all what we said is right then objects, time and space are all real if there is a subject (in some sense this is reminiscent of trascendental idealism, especially the version of Schopenhauer). But if this is true, then the "object is always in relation with a subject", therefore if we remove the "subject", the object too "disappears". Well, this reminds me of "neither one nor many" of Mahayana Buddhism (also for that matter Schopenhauer noted a common ground here) :wink:

If I am to believe the Wikipedia entry on Model-dependent realism, it rather looks like a half-baked mixture of pragmatism and Popperian falsificationism. Putnam's mature pragmatic pluralism also is a form of realism, which he distinguishes from metaphysical realism. It is a realism that is essentially relational. It dispenses entirely with the idea of the world as it is in itself, which our models would only convey incomplete understandings or representations of. It is thus neo-Kantian and, likewise, not any more relativistic than Kantian epistemology is. While the elements of the open ended plurality of objective empirical domains, in Putnam's view, each are essentially related to definite sets of pragmatic considerations (or to ways of being-in-the-world), they don't constitute relative points of view on some fundamental reality that grounds them all. — Pierre-Normand

Thank you for the elucidation.

Model-dependent realism is a fancy name for relativism. — Wayfarer

Hi Wayfarer,

I think that it is more a "perspectivism" of sorts. I mean it says that there is an objective reality but there are multiple descriptions possible. Whereas "relativism" denies that there are universal truths.

In some sense it is similar to "realistic pluralism" by Putnam.

But as I said to noAxioms I might recollect badly.

No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation. — noAxioms

Sorry for the misunderstanding. Anyway, I suggest you to check Rovelli's ideas and similar. (for a start you might enjoy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/)

Have to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.

I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested. — noAxioms

Yeah, MDR is very nice too (If I recall correctly, it has also a more "epistemological" streak, so to speak, rather than an "ontological" one. By this I mean that MDR is more interested on what we can know about reality, rather than what "is" reality. However I might be wrong :wink: ).

Well I am quite slow, too. So it is not a problem for me :wink:

OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below): — Andrew M

Hi, interesting. Have to think about it. This seems interesting: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/is-the-pbr-theorem-valid.924718/ . <a href="https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/</a>

I will read these threads...

Tank you for the objection!

Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI. — Andrew M

Agreed!

Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things. — Andrew M

Good point!

In fact what MWI says is that all the possible outcomes occur and at the classical level there is determinism, so IMO it has the same problem of "classical determinism" if what you say is right ;)

I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee). — Andrew M

Well yes, I admit you are right and I am defeated :lol: but at the same time the unitary evolution of the Schroedinger equation implies that "all possibilities occur". So FW is incompatilble with MWI (well for that matter is incompatible with all theories in science)... IMO this is one of the reasons why I do not think reality is (only) mathematical, like MWI esplictly holds. At least other interpretations do not go so far.

Thank you for the insights!

Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms

Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory?

They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong. — noAxioms

Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation?

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.

In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence. — noAxioms

Well this seems a "relational ontology", i.e. that everything exist in virtue of relation with something else. Nothing exist independently. Well, this is really a fascinating idea to me!

The idea of a two dimensional present is becoming more common amongst speculative physicists. I think it provides a basis for explaining our experience of activity occurring at the present, and it might also help to create a bridge between relativity theory, and our intuitions, that the present is a substantial aspect of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi,

interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance!

Have you ever wondered how we observe motion visually? If one's viewpoint is the dimensionless point of the present, then we can only notice static states at this non-temporal point. We'd have to infer motion by stringing together still frame states. What we see as activity would have to be a creation of the memory. It may be that this is actually how we observe motion, but the problems are numerous. If we observe static states at the moment of the present, then we have a big logical hole, between the static points, which needs to be filled. The actual passing of time would have to occur between the points, when we couldn't see it, and therefore actual change would have to also be occurring between the points of observation. So we'd be seeing a serious of still-frames, but the entire activity of change, whereby one still-frame is replaced with the next, would be completely invisible to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed! If our POV is dimensionless then the "experienced world" would be a succession of static images and change is an artifact of memory, so to speak. If this is the case, we would not percieve change but rather we would only infer it (and also, our memory would "create" the illusion of continuity between the static images - which a-priori for us would be independent).

If this were the case, then the actual change that occurs behind the scene, which we cannot see, must occur extremely fast because it wouldn't be as if the object moves from point A to point B, while we're not seeing it, the object would have to be reconstituted at each point where we see it in a still frame. We cannot assume that the object "moves" from point A to B or else we'd have to allow that it could be at intermediate points. The behind the scenes activity would have to consist of a re-creation of each object at each moment of time, as time passes. So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. I called it real time, because it is when the real activity is going on, which is the preparation of the next still frame. But all this activity is not evident to our eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, if we do not want to fall into solipsism or a sort of "Evil Genius" theory we have to assume that there are two "times". And the "real time" is not a part of our experience but a part of the "external world". But as I said some posts ago, this is only a "reasonable inference" for the "external world". And in fact "the sense of continuity" is a "creation" of our memory, which a-priori is unrelated to the "real time".

So we must account for this difference in "direction" when we try to understand motion. The conscious mind produces a concept of motion from large objects moving, and looks back toward the tiny, from this artificial perspective. But the living being already has a natural perspective, which is the reverse of this, it is already utilizing these tiny fast motions to rule over the more static, temporally extended states. The natural "rule" of the living being therefore may be derived from the "real time", the activity between the static states, and the static states may be completely artificial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Mmmm, very interesting. In fact we started by assuming that the "static" view was the "natural" one and we ended up with three "times". The real time is "behind" both the external reality and the workings of our senses, the "static" is the perspective of the "soul" and finally we have the "time" that is created by memory (or other falculties) to "connect" the static images. So in fact our "perception" of time is completely artifical.

Consider the possibility that the static states of the still frame representation are artificial, created at the conscious level. The states correspond to objects. The objects we see are masses of molecules in different shapes. We create a present, a timeline by giving these shapes temporal extension, inertia. But if we look at individual molecules, as shapes, then we have created a different set of static frames with a different, but supposedly parallel timeline. If we go to atoms, we have a different set of frames, and a different parallel timeline. — Metaphysician Undercover

If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites).

This produces all sorts of problems and complexities with the nature of spatial extension. Let's assume that all physical objects, static states with temporal extension and inertia, are artificial, created by the conscious mind, as described above. This means that "space", which is our conception produced to allow for the real existence of objects, is created according to our observations of these objects as well. So if we go to a parallel time line, as described above, we need a different conception of space at this timeline. And each timeline requires a different conception of space, to allow for the necessity that spatial existence, and therefore space itself, comes into existence at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, if our model is "right" then also spatial existence must be reconsidered. In fact as the "static image" is a construction also space is. We continue to recreate "space".

At the same time, however, like time we can think that there is a "real space". But like "real time", "real space" is beyond (in the sense that it precedes) our experience. If this is the case then the same ideas about the "multi-layered" represention applies also to space and therefore we have a lot of maps. And each map has its "space", its "time", its "objects" etc.

So I think that the issue with the tint is to figure out the exact nature of the tint. I believe it is as you say "a priori" within all our observations, but that does not mean that it must remain hidden to us. The reason, is that we have different senses, so the tint will appear differently to the different senses. And this is how we will determine the nature of the tint. Notice, that in my discussion of the different senses above, I did not even approach the relationship between seeing and hearing, of which the Fourier transform and the frequency/time uncertainty are derivative. The uncertainty, being a product of the tint, ought to have a different measure in sight than it has in sound, and that would help to expose the nature of the tint. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, the only way to know (at least partially) the tint is to study all our senses and the relationship between them.

Let's assume for the sake of argument, that the tint is in how we draw our timeline. If for example, we create a timeline by using relatively large bodies like the earth and sun, and stay true to that timeline, we will produce accurate knowledge of things within this spatial realm of "objects", objects this size. But this knowledge would not be very reliable in relation to larger objects like galaxies which exist on a different timeline, because we would be making a diagonal across from one timeline to another, without knowing this. The desire would be for an orthogonal relation between timelines, but how would we know what's orthogonal? Likewise, if we study tiny subatomic particles, an atomic clock would give us a good timeline, but to relate this timeline to the one of the earth and sun would be problematic because we would know the orthogonal relation. To determine the orthogonal relation would require figuring out how spatial existence comes into being at each moment. Anytime one timeline is related to another, without determining the true tint, it would cause a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah the relation between the various timelines is a very problematic issue. In fact as you say we even recreate space as we change the scale. So, yeah in order to avoid these issues we need to determine the tint.

Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M

Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant.

Positing an invisible and undetectable res potentia (whether for the wave function itself or just the unobserved states) seems to be a purely semantic move and not one that is motivated by the Schrodinger equation itself. — Andrew M

Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:

Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:

Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe


Whereas I accept Aristotle's immanent realism about universals. That is, the universe is substantial (matter and form), not merely formal. — Andrew M

Good point. BTW what I meant is that the universe becomes literally a "mathematical structure" also in "normal" MWI. To me saying that "the universe is" (nothing more than) "a universal wavefunction which never collpases" is reductionism. I prefer to use the much more modest epistemological view of Bohr, or something similar to that. I do not deny however that also his version of QM has problems.

Regarding the "non-scientific reasons"... Well consider ethical responsibility. The reason why we give importance to ethics relies on the fact that we have to choose everytime what to do. We have to make up decisions. With determinism we are completely helpless: we think we have the possibility to choose but in fact we have not that possibility. Every movement and every thought in fact is simply "necessary".

Of course determinism is not the "view" of MWI and before considering the ethical, let us now see what MWI predicts. According to MWI as time passes the universe continue to "split". The are now a huge number of "boundless adults" that "came" from "boundless child". With some I share the same memories. However we all have a distinct consciousness. Therefore while every "story" is in fact meaningful since can be traced back to "boundless child", the problem is that in the opposite verse of time there is a continuous splitting. I concede that energy conservation is not a problem for MWI, but what about the splitting and consciousness? There is a continuous creation of "subjects" every moment. And here we have a quite inelegant consequence - there is a multiplication of "sentient beings" among other things.

Also, if it is possible according to MWI that "boundless" commits a crime and we observe he does not, then we know that necessarily another "clone" of "boundless" committed the crime. Therefore, "boundless" is simply one of the possible actual outcome of the "universal wavefunction". Free will becomes meaningless because in fact "one" of the "boundlesses" always commits the "wrong action" (or the "right action"). In this case what "boundless" does is simply due to the fact that it is a possibility. But at the same time the other possibilities are, in fact, actualized. Therefore unless you add some "subsystems" in the structure of the universe MWI has the same problems of other determinisms in ethics. The "right" action becomes simply a possible (and therefore actual) occurence. In fact if there are two possible choices, then both in two different branches are done.

So all actions in reality have the same value since they are inevitable. If the universal wavefunction is all there is, then all stories are actual and our "illusion of free will" is due to the fact that we see a story. Note that IMO according to most ethical theories it is of fundamental importance that they can be broken. In fact virtue becomes relevant when X can decide to follow it and not to follow "vice". In MWI X follows vice and virtue in two different stories. Both the virtuous and the vicious are "two outcomes" of the wavefunction. . If both choices are a possibility then in two different "worlds" Xs choose both. And the existence of the virtuous X depends on the existence of vicious X. So actually every time all (possibile) good and bad choices are actualized.

Of course I agree. The problem lies with the interpretation of mathematics as describing the 'primary attributes' e.g. mass, velocity, and so on, and relegating the domain of the qualitative to the subjective realm of mind. This manifests as the attitude that science is the sole custodian of fact and that qualitative and ethical judgements, whilst they may or not have merit, are regardless a private matter. It is another facet of the modern 'mind-body' problem. (The subject of a classic text, E A Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science.) — Wayfarer

I am in agreement with this. To be more clear: I agree that a part of both mathematics and ethics is "conventional" or a "creation" of humans. On the other hand however there is a very important part of both which is "very real".

Therefore I agree with most religions that there is a "moral order" in the universe. And sages do discover it in some sense (in fact it is not a case that on ethical matters there is a strong agreement in most religions)

Note that the apple also doesn't appear solid if I'm not looking at or touching it. Yet it doesn't follow that it's not solid. Properties of things are identified in experience, but are real independent of experience. That's the nature of language abstraction.

So, in normal usage, there is nothing wrong with saying that the apple appears green but is actually red (e.g., because of background lighting or filter glasses). Or that the apple in the dark, sealed box is red. Whereas it would be wrong to say that it appears red when no-one is looking, or when there is no light, since "appears" refers to perceptual experience, not the object. — Andrew M

Hi, sorry for the delay in answering (mainly due to the flu)...

By the way, I think that I agree with the above. Unfortunately expressing these concepts sometime creates a lot of confusion.

Yes, the problem is that that distinction doesn't arise in the mathematics - each relative state is treated equivalently. So why make such a distinction? As I suggested in another post, it seems like taking a heliocentric model and packaging it as geocentric. — Andrew M

I see what you mean. But at the same time, conflating the "actual" and the "potential" can appear to be inelegant in its way. In any case, if this perspective is used then one must accept MUH (Mathemaical Universe Hypothesis).

Feel free to write them - I'd be interested. — Andrew M

Yeah, I am very sorry but you have to wait a couple of days (the reasons being the aforementioned flu plus academic business :( ). I anticipate that it is a mainly ethical problem...

Even Everett viewed mathematical model as a fiction of the mind. It is a strange ontology that views symbols (mathematical, linguistical, or otherwise) created by the mind more real than the mind that creates them (for practical purposes). — Rich

Regarding mathematics, I think that a part of it is "real" and another of it is "conventional". But I still cannot see where there is the distinction...

Here my attempt to answer :wink:

I'm not convinced of the conclusion that if it is impossible to avoid the tint, then it is impossible to know how things really are. I think it just means that we have to take a detour in our proceedings, and work on determining the nature of the tinting. This is why we have numerous different senses to compare, we have logic, and we have philosophy. These are the tools for assessing the tint. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agree!

Now assume that we've created a concept of time, duration, the flow of time, by looking across the emergence of the big objects. When the big objects are fully emerged from the plane of the present, this marks the moment when time has gone from future to past. So the non-dimensional plane, which is "the present", which we have created artificially, has been produced by looking across the moment when the big objects are fully emerged into the past. Now we look at the tiny objects, and these tiny objects must make a plane of "the present" as well. They emerge from the future slightly before the big objects, so we can create a separate plane of "the present" by looking across their emergence There are two planes of the present, and the breadth of the present is the entire area between. BY establishing a relationship between the one plane and the other, we can determine the passage of time at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Some time ago, I actually considered an idea similar to this. I was wondering how "big" is the present. And in fact I arrived that if the "present" has some "thickness" change would be impossible. But interestingly, here you are giving an interesting perspective on this, i.e. that it is possible to accept both a "thick" present and change.

In the analogy, the tiny objects pop out from the future to the past, first. This seems intuitive, but it's not necessarily the case. To really understand the way things exist at the present, we need to look at the way we act in the world, and interact with it. There are some things, with large mass and inertia, which appear to be fully determined. And, we find possibility in small things, and this allows us to make changes which are actually very small in relation to the vast universe. If we assume that change only occurs at the present, then the large things must come out first, determined with mass and inertia, and by the time that the tiny human brain is out, and apprehends what is going on, it has no capacity to alter what has already come out into the past. So the human brain exercises the capacity of free choice only over the tiny things, because the big things are already in the past. This is consistent with the Neo-Platonist's principle of emanation, or procession. The One, which represents the unity of the universe is first, then the Soul, then the Mind.

...

In the past, we have produced a system for time measurement based on the motions of the earth and sun, so this is pretty much in the middle of the breadth of the present. Now we have produced atomic clocks measuring duration with tiny objects, so this would be (presumably) measuring time duration at the past side of the present. But we have established no real principles to determine the breadth between these two. How much behind the present, which is determined by the motions of the earth and sun, is the present which is determined by the atomic clocks? Both these clocks can keep time in a synchronized, accurate way, but according to the theory above, they represent parallel "presents", with time, breadth between them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reasoning is in fact, sound. The possibility of being more "presents" as the "scale" of observation varies is something that I have never encountered in physics (and in philosophy for that matter). But again, nothing tells us that there is only a "present". In fact, the tendency to hyper-semplify sometimes had its side-effects: for example the Newtonian "absolute" space is certainly simpler than SR, but it is not really effective.

In any case, if you are right then there is an even stronger relationship between the measures of distance and time: atomic clocks measure a "present" which is different than "macroscopic" clocks. If this is the case we need a "meta-theory" which must explain the relationship between all these clocks, i.e. a theory about the "interaction" between the "knower" and the world, or something in that direction. Such a theory certainly would help us to understand better the tint.

This is the tinted glass problem in a nutshell. The tint is the concept, "matter", which is the means by which we make the changing of the physical world intelligible in relation to the assumed static, eternal "soul". We look through the tint, and we know that it's a tint because it's a source of error, and we have figured out that it's there. Therefore we must conclude that there is a part of reality independent from us, which is unintelligible to us, because of the tint. It is the inversion of the tint, what the tint negates, which is unintelligible. Whatever we assume as matter, the concept of matter, then the deficiencies of this assumption, is what remains unintelligible to us. What is not assumed, but ought to be assumed creates the unintelligibility caused by the assumption "matter". So we have to approach the concept of "matter" in a kind of trial and error way, we produce a concept, like Aristotle did, and see if it works. The success was limited, and the concept was replaced by a more comprehensive assumption, "energy". Now we have to assess this assumption for successes and failures. It's a matter of assessing failures which are the result of improperly representing the tint, on and on, until we figure out the tint and represent it properly. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I see two possibilities, BTW:
1) We at best can have a "partial knowledge" of the tint. In this case our "trial and error" procedure allows us to know partially the "tint" by the "inside", so to speak. We can think that the "tint" actually has two "parts". One part is changeable by us: we can in fact use whatever concept we like and "test" it. However a part of the tint is completely "hidden", it is "a priori" in all our observations. We cannot "remove" it, so to speak. In this case we can never have the possibility to "see things as they are", but we can have a "partial knowledge". This IMO is quite a rational perspective.
2) On the other hand we can accept that we can "trascend", so to speak, all tinting. In this case the "tint" can be modified by our trials until we arrive to a "perfect" untinted perspective. Note that this is possible only if no "part" of the tint is "a priori", since in that case we could not even imagine "reality as it is". If there is no "a priori" part of the tint, then in fact we can infer how the untinted perspective is by studying the "behavior" of the results of our trials and errors.

Hi,

I think in this latest answer you have written really good points. Be patient but right now I cannot make a well-made reply due to the flu. I hope to be able to answer this week end.