Why wouldn't matter be better represented as a continuous field, — Metaphysician Undercover
But the key to believing it, or accepting it, is to recognize the logical necessity of concluding that physical objects are necessarily re-created at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover
I can extrapolate to conclude that all physical existence must come into being at each moment as time passes. — Metaphysician Undercover
They are not being recreated. They are morphing. There are no static states. Static states (nothing is static) are symbolic projections which the mind creates to share observations or solve practical purposes. — Rich
No, existence is just continuously morphing exactly as it is perceived. Memory of the past gives us the sense of duration. — Rich
the assumption of static states is fundamental to the conscious understanding of the physical world, as is evident from the basic laws of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
We need a static viewpoint, independent of the morphing forms, from which to observe and produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. — Metaphysician Undercover
We don't ever actually obseve anything that it's static. However, we can sort of view something as static in our minds though it too is always changing. Three closest thing we can create that is static is some c symbolic language, but when we do this, the mobile nature of nature is lost. — Rich
Not really. Observing movement directly, e.g. music, is Infinitely better than trying to understand music from notes. — Rich
From the perspective of this point, the notes and musical score flow past as a procession. — Metaphysician Undercover
I see what you mean. But at the same time, conflating the "actual" and the "potential" can appear to be inelegant in its way. — boundless
In any case, if this perspective is used then one must accept MUH (Mathemaical Universe Hypothesis). — boundless
Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe
the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M
Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M
Positing an invisible and undetectable res potentia (whether for the wave function itself or just the unobserved states) seems to be a purely semantic move and not one that is motivated by the Schrodinger equation itself. — Andrew M
Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:
Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe
Whereas I accept Aristotle's immanent realism about universals. That is, the universe is substantial (matter and form), not merely formal. — Andrew M
I don't disagree, but this is already stepping into interpretation territory. QM doesn't say what the states actually do.Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical. — Andrew M
Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems.Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant. — boundless
They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong.Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:
Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:
Stephen Hawking famously asked "what is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?" In the context of the MUH, there is thus no breathing required, since the point is not that a mathematical structure describes a universe, but that it is a universe. — Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe
I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms
Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. — noAxioms
Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)?Since doing away with ontology renders this as an impossibility, it is an unacceptable proposal. — Metaphysician Undercover
The idea of a two dimensional present is becoming more common amongst speculative physicists. I think it provides a basis for explaining our experience of activity occurring at the present, and it might also help to create a bridge between relativity theory, and our intuitions, that the present is a substantial aspect of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
Have you ever wondered how we observe motion visually? If one's viewpoint is the dimensionless point of the present, then we can only notice static states at this non-temporal point. We'd have to infer motion by stringing together still frame states. What we see as activity would have to be a creation of the memory. It may be that this is actually how we observe motion, but the problems are numerous. If we observe static states at the moment of the present, then we have a big logical hole, between the static points, which needs to be filled. The actual passing of time would have to occur between the points, when we couldn't see it, and therefore actual change would have to also be occurring between the points of observation. So we'd be seeing a serious of still-frames, but the entire activity of change, whereby one still-frame is replaced with the next, would be completely invisible to us. — Metaphysician Undercover
If this were the case, then the actual change that occurs behind the scene, which we cannot see, must occur extremely fast because it wouldn't be as if the object moves from point A to point B, while we're not seeing it, the object would have to be reconstituted at each point where we see it in a still frame. We cannot assume that the object "moves" from point A to B or else we'd have to allow that it could be at intermediate points. The behind the scenes activity would have to consist of a re-creation of each object at each moment of time, as time passes. So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. I called it real time, because it is when the real activity is going on, which is the preparation of the next still frame. But all this activity is not evident to our eyes. — Metaphysician Undercover
So we must account for this difference in "direction" when we try to understand motion. The conscious mind produces a concept of motion from large objects moving, and looks back toward the tiny, from this artificial perspective. But the living being already has a natural perspective, which is the reverse of this, it is already utilizing these tiny fast motions to rule over the more static, temporally extended states. The natural "rule" of the living being therefore may be derived from the "real time", the activity between the static states, and the static states may be completely artificial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider the possibility that the static states of the still frame representation are artificial, created at the conscious level. The states correspond to objects. The objects we see are masses of molecules in different shapes. We create a present, a timeline by giving these shapes temporal extension, inertia. But if we look at individual molecules, as shapes, then we have created a different set of static frames with a different, but supposedly parallel timeline. If we go to atoms, we have a different set of frames, and a different parallel timeline. — Metaphysician Undercover
This produces all sorts of problems and complexities with the nature of spatial extension. Let's assume that all physical objects, static states with temporal extension and inertia, are artificial, created by the conscious mind, as described above. This means that "space", which is our conception produced to allow for the real existence of objects, is created according to our observations of these objects as well. So if we go to a parallel time line, as described above, we need a different conception of space at this timeline. And each timeline requires a different conception of space, to allow for the necessity that spatial existence, and therefore space itself, comes into existence at each moment of passing time. — Metaphysician Undercover
So I think that the issue with the tint is to figure out the exact nature of the tint. I believe it is as you say "a priori" within all our observations, but that does not mean that it must remain hidden to us. The reason, is that we have different senses, so the tint will appear differently to the different senses. And this is how we will determine the nature of the tint. Notice, that in my discussion of the different senses above, I did not even approach the relationship between seeing and hearing, of which the Fourier transform and the frequency/time uncertainty are derivative. The uncertainty, being a product of the tint, ought to have a different measure in sight than it has in sound, and that would help to expose the nature of the tint. — Metaphysician Undercover
Let's assume for the sake of argument, that the tint is in how we draw our timeline. If for example, we create a timeline by using relatively large bodies like the earth and sun, and stay true to that timeline, we will produce accurate knowledge of things within this spatial realm of "objects", objects this size. But this knowledge would not be very reliable in relation to larger objects like galaxies which exist on a different timeline, because we would be making a diagonal across from one timeline to another, without knowing this. The desire would be for an orthogonal relation between timelines, but how would we know what's orthogonal? Likewise, if we study tiny subatomic particles, an atomic clock would give us a good timeline, but to relate this timeline to the one of the earth and sun would be problematic because we would know the orthogonal relation. To determine the orthogonal relation would require figuring out how spatial existence comes into being at each moment. Anytime one timeline is related to another, without determining the true tint, it would cause a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover
Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)? — noAxioms
My proposal of reality being a relation (not actual ontology) is something like model dependent realism, except the realism claimed is more like existential quantification. — noAxioms
This is just acknowledgement of epistemology. Few stances claim that absolute certainty can be known. But does MDR take a stance that despite the inability to know it, there might be (must be???) a true reality? — noAxioms
Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant. — boundless
Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph's theorem, which has come to be known as the PBR theorem, essentially offers an ultimatum. If quantum mechanics is right, then the wavefunction cannot be epistemic - it cannot merely represent an experimentalist's partial knowledge about reality. It must instead be ontic and directly correspond either to part of reality (as Bohm said) or to reality in full (as Everett said). — The life of psi - Jon Cartwright
Regarding the "non-scientific reasons"... Well consider ethical responsibility. The reason why we give importance to ethics relies on the fact that we have to choose everytime what to do. We have to make up decisions. With determinism we are completely helpless: we think we have the possibility to choose but in fact we have not that possibility. Every movement and every thought in fact is simply "necessary".
Of course determinism is not the "view" of MWI ... — boundless
I concede that energy conservation is not a problem for MWI, but what about the splitting and consciousness? There is a continuous creation of "subjects" every moment. And here we have a quite inelegant consequence - there is a multiplication of "sentient beings" among other things. — boundless
Also, if it is possible according to MWI that "boundless" commits a crime and we observe he does not, then we know that necessarily another "clone" of "boundless" committed the crime. — boundless
In fact virtue becomes relevant when X can decide to follow it and not to follow "vice". In MWI X follows vice and virtue in two different stories. Both the virtuous and the vicious are "two outcomes" of the wavefunction. . If both choices are a possibility then in two different "worlds" Xs choose both. And the existence of the virtuous X depends on the existence of vicious X. So actually every time all (possibile) good and bad choices are actualized. — boundless
I don't disagree, but this is already stepping into interpretation territory. QM doesn't say what the states actually do. — noAxioms
They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong. — noAxioms
Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.
In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence. — noAxioms
interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance! — boundless
If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites). — boundless
Wait, how is a collapse-interpretation not unitary? Unitary seems to mean that probabilities of various outcomes of measurements add up to 1. There are apparently some interpretations where this is not so, but I'm not very familiar with them. Granted, they all seem to describe superposition states.Unitary QM does. If a quantum state describes a photon being emitted towards a 50/50 beam splitter then, per the Schrodinger equation, this initial quantum state evolves into a superposition of two quantum states with one state describing a transmitted photon and the other state describing a reflected photon.
Other interpretations provide different accounts because they alter or add to unitary QM in some way (e.g., adding collapse). — Andrew M
The interpretations with which I am familiar say the photons are both there, in superposition, so long as they've not been measured. It is only after measurement where they differ. Mostly talking about collapse or not interpretations. Copenhagen is mutually exclusive with MWI only in its choice of reality against which the state is defined. If reality is a relation, this is no more contradictory than my location being both north-of and south-of something. Just different things.There are either two photons emerging from the beam splitter in the scenario I described above (per unitary QM) or just one (per most other interpretations). Aren't they mutually exclusive claims?
If the physical universe is a mathematical structure, and humans are part of it, and not something separate from it but interacting, then humans are 'in' the structure, just like my engine is in my car. How is that a category mistake?OK, but the theory still has to be coherent. I think it's a category mistake to talk about "the human in the mathematical structure..." or to presume that humans and numbers have the same ontology.
Clearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it.Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)?
— noAxioms
It's quite simple. Ontology puts forward the fundamental principles by which we understand reality, it determines how we distinguish true from false [...] because one's ontology (world view) determines how one describes what is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it. — noAxioms
I think you don't understand the view, in the same way you claim eternalism is false because the empirical experience would be different. — noAxioms
Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure.If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover
I am. I don't really hold to a specific view. I'm just exploring in this area lately, and looking for inconsistencies.I'm, not questioning your view — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure. — noAxioms
As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not. — noAxioms
The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution. — noAxioms
OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below): — Andrew M
Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI. — Andrew M
Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things. — Andrew M
I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee). — Andrew M
Epistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms
They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong. — noAxioms
Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.
In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence. — noAxioms
No, I don't think 6 needs to have platonic reality for 12 to be even.So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the term is 'existential quantification'.If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?
Yes to both questions. The reality of both things is probably the same.Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? — Metaphysician Undercover
There are biases in the asking of this. I wanted to get below that. So wrong question.Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation.Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory? — boundless
Have to look it up.Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation? — boundless
Have to look it up. — noAxioms
No, not at all. I perceive the cup. It is as real as I am probably. If it were an illusion, it would have a different reality-status from me. Can't rule that out, but not where I'm investigating. Just saying that it is a real part of this world in which I'm also a real part. It is a relation of reality to the world. If reality is related to my direct experience, then the cup is real only when experiencing it, and not otherwise. That's idealism of sorts, but still no illusion. The view is not in conflict with the former, just a relation to a different definition of reality. None of it requires objective (relation-independent) ontology. I guess there is still ontology, but only as a relation. — noAxioms
Have to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.
I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested. — noAxioms
So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. — Metaphysician Undercover
this is already stepping into interpretation territory — noAxioms
Meta pointed me to MDR — noAxioms
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