You just quoted the OP out of context, — Bob Ross

No, I didn't do that either.

The biggest problem for indirect realists (that's the title of your OP) is their own assumption that we never experience objects and states of affairs directly. How is knowledge possible even under such conditions? Hence the complexity of Kant's investigation, and its seemingly paradoxical use of two worlds or perspectives. Such problems don't even arise for direct realists or idealists.

you didn't even attempt to address the OP at all. — Bob Ross

I'll quote the part of the OP again to which my first post is a response

..what grounds do we have to accept Kant’s presupposition (that our experience is representational)? — Bob Ross

Examples of illusions, dreams, hallucinations etc. ... — jkop

For many indirect realists, arguments from illusion, dreams etc. are "grounds" for accepting representational experience.

Kant is more sophisticated, but his presupposition (that objects are conformed by the categories and the perceptual apparatus) amounts to the conclusion that we never experience objects directly, only indirectly by way of experiencing conformed versions first.

The question is posed as if it is possible to compare the appearance and the object, implying that they are separable. I think that relies on an implicit 'world-picture' of the self and world - but that itself is a product of the brain/mind! We can't 'get outside' phenomena in that way. — Wayfarer

I agree we can't get outside phenomena. The question follows from concluding (from illusions etc) that we see external objects by way of seeing something else first (e.g. sense-data, mental representation etc). That's indirect realism. It creates an insurmountable gap between what we see and what it supposedly represents.

Idealism and naive realism are two ways of closing that gap, but Kant rejects both. His ontology consists of categories, not objects. Objects are conformed by the categories. It sure seems to assume that there are two objects, or two versions of one object: one we see, and another we don't see.

If we don’t trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent, then what grounds do we have to accept Kant’s presupposition (that our experience is representational)? — Bob Ross

Examples of illusions, dreams, hallucinations etc. tend to make some thinkers conclude that the object of experience is not the external object but a figment of the perceptual apparatus, conceptual scheme, language, culture etc.

But if the object that we see is only our own phenomenal object, then how can we explain its relation to the external object?

We can't, and idealists know this, but "solve" the problem by rejecting the external. However, Kant's transcendental idealism maintains the external object by distinguishing between its empirical sense and transcendental sense.

In its empirical sense it's an object of experience, but in its transcendental sense it's an abstraction, an object without properties, hence imperceivable.

But it seems to make explanations of perceptual experience ambiguous, e.g. when we see the empirical object, do we see the object or our own phenomenal representation of... what? It also seems to make skepticism true, e.g. do we see the object, a representation, or an hallucination?.

Is there anything that language can’t express ? I don’t think it’s very good at expressing emotion because emotion is non-linguistic. — kindred

No, we use ordinary or poetic languages for expressing emotions. Often in combination with other ways of expression, e.g. gestures, sounds, and pictures.

Some ways of expression are recognizable as symbols for emotions, because they exemplify properties shared by what they express.

For example, "Ouch!" expresses sudden pain by exemplifying some property it shares with the experience (i.e. something sudden, uttered as if being hit or surprised etc.) It's a metaphorical exemplification that's frequently used in literature, theatre, music, pictures, cartoons etc.

I think 'naive' is fine, because in the philosophy of perception it does not refer to ignorance.
— jkop

What does it refer to then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Versions of direct perceptual realism (e.g. McDowell's disjunctivism, or Searle's non-disjunctivism).

Compare it with indirect perceptual realism, which is sometimes called 'scientific' despite the fact that it does not refer to science per se but the philosophical assumption that perception is indirect since scientists can manipulate the conditions of observation and evoke non-veridical experiences or hallucinations. But from artificially evoked experiences or hallucinations it doesn't follow that all experiences are hallucinations, nor that we never directly experience objects and states of affairs.

In both of these cases the words 'naive' and 'scientific' are used metaphorically (or rethorically), not literally.

I still like the term naive realism. I think it is apt since it's not doing justice to any adequate theory of realism. An adequate theory of realism would have to treat the perceiver as a genuine agent, not an entirely passive recipient of a purely objective world in all its glory. — Bodhy

Have you read any of the above mentioned philosophers on perception? Try this.

Hence, why I think critical realism and new realism are better positions since they're seeking a better understanding of what it even means for something to be real. — Bodhy

They're better, because they're better at satisfying what you already assume? :roll:

What are you saying, that "direct realism" is better terminology? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, 'direct' is equally misunderstood by uncharitable opponents. I think 'naive' is fine, because in the philosophy of perception it does not refer to ignorance.

There is a reason why the word "naïve" is used to describe naïve realism. The person holding this view is like an ignorant child rejecting higher education. — Metaphysician Undercover

Like Aristotle? Putnam? Searle? McDowell? To ascribe child-like ignorance to those who defend naive realism is not so educated.

In the philosophy of perception, 'naive realism' is the name for the idea that the relation between observer and object is direct.

What matters is that both a) I see a can of red Coke and b) the photo does not emit 620-750nm light are true. — Michael

a) is false. You don't see red. One colour, or a bundle of colours, can look like another colour. For example, at dusk, dawn, under coloured lights, in pointilistic paintings, RGB screens etc.

the colours we see are determined by what the brain is doing. — Michael

That's also false. The blind can't see anything no matter what their brains are doing.

The arguments from illusion continue to pile up, as if the hight of the pile would make them more convincing. :roll:

Did anyone mention RGB? The screens of modern phones, tablets, computers, TVs etc use three colour channels: red, green, blue. There's no yellow light emitted from these screens, yet they can depict yellow objects, and we see them as yellow. But the truth is that those are faint green colours looking as yellow.

Try this. Open a picture of a yellow colour swatch on your phone, zoom in so that the colour covers the entire screen. Then go into a dark room or closet, and let the light from the screen shine on a (white) wall. The light on the wall does not look so yellow. It's faint green.

Do you believe the balance between our focus on the positives and negatives has an optimal state or are we necessarily in various states of flux regarding how we regard others? — I like sushi

Our lives and communication with each other would become unnecessarily difficult or impossible if we'd focus on negatives only. In fact, it is irrational to focus on negatives when positive interpretations are available (this is basically the principle of charity).

To focus on negatives enables us to avoid negatives. To focus on positives enables us to enjoy positives. They're not mutually exclusive, so I'm not sure there's anything to balance here. Both are functions of our interest, both increase our fitness.

Can We Change Our Own Thoughts and Behaviour? — Jack Cummins

After you become aware of having a thought, you still have the capability to veto the thought, e.g. ignore it or think of something else.

You don't get to choose (homunculus) what thoughts pop up in your conscious awareness , but you do get to choose to withdraw, distract, focus, or redirect your awareness of thoughts, and change your behaviour accordingly.

Why or how has communism lost its appeal, if it really has? — Shawn

It lost its appealing support for workers' rights, for instance, because many workers have become consumers, stock owners, home owners etc. It seems to me that today's communists don't mind being capitalists themselves. They have found other means for acquiring political power, e.g. by supporting minorities, implementing identity politics etc.

..art became an off-shoot from crafts, like philosophy became an off-shoot from science.
— jkop

I think you have gotten that backwards ;) — I like sushi

Well, philosophy used to be the name for science, recall. The off-shoots from this old sense of science are the special sciences and philosophy in their modern senses. Likewise, the modern sense of 'art' is an off-shoot from an older and more inclusive sense of crafts.

they may well not have had a specific word for Art but certainly had enough terms to talk of it how we do. — I like sushi

They could, but modern art, especially concept art, is often context-dependent, whereas the meanings of craft manifest in the works.

I thought this might be of interest.
— T Clark

The Greeks and Romans had no conception of what we call art as something different from craft; what we call art they regarded merely as a group of crafts... — R.G. Collingwood - The Principles of Art

Right, art became an off-shoot from crafts, like philosophy became an off-shoot from science.

Some contemporary art is craft-like, and some contemporary philosophy is practiced scientifically. But there's a lot of art without craft (replaced by concepts, originality, fame etc), and there's a lot of philosophy practiced like literature (some being critical or hostile to science).

What might the ancient stoics say about modern concept art? A modern stoic?

If there is no color in the world, then rainbows and visible spectrums are colorless. — creativesoul

:up: :100:

It's a synthesis of sense and intellect. We look, see, feel and judge works of art or nature, no matter whether they are ugly or beautiful. — Amity

Right, so perhaps a stoic finds meaning in the understanding of works of art, whereas a hedonist finds meaning in being attracted, surprised, provoked etc by works of art. Therefore, it might matter for the hedonist whether a work is ugly or beautiful or at least interesting.

You could hardly be recognized as biased if your expressions were meaningless. — frank

One does not even have to speak. They have already diagnosed whatever one says as a function of identity, sexual phobias, privileges, self interest, inherited sin etc. Thus any criticism can be dismissed as biased, regardless of the truth of the words.

That brings up the issue of understanding the biases of those who step back from science
— wonderer1

Yes. That's also part of phil of sci. — frank

Makes me think of the many revelatory ideologies (freudian, marxist, individualist, religious etc), categorically assuming underlying biases, power relations etc. no matter what. They just "know' that what one says or writes is a function of one's biases, not of the meanings of the words.

But plaster walls don't emit photons..., — Michael

They do in the sense I describe above.

..which is why I can't see them when I close the curtains and turn off the light. — Michael

..which is not the sense I describe above.

I think the term you're looking for is "fluorescent", — Michael

No, I'm not looking for a term, and plaster walls are not fluorescent..

Not sure what you mean by "pigments" here, but it's usually things like stars and torches and lightbulbs and fire that emit photons. — Michael

I'm not talking about stars, torches, nor lightbulbs. but pigments. Pigmented surfaces exposed to light emit light, unlike glossy surfaces that reflect light.

A pigmented surface is uneven, incoming photons bounce and scatter on it according to the wave-like behaviour of light. That's why a rough plastered wall, for instance, emits/spreads more light on its surroundings than a smooth glossy wall which instead reflects incoming light.

Walls of plaster, wood, stone etc may both emit and reflect light in various degrees, but that's because their pigmented surfaces (which emit light in the above sense) can be grinded or treated or covered with glossy materials (reflecting light).

The rejection of naive realism is like obscurantism: a habit among intellectuals to expect a phenomena or its explanation to be sufficiently complicated to appear advanced, learned, intriguing, surprising, absurd, or incomprehensible even... anything but mundane or naive. If the explanation is too obvious, then it won't be taken seriously.

Yet I don't know of any good arguments against nsive realism, so perhaps it's worth investigating (but in a separate thread) :cool:

So we have an superficially enigmatic situation in which the ball does not change colour but the colour changed. Is this a paradox? Not at all. We understand the background of each description, and we acknowledge the truth of both: this is what a red ball in part shade looks like. — Banno

Right, in white light that has the energy of daylight the pigments emit photons of about 700 nm. In shade (ambient light) they emit photons with less energy. Hence the red is darker or less saturated in the shade.

A damaged eye, brain injury, spectral inversion, colour blindness, hallucination, illusion etc. may impair one's ability to see things as they are, but an impaired ability won't change what there is to see: a coloured world of pigments, shapes, varying behaviour of light.

The percept of the ball changed, but its color stayed the same. — Leontiskos

No, the change is the shadow falling over a part of the red ball, making that part look dark red. That's what there is to see.

The "percept" (or mental phenomenon) is the seeing, not the colour that one sees. Even if the colour is a systematic hallucination, it is not a percept. What makes it systematic is the fact that the hallucination is causally constrained by the eye's interaction with wavelength components of light.

I don't have a copy of Searle, but according to this:

Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.

This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena, and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael

:roll: According to Searle, colours are systematic hallucinations, and what characterizes hallucinations is that you're having experiences without experiencing anything, not even percepts.

"Every effect has a cause" may be true, in a way. But it does not follow that every effect must have a cause which is a specific component of the building. The cause of utility might be an effect of the totality of the building as built, rather than as a collection of components. — Ludwig V

No, its utility may become available when it's built, but just being available does not cause anything, unless it already has the property, which can attract and initiate use.

Short version - holistic aspects of the building. — Ludwig V

Here's a sketch of different levels of composition that I'm thinking of:

Architecture is a composition of practical, beautiful, sustainable parts.

The practical, beautiful, sustainable parts of architecture are composed of materials, structures, processes.

The materials, structures, processes are composed of minerals, organic or other chemical compounds, geometries, structural design, causal chains, relations to contexts etc.

utility, beauty and sustainability are the result of other components, but not one of them. — Ludwig V

True, but I'm not saying they're components of themselves. They're components of the architecture.

Their own components result in practical, beautiful, and sustainable parts of a building, but the building won't be successful as a building by merely having such parts.
These, in turn, must be composed (e.g. balanced or distributed) in ways that make the building successful as a building.

That's composition on a more general level than the compositions of utility, beauty, and sustainability (which in turn are composed of more specific parts, features, configurations, materials, chemical compounds, atoms, or particles in fields of force).

I am left wondering about the spectrum of eternal ideas and how these come into play in the human imagination — Jack Cummins

All ideas are expressed with words, and words come into play by the principle of compositionality. Meaningful expressions are built up from other meaningful expressions.

We can understand a large—perhaps infinitely large—collection of complex expressions the first time we encounter them, and if we understand some complex expressions we tend to understand others that can be obtained by recombining their constituents. — SEP

That should answer your question, unless you're an opponent of compositionality, e.g. assume that the meaning of an idea depends on the intentions of the speaker, or on the context, regardless of the meanings of the words that express the idea.

So it seems reasonable to me, to see understanding of emergence as something particular experts have,
— @wonderer1
Yes. I like the idea that it is about particular cases, rather than some very general abstraction. Generality is there the hand-waving comes in. — Ludwig V

one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies and exhibiting autonomous properties and behaviors...
...
The general notion of emergence is meant to conjoin these twin characteristics of dependence and autonomy. It mediates between extreme forms of dualism, which reject the micro-dependence of some entities, and reductionism, which rejects macro-autonomy — SEP

So in the case of architecture, there are parts, features, and configurations from which three general properties emerge: utility, beauty, and sustainability.

Those properties are functionally separate, and they typically counteract eachother in ways that call for compromises, because the success of the composition is dependent on them.

In this sense, they are both emergent properties and components of the architecture.

The special sciences won't answer how they causally emerge, nor how a balanced or distributed composition satisfies the success of a building. Yet every effect has a cause, and for millennia we have known that buildings should be practical, beautiful, and sustainable.

"utility, beauty, and sustainability", I would say are not components of the building, but aspects (properties) of the whole. So I agree with your sentiment, but am inclined to think that "causal relations" - which implies that they are distinct parts (components) of the whole - is not quite the right way to articulate the point. — Ludwig V

The components have properties, and when they interact with each other, other properties emerge. I think the utility, beauty, and sustainability of a building are Emergent Properties, and the parts, features, and configurations from which they emerge are not so distinct. They can depend on each other, or emerge from one and the same part.

For example, the durability of reinforced concrete slabs means that they can be carried by a sparse grid of columns (instead of a forest of columns or thick walls) which, in turn, enables freedom for efficient, flexible, and aesthetically varied organization of the spaces (e.g. with thin walls or open plans). Such a building is easy to change and adjust to passing trends and uses, hence sustainable. If we change the durability of the slabs then we also change the building's practical, beautiful, and sustainable properties, since they emerge from the same part and its configuration.

I don't quite understand "causally" here. — Ludwig V

Architecture consists of its components, but there are causal relations between them and the composition.

As in cooking. A cook selects specific ingredients based on their looks/taste, nutrition, structure etc. and prepares them in ways that cause the ingredients to interplay with eachother. From their interplay emerges a meal that has a specific taste, utility, and sustainability.

The traditional ideas that there are certain proportions of buildings that make them beautiful are another approach. — Ludwig V

Yes, good looking proportions are rare in times prioritizing maximum exploitation per square unit.

The three qualities: utility, beauty, and sustainability can be balanced or distributed, but in some cases they seem to coalesce, such as in roman arches, catenary arches.

I meant seeing reality in an objective way, because belief is subjective and we already discussed that it can lead me to error. — javi2541997

Belief in scientific facts is not so subjective...

What is an example of an objective or subjective way of seeing reality? Perhaps a Sunday painter might try to depict an object in some "subjective" way of seeing it, like a drunken poet might think that reality looks more "subjective" through a foggy glass of beer? Others might look for "objective" ways of depicting things, e.g. photo realistically. But does reality look like a photo? Of course not. Would you be seeing reality in a more "objective" way if you could make reality look more like a high-definition photo? No, seeing reality is not like depicting reality.

There's something wrong with the idea that there are such ways of seeing reality. I think the root cause is the metaphorical idea that seeing things is like seeing a picture inside your head. But sensory experiences are not representations, they are presentations.

No, I am not assuming anything. I actually wonder if there is a possibility to see the representation of reality without being cheated by my own beliefs. — javi2541997

You assume that there exists such a thing as the representation of reality. I'd say that's what keeps you away from the possibility of seeing things as they are.

Imagine, what could such a representation look like? Is it flat or in 3D, does it contain all the visible colours and shapes all at once? No, the idea of seeing as representational is based on a simple but fatal misunderstanding of the nature of observation.

So, because belief can lead to mistakes, I tend to have a distorted view of reality because what I believe when I experience rain is frequently wrong. But 'it rains' as a preposition is the truth. Therefore, the latter will help me see reality in a correct manner rather than through belief. Am I right, or am I missing something? — javi2541997

From 'belief can lead to mistakes', it doesn't follow a tendency to have a distorted view of reality, nor frequently wrong beliefs.

The sentence 'it rains' expresses a proposition. That alone doesn't make it true, nor does your belief. It needs justification. But also justified beliefs can lead to mistakes. Hence the classic definition: justified true belief.

I have no idea what you mean by a "correct manner" to see reality. Unlike beliefs which, indeed, can be more or less correct, any manner of seeing reality is correct. None of them could be incorrect, just like there is no correct manner for rain drops to fall. They fall exactly as they are under such and such conditions.

But if you assume that you never see reality, only your own representation of it, well... that will inevitably lead you to doubt whether your manner of seeing reality is correct.

If experiencing the rain is a casual sensory interaction with the rain, my belief cannot be false. — javi2541997

Why not? You can separate your belief from the fact that it rains by ignoring the fact, or by doubting or dismissing the splashing sounds of rain as "fake".

But you can't separate the splashing sounds of rain that you hear from your awareness of their presence (or whatever causes your awareness). Even if it's just water from a garden hose, or a stipulated hallucination, the experience is inseparable from the conditions from which it arises.

That's what makes illusions possible: you experience something but believe it's something else. It's the belief that goes wrong, while the experience is a fact that arises under whatever conditions that satisfy it

how can I experience the belief and the sentence separately? — javi2541997

Because they are separate. Physically, the belief is a mental state, whereas the sentence is a string of symbols expressing a proposition. Logically, the belief is about the sentence.

What is a belief, and what is an attitude? — Noble Dust

The SEP article on Belief is fairly clear, I think.

An attitude is a mental state, e.g. hope, doubt, confidence, certainty etc.

A belief is an attitude about a proposition. It can be expressed in the form: S A that P

S is the individual having the mental state
A is the attitude
P is a sentence expressing a proposition

For example, when I believe that it rains, I'm feeling confident about the truth of the sentence 'it rains'. The belief is representational, it can be true or false, unlike experiencing the rain, which is a causal sensory interaction with the rain, not sentences.

Will they ever be able to say "the firing of this specific number of these neurons in this part of the brain will produce this specific intensity of this emotion"? — Gregory

One doesn't have to be a scientist, nor to study the neurons in my brain, to be able to say what will produce this specific intensity of this emotion when I taste a piece of chili pepper. It's the chili pepper!

Sometimes i'll feel two different feelings while making a choice and they feel equally strong yet I definitely want one over the other for which reason i have no explanation. — Gregory

Right, we sometimes form opinions and make choices in haphazard, thoughtless ways, by habit, or by going with the flow, relying on herd intelligence, or we have inherited dispositions to chose this over that, or there's social pressure, fashion etc.

No, science is not epistemically subjective. Opinions are, for example, my opinion that 'classic jazz is better than hip-hop' is epistemically subjective.

If could be that my opinion is not just an opinion but refers to my actual experiences of classic jazz and hip-hop. We can research and compare the mental states that arise when I listen to the two styles of music, e.g. notice if my toes tap to the rhythms, check my dopamine levels, brain activity etc. and correlate the results with my reports. That's possible science about phenomena in an ontologically subjective domain.

We can also research the ontologically objective properties of the two styles of music, e.g. their structure, complexity, harmony, etc. and find out that jazz differs from hip-hop in many ways that have correlations to my behaviour and reports.

I am prone to florid sentences myself sometimes but this is just too much for me to stomach anymore. — I like sushi

What would philosophy be without dubious sentences?

A more charitable interpretation of that sentence is that it is based on the dubious assumption that art and science are opposite modes of inquiry, and somehow ecology meshes them together. But the assumption is proven wrong by the fact that both in the sciences and in the arts we use pretty much the same modes of inquiry, e.g. abductive.

what the differences are between the two titans: science/art, and how those modal differences are mediated by the unifying synchro-mesh of ecology. — ucarr

Are they mediated? There are geometric forms that allow durability, utility, and beauty to coalesce, as in arches or catenary curves. Just being present or available satisfies a versatility that is adequate for many areas of human interest, e.g. architecture.

Health care and medicine are other areas where the wedge between the sciences and the humanities has had polarising effects on practices.

For example, the idea that consciousness is subjective, but science is objective, and therefore we can't have a science about consciousness, conflates two different senses of 'subjective'.

Consciousness is ontologically subjective as it exists only for the one who has it, but that doesn't mean epistemically subjective. We can be conscious of science, and we can have science about the conscious states of individual organisms.