I understand you better now. I agree that maybe my original post is generalizing the process of writing. My intention was not to divide this into two parts but to discuss with you to what extent you agree with Fosse's lecture on the Nobel ceremony. Although it is only a seven-page paper, I think it is very worthwhile to read because he focuses on some philosophical questions and topics, apart from literature itself. — javi2541997

On your advice, I've read the speech, and will provide some suggestions of interpretation for you. To begin with, and in general the speech is loaded with ideas which are not well presented. One could say there's abundant content with poor form. However, you should keep in mind that this piece of writing is meant as a speech, therefore it is principally a spoken act of language, rather than a written act of language, so it demonstrates that difference between the two, where content rather than form is usually more important to spoken language, and form over content is usually more important to written language.

The paradox I referred to is well expressed at the bottom of page two.
"One thing is certain, I have never written to express myself, as they say, but
rather to get away from myself."
The writing act as explained by Fosse can be seen as a retreat into oneself. So he's describing a way of hiding from himself within himself. It's so paradoxical, that we must really question his form of presentation. To "express myself" implies others, whom I express myself to. We cannot truly escape the reality of others, so this reality, "others" must be included into this statement. Therefore, what I suggest is really meant by Fosse with this statement, in order that we avoid the paradox of hiding from oneself within oneself, is 'to get away from others'.

This allows us to make sense of that statement, and also put the division between spoken language and written language which he speaks of into a better context. The spoken language provides a communion with others, while the writing provides a communion with oneself. It cannot be described as "to get away from myself", because despite the fact that it might allow me to relate to myself as if I am another, like I might be communicating with myself as another person, allowing myself to be other than myself, I am not really getting away from myself by hiding within myself, rather I am getting to know myself even better.

This act, of getting to know myself better, I think is essential to any artist. It is how the artist comes to know one's own capacities, skills, inclinations, ambitions, etc.. Notice how he describes moving away from music to focus on writing. There is also another essential feature of artistry which he describes quite well, and this is the process of being recognized by others, which produces what is known as success.

The existence of "others" is paramount to success. The artist turns inward, hiding from others within oneself, as I described above, and this is well explained by Fosse with his innate fear of public speaking, originating as the fear of reading out loud. The fear is centered on reading the words of others, probably because he does not necessarily know those words which originate from others, and would mispronounce them or something like that, causing great embarrassment. So the fear is based in the possibility of misrepresenting what is wanted by others. Therefore Fosse retreats into himself, to find and do what he better knows is wanted, wanted by himself.

Success, however, has the prerequisite of providing for others, what they want. Now there is a fine line of balance for the artist to walk. You can tell me what you want, and I can give that to you, hopefully resulting in my success, or, I can show you want you want, by giving it to you, thereby influencing you to want what I have to offer. Notice that the latter is what provides real success for the artist because it allows the artist to maintain the internal relation with oneself, as knowing what is wanted, without succumbing to the desires of others. But of course, these are idealistic representations, and the artist will always be "corrupted" to some extent by the desires of others.

This process which I call corruption, he describes as turning toward writing drama. It is a paid job, where he must write the form of material which he is paid for. His form is then very much restricted. However, he describes a way of retaliation, what he calls "the silent speech", where the content, imagination, is allowed to overpower the form. This is an example of what I referred to as the artist showing the audience what they want, and giving it to them, rather than having them tell you what they want. That amounts to the success of an idiomatic form.

Notice how he describes using that technique when he goes back to writing novels like "Septology". Also notice how this "corruption" of the artist, when he is paid to write dramas, becomes very evident as a negative feature, when he goes back to writing prose. " And during the writing process of that novel, I experienced some of my happiest moments as a writer...". At this point he has freed himself from the formal restrictions which he had forced upon himself by the need to be financially successful.

However, he also describes how writing dramas had provided him with a very important, positive lesson. That is that he got to observe his own plays, allowing him to, in a way, see himself as others see him. I believe that this is an extremely important aspect of how an artist relates to success. Notice at the beginning he is very adamant that he is not expressing himself. But then he has to realize the reality of the situation is that if he has any degree of success, others inevitably will see him as expressing himself. This is when he must realize that he has to play to the audience, and actually see himself as expressing himself, otherwise he would be forever locked within the paradox, never being able to relate to his own success.

Good luck with that javi. I hope it gives you at least something to chew on. The speech is jammed full of "stuff", as I said abundant content, and the lack of form leaves interpretation wide open. The chronological order appears as the principal logical form, so it is sort of an expression of a life of learning.

Not an auspicious omen for a fruitful conversation. — Janus

I think what was required is that you better explain yourself. What I explained to you is that I could not make sense of your description of real possibilities as "physically law-abiding". But you wrote it, so it must make sense to you, therefore you would probably be able to explain to me what you actually meant by this.

If we don't undertsnd it, how can we draw any conclusions about it? Sounds like the very defintion of "undecidable' to me. — Janus

I can assure you that people draw a lot of conclusions about things which they do not understand. That is what is known as misunderstanding and it's very common. It is not the case, that if a person does not understand, they will not draw any conclusions about that which they do not understand, because often they think that they understand when they actually do not understand.

So for example, I drew a conclusion about what you meant by possibilities which are "physically law abiding", and the conclusion was that this would be a self-contradicting proposition. But obviously you did not mean to present me with a self-contradicting proposition, so we can make a further conclusion, that I misunderstood you, and I made a conclusion about something which I did not understand.

You are ignoring that fact that all possibilities remain such for us (since we cannot know the future). So even if what we think of as real (i.e. physically law-abiding as opposed to merely logical) possibilities are actually necessities (if determinism is true) they still remain just possibilities, epistemologically speaking. — Janus

Sorry Janus, I just cannot follow you. It seems like we must each have a completely different idea of what "real possibilities" means.

I do not see how a real possibility could be "physically law abiding". The very nature of "possibility" implies that the selective process which decides which possibilities would be actualized, cannot be described by "physical law". If the selection was describable by physical law, then the thing selected would be necessitated by the reality which that law itself describes. So there would be no real possibility there, only a deterministic world with our lack of knowledge creating the illusion of possibility.

After rereading your answer, I am not sure if you're actually scolding me or just disagreeing with Fosse. — javi2541997

I was trying to be careful not to provoke sensitivities, so most likely I was not actually doing either of those two. I was just trying to find a way to bring some sort of objectivity to bear on a very subjective issue.

The point being that this question you ask, "Do you agree that writing is a process of approaching only ourselves?" is sort of paradoxical in nature. If writing was only about approaching oneself, then each individual's reasons for writing would be just as unique as that person is, the writing being solely a reflection of the person. But then the generalization which produces that statement, that writing is only about approaching oneself, would be false, because some individuals would have reasons other than approaching oneself for writing, and the writing would reflect this.

Writing ought not be portrayed as essentially different from any other art form. And like any art form, the reason why any individual artist partakes in the art that one actually does partake in, is particular to the artist. So your question about whether this specific art form, writing, can be portrayed as a relationship with oneself, could at best, only be partially answered, as it would be more true for some, and less true for others.

I discussed with Vera Mont and @Bella fekete whether literature or the art of writing is an individualistic or collectivist act. I want to know what you think because, following Fosse's thoughts, it helped him in pure loneliness, giving him a sense of safety. He faced and overcame fear by starting to express himself in an individual language.

...

Do you agree that writing is a process of approaching only ourselves? — javi2541997

I would be careful not to attempt this type of wide ranging generalization. It's bound to be flawed induction. There is clearly many different factors which motivate writing, as there are many different forms of writing. Distinct motivating factors would produce distinct forms of writing, but the distinctions are not made clear. So, the different forms are not as separate and distinct as a critic might like them to be, or even represent them as being. So, as you describe with Foss, fiction crosses into philosophy. Such a crossing of genres is common, and fuels the attempt at wide ranging generalizations, which are very poor inductive conclusions

Plato was very critical of the way that narrative infiltrates philosophy. There appears to be no line of division between fact and fiction within the narrative. In Plato's time the moral lessons were passed down from generation to generation through narrative, without such a line between fact and fiction. The fact/fiction line was unimportant so long as the moral lesson could be taught. However, what Plato disliked was that the lack of such a line allowed for various different types of narratives, providing for degradation of the moral lesson.

In other words, teaching morals through narrative allows for "bad", or faulty morals to be taught through "good" narrative form. This can be seen in the content/form distinction employed by some critics. Good writing form is very pleasing and entertaining, but if the content is flawed, bad moral lessons may be taught through this good form.

This is indeed beautiful. However, I've discovered a new way to perceive suicide. When I read Mishima back in the day, I interpreted suicide as an artistic act of dying with honor, and this author genuinely romanticized it.
Suicide has always been a key component in art and literature, but a significant difference emerges between Western and Japanese culture. Fosse even felt uneasy about writing extensively on suicide, but he understood that it was a necessary topic to explore. — javi2541997

This may be a very good example of such a degradation of the moral lesson. It may actually be morally wrong to glamourize, or romanticize, the suicidal artist. This could motivate the suicidal inclinations of individuals who might feed on the thought of looking to create a big splash, the flash in the pan, going out with a bang, or some misguided idea of being a hero.

I don't see how it follows that there must be real possibilities which do not become actualized. If nature is fundamentally random there would be, but if it is fundamentally deterministic there would not be, and we have no way of telling whether nature is fundamentally random or deterministic. — Janus

The supposedly unanswerable question was, "whether there are real possibilities that never become actual or whether all real possibilities are determined to become actual". Within that question "real possibilities" is assumed. And "real possibilities" implies that not all of those possibilities become actual, because then they would be necessities rather than possibilities. They would just have the appearance of possibility but not really be possibilities.

So I really cannot understand your way of thinking here. The assumption of "real possibilities" as a primary premise, denies the possibility of determinism, leaving the proposition "nature is fundamentally deterministic" as necessarily false, therefore not relevant in this context.

If I speculate that the past might change, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the past"?

And If i speculate that the future is already decided, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the future"? — sime

I don't see that at all. It would require that "past" and "future" be defined in such a way so as to create those contradictions. But that is not the way that we normally define past and future. We normally define them in relation to time, as the time not yet come and the time already gone by, or in relation to physical events as those not yet occurred and already occurred. Notice that neither of those two stipulate whether the past might be changed, or whether the future might be already decided. To produce the contradictions you refer to, we need to add these metaphysical/ontological principles as premises.

I don't conceive of a clear distinction between the tenses and the modalities. I interpret both empirically within the context of the present, even I don't consider their meanings to be empirically exhausted by present observations, memories, intentions, actions and so on. — sime

I really don't understand what you are saying here. You appear to be saying that you see no clear distinction between past and future, because you interpret everything "within the context of the present". But isn't it the case that your reference to "the present" already implies a clear distinction between past and future? What could you possible mean by "the present", other than an assumed separation between memories of past, and anticipations of the future? Therefore your reference to "the present" seems to already imply a clear distinction between past and future.

Furthermore, you refer to "present observations", but this concept is logically flawed. There can be no such thing as present observations because "to observe" is to take note of what happens, and this implies that an observation, being what has been noticed is necessarily in the past. It is this idea, of "present observations" which is actually self-contradicting.

Put predictions aside for a moment. How would you deal with possibilities in the sense of "it is possible for me to do X, and possible for me to do Y", when X and Y are mutually exclusive? If I act for Y, then X is made to be impossible, and if I act for X, then Y is made to be impossible. However, at the time when I am deciding, both are possible.

How can we model this type of future in relation to this type of past, when both X and Y change from being equally possible in the future, to being one necessary, and one impossible in the past? What happens at "the present" to change the ontological status of these events?

Surely it is not the human act of deciding which causes the change in ontological status, which is known as the difference between future and past. That would mean that human beings have the capacity to create real ontological possibilities when those possibilities would otherwise not be there. How could human beings create possibilities in an otherwise determined world? It makes far more sense to assume that the possibilities are already there, as a characteristic of passing time, and human beings just have the capacity to take advantage of those possibilities.

The interesting {but unfortunately unanswerable) question is as to whether there are real possibilities that never become actual or whether all real possibilities are determined to become actual. — Janus

I don't see why you would say this is unanswerable. If there is real possibilities then many do not ever become actual, otherwise they would not be real possibilities. Possibility means that actualization is not necessary.

But we are looking at two lines, not planes. — jgill

Yeah I know, but the imagery of the metaphor works better to talk about "planes of existence" rather than lines of existence. The representation of the real numbers as a line is just an analogy in the first place. The numbers have a corresponding value, and unless something provides real position to the number line, nothing justifies the assigned order. Placing the perpendicular line at zero, the origin, the Cartesian method, provides a grounding for order, negatives one side, positives the other. I believe that the imaginary part of a complex number produces the need for separate rules of ordination. This alters the relationship between the spatial representation (the line) and the numerical value assigned to the number, leaving the values without fixed location on the line.

At the end of my metaphor, it all gets reduced to the temporal dimension being outside any spatial concepts anyway. I believe that is the only true way to deal with the human urge demonstrated by mathematicians, to escape the boundaries of spatial constraints (and this need is demonstrated to be very real in the local/nonlocal problem of quantum physics), yet still maintain some sort of logical order. The order must be based in a temporal representation, which allows the spatial features to emerge. In this way, spatial order which appears to be illogical from our current representations can be provided for with the appropriate temporally based logic.

Unfortunately, string theory can't give us an answer, at least not yet. The trouble is that string theory isn't done — we only have various approximation methods that we hope get close to the real thing, but right now we have no idea how right we are. So we have no mathematical technology for following the chain, from specific manifold to specific string vibration to the physics of the universe. — universeness

Some physicists, like Smolin would say that string theory is done. It cannot give us an answer ever, because it has run into a dead end. The next foray is quantum loop gravity, but this appears to be headed toward a similar dead end.

"Two genres", I like that. The main criticism with this, or difference I would request, is that I would replace "rational" and "imaginative" with "true" and "fantasy".

Now, we have the "true world" on one plane of existence, one genre, and that consists of everything which is, and must necessarily be, as it what is real by the status or the true physical world. Therefore possible expressions concerning the true plane are restricted by the reality of the physical world. On the other plane of existence, the other genre, we have the fantasy world, and the only restrictions here are the mental capacities, of the human mind. So this plane consists of all the things we want and desire of the world, and in a very fundamental way it is free and unrestricted by that plane of truth and reality.

However, the two planes intersect, the two are orthogonal. Therefore, what we apprehend as the true plane of existence, all the realities of the physical world, must have a logical bearing on the imaginary, all the things we want and desire from the world, or what we want the world to be. And in this way the imaginary plane is truly restricted. I caution you though, be extremely wary because the relation is not defined as unidirectional, therefore it might just as well invert itself, and the imaginary world of all the things we want and desire, and how we want the world to be, might reflect back onto the perpendicular "true world" influencing the way that we apprehend and represent the "true world". Then the axioms for our understanding of that plane would become more representative of how we want things to be rather than how we actually perceive things to be.

Here is what I think is a very good way to look at these two planes. They are temporal in nature, the true world is the past, and this world imposes restrictions on the future world of possibilities, which is the imaginary plane. Notice that if we understand this relation as temporal, unidirectionality is enforced by our understanding of time. However, we cannot place this understanding of time on either of the two planes, because that would restrict it according to the axioms of that plane, disallowing its superiority and ability to order both planes relative to each other. Therefore we must put time as outside any planes, or such a spatial form of representation.

Wheeler suspects that most of the universe consists of huge clouds of uncertainty that have not yet interacted either with a conscious observer or even with some lump of inanimate matter. He sees the universe as a vast arena containing realms where the past is not yet fixed.

I wonder what a cloud of uncertainty looks like. There's something essential missing from this perspective. What is the case, is that we do not in any way actually observe the "cloud" of uncertainty, or possibility, it is detected by logic, and not seen or sensed at all. What is observed is the posterior, the physical universe after those interactions which are referred to.

So, we do not observe the cloud of uncertainty, yet we do observe what is known as "interactions". And whatever it is that happens, which brings something to be from the cloud of possibilities, this, as an actual cause, cannot be an observable "interaction". But as a cause it is prior in time to the observable interactions of the physical universe, and it must itself be an "action".

This implies that there must be something actual, an actual cause, existing within that cloud of uncertainty, which is unobservable. As an actual cause though, it must also be intelligible. Recognition of this intelligible actuality, inherent within the cloud of uncertainty, as the cause of the particular event which is observable, is the essential aspect which is missing from that perspective. We must recognize that the cause of something observable, the cause of observability, is itself necessarily prior to the act of observation. This frees us from the illogical assumption that the posterior act of observation could be the cause of what is observable, also rendering the cloud of uncertainty or possibility, as inherently intelligible, in relation to the observable physical universe.

I continue to dabble in the complex plane where the world is two dimensional — jgill

I don't know if you can accurately say that is "the world". Isn't it more like two distinct perpendicular worlds, the world of real numbers and the world of imaginary numbers?

The principal problem expressed in Zeno's paradoxes, involves an issue with the way that we relate space and time, and this problem manifests today in the Fourier transform, as the uncertainty relation between time and frequency.*
The irrationality of pi and the square root of two indicates a problem with the way that we represent space with distinct dimensions. Modern physics demonstrates that these dimensions are not sufficient for a true and accurate understanding of spatial activity. So "string theory" for example proposes a number of extra dimensions, and "quantum gravity" may be viewed as an attempt to avoid dimensions altogether.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.05417.pdf
*Added by edit: https://sepwww.stanford.edu/sep/prof/fgdp/c4/paper_html/node2.html

Just so that you understand where I'm at JZ, I pretty much lost all my interest in discussion with you when you wrote the following, what I consider to be a very closed minded statement.

When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being.

Otherwise the rest of your answer is based on introducing notions such as intentional acts (voluntary, with a purpose, with priorities and scales of value). But introducing these notions is wrong, in the sense that they are far from being able to describe the non-intentional and non-voluntary aspect that belongs to the thing that occurs as an internal relationship between elements of something like a triangle. Except for the notion of "order" which is referred to formalization of set theory then also transcends the psychological act. But I suspect that what you understand by order is rather referring to the human act of ordering things. — JuanZu

If you refuse to even consider the role of intention in your representation of meaning and ideas, I don't see how this discussion could progress in an meaningful way.

I'm sorry but that is absolutely false. Even empirical evidence refutes it. For example, as children we do not imagine something like a "triangle" but rather we find it in books or in the virtuality of a screen. — JuanZu

I already went through this. I called it "learning". But if every idea of "triangle" comes from learning, this produces the infinite regress I described. So we know as historical evidence indicates, that there must be a beginning to humans producing triangles in their minds. Plato tried to escape the infinite regress by characterizing learning as recollection. Please don't ask me to circle back and repeat what I've already explained, this gets us no where.

But there is no approach in which the terms, operations and relations of geometry are equivalent or can be replaced by other terms, other operations and other relations. — JuanZu

I don't see why you request that the terms be "replaced". That seems irrelevant. But if you insist, we could replace "triangle" with the Spanish "triangolo", or some other language. And operations differ as well, as the French do long division in a way different from the English. But, as I said, I really do not see the relevance. We could all use the same words, and the same operations, and all this would indicate is consistency in the teaching methods. It still does not demonstrate that the ideas are not humanly created in the beginning, that they are not artificial but discovered.

Let me teach you something: When you say that something IS psychological and is reducible to the psychological, you are determining an identity, that is, you must necessarily determine it semantically as well, and go from that identity to a reduction that results in a replacement of terms, then of operations and then of relationships (since geometry is constituted, like any science, by these things). So assuming you have the terms of psychology you have to carry out a replacement, as long as you are talking about BEING X. If the reduction is understood as an identification then it is an eliminativism. — JuanZu

I gave you my method of reduction, the ideas of geometry are completely imaginary therefore the subject of psychology, as psychology deals with imaginary ideas which come to the mind. You have not at all justified your claim that replacement of terms is required so I'll treat it as a ruse, until you justify this claimed need.

The principal point of my argument is that you should developed or presented a real reduction. But you didn't and just constantly repeat that something is psychological because geometry is something created by humans. That kind of statements need to be well explained and demonstrated. But that's not your case. — JuanZu

As I said, "psychology" deals with things of the mind like ideas, and this includes geometrical ideas. I don't see that you have refuted this in anyway. Here's a passage from the Wikipedia entry on "psychology".

Psychology is the study of mind and behavior.[1] Its subject matter includes the behavior of humans and nonhumans, both conscious and unconscious phenomena, and mental processes such as thoughts, feelings, and motives. Psychology is an academic discipline of immense scope, crossing the boundaries between the natural and social sciences. — Wikipedia: psychology

It seems like our disagreement concerns what "psychology" refers to, not what "geometry" refers to.

Not at all. That the field of geometry is closed to the field of psychology means that the geometric thing is not reduced to nor can it be identified with the geometric thing. Again, the relationships that are discovered, the semantics that are implicit, operations, terms, etc. — JuanZu

I'm really not able to follow you at all JZ. What do you mean by "the geometric thing is not reduced to nor can it be identified with the geometric thing". Are you saying that contrary to the law of identity, a thing is other than itself?

Regrettably in this case I have to agree with your opponent. — Wayfarer

Yes, I already knew that you held this opinion. You like to portray the issue as a debate between nominalism and realism, and through that approach I've tried to get you to change your mind numerous times.

The principal issue which Plato pointed to, Aristotle elucidated, and Aquinas expounded on, developing clear principles to deal with, is that we need to maintain a real separation between "Forms" which exist independently from the human mind, and "ideas" which exist within the human mind, and are therefore dependent on it. A careful understanding of Plato and Aristotle will see this separation revealed in the usage of "idea" prevalent in Plato, and the distinct term "form" which Plato introduced, and became prevalent in Aristotle. (https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/77950/how-when-and-why-platos-ideas-were-changed-to-forms-in-english-translation). This separation is the only conceivable way that we can account for the reality of error in human ideas, and human knowledge in general.

Without the separation, we'd have to say that some human ideas are true, independent Forms, with eternal truth, while other human ideas are fallible. Then we would need some principles to distinguish which human ideas are properly independent Forms, and which are fallible human opinions.

So, we can proceed by examining the evidence available to us, which appears to us as the existence of human ideas, just like Plato did. Then we find through Plato's guidance, that there is no real identifiable difference between the very subjective ideas such as "love", "friendship", "beauty", "just", and the supposedly more objective ideas like "chair", "bed", and even the mathematical axioms. The difference between the two is the strength of the human conventions which 'fix' the meaning of the terms in what appears to be unchanging, eternal forms. We can also see that this strength, or fortification of the human idea through convention, is supported by usefulness.

This evidence, derived from the extensive and very thorough investigation and analysis into the true nature of human ideas is what leads to nominalism. But that is not the end of the story because now the fortitude of human conventions, along with the moral virtue and ethics which support these conventions, becomes the central issue. What the investigation and analysis of human ideas revealed to Plato, is that human ideas precede in time, the artificial things which the human beings bring into existence, in the sense of being causal. This is the formula which is applied in production, and this causal role he associated with "the good", what Aristotle termed as "final cause". The priority of the ideas is revealed in the cave allegory as what causes the shadows which most people think are the real things. You'll see in The Republic, that the carpenter works with an idea which is the formula for "bed" and this is supposed to be a representation of the divine Idea of "Bed". But the formula, as the idea in the carpenter's mind, is not actually the same as the divine "Idea", the perfection of the "ideal", which following Aristotle became known as the independent "Form", it is only as near to the ideal as the carpenter's human (less than perfect) mind will provide for.

Now we have the principles for the separation between the divine, separate Forms, and the human ideas, which are supposed to be a representation of the divine, but are really just the best that the individual human being's capacities will provide for through the means of the fortitude of human conventions. This separation is pursued by Plato in books like The Timaeus, and Aristotle in his Metaphysics, and the ensuing efforts of Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians.

Well, here you are talking about reducing the concept of a triangle to a pure psychological act. And this is where my refutation comes in. The processes that lead to the discovery of an essential relationship in a right triangle cannot be determined as psychological operations, since the difference between the terms and operations of both fields is necessary. You would have to make this reduction and explain it. But I know you won't do it, because it can't be done. Any attempt at something like that would only establish association relationships between elements. But association does not mean identity, much less identity in operations and relationships. — JuanZu

What I am saying is that there is no such difference, it is all psychological. You are merely insisting on a difference to support your ontological position. All the geometrical terms, points, lines, angles, etc., what you call the "elements", along with the relations between them, refer to things imagined by the mind. And things imagined by the mind are studied in the field of psychology. There, I have made the reduction and explained it.

Now, the onus is on you to support your claimed "difference". You refer to "the discovery of an essential relationship in a right triangle", but this makes no sense to me. Any supposed "essential relation" can be shown to be made up, fabricated, created by a mind, and that is why this act (as an act of the imagination), is reducible to being a psychological act. It is not an act of discovering something. An act of discovery could not be described as purely psychological, because there would be something independent of the mind, which would be what is "discovered".

There are two "essential" aspects of the right triangle. One is the right angle, which I described as two lines crossing with equal angles on all four sides, and this is completely imaginary. The other is the triangle, which I described as a plane figure with three sides and three angles. A "plane figure" is completely imagined, and not discovered, therefore this essential aspect is also reducible to being purely psychological. The relation between these two essential aspects, which is to put these two together, and create a right triangle is also a constructive act of the imagination, and therefore psychological. It is all imaginary, psychology, there is nothing here which is discovered.

The field of geometry is closed in relation to the field of psychology. You are not reading, you are assuming things and creating straw men. Saying that the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate. That is, certainly the field of geometry is closed to a psychological approval that attempts to found and determine it. — JuanZu

You are only providing more evidence that you are simply begging the question with your claim: " the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate."

What you appear to be saying, is that this premise is not made "necessary" by any real evidence, it is just necessary for your argued position. However, as I explained, it is the only way that you can support your conclusion, by starting with a premise which leads necessarily to that conclusion. Begging the question.

The incommensurability between both fields is especially present in the methodological order: Association is not equivalent to identity or equality. — JuanZu

As I clearly explained, and gave very good examples to support what I said, incommensurability does not imply closure and a separation into two fields closed to each other. There is often incommensurability within the very same field.

You have said that they are incommensurable, but that incommensurability, as you treat it, if we follow your strange reasoning, since it evokes an absolute difference, you cannot speak of two numerical systems. You would have to talk about a numerical system and something else that can no longer be a numerical system. That is why you fall into a performative contradiction, because you are involuntarily assuming the same within what you try to express as different. — JuanZu

This very poor logic. There is no "absolute difference" implied, even though I cannot say that I understand what that would actually mean. As I explained already, two things of the same type can be called by the same name. Two different dogs are both called "dogs". Two different numerical systems can both be called "numerical systems". And, the two incommensurable numerical systems can exist within the same field, mathematics. Your claim that only one could be called a numerical system, and the other would have to be called something else, is nonsensical and clearly illogical, as being not supported by any premise which would produce that conclusion.

And if you stated the required premise you would see how unsound it is. The premise would be "two incommensurable things cannot be of the same type". But, here we have two incommensurable numbering systems, things of the same type, which are also incommensurable. The required premise is obviously false.

I read it and refuted it. Showing how your argument leads to the misunderstanding that would not allow us to talk about two types of anything. Well, I contrasted analogy with equivocation: that a thing be identical and different at the same time. — JuanZu

Well, if you do not agree that two different things can be said to be the same type, then I believe this discussion is pointless. And I really do not see how you conclude that this would make it impossible to speak of two different types.

I think you need to show your arguments more clearly JZ. State your premises clearly and show the logic which leads to your conclusion. Simply making assertions that your conclusions are logical doesn't cut it. Look, you concluded that my way of looking at things would mean that there could not be two different numerical systems, without showing any premises or logical procedure which produces that conclusion. In a very similar way, you now claim that what i said leads to the conclusion that we cannot speak of two different types. Where are your premises, and logical procedure which produces these absurd conclusions?

When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being. — JuanZu

This is all psychology, as explained above. The supposed "elements", lines and angles, along with the internal relations, are completely imaginary. These are all created by the imagination, and so is your supposed "object itself", a product of the mind. Your proposed "thing itself", the right triangle, along with whatever meaning is supposed to be associated with it, since it is all, in its entirety, a product of the imagination itself, is to be understood through psychology.

Something I've noticed is that there is almost no reference to 'emotions' in classical texts, whereas there are very frequent references to 'the passions'. You will know if you read Stoic literature, that 'the passions' are something to be subdued, and that 'subduing the passions' is one of the marks of wisdom. I don't think they're praising callousness or mere indifference to suffering, but the ability to rise above feelings, emotions and moods. 'Constancy of temperament' was a highly prized virtue in the classics (reflected in the name 'Constance'). — Wayfarer

Yes it is interesting that ancient texts refer to passions as opposed to emotions. It may be because the chemical basis was not fully understood. Even more recently, Robert Burton's 'The Anatomy of Melancholy' considered melancholy as connected with humors. — Jack Cummins

Yes, this is what a modern such as Spinoza means by affects – 'passions', or passive reaction – which is the focus in two sections of his Ethics: III. — 180 Proof

I think that the issue here is a lot more complex than one might think.

To begin with, we now have one word, "emotion" which may be used to refer to either positive or negative, meaning good or bad, "feelings". I believe that most cultures in the ancient days would not have had the words or concepts which would allow them categorize good and bad in the same category.

It was Plato who worked this out by demonstrating that pleasure and pain could not be properly opposed to each other. This allowed for another category, "good", which both pleasure and pain could partake of. So neither pleasure nor pain could be said to be unconditionally, or necessarily good. That provided for the separation between pleasure and good. Plato's discussions allowed that both pleasure and pain, as well as other feelings which he investigated, could be either good or bad depending on the context of occurrence. But I believe that this was very advanced psychology for the day, and not indicative of how the common people spoke, or the way they commonly thought in those days.

I think it is evident that people in that ancient time tended to place what we put in one category (emotions) into two distinct categories, good and bad. There was no such category as "the emotions", and all the different types of feelings which we would class as "emotions" were classed some as good and some as bad. Feelings associated with love and pleasure were judged as good, while pain and suffering were bad. We can see in The Old Testament that God was said to be a jealous God, so jealousy being related to love was also judged as a good. And the ancient terms now translated as "passion" may involve a lot of ambiguity, but this word was generally tied to emotional pain, suffering, so it was judged as bad. Passion was associated with anger and hate. I do not believe that "passion" was associated with love, as we find today. The turn around perhaps can be found in the concept of "The passion of Jesus". Jesus sacrificed himself, suffered on the cross, for his love of others, and the meaning of "passion" took a turn for the better.

In any case, we ought to consider that the way we talk about emotions, and also the way we actually feel emotions, is most likely not static, but evolving. And if it is evolving this implies necessarily that there is variance between individuals.

Among the evidence is the impossibility of carrying out a process with the same results based on certain terms and operations. The terms and operations of psychology and geometry are radically different. The terms and operations carried out in geometry reveal internal relationships that you cannot discover by exchanging these terms for others in psychology. — JuanZu

The field we are working in here is philosophy. We are discussing the reality, and objectivity of geometrical objects, that is philosophy. You have assumed that we are discussing two distinct fields, geometry and psychology, and this forms the premise for your argument which proves that these are distinct fields. That is called begging the question.

I really do not see how your other premise, "the impossibility of carrying out a process with the same results based on certain terms and operations" is at all relevant, or even how it is meant to be interpreted. Therefore you need a much better explanation of what you are talking about before this phrase can be admitted as "evidence".

You didn't . The only thing you said is that geometry objects are not isolated objects. But that's assuming you can delimit the field of geometry from every other field, which is not the case, I assume you can't do that. — JuanZu

Obviously you did not understand me, so I will repeat with explanation. I said: "geometrical terms get defined by a wider field of mathematics, and concepts of spatial dimension. This issue is often addressed by philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in On Certainty, because it appears like it may produce an infinite regress of meaning, leaving no concepts truly justified as "ideal", in the sense of perfect, absolute certitude."

To explain in a simpler way for you, all terms and conceptions get defined and understood by a wider context. There is obviously no assumption here that geometry is "delimited", as what is expressed is exactly opposite to that. I am saying that no concepts are actually "delimited", and this has been an issue for philosophers. Wittgenstein said in the Philosophical Investigations for example, that concepts have no inherent boundaries, though a person may create a boundary for a specific purpose.

This I assume would be the case when we define a term for the purpose of a logical operation, as a premise. The issue I am telling you about, is that the understanding, or interpreting of this definition takes us outside the boundaries which the definition is meant to create. So, for example, if we define "right triangle" as a triangle with one right angle, then to understand these terms, "triangle", and "right angle", we must go to a wider context. We can define "triangle" as a plane figure with three sides and three angles, and we may define "right angle" as the angle produced when two lines cross each other and have equal angles on all sides. To understand or interpret these definitions we need to go to a wider context. We need to define "plane figure", "sides", "angles", "lines".

As you can see, at each step of defining the terms, then defining the terms of the definition, and then defining the terms which define the defining terms, we move into a wider and wider context, with an increase in terms to be defined, and an increase in the possibility of ambiguity and misunderstanding. It appears to many philosophers that this need to continually place the terms into a wider and wider context, in one's attempt to understand, would lead to an infinite regress rendering true understanding as impossible.

On the other hand, I have exposed the incommensurability between one field (geometry) and another (psychology). Relative to the field of psychology the field of geometry is closed in the sense that none of its terms, operations and relationships can determine the nature of the field of geometry. — JuanZu

This is exactly why what you are arguing is self-contradictory. First you say geometry cannot be delimited. This means that this proposed "field", geometry has no fixed boundaries. Then you argue that there is incommensurability between this proposed field, geometry, and another proposed field, psychology, and so you conclude that the two fields must be closed. Your conclusion contradicts your premise.

Do you apprehend the blatant contradiction? On the one hand you assume, 'geometry is not delimited. Then from here you say, 'but there is incommensurability between the terms of geometry and the terms of psychology'. So you conclude, 'relative to psychology, geometry is closed'. But this is obviously a fallacious conclusion. You do not have the premise required, which would state that there cannot be incommensurability within the same field. Furthermore, we have all sorts of evidence of incommensurability existing within the same field, which proves that such a premise would be false.

For example, within the field of mathematics there is incommensurability between real numbers and imaginary numbers. The use of imaginary numbers produces all sorts of complexities within the field, making the above mentioned concept of "plane" extremely difficult and complex. The use of imaginary numbers creates the need for a completely different definition of "plane".

Now, we can justly inquire whether the use of imaginary numbers is better described as a mathematical operation, or a psychological operation. We can look at this usage from at least two perspectives, what imaginary numbers actually provide for us within the field of mathematics, and also from the perspective of the psychology behind the desire to create such a thing as imaginary numbers. If there is incompatibility between these two, as you seem to assume, then we can conclude that imaginary numbers do not fulfil the purpose they were intended for.

They are the same insofar as they are numbers, they are different insofar as they are different types of numbers. — JuanZu

OK, now the point is that there is incommensurability between the different types of numbering systems. And, this incommensurability exists within the same field. Therefore your conclusion that fields are closed to each other when there is incommensurability between them, is unsound. Furthermore, your argument that geometry and psychology are distinct fields is also unsound. And, we can conclude that your presumption that these two names are representative of two distinct fields is nothing but a prejudice which is presented a premise for a fallacious argument, due to the fallacy of assuming the conclusion, begging the question.

Have you ever read about being as equivocity, as univocity and as analogy? Well, it seems that you speak from equivocity (all things are different and none can be the same in any sense), but contradicting yourself by using the same numerical system sign. — JuanZu

Did you not read where I explained the difference between "being the same thing", and "being of the same type". I'm really starting to think that you do not even bother to read half of what I post JZ.

A geometric object is presented to us and given to us even though it is a human creation. But it is given to us as a set of internal relationships and meanings that transcends the acts of its creation. It is in this sense that it gives itself: — JuanZu

Now you're finally saying something which appears possibly reasonable, which warrants a thorough investigation. You say that geometrical objects are created, but their meanings transcend their creation. Is that correct, and what exactly do you mean by "meanings that transcends the acts of its creation"?

Let's look at "meaning" to begin with, in its most simple and ordinary sense. When someone uses words, we say that the meaning is what is meant by the author, what the author intended with the words. Do you agree with that? If so, how would you say that "meaning" in this sense, "transcends" the act of creation, which is the act of the author thinking up, and giving physical existence to the conglomeration of words? Would you say that "transcends" is used here in the same way that we might say that one's intention "transcends" one's intentional acts?

If so, then we have your expression of "internal relations and meanings" as transcending the intentional act. But I defined "meaning" as what is given by the act itself, what is meant by the act. It appears wrong to say that meaning could transcend the act, because meaning seems to be intrinsically tied to the act. How could there be any meaning when the act which gives meaning is non-existent? We might be better off to say that "intention" transcends the act, and meaning is what is created by the intentional act, but intention is defined by terms which lead us in a different direction. It is defined by "purpose".

Let's say the "purpose" of the intentional act, or act of creation, transcends the act. And "purpose" implies a completely different type of "relations", which are not spatial relations at all, like what geometry works with. The relations implied by "purpose" is a hierarchy of values and priorities in relation to goals or ends. So, would you agree with me, that if there is a sort of "relations" or even if we might call it "meanings" which transcends the act of creation, these relations are "value" relations, which are distinct from spatial relations, being based in "priority". We might see that mathematics also is based in a type "value" system, and "priority" is paramount in the concept of order which is very important to mathematics.

We can say that it is something created and discovered for the reasons I have given (genesis and structure). A straight line could perhaps have been imagined once, or imagined by three different people at different times, or simply be an imaginary act repeated three times. That doesn't matter (and it's important that it doesn't matter), the important thing is when those lines entered into a relationship and crossed forming a triangle (three angles appeared). Something like a leg and a hypotenuse appeared and relationships emerged between these elements, regardless of how the lines were created. — JuanZu

Let's look directly at what I've identified as the relations which could possibly transcend the human, artificial act of creation, "priority", "order", and "value". If "order" transcends the acts which create mathematical axioms, is it possible, in mathematics, to have a set with no order, or no elements? Wouldn't such an axiom be necessarily false, therefore needing to be rejected as ontological wrong. However, mathematics does employ such axioms. Therefore it appears impossible, because of falsity, to argue that "priority|, "order", and "value" transcend the axioms of mathematics, because these axioms define what those things are.

Well, I precisely maintain that they are different fields, not only in terms of validation but in their terms, their relationships and operations. — JuanZu

So you're argument amounts to "I stipulate that these fields are different", and you think that this validates your perspective. That's called begging the question.

But you are assuming it is the same field (psychological acts) by simply repeating it, ignoring all the evidence I have presented to you and in no way refuting it. — JuanZu

You've presented exactly zero evidence, only some blabbering about relationships between fictitious imaginary elements. On the other hand I've presented the example of learning, the problem with infinite regress if concepts are only learned, Plato's proposal of "recollection", the problem with this, and Aristotle's resolution to that problem.

you are saying that it is not a closed field but without giving any justification or argument. — JuanZu

I explained why no field is a closed field. You don't seem to know how to read Juan. Or do you prefer just to ignore evidence which does not support what you believe?

And yet you continue to refer to both cases as "numerals". You have not yet understood that you cannot speak of the different as the same. That is, if you speak of two cases (Greeks and Arabs) as species of the same phenomenon (numbers) , you are only arguing against yourself. I say again, you do not explain the same thing by what is different. — JuanZu

Yes, two very different instances of the same type of phenomenon. This implies a difference between the two specified things, and in no way implies that the two are the same thing. However, two different things may be of the same type, so your objection "that you cannot speak of the different as the same" is ridiculous. Two different things cannot be the same, yet they can and often are, said to be the same type. So, very commonly we speak of the different as the same, so long as we maintain the distinction between particular and universal, and recognize that "the same type" does not mean "the same individual".

What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." — JuanZu

What I saw as contradiction was that you said a right triangle is "objective" because it "gives itself" and presents itself to us. This was the alternative to my claim that the right triangle was created by us. Later, you said "But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective."

Therefore we need to conclude that whether or not the right triangle is objective, is irrelevant to whether or not it "gives", "presents itself" to us, or whether it has been created by us. And all this talk about objectivity is just a ruse.

What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." That is, the first geometer may have imagined a line, the first line in the world; However, this line was already the object of a length, and the object of union with other lines that formed a triangle. But then the lines autonomously maintain a relationship with each other, which, depending on the measurement or value of their length, is equivalent to this or that other value. The key here is autonomy and the internal relationship between a set of elements. This relationship between elements can no longer be thought of as a psychological act of the imagination. Why? Because these relationships are said of the elements and not of the imagination. That is why geometry is objective, created and discovered at the same time. — JuanZu

So your argument here is worthless. The "autonomy and the internal relationship between a set of elements" is no more likely if the triangle is natural than if it is created.

Furthermore, what you say about "the first line in the world", that " this line was already the object of a length, and the object of union with other lines that formed a triangle", is clearly false. If it is the first line in the world, it is contradictory to say that it is already a union with other lines, making a triangle. This would imply that it is not the first line, but that it coexisted with other lines. But this is impossible, because you described it as the first line in the world, created by the first geometer.

Here I repeat the argument that I have presented in relation to your example of numbers. — JuanZu

The argument which amounts to an ignorance of the difference between 'being the same thing', and 'being of the same type'?

Maybe you think it's not relevant because you're not understanding it very well. For example, if you don't talk about neuronal synapses, you can talk instead about cognitive processes, or psychological acts. So what I have said about neural processes a fortiori is said of any theory that attempts to reduce (reductionism) one field to another. — JuanZu

I still don't know what you are trying to say JuanZu. My point was that one is prior to the other, as the cause of the other. Minds are prior to ideas as the cause of ideas. Since ideas and minds are subjects of the very same field, there is no attempt to reduce one field to another here, and your supposed "a fortiori" assertion is irrelevant. You seem to be wanting to claim that ideas are prior to minds, so please address the arguments I've made, instead of attempting to change the subject and using that very change of subject as the basis for your claim of a fortiori.

I did. As I have exposed an internal relationship between the elements of a closed field, in this case geometry. — JuanZu

Geometry is not a "closed field", there is no such thing as intelligible objects which exist in total isolation from others. So geometrical terms get defined by a wider field of mathematics, and concepts of spatial dimension. This issue is often addressed by philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in On Certainty, because it appears like it may produce an infinite regress of meaning, leaving no concepts truly justified as "ideal", in the sense of perfect, absolute certitude.

Or can u say that geometry theorems are different through different cultures? ). — JuanZu

Yes, geometrical ideas have been very different in different cultures. All you need to do to find this out, is read someone like Plato, where it is described how the different geometrical concepts were derived from different parts of the world, Egypt and Babylonia for example, and from there the ideas spread to other parts of the world like Greece, and what is now Italy, where they were assimilated through the process of working out differences, inconsistencies and incompatibilities.

A more modern, and also very clear example, can be found in numerical systems. Currently we use what is known as "Arabic Numerals". This numeral system came to supplant the use of "Roman Numerals" in the western world. It is not the case that these two are simply different names for the same conceptual system, because these two conceptual structures were completely different, as is plainly evident from the absence of the zero in the Roman Numerals. I admit that this example is not specifically "geometry" but it is related, and it gives very clear evidence of how highly logical theorems very clearly vary through different cultures.

Now, you will say "but geometry does not represent anything and is something created." Quantum physics is also something created, logic is too. But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective (even if we follow ur argument no one can say that a computer or a sintetic chemical element is non-objective just because it's artificial) . — JuanZu

Why are you arguing against yourself now? You used "objectivity" as evidence that ideas are discovered, presented or given to us, rather than created by us. Now you claim "the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective", so you've just undermined your entire argument.

Ur argument, if I understand correctly, is based on a sense of objectivity as representation wich grounds it. That is, as the correspondence between the theory and a referent wich is provided by the sensory system. But if we abandon that idea of ​​objectivity as representation we also abandon what you say about geometry as something non-objective. And let me tell you: We have to abandon your sense of objectivity as a representation or as a necessary link between theory and an empirical reference that must correspond to. In the case of geometry it can be said that it is its own reference, and to the extent that we discover its internal relationships we discover things, regardless of the fact that it has no other origin than Humanity.

U can call this "objetive constructivism". — JuanZu

Remember JZ, you introduced "objectivity". I'm happy to go ahead without that term, as something irrelevant, but your claim was that being "objective" implies that concepts are not created, but discovered. You said that the reason why a right triangle is "objective" is because it gives itself to us, or presents itself to us as this type of an object. So you are very clearly saying that being "objective" is what implies, or justifies your claim that the right triangle is a discovered (natural) object rather than a created (artificial) object.

In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is. — JuanZu

That is what you said.

It is not false. You are pointing out particular accidents to say that we are not referring to the same thing. But obviously in the act of communication an identity and repetition must take place so that there is a minimum of understanding, this is the meaning. If you say to a Greek and an Egyptian to give you 5 units of that fruit and not 4, they will probably both give you the 5 units; Well, this fact is not a simple coincidence and must be explained. But obviously we cannot explain the same from what is different. We cannot explain, for example, why the Egyptian and the Greek acted in the same way based on the sound differences that each one heard, on their culture wich they belong, on their language, etc. — JuanZu

With respect to the identity of an object, each accidental of that object must be accounted for, or else two distinct objects, with different accidentals would have the same identity, and therefore be the very same object. Therefore in any instances when the accidentals differ, as not being the same in each of the instances, we must conclude that the two objects are distinct objects and not the same object. This is derived from the law of identity.

You have confirmed what is seen frequently here that when one turns philosophical on an issue one goes back in time to see what the Greeks had to say, and to join them across the ages in their despair. — jgill

We look back in time to see how the problems which exist today developed over time. And when we look back we see others who have looked back, and we learn from them. I would not call this an act of despair, but rather the propagation of hope. The denial, which appears more common, that the problems exist today, and the relationship between the past manifestations of the same problems, appears more like despair to me.

Out of curiosity, are you an old guy like me, middle aged, or a "youngster"? — jgill

I've seen you state your age, and I'm not that old, but I'm by no means a youngster.

However it appears to reinforce the idea of reversibility of the essential idea from a intensive sentiment, that always appears as a tentative presentation, never able to catch its faith Ian’s confidence of running out of air up ahead. — Bella fekete

Sorry Bella, I just can't make out the principle of reversibility which you are proposing.

On the other hand, if the object I see is not at all like a swan, then I won't be tempted to modify my generalization, so it isn't problematic. — Ludwig V

It cannot be true that it isn't problematic because you've already labeled it as "swan Z". So you are clearly seeing it as a swan, despite it being the wrong colour. If you did not see something about it which made it look like a swan, despite being the wrong colour, you would never have called it "swan Z". Then that black thing would be irrelevant, and you would not even have the example you gave me, because the naming it as a swan was essential to the example.

Well, it's a bit more complicated than that. Generalizations are indeed like a rule, and every application is a new decision. But they are subject to inter-subjective agreement. So, if I want to communicate with others, in unusual circumstances, I need to carry their agreement with me.

Your representation of the relationship between me, the rule and the case is a bit odd, but I'm not a Platonist so it is not worth arguing about. — Ludwig V

The way that I represented generalizations as tools, used in our lives of relating to particulars, makes the fact that they are subject to intersubjective agreement irrelevant. What is important is that the individual's relation with particulars is direct. That the generalizations require intersubjective agreement only reinforces the idea that they are secondary, or posterior to that primary relation (the individuals of the intersubjective relations are themselves particulars).

I think I'll just skip this issue. You are clearly speaking a language different from mine, so there's not prospect of mutual understanding. — Ludwig V

What I think is that "Platonism" in its modern form, what is understood by, and referred to by, that term, is not a good representation of the actual philosophy of Plato. So I disagree with "Platonism" in its modern representation, but I find within the philosophy of Plato, the ways and means to get beyond the problems associated with what is known today as Platonism. The modern conception of Platonism, if intended to represent the philosophy of Plato, is a straw man.

You have a point. But then, you don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, so I don't know what's going on. — Ludwig V

It's not that I don't want to exclude the chair as an interpreter, intuition strongly tells me that I ought not believe that the chair does any type of interpreting at all. However, I do not see the principles required to exclude the chair, and that is why I argued that we cannot exclude the chair. That would not make sound logic, to simply adopt the propositions which you desire.

The problem is, as I explained, that we do not have a clear and accurate understanding of what it means to interpret. So, despite the fact that you provided the principles of what you called a standard model of interpretation, that model I found to be extremely deficient because it provided no description of the interpreter. Since interpretation is the act of an interpreter, I do not see how one could ever claim to have a model of interpretation which has no reference to the interpreter. So until we know what an "interpreter" is, we cannot exclude the chair as a possible interpreter.

Well, you can't. Since we are talking about an internal relationship that is deduced from elements of an object that differs in its identity from the mind. That is, in order to reduce it to a psychological act you would have to express the internal relationship in terms of a relationship of psychic elements. For example, if we assume that the psyche is nothing more than synaptic processes between neurons, your claim would have to be represented in the form: "this synapse is the relationship of equality between two elements, and it is also an incommensurability." Which is obviously doomed to failure. — JuanZu

I do not reduce the psyche to synaptic processes, so I do not see how this reply is relevant at all. You have in no way addressed the points I made.

It is for this reason that you cannot reduce knowledge to a creation of human genius, even if it has no other origin than humanity. Because knowledge is something like the relationship with something objective. In no case can it justify the objectivity of knowledge based on the particular psychological movements of, in this case, Pythagoras. You may say, “but logic is the condition of objectivity” Well, what you say about geometry (its reduction to psychological acts) you say a fortiori about logic. — JuanZu

Furthermore, as I indicated, you have in no way justified your claim of objectivity in knowledge. And now you simply repeat your unjustified assertion that knowledge is "objective", and use this unsound premise to support your insistence that knowledge cannot be an artificial creation.

If the meaning is nothing more than psychological acts... how can you say that it is the same meaning in each case if they are two different psychic phenomena? — JuanZu

I do not claim that you and I ever associate the very same meaning with the same words. In fact, I think the evidence that different people associate different meaning with the same words is overwhelming, and ought not even need to be discussed. Simply hand two people the same sentence, or the same word, and ask them to write a very inclusive statement as to what it means to them, and compare the reports. You will see that even with very simple concepts like "circle", "square", or "triangle", they will produce a variance. The only time the reports will be the same is if the two people have memorized the same definition. But then they would just write a different interpretation of that same definition anyway. Two people referring to the same definition is the result of learning, which I addressed in the last post, and you seem to have completely ignored for some reason.

The particularity of each case denies its universal formulation, and is not able to justify why it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds, different languages, different cultures, etc. — JuanZu

The point is that this idea, that "it is the same meaning and is repeated in different minds" is simply false. Each mind relates to the same words in ways exclusive, and unique to that mind. We might say that it is "essentially the same", but we cannot ignore the accidentals which actually make it not the same.

So am I entitled to conclude from your last sentence that "all swans are white" is only as reliable as the induction that created it in the first place? Fair enough. So "Swan A is white" and "Swan B is white" etc are the premises of the induction? Fair enough. So now I reason that "all swans are white" Then I discover that Swan Z is black. So my generalization and the preceding induction is not reliable. So I need to do one of three things: a) abandon the generalization b) modify the generalization ("swans are white, except in Australia") c) change my definition of a swan ("A swan may be black or which" or the quantifier ("Most swans are white".) — Ludwig V

Another possibility you have not considered, the black thing you saw is not a swan. This is a real possibility, and it is the bigger problem with "seeing" things according to essential properties produced from induction. If swans are known as necessarily white, then your eyes may be closed to many other properties when judging things as a swan. When you see a black thing you would not see it as a swan. And so, if someone suggests that it is a swan, this proposal must be justified by reference to something else, other than colour. That is a real problem with "essential properties".

The swan example is very simple, and so it might not elucidate the principle I'm trying to express, about how the way we see things, is greatly influenced by the way that we learn to see essential properties. We might find better examples in the way that science looks at dividing things into parts, each part having essential properties which make it the part which it is, and that guides us in the way that we divide the thing into parts. The thing must be divided so that the parts have the essential properties which we've expressed as necessary. So for example, an electron is negative and a proton is positive, and we cannot divide the atom in any other way because we've created these categories of essential properties of the parts. However, adhering to these principles produces the need to assume "anti-matter". This should indicate a problem with the restrictions we have dictated.

True, the new generalization is also subject to the same hazards. But what am I supposed to do - abandon all generalizations? I don't think so. There's no pretence involved at any stage. — Ludwig V

You don't seem to have grasped the "pretense" I referred to. Let me try to explain in a different way. The pretense is in the claim that the generalization has provided us a relation with the particular thing. The generalization guides the acting, thinking human being, in one's relation to the particular. So the human being who applies the generalization, as a tool, is really between the generalization and the particular. The relation with the particular, is between the person and the particular, and the generalization is something outside this relation, created for the purpose of enhancing this relation.

Look critically at the way you presented your swan example please. First, you produced the inductive premise, "all swans are white". Then, you proposed "swan Z is black". Surely you see that the proposition of a black swan is contradictory to your inductive premise. What does this indicate? It indicates that you have allowed a relation to the particulars of the world which is distinct from, and not controlled by, nor dependent on those universals, those inductive generalizations. This relationship with the world which you have, allows you to say "Z is a swan" regardless of what the generalizations (rules and regulations) dictate. Therefore we ought to consider that the person's real relationship with the particulars of the world is direct, and the universal, or generalization, is a sort of tool which the individual can use or not use, as one wills.

That is why I said that this idea, that the person relates to the particulars of the world through the generalizations is just a pretense. But that's an ambiguous and finnicky kind of statement because we actually do relate to the particulars through the means of the universals. However, the universals can be looked at as tools, and they are not essential to that relationship, as the direct relationship is prior to, and precedes the existence of the tool, which is created by the desire to enhance or augment the relationship. It is the idea that the universal is prior to, and fundamental to the relationship (as in Platonic idealism), as the medium between the individual person and the particular, which is the pretense.

If my chair does not interpret ("produce interpretations") what I say, there are two possibilities: a) that it produces interpretations of some other thing(s) or (b) causes me to produce interpretations. I deduce that you meant the latter. My mistake. But that does not give any ground for supposing that the chair has a mind or is conscious. — Ludwig V

No, I meant a). Even if we can produce conclusive evidence that your chair does not interpret the words that you say, we cannot exclude the possibility that it is interpreting some other things. We really do not know many aspects of the world, like at the quantum level. So we cannot claim to know exactly what the chair is doing in the basic activity it is engaged in, especially in relation to "interpretation" which is not a clearly defined term with clearly expressed essential properties.

You do represent the prior judgement as intentional, so how do you avoid the infinite regress? — Ludwig V

The infinite regress is avoided in the way outlined by Plato, by assuming the reality of "the good". As explained by Plato, "the good" as the fundamental base for action, activity, or actuality, is unknowable to us human beings, though it is in its essence highly intelligible. That it is essentially intelligible indicates that there is no infinite regress. The appearance of infinite regress is produced by a misrepresentation of what is unknowable to human beings as unknowable in general, or absolutely, like infinite regress.

You are missing the cognitive element in most? all? emotions. If I am afraid of snakes, I have made a judgement about snakes and that judgement is an important part of the judgement about what is needed. Prejudices may be erroneous or ill-founded, but they are nevertheless judgements about what is appropriate in various circumstances - even if I am not aware of them. — Ludwig V

I am not "missing the cognitive element" within the cause of action, I am downplaying it as inessential. This is evident in involuntary acts, reflex, etc.. It is simply not true that you must have made a cognitive judgement to be afraid of snakes. Creatures are born with many such innate fears, prior to the capacity of making cognitive judgements.

1. Something before the interpretation, a text, a picture - something that means something. Call it the original. "Interpretation of...." — Ludwig V

What I am talking about as prior to the interpretation is the condition of the interpreter, before the interpretation. The individual must be capable of interpreting, attentive, and motivated, as interpretation is an act carried out by the thing which interprets. How can you have a "standard model of interpretation" without a representation of what constitutes an interpreter? It is only by properly modeling "the interpreter" that we might exclude the chair as an interpreter.

I've given myself permission to be quite rude in this comment, which I'm hesitant to do in a forum where I'm pretty new, but the points you are holding fast to are so flawed that they're almost actively anti-intellectual. And that's the main reason I'm responding at all. — Jaded Scholar

This is "The Lounge", rudeness is accepted and expected. I understand that it's all good hearted and meant for improvement, self and other, and I hope you do too.

But your last comment has clarified things for me: you obviously just don't understand anything about modern or classical physics and are just parroting random critiques of physics and maths from throughout the ages, which were all valid at the time, but have been turned into jibberish by your comprehensive ignorance of the actual contexts they apply to. — Jaded Scholar

Sound criticism can never be turned into gibberish. It seems you haven't studied philosophy and therefore have no understanding "of the actual contexts they apply to". I have, and do understand the context. Sorry jaded, but it is you whose talk is gibberish in this context.

I literally just detailed in my last response that you are describing a problem that existed in pre-Newtonian classical physics which was solved by Newtonian physics. — Jaded Scholar

The problem was never solved, as is clear from the evidence I cited, the time/frequency uncertainty of the Fourier transform. As I've told others already on this forum, calculus provided a "workaround" for the problem, which was sufficient in the context of the physical problems of the time period, but it was not long before the physicists reached the limits of the applicability of that workaround, and so, the same problem reappeared.

Yeah, thanks for (again) confirming that you don't know what you're talking about. Within Fourier transforms, there is intrinsic uncertainty within first-order terms between time and frequency for the exact same reason that any other integral transformation has an intrinsic uncertainty between conjugate variables, be it time/frequency, position/momentum, gravitational potential/mass density, voltage/charge, etc. There is nothing remotely unique to time itself in this line of argument. — Jaded Scholar

I see you have yet to produce a good response to this issue, only to say that the problem which is derived from a failure in our representation of time is not limited to time. The so-called "discipline" of physics has managed to spread the problem around to all sorts of spatial concepts, producing a more general "uncertainty principle", through its conventional ways of relating space and time.

I don't agree with your definition of "sophistication", which seems to be equivalent to "complexity". My meaning of it in this context was more like "advanced"/"accurate"/etc. — Jaded Scholar

Are you aware of the history of the term "sophistic"? Why are you intent on portraying sophistry as "advanced", "accurate". In reality, sophistication is the oldest form of deception. Add as many slights of the hand as possible, to make things appear to be advanced and accurate, in order to hide the trickery which is really going on underneath. Simply put, "sophisticated" does not imply "advanced" or "accurate", and you definition is a hope filled fantasy, to portray sophistication as advanced and accurate, instead of as an affront to Occam's razor.

What you are saying is a collection of truth-adjacent things, which you have combined into something that is just not true. And you could easily have avoided asserting something this ridiculous if you were interested enough in what you're talking about to spend 30 seconds looking it up online. — Jaded Scholar

Come on Mr. Scholar, what the fuck are you even talking about here? What the hell is a "truth-adjacent thing? (Excuse the rudeness please, but this is The Lounge.) Either it's true or it's false, or would you prefer that we sink ourselves into a world of probabilities, with nothing to ground what is actually the case?

I do slightly object to the value label of "good" maths systems being those which are better tools for modelling our specific reality, but then again, that's the whole point of maths, so it's probably not worth quibbling about here. — Jaded Scholar

Excellent! We almost have agreement on something, except you would overrule my "good" with something "better". What if I overrule your "better" with "The Greatest" (that would be God).

But in keeping with the theme of my rebuttals, both maths itself and our scientific culture have changed a bit since then! — Jaded Scholar

Yes, math has changed "a bit". Unfortunately the fundamentals of circles and angles remain the same, and the glaring contradiction of discrete units within a continuity, just does not want to go away.

Moreover, one of the reasons for modern mathematics no longer being merged with the field of physics is that - as I also mentioned previously - assumptions and value judgements about physicality or "reality" are outside the field of mathematics, which is now primarily directed with finding and fleshing out any and every mathematical system we can think of. This is closest to an actual reason for the abundance of complexity and axioms that you lament: the field is not defined by or limited by an attempt to describe our perceived reality. It seeks to describe all possible mathematical systems. Each of which require axioms to define. — Jaded Scholar

Here we go... Instead of grounding the mathematical principles (axioms) in what is actually the case, truth, as philosophers do with "self-evident" truths, you'd prefer to waste time looking at an infinite number of "possible mathematical systems". Good luck with that endeavour, you can find me in The Lounge sipping some whisky, and from time to time some whiskey.

If you feel the need to reply again, then I challenge you to point out one such problem that has been labelled, and is not something that modern mathematicians want solved (or have already solved). — Jaded Scholar

That's not the issue. You said:

if we could label them, we could have fixed them by now. — Jaded Scholar

Now you're changing your tune to say that the ones which are labeled, "mathematicians want solved". I would urge you to take another step further, if you're truly a scholar who is jaded, and make a critical inspection of all those problems which have been labeled and which you seem to think mathematicians "have already solved". Creating a sophisticated workaround, which is useful in a multitude of situations, but then fails when physics needs a more precise approach to the relation between space and time is not a true solution. And when the mathemagicians use smoke and mirrors in an attempt to demonstrate that the workaround is a true resolution, that is nothing but sophistry.

I think mathematics and science are not perfect tools for modelling the real world. And nailing down the exact nature of their problems is both important and difficult. And I think it does a great disservice to these very valuable pursuits if we pretend that the long-solved problems of their forebears are some kind of inescapable black mark upon them. It can be highly useful to learn from the problems of the past, but the most instructive part of that kind of analysis is how they were solved - another reason it's counterproductive to ignore the fact that those solutions exist. — Jaded Scholar

You are jumping to conclusion. You approach with prejudice, a preconceive bias, that these problems have been "solved". That is what you state "they were solved". But when you approach these problems, Zeno's paradoxes for example, and the irrationality of pi and the square root of 2, with the attitude that these problems have already been solved, you do not look at them as real problems, they are pseudo-problems, because you have presupposed that they are solved.

Instead, you need to approach the problems as they are expressed, exactly as presented at the time, as real problems, and come to understand them as real problems. Then you are in a position to look at the proposed solutions, and judge them as to whether they are real solutions, or just convenient workarounds. You clearly approach from the preconceived idea that the problems have been resolved, and therefore do not understand them as real problems. Newton's law prohibits infinite acceleration, but prohibiting a problem does not resolve the problem.

It's like pretending that all criticisms of horse-drawn carriages are equally valid criticisms of cars. You're not accomplishing anything worthwhile when you muddy the debate by saying that cars are good, but all of the horse dung is a real problem. That's the problem with you doubling down on arguments like "Oh, the problems are clear - they just can't get over [method of thinking they got over a millennia ago]." — Jaded Scholar

This makes no sense. Both cars and carriages have wheels and bearings, so they share the same fundamental problems of friction and inefficiency. Also, cars pollute at least as much as horses do, so the mention of "horse dung" is just a sophistic trick. You might argue that the car is "better" because the very specific issue of "horse dung" is avoided, but the more general problem of "pollution" remains, as the specific "horse dung" is replaced with other forms of the same problem "pollution".

Of course, I'm probably wasting my time by spelling out the problems with your approach. All of the arguments you have doubled down on by basically just repeating yourself and ignoring my refutations (and any other easily accessible information on them) are a series of data points suggesting that you don't actually care about the truth or falsehood of the arguments you are summoning and, for some reason, are primarily motivated by a desire to disagree, and not remotely motivated by any desire to seek out actual truths. — Jaded Scholar

I haven't seen any refutation from you yet, only false premises, and a refusal to accept the truth, through a veiled appeal to possible worlds as somehow more real that actual truth.

When I started writing this response, I was intending to liken your responses to that of a LLM like Chat GPT-4 - nominally referencing a rich variety of information sources, but demonstrating no contextual understanding of any of them - but after a more thorough read of your commentary, I'm quite confident of your humanity. LLMs haven't yet got the exact register we see in humans with nothing to say and a determination to say it as loudly as possible. — Jaded Scholar

Jesus Christ! Likening my work to GPT-4, or LLMs in general, that's the highest compliment you could give anyone. Then you even go one step further, in saying that I actually add a touch of humanity. Thank you very much Jaded Scholar, you live up to your name very well, and welcome to the ideology of skepticism. You are ready to roll.

In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. — JuanZu

This is what i disagree with. I think that any instance of the conception of a triangle actually does reduce to a purely psychological act. If you assume that it "presents itself" to us, you need to ask how it does this. Then you see that it is a matter of learning, the concept must be learned, and learning is a psychological act.

So, you might ask where did it first come from. There cannot be an infinite regress in time, of human beings teaching each other the concept, it must have come from somewhere in the first place. This is easily understood as a matter of creative genius. As is evident in all axioms of mathematics, they are clearly thought up by human beings, created by them. With modern math, we see a clear history of who created what, the history is very well documented. In ancient conceptions such as the right angle, the documentation is not there, but there is no reason to think that the process was any different in principle.

To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is. — JuanZu

This claim of "objective" is unjustified. That the triangle is "presented and given to our knowledge" is supported only by the evidence of learning. And inter-subjectivity does not objectify. Furthermore, there obviously cannot be an infinite regress of learning. This is why Plato investigated the theory of recollection in The Meno. But this theory has its own problems, which Aristotle expounded on. Aristotle's solution was that the geometrical constructions only exist potentially, prior to being actualized by the mind of the geometer. But something which exists only potentially cannot be an "object", and potential cannot be said to be "objective".

If the specifics don't conform to the generalization, it's a problem for the generalization, not for the specific. — Ludwig V

This is not true. The issue is the way that the specific is related to the generalization, and whether the relationship assumed is logical or illogical. Your example assumed a relation between the specific and the generalization which was not implied by the generalization. This fallacious or illogical relation produced a claim that there is a problem with the generalization, when the real problem was with misapplication of the generalization.. Andt since this supposed problem with the generalization is only produced through the means of an illogical relation with the specific, the claim that it indicates a problem with the generalization is not justified.

Here's an example which is analogous to the mistake you made. Suppose I make the proposition that we see electromagnetic waves as colour. Then you mention some specific wavelengths like ultraviolet, and infrared, which are outside the visible range, claiming that this is evidence that my proposition is false. The specifics do not conform therefore there is a problem with the generalization. But my proposition does not state that we see "all" electromagnetic waves, so the relation which that claim relies on is not justified by logic, it is illogical. What would really be the case in this instance is that you misunderstood, and therefore misapplied the generalization.

That is the same sort of illogical relation between the specific and the generalization, which your other argument relied on. I make the proposition that a chair produces interpretations. You say that a chair does not interpret what I say, therefore a chair does not produce interpretations.

How do you know that? Surely, if we can know that their perceptions of the world are different from ours, we can "relate" to them. — Ludwig V

This is a common epistemological problem. It is commonly represented in the form of 'We can know causes from their effects, without establishing a direct relation with the cause itself'. We do this through the means of generalization, principally inductive reasoning. But inductive reasoning does not have precise rules and therefore does not provide the level of certainty which some epistemologists require for "knowledge" so they expose problems like Hume did.

The issue you point to here is ambiguity in the use of the term "relate". There is a vast multitude of different ways which "relations" may be made, implying a multitude of types of "relations". Sometimes we do not properly distinguish between different types of relations, and ignore the fact that certain types produce a much higher degree of certainty than other types.

So you are correct to say that if we can know that other animals have perceptions, we can "relate" to these perceptions, but what happens with this type of reasoning is that the former, "animals have perceptions" is a generalization, while the latter "we can relate to these perceptions" expresses a proposition about some specifics. The relationship with the mentioned specifics, "perceptions" is established through the means of the generalization which is naturally lacking in certainty. The relation is not direct between the subject and the particular. This type of relation inverts the true order of necessity, so it is a completely different type of relation, i.e. it lacks in necessity due to the inversion.

Here's an example "all grass is green" is a generalization. We can say that this proposition provides a relation to individual blades of grass, that each one must be green, but it's really just a pretend relation to individual blades of grass. And because it's just a pretense, despite the fact that you may call it a relation, the knowledge derived here is only as reliable as the inductive reasoning which created the generalization in the first place. So if I tell you that I have a blade of grass in my hand, and you think that the generalization provides you with a relation to that blade of grass, you'll conclude that the blade of grass in my hand is green. But it might actually be brown, or some other colour, because the generalization is faulty. And that's why I say that this type of relation. though it is correct to call it a relation, is a sort of pretend relation, because it's not direct, it goes through the intermediary of a generalization and therefore is only as reliable as the generalization. Further analysis shows that the relation is not with actual individuals, but possible individuals.

I would say that this is the case with the generalizations I provided, first that other animals have perceptions, and second, that they are different from ours. These generalizations are to some extent unreliable as produced from a sort of inductive reasoning. Now you say that if we know that the perceptions are different from ours, then obviously we relate to them, but this is what I called a pretend relation, through the intermediary of the generalizations. My principle was that different people have different perceptions, and I extrapolated to other animals having different perceptions.

So if I talk about a person on the other side of the world, whom I know has different perceptions from me, through that generalization, this does not mean that I have established a relation with the perceptions of a person on the other side of the world. It's purely fictional, just a pretense, created by the generalization, but the generalization creates the illusion that I am actually saying something real about a real person's perceptions, and I actually have a relation with those perceptions.

So we formulate a judgement, which is not an interpretation, and then promote it to an interpretation and then decide whether it is correct or not? At first sight, it would resolve my problem. But what is this promotion process? — Ludwig V

No, I think what I said is the inverse of that. We form an interpretation, but the interpretation is not a judgement at all. Then afterwards the interpretation is judged as correct or not. I might have confused you though, because I then said that the interpretation is itself is purposeful, intentional, and therefore aimed or directed by some form of good. So I would not characterize the interpretation itself as a judgement, but an action which is the product of this more base form of intention, which may be called a form of judgement. Interpretation is more like a tool of intentionality which lies between two distinct forms of judgement, the judgement which directs its production, and the judgement which judges the correctness of it, afterwards. The judgement which is prior to the interpretation is a judgement of what is needed, the interpretation itself is the act deemed as required to fulfil the need, and the posterior judgement determines successfulness. The process of trial and error can be understood in this way. Far too often though, the judgement made prior to the trial and error action is represented as non-intentional, to avoid an infinite regress of intentional acts.

To put the point another way, surely to make a judgement is normally to evaluate it as correct? — Ludwig V

I think we really need to recognize two very distinct forms of judgement, the prior and the posterior, in relation to the act. The prior judgement, as a judgement of what is needed, the act required, or means to the end, cannot really be characterized as a judgement of correctness. It can sometimes be seen as a judgement of "the correct act" but most often it cannot. If we start to characterize the prior judgement as a judgement of correctness, we start to portray all intentional act as a matter of following rules. The act would be determined by a rule, and this rule would produce a judgement of the correct act for the circumstances. But this is not how we think and act in real situations. The need to act is influenced by emotions and all sorts of subconscious things which cannot be described as judgements of correctness.

Some interpretations seem to be based on a process that we are not subjectively aware of. The usual term for that is unconscious, which is distinct from non-conscious. Non-conscious beings neither have nor lack an unconscious. — Ludwig V

Yes, this is the point. If interpretation is a form of action, then the judgement which is prior to the action, which brings the action into existence, must be subconscious (I don't understand the distinction between unconscious and non-conscious which you point to). This produces the need to consider distinct forms of judgement, the prior and posterior, as explained above.

I'm not trying to disassociate it. I'm trying to understand it. I'm arguing that there is a problem with the standard model of interpretation. — Ludwig V

I don't believe there is a standard model of interpretation.

This value of the square root of the sum of the squares of the legs would be closer –closer than anything– to X, with X being an irrational number. — JuanZu

In my opinion you have this inverted. The value of the square root of the sum of the legs is something indeterminate, a number which cannot be expressed. We might signify this with X, but X then signifies a value which is impossible to determine, and therefore impossible to express numerically. That's probably why pi is called "pi" rather than expressed as a number. It cannot be expressed as a number. The irrational number is our attempt to express this value, which is close to what is signified by X, but not X.

On the other hand, you call a real object one that is logically consistent. I, however, regarding the case, would speak of a qualitative incompatibility in the objective nature of the right triangle as an object. Adding the term "Real" or "not real" would not make much sense once we consider it this way. — JuanZu

It was not a matter of adding the word "real", it was a matter of describing what makes an object real what constitutes "realness", or "objectiveness". The issue was how do we get from stated properties, to the conclusion that the thing with those properties has real, objective existence. My proposal was that to be a real object the stated properties must be logically consistent. So the "qualitative incompatibility" you speak of would exclude the "objective nature" of the triangle, leaving it as something other than a real object.

Yes, but the sense-datum is supposed to be what is left when all assumptions are set aside. — Ludwig V

I know, and that's why it's incoherent to say that the sense-datum is what is seen, because seeing necessarily involves what you call "assumptions". What is seen includes "assumptions".

So the chair you are sitting on might understand what you are saying, and your dustbin might understand that to-day is the day it gets emptied? — Ludwig V

You are citing specifics again, and that is a problem. If the chair is capable of making an interpretation, this does not imply that the chair is capable of understanding what I am saying. What the chair is interpreting might be something that we have no idea of. The dustbin example suffers the same problem.

That's the complexity of "interpretation". I am not necessarily capable of interpreting the same thing with meaning that you are capable of interpreting. And, I might not even recognize as meaningful, something which you are capable of interpreting the meaning of. Furthermore, all these difficulties make it so that we cannot even understand exactly what the act of interpreting actually consists of, so we can't even say for sure whether a chair is interpreting or not. We'll say that the chair does not interpret in the way that human beings do, but since other animals interpret in other ways which we really cannot relate to, we can't rule out the possibility that plants and even inanimate objects might themselves have different modes of interpretation.

. Something that is not conscious cannot understand or misunderstand, so your argument does not "break the link". — Ludwig V

The argument holds, because neither understanding nor misunderstanding can be implied by "interpretation" itself. These are judgements made as to correct or incorrect interpretation. Therefore understanding and misunderstanding are not things intrinsic to the interpretation, but are determinations attributed to the interpretations post hoc, often by a third party. The interpreter does not necessarily assume to understand, nor to misunderstand, in the act of interpretation. Nor does the interpreter necessarily believe that the interpretation must be one or the other of these two. What is done is merely interpretation, a judgement of meaning. So the non-conscious cannot be excluded from interpretation through the requirement of understanding or misunderstanding. However, there is necessarily some underlying inclination toward a good, or intention, purpose, which drives the act as an act of judgement. But acting with purpose, intention, is not restricted to consciousness.

So we learn pretty quickly what works and what doesn't. That's the basis for how we see something. Interpretation can play a role sometimes, but I'm not sure it's meaningful to suppose that it always plays a role. — Ludwig V

"What works and what doesn't" implies purpose, and purpose implies intention. And any act with intention has meaning, as what was meant. So I do not think you can disassociate interpretation from seeing in this way. If learning to see is a matter of learning "what works and what doesn't", then it is directed by intention and judgements of value and meaning are involved, therefore interpretation is involved.

But isn't that just for the case where the length of each leg is 1? — JuanZu

That is the proposed equality. When the two legs are proposed as equal, the problem of incommensurability arises. Therefore I propose that we ought to conclude that they cannot actually be equal.

On the other hand, I would like to know what you mean by "Real Object." — JuanZu

Let's say that a real object is something which has a description which is logically consistent. If a logical problem in the description of the object, such as contradiction, is evident, then the described object cannot be a real object. So the logical problem with the right angled object is the incommensurability of the two sides, as explained above. This logical inconsistency indicates that the object described cannot be a real object.

We find a very similar problem with "the circle". The square and the circle are two very distinct ways of representing two dimensional "objects", two straight lines at an angle, or a curved line. Both have a very similar logical problem. There is also another similar problem which arises from the distinction between a one dimensional line, and a zero dimensional point. What I propose is that what we ought to conclude is that the "dimensional" representation of objects is logically flawed, and therefore does not accurately represent "real objects".

So now I ask whether "those differences result from differences in what is seen, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear." — Ludwig V

It makes no sense to ask that question. Memories and anticipations inhere within, and are necessary to, the act of seeing. Therefore differences in what is remembered or anticipated manifest as differences in what is seen. The distinction you ask for cannot be made.

If a plant produced interpretations of its world, it would be conscious. If an AI produced some sort of interpretation, it would have some sort of consciousness. — Ludwig V

All you are doing is unnecessarily restricting the meaning of "interpretation" in a way so that only consciousness can perform the act which produces an interpretation. The problem is that I do not see the reason for this restriction. I see very little in any conventional definition, or use of the word, to support your requested restriction.

The word is generally used to signify an act which presents the meaning of something, and "an interpretation" would be an instance of what is produced by this act. There is nothing to indicate to me that this type of act could only be carried out by a consciousness. There is however, an implication of "understanding" in some usage, but this is somewhat problematic. Nothing necessitates that the interpretation consists of understanding rather than misunderstanding. Since the interpretation might equally be misunderstanding as well as understanding, we cannot say that "understanding" is implied by "interpretation", so the link between consciousness and interpretation may be denied in that way.

But that is only my, very subjective, interpretation of "interpretation". And of course, I admit that it may be a misunderstanding. But this leaves me with no principles to distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect. Therefore the principles which distinguish understanding from misunderstanding, correct from incorrect, or in general, good from bad, cannot be derived from sense-data, which would require interpretation. A judgement of this kind must be prior to, and active in the production of the interpretation. That makes the perspective of "sense-data" ontologically problematic because our innate sense of good and bad must be derived in some means other than through the senses, because it must have an active role in the process of interpretation.

You seem to have a restricted concept of a “real object.” It is also not clear to me how you deny that the Pythagorean theorem tells us anything about right triangles. — JuanZu

I did not deny that the Pythagorean theorem tells us anything about right angle triangles. What I clearly said is that it demonstrates to us is that this type of triangle is not a real object. If you do not agree with the reasons I gave for this conclusion, then you could have simply said so.

"Something about X" means that we are pointing out a property of X. In this case, an equality between the parts that constitute the object called "Right Triangle". — JuanZu

The problem is that there is no such equality between the parts, hence the irrational ratio between the two legs. This irrational ratio is known as the square root of two. If the proposition states that the two legs are equal then the straight distance between the two defined points, known as the hypotenuse, is an indefinite distance, unmeasurable. It is said to be irrational. This indicates that in actuality there is an incommensurability between the two legs which are assumed to be equal, such that they cannot actually be equal. The proposition that they are equal, forces the logical conclusion that the hypotenuse is indefinite, irrational, therefore the proposition that they could be equal must be rejected as illogical.

Different interpretations of a picture presuppose a picture that is the original and mediates between interpretations. — Ludwig V

You're missing the point. You are assuming "a picture". But if some of the different interpretations of the supposed "same thing", do include "a picture", there is nothing to suppose as the original except the assumption of "the same thing". But if the interpretations are different, where's the logic in assuming that they are interpretations of the same thing in the first place?

I'm not clear whether those differences result from differences in what is seen (unlikely, but possible) or differences in what they notice or attend to, or perhaps in what they remember or even in differences in what they think I want to hear. — Ludwig V

This is the problem, "seeing" requires noticing and attending to. This mental activity constitutes a basic part of seeing, such that there is no seeing without it. Therefore, premising that the difference is due to a difference in attention does not imply that the difference is not also a difference in what is seen, because attention plays an active role in determining what is seen.

I understand what speculation means in ordinary life, but in cases like this, I lose my bearings. How do you manage? — Ludwig V

I have no problem with this, it seems to come naturally for me. See, you and I have very distinct modes of interpretation. Can you imagine that a plant might produce interpretations of its world? We can go far beyond "consciousness", in our speculations about interpretations. What about a non-conscious machine, an AI or something, couldn't that thing being doing some sort of interpretations?

Well, in both cases it doesn't add anything that we can say is a property of this type of triangle. With this example we can deduce that the objective properties of things, the being of things, is not reducible to subjective experience, whether understood as perspective. A judgment, therefore, if it hopes to be true, must exceed the order of perception and perspective. — JuanZu

The Pythagorean theorem makes the two perpendicular lines of a square as in commensurable. This is known as the fact that the square root of two is irrational. Because of this irrationality we cannot conceive of "this type of triangle" as a real object, with real "objective properties". There is inherent within this supposed object, "this type of triangle", a fundamental irrationality.

"Translation" here is an idea that came up earlier in the discussion. It treat the idea of sense-data as a question of language than of metaphysics. — Ludwig V

I think this is very good, and it is an important aspect of the "sense-data" perspective. We need to look at all acts of sensing as acts of interpreting. The tendency is to think that all human beings sense things in the same way, due to similar physical constitution. But just like we each interpret the same proposition in a unique, slightly different way from others, so we also interpret sense-data in a unique way. The difference becomes evident and very significant when one undergoes certain illnesses, toxins, hallucinogens, etc.. But simple experiments can demonstrate the magnitude of the fundamental differences unique to each being. For example, line up a group of people facing a particular direction, tell them to take mental note of what they see, then have them turn around and write it down.

But it is difficult to imagine a different way of interpreting the world which was completely incomprehensible to human beings - we couldn't even identify it as an interpretation of the world. (That's a vey brief gesture towards how the argument might go.) — Ludwig V

I would say that such a thing is not difficult at all. Consider the human being's temporal perspective, one's "present" in time. The average person's "present" is said by psychologists to be about two to three seconds. This time period, the temporal frame of reference, grounds what we know as the present state, "what is", the base for interpretation of the world. Now imagine if one's temporal frame of reference was a couple billion years, or just a couple nanoseconds. Each of these would give us a completely different grounding for "what is", at the present time. The extremely long frame of reference would have billions of years of celestial motions all blurred into one "now", while the extremely short frame of reference would show precise positioning of tiny fundamental particles. To me, when the temporal frame of reference is considered, it is not at all difficult to imagine that there would be ways of interpreting the world which would be completely incomprehensible to human beings.

Is there not in all philosophy and science an intention of truth, of objectivity, of universality of discourse? Therefore, isn't the skeptic's doubt a gesture in a certain sense that is anti-philosophical and anti-scientific? Doesn't it necessarily fall into the liar's paradox? Doubting the world would be like cutting the branch on which I am sitting, waiting for the tree to fall and not the branch. — JuanZu

No, the skeptic's doubt is the way toward truth. This is because we tend to accept statements propositions, etc., as true without proper scrutiny. We often accept conditions such as authority, convention, usefulness, efficiency, as indications of truth. Then these ideas, which we accept not because they've been shown to be true, but for some other pragmatic purpose, become entrenched into our methods, techniques, etc., as habits. The skeptic sees the need to inquire into all these principles which form the basis of these habits, to distinguish good from bad.

Doubting the world is not like cutting the branch which one is sitting on, it is to question whether it is correct to assume that I am sitting on a branch. The difference is that doubting precedes action, and therefore it is very useful in preventing mistaken action, but you portray it as a mistaken action. That's a false representation of the skeptic's doubt.

You don't seem to understand the difference between a closed and an isolated system. — Lionino

I am ready for a descriptive explanation, if you care to give it a go.

Whether a closed or isolated system are physically possible is irrelevant as it is a concept, not a theory, which, like in everything in physics, makes an approximation of reality. — Lionino

So we agree on this, except maybe terminology, you say "concept", I say "theory". Whatever. Now, my point was that if we get swayed by the idea (which is proposed in some metaphysics) that this "approximation of reality", is a representation of what really exists, we will be misled.

The inside of an average-sized black hole may be treated as a closed system when no matter is entering the event horizon, as the Hawking radiation emitted every second or even year is nothing compared to the billions of billions of tons of mass the BH has. — Lionino

Didn't you just say that a closed system is a concept which "makes an approximation of reality"? Why would you now say that a black hole ought to be treated in this way? Do you understand why it was so difficult for ancient astronomers to figure out the true nature of the solar system? It was because they were treating the orbits of the planets as perfect circles rather than as ellipses. This is how the ideals mislead us, and modern science has numerous examples, black bodies, white bodies, etc..

What? Isn't a lab part of nature? — Lionino

No, a lab is not natural, it is artificial, and "natural" is defined as not artificial.

When we need to calculate the voltage a heater/boiler must take, should we not treat the heater as a closed system because supposedly it is not natural? — Lionino

There are energy loses, therefore the system is not truly closed. This is understood under the concept of efficiency.

What energy is lost to entropy? Entropy and energy are different measurements. — Lionino

No system has 100% efficiency, therefore energy is always lost from a system.

2 - closed or isolated system are not theories. There is no theory in physics where it says "there is a (true) closed system", physics does not make existential statements even though it relies on them. Open, closed, isolated system are abstract concepts used to specify the conditions of a system. You could replace those words by ΔE = 0, Δm > 0, Δm = 0, if it helps you solve the exercise faster. — Lionino

So, as I said there is no such thing as a truly closed system. A "closed system" is an ideal which represents nothing natural or artificial, it is a theory only. Not only that, but as I explained, it is impossible for a closed system to actually exist, either naturally or artificially, such a thing is actually impossible. So we must respect this fact, and not allow ourselves to be misled by the idea that a closed system could actually exist.

o? Your inability to see is not my problem. Tell me the illogic. What is wrong with proposing the Universe is created by conscious observation of probability waves? — ken2esq

Let me put it this way. How would a person know oneself to be observing "probability waves"? What are the identifying features of these, so that I can find them in the universe and observe some?

I look out and I see a universe, and I observe this universe. You say, that the universe which I observe has been created by some other consciousness observing probability waves. But you seem to be incapable of telling me what a probability wave is, and how a consciousness could observe one, or a bunch of them.

Tell you what: Google Schroedinger's cat, read up on the concept of probability waves being intrinsic to reality. You seem to be bereft of basic science to claim probability waves are "magic." — ken2esq

It's your theory, so I want to see it explained by you. What type of existence do you think that a probability wave has, and how do you think that a consciousness could observe probability waves? This type of explanation is required so that I can judge the logic of your theory.

It seems to me that there is a confusion about what "measurement" means. When we measure [for our case in the process of wave function collapse] we are not “Becoming aware” of a phenomenon, but rather we are physically intervening in the state of quantum coherence, which causes the collapse of the wave function. Introducing consciousness as the cause of quantum decoherence or wave function collapse is a very common error in interpretations of quantum physics: Transcategorical Error. This error consists of introducing notions and concepts that in fact do not and cannot operate in scientific practice.

That is why, taking the above into consideration, instead of using the notions of consciousness and the like, which are rather confusing, we should prefer to describe the phenomenon as the moment in which an isolated or closed system opens up for the environment to intervene. . This frees us from believing that the physical world is in a state of permanent decoherence waiting to be "perceived" so that it acquires the classical properties of physics. In a certain sense it is like saying that the universe measures itself, but this measurement is nothing more than the moment in which the environment intervenes in a closed and coherent system. — JuanZu

With reference to the title of this thread, "science" in its modern form creates, rather than discovers reality. With this context in mind, we ought to properly respect the fact that the supposed "isolated or closed system" which the physicist produces in some form of laboratory, is completely artificial. This artificial situation is not at all natural, because such closed systems do not actually exist naturally. Furthermore, the assumed closedness of the supposed "closed system" is not real, or a true closure, because there is an issue of how, or where, does the energy which is lost to entropy escape the parameters of "the closed system".

So we can see that the use of this type of assumption, "an isolated or closed system" is problematic in two distinct ways. First, the so-called "closed system" is an artificial arrangement which does not at all represent anything natural. Second, our failed attempts to create such a "closed system" demonstrate to us, through the use of the scientific method and inductive reasoning, that such a theory, that there is a thing which could be known as "an isolated or closed system" has actually been demonstrated to be false. It is impossible within the real physical world that we inhabit, to have a fully "closed system". Therefore we need to be very wary when interpreting observations which reference "an isolated or closed system", because we can be absolutely certain that this is a faulty and untrue concept, the use of which may significantly mislead us.