Then you need to study nuclear physics and the behavior of the quarks in high energy physics. — Dfpolis

Wave mechanics does not explain the behaviour of quarks. I believe the proper terminology is "field theory". And, there are many aspects within quantum field theory which break the laws of wave-type representations, such as those very important aspects known as spontaneous symmetry breaking.

Mass is proportional to the frequency of a quantum in its rest frame. — Dfpolis

This is what I've identified as a self-contradicting concept, 'a quantum of energy in its rest frame'. Ideas like this are what distort and render the concept of mass as completely unrealistic, regardless of whether it's consistent with special relativity. As I explained, "mass", as "relativistic mass", or variable mass, or whatever you want to call it, has become the tool which physicists use to coverup flaws in the theories they apply.

No physical theory has explained the existence of mass. We can explain our observations of the quantity of mass, but existence is a metaphysical problem. It was solved by Aquinas, who concluded that it is contingent on the continuing creative act of God.

I am well aware of the strong force. It is described using wave mechanics. Its range is related to the time an intermediating boson can exist (which is inversely proportional to its mass). That time is calculated using Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation. The same is true of all the forces known to physics. — Dfpolis

So the boson does not explain the existence of the quantity of mass then. Therefore it does not explain the strong force, nor the existence of matter either. Why do you think mass is explained, or described by wave mechanics then?

As I understand it, the colour charge of a gluon cannot represent a wave, because it is solely time-like and non-spatial. It appears like you have stretched your imaginary conception of "wave" far beyond reasonable limits, to include non-spatial conceptions as "waves". Since you say "the same is true of all the forces known to physics", I conclude that none of the forces can actually be described as waves. "Force" is the term used for how things, including waves, interact, but the interaction occurs in a medium between.

The mass of the electron is known with great precision. It is not zero. — Dfpolis

Nor is the mass of a photon zero, "in its rest frame", by your statement above.

Other than displaying the inconsistency in the physicist's use of "mass", you appear to be mainly just circling back now. Unless you want to try and describe to me how you think the concept of the boson, represented as a wave feature, can provide an adequate description for the strong force and the reality of mass, we might be best off to just leave the discussion at this point.

Thanks for the explanation DF. I'll expound a bit on my own perspective, to clarify why I think your idea of "matter waves" is insufficient. Like I explained earlier, the Michelson-Morley type experiments indicate that the medium of electromagnetic waves, and what composes the "matter" of massive bodies is likely one and the same substance. However, I think it is a mistake to characterize an object with mass as a wave activity in this substance.

I know it is true that electrons may simply be represented as waves, and electrons are also designated as having mass, but the quantity of mass of an electron is so tiny relative to the overall mass of a an atom, this need to assign mass to a wave feature (electron) may readily be attributed to possible faults in the mass/energy equivalence theory. It may be the case that it is a mistake to say that an electron has mass. A slight fault in the theory, along with the customary procedure of assigning quantities of mass according to what the theory predicts, would produce the need to assign mass to that wave phenomenon which is called "an electron", when electrons really ought to be represented as pure wave features without any mass.

From this perspective, I'll point to a few spots where I have criticism of your explanation.

So, electrons, an essential constituent of every atom, are waves. Every property previously explained using the particle assumption can be explained by their wave nature. On the other hand, no wave property is explained by the particle assumption. That means the particle hypothesis is falsified. — Dfpolis

This is a conclusion made about electrons only, not the other parts of an atom, being the massive nucleus. So what has been falsified, by your argument, from my perspective, is the theory that electrons are particles with mass. This supports what I have said above, that electrons ought not be represented as having mass, and should be represented entirely as waves. This would imply that the interaction between radiant energy and electric energy is completely an interaction of waves. And it would force the need to further analyze the relationship between the atom's nucleus being expressed with a positive charge, and it's electrons having a negative charge.

The current need to assign mass to the electron appears to be the result of a lack of understanding of the relationship between the massive nucleus and the wave features. I propose that the waves of electromagnetic radiation are affected, altered, by interaction with the nucleus (rather than to conventional representation of an interaction with electrons), making electrons and electromagnetic radiation one wave structure instead of interacting waves, and the characteristics of this wave phenomena is the result of, effect of, the activity/inactivity of the nucleus.

The nucleus causes changes to the electromagnetic field, and vise versa, and we understand these changes as electrons. Accordingly, all electron phenomenon would need to be understood in terms of relations between massive nuclei and electromagnetic field. Radiation would be an extension of this, eliminating the need for complex and unnecessary electron/photon relationships.

We have since found that wave mechanics also applies to protons and neutrons, the constituents of atomic nuclei. Every part of atoms, which constitute both ordinary and ionized matter, behaves like a wave. None is a point particle, or a hard object with a well-defined edge. That physics has nothing more to say about what is vibrating does not mean that the constituents of matter do not oscillate in both space and time in well-defined ways. So, ordinary matter is made of waves. That is what I mean by "matter waves." — Dfpolis

This is where I find the most significant fault with your proposed theory. I believe it is simply not the case that wave mechanics can explain the massive nucleus of an atom. And "mass" is what is most properly related to "matter". Mass is what provides the stability for the temporal continuity of sameness manifesting as "inertia" in common physics. The fact that wave mechanics cannot explain the existence of mass ,may be understood through a glimpse into the mechanics of the strong interactive force. This force accounts for the vast majority of "known" mass, and the rest of "known" mass may be dismissed in the way described above as applicable to the mass of an electron, simplifying calculations. Here's a passage from the Wikipedia article on the strong force. After considering the reality of this force, please reconsider whether you truly believe that the nucleus of an atom can be represented with wave mechanics. If you still do, maybe you can explain it to me.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons (N), no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_interaction

But, if there is no body, why would we expect it to have a well-defined (point) location or arrival time? — Dfpolis

The particle is understood to behave under the principles of Newtonian mechanics. Therefore it has momentum, and mass is a requirement for momentum. And the reality of mass is observed through the effects of gravity which constitutes empirical evidence for the concept of a centre of gravity, therefore a point of location which marks the centre of the mass. When the electron is represented as having mass, then the Newtonian conceptual space applies, including momentum etc.. It has a rest mass, a point of location, an inertial frame applies, and all that follows for a body of mass.

If we rob the electron of its mass, take it away, and deny that it has any mass, then that discrepancy in total mass, and violation to conservation laws needs to be accounted for. But we know from experimental data, and the need for "entropy", that the conservation laws are ideals which are not completely applicable as the true physical reality. And the supposed mass of an electron is so tiny that the only real reason why it is assumed is the need to maintain the conservation laws. Therefore there is no good reason to maintain the principle that an electron has any mass, consequently no reason to represent it as having momentum, or any well-defined point of location. That need is simply the desire to maintain an untrue ideal, the conservation law, and follow traditional conventions of calculation. But it's a misleading path, and like a vector, the further away you get from the starting point, the further you get from the true path.

Since a quantum's energy is proportional to its frequency and its momentum is inversely proportional to its wave length, finite wave packets have neither well-defined energy nor momentum. — Dfpolis

See, the fault here is to assign momentum to a wave. This implies that the electron has mass and a stable, inertial centre required by Newton's first law. But if mass truly converts to wave energy, then the centre point of an electron which is radiating or absorbing wave energy would actually be an unstable, decaying or increasing mass, and this is not consistent with the first law. The atom's mass would decrease as it emits radiation, or increase as it absorbs. Therefore the electron really cannot be represented by the Newtonian mass/inertia/momentum conceptual space.

So, we can transfer this mass to the nucleus, and the instability which exists as the radiation and absorption (interaction) of energy represented as electrons, is in most cases a very minimal instability, as a proportion of the total mass of the atom. However, there are features of the nucleus, which result in the various electron shells for example, which represent critical thresholds in the stability. The key point is that the Newtonian stability assumed by the first law of motion (which is itself an ideal symmetry) must be forfeited in order to adequately account for these minute change to physical bodies, by allowing that changes inherent within and originating within the nucleus, may alter the wave field.

That is exactly what the wave equations do represent. The problem is that you cannot pick the one actual solution out of an infinity of possible solutions without knowing the initial conditions. — Dfpolis

I think that this is incorrect. "Probability" is produced from a comparison of what is known about many instances of particular circumstances, with a statistical analysis of a set of similar particular circumstances. The crucial point is the judgement of "similar". That is why the probabilities of the wave equations do not actually represent the particular circumstances, these probabilities represent a conclusion drawn from numerous particular circumstances, which are categorized as "the same" by a judgement of similar.

Again, there is no "body." — Dfpolis

There is mass, and mass is what constitutes the matter of a body. I strongly believe that wave structures cannot account for the mass of a body, and I will continue to believe that, unless you or someone else, can answer my question above, and show how waves can explain the strong interactive force.

When you say you dont consider yourself to BE something "necessarily", are you speaking of anatman? — Gregory

I suppose that would be one possibility.

Well you got me there Dfpolis, I really don't know what you know so I clearly do not know what I'm talking about. But that's because you're not very forthcoming with your principles. Can you explain how you conceive of a "matter wave"?

I mean don't give me a mathematical formula, give me the principles. How do you make the kinetic energy of a single moving body which necessarily has mass to have kinetic energy, and therefore a center of gravity at a point, consistent with the energy of a wave which is necessarily spread out over an area? The momentum of the body could be provided by an energy equivalence with the energy of the wave, but the uncertainty principle would render the position of such a body, with a determined momentum, as having no determinable location.

I suggest that what is the case, is that data from many similar circumstances is collected to together, and from statistical analysis probabilities are produced. Hence the "matter" wave is better known as a "probability" wave. And, there is no real consistency produced between the energy associated with the mass of a body, and the energy associated with the wave, because the particular wave in the particular set of circumstances is not ever actually represented. All that is represented is the energy of the wave derived from application of theory, and the probability of location, which is a conclusion drawn from the statistical analysis.

So for example, if we make a statistical analysis of the rising of the sun over many years, we can make a very accurate projection of where and when the sun will rise tomorrow. However, this statistical analysis does not represent the movement of the sun relative to the earth, it represents the sun's appearance at a multitude of specified times. The likelihood of where it will appear tomorrow is deduced. Likewise, the statistical analysis used to produce the probability wave (matter wave) does not represent the movement of the supposed underlying wave, it represents the locations of a multitude of instances of the detection of a body with mass.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the uncertainty relation between momentum and location is overcome in that way. The momentum is derived from wave observations and theories of energy equivalence. And the position is determined by probabilities derived from statistical analysis. But what is represented by the statistical analysis, as the "probability" or "matter" wave, is not a wave at all. It is not a representation of the wave, because it represents possible locations of the body with mass. The wave is actually represented by what is on the other side of the uncertainty relation, the momentum of the body.

They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. — Dfpolis

The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. A description of the medium, and the restrictions placed on potential wave movement due to the composition of the medium, or substance which the wave exists in, is replaced with "degrees of freedom". Even if we assume real underlying waves, as what is being described, not one of these equations can provide an adequate description of what is going on, because the "degrees of freedom" are formulated according to the circumstances rather than according to an understanding of the medium itself, and the restrictions intrinsic to the nature of that medium. That's why a synthesis of many such equations is required for quantum field theory, to account for the various ways of determining degrees of freedom.

Furthermore, the fact that a representation of a temporal continuity may be produced which is very similar to how waves would appear if represented in this way, is insufficient evidence to make the deductive conclusion that waves are being represented. This is because the essence of "waves", by definition, is "disturbance in a substance", and that is not what is represented by those equations which describe degrees of freedom. Simply, the substance has not been identified.

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures. — Dfpolis

This is where we disagree. "Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. They are mathematical descriptions without substance, as Wayfarer describes above. So they are descriptive 'forms', not the 'matter' of physical bodies, evidenced by the fact that they only reference the possibility of a body. Saying that matter is wave structures is like saying that matter is a collection of properties. But this annihilates the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, and leaves the collection of properties without substance.

I believe that what you are proposing is a simple Pythagorean idealism. As such, it suffers from the interaction problem. Like I explained, the ideals (symmetries) of the wave structures, if they were the real matter, could not possibly interact with the world of physical bodies which we observe in experience. This interaction problem has two principal manifestations in quantum physics, first the problem of nonlocal causation, and second, the need to assume random chance activities.

The solution I outlined is the need to identify the true substance of the waves, the medium which is waving, as the proper "matter" which the wave structures are the formal representation of. Without identifying this substance as "the matter", the "wave structures" representation will always suffer from this interaction problem.

Further analysis of the wave function representation will show the interaction problem involved with this type of idealism much more clearly. Space is represented as points in a coordinate system. Because each point is represented as having commuting observables, uncertainty is inherent within the representation of each point of the space represented. The uncertainty is represented by the Fourier transform, as the fundamental inability to accurately determine spatial activity (frequency) over a duration of time. This uncertainty leaves a gap between the mathematical ideals of representation, and what is actually occurring in the space being represented. It is an "interaction problem" because the ideals employed have incorporated within themselves, the inability to accurately represent the spatial-temporal relation (the uncertainty of the Fourier transform), and therefore cannot provide the means for bridging this gap. In other words "the ideals" are compromised to allow uncertainty to inhere within them, rendering them as less than ideal.

The difference between the representation of the Fourier transform, and what is actually happening in the physical reality can be approached here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_mechanics

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here. — Dfpolis

OK, in truth, I forgot the topic. I'll have to reread the op, because the title doesn't seem quite consistent with the op.

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. — Dfpolis

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". "Potential", as the Aristotelian defining feature of matter is insufficient because the wave functions are clearly understood as referring to forms, actualities, therefore not consistent with Aristotelian "matter". And "mass", as the defining feature of matter in conventional physics is obviously insufficient. So the only way to represent what the wave function refers to as something material, is to produced an intentionally designed definition of matter.

This violates your statement in the op:

Since physics has no intentional effects (despite wishful thinking), it cannot effect intentional operations. — Dfpolis

Obviously, the physics of wave functions has effected the way you look at matter, and influenced you to create an intentionality driven conception of "matter". Physics has affected your intentions, such that you conceptualize "matter" in a way such that you may call these waves "matter waves", when in reality wave functions are formal structures, consisting of ideals which have no true bearing on "matter" by convention conceptions of matter.

You even alter the definition of "physics" to suit your purpose. Instead of the conventional definition, as the discipline which deals with the interactions of matter and energy, which refers to real particular instances of interaction, you define it as dealing with "changes in space and time". Space and time are universals, abstractions which may or may not have been derived from the discipline of physics.

So you actually reverse the role of the discipline. Instead of recognizing that physics is the science of particulars, instances of matter and energy, you cast it as the science of the universal abstractions, space and time. In reality though, metaphysics is the discipline which deals with such abstractions.

This is hardly a problem when we realize that both physics and mathematics are based on abstractions -- which is to say they are the result of attending to some aspects of reality while ignoring others. — Dfpolis

This mischaracterizing of "physics" is evident here in the op. Physics is not based in abstractions. It is an empirical science, based in particular instances of observation, from which abstractions may be logically induced and deduced. This is a very significant difference ontologically, and consequently epistemologically, which you ought to respect.

When you respect this difference, you will understand that abstractions, universals, and ideals, are necessarily prior to any empirical science, as the means by which the particular instances of the physical world, are grasped and understood by the intellect within the activities of the empirical sciences. The faculty of the intellect, or soul which produces these abstraction cannot be an empirical science like physics, because these abstractions are necessarily prior to the activities of those science. The empirical science must not be allowed to be based in the abstractions themselves, or else the objectivity of the science will be overcome by the subjectivity of the abstraction. The science therefore is based in the particular instances of observation, and this may be used to override the preexisting (therefore prejudiced) abstractions

So for example, the scientific method is said to proceed from hypotheses to try them in experimentation. These hypotheses are necessarily prior to the method of sciences which seeks validate them, therefore they are not themselves "scientific". That word can only be affixed posteriorly, after they been tested through experimentation. Therefore the hypotheses must be produced through some other means than science. And if you look into this, you will discover that the production of such hypotheses is very much purpose directed, driven by intentionality. The science itself though, must be based in the particular instances of observation, in order that it may be used to rid the abstractions of subjective prejudice.

Once we realized that abstractions are not reality, things become easier. There is no reason to think that the laws of mindless matter should apply without modification to thinking beings. — Dfpolis

This statement then becomes rather ironic. The "modification to thinking beings" which you recommend turns out to be the need to dismiss the proposition which leads to this, "abstractions are not reality". Once it is realized that abstractions are at the very base of our understanding, prior to observation, as the means by which observation is made, we must realize that abstractions are the only reality which we have, and everything else is understood in relation to this assumed reality. When observation indicates mistakes within "reality" (being the abstractions) modification of reality is required.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions.

Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment. — Dfpolis

Without an underlying substance which is waving (the proposed aether for example), these are not real "waves", and cannot constitute matter. Being "ideal", there is no representation for the accidents of "matter". There is simply "uncertainty", with no matter/form distinction to isolate the uncertain aspects from the certain. The result is that uncertainty permeates the entire conceptual structure. It's a type of formalism whereby the content is incorporated right into the form, to produce the illusion that the conceptual structure is entirely formal, thereby eliminating the unintelligible content (matter), but this is just an illusion. In reality though, the unintelligibility of content (matter) is incorporated right into the form from the premises, allowing it to permeate the entire conceptual structure as uncertainty.

You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. It would seem like physics allows contradiction then. "Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. Allowing contradiction into the premises by premising a wave with no medium, is what allows uncertainty to permeate. "Matter" as the designator of the unintelligible is lost as being incorporated into the form.

Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them. — Dfpolis

Now we have ambiguity as to what "mass" is. In some cases it's the property of a body, and in other cases, it's "a quantity associated with them". This is further evidence of allowing the unintelligible into the premises as the result of formalism. What does that "quantity" represent then, if it is not a property of a body?

It seems like "mass" has become just a variable, a number assigned arbitrarily, but according to rules, to make the equations balance. What is the mass in X set of circumstances? It is whatever quantity is required to balance out the equation. No wonder symmetries are all over the place, they are created whenever desired, by assigning a quantity for "mass" which is required for upholding a symmetry. "Mass" is based in nothing other than the quantity required to fulfill the needs of the physicist. to maintain the invariance prescribed by laws such as conservation laws and the invariance of the speed of light in relativity.

You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what I argued in another thread recently, "Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false". But your stated conclusion "that the measured speed of light is invariant", is equally inaccurate. What the experiments demonstrate is that the substance of the physical body, and the substance of the aether, are not distinct substances, but they must be one and the same substance. The experiments involved a very narrow range of type of physical body, so there is insufficient evidence to extend the supposed invariance to other types of bodies, like atoms and the parts of atoms, and in the other direction, galaxies and large things like that.

No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle. — Dfpolis

Conjugate variables are the pairs which bear the uncertainty relation of the Fourier transform. It is because of this uncertainty relation prescribed by the Fourier transform, that the relation has the name you gave it . Energy, as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", denotes an uncertainty relation. According to "Quora", this is what ChatGPT said"

Why are energy and time complementary variables in quantum mechanics?
Profile photo for ChatGPT
ChatGPT
In quantum mechanics, energy and time are described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that the more precisely the position of a particle is known, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and vice versa. The same applies to energy and time, where the more precisely the energy of a particle is known, the less precisely its time can be known, and vice versa. This is due to the wave-like nature of particles in quantum mechanics, where a particle can exist in multiple states simultaneously until it is measured, at which point it collapses into a single state. The uncertainty principle is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics and is a result of the wave-particle duality of matter.

So, yes it is true that defining energy as ""the dynamic variable conjugate to time" puts "energy" into a wider context, just like defining "hot" as the opposite of cold puts "hot" into a wider context, but you now need to respect the context which you have placed "energy" into. You have placed it into the context of having any uncertainty relation with time, as determined by the Fourier transform. This is unlike the certainty relation created by defining "hot" as the opposite of cold. If it is hot it is not cold, is a relation of certainty created by that definition.

Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy. — Dfpolis

Violations of conservation of energy are detected anytime an experiment is carried out. All of the energy can never be accounted for. There is always a quantity which is lost as time passes. Within a "system", the energy loss may be written off to entropy, and then some people might assume that the energy remains within the system but is unavailable to it. But this is not actually implied, the energy is simply lost. And, it's rather nonsensical, to think that the energy is still in the system when it has been lost to the system. To support the nonsense one might simply adjust the amount of mass assumed to be in the system so that it appears like conservation is upheld. That's the problem with mass being an associated quantity rather than a property of a body, the quantity may be variable, and allowed to be manipulated so as to conform to the theory, providing for the appearance of symmetry.

But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do. — Dfpolis

Are we adhering to Aristotelian terms or not? What is represented is always form. "Matter" names the aspect of a thing which does not enter into the understanding. Science produces a formal understanding, and there is always something at the bottom which escapes the formalization, this is the "matter".

However, the modern conception of "matter" has been altered by Newton's laws which name "mass" as a property of matter. But properties must be formal. This move by Newton allows the unintelligibility of "matter" into the formal representation, an example of the problem with formalism which I explained. Now the unintelligibility inheres within the concept "mass". Further, an equivalence has been established between mass and energy by means of Einsteinian relativity and the supposed invariance of the speed of light, such that the unintelligibility of matter, through the means of the concept of "mass" manifests as the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle.

We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect. — Dfpolis

Symmetries are not imperfect. I am not saying that symmetries are imperfect. What I am saying is that they are ideal, and represent nothing real in the natural, physical world, due to the assumed perfection of the ideal. Current use of "symmetry" is analogous to the ancient law of perfect circular motion criticized by Aristotle in "On the Heavens". Aristotle demonstrated how a thing moving in a circular motion must be a body, and the body must consist of matter, and by this fact it is generated and corrupted, therefore not eternal. So what was demonstrated is that as much as eternal circular motion is logically consistent, and therefore a real logical possibility, the reality of matter in the physical world makes this ideal physically impossible. There must be something material, corruptible involved in that activity, rendering the eternality as impossible, therefore the entire concept as a false representation for anything real.

The very same thing is the case for modern symmetries. The "invariance" described by the laws is ideal and logically consistent, but not truly representative of, or corresponding with, the physical reality of material existence. This problem is covered by Hume's discussion of the incompleteness of induction. The laws of physics have limits to their applicability such that the "invariance" implied by them is not a true, or real representation, because it breaks down at these limits, and the idea that "invariance" is a true or real aspect of the physical world is a faulty conclusion drawn from the fact that the range of applicability appears to be broad, and everything outside this range is ignored. This issue with the supposed "invariance" of the laws of physics is explained well by physicist Lee Smolin, in his book "Time Reborn"

You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact. — Dfpolis

The above paragraph ought to demonstrate that this is incorrect. The laws which describe the way that things interact suffer from Hume's problem of induction. And, the invariance presumed, which makes the law a "law" is evidenced only by observations made within the confines of the limits of applicability of the law (ref. Smolin). The invariance, therefore symmetry, of these ideal laws, is not a true representation of the way that things actually do interact.

And it's not a matter of some interactions are consistent with the laws and some are outside the laws. What is the case, is that all interactions have aspects which partake of the extremely micro, and aspects which partake of the extremely macro, so all interactions have aspects which fall outside the range of applicability of the laws. This means that the symmetry expressed as "a property of the way things interact" is not a true representation of any interaction at all, just like an eternal circular motion is not a true representation of any motion at all.

A good example is the law of conservation of energy which you mentioned. Empirical data, observational evidence indicates that energy is never completely conserved in any interaction. This means that any symmetry derived from application of this law is not a true representation, because energy is not actually conserved.

The obvious implication is that we need to determine why energy is never completely conserved in order to have a true understanding of the nature of material existence. The faulty conclusion is that this slight imperfection in the law is simply a difference which does not make a difference. To identify something as a difference, and then insist that it hasn't made a difference is contradictory. Therefore we need to take account of these slight imperfections which demonstrate that the ideal symmetries do not truthfully represent material existence.

I'm not a physicist or topologist, so I'm not qualified to argue the question of "faulty deduction". Are you? — Gnomon

Deductions are logic, which is part of the discipline of philosophy, not physics. Philosophers are trained to determine whether deductions are faulty or not. So if a physicist makes a faulty deduction, being poorly trained in philosophy, it is the task of the philosopher to identify the faulty deduction and bring it to the attention of the physicist.

Are you suggesting that physical symmetry --- or its "application" to philosophy --- violates some higher rule of reality? — Gnomon

I am suggesting that the symmetries of physics are highly useful principles (like my analogy of perfect circular motion which is eternal, was highly useful thousands of years ago, and variations actually remain in many concepts employed in physics), but they are ideals which do not truthfully represent anything existing naturally. So, when we take these ideals, and try to represent them as what is fact, or true in nature, or reality, we are making a mistake of misunderstanding the true nature of reality, which has none of these symmetries in any part of its existence.

Does physical symmetry have a philosophical role in the Dualism vs Monism question? :smile: — Gnomon

Ideals such as "symmetry" play a key role in demonstrating the interaction problem. If way say that a symmetry such as perfect circular motion is in any way a real part of the physical material world, then that perfect symmetry is necessarily isolated from the rest of the world. If it interacted with the material , world which does not consist of those perfections, in any way, the symmetry would, by that interaction, be broken. So, for example, the body engaged in the perfect (ideal) circular motion described by Aristotle would necessarily be eternal. If that body interacted with anything else in the world this would break the perfection of the circle, altering the body, and rendering the whole concept as not applicable. Therefore if these ideal symmetries described anything real within the world, the real things described by them could not be interacting with anything else in the world.

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. — Dfpolis

The uncertainty principle is not so simple. What I believe is that the concept of "mass" incorporates the unintelligibility of "matter" into the formal description of a body. "Mass" as representing "matter" is something unintelligible, which is disguised as being understood in the conceptual structure. When compatibility between mass and electromagnetic radiation is attempted, the limits to our capacity for understanding rapid wave activity described by the uncertainty relation derived from the Fourier transform, is transferred, implanted, and disguised in the unintelligibility inherent within the concept "mass". The uncertainty produced by our limited capacity to understand these waves, is absorbed into the unintelligibility of "mass", hence the tendency to think of waves as particles, particles being understood as things with mass. So the uncertainty is more properly assigned to the attitude of thinking that bodies have mass.

Yes, but not the ontology of quantum waves. — Dfpolis

Quantum waves, or more properly called "wave functions" are ideals, mathematical constructs. They have no physical existence. We ought to start with this clearly stated.

It makes perfect since once you realize that the electrons and nucleons composing atoms are waves. — Dfpolis

I accept that the electrons and nucleons of atoms are composed of waves. The problem is that physicists tend to represent these as bodies with mass. And then of course there are the quantum waves which you refer to above. These so-called waves are ideal constructs composed of mathematical axioms. So, there is an interaction problem between the bodies with mass representation, and the ideal (immaterial) waves representation. The solution I proposed is to determine the substance which the waves that compose electromagnetism, as well as electrons and nucleons, exist in. This would allow us to speak of waves with physical existence. Then all activities, electromagnetism and the activities of massive objects, would be activities of the same substance.

They underlie the classical understanding, not our quantum understanding. Now we understand that energy depends on the frequency at which elementary structures vibrate. E = h where h is Planck's constant and is the frequency. — Dfpolis

Nice try Df, but Planck's law is based in the emission of electromagnetic radiation from bodies (black-body radiation). This is the activity of a body with mass, not the activity of waves. The simple fact of the matter is that physicists do not have the required theories, or principles, to measure the energy of wave activity directly, without converting this energy to the activity of a physical body. And, like I've been explaining, this is done through the precepts of relativity theory which pays no respect for the true medium, or substance, which the waves and the bodies are a part of. Instead, it dogmatically imposes unsubstantiated ideals, like the constant speed of light.

Now we understand energy as the dynamic variable conjugate to time. — Dfpolis

I understand this, it is derived from the Fourier transform. And, our inability to make measurements of high energy in a very short period of time is the reason for the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle, in general.

However, stating that energy is understood as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", does not in any way state what energy is. That's like saying "hot" is understood as the opposite of cold, that says nothing about what hot is. The only difference in your expression is that you use fancy jargon to make it look like you're saying something important.

Nonetheless observation is the basis of all human knowledge. — Dfpolis

This is the physicalist perspective, and the perspective of scientism, the idea that observation is the basis of knowledge. "Observation" is understood as the collection of data from external sources through the use of sensation. The alternative perspective is that internal experience is the basis of all knowledge. If we compromise and say that both are a requirement for "knowledge" as we know it, then we can't say either one is the basis of all human knowledge.

Still, that is very approximately conserved is a real feature of nature and points to nearly perfect time-translation symmetry. — Dfpolis

OK, you may call it "nearly perfect", but "nearly" is a subjective judgement. So, do you agree then, that a good ontology must respect this fact, that natural things are not perfect, as sometimes modeled, but are actually "nearly perfect". This is represented by Aristotle as the reality of accidents. The material world which we represent with forms, formal models etc., is not actually as we represent it because we cannot represent the material aspect. All we have as representation is forms, and "matter" refers to those accidents which always escape the formal representation.

They point to real features of nature. — Dfpolis

What they point to, is the fact that the real features of nature are not perfect symmetries, as modeled. You might say, reality is "nearly" like it is modeled, but to me that is just an admission that it is not like it is modeled. And if it is not like it is modeled, then the models are wrong, the theories and principles need to be revisited, and improved upon.

That symmetries are properties does not mean that they do not exist. It only means that they do not have independent existence. — Dfpolis

This is exactly the point of the interaction problem. Symmetries are perfectly ideal balances, just like the eternal circular motion described by Aristotle. If that perfect ideal has any interaction with anything else, then by that very interaction, it loses its status as a perfectly ideal balance. Therefore these ideals cannot play any role in the real physical world, because they could no longer be perfectly ideal.

So, what I explained about designating these symmetries as properties, is that they cannot be properties, because a property is only a part of the thing it is a property of. And anything which is a part of something else, has some sort of interaction with the rest of that thing. So it is impossible that a part could be a symmetry because this interaction would break the symmetry. By the very fact that a part has a relationship of interaction with the thing that it is a part of, the proposal that the part is a symmetry is made impossible. Therefore it is impossible that symmetries are properties.

es. Symmetries are not observed, but deduced. Like constellations in the sky, the inferred patterns are mental, not material ; subjective, not objective. It's good to be aware of that distinction when engaged in metaphysical discussions. Symmetries are, however, handy tools for mathematical analysis of topological transformations. — Gnomon

If these symmetries were deductions, then they would be faulty deductions, just like the ancient ideal that the orbits of the planets were perfect circles, therefore eternal circular motions. However, I do not think that such things are deductions. I think that they are mathematical principles or axioms which are not properly applied. So they are handy tools, as you say, but when they are applied where they ought not be applied, they become misleading.

Philosophically, I agree that waves are modifications of something; however, saying that contributes nothing to the goal of physics, which is to describe the behavior, and not the ontology, of physical systems. For physics, it is enough that the waves can be described in space and time. If a hypothesis about what they modified, say that it was made of particles or strings, led to a better description, then it would be relevant to physics. — Dfpolis

This is incorrect. If you take any time to study the physics of waves, you'll know that waves cannot be described simply by space and time. A wave is an activity of the particles of a substance. This is Physics 101.

Furthermore, the subject of the thread is an ontological topic, so an appeal like 'it's enough for physics' has little if any bearing on the subject of the thread, which would be whether it's enough for metaphysics. There is no logic to the implied premise, that if it is outside the goal of physics it is not significant to the ontological subject of the thread.

This misconceives measurement. The instruments are also wave structures. — Dfpolis

Again, this is blatantly wrong, and I'm sure you know it. Energy is not measured by waves structures, it is measured by electrical voltage. And calculations are done in terms of inertial frames and "rest mass" which is essential. These are concepts of classical mechanics of bodies, not waves. I'm sure you know this, and this is why I was so frustrated by your refusal to attempt to justify your claim, and the reference to a higher education. It's as if you believe that a high education can magically make what you know to be false claims, true. What kind of instruments are understood to be wave structures?

I greatly appreciate your perspective, and I would probably agree if you said that the instruments and their measurements ought to be represented as wave structures. But they simply are not, under the principles and theories currently employed. So it doesn't make sense to claim that they are, and it would make a lot more sense to look at the reasons why they are not. And the reason is that we understand energy and all movement in terms of massive bodies existing in space, and the movement of light waves is understood as relative to that fundamental understanding. So the movement of massive bodies is foundational, and the movement of light waves is layered on top as relative to this. So the certainty of this understanding of light waves is dependent on the certainty of the theories which relate it to the foundation, the movement of massive bodies, and ultimately the foundation itself, our understanding of the movement of massive bodies.

You might insist that these concepts are archaic, and even be able to demonstrate how problems arising from the theories which relate the activity of light waves to the activity of massive bodies indicates that the foundational understanding of the activity of massive bodies is deeply flawed, but still it's simple fact that these are the concepts which underly our understanding of energy. None other are employed. Even a quantum of wave energy, a photon, must be assigned a "relativistic mass" to make the wave energy consistent with he momentum of moving bodies. This is because "energy" as a concept is fundamentally a property of the momentum of mass (kinetic energy being 1/2mv2).

Symmetries are observed in nature. — Dfpolis

Symmetries are not observed in nature. Each thing that we observe as a near-symmetry is not actually a symmetry, which is an ideal balance. Laws are artificial, and created as universals so your examples are irrelevant. That the Pythagorean theory is true here, and also over there, does not indicate the existence of a natural symmetry because these laws are artificial and intended to state something universal. Natural things are particular, and there is an interaction problem involved with trying to demonstrate how the particular partakes of the universal.

It does not because physical symmetries are not interacting things, but properties of interactions of things. — Dfpolis

Exactly, properties do not exist independently of the things that they are properties of, except as abstractions in the mind. Natural, "interacting things" do not exist as symmetries, the mind creates the symmetries in an attempt to understand these things. But the artificial symmetry does not grasp the accidentals which inhere within the thing, so that the natural things do not actually exist as symmetries.

To explain this in a different way, let's say that "a property" is a part of a thing, but not the whole thing. We represent the property as a symmetry. But that representation does not show how the property is related to, or inheres within the thing itself. Since the property is a part of the thing, and is necessarily connected to the thing, as it does not exist independently, there is something more to the property which is not represented by the symmetry, i.e. how it is connected to the thing. This "something more" necessarily breaks the symmetry as the means by which the assumed symmetry must be united to the whole. This indicates that symmetries simply do not exist naturally.

OK, but I was using the term "coin-flipping" metaphorically, not literally. Einstein used the similar metaphor of God playing dice, to ridicule the quantum evidence that Nature is inherently indeterminate*1*2. Also, I was not talking about un-natural Random Number Generators. Instead, I was referring to the innate Quantum Indeterminacy that provoked Heisenberg to define his Uncertainty Principle in terms of statistical Probability*3. — Gnomon

My point still stands, all known instances of random chance occurrences are artificially created. Something natural may appear to be a random occurrence, but a claim to know it to be a random occurrence could not stand up to epistemological scrutiny. This is because the reason why the occurrence is designated as random, is that its cause is unknown. And "unknown cause" does not justify "no cause", or randomness. From the position of not knowing the cause we cannot conclude that there is no cause.

Artificially, we can create the conditions for chance occurrences, the coin flip, the dice roll, etc.. Likewise, in a lab we can sufficiently isolate the conditions as required to produce an approximation of a symmetry. But all of these are not naturally occurring situations, they are fabricated. The randomness of the coins and dice dependent on the design, and the lab-created symmetry depends on the lab. Therefore these instances do nothing to support the claim that there could be an independent, natural random chance occurrence.

Since you found my implication that Nature is not rigidly Deterministic problematic, are you a strict classical Determinist*4 like Einstein? — Gnomon

No, I'm definitely not rigidly deterministic. I just find that the method you use to reach your conclusion is deeply flawed.

@Dfpolis
Quantum field theory and the standard model of particles are composed of immaterial ideals which have no direct correspondence in the physical world. If you have the education you claim, you know this. The truth of this is evidenced by the reality assigned to symmetry in the models, when such symmetries are simply not discovered in nature. Symmetries are ideals which may be artificially synthesized to an extent, in a lab, but have no true occurrence in the natural world.

The interaction problem involves the question of how such ideals could interact with the true natural physical world which we live in. And this manifests as the problem of how the ideal world of symmetries described by the standard model could interact with the world of material bodies which we live in. The proposed solution, random chance symmetry breaking, suffers the problem I described in my response to Gnomon above. There is nothing in our experience of living in the world of material bodies, which would indicate that nature consists of any sort of random chance generator. Such implements are all known to be artificially created.

I agree that our subjective "mode of understanding" is suspect, but in the expression "natural fact", I was referring to the scientific evidence that Nature is inherently statistical (random chance) in its fundamental behaviors*1. Some might interpret the statistical nature of waveforms as a sign that coin-flipping Luck is a feature of natural processes. Hence, a smidgen of doubt smudged the surety of classical physics. — Gnomon

The whole idea that coin-flipping is evidence of natural random chance is fundamentally flawed. The production of this random chance type of event is intentionally designed, as are all examples of such random chance generators, so these examples do nothing to support the claim of naturally occurring random chance events.

So nobody is "blaming the object" ; merely accepting that statistical probabilistic uncertainty is inherent intrinsic immanent in physical Nature. — Gnomon

This is a faulty conclusion, based in the unsound premise described above, that there could be a naturally occurring generator of random chance events.

This is not the place to argue this. Let's just say that my education puts me in a better position to judge. — Dfpolis

Again, I disagree. Instead of addressing the valid points I brought up, points which are very relevant to the subject, "interactionism", you retort with an implied 'you're wrong because I'm more highly educated than you'. You demonstrate childishness rather than education, and that's why I disagree with your claim "my education puts me in a better position to judge". If you really have the education which you claim, you could very easily show me why you think I'm wrong. Therefore I conclude that whatever education you do have, indicates to you that you are actually wrong, and you have not the gumption to address this problem.

No, they do not. They generate the light pulses we call photons, which have a finite duration in order to have a well-defined frequency (because of the uncertainty principle). So, we can tell how long the transitions take. Further, the transitions are much better described as wave phenomena than as particle phenomena. The electrons in each level have a well-defined energy and so a well-defined frequency. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that without a medium (aether or whatever), a substance to support this so-called "wave phenomena", it is fundamentally immaterial. There is no substance to these supposed waves, no material to their existence, The wave function is simply an immaterial, mathematical representation. And all it represents is something like the probabilities of how that supposed immaterial activity might interact with a material body. Clearly, what we have here is an interaction problem between the immaterial waves (with no material substance), and the material bodies (instruments of measurement).

C. If the universe produced us, and we have purposes, then nature already obviously does create purpose. In a rather straightforward way, plungers are for unclogging toilets, hearts are for pumping blood, etc. Any comprehensive theory of the world needs to explain these, not deny them. If hearts don't have a purpose in the way plungers or corporations do, we need to be able to explain the similarities and differences in terms of something we DO understand, not claim the difference is in presence or lack "of purpose," the very thing we want to understand. That's just circular, question begging, and dogmatic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think the problem you are demonstrating is that if you switch to "universal purpose", you need to adjust your premises accordingly. You can no longer talk about nature creating purpose, because nature would be created with purpose, therefore purpose would be prior to nature, and not the type of thing which nature creates. Then we need to look at intention as it is evident to us, within ourselves, as an example of it, in order to understand it in the universe in general.

We can see that there is a problem with looking at the object created with intention and trying to determine the intention behind its creation. This is because of the nature of the "necessity" involved in this relation. It is not a logical "necessity", but "necessity" in the sense of what is determined as needed, for the sake of something else, and that judgement may be carried out without the use of logic. Also, the object created may be used in a way other than the way intended by the creator, and this is evidence of that problem.

So we might refer to the "accidentals" of things created with intention. The reality of accidentals ensures that there is no logical necessity in the relationship between the intent and the thing created with that intent. Therefore logic does not provide us with the means for understanding the intention or purpose behind a thing, from an analysis of the thing produced with intention. Accordingly, we cannot understand the intent or purpose behind the universe, or nature in general, through a study of these as objects.

However, if we look at intention directly, as it exists within us, we can see this lack of logical necessity from the other side, from the side of intention itself, and it appears to us as free will. When we have a goal or objective we may consider numerous options for achieving that end. There is no direct and logically necessary relationship between means and ends, and this is why we presume the reality of free will. We may choose our means. Furthermore, the end or goal, as what is desired or needed, is never fixed but is adaptable and may be manipulated according the apprehension of available means. This implies that both means and ends are flexible.

That the ends are flexible has a considerable effect when we attempt to understand the intention from the point of view of analyzing the intentionally created object. Because the artist may adapt the goal to be suitable to the means available, the object created may be not a very good representation of the true intention, as the original ideal, but a representation of a very compromised form of the intention.

Do you conceive of, or define "you" and "we" as something? — Fooloso4

Not necessarily.

"Survival of the fittest," works well for all sorts of things we don't think of as living. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When you consider that "survival" in evolution theory refers to the species, which is a type, rather than to individuals, this becomes even more evident. The stability of molecules for example, is the reason why the periodic table of elements is arranged in the way that it is. Specific types of molecules are more apt to survive.

The problem though, is that life likes to make use of instability, as instability provides for the special capacities which living things enjoy. This means that survival, and having special capacities to be able to enjoy being alive, are two distinct ends, which at the fundamental level must be very much in confliction. I suppose this is why risk-taking is exhilarating.

Evolutionary theory therefore, ought to take into account both of these two conflicting purposeful features of being alive, modeling evolution as a sort of balancing process. And by being an imperfect balance, employing the instability which is available within its own being, life is allowed to extend itself towards a multitude of different types of enjoyment, which it discovers through its journeys. Current conventional evolutionary theory is very one-sided, representing stability only, as survival, and this is not at all representative of what it means to be alive. This is because it completely misses what it means to enjoy being alive, and the enjoyment of being alive is what drives the will to survive.

That there is something is a necessary condition for speculating about nothingness. — Fooloso4

Not necessarily, because it depends on how you would conceive of, or define, "something". It's possible that all that is does not fit the criteria of "something".

:clap:

So, the "appearance" of subatomic (i.e. fundamental) Uncertainty and Unpredictability appears to be a natural fact. :cool: — Gnomon

"Appears to be a natural fact", doesn't get us anywhere. it always appeared to be a natural fact, but that's irrelevant. The fact is that "uncertainty" is a property of the subject, not the object. And, it is always caused by the subject's mode of understanding not being properly suited to the reality of the object which it is attempting to apprehend. It makes no sense to blame the object here, therefore the subject's mode of understanding needs to be scrutinized.

Uncertainty principle :
It states that there is a limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, can be simultaneously known. — Gnomon

There's obviously a basic problem here. If something is moving it cannot truthfully be said to have a position. And if something has a position it cannot truthfully be said to be moving. Since only moving things can have momentum, a thing which has a position cannot also have momentum.

Therefore it appears very obvious that this type of "uncertainty" is the result of a faulty human ontology which allows the contradictory premise that a moving thing has a position, or the converse, that a thing with a position could be moving. Clearly the uncertainty here is the result of faulty concepts.

Could you clarify, are you saying subjectivity is fundamental to what organisms are or what is fundamental to what organisms are is subjectivity? In other words, are you simply defining what is fundamental to organisms as subjectivity or stating that what organisms are has the fundamental quality of subjectivity? — kudos

Consider this, quantum mechanics demonstrates to us the real existence of possibilities in the physical world. However, quantum mechanics does not provide for us the means for understanding the subjective capacity to choose from possibilities. This subjective capacity, to choose from possibilities available, is demonstrated by even the most basic life forms.

Argues that organic life is qualitative from the get go, that the processes embodied in organic molecules already transcend the bounds of physical causation. — Wayfarer

That's right, the organization inherent within organic molecules extends to the most fundamental levels of the physical parts of these molecules. This implies that the cause of this type of organization is itself not physical.

Okay, absolute nothingness is either a thing or not. If it is a thing, it is self-contradictory, and thus cannot exist. If it is not a thing, it cannot exist (by my earlier definition). Thus, absolute nothingness cannot exist no matter what. So, something exists, right? — Ø implies everything

I think you need to recognize distinct uses for "thing". This makes "thing" have a much wider range of usage than that outlined by your definition when you say "if it is not a thing, it cannot exist". So we might recognize that as well as things which exist, there is also things which do not exist. Consequently we talk about all sorts of fictional (non-existent) "things", as well as concepts as "things, and so on. Now as much as it may be true that "if it is not a thing, it cannot exist", there are also many "things" which do not exist.

Therefore we can say that "absolute nothingness" is such a thing. It is a "thing" in the sense of being a concept. And whether or not it is self-contradictory cannot be judged in the way you propose, because it would be required to determine what "nothingness" means in that context of the qualifying term "absolute". So far, I see nothing to indicate that the concept of "absolutely no thing" is self-contradictory, unless we stipulate that all concepts are necessarily things.

And if this is the case, I think we'd be better off to describe it as a type of hypocrisy rather than as self-contradiction. We'd have the proposition of "all concept are things" as a premise, and also we'd have a concept of "absolutely no thing". By that premise, the concept itself is a thing, and this would prove that the proposed concept does not state something true about reality, but it could still present us with a possible situation. However, we could truthfully state that under no circumstances could the description of "absolutely no thing" be true under this premise, because this would be a case of trying to do what the stipulated premise makes impossible. Notice though, that such stipulations don't render the described action as impossible, they only stipulate that it ought not be done. And doing what is contrary to what we state that we ought to do, is hypocrisy.

The further problem though, is that hypocrisy is very real, and actually occurs regularly. Therefore concluding that it would be hypocritical to hold as true, the concept of "absolutely no thing", does not prove that the concept is false. It may simply be the case that the premises which produce this conclusion are false. So we'd have to revisit the premises to see why the stipulated rule could be broken in a hypocritical way. Then we'd see that "all concepts are things" is not at all sound, and we'd discover that the hypocrisy is allowed for by this false premise. We can actually produce a concept which is not a thing.

That's why this type of argument does absolutely nothing for us.

That's definitely not what truth is. Science makes use of language where truths are inherently pragmatic and goal-orientated. We can test the "effectiveness of X" or "compare the effectiveness of X and Y". It might be true that method X is effective if it fulfils the objective, and true that another method is superior because it can be done faster and more cheaply. We want methods that better accomplish our many goals, such as being more environmentally friendly or safer for workers and so on. — Judaka

The cause/effect relationship between means and ends deserves analysis. The basic representation is as you outline here, methods are employed as the means for achieving the goals, ends. So there is a cause/effect relation whereby the means are the efficient cause of the ends. However, there is obviously an inverse relation whereby the goals are the cause of the coming into being of the means, as the means are judged as what is needed to achieve the desired end. This is known as the causal affect of intention, final cause. So for example, if "truth" is the goal or end of the scientific method, then "truth" as an ideal (the desire for truth), as such, is the cause (final cause) of the coming into being of the scientific method. The scientific method is then represented as the potential cause (efficient cause) of truth, and may be judged as to whether it actually causes truth, based on the successfulness of its outcomes, results, in relation to the guiding end, which was the ideal, "truth".

Now, when we understand this inversible relationship between the means as efficient cause, and the end as final cause, we can move toward understanding a deeper, more significant and impactful inversion of the relationship between means and ends. When the means (methods) are judged as successful for bringing about the desired end, they are put into practise, production, and the methods are employed on a regular basis, toward bringing about the desired end. The successfulness and effectiveness of the method for bringing about the desired end, has been judged, and this judgement is now taken for granted.

So we have a practise of repeated employing the same means, and its successfulness is taken for granted. We can understand this practise of repeatedly employing the same means for the sake of producing an end which is taken for granted, as a sort of "habit", and we can understand this type of activity through that concept "habit". The inversion I am speaking of here, occurs when the method which is the habit, becomes the end itself, as a habit may get to the point of being. The addictive habit is chosen for the sake of itself only, because its effectiveness for achieving the end is taken for granted therefore it is actually desired for the sake of itself only.

If, on reflection, the ends which are taken for granted are revisited, and the habit is very addictive, such that the desire for it is strong, then the ends get shaped to fit the needs of the means, as the means are the addictive habit and have become desired for the sake of themselves. This is commonly known as "rationalizing". At this point, the method is actually the end, as that which is desired, and the stated goals are pseudo-ends. They are created, shaped, and stated, in a way which is subservient to the desire for the means as the addictive habit, which being desired for the sake of itself is the true goal here.

For example. We start with the goal of "truth", as the ideal which is desired, and we create the scientific method as the means to that end. The means are judged as effective and successful, and therefore become habitual. Then, as an addiction, the habit itself has become the desired end. Now the original goal, which was the ideal "truth", is replaced with the new goal, the scientific method as the addiction, and any reference back to the original goal must ensure that the status of "taken for granted" is well maintained. Now the original goal, the ideal "truth", must become subservient to the means, which is the scientific method, such that the means will always be judged as successful and effective at bringing about the end, so that the method will be continued to be employed. That results in a manipulation of the definition of "truth", because of the irrational desire due to addiction. At this point, it is required to adjust the definition of "truth" according to circumstances, to ensure that the scientific method is always successful and effective at bringing about the desired end, "truth". In reality though, the rationalized "ends" have become subservient to the means, the addictive habit, which has actually become the end itself.

This reality is very evident in the following exchange:

Science pursues truth, namely scientific truth. It does not pursue non-scientific truth, such as philosophical or political truths. — Leontiskos

So, there are all of these different types of truths, dozens of them, potentially infinite, and science pursues only one of these. — Judaka

Quantum leaps seem to be inherent in the foundations of the physical world, as revealed by 20th century sub-atomic physics. In the 17th century, Isaac Newton assumed that physical processes are continuous, but the defining property of Quantum Physics is discontinuity. When measured down to the finest details, Energy was found to be, not an unbroken fluid substance, but could only be measured in terms of isolated packets, that came to be called "quanta"*1. Yet, on the human scale, the brain merges the graininess of Nature into a smooth image. There's nothing spooky about that. If you put your face up close to your computer screen, you will see a bunch of individual pixels. But as you move away, those tiny blocks of light merge into recognizable images. — Gnomon

The first thing I need to correct you on, is that energy is not measured it is calculated. Measurements are made, a formula is applied, and the quantity of energy is determined. Because of this, it is not accurate to talk about energy as a substance, it is actually a property, as a predication.

Bohr, Planck, etc found the observed quanta & quantum leaps to be "unintelligible", and characterized by inherent Relativity & Uncertainty*2. — Gnomon

Since a quantity of energy is calculated through a formula, and uncertainty arises from application of the formula, this suggests that the formula being applied is in some way deficient, and this is the cause of the appearance of uncertainty.

Due to the "spooky action at a distance" that annoyed Einstein, sub-atomic physics defies common sense. But pragmatic physicists gradually learned to accept that Nature did not necessarily play by our man-made rules. — Gnomon

This is especially the case when the "man-made rules" are not well crafted.

*2. That Old Quantum Theory :
Einstein's two theories of relativity have shown us that when things move very fast or when objects get massive, the universe exhibits very strange properties. The same is also true of the microscopic world of quantum interactions. The deeper we delve into the macrocosm and the microcosm, the further we get away from the things that make sense to us in our everyday world. — Gnomon

Strong evidence that the formulas being applied are deficient.

Everett’s Many worlds theory might get around the collapsing wavefunction problem. Not saying it’s the right theory, but it accounts for a sort of reason behind the becoming (each probability is really a separate world that did actually happen). — schopenhauer1

I don't see how you can make such a leap from future to past. If the wave function deals with possibilities of what might be measured, that's a prediction for the future. But I see no reason to believe that when that predicted point in time moves into the past, we ought to believe all those possibilities have actually happened. If there are many possibilities as to what you will be doing in an hour from now, and that time moves past, there is no reason to believe that all those possibilities actually happened.

By thing, I mean anything that could exist, be it a process or a concept or whatever. So, if absolute nothingness is a thing, then it would mean it could exist, which would make it self-contradictory. It cannot exist, because its existence would imply its non-existence. Thus, absolute nothingness is impossible. — Ø implies everything

What you are saying, is that we ought to conceive of absolute nothingness as something other than a thing. No problem there, right? But then you define "thing" in such a way that if it is not a thing, it does not exist. Therefore you want us to conceive of absolute nothingness as other than existent. There's no problem there either, but it does not mean that such a concept would be impossible, self-contradictory, or in any way incoherent. We can and do conceive of many non-existent things.

In answering this question, one must contemplate absolute nothingness, that is, the non-existence of everything. This "concept" is often deemed oxymoronic. For something to exist/be true, it must be
a thing. If absolute nothingness is a thing, it would entail its own non-existence, which would mean absolute nothingness would be true and untrue at the same time: a contradiction. If absolute nothingness is not a thing, then it cannot exist/be true. — Ø implies everything

The principal premise of your argument is: "For something to exist/be true, it must be
a thing." To consider the soundness of your conclusion we need to understand the soundness of this premise. Why do you believe that existence necessarily consists of "things"? If you take a look at "process philosophy" you will see that this class of philosophers deny the truth of this premise. They place activity as prior to and therefore not dependent on being. From this perspective it is possible to have existence without things.

However, in your conclusion, you move to qualify nothing with "absolute". This qualification is not supported by your argument, which restricts existence to things. Your argument premises that existence consists only of things, then it classes "absolute nothing" as a thing. So it fails to address all of reality which falls between things and true absolute nothingness, which is activity, process. Then you take an obviously false premise, that the nothingness you are talking about is "absolute", and proceed from that.

The premise is clearly false, because your principal premise has already restricted "existence" to things, therefore not an absolute nothingness. So "existence", by this definition is not absolute. In reality therefore, your argument proceeds from two contradictory premises, the first being that existence is restricted to things, and the second being that "absolute nothingness is a thing".

Consequently, I have wondered if we could take Nothingness seriously, and eliminate the perceived necessity for a mysterious ethereal substance. Take a typical atom for example, and watch as an electron (point particle) jumps up, and then back down, between energy levels (orbits). This up & down -- maximum to minimum -- action produces waveforms on an oscilloscope. But the actual jumps seem to occur almost instantaneously. So, what if we imagine them as quantum leaps without passing through the space (nothingness) in between. In that case, the pattern would look more like a series of dots than a sine wave curve. {see image below} — Gnomon

I don't think this concept of nothingness works, because it renders what you call the quantum leap as unintelligible, impossible to understand. It may be the case that it actually is unintelligible, that is a real possibility, but we ought not take that as a starting premise. We need to start with the assumption that the medium is intelligible, then we'll be inspired to try to understand it, and only after exhausting all possible intelligible options should we conclude unintelligibility, nothingness.

Quantum observations are completely explainable without invoking the "particle" concept. Modelling the physics using the concept of particles works in many, but not all cases. Modelling it in terms of waves works for all the observations. — Dfpolis

I don't agree with this. The reason for modeling "particles" is to account for the waves' interaction with physical bodies. This is exemplified by the photoelectric effect. In this example the wave activity is a form of "becoming", understood as a continuity of change through a duration of time. The physical body is a form of being, is understood as the continuity of an unchanging subject with changing predicates.

The obvious issue here is that we do not understand the medium (substance or aether) within which the waves are active. We know that waves are an activity of a substance, but we do not know the substance which these waves are an activity of. It is often argued that the Michelson-Morley type experiments have demonstrated that there is no such substance, but as I just argued in a different thread, this is a faulty conclusion drawn from those experiments. In reality, what those experiments show is that the relation between physical bodies and the waving medium is not as premised.

With this way of looking at the medium which the waves are active in, the photoelectric problem is better exposed. The relationship between the waving medium and the physical body is not properly understood or represented. The body needs to be represented as a property of the medium, negating its supposed independence from its environment. This means that Newton's first law of motion which represents a body as an independent thing with a necessary continuity complete with "identity" as per the law of identity, with changing properties, is a faulty representation.

Therefore the body, individual, or particular, must be stripped of its identity as a thing in itself with a temporal continuity of sameness (law of identity), and be represented as changing properties of an underlying substratum, the waving medium or aether. This would allow that any body, in its entirety, could come into being, or cease being, at any moment in time, as we normally allow contrary premises. The temporal continuity, which in Aristotelian physics is assigned to matter as the supporting substance, is then passed to the underlying medium.

This has been made necessary by the advancements in physics which have seen the need to represent the continuous (existing as a temporal continuity) "potential" of the world as "energy" rather than as "matter". Aristotle represented this potential with "matter", and provided a guideline for restrictions to it with the law of identity, representing the potential as inherent within individual bodies. This supported the Newtonian concepts of mass, inertia, etc.. But the modern concept of "energy" allows that this underlying potential readily transfers from one body to another. Now we see that this underlying potential cannot be properly represent as inherent within individual bodies because the interaction between bodies cannot be adequately represented in this way. So that entire conceptual structure which assumes the temporal continuity of a body as having an identity as a body, must be deconstructed and rebuilt based on the underlying medium having an identity as the temporal continuity of potential, with the bodies being properties of the medium.

Quantum mechanics provides a very good example of the incompatibility between being and becoming I've been talking about, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. "Being", is represented here as the describable state of a fundamental particle. It is what is, at any specific point in time, what you call a stage of becoming. But change, "becoming" is what occurs between these points in time, how the particle gets from A to B, etc., and this is represented as a wave function.

So the wave function, as a representation of a form of becoming, must be expressed as linear or else it would be completely unintelligible to us, as totally unrelated to our points of observation. However, the points of observation (providing the states of being) must be adapted, manipulated artificially to match up with the information we have about what occurs between these points, rendering the representation as nonlinear, involving substantial unknowns. Therefore each, the representation of being and the representation of becoming, are left compromised due to the attempt to bridge the underlying gap of incommensurability, as the incompatibility between being and becoming manifests itself in particle physics.

Responding to you is time-consuming and seems to provide little benefit to either of us or to anyone else. I need that time to work on my articles for publication. So, I have decided to spend it there.

With kind regards,
Dennis Polis — Dfpolis

Thanks for the time Df, I do not think it was wasted. I know you've helped me to reconsider and better understand some things in the past, and I'm looking forward to more of the same in the future. Anyway, despite my criticism I do like your work. As a novel variety of science based metaphysics, it's like a breath of fresh air. That's why I'm quick to engage you when you post a thread, I like you.

You did not cite Aristotle and you did not lead me to reject being during change. — Dfpolis

I did, Metaphysics Bk 4 Ch 7-8, where he discusses change and the applicability of the of excluded middle . You refuse to address it. What's the point in asking for the citation if you refuse to go to the text and read the context for your own sake of understanding

To say that a thing is identical with its essence (which btw is false) is not to say anything about what happens over the course of time, which is what you are talking about. Essences only define what a being could do if it existed. So, as Aquinas saw, we need actual existence in addition to essences. — Dfpolis

You continue to deny the relevance of the two senses of "essence" and "form", saying that this statement is false while adhering to one sense, and not considering that it may be true in relation to the other sense. Essence is form, and form is actuality.

You keep doing this, trying to present some forms as non-actual, but this is completely unAristotelian, and makes a mess of his conceptual structure. So your statement "we need actual existence in addition to essences" is nonsensical, "essence" as form, is what gives actuality to existence.

That is the point of the passage I quoted. There is no difference between Socrates the individual, primary substance, and the essence of Socrates, what it mans to be Socrates. You can disagree, and say it ought not be expressed like this but then you step out of Aristotle's conceptual structure. This is how Aristotle makes matter accidental, and Form separable and prior to matter as cause of material existence, which is the basic, guiding purpose of his Metaphysics. You deny this point because you are not willing to accept independent Forms. Therefore you say it is false, and remove yourself from being Aristotelian.

I accept that, but there is also being at each point in the process. — Dfpolis

But you were denying my insistence that being and becoming must overlap. Do you now accept this, that there is a duality of being and becoming within each material particular, or individual? And, the further point you need to apprehend is the fact that the aspects which are "becoming" cannot be described in the terms used to describe the aspects which are "being". And whatever aspects are described as "being" cannot be described in the same terms as those used to describe "becoming", because of the fundamental incompatibility, or incommensurability demonstrated by Plato and Aristotle. This is discussed in Plato's Theaetetus, and Aristotle Met. Bk4 Ch 7-8.

Becoming is the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency. — Dfpolis

You accuse me of "nonsense", then you make a statement like this. If a potency is actualized, then it is no longer in potency. You argued this yourself. Now you are saying that the potency might still be in potency, in the actualization of that very potency. Which is it that you believe? Either there is overlap between the actuality and the potency because they are distinct categories, which is what you seem to be saying now, or one simply replaces the other, as you said before.. Don't you think? But you don't seem to grasp Aristotle's guidance for violation of the law of excluded middle at all. Read Bk4 Ch 7-8 please, and get back to me when you have something sensible to say on the issue of becoming.

I did not say that. I said the number of kinds was always finite. — Dfpolis

Why though,? We can make up whatever imaginary "kind" we want. So there is infinite possibility for kinds. That's demonstrated by set theory.

A continuum is not a regress. There is typically one efficient cause, and one potential being actualized, for the whole transformation. What do you see as a regress? — Dfpolis

I explained the infinite regress, twice now. Between each supposed different state of being which marks each stage in a change, there is necessarily another state of being to mark that stage of the change. This goes on ad infinitum, i.e. an infinite regress.

Since it is neither true nor false, the rules applying to truth and falsity do not apply. — Dfpolis

Right, so this is the case with "matter" in general, being designated as the aspect of the world which is "potential", the rules applying to truth and falsity do not apply to matter.

Now matter is that part of reality which we cannot understand because the rules of truth and falsity do "not apply". So this produces a very real interaction problem. We have two senses of "form", "actuality" or "essence". One is the essence of the thing itself, which is the same as the thing itself, the other is the essence we assign to the thing, through our use of sense, intellect, and understanding. Each is equally "actual", but what separates these two are the accidents, and Aristotle posited "matter" to account for the accidents, as the aspects which the intellect does not grasp. So "matter" becomes the intermediary between these two very distinct types of actuality, therefore it is the medium of interaction between the two types of actuality. But since it is what the intellect does not grasp, the interaction is not grasped. Therefore an interaction problem.

There are different ways of interpreting this situation. The materialist will assume that "matter" represents something real in the universe, and therefore conclude that there are real aspects of the universe which are impossible for the intellect to grasp. So we have ontologies like dialectical materialism which allows that the reality of matter violates the law of non-contradiction, therefore matter is something real which is impossible for us to understand. But from the Aristotelian perspective, "matter" does not represent anything real, it is just a name used to refer to that part of reality, "potential" which the intellect of man, at that time, could not understand. It is that part of a particular thing's essence which the human mind does not grasp. You will probably insist, as most others do, that Aristotle intended for "matter: to represent something very real, and I would reply that a lack of understanding of the human intellect is something very real. It is just not what we tend to think of as the reality of matter., because it is a type of nothingness rather than a type of something.

Not quite. Conceiving the same reality in different ways is a form of equivocation. When we are using different meanings for the same (nominal) concept, the same formal proposition can be true and false, not because the reality is indeterminate, but because we are not thinking the same things about it. — Dfpolis

Aristotle is not talking about using different meanings for the same concept. He is talking about "relativity" as proposed by Protagoras. In this case, since the world is said to be as it is perceived, or "appears" to be, and it appears to be different to different people, we are faced with the possibility that there is no such thing as truth. This is similar to, but clearly not the same as giving different meanings to the same words. Read the referenced section please.

In Plato's theory, sensible things are like images in a mirror and have no more an essence than a reflection does. — Dfpolis

It seems you have not read Plato's Timaeus.

Yes, it is an activity, and it can change but it is not always changing. — Dfpolis

Wait, what kind of activity is not always a change? I think activity is always a change, whether it's change of place, or change of some quality. Activity as motion, necessarily implies change.

Becoming is not incompatible with being. At each stage, what is becoming is what it is. — Dfpolis

I explained to you why becoming is incompatible with being, and this is directly from Aristotle. Plato initially outlined this problem in The Theaetetus I believe it was. Aristotle demonstrated it in a way similar to what I expressed.

Yes, at each stage of becoming, the thing is what it is, but as Aristotle demonstrated, "becoming" as change is what occurs between each stage. It must be, or else there is an infinite number of stages between each stage. So it is impossible that becoming can be described by states of being at various stages, because this would require an infinity of stages for even the smallest degree of change.

Citation? The Law of Identity is "Whatever is, is and whatever is not, is not." So, you are making up your own law. Please state what you think it is. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what Aristotle denies. Metaphysics BK 4, Ch 8, 1012b,5-8 "But against all such views we must postulate as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means." See below for context.

A good representation of the law of identity is found in Metaphysics Bk7, Ch 6.

Each thing itself. then, and its essence are one and the same in no accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.
...
Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one ad the same as its essence. The sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. — 1031b-1032a

No, the self-identity of a changing being is based on organic continuity. I do not have the same description I did when I was conceived, but I have organically developed developed from that zygote into the person I am today. — Dfpolis

I haven't the vaguest idea of what "organic continuity" means. It's not Aristotelian and it seems that it is actually you who is making up your own laws. How would you account for the temporal continuity of changing inorganic things like rocks? Surely the rock remains the same rock, despite despite a change in location, or chipping and other changes which occur to it.

It is not that we have different being, but a different kind of being. "Kind" is a conceptual reality, based on the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time. — Dfpolis

You seem to be incapable, or unwilling to grasp the fact that "becoming" is what occurs between points in time, and therefore cannot be accurately described as "the being in progress at each point in time". This issue is fundamental to an understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics. As Aristotle demonstrated, if understanding becoming was a matter of grasping "the intelligibility of the being in progress at each point in time", then "becoming" would be completely unintelligible as requiring understanding "the being in progress" at an infinite number of points in time, just to be able to understand even the most simple case of becoming.

That intelligibility does not become an actual "kind" unless the agent intellect actualizes it, and forms a universal concept by prescinding from individuating notes of intelligibility. So, while we have an infinite number of potential kinds, we only have as many actual kinds as the agent intellect is able to generate. — Dfpolis

This does not resolve the problem, nor is it Aristotle's recommendation.

Suppose there is assumed to be an actual number of different states of being inherent within each instance of change. So there would be an actual number of stages each consisting of a different kind of being at each stage. What Aristotle pointed out is that "change" is what occurs between each instance of existence of a different kind of being.

So, saying that at t1 there was X type of being, and at t2 there was Y type of being, does not explain the intermediary change which occurred, which is known as how X became Y, because this is what happened between t1 and t2. If we posit Z type of being as the intermediary stage, we face an infinite regress. If we say as you are proposing, that there is a limited number of actual stages, then we are right back to the very same problem as we have at the beginning which Aristotle was addressing. We need to account for what happens between each of the stages, as this is when change, or becoming occurs, how one stage becomes the next. Clearly, what you propose is not what Aristotle proposed, because this proposal produces the very problem which he proceeded toward finding a solution for.

Citation? His solution was to point out an equivocation. — Dfpolis

There is a number of places where Aristotle demonstrated the necessity of violation of the law of excluded middle. I think the most famous is in "Categories" where he talks about the possibility of a sea battle tomorrow.

What I believe is the best demonstration is in Metaphysics. One place is Bk 4. First, in Ch 3 he explains why the law of non-contradiction must be adhered to, as the most self-evident principle of all. Then, in Ch 5 he explains Protagorean relativity theory, and the problem involved with understanding "change". If different people perceive the same changing thing in different ways, and the truth about a thing is according to how it is perceived, then the same thing is at the same time both "so and not so". Because of this problem, it appears like many people, believed that there could be no true or false statements made about change, so some concluded that change is impossible.

The real problem Aristotle said, is that these people attribute "truth", "that which is", as being identical with the sensible world, and the sensible world is always changing. This view blossomed into the extreme position of Heraclitus, who said you could not make a true statement about anything, and finally Cratylus who criticized even Heraclitus for assuming it to be true that you cannot step in the same river twice, claiming you could not even step in it once, because "the same river" makes no sense at all. So Aristotle's conclusion is something like 'that which appears is not necessarily the truth', because the same thing may both appear to be and not be in the same way at the same time, depending on perspective.

In Ch 7 he proceeds in a discussion of the law of excluded middle. First he shows that the argument that "there must be an intermediary between all contradictories", in the same sense that grey is intermediary between black and white, leads to infinite regress, just like I've explained. This is not a problem of ambiguity, but a problem of insisting that change can be described by intermediary states of being. It is a fundamental problem of that way of speaking. It produces sophistic, or "eristical" arguments which men will concede to because they cannot refute them.

The solution is discussed in Ch 8. What is required is that the intermediary which is change, be undefined. Attempts to define it produce the infinite regress. Therefore the law of excluded middle applies only to defined terms, not to appearances as observed. 1012b,5-8: "But against all such views we must postulate as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means."

It is Aristotle's definition. I just accepted it. — Dfpolis

But Aristotle had two definitions of substance, primary and secondary, and you simply dismiss secondary substance as derivative. However, in his Metaphysics the substance of a self-subsistent, separate thing, is equated with the thing's essence, following Plato's Timaeus. This is not derivative, but prior.

Metaphysics Bk 5 Ch 8. " It follows, then, that 'substance' has two senses, (A) the ultimate substratum which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (B) that which, being a 'this' is also separable --and of this nature is the shape or form of every thing"

This does not follow. In Aristotle's view I am the same substance I was the moment I qualified as a rational animal. What need is there for another substance? — Dfpolis

As Aristotle demonstrated, and I explained above, this view you state here, cannot account for the reality of change. If we accept as true, that you are always the same substance, just having a different form at different times, then we can never understand the reality of changes which occur to you. The changes are necessarily something distinct from, and cannot be described as, substance which is a your form or essence. And since your form is constantly changing, then your identity must be something other than your substance because this constantly changes. But, change is just as much a real part of you as identity is, therefore "substance" also has the definition of matter with form. Now we have two "substances". So, as Aristotle demonstrated, change is real, actual, and substantial, but consisting of "substance" in the sense of a logical necessity but there is also "substance" in the sense of a combination of matter and form, and that is of a physical, or sensible necessity, to account for the reality of appearances. And it must be allowed, that appearances defy the law of excluded middle.

Not by Aristotle's definition. He knows that things undergo accidental changes and remain the same substance. — Dfpolis

That's exactly why we need to accept the reality of something other than "substance", as per the way you apply the term. However, when we start to understand this "something other", it becomes very clear that it is no less substantial, by the very definition you employ to call the other thing 'substance". So now there is a need for two distinct substances, both fitting the definition you propose, but each being very different from the other.

If you think ideas exist as particulars, then you need to define "particulars," because what I see is particular humans thinking ideas. The dependence on humans makes an idea an accident in the sense of a predicable, not a "this something" (tode ti), as humans are. — Dfpolis

OK, I think we can start from this point. What I described as a "particular idea", you say is not a particular at all, in the sense of substance, but since it is dependent on a human being, it is a predicable. However, since this sort of idea which I was talking about, the idea which circumscribes the means to an end, or personal goal, is unique to the individual, in a particular set of circumstances, it is as you say an accident, and therefore not a universal. Would you agree with me that this sort of idea is better represented as an activity, a thinking activity, always changing according to the evolving circumstances as physical activities are carried out? And would you agree that although habit plays an important role in this sort of thinking activity, there are many ideas which stretch beyond habit, freely willed ideas, which contribute to creativity?

Please read Aristotle's Physics I, where he explains the relation between these concepts. — Dfpolis

I have, more than once, and my objection stands.

There is no middle ground between being the completed thing and not yet being the completed thing (an entelecheia). — Dfpolis

There is always a middle ground, it's called "becoming", and becoming is fundamentally incompatible with being, as explained by Aristotle. There are two logical states, the being of the thing and the not-being of the thing. The middle ground between these two is what we know as "change", or becoming.

Suppose at t1 we have the not being of a particular thing, A, and at t2 we have the being of A. Between t1 and t2 there is necessarily change, becoming. If we describe the change in terms of a different being, and suppose that halfway between t1 and t2, at t1.5, we have a different being, being B, then we must account for the change between being B and being A, in the time between t1.5 and t12. Now we posit being C at t1.75. You can see that this leads to an infinite regress of different beings at each conceivable moment of passing time in the duration of change.

So Aristotle concluded that "becoming" is incompatible with the logical terms of being and not-being. He stated that sophists who adhere strictly to the fundamental laws of logic are known to "demonstrate" or prove absurd conclusions ( Zeno's paradoxes for example) by doing this. His solution was to allow that the law of excluded middle be violated in instances where potential (may or may not be) was involved and this is the case for "becoming".

Therefore we need to conclude that there is always a middle ground in an activity of change. The potential of activity cannot be described in terms of being and not being, due to the problem of infinite regress outlined by Aristotle, and there must always be something in between any two distinct states of being, which cannot be described as a state of being, because it is change, becoming.

Yes, we can. What we may not be able to say is where the line is. For example, when is a fetus a human being? Still, wherever the line is, before that, we have becoming and from that point on we have the being. — Dfpolis

As demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, there is not a line, there is always necessarily a duration of change, or becoming, and this cannot be described as a line between two distinct states of being. If we try to describe this with lines between distinct states of being we have an infinite regress, of an infinite number of distinct states of being between each moment in time.

First, we are not completely identical at different times, so the law of identity does not apply. — Dfpolis

This is a misunderstanding of the law of identity. The law of identity allows that the very same thing is changing as time passes, because a thing is the same as itself, not the same as any description of it. This is the beauty of the law of identity, and why it is so ontologically useful in understanding the nature of material existence. We notice that objects are constantly changing, they get chipped, dented, or otherwise damaged, or altered. If the "identity" of a thing is a description which is supposed to correspond, then at each passing moment, a thing which consists of moving parts, must have a new identity, i.e. be a new thing at each passing moment. However, we also see the need to allow that a thing maintains its identity as the same thing, despite changes to it. So Aristotle was very intuitive to clarify the law of identity to account for this reality of observed temporal continuity, that a thing maintains its identity as the thing it is, despite changes to its form, as time passes.

Second, we are the same being because of our dynamic continuity, not because of the same stuff or the exact same form. — Dfpolis

This dynamic continuity is exactly the reality which the law of identity accounts for. And this is why I said being and becoming must overlap. A thing, such as a human being for example, is continuously changing, becoming, yet maintaining its identity as the same being.

My 10 year old self was not identical to my 11 year old self. — Dfpolis

You maintained your identity as the same being when you were 10, when you were 11, and still now. You were always the same being despite many changes, and you were always "the same as yourself". That is the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". No specific description forms the identity of a thing.

I agree that applying our concepts can be fuzzy. This results from our concepts not being as clear as we would like, and perceptions being inadequate to determining sharp lines. These are epistemological, not ontological problems. — Dfpolis

The infinite regress demonstrated by Aristotle, and explained above, is a very significant ontological problem. This is why we cannot accurately account for the nature of reality by simply assuming one substance. The substance would exist in distinct states, but there would be an infinite regress of distinct states in each moment of time. So we must accept that there is something other, which is incompatible with this one substance existing in distinct states. It doesn't matter that you do not want to call this 'other' thing "substance", so that you can avoid substance dualism, because we end up in the same situation any way. Instead of having two real substances, we now have real substance and real non-substance, so what's the difference?

No, I am applying the term in the different ways it was applied historically. Aristotle and Aquinas define a substance as "this something" (an ostensible unity). Descartes and the modern tradition see substance as a kind of stuff things are made of (an analogue of matter). These are radically different concepts. — Dfpolis

Again, you are adhering to Aristotle's "primary substance", and conveniently ignoring his "secondary substance", in your definition of substance.

Concepts are real because they are acts of real people, e.g. the concept <apple> is people thinking of apples. — Dfpolis

So, we're back to the top of my post. Concepts are "acts", as stated here, and as described at the beginning of this post. And, as described in the rest of this post, activity, as change, becoming, is what lies between states of being, as something incompatible with the descriptive conventions of being and not being. So concepts are very real occurrences of "non-substance".

But now we have a problem with your definition of "substance", as "this something". Every time we point to a "this something", we find that it is engaged in change, activity, so it is also non-substance at the very same time. Any instance of substance, a thing, also consists of active becoming or change, and by your exclusionary definition of "substance", this must be "non-substance". So now, instead of violating the law of excluded middle, which Aristotle recommended, you violated the law of noncontradiction, which Aristotle strongly urged us not to do in this situation of trying to account for the dual reality of being and becoming.

There is no actuality of a potentially living body before there is an actual living being. — Dfpolis

There is necessarily an actuality which is before, that's what Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument demonstrates. A potentiality cannot actualize itself, something actual is required. So if there is a body with life potentially in it, it is required that there is an actuality which actualizes this body and makes this become an actual living body. This is "the soul", the actuality which is necessarily prior to the actual living body.

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’? — Wayfarer

Are you familiar with the law of identity? I mean do you understand its presentation and meaning, rather than just being able to copy the conventional representation of "A=A"? Did you read the SEP quote, which states that identity is a relation which can only hold between a thing and itself?

Surely you must understand that "a thing" is a particular, not the representation of a particular. And the meaning of "can only hold between a thing and itself", is self-evident. Therefore representing a particular individual with a symbol ("A "for example), does not produce an identity relation, when the law of identity is formally adhered to. The commonly accepted notion of "identity", the vulgar notion, by which a thing is identified with a name, is not consistent with the law of identity. This is a corrupted "identity" which is derived from a faulty ontology, and cannot provide for a rigorous logic.

A category is "specific", not "particular". This is because the parameters of the category are specified, and are not necessarily "particular", meaning of that specific category and not other categories. Call me pedantic, but logic fails when it is not rigorous.

Plato demonstrated this problem in The Parmenides. If a whole, "One" (category in this case) is defined as a collection of individuals, (particulars in this case), then One (as category) cannot be an individual (particular) because then there is no logical separation between the One and the Many. Therefore the metaphysically, or ontological acceptable, as in logically rigorous, way of proceeding is to employ a further definition which distinguishes the category from the things which exist as members of that category. So if the members are said to be particulars, then the category itself must be something other than a particular. We call it a universal.

Whether or not set theory adheres to this principle is debatable. Set theory makes a set an individual, as a mathematical object, which the members of the set also are, mathematical objects. This is a metaphysical or ontological flaw. which I believe produces the problem described above, resulting in "Russel's Paradox". I believe that the conventional solutions to this problem do not provide the required separation between the definition of "set" and the definition of "element" to actually resolve the problem. To produce the required ontological separation would annihilate the validity of set theory.

That a "set" is necessarily distinct from an "element" of a set, therefore requiring different defining terms, is evident from proofs which show the reality of the "empty set". The empty set is distinct from the set which contains zero as an element. And that it is possible to have an object (set, as mathematical object), which consists of nothing at all, no substance, demonstrates the need for a separation between "category" as specified, and "particular" as an element of the category. The latter, the particular, cannot consist of nothing, no substance, but the former the empty set is very real as a logical possibility.

So in the way that this law is usually identified - “A=A” - what, precisely, is the difference between the left-hand ‘A’ and the right hand ‘A’? Are they ‘particulars’? — Wayfarer

A signifies one particular. Therefore in that expression of the law of identity there is no difference between the left and right side. However, since this is a representation of the law of identity, "=" must signify "is the same as" not equality. "Is the same as" is a very special case of equality.

So what is the case, is that when the law of identity is represented as "A=A", "A" symbolizes the thing, and "=" symbolizes "is the same as". In mathematics, "=" symbolizes equality. Therefore in the quoted representation of the law of identity, "A=A", the "=" symbol must mean something different from what it means in mathematical usage.

The issue of, and history of, how the law of identity came to be stated as A=A, instead of as A is A, as proposed by Leibniz, and how "is the same as" became replaced with equality, is actually quite complex. If you study it, you might discover a sophistic trick, which is a type of inversion fallacy. The proposition is that in all instances of A, A is equal to A. And so A is equal to A is proposed as the law of identity in formal logic. It says something about A, that it is always equal to itself, and cannot not be equal to itself. However, A is equal to A is not as logically rigorous as A is the same as A. This is because in all cases of "is the same as", there is necessarily equality, but not in all cases of equality are the equal things the same. Therefore identity is a very special type of equality, a relation which a thing has with itself, but "A is equal to A" does not signify what the special type of equality is, which is stated as "is the same as".

Here's a quote from SEP:

Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself. Its name implies the controversial view that it is the only identity relation in accordance with which we can properly count (or number) things: x and y are to be properly counted as one just in case they are numerically identical (Geach 1973).

Numerical identity is our topic. As noted, it is at the centre of several philosophical debates, but to many seems in itself wholly unproblematic, for it is just that relation everything has to itself and nothing else – and what could be less problematic than that? Moreover, if the notion is problematic it is difficult to see how the problems could be resolved, since it is difficult to see how a thinker could have the conceptual resources with which to explain the concept of identity whilst lacking that concept itself. The basicness of the notion of identity in our conceptual scheme, and, in particular, the link between identity and quantification has been particularly noted by Quine (1964).

You are misrepresenting what Wayfarer said. Ideas exist only in minds, not as particular substances, even though they may be about particulars. — Dfpolis

Well, this is what is being debated, whether or not some ideas actually exist in some minds as particulars. Simply stating that they do not, does not argue your case. It seems to me, that if I see a piece of fruit on the counter, and my goal is to eat that particular piece of fruit, this is a very particular idea. Likewise, if I have a plan to put some particular pieces of lumber together with some particular nails that I have, in a very particular way, this is also a very particular idea.

What I explained above, is that intention starts out as something very general, a general desire or ambition, or in my example, the general feeling of hunger. But by the time the individual acts on one's intentions, the goal is something very particular, to manipulate very particular material objects in a very particular way. It must be that this is the case, because we manipulate particular things in the world, in particular circumstances, and we cannot move around, and work with particular material objects in a general way, because our actions are particularly shaped to the situation. Each instance of manipulation is particular, as is the thing manipulated, and the circumstances within which it is manipulated, so the corresponding ideas must also be particular.

This is the issue of moral philosophy. How do we apply general principles in particular situations. The reality is that we do not. The general principles act as a sort of guide which assist us to produce particular ideas which are suited to each particular situation in which we find ourselves.

What prevents mathematical objects from being physical is that they require a counting or a measuring operation to become actual, while bodies need not be observed to exist. So, mathematical objects are mental existents with a foundation in reality, not realities simplicitur. — Dfpolis

By Aristotle's Metaphysics, it is the mathematician's mind which actualizes mathematical objects, therefore they have actual existence within the mind.

Good! What makes them the "same" is that they can elicit the identical (universal) idea. They need not be equal. 1 kg of sugar is the same kind of thing as 5 kg of sugar, but they are not equal. — Dfpolis

As each is sugar they are equal, in that parameter, and can be measured by the same laws of measurement. In the same way, you and I are equal as human beings, and are subject to the same laws.

Nonsense! They are saying nothing about the law of identity. You are equivocating on "the same." It has one meaning in identity, and a different meaning in equality. — Dfpolis

I suggest you speak to some mathematicians on this forum. There are many here who insist that "2+2=4" means that "2+2" is the same as "4", by the law of indentity. I believe it is the axiom of extensionality in set theory which gives rise to this way of thinking. Here's something Wikipedia says about that axiom: "Thus, what the axiom is really saying is that two sets are equal if and only if they have precisely the same members." Notice that under this axiom. for two sets to be equal, they must be the same. This axiom supports the claim that if two things are equal they are therefore the same.

No, he never has an interaction problem because one substance, a human being, cannot interact with itself. The interaction problem arises when you deny that we are one substance and make us two: res cogitans and res extensa. — Dfpolis

You seem to be forgetting that Aristotle distinguished primary and secondary substance. Primary substance is one individual, consisting of matter and form, but secondary substance is formal only. Since each sense of "form" is actual, we need to resolve how primary and secondary substance interact with each other.

Becoming cannot be an interaction with the product of becoming, because they do not co-exist. — Dfpolis

You have no grounds for this statement because "becoming" is incompatible with the states of being and not being. So when a thing comes into being from not being, through the means of becoming, you have no principles to argue that becoming cannot overlap both the not being, and the being of the thing which is coming into existence. By Aristotle's principles, "becoming" violates the law of excluded middle, neither being nor not being, but by Hegel's principles, "becoming" encompasses bot being and not being. So we really cannot say with any amount of certainty whether becoming truly overlaps the being of a thing or not.

I would say that since a thing is always changing, and maintains its identity as the same thing, despite undergoing change, according to the law of identity, we must conclude that the being and the becoming of the very same thing, do co-exist.

Yes, but while it is being perfected, it is not the finished (formed) product. — Dfpolis

By the law of identity it is still the same thing, during that extended period of time which it is undergoing the changes which are attempts to perfect it. Clearly, the becoming of a thing must overlap the being of the thing, and this is why there cannot be a clearly and distinctly defined "point in time" at which the not-being of the thing is replaced with the being of the thing. There can always be debate as to the precise point in time when a thing actually starts to be the thing that it is.

If you mean that there are two kinds of form, one the mental plan and the other the actuality of the product, I agree. If you mean that there are two substances in the product, which is what "dualism" usually means, I disagree. — Dfpolis

It appears like you are just manipulating your use of "substance" to suit your purpose. That's fine, if you do not want to call the immaterial form which precedes in time the material form, a "substance", because "substance" implies matter to you, then we can proceed on those terms. Still we must account for the reality of that immaterial actuality.

You seem not to have read De Anima. Psyche is defined as the first actuality of a potentially living body. It cannot exist before there is an actual living body. The agent intellect is "divine" and separable, while the passive intellect is "perishable" and so physical. — Dfpolis

I've had extensive discussion on De Anima, on this forum, and I've read it multiple times. It contains ambiguity and reason for differing interpretations. By my translation, "soul" is defined as the first actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This means soul is prior to life. But you and I have already discussed the two senses of "actuality" used by Aristotle in this book, and I would be willing to further this discussion. It is an interesting topic.

seems like pointing to a non-issue: categories are particular just as indivdual objects are. — Janus

I would not agree to that. A category is a universal, not a particular.

The form, idea or principle is not something that exists - at least, in the sense that a particular exists. The intelligible form of particulars is a universal. — Wayfarer

This is a misrepresentation. The idea, as design or form in the mind of the artist exists as the idea of a particular, not of a universal. The thing desired is very particular, not universal. We can characterize "desire" as a general feeling, a universal, in the way that "hunger" is a universal, as a general feeling, or urge, but when the individual human being is moved to act on a specific desire, or intent to create something, the object of intent becomes very particular, as a goal of a particular material consequence. The general "hunger" becomes the goal to eat a particular thing.

In Aristotelian and classical philosophy, the law of identity is a logical law that is general and not tied specifically to particulars. — Wayfarer

The law of identity is a general law, but it applies to particulars just like any inductive law. So is tied specifically to particulars, as a statement about what all particulars have in common. It states something about all particulars which differentiates a particular from a universal. It is actually intended to represent the very difference you refer to above, the difference between a particular and an universal, in order to prevent the sophistry which follows from failing to maintain this difference, such as the tendency to allow that mathematical objects, like numbers, have the same type of existence as material objects.

The law of identity says that "a thing" (i.e. a particular) is the same as itself. It serves to differentiate the use of "same" in reference to particular individuals from the use of "same" in reference to type or category, and avoid the sophistry employed through the use of equivocation and the employment of this category mistake. When the law of identity is well understood, this usefulness becomes very evident.

When two things are of the same type, people commonly say that they are the "same". However, they are not "the same" by the law of identity, because that would imply that they are one thing, not two. The law of identity dictates that "same" refers only to a relation which a thing has with itself, not a relation with other things. Therefore being judged as "of the same type" whereby two distinct things are said to be "the same" is best represented as establishing a relation of equality between the two. They are equal according to the parameters of the type, and are said to be "the same" by those specific parameters. They are not "the same" in the sense of the law of identity which is an absolute sameness.

The law of identity allows only that a particular has that specific relation, "same" with itself making "same" absolute rather than relative. Therefore whenever someone argues that two things which are equal, such as what is represented by the left side and what is represented by the right side of a mathematical equation, are "the same" because they are equal, they violate the law of identity. I believe it was Hegel who initiated the modern trend of violating the law of identity, by insisting that it could not be useful. And we might say that this violation is always carried out for some sophistic purpose. That purpose is usually to support an untenable ontology such as Pythagorean idealism, where the potential referred to by numerical figuring is said to be the very same as the "potential" of matter. But this is a category mistake.

No. You cannot have an interaction between a prior intention and its instantiation anymore than a line can interact with its terminal point. First, the intention to create terminates once the object is created, and second, a form as plan is not a form as actuality. If they were, we would have an actuality whenever we had a plan. — Dfpolis

Under Aristotelian principles, all instances of "form" are actual. Are you seriously trying to deny this, or are you proposing something non-Aristotelian? This is how the interaction problem is resolved by Aristotle, by making forms actual.. And there is interaction between the prior intent, and the instantiation, it's called "becoming". Becoming requires a period of time within which the two interact, as an artist interacts with one's work, with the intent to perfect it.

True, but that continuity does not make a plan the same as an actuality. — Dfpolis

A plan is a form, and a form is an actuality. That is Aristotle 101. The object of intent is an actuality, that is how it acts as a cause, final cause.

We must not confuse accidents as unplanned outcomes with metaphysical accidents, which are notes of intelligibility that inhere in, and can be predicated of, the the whole. It is not unplanned accidents that make a thing actual, but the efficient cause implementing the plan. Accidents inhering in a being cannot be prior to that being. Matter as potential is prior, but once we have an actuality, all accidents belong to that actuality or form. For a human artisan, the actuality may depart from the plan because of the stuff used, but that is not the reason a plan is not an actuality. — Dfpolis

The accidents are attributable to the matter's prior form. The artist chooses one's medium, as "the matter" to work with, but that matter necessarily has a form. The form which this matter has, which is not properly accounted for by the artist's plan is the reason for accidents, "form" in the created object which is not a part of the "form" of the design. In this way, the accidents are prior to the material object, and they are causal in the sense of "material cause". "Material cause" referring to that which was prior to, and persists after the act of becoming.

Again, no. The mental form part of the process of execution. There is no gap because that process terminates in the executed reality. If there were a gap, it would mean that were were finished making the thing before it became actual, a contradiction. — Dfpolis

If the form of the intended object and the form of the material object created, are not the same form, then there is necessarily a gap between the two, a lack of formal continuity which must be explained. Simply asserting "there is no gap" does not close the gap. As I described, and you seem to agree, the gap is commonly understood to be closed through the implication of "efficient cause", as the means to the end, which occurs during "becoming". However, as stated above, becoming requires a temporal duration, and the efficient causes must be directed during that time period. This is the interaction which closes the gap. But it requires either that the form of the object of intent is the very same form as the form of the created material object, or that they are distinct, and that there is interaction between the two during the process of becoming. Either way is dualist. Denying that the "form" which is called the object of intent, as plan or design, is actual, as you are doing, is not Aristotelian. Form is always actual.

But, it cannot, because it has no mind. God has a creative intent. It is manifest in the laws of nature which guide the transformation of the acorn's potential into an oak — Dfpolis

Anytime a plant or animal selects from possibilities, for a purpose, there must be intention involved. To say that intention necessarily involves "mind" makes mind prior to the material body of living beings. This is a problem which Aristotle addressed and I believe proposed a solution by separating the concept of "intellect" from that of "soul". At his time, "mind" and "soul" were often used synonymously and he pointed to this problem. But the soul is demonstrated to be prior to the body, while the intellect is posterior as dependent on the body. However, the soul is actual, and acts with purpose or final cause. Therefore "intent" or "final cause" does not necessarily imply "mind" or "intellect".

We have to turn to God immediately because oaks do not have minds, and we need a mind as a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

No, we do not need to refer to "a mind" here. That is a faulty restriction of the definition of "intentionality" which has become common in the modern vernacular. However, if you check a reasonable dictionary like OED, you will see that "intention" means simply to act with purpose. This modern tendency, to restrict "intention" as you do, thereby claiming that only human acts, or acts of "a mind" can be intentional, renders all the purposeful acts of all the creatures which have no mind, as unintelligible because then you have purpose without intent. Purpose without intent cannot be understood as it makes this sort of "purpose" a sort random chance selection, which cannot be "purpose".

Indeed it does, but a being's own form/actuality cannot be a prior cause because nothing is actual until it exists. What is prior is a being's matter, its efficient cause, and its telos or end. Thus, the efficient cause, working on specific matter for a specific end produces a specific form or actuality. — Dfpolis

The telos or end as the intent of the designer, is actual, and prior to the material existence of the thing. This is Wayfarer's principle, or blueprint. The blueprint, or design of the thing, as a form, is actual and prior to the individual material thing. Further, there must be continuity between the form as design, and the form in the individual thing, to avoid the interaction problem. These must be one and the same form, or else we have the so-called interaction problem.

The artist who is "working on specific matter for a specific end" with the means of efficient causation, must actually put the form into the matter. Otherwise there is a separation, a gap, between the form as design and the form within the individual object. This gap denies the possibility of the telos or end being causal. If there is a gap between the form as desired end, and the form as individual object (outcome), there is no causation between the two, and the telos or end is not causal.

So the gap is filled with "efficient cause". The efficient causes are the means. But still there appears to be a difference between the form as design, and the form within the individual, the material object as outcome. The difference is attributed to accidents, and the accidents are the influence of the matter which is chosen by the artist.

Now the question is whether the influence of matter, and the resulting accidents, renders the form of the individual as a distinct form, or is it just a change of form, allowing the form to maintain its identity as the same form, in the way that a changing object maintains its identity as the same object, by the law of identity. I believe that we must allow for the temporal continuity of "the same form", or else there is an interaction problem, a gap between the form as intent, and the form as outcome. But when we allow for this continuity which I am describing, we also admit to independent forms, as the form is then prior to its material existence, therefore independent.

To defend your position, you need to explain how a thing can be actual before it is. I think you are confusing two meanings of "form." An artisan has a "form" in mind before she produces her work, but that "form" is not the "form" (actuality) of the finished product, but her intention, i.e. an end (final cause). In the same way, the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, act on prior states produce final states. — Dfpolis

As I said above, if we do not allow that the form in the artist's mind, and the form of the artist's finished work, are one and the same form, there is a gap between the two which produces an interaction problem. So, in common understanding, we say that the form is brought from the artist's mind, and put into the medium, through the means of efficient causes. Therefore, the intermediary, efficient causation, solves any interaction problem. However, if we deny the continuity between the form in the artist's mind, and the form in the work of art, then we cannot say that the artist takes the form from one's mind and puts it into the medium, through the means of efficient causation. And then we have an implied interaction problem between the form in the mind, and the form in the work of art.

Every creature has a prior creative intention in the mind of God. But, that is a metaphysical, not a physical, explanation. Physically, the form of an acorn is the foundation for the form of the oak into which it may sprout, but, being the foundation for a form is not being the form. It is being a potential. — Dfpolis

The problem here is that physics does not deal with telos, ends, and intention, but metaphysics does. So if the reality of the situation is that telos and intention are causal, and you reject the explanation as metaphysical rather than physical, you are going in the wrong direction. Physics cannot give an explanation for this, but metaphysics can. Therefore you ought to consider the metaphysical explanation , and forget about your desire for a physical explanation.

This is confused. What is ontologically, not temporally, prior is God's creative intent. — Dfpolis

What I am saying is that the oak tree has creative intent when it produces the acorn. It must, because the purpose of the acorn is to produce another oak tree, and intent is defined as purpose. So there is no need to refer to "God's creative intent" at this point, we need only look at the oak tree's creative intent. However, there will be a problem of infinite regress, or a first living being, and at this point we might be inclined to turn to God.

Quite blustery, but demonstration of more accurate understanding of Special Relativity is what I was hoping to see. So like I said, if you can provide that, get back to me. — wonderer1

I demonstrated a very accurate understanding. But you requested math, which is not necessary for an accurate understanding of the principles involved. Therefore you demonstrated an inaccurate understanding, thinking that math was a requirement. And still you refuse to state your argument. Please state your argument.

No actuality can be prior to the existent of which it is the actuality. — Dfpolis

This is inconsistent with Aristotle's Metaphysics. A thing is necessarily the thing which it is and cannot not be the thing it is, by the law of identity. And "a thing" is not a random disorderly existence. So when a thing comes into existence it necessarily has a cause of being the thing it is, and not something else. This cause is the form of the thing, which pre-exists in time, the material existence of the thing. Therefore the form of a thing (its actuality, as what it actually will be) must be prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as cause of it being the very thing that it is, and not something else.

If it were a separate entity, we would have dualism. It is not. A "principle" is the source (arche) of a concept. Consider the actuality and potential of an acorn. Its actuality (eidos = form) is being a kind of nut. Its potential (hyle = timber, poorly as translated "matter") is to be an oak tree. These are not two substances joined in some way, but one thing considered in two ways. So, human souls are actual human beings, while human "matter" is our potential to be planting soil for daisies. — Dfpolis

I think you misrepresent "potential" here. The potential of an acorn is not "to be an oak tree", because "an oak tree" is a form. Potential is better represented as the capacity to be or not be. And since potential encompasses many possibilities, it cannot be restricted by one specific thing, such as your statement, "an oak tree". What restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn in this way, such that we might say it may either become or not become an oak tree, rather than a maple or something else, is the form of the acorn. So your statement "to be an oak tree" does not represent the matter of the acorn, it represents the form of the acorn, as that which restricts the matter to specific possibilities.

Furthermore, this form which is put into the acorn, which restricts its potential in that way, is prior to the material existence of the acorn, as Wayfairer indicated with, "a principle of organization, or blueprint". So it is very clear that the form of the acorn "a kind of nut", which restricts the potential (matter) of the acorn so that the possibilities for what it may become are limited, pre-exists the material existence of the acorn. This form is derived from the parent oak tree which produces the nut.

Therefore the form of the acorn pre-exists the material existence of the acorn, and acts (as an actuality) to direct the coming into being of the material acorn such that the potential (matter) of the acorn is limited in the particular way that it is. This pre-existence of the form of the acorn, as prior in time to the acorn, therefore separate from the acorn, is what we need to deal with as implying the requirement for dualism.

But you won't find out why I think as I do, until you study special relativity well enough to know what you are talking about. So get back to me if that happens. — wonderer1

If you think one has to do the math to understand special relativity, you clearly haven't read Einstein's book. This is a ridiculous conversation. But you're making it fun for me, so carry on please.