If these symmetries were deductions, then they would be faulty deductions, just like the ancient ideal that the orbits of the planets were perfect circles, therefore eternal circular motions. However, I do not think that such things are deductions. I think that they are mathematical principles or axioms which are not properly applied. So they are handy tools, as you say, but when they are applied where they ought not be applied, they become misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not a physicist or topologist, so I'm not qualified to argue the question of "faulty deduction". Are you?

Symmetry is not very high on my list of philosophical subjects. So, I wonder what difference it makes to you whether such relationships are directly objectively observed or subjectively deduced/induced from other observations. Your strongly-worded opinions --- "faulty" ; "properly" ; "ought not" --- imply that it's a moral/ethical or true/false question for you. Are you suggesting that physical symmetry --- or its "application" to philosophy --- violates some higher rule of reality?

Now that sounds like a philosophical topic. Since symmetries are related to natural laws & physical structure, they may qualify as elements of cosmic ethics : e.g. real vs unreal ; observation vs illusion. Does your worldview imply that physical symmetries not just are, but ought to be one way or another? Does physical symmetry have a philosophical role in the Dualism vs Monism question? :smile:

The role of symmetry in fundamental physics :
Einstein’s great advance in 1905 was to put symmetry first, to regard the symmetry principle as the primary feature of nature that constrains the allowable dynamical laws. . . . Symmetry principles play an important role with respect to the laws of nature. They summarize the regularities of the laws that are independent of the specific dynamics.
https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.93.25.14256


The is-ought fallacy occurs when the assumption is made that because things are a certain way, they should be that way

This means that if time ( where time = rate of firing) is not a factor in the formation of the distribution pattern, which implies that time is not a variable in the generation of the interference pattern. — Wayfarer

It is not a variable in describing the final pattern, but it is a factor in describing the dynamics that bring the pattern about. It takes time for the electron wave to arrive, and time for it to interact with the electron waves in the detector's atoms.

The outcome of the experiment, the interference pattern, is a result of the quantum probabilistic nature — Wayfarer

Yes, that is what people say. Yet, it is not the case. It is an accepted fact that all unobserved processes are deterministic. So, put the whole experiment in a box and do not observe it. (You could even include an observer in the box.) Then you can only conclude that the interaction with the detector is deterministic. (If you included an observer, that would also include her observations.) Looking at it after the fact will not change this. So, the hypothesis that observations are random is inconsistent.

In that sense, the wave function is not a function of time, in a way that is very different from physical waves, which are obviously time-dependent. — Wayfarer

There is an experiment in which a beam of neutral kaons interferes with itself, because the neutral kaon has two different states that have different masses and so different frequencies. This can be observed because different combinations of these states decay in different ways. As you move the detection apparatus along the the length of the beam different decay modes are detected, showing that the different mass states interfere with each other in real time.

It is an accepted fact that all unobserved processes are deterministic — Dfpolis

Being determined by what, exactly? Isn't the whole point of uncertainty that it's.....uncertain?

As with all natural science, it is a theoretical statement. The wave equations of quantum theory are well confirmed, and they are deterministic.

The wave equations of quantum theory are well confirmed, and they are deterministic. — Dfpolis

Confirmed, yes, but 'deterministic' is questionable. Quantum mechanics is not a deterministic theory in the classical sense. In classical physics, if you know the initial conditions of a system with perfect precision, you can predict its future state with certainty. In quantum mechanics, this determinism is replaced by inherent probabilistic behavior. The Schrödinger equation describes the time evolution of a quantum system. It gives the probability distribution of where a particle is likely to be found at a given time. The outcome of measurements in quantum mechanics is probabilistic, meaning that you can only predict the probability of obtaining a particular measurement result, not the specific outcome for a single measurement (per Quantum (Manjit Kumar) and Uncertainty (David Lindley)).

...if you know the initial conditions of a system with perfect precision, you can predict its future state with certainty. In quantum mechanics, this determinism is replaced by inherent probabilistic behavior. — Wayfarer

Is the determinism replaced, or is it simply the case that you can't know the initial conditions of a system with perfect precision?

Is the determinism replaced, or is it simply the case that you can't know the initial conditions of a system with perfect precision? — wonderer1

It's controversial but as conveyed in both those references I gave, it is non-deterministic - uncertainty is real. That is why for example you have the wave-particle duality - in some contexts, a wave is observed, in other contexts, a particle. Whether it's 'really' a wave or 'really' a particle is impossible to ascertain.

From Brian Greene, Fabric of the Cosmos, in relation to a discussion of uncertainty and the measurement problem, and whether that problem arises because of interfering with the object:

The explanation of uncertainty as arising through the unavoidable disturbance caused by the measurement process has provided physicists with a useful intuitive guide… . However, it can also be misleading. It may give the impression that uncertainty arises only when we lumbering experimenters meddle with things. This is not true. Uncertainty is built into the wave structure of quantum mechanics and exists whether or not we carry out some clumsy measurement. As an example, take a look at a particularly simple probability wave for a particle, the analog of a gently rolling ocean wave, shown in Figure 4.6.

Since the peaks are all uniformly moving to the right, you might guess that this wave describes a particle moving with the velocity of the wave peaks; experiments confirm that supposition. But where is the particle? Since the wave is uniformly spread throughout space, there is no way for us to say that the electron is here or there. When measured, it literally could be found anywhere. So while we know precisely how fast the particle is moving, there is huge uncertainty about its position. And as you see, this conclusion does not depend on our disturbing the particle. We never touched it. Instead, it relies on a basic feature of waves: they can be spreak out. — Brian Greene, The Fabric of the Cosmos

Fig 4.6

Do you think you can know the initial conditions of a system with perfect precision? Is this something you have done?

I'm not an experimental physicist, myself, but I trust the sources I've referenced. Besides, the fact of uncertainty is well-established - it's the implications of it that are contested.

It seems to me as if you are aren't really engaging with my question, and are instead presenting a red herring.

It’s probably more that I fail to see the point of the question. But if you mean, is uncertainty a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the initial conditions, I think Brian Greene answers that in the negative. If you don’t think so, maybe you might re-phrase it.

In quantum mechanics, this determinism is replaced by inherent probabilistic behavior. — Wayfarer

No, it is not. Not being able to determine the exact value of classical variables does not mean that the system is intrinsically random. It only means that classical variables are not the best means of defining its state.

It gives the probability distribution of where a particle is likely to be found at a given time. — Wayfarer

If you insist that quanta are particles, you will suffer the logical consequences of the error you have made. There are no "particles," only wave structures. Wave structures are not point-like and insisting that they are will cause you to think that your non-existent particles are in random places.

you can only predict the probability of obtaining a particular measurement result, not the specific outcome for a single measurement (per Quantum (Manjit Kumar) and Uncertainty (David Lindley)). — Wayfarer

If you are ignorant of the exact initial state, you will be ignorant of the exact final state, no matter how deterministic the dynamics are. Further, quantum measurement is a nonlinear process, which is mathematically chaotic, subject to the Lorenz Butterfly effect.

It’s probably more that I fail to see the point of the question. But if you mean, is uncertainty a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the initial conditions, I think Brian Greene answers that in the negative. If you don’t think so, maybe you might re-phrase it. — Wayfarer

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. The wave structure is perfectly well-defined, but it you insist it is a particle, which it is not, you will be unable to assign particle properties with precision. Similarly, if you insist that a pig can fly, you will have difficulty explaining how.

Quantum waves constitute matter. Wave functions are the mathematical functions describing these matter waves and their interactions. The concept is an ideal, but it is based on the observation of real wave properties, specifically, interference of the type demonstrated in Young's experiment. — Dfpolis

Without an underlying substance which is waving (the proposed aether for example), these are not real "waves", and cannot constitute matter. Being "ideal", there is no representation for the accidents of "matter". There is simply "uncertainty", with no matter/form distinction to isolate the uncertain aspects from the certain. The result is that uncertainty permeates the entire conceptual structure. It's a type of formalism whereby the content is incorporated right into the form, to produce the illusion that the conceptual structure is entirely formal, thereby eliminating the unintelligible content (matter), but this is just an illusion. In reality though, the unintelligibility of content (matter) is incorporated right into the form from the premises, allowing it to permeate the entire conceptual structure as uncertainty.

You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. It would seem like physics allows contradiction then. "Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. Allowing contradiction into the premises by premising a wave with no medium, is what allows uncertainty to permeate. "Matter" as the designator of the unintelligible is lost as being incorporated into the form.

Rather, mass is a quantity associated with them. — Dfpolis

Now we have ambiguity as to what "mass" is. In some cases it's the property of a body, and in other cases, it's "a quantity associated with them". This is further evidence of allowing the unintelligible into the premises as the result of formalism. What does that "quantity" represent then, if it is not a property of a body?

It seems like "mass" has become just a variable, a number assigned arbitrarily, but according to rules, to make the equations balance. What is the mass in X set of circumstances? It is whatever quantity is required to balance out the equation. No wonder symmetries are all over the place, they are created whenever desired, by assigning a quantity for "mass" which is required for upholding a symmetry. "Mass" is based in nothing other than the quantity required to fulfill the needs of the physicist. to maintain the invariance prescribed by laws such as conservation laws and the invariance of the speed of light in relativity.

You need to read the history of modern physics if you want to think about these things. It was assumed that we could measure different speeds of light as the earth passed through the either. In 1887 Albert A. Michelson and Edward Morley attempted to do so, and failed. They measure the same speed in each direction and at different orbital positions of the earth. So, we were forced, experimentally, to conclude that the measured speed of light is invariant. Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false. — Dfpolis

This is exactly what I argued in another thread recently, "Contrary to popular belief, their experiment did not show that there is no aether, but that one aether theory was false". But your stated conclusion "that the measured speed of light is invariant", is equally inaccurate. What the experiments demonstrate is that the substance of the physical body, and the substance of the aether, are not distinct substances, but they must be one and the same substance. The experiments involved a very narrow range of type of physical body, so there is insufficient evidence to extend the supposed invariance to other types of bodies, like atoms and the parts of atoms, and in the other direction, galaxies and large things like that.

No, it is not. Fourier transforms enter into the derivation of the uncertainty principle. — Dfpolis

Conjugate variables are the pairs which bear the uncertainty relation of the Fourier transform. It is because of this uncertainty relation prescribed by the Fourier transform, that the relation has the name you gave it . Energy, as "the dynamic variable conjugate to time", denotes an uncertainty relation. According to "Quora", this is what ChatGPT said"

Why are energy and time complementary variables in quantum mechanics?
Profile photo for ChatGPT
ChatGPT
In quantum mechanics, energy and time are described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that the more precisely the position of a particle is known, the less precisely its momentum can be known, and vice versa. The same applies to energy and time, where the more precisely the energy of a particle is known, the less precisely its time can be known, and vice versa. This is due to the wave-like nature of particles in quantum mechanics, where a particle can exist in multiple states simultaneously until it is measured, at which point it collapses into a single state. The uncertainty principle is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics and is a result of the wave-particle duality of matter.

So, yes it is true that defining energy as ""the dynamic variable conjugate to time" puts "energy" into a wider context, just like defining "hot" as the opposite of cold puts "hot" into a wider context, but you now need to respect the context which you have placed "energy" into. You have placed it into the context of having any uncertainty relation with time, as determined by the Fourier transform. This is unlike the certainty relation created by defining "hot" as the opposite of cold. If it is hot it is not cold, is a relation of certainty created by that definition.

Let me be more precise. I mean we have been unable to detect violations of conservation of energy. — Dfpolis

Violations of conservation of energy are detected anytime an experiment is carried out. All of the energy can never be accounted for. There is always a quantity which is lost as time passes. Within a "system", the energy loss may be written off to entropy, and then some people might assume that the energy remains within the system but is unavailable to it. But this is not actually implied, the energy is simply lost. And, it's rather nonsensical, to think that the energy is still in the system when it has been lost to the system. To support the nonsense one might simply adjust the amount of mass assumed to be in the system so that it appears like conservation is upheld. That's the problem with mass being an associated quantity rather than a property of a body, the quantity may be variable, and allowed to be manipulated so as to conform to the theory, providing for the appearance of symmetry.

But, we can. That is what physics, chemistry, biology, etc. do. — Dfpolis

Are we adhering to Aristotelian terms or not? What is represented is always form. "Matter" names the aspect of a thing which does not enter into the understanding. Science produces a formal understanding, and there is always something at the bottom which escapes the formalization, this is the "matter".

However, the modern conception of "matter" has been altered by Newton's laws which name "mass" as a property of matter. But properties must be formal. This move by Newton allows the unintelligibility of "matter" into the formal representation, an example of the problem with formalism which I explained. Now the unintelligibility inheres within the concept "mass". Further, an equivalence has been established between mass and energy by means of Einsteinian relativity and the supposed invariance of the speed of light, such that the unintelligibility of matter, through the means of the concept of "mass" manifests as the uncertainty of the uncertainty principle.

We cannot say that. We can only say that in some cases, we are unable to observe possible imperfections, so, we have no reason to believe that the symmetries are imperfect. — Dfpolis

Symmetries are not imperfect. I am not saying that symmetries are imperfect. What I am saying is that they are ideal, and represent nothing real in the natural, physical world, due to the assumed perfection of the ideal. Current use of "symmetry" is analogous to the ancient law of perfect circular motion criticized by Aristotle in "On the Heavens". Aristotle demonstrated how a thing moving in a circular motion must be a body, and the body must consist of matter, and by this fact it is generated and corrupted, therefore not eternal. So what was demonstrated is that as much as eternal circular motion is logically consistent, and therefore a real logical possibility, the reality of matter in the physical world makes this ideal physically impossible. There must be something material, corruptible involved in that activity, rendering the eternality as impossible, therefore the entire concept as a false representation for anything real.

The very same thing is the case for modern symmetries. The "invariance" described by the laws is ideal and logically consistent, but not truly representative of, or corresponding with, the physical reality of material existence. This problem is covered by Hume's discussion of the incompleteness of induction. The laws of physics have limits to their applicability such that the "invariance" implied by them is not a true, or real representation, because it breaks down at these limits, and the idea that "invariance" is a true or real aspect of the physical world is a faulty conclusion drawn from the fact that the range of applicability appears to be broad, and everything outside this range is ignored. This issue with the supposed "invariance" of the laws of physics is explained well by physicist Lee Smolin, in his book "Time Reborn"

You do not understand the meaning of "symmetry" in physics. It is not the kind of thing that can interact. Rather it is a property of the way things interact. — Dfpolis

The above paragraph ought to demonstrate that this is incorrect. The laws which describe the way that things interact suffer from Hume's problem of induction. And, the invariance presumed, which makes the law a "law" is evidenced only by observations made within the confines of the limits of applicability of the law (ref. Smolin). The invariance, therefore symmetry, of these ideal laws, is not a true representation of the way that things actually do interact.

And it's not a matter of some interactions are consistent with the laws and some are outside the laws. What is the case, is that all interactions have aspects which partake of the extremely micro, and aspects which partake of the extremely macro, so all interactions have aspects which fall outside the range of applicability of the laws. This means that the symmetry expressed as "a property of the way things interact" is not a true representation of any interaction at all, just like an eternal circular motion is not a true representation of any motion at all.

A good example is the law of conservation of energy which you mentioned. Empirical data, observational evidence indicates that energy is never completely conserved in any interaction. This means that any symmetry derived from application of this law is not a true representation, because energy is not actually conserved.

The obvious implication is that we need to determine why energy is never completely conserved in order to have a true understanding of the nature of material existence. The faulty conclusion is that this slight imperfection in the law is simply a difference which does not make a difference. To identify something as a difference, and then insist that it hasn't made a difference is contradictory. Therefore we need to take account of these slight imperfections which demonstrate that the ideal symmetries do not truthfully represent material existence.

I'm not a physicist or topologist, so I'm not qualified to argue the question of "faulty deduction". Are you? — Gnomon

Deductions are logic, which is part of the discipline of philosophy, not physics. Philosophers are trained to determine whether deductions are faulty or not. So if a physicist makes a faulty deduction, being poorly trained in philosophy, it is the task of the philosopher to identify the faulty deduction and bring it to the attention of the physicist.

Are you suggesting that physical symmetry --- or its "application" to philosophy --- violates some higher rule of reality? — Gnomon

I am suggesting that the symmetries of physics are highly useful principles (like my analogy of perfect circular motion which is eternal, was highly useful thousands of years ago, and variations actually remain in many concepts employed in physics), but they are ideals which do not truthfully represent anything existing naturally. So, when we take these ideals, and try to represent them as what is fact, or true in nature, or reality, we are making a mistake of misunderstanding the true nature of reality, which has none of these symmetries in any part of its existence.

Does physical symmetry have a philosophical role in the Dualism vs Monism question? :smile: — Gnomon

Ideals such as "symmetry" play a key role in demonstrating the interaction problem. If way say that a symmetry such as perfect circular motion is in any way a real part of the physical material world, then that perfect symmetry is necessarily isolated from the rest of the world. If it interacted with the material , world which does not consist of those perfections, in any way, the symmetry would, by that interaction, be broken. So, for example, the body engaged in the perfect (ideal) circular motion described by Aristotle would necessarily be eternal. If that body interacted with anything else in the world this would break the perfection of the circle, altering the body, and rendering the whole concept as not applicable. Therefore if these ideal symmetries described anything real within the world, the real things described by them could not be interacting with anything else in the world.

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. — Dfpolis

The uncertainty principle is not so simple. What I believe is that the concept of "mass" incorporates the unintelligibility of "matter" into the formal description of a body. "Mass" as representing "matter" is something unintelligible, which is disguised as being understood in the conceptual structure. When compatibility between mass and electromagnetic radiation is attempted, the limits to our capacity for understanding rapid wave activity described by the uncertainty relation derived from the Fourier transform, is transferred, implanted, and disguised in the unintelligibility inherent within the concept "mass". The uncertainty produced by our limited capacity to understand these waves, is absorbed into the unintelligibility of "mass", hence the tendency to think of waves as particles, particles being understood as things with mass. So the uncertainty is more properly assigned to the attitude of thinking that bodies have mass.

You may insist that the idea of immaterial waves, waves without substance, is good enough for physics, but it's not good enough for metaphysics. — Metaphysician Undercover

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. So, you are right, metaphysics has different concerns.

Wave" is defined in physics as a disturbance moving in a medium. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one is denying this. Physics merely abstracts the aspects of reality it can deal with.

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here.

Similarly, if you insist that a pig can fly, you will have difficulty explaining how. — Dfpolis

however that analogy has weaknesses, because electrons really can appear as particles.

↪Wayfarer
As with all natural science, it is a theoretical statement. The wave equations of quantum theory are well confirmed, and they are deterministic. — Dfpolis

Seems that you and are looking at different parts of the same elephant : equations or experiments. Maxwell's classical wave equation was clearly deterministic. That's why Schrödinger was perplexed when quantum measurements didn't confirm his classical expectations. The inescapable indeterminacy of quantum non-particles was famously illustrated in his Cat in the Box paradox. :nerd:

PS___ The general question of Determinism may have some bearing on the question of genetic or social Interactionism. But I'm not qualified to pursue that angle. Maybe you can "teach" me. :joke:

What exactly is deterministic in Schrödinger's equation?
In quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation, which describes the continuous time evolution of a system's wave function, is deterministic. However, the relationship between a system's wave function and the observable properties of the system appears to be non-deterministic.
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/400162/what-exactly-is-deterministic-in-schr%C3%B6dingers-equation

Are quantum processes deterministic? :
Does Quantum Mechanics Rule Out Free Will? - Scientific American
“In quantum mechanics,” she explains, “we can only predict probabilities for measurement outcomes, rather than the measurement outcomes themselves. The outcomes are not determined, so quantum mechanics is indeterministic. Superdeterminism returns us to determinism.”
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-quantum-mechanics-rule-out-free-will/

Is superdeterminism a real thing?
In general, though, superdeterminism is fundamentally untestable, as the correlations can be postulated to exist since the Big Bang, making the loophole impossible to eliminate. - Wikipedia

Seems that you and ↪Wayfarer are looking at different parts of the same elephant : equations or experiments. — Gnomon

Well, I will defer to dfpolis judgement on the basis that he is qualified in physics and I'm not. I'm interested by his response above, that:

Uncertainty arises from thinking of waves as particles. — Dfpolis

The question this occasions for me (and I can't think of a more subtle way of putting it) is that, if particles don't really exist, then what is everything made of? :roll:

As I have already spent a lot of time trying to teach you what physics tells us, and this whole area is off-topic, I am going to stop here. — Dfpolis

OK, in truth, I forgot the topic. I'll have to reread the op, because the title doesn't seem quite consistent with the op.

While it is absurd to call matter waves "immaterial," physics is not the science of being, but of changes in space and time. — Dfpolis

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". "Potential", as the Aristotelian defining feature of matter is insufficient because the wave functions are clearly understood as referring to forms, actualities, therefore not consistent with Aristotelian "matter". And "mass", as the defining feature of matter in conventional physics is obviously insufficient. So the only way to represent what the wave function refers to as something material, is to produced an intentionally designed definition of matter.

This violates your statement in the op:

Since physics has no intentional effects (despite wishful thinking), it cannot effect intentional operations. — Dfpolis

Obviously, the physics of wave functions has effected the way you look at matter, and influenced you to create an intentionality driven conception of "matter". Physics has affected your intentions, such that you conceptualize "matter" in a way such that you may call these waves "matter waves", when in reality wave functions are formal structures, consisting of ideals which have no true bearing on "matter" by convention conceptions of matter.

You even alter the definition of "physics" to suit your purpose. Instead of the conventional definition, as the discipline which deals with the interactions of matter and energy, which refers to real particular instances of interaction, you define it as dealing with "changes in space and time". Space and time are universals, abstractions which may or may not have been derived from the discipline of physics.

So you actually reverse the role of the discipline. Instead of recognizing that physics is the science of particulars, instances of matter and energy, you cast it as the science of the universal abstractions, space and time. In reality though, metaphysics is the discipline which deals with such abstractions.

This is hardly a problem when we realize that both physics and mathematics are based on abstractions -- which is to say they are the result of attending to some aspects of reality while ignoring others. — Dfpolis

This mischaracterizing of "physics" is evident here in the op. Physics is not based in abstractions. It is an empirical science, based in particular instances of observation, from which abstractions may be logically induced and deduced. This is a very significant difference ontologically, and consequently epistemologically, which you ought to respect.

When you respect this difference, you will understand that abstractions, universals, and ideals, are necessarily prior to any empirical science, as the means by which the particular instances of the physical world, are grasped and understood by the intellect within the activities of the empirical sciences. The faculty of the intellect, or soul which produces these abstraction cannot be an empirical science like physics, because these abstractions are necessarily prior to the activities of those science. The empirical science must not be allowed to be based in the abstractions themselves, or else the objectivity of the science will be overcome by the subjectivity of the abstraction. The science therefore is based in the particular instances of observation, and this may be used to override the preexisting (therefore prejudiced) abstractions

So for example, the scientific method is said to proceed from hypotheses to try them in experimentation. These hypotheses are necessarily prior to the method of sciences which seeks validate them, therefore they are not themselves "scientific". That word can only be affixed posteriorly, after they been tested through experimentation. Therefore the hypotheses must be produced through some other means than science. And if you look into this, you will discover that the production of such hypotheses is very much purpose directed, driven by intentionality. The science itself though, must be based in the particular instances of observation, in order that it may be used to rid the abstractions of subjective prejudice.

Once we realized that abstractions are not reality, things become easier. There is no reason to think that the laws of mindless matter should apply without modification to thinking beings. — Dfpolis

This statement then becomes rather ironic. The "modification to thinking beings" which you recommend turns out to be the need to dismiss the proposition which leads to this, "abstractions are not reality". Once it is realized that abstractions are at the very base of our understanding, prior to observation, as the means by which observation is made, we must realize that abstractions are the only reality which we have, and everything else is understood in relation to this assumed reality. When observation indicates mistakes within "reality" (being the abstractions) modification of reality is required.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions.

You see, the particular instances of observation utilized by the empirical sciences, do not provide any sort of "reality" to us. Nor do they provide us a window into reality. All they do is give us the information required to make judgements, against or for, the preexisting reality (the prejudices), which form our reality, the world of abstractions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our concept of reality is based on what can be experienced, aka what can be observed.

however that analogy has weaknesses, because electrons really can appear as particles. — Wayfarer

Some of what electrons do can be interpreted as particle behavior. All of what electrons do can be interpreted as wave behavior. That means that the particle hypothesis is falsified, while the wave hypothesis is not. What makes the waves appear to be localized is that they interact with atoms in which the electron waves are localized.

The inescapable indeterminacy of quantum non-particles was famously illustrated in his Cat in the Box paradox. — Gnomon

Schroedinger's cat was designed to show the absurdity of the probabilistic interpretation, not support it. It is not a fact. It is the consequence of a hypothetical interpretation, based on thinking of detectors as classical devices. If you think of detectors properly, as composed of atoms behaving quantum mechanically, there is no need for randomness. Indeed, assuming it is contradictory.

the observable properties of the system appears to be non-deterministic. — Gnomon

Only if you assume that electrons are particles. If you drop that assumption, there is no need for them to have either well-defined momentum or well-defined positions. All you have is a complex, extended wave structure.

The outcomes are not determined, so quantum mechanics is indeterministic. — Gnomon

This is a non sequitur. Being unable to predict the exact result of a measurement does not mean that it is not determined. We cannot predict turbulent flow and everyone agrees that it is deterministic.

Also, free will is not indeterminate will. It is will determined by the agent willing.

The problem is that there is no conventional definition of "matter" which allows this "wave-like" feature of reality to be called "matter waves". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures.

Some of what electrons do can be interpreted as particle behavior. All of what electrons do can be interpreted as wave behavior. That means that the particle hypothesis is falsified, while the wave hypothesis is not. — Dfpolis

The wave-particle duality does not falsify either the particle or wave hypothesis. Instead, it suggests that particles like electrons exhibit properties of both particles and waves depending on the experimental context. Quantum mechanics doesn't choose between the particle or wave nature of particles; it incorporates both aspects into its mathematical framework.

Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures. — Dfpolis

While it's true that matter at the quantum level can be described by wave functions, I understood that the wave functions themselves are mathematical representations that describe the probability distributions of finding particles like electrons in certain states or positions. Matter is composed of particles (like electrons, protons, and neutrons) that exhibit both particle and wave properties. I think it's fallacious to claim it is purely one or the other, or that bodies consist of 'wave structures'.

Being unable to predict the exact result of a measurement does not mean that it is not determined. We cannot predict turbulent flow and everyone agrees that it is deterministic. — Dfpolis

In quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle is not about the inability to predict measurement outcomes accurately; it's about inherent limits on how precisely certain pairs of properties (like position and momentum) can be simultaneously known (which is the uncertainty principle.)

In the context of turbulent flow, while it can be challenging to make precise predictions due to the complex nature of the system and its sensitivity to initial conditions, it is still considered deterministic in classical physics. However classical determinism is fundamentally different from the quantum uncertainty principle, which arises due to the probabilistic nature of particles at the quantum level.

Yes, there is. Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures. — Dfpolis

This is where we disagree. "Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. They are mathematical descriptions without substance, as Wayfarer describes above. So they are descriptive 'forms', not the 'matter' of physical bodies, evidenced by the fact that they only reference the possibility of a body. Saying that matter is wave structures is like saying that matter is a collection of properties. But this annihilates the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, and leaves the collection of properties without substance.

I believe that what you are proposing is a simple Pythagorean idealism. As such, it suffers from the interaction problem. Like I explained, the ideals (symmetries) of the wave structures, if they were the real matter, could not possibly interact with the world of physical bodies which we observe in experience. This interaction problem has two principal manifestations in quantum physics, first the problem of nonlocal causation, and second, the need to assume random chance activities.

The solution I outlined is the need to identify the true substance of the waves, the medium which is waving, as the proper "matter" which the wave structures are the formal representation of. Without identifying this substance as "the matter", the "wave structures" representation will always suffer from this interaction problem.

Further analysis of the wave function representation will show the interaction problem involved with this type of idealism much more clearly. Space is represented as points in a coordinate system. Because each point is represented as having commuting observables, uncertainty is inherent within the representation of each point of the space represented. The uncertainty is represented by the Fourier transform, as the fundamental inability to accurately determine spatial activity (frequency) over a duration of time. This uncertainty leaves a gap between the mathematical ideals of representation, and what is actually occurring in the space being represented. It is an "interaction problem" because the ideals employed have incorporated within themselves, the inability to accurately represent the spatial-temporal relation (the uncertainty of the Fourier transform), and therefore cannot provide the means for bridging this gap. In other words "the ideals" are compromised to allow uncertainty to inhere within them, rendering them as less than ideal.

The difference between the representation of the Fourier transform, and what is actually happening in the physical reality can be approached here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matrix_mechanics

"Wave structures" refers to conceptual structures composed of mathematical ideals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since I made the reference, I know what I am referring to, and I am not saying that bodies that are made of mathematical structures. They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. The fact that waves may be described mathematically does not mean that they are mathematical abstractions. Things are not their descriptions, and refusing to admit that is irrational.

Matter is what composes bodies. They are composed of wave structures. — Dfpolis

What kind of substance (e.g. matter ; math ; other) are "wave structures" made of? :smile:

I put the question about the nature of the wave function to ChatGPT. I don't regard it as authoritative, but it's a useful summary of the issues. But I don't think the question ought to be pursued further as it's tangential to the OP.

They are made of waves that may be described by the Schoedinger equation, and more accurately by the Dirac equation. — Dfpolis

The problem being that these equations do not describe waves, and you know this. A description of the medium, and the restrictions placed on potential wave movement due to the composition of the medium, or substance which the wave exists in, is replaced with "degrees of freedom". Even if we assume real underlying waves, as what is being described, not one of these equations can provide an adequate description of what is going on, because the "degrees of freedom" are formulated according to the circumstances rather than according to an understanding of the medium itself, and the restrictions intrinsic to the nature of that medium. That's why a synthesis of many such equations is required for quantum field theory, to account for the various ways of determining degrees of freedom.

Furthermore, the fact that a representation of a temporal continuity may be produced which is very similar to how waves would appear if represented in this way, is insufficient evidence to make the deductive conclusion that waves are being represented. This is because the essence of "waves", by definition, is "disturbance in a substance", and that is not what is represented by those equations which describe degrees of freedom. Simply, the substance has not been identified.

What kind of substance (e.g. matter ; math ; other) are "wave structures" made of? — Gnomon

What are light waves made of? We do not know. That does not stop us from knowing that light is a wave. The same is true of matter waves. I should add that there are no mathematical substances, only mathematical concepts, based on abstraction form physical reality. We know some properties of the medium, namely, that it obeys, to a good approximation, the equations currently in use.