Phenomena in the world are not constrained to behave in accordance with our definitions. Before Michelson-Morley, people did believe that a medium was required for a wave to propagate. It took them a while to be convinced otherwise. Your definition is 150 years out of date. — T Clark

This is not at all true. The physics of waves is very definite. Waves require a medium. All physicists know this, it is taught in basic high school level physics. This is why light is understood by physicists to exist as particles, photons, not as waves, and the movement of photons is understood by "wave functions", not waves

So the best analogy I can come up with is that photons are particles which also exhibit wave-like behavior. — EricH

That's right, the principles of physics force us to treat this as "wave-like behaviour". This will be the case until we determine and identify the medium, at which time we will be able to treat it as true waves, which the empirical evidence indicates that it obviously is. Consider, that thousands of years ago people understood sound to be vibrations in the air. They knew, by its behaviour, wind and sound vibrations, that "air" had to be a medium, but they could not see it, nor identify the particles which air is comprised of. Having no capacity to see or identify any particles of air did not prevent them from developing an understanding of "air" as a substance. This is the same way that we should look at the aether. The evidence, wave-like behaviour, indicates that it is there, we just have not yet been able to understand its existence.

By way of background, I'm pointing to the issue of definite descriptions, claiming that the arguments to the effects that one does not need a definite description in order for reference to function are pretty convincing. — Banno

It's very obvious that we do not need definite descriptions for proper names to work. We can just point to a thing and name it, with absolutely no description whatsoever.

The problem appears when we consider the fact that anything named in this way necessarily has a temporal continuity of existence (in traditional terms it is a "temporal object"), and so it has the property of a temporal duration.

This is a problem for "definite descriptions" because empirical evidence indicates that all temporal things are necessarily changing as time passes. So any proposed "definite description" would require an inclusion of the temporal changes to the object, in order to make the object identifiable at any time. Simply stating the description for a specific point in time would not suffice, because then the object would only be identifiable at that point in time, which would never coincide with "now" which always seems to consist of a duration of time.

The problem becomes even more difficult when we consider the nature of temporal existence, and the fact that the future consists of possibilities. Because the future consists of possibilities, any supposed "true" temporal extension of the object, into the future cannot be known. As Aristotle argued there is no truth or falsity concerning future events which are possible (future possibilities violate the law of excluded middle). Therefore this part of the object's description is necessarily "indefinite". This renders "definite descriptions" as an impossibility. So not only is it the case that definite descriptions are not necessary, they are necessarily impossible, and very definitely not the way that proper names work.

I don't have much background in Aristotle, but suspect that logic has come some way since his time. — Banno

You ought to listen to what @Leontiskos says. Aristotelean logic was the principal, if not the only, form of logic studied in European schools for hundreds of years. It forms the foundation for all modern formal logic, other than modern mathematics which under the influence of Hegel took a different approach to Aristotle's law of identity. Aristotelian logic even provided the grounds for modern modal logic, with his insistence on an exception to the law of excluded middle for future events, and the role of the potential of "matter" in the unfolding of time. The Hegelian approach is to allow that "matter" violates the law of noncontradiction (dialectical materialism), something which Aristotle was strongly opposed to. Violation of the law of noncontradiction leaves the law of identity as completely useless, which is what Hegel argued about this law, that it is in fact completely useless.

Well, I think there is two basic problems with the conclusions you draw from the experiment. First, is that you cannot necessarily say that it was a sense of duty which lead those people into that movement. Different people have different reasons for joining into such a movement. Second, is that even if all those people were moved by a sense of duty, this does not validate your claim that duty is the "single strongest motivator for action", because there is no other motivators offered for comparison.

There is no indication of what percentage of the people exposed to the movement joined the movement, and there is no indication as to what other type of motivators those people were exposed to at the same time for comparison, to show that they chose the experimental movement out of a sense of duty, over something else. So for example, it might have been the case that the people who joined the movement were just extremely bored at the time, with nothing better to do, or even that some other incentives for joining were offered, that are undisclosed to us. (The followers were students, and the conditions were of course set up by the teacher who was carrying out the experiment, so he might have set up conditions of extreme boredom in the classroom, then offered the students 'something to do'.)

If I believe what I am writing I am not operating on bad faith.

I try my best to explain my reasoning. — NOS4A2

I think it's better known as "rationalizing". When a person rationalizes it is quite likely that they do not actually believe what they are rationalizing. The rationalizing seems to be done as a way for the person to convince oneself that something which they want to believe, but they cannot quite apprehend as believable, actually is believable.

This is not a metaphysical statement. In this context it's a statement about optics, the physics of light, and it's wrong. — T Clark

You're displaying very poor reading skills T Clark. Please reread the statement you quoted. It's not at all a statement about the physics of light. I never mentioned "light" or "electromagnetism". It's a statement about what it means to be a "wave", how the concept indicated by that word is understood through normal human conventions, especially as it is used in the more specific physics of waves.

So, if light exists as a wave, which much evidence indicates, then it exists according to the principles understood by the concept signified by "wave", which i was talking about in the statement. It is a simple conclusion of deductive logic. P1, Waves have x essential properties. P2 Light exists as waves. C Therefore light has X properties.

Again - this statement is at odds with the fundamental basis of modern physics. — T Clark

It might be "at odds with the fundamental basis of modern physics" but it's a true statement about the logical conclusion we can draw from the M-M experiments, if we adhere to the premise that light exists as a wave. As the article you quoted stated, the experiment was an attempt to detect the relative motion of matter through the aether. The experiments could not determine any such relative motion, and strongly indicate that there is no such relative motion. From here we can either conclude that there is no aether therefore light does not exist as waves, but for some unknown reason appears to be spookily similar to waves, or we can maintain the premise that light exists as a wave, therefore there is an aether: and from the results of those experiments we can conclude that matter moves with the aether, so that there is no such relative motion. If modern physicists have failed to draw the latter conclusion, and cannot understand why light spookily appears to exist as a wave, then that is a problem with modern physics, not a problem with my statement, which is at odds with modern physics.

I agree that a value judgement is an activity, an event. But I’m not talking about a particular value created by such a judgement - a measurement. That is a position in a hierarchical (linear) relation to our momentary involvement in that event. It is not an object. What I’m referring to is qualitative or potential value as variability, not a value as a reductionist relation to intra-action. — Possibility

Do you not agree that a "value" is the worth, desirability, or usefulness of a thing? And that this is the product of a judgement? If a particular thing has a "variable" value, then the thing has a different worth, desirability or usefulness depending on its context of existence relative to the mind that makes the judgement. How could a thing possibly have a variable value unless its value is a feature of its relationship with the mind which determines its value?

What I’m saying is we assume that value structures are dependent on the human mind, but this is a misunderstanding. The number is a measurement, a momentary intra-action with value, not value itself. It is the human mind that consists of ongoing value judgement - ongoing relationality to the inherent variability of potential/value. — Possibility

I really cannot see how you are proposing to separate the value from the judgement, in order to support you claim that it is incorrect, or a misunderstanding, to say that value structures are mind-dependent.

What you appear to be saying, is that the number produced by a measurement, is the result of an interaction between a mind, and a value, such that both the value and the mind pre-exist the judgement. When the mind and the value come into relationship with one another, the mind measures, or makes a judgement, and the result is a number. The number represents the value, but the value maintains its independent status. So numbers are not values, they are representations of values.

In order for me to understand what you are proposing, I'm going to replace "number" which is a quantitative representation of value, with "good", which is qualitative. So we have goods which exist independently of the minds which apprehend them, as independent values. I like to call these goods "objects", instead of values (but maybe you don't like this), and I reserve "value" as the result of the judgement which the mind makes concerning the independent thing, which is considered as the "good" here. But I'll consider that the independent thing, the good itself, is a value, as you propose, and allow that the mind simply makes a representation of the real value, which exists independently.

Now, let's consider the matter of "variability". From my perspective, I would say that the variability of a value is a product of the relationship between the thing being valued, and the mind which values it. Differences in this relationship are responsible for the variability of the value. Variability is a product of the process of evaluation. But your proposal does not allow this. The value is independent from the mind which evaluates, so variability must inhere within the value itself.

How do you propose that a mind could ever determine the true representation of a value if the truth is that the value itself is variable? Any determination, or representation of a value, made by a mind, could be proven to be false, because the value itself, being represented, is intrinsically variable. Therefore no representation could be the true representation, or else contradicting representations could be true. If your proposal represents the truth about the way that values exist, then it would be absolutely impossible to determine the true representation of the value, because the value itself would be inherently variable, and any representation of it, produced by a mind, would be equally true and false.

On the other hand, the way that I look at values, "value" being the result of the relationship between a thing, object, and a mind, we can readily account for variability as a result of differences within this relationship. There can be a truth about the thing, the object, and variability is just a product of differences in the variety of possible relationships between mind and object.

Accordingly, your proposal excludes the possibility of truth concerning 'that which is independent', while the way that I look at 'that which is independent' allows for the possibility of truth. This is why I say that philosophers, metaphysicians, who are seeking truth, must necessarily reject proposals such as yours, because they render truth as impossible, and they ought to proceed in a direction such as what is outlined here by me, because this direction leaves truth as possible.

The only requirements for a system are complexity and relationality. — Possibility

Not quite, #1 assumes a "working together" as a "complex whole". This implies cooperation in relation to a purpose. And this means that such a "system" is created by intention. Also, #2 expresses intention toward getting something done. Therefore both #1 and #2 express more than complexity and relationality, but also purpose and intent. That is why I say that all systems are artificial, it's simply within the nature of what "a system" is, by any conventional definition.

Stop trying to anthropomorphise the hurricane. Regardless of our models, a hurricane would not exist without certain intra-acting variables (not particular values), which also determine its duration, movement, intensity, etc. Whether or not anyone cares or understands, these variable aspects of reality are important and significant to the hurricane in its becoming. — Possibility

This clearly exemplifies the philosophically repugnant and unintelligibility of you perspective, as explained above. You position "values" as within the thing itself (the hurricane in this example), and therefore the variability of the values is also within the thing itself, rendering the truth about the thing as impossible to determine because the values themselves are indeterminate. Why did the hurricane make a last minute change which was not predicted? Because there was an amplified number of quantum fluctuations of value, which are actually impossible to predict, and this made it decide to do that.

There is the human mind governed by grammatical logic, and some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent. — Possibility

This is what is derived from your perspective, "some external system of reality it cannot accurately represent", because you place variability as inherent within that external "system". The human mind cannot possibly represent the external system of reality in a truthful way, because variability inheres within the independent reality, as contradicting properties within the thing itself. My perspective, on the other hand allows that the human mind can accurately represent the external reality because variability is a result of the relationship between the mind and the thing, it just has not yet developed that representation. Understanding this relationship, and properly representing it as a feature of our representations of reality allows for accurate representation.

It’s a refusal to posit and seek to understand a broader relational framework in which two systems can intra-act. — Possibility

the idea of two systems intra-acting is completely useless as an approach to understanding the truth about natural reality. This is because the division of nature into separate systems would be completely arbitrary so the relations between systems would not represent any true relations between true things, but arbitrary boundaries imposed for various purposes, just like "model-dependent reality". This is evident in your hurricane example. We could model a high pressure area as "a system", and a low pressure area as "a system", or two low pressure areas as "two systems", and map these distinct systems with boundaries. However, any such boundaries are completely artificial, and arbitrary, and are not truthfully representative of the true nature of the atmospheric processes.

I’m suggesting that you consider the possibility that this logical system dictated by grammatical conventions exists in a broader relational framework which includes those aspects of mathematical and scientific findings that appear to contradict within the narrow framework of grammatical logic. Consider the possibility that you’re on the wrong track, if it must stop at dualism. — Possibility

I have very often, in the past considered the possibility that I am on the wrong track, and I continue to do so today. That is why I consider your posts very seriously, as I said, an open mind is a requirement for the seeking of truth. However, I have discussed this type of metaphysics already at this forum, and the deficiencies of the approach are becoming more and more apparent. Therefore this discussion with you serves more to strengthen my opinion rather than to change my mind. It's becoming more and more apparent to me, that the reason why mathematical and scientific findings seem to contradict the narrow framework of grammatical logic (the very few true principles I've found to cling to), from which I approach, is because the logic of these fields of discipline is severely compromised.

This is completely at odds with the fundamental basis of modern physics. There's no legitimate physicist in the world who believes it. Light propagates without a medium. If you post this on a physics forum, it will be removed immediately. It's pseudoscience. — T Clark

It's not pseudoscience which I am engaged in, because I do not pretend to be doing science. I am speculating in metaphysics and not at all pretending to be doing physics. The larger problem though is with the way that many people regard physicists. If a physicist speculates in metaphysics, many individuals will believe that such speculations are actually science because the speculations are carried out by a scientist.

Clearly such speculations, even if carried out by a scientist, are not science. And in reality, unless the physicist is properly educated in metaphysics, this physicist is just an undisciplined metaphysician, practising pseudo-metaphysics. Steven Hawking is a prime example of a pseudo-metaphysician. He clearly had very little if any training in metaphysics, yet in books like "The Grand Design" he pretended to be well-versed in it.

The experiment compared the speed of light in perpendicular directions in an attempt to detect the relative motion of matter through the luminiferous aether ("aether wind"). — Wikipedia - The Michaelson-Morley Experiment

This is the key point, the attempt to detect "relative motion" of matter through the ether. If it is the case that matter as well as the waves are both properties of the ether, then there would be no such relative motion, what we perceive as matter would just be a moving part of the ether. And, this is supported by quantum field theory. Particles of matter are understood as properties of the field, not distinct from (so as to move relative to) the field.

The comparison is an understandable one to bring up, I think, but this answer illuminates what I was saying above: the quantum field(s) being Lorenz invariant makes it fundamentally different from the aether — flannel jesus

It's fundamentally different from the aether, because the aether was always understood as an independent, separate substance from the bodies which exist within it. This was the premise of the M-M experiment. Now, respecting the results of M-M, we can either say that this was a misunderstanding of the aether, and produce a new model of the aether which does not have that requirement, or we can insist that "separate substance" is essential to the conception named "aether", and therefore dismiss "aether" as inadequate, and come up with a new word to refer to the medium for light.

Clearly, "field" is inadequate because it represents the medium with random locations, arbitrary points, instead of identifying the true particles which must exist within the medium, comprising the medium, as is required to support the observed wave motion of electromagnetism. Only through identification and modeling of the true particles of the medium can an adequate understanding of it be produced. And according to what M-M indicates (no aether wind), along with what the experiments of quantum field theory indicate, all massive objects must be composed of this same medium.

But a value judgement is not value as an objective structure of reality. It’s much more complex than this narrowly perceived relation configured as a linear hierarchy or sliding scale. — Possibility

OK, I will admit that it is possible to say that a value is not itself a value judgement. We can say that it is the result, or consequence of a value judgement. And, this is a necessary relation, a value does not exist independently of a value judgement, it is dependent on a value judgement, as only being capable of being produced by a value judgement. We can say, this is what a value is, what is produced from that type of judgement.

Also, please note that a value judgement, is an activity, an event. But a value, if we allow it separate existence, as something created by such a judgement, is now static, an object, because it has been separated from the agent, and the activity which created it. This is why we can say that a value is dependent on that agency, and is not properly independent from it.

To understand value, we need to take into account the capacity of non-human materiality to contribute to a broader perception of meaning. The oscillation frequency of an electron in a caesium atom matters to us ‘reading’ an atomic clock, but does this matter if no-one is ‘telling’ the time? And isn’t the number we attribute to this frequency just a value judgement - a measurement derived from our collaboration with the materiality of the clock components in ‘telling time’? The notion that meaning and value are structures exclusive to the human mind is symptomatic of grammatical conventions falling behind in understanding our broader relationality with the world. — Possibility

In this paragraph you describe value structures as being dependent on the human mind, then you conclude by saying that this is a " falling behind in understanding". But there is no other way to understand values, except as being dependent on minds, so how can this understanding be a" falling behind", rather than a moving forward. In reality, to deny that values are dependent on value judgements, which are dependent on minds, is what ought to be called a falling behind in understanding.

Agency is recognised as a property of the system itself, and these so-called ‘subjects’, ‘actions’ and ‘objects’ are all fundamentally active elements, their apparent ‘properties’ a purposeful configuration of the particular intra-action, within which we should recognise ourselves as necessarily involved. — Possibility

All systems are artificial. We have mechanical systems, logical systems, as well as representative systems such as models. But all types of systems are fundamentally artificial, therefore agency in the sense of an intentional action of an intentional being, is required for the creation of any system. So agency is prior to a system, as cause of it, and any form of agency which inheres within the system is distinct from the type of agency which acts as a cause of the system. Now we have a very obvious need for dualism, to account for these two very distinct types of agency.

A mind is not required to respond to the variability of value, only to render it as a judgement, an opinion. — Possibility

All you are saying here is that a mind is required for the existence of the value, as a value. That is exactly what I am arguing.

We can reference God if you’d like, but I would argue that God is not an actual being who makes value judgements, but is the pure, undifferentiated source of logical, qualitative and dynamic relationality, with which all judgements are but a localised (limited) intra-action of perceived meaning. — Possibility

If God does not make value judgements, then we cannot reference God as the source of values independent from human minds. Therefore we ought to accept what the inductive reasoning and evidence shows us, that there are no independent values. All values are dependent on minds of the type that are human minds.

So we understand that what is important to the hurricane are some variables and not others - regardless of how it might be perceived in terms of ‘value’. — Possibility

This is very obviously a misunderstanding. Those particular values which are called "variables" are not important to the hurricane itself, but are important to the human understanding of the hurricane. The human beings are modeling the storm as a "system" and these are the variables which are important to them in their understanding of the storm. They are not important to the storm itself, because the storm has no intention, purpose, and doesn't care about anything whatsoever.

Then how can you be sure you’re on the right road, or even heading in the right direction? — Possibility

As I said, intuition. And, very often I am on the wrong track, that's the problem with intuition, it's not super reliable. However, the open mind which is a necessary aspect of seeking the truth allows a person to readily change one's mind, as the need arises. That's the Socratic position of not knowing, the lack of certitude provides for an open mind.

That feeling of ‘repugnance’ is intuition telling you there’s something amiss, but there's no determining from affect alone whether what’s amiss is in what you’re describing or the system you’re using to describe it. And you can only critique the system from outside it. So what are you afraid of? — Possibility

I don't follow this. The whole point of dualism is to allow for this position, that the thing being described, and the system describing it, are distinct. You reject dualism, but now you use a premise which requires dualism, "you can only critique the system from outside it", to make your argument. Without dualism, there is no such thing as outside the system, so the describing would be done with the same system which is being described. I believe this is why you seem to have a hard time with the category separation between the representation and the thing represented resulting in the category mistake I've pointed to. An activity, as a type, a description, or a model, does not require a particular thing which is active, because any specific activity is a type, a universal. But a particular activity, meaning a particular instance of activity, always involves something which is active.

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So why cling to the goal? Why not try to understand the complexity as it exists? — Possibility

Contradictions are impossible to understand. When they arise, we must respect the fact that the method being used, which creates contradiction, is faulty, rather than trying endlessly to understand what is impossible to understand.

M-M explicitly disproved that notion. If there was a substance, then M-M would have detected it. That's what eventually led to relativity. If I'm misunderstanding it then please explain. — EricH

What M-M disproved is that the relationship between massive objects, bodies, and the ether, is not as was hypothesized. That does not prove that there is no substance which is waving, it just proves that the relationship between massive objects and the substance which is waving, is not as they thought it ought to have been. I think you can read this on Wikipedia, or other online explanations of M-M.

Then, instead of trying to determine the proper relation between massive objects and the ether, the physics community decided just to dispense with the ether altogether, because that facilitated the application of Einsteinian relativity.

Ok, suppose space is the "substance there which is waving". After all, the gravitational wave observations (combined with electromagnetic observations of the source of detected gravitational wave observations) provide some pretty good evidence for space waving. — wonderer1

All right then, do you understand that a "wave" consists of an interaction of the particles which make up the substance which is the medium? So if "space" is the substance within which the waves exist, then space must be made up of particles.

That some people are highly motivated without feeling duty says nothing about the power of duty, just as the claim that, say, there are more roses in a garden than any other type of flower is not affected by the claim that there are other types of flowers in a garden. That this "garden" could hypothetically have a different composition I grant, but all of the flowers need not be roses for most of them to be. — ToothyMaw

OK, so now it's your turn to demonstrate why you believe that this particular flower, the one you call "duty", is more prolific than all the rest. I don't see how the Third Wave experiment demonstrates this.

The article says "As the movement grew outside his class and began to number in the hundreds, the experiment had spiraled out of control. " There are millions, billions of people in the world, "outside his class", "hundreds" does not represent a majority. This is more like Trumpian logic, 'I have thousands of people at my rallies, therefore the majority supports me'. You might say 'I see hundreds of people motivated by duty, therefore duty is the single strongest motivator'. You have not provided the premises required to produce your conclusion.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you, but the Michelson–Morley experiment disproved that idea. — EricH

I don't think you misunderstand me, but I do think you misunderstand what the M-M experiments disproved.

I contend that duty is perhaps the single strongest motivator for action I can think of, whether it is duty to the tribe, an ideal, a spouse, etc., and should be nurtured wherever it exists to good ends. — ToothyMaw

As others have indicated,, , this is really incorrect. I would characterize the motivator for action as "ambition", or even "spirit", but that's just my personal preference of words. The important point is that the motivator has personal a base, not a relation to something external like "duty".

"Duty" is better described as a director of action rather than a motivator of action. A person with no sense of duty might still be highly motivated to act. So if you want to talk about "duty", you ought to be able to make this distinction, between being motivated to act, ambitious, and being directed in your actions by some sort of sense of duty. Then we could discuss how ambitions are directed. Accordingly, the following paragraph doesn't make much sense:

Soldiers, office clerks, garbage men, engineers - everyone craves duty, and those who can deliver the correct conditions are the most potent agents. Some say that the people might need to rise up in the United States because we are increasingly having to choose between fascism and neoliberalism - all the while the oligarchs line their pockets. — ToothyMaw

What do you think "everyone craves duty" actually means? People crave things, and this may or may not influence their ambition. It "may not" influence their ambition in cases of people who are lazy, or something like that, and so they still do not act on their cravings. But how would you say that "duty" relates to what people crave? Not only do I see no necessary relation here, but I see no relationship at all, due to the subjective nature of individuals and cravings. It's just like as if you are saying 'everyone craves chocolate ice cream'. It's really wrong on multiple levels.

And yes, I do maintain that duty is the most powerful motivator, as it can override just about any other consideration if the human is manipulated correctly. Remember the Third Wave experiment? — ToothyMaw

If the "Third Wave experiment" supports what you say, then maybe you need to describe it.

I do think the usual idea of the fields is that the waves aren't distinct from the field, the waves are literally perturbations of the field. I don't know if there's any conception of quantum fields where the waves are somehow distinct from the field, never heard of that idea before. — flannel jesus

I think what is needed here is a clear understanding of what is a "field". Wikipedia tells me that it is a geometrical representation which assigns values to various points in space. The values will
change as time passes.

What I would say, is that the changing values of the field are a representation of the real wave motion (a motion which would require an ether). However, there is no ether identified, so there is no real wave motion which can be identified. However, the field representation does show the transmission of energy through the thing represented as a field. So many physicists are inclined to just think of the field as the thing which is real, and forget about the real waves which the field represents.

I find it strange, the way you seem to get hung up on words being used in ways you disapprove of. Analogies play an important role in the way humans communicate things with each other and the use of "wave" to convey somewhat analogical things about electromagnetic fields has been going on for longer than either of us have been alive. It looks to me like you are fighting a losing battle.

What do you see as a problem, with having a notion of "wave" that needs nothing more than space to propagate through? — wonderer1

I've studied enough physics to know that a wave is an activity of a substance. That's simply what a wave is, and all waves are understood through modeling the movement of the particles within that substance. That's what a wave is, a specific type of activity of a substance which involves an interaction of its particles. Therefore a wave in empty space is simply impossible because there would be no particles there to make the wave. Yet we know from observation, rainbows, and other refractions, that light must consist of waves, therefore there must be a substance there which is waving.

Importance and significance implies value, yes - but be careful not to assume that all value is judged by human minds, or according to a single system of logic. And no, importance and significance (value) can be meaningful simply in relation to other values. — Possibility

I definitely agree that value is not necessarily judged according to one system of logic, that's why values are commonly said to be subjective. But what else, other than human beings, do you think is capable of making value judgements? Would this be some other animals? I can agree that animals, maybe even plants, are capable of doing something which we might call making value judgements. Is this what you had in mind?

Why must importance and significance only be judged in relation to human minds? — Possibility

Human minds are the type of thing which makes value judgements. We know that from experience. It is possible that other types of things. like animals and plants have a sort of mind which could make a value judgement. Is this what you are suggesting?

When value is recognised as a variable (as in mathematical logic), it is freed from the affected judgement of human minds (that assume they are logical), and perceived only in potential relation to other variables. — Possibility

No, recognizing a value as a variable does not free it from the judgement of a human mind, because a human mind is making that judgement to recognize it as a variable.

I agree in principle with much of what you say following this, but I have difficulty with this:

We need to include non-human matter in discussions about agency, importance and significance. — Possibility

I don't understand how you can talk about non-human matter, importance or significance without referencing God. Suppose some other creatures, plants and animals are capable of making value judgements (this would be a requirement if we are going to talk about what is important to them, they would have to be able to make such a judgement, because we cannot decide for them what is important to them, just like I cannot decide for you what is important to you). Don't you see that there would be so many contradictions between the various creatures, concerning what is important? Creatures eat other creatures. How do you propose that we could ever sort out this massive mess of conflicting matters (things of importance) without referencing some sort overlord judge, like God? Clearly us human beings are not capable of making such decisions and judgements, because what is important to me already conflicts with what is important to you. So each of us is going to insist "I am the one to decide what is important".

This requires a new logical framework, most noticeably in the area of grammatical logic. But this is not a matter of quantum mechanics dictating changes to grammatical logic, but rather bringing discursive practices into the intra-active process, acknowledging their significance as inseparable from the material practices of ‘doing science’. Because I think grammatical logic, properly understood and configured, is actually the key to our sustainable future. — Possibility

But above, you argued for separate values, by recognizing values as variable. How can you argue the two opposing sides of the coin, variable values which are separable (above), and now, values which are inseparable form other values. What makes a value non-variable is its relations with other values. These relations set or fix the value within a concept. If there was such a thing as a separate, variable value, it would just be free floating, not attached to any other value to set its worth as "x value", therefore it would actually have no value at all.

Consider that a hurricane consists of both actual and potential matter, as well as actual and potential form. — Possibility

Sorry, I cannot decipher what you are trying to say here. As far as I know, a hurricane does not make value judgements, so we cannot say that a hurricane consists of matter, by your definition. There is nothing which is inherently important to the hurricane itself, because the hurricane makes no such judgements, there is only what a person, or persons might say is important to the hurricane, but this is a completely different matter. It is an importance which people impose on another, and that is what produces contradiction, and conflict, such attempts at forcing one's values on others.

If you have to keep referring to a ‘living human mind’ or a ‘divine being’ to make the system work, then you have a self-shaped gap in your understanding. Humans are not necessary beings. — Possibility

It is you who has chosen to define "matter" as importance or significance, and this is what requires reference to a mind which makes a value judgement. I had a different way of defining matter, which did not require referencing a mind which makes value judgements in order to understand the concept of "matter". Mine is the traditional concept of "matter", adopted by the sciences. The problem you refer to here is a problem with your ontology, your proposed definition of "matter", not mine.

You keep trying to explain events in terms of objects, but it’s not the same structure. ‘Active’ and ‘actual’ have different qualitative structures for an event and for an object. Try to explain “acceleration” without reference to an object. Try to describe an entire acceleration event. You cannot use your current understanding of grammatical logic to describe the event - you are forced to change your perspective. But do you even notice that you’ve changed perspective? Do you recognise that you are describing an instantiated observation of the event, when I’ve asked for a description of the actual event? How can you describe ‘acceleration’ by simply describing an object at the point it begins to move? How is this describing actual acceleration? — Possibility

Like I've told you, and explained why to you, a number of times already, a particular "event", or "activity", without something which is active, is incoherent as a category mistake. You claim otherwise, but have provided nothing to back up your bald assertions. You simply continue to deny the obvious.

No, fields have been previously assumed to be the property of something, but evidence from quantum experiments has brought this assumption into question. Your first clue should have been your appeal of ‘always known to be’. You have to remember that we’re talking about relational structures of significant variables as active (not actual) entities in a four-dimensional system. — Possibility

Actually, quantum mechanics has provided absolutely no evidence of fields which are not the property of something. What is the case is that the failure of quantum mechanics in its ability to provide an understanding of reality, has made people speculate about the possibility of such fields. That's merely speculation which is unsupported by science.

Values don’t exist in a single hierarchy, anymore than all events exist on a linear timeline. — Possibility

I know, this is obvious, and it's the reason why there is contradiction and conflict. The goal is a single hierarchy to dispel conflict and contradiction, but it is clearly not the case within the world we live in.

How can you be so certain you ‘know the truth’ of reality, if you cannot use it? Philosophy is the love of wisdom - wisdom being knowledge of correct action, not simply knowledge. — Possibility

We are seeking the truth, not claiming to know it. As philosophers we apprehend that the truth about reality is a long way off, but that does not stop us from heading in that direction. It's a march down a long road, which provides nothing useful to us who are doing the marching.

And yet you automatically exclude what doesn’t adhere to the doctrine of grammatical logic, despite being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science. That sounds like blindly following doctrine to me. — Possibility

Contradiction is a repugnancy, and repugnancy is not determined by grammatical logic, but intuition. So it's a matter of adhering to intuition, not a matter of adhering to grammatical logic. But naturally grammatical logic is intuitive. as grammatical logic is derived from intuition.

Mathematics and science are both so full of contradictions its pathetic. So your claim of "being consistent across the logical structures of both mathematics and science", is nonsense because the various different logical structures of mathematics are not consistent with each other, nor are the various different logical structures of science.

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On your view, why does it matter what material the conductor is composed of, or what the cross sectional area of the conductor is? — wonderer1

I made a reply to tim wood's statement of opinion "the electron is particle-like, and only cloudlike in the sense that it moves around really, really fast." On the other hand, it is my opinion that the transmission of energy through a field cannot be adequately represented as particles moving really really fast. In fact, what I've been arguing is that the representation of such energy transmission as through particles is completely wrong. This is compatible with what flannel jesus is arguing, that the outcome of Bells theorem is that the classical representation of energy as the property of bodies (particles in this case) is fundamentally inadequate.

Of course "the body" of the conductor plays a role, and that's why I argued elsewhere in the "Entangled Embodied Subjectivity" thread, that it makes no sense to talk about "just the field", as if the field could exist without the body. This specific problem, I believe is due to the deficiencies in our understanding and conceptualization of what is called "the field".

Since there is no ether identified as the medium within which the waves exist, the only substance which this concept is grounded in is the body which the field is a property of. Establishing the correct relationship between body and field is problematic in current conceptualizations. If the ether which is logically required to support the real existence of waves, was identified such that its real properties could be tested, this would allow us to conceptualize independent existence of the waves, enabling us to properly conceive of the waves as prior in time to the body, and therefore the appearance of a body (particles, atoms, molecules, etc.) as property of the waves. But this implies a conception of the waves which would be completely distinct from the current "field".

Matter (noun): 1. physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
2. a subject or situation under consideration.
(verb): 1. be important or significant.

I would say that ‘matter’ is not so much a concept as the human conceptualisation of an idea. In reference to things, matter is physical substance, but also mental substance. But in reference to activity, to matter is to be important or significant. You can’t just ignore these additional aspects of the conceptualisation of ‘matter’. And you can’t declare them ‘different substances’ without an understanding of how they relate. — Possibility

OK, I see how you want to define "matter". You define it as the verb in the definitions above, "to be important or significant". Do you agree, that "importance and significance" implies a judgement of value? Importance and significance only have meaning in relation to something which is valuable.

First of all, I didn’t say that ‘immaterial’ implies inactive. I said it implies that the activity in question doesn’t matter. What you’re arguing is that the only way this kind of activity can matter is if it actually matters to living human minds FIRST. Quantum mechanics refutes this, and so does neuroscience. — Possibility

So I cannot understand what you are trying to say here. What "matters" is what is important or significant, and this is only judged in relation to human minds. Why do you believe that quantum mechanics refutes this? Does it demonstrate importance and significance in relation to values which are non-human? What are you saying?

The first assumption is that ‘categories’, with their determinate boundaries and properties, divide up reality with mutually exclusive accuracy. So, according to Aristotle, a particular event cannot be both potential and actual. — Possibility

This is another bad misrepresentation. Categories are not mutually exclusive in the existence of real things, like dichotomies are. That is the whole point of using categories rather than dichotomies, to allow for the overlapping of concepts, which would not be allowed by dichotomous divisions. So in Aristotle's hylomorphism, physical objects consist of both matter (potential), and form (actual). In fact, a particular is by definition both. Yes, "potential" is distinct, as a separate category from "actual", so that one is not the other, but the categories don't serve to divide up reality, they serve to divide up the conceptual structure for the purpose of better understanding reality.

For example, we might have the categories of sight and sound, and we could divide up a conceptual structure accordingly. But this is not to divide up reality, as the same thing might be both seen and heard, though the property which is heard is distinct from the property seen, according to that conceptual structure. it is a tool to help us understand reality, but if you think that it is actually dividing up reality, that is a misunderstanding.

But that necessary event need not have become fully actual prior to all other events in the series. It only needs to have begun. In which case said necessary event - the universe itself - is being, and even now, still in the process of becoming. So there is no reason for the universe in its becoming to be denied agency, except that this affects us in a way that impacts our homeostasis. — Possibility

I do not know what you might mean by "fully actual" here. If an event has "begun", it is active, therefore actual. To suggest that there is a time when the event is partially active, yet not fully active is incoherent. Take the concept of "acceleration" for example. Suppose something is assumed to be at rest, it is not active. At some point in time it begins to move, accelerate. At that point, it is fully active, though it hasn't reached its top speed. We do not say that it is nof fully active, or not fully actual. As soon as it has motion it is active, actual, and it make no sense to say that it is partially actual, but not fully actual.

So I really don't know what you're trying to say here. If the supposed event is not occurring, not actual, then it requires a cause to become actual. That cause itself must be actual, and the cause is prior to the actuality of the event which is the effect. So if the universe is that event, then there must be something actual which is prior to it as the cause of its actuality. We cannot simply say that the potential for the universe was prior to the universe, because that pure potential could not act to cause the universe, so there must have been something more than just the potential, there must have been something actual. There must be something actual which was prior to the universe.

True and mathematical Newtonian time exists; it is a real entity; it is the gravitational field — Carlo Rovelli

Time cannot be reduced to gravitation, that is a misconception.

For his part, Aristotle is right to say that ‘when’ and ‘where’ are always located in relation to something. But this something can also be just the field, the spatio-temporal entity of Einstein, because this is a dynamic and concrete entity, like all those in reference to which, as Aristotle rightly observed, we are capable of locating ourselves. — Carlo Rovelli

And this is also a misconception, because a field must itself be a property of something. So we cannot truthfully say "this something can also be just the field", because fields are always known to be the property of something which creates the field, therefore to assume "just the field" is in violation of physical evidence and inductive reasoning.

Understanding is not about grounding concepts in just one ‘logical’ system — Possibility

Yes understanding is about having one logical system, because that is what produces consistency and coherency. To have multiple different conceptual systems which are unrelated allows for contradiction and incoherency, and this is misunderstanding. The only way to eradicate contradiction, incoherency, and misunderstanding is to have one overall system within which all the parts are coherent. To have parts out side one system, which are incoherent to that system, but are allowed to be maintained because they are coherent within a different system, is a symptom of misunderstanding.

To put this into your perspective, the perspective of "matter", or "what matters", what is required is a hierarchy of values. What is important or significant is determined relative to something valued. But when two competing values produce contradiction, or inconsistency in what is important, or not important, then we must appeal to a higher value to make the judgement as to whether the thing is important or not.

‘Good dialectics seeking truth’ is just seeking to ‘support the usefulness of their own discipline’. Surely you see this? — Possibility

Not at all, truth is sought for the sake of knowing the truth, not for some usefulness. That is why philosophy is known as being useless. Surely you must see this?

Compatibility does not require a ‘higher purpose’, only a broader understanding of each discipline. — Possibility

This is clearly not true, as explained above. There is very clear evidence of a difference between various disciplines as to what is important, what matters. When it is the case that what is important to one discipline is not important to another discipline, there is incompatibility. The "broader understanding" which you refer to is just a higher purpose, a higher value, which can arbitrate the incompatibility.

To declare otherwise is to put your faith in a narrow ideology, to blindly follow doctrine. I honestly thought you were more intelligent than than, and I’m a little disappointed at all this pontificating. What is truth if it isn’t — Possibility

To seek the truth is not to "blindly follow doctrine", in fact it is the very opposite of that.

As to cause, one of the basic presuppositions of Newtonian science, Newton held that some things were caused and some things were due to the operation of law — tim wood

What you propose here is a distinction between things which occur because they are caused, and things which occur because there is a law operating. This places "things which are occurring because there is a law operating" into a separate category from "things which are occurring because there is a cause". The problem with this proposed separation is the problem of induction which I pointed to already. As Hume demonstrated, these "laws" are inductive, and induction does not provide the necessity required for that category "things which are occurring because there is a law operating", to completely explain any activity.

In simple terms, "there is a law operating" is insufficient to account for the occurrence of things which are said to be "due to" the operation of the law, because the relationship between these two, the occurrence of things and the law, is not one of necessity. That was Hume's point, "law" is an inductive conclusion, and induction cannot ensure that every occurrence will be according to that law. This is why Newton who was trained through Church run institutions, in the traditional manner, supported his laws with "the Will of God". Because "the operation of law" on its own, is insufficient to necessitate any contingent occurrence, the Will of God is needed to underly "law" as substance. You remove "the Will of God" from your representation, but then it does not correctly portray what Newton believed. Newton believed that "the operation of law" required the Will of God. So things which "were due to the operation of law" were understood by Newton to also be due to the Will of God.

I think you need to take a good look at the nature of "contingency", "contingent events". Suppose there is an apple hanging on a tree, and then the apple falls. You'd be inclined to say that when the apple is falling, the falling is due to the operation of law. However, prior to falling, the apple was hanging. And to transition from hanging to falling requires a cause, a bird pecked it, the stem rooted, whatever. Now, you ought to be able to see that "the operation of law" is insufficient as an explanation for any contingent event because a cause is still required at the boundary, which marks the temporal beginning of any event which occurs according to the operation of law.

So we might take a bigger event with a much longer temporal duration, than the falling apple, like the orbiting of the earth around the sun. You'd say that activity is due to the operation of law. However, just like the falling apple, this event is not eternal, it must have a temporal beginning, a cause. That every event such as this requires a cause for its existence, and cannot be explained simply as "due to the operation of law", is the reason why we call them "contingent". Even if the event is according to, or consistent with, a law, it still requires a cause, and at this point necessity was lacking, hence it is contingent. The same principle holds for quantum events of extremely short duration. Any occurrence is contingent, and requires a cause, it cannot simply be said to be due to the operation of law. This implies a very large number of causes in a very short period of time, to account for the reality of all these contingent events.

But you it seems would take a bit of snake, and of newt and frog and bat and dog, and some other ingredients, and boil up a potion that you would call knowledge, but in fact is nonsense or worse. So, for any of your "conclusions" in your posts, never mind all your qualifications and variant perspectives, how do you know? — tim wood

I have no idea what you are talking about here. I didn't talk about snakes, newts, or frogs, that's all in your imagination. And so is your assessment that what I said is "nonsense or worse". Furthermore, your question here is incoherent, you ask me to tell you how I know, without reference to my qualifications.

I'm afraid your source is not very good. It seems to be mistaking the skin effect which is applicable to AC signals, for a general rule about electrical conduction.

In either the AC or DC case, electrical current travels through the conductor. That link provides some explanation as to why in the AC case the conduction of current becomes more and more confined to the outermost portions of the conductor as the frequency of the AC signal increases. — wonderer1

Your assertion is not very convincing wonderer1. I've read a fair bit of material authored by Richard Feynman, much is available on the net. And, he is very explicit in saying that the flow of current is not in the body of the conducting material, because the electrons are freed from the atoms, and the flow is therefore in the field.

It seems to on any macro-scale. The "seems to" not just a throwaway phrase, but rather a pretty good clue as to what is, er, seems to be, the case. The real trick here is to not use the "I don't knows" as grounds for knowing. — tim wood

What seems to be, often is not what is the case. The issue is the nature of what has been called "persistence" in this thread. And although we take persistence for granted, as indicated by Newton's first law of motion, it is demonstrably not a necessity, not necessary. That things will continue to be, as they have been in the past, is not a necessity. This is what Hume pointed to with his discussion of causation and the problem of induction, the necessity required for solid, sound conclusion of certainty, just is not there. Even Newton stated that his first law of motion was dependent on the will of God. He noticed that what this law takes for granted, that a body will continue to move, as time passes, with the same motion that it had in the past, unless caused to change, is not a statement of necessity. It is an inductive conclusion, and such conclusions lack necessity, as Hume argued.

So there is another way to look at the persistence of objects, a way which does not take for granted the continuity of existence, the persistence, which is expressed by Newton's first law. When we do not take this law for granted, then we see that what is expressed by this law requires a cause. So for example, if a body is going to continue to move in a predictable, uniform way, then at each moment as time passes, there must be a cause which makes it be at that particular predictable place. From this perspective, we do not take for granted that the body will move in a predictable way, as described by Newton's law, we understand that there must be a cause of it moving in that predictable way, and so this cause is acting on the body at each moment of passing time, making it exist at the place where the prediction dictates.

And you know this how? — tim wood

I know this by inductive reasoning. Every real physical body, object, or thing, has a location. If it does not have a location it is a fictional thing. If you are not inclined to believe that inductive reasoning can give sound premises, and you recognize that it is lacking in necessity, then you are in a good position to understand what I wrote above.

My private opinion is that the electron is particle-like, and only cloudlike in the sense that it moves around really, really fast. And it would not offend my scientific sensibilities if someone were to suggest that maybe the particle-like in its motion sets up a kind of standing shock wave, though in what medium or made of what I don't know. — tim wood

Why then does electrical energy travel through the field around copper wires, instead of traveling through the copper wires, where the electron particles are supposedly located? Or do you think that particles of the wire, the electrons are actually outside the wire?

However, electrical energy does not travel though the wire as sound travels through air but instead always travels in the space outside of the wires. This is because electric energy is composed of electric and magnetic fields which are created by the moving electrons, but which exist in the space surrounding the wires. — http://scienceline.ucsb.edu/getkey.php?key=3199

"Validated"? I'm not sure this will be a useful discussion. It seems you want to commit the fallacy of, "Because I do not know, I know."

And if you were honest about it, you'd have taken note of the quoted remark above that make clear that the term - and the concepts - of spin are problematic, — tim wood

No, I'm being honest, it's not a matter of "because I do not know...". I'm going by what flannel jesus said:

Then, Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg, Schrodinger and friends introduced QM to the world. They said that there are some properties of particles that, prior to measurement, we can't actually tell a Classical story about. If we shoot a particle at t=0, through a double slit for example, and measure where that particle landed at t=100, we might be tempted to ask the question "ok, so where was that particle at t=50?" If the world worked classically, then there would be an objectively true answer to that question - even if we as human beings couldn't find an answer. If we can't find an answer, that's just our own ignorance, but there still *is* an answer. QM said, actually, there *is not* an answer. Or at least, not a *singular, definite answer* -- that's the phrasing I like to use. Prior to measurement, some of these properties of things like Photons and Electrons do not in fact have singular definite answers - not even to God. If God himself were to peer into the universe and look at that particle at t=50, he wouldn't have a singular definite answer to the question "where was that particle?" (Please note that I'm using God as a narrative tool, I'm not a theist. "God" is just a stand in for the idea of some external entity who could, in principle, know the world as it really is - could answer any question about any system without disturbing that system). — flannel jesus

If the particle has no location at t50, then there is no particle at that time. Why is that not obvious to you tim?. There is no such thing as an object like a particle, without a spatial location. To accept otherwise is to venture into a world filled with magic.

The detectors reliably and consistently measure something, called in this case spin - and it is at the moment irrelevant as to what spin is - and this spin deemed to be an aspect or quality of the particle itself. — tim wood

Let's be more precise with our terminology, let's just say that the detectors detect something. Because there is uncertainty between the relation of position and momentum, we ought not even call this a "measurement". Due to the uncertainty relation, we cannot accurately say what is being measured, so it's a stretch to even say it is a measurement.

And, because of this uncertainty, the concept referred to by "spin" is not a property of anything at all. It's just a mathematical way of describing what the detector detected. So if we go ahead and look at your proposition 'This spin is an aspect or quality of the particle itself', we must designate it as a false and misleading proposition. The detector is not really detecting any properties of any particles. It is detecting something which is called "spin", but the concept associated with this term in no way is an accurate representation of what is actually being detected

Denial of the particle having this spin except when it is measured begs the question as to how the particle knows it's being measured and reacts, and what, exactly, triggers that knowledge and reaction, not to speak of the time that all takes. — tim wood

Failure to recognize that there is not even a particle being detected, and that these dimensional-based (classical-based) concepts such as "spin" are woefully inadequate for describing the wave activity being detected, is misleading you here. I am not denying that the particle has "spin", I am denying that there is a particle. The concept, "spin", which refers to what is detected, does not properly represent what is actually detected, therefore the existence of the thing (particle) which is assumed to have that property is not substantiated (if you do not like "validated").

It seems you fail to distinguish between spin and "spin." Forget the ordinary English word "spin". And for clarity's sake just for you in this post let's call the other spxn. Let's suppose what is actually the case, that certain people use the term that we call here spxn to represent a set of ideas that they have collectively, and that they can convey to each other by speaking and writing the word spxn. In as much as I am not one of those people, I will leave to them the choice of their own words for their own use; and I (shall) assume the the word is efficacious when used by them among themselves. So much for the word — tim wood

It's not quite correct to ask for such a separation in the use of "spin", because no matter how you look at it spin is still a type of angular momentum, and this is a vector concept. The point I was making is that such dimensional concepts are not adequate for explaining the properties of particles which are assumed to be non-dimensional. Read the following from Wikipedia:

The three-dimensional angular momentum for a point particle is classically represented as a pseudovector r × p, the cross product of the particle's position vector r (relative to some origin) and its momentum vector; the latter is p = mv in Newtonian mechanics. Unlike linear momentum, angular momentum depends on where this origin is chosen, since the particle's position is measured from it. — Wikipedia: Angular momentum

Notice, "pseudovector", because the principles of classical 3-d vectors do not hold for these particles. So consider Flannel Jesus' explanation. The existence of the particle cannot be validated during the entire time between t1 and t100. It is only validated at these two time points through measurement of those properties like "spin". However, these concepts which make up those supposed properties are not adequate to measure what is really there at that time. So, since the existence of the particle is only known by determining these properties, at those two times, and these properties do not even accurately represent what is there at those times, and the indication is that there is no determinable particle between those times, then why should we even think that there is any particle at any time whatsoever? These dimensional concept like "spin" are misleading us.

I thought you were opposed to such antics. — NOS4A2

That was an unsound conclusion you made, as you are prone.

I choose my actions according to the situation, so I can be mean when meanness appears necessary. Go on now, hit me if you will. I'll suffer the pain but admit to having started the fight, rather than suing you for damages.

Maybe I'm misreading you, MU. It seems to me you're objecting to the use of the English word "spin" to refer to something meaningful to a technical user as a term of art. If that's the case, why? — tim wood

Yes, you very much were misreading me. I was talking about the deficiencies of the concept which is labeled with the word "spin", as stated in the first sentence of my post: "'Spin' is a highly deficient concept." The choice of word to name the concept is irrelevant. All I can say is try rereading, and stay focused this time. That ought not be difficult because it's not a long post.

..proving to me.. — NOS4A2

We've seen a lot about proving things to you. No one can prove anything to you, which you do not want proven. But anything which you want proven, you readily prove it to yourself.

"When certain elementary particles move through a magnetic field, they are deflected in a manner that suggests they have the properties of little magnets. In the classical world, a charged, spinning object has magnetic properties that are very much like those exhibited by these elementary particles. Physicists love analogies, so they described the elementary particles too in terms of their 'spin.'

"Unfortunately, the analogy breaks down, and we have come to realize that it is misleading to conjure up an image of the electron as a small spinning object. Instead we have learned simply to accept the observed fact that the electron is deflected by magnetic fields. If one insists on the image of a spinning object, then real paradoxes arise; unlike a tossed softball, for instance, the spin of an electron never changes, and it has only two possible orientations. In addition, the very notion that electrons and protons are solid 'objects' that can 'rotate' in space is itself difficult to sustain, given what we know about the rules of quantum mechanics. The term 'spin,' however, still remains." — tim wood

Just as I said, the so-called "spin" is not a property of a particle at all. The 3-d geometrical representation which is called "spin" cannot be the property of a non-dimensional point.

May I know what you were drinking before you wrote your post? I should like to try some for those occasions when I too would like to loosen my grip on reality. — tim wood

As you've already indicated, we ought not focus on realism, so reality might be completely irrelevant to this subject. I believe that now might be the optimum time for you to go a ahead and loosen that grip on your assumed "reality". So, if you're interested in purchasing some of my special intelligence boosting juice, you'll need to send the money first, then I'll decide whether you're likely to benefit from it.

This is a formidable challenge. Do you think this makes Leibniz Law untenable entirely? — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's not that the law is "untenable", because it, like the law of identity, holds, is applicable if it is ever required in argument, and is never proven false. But both, Leibniz' law, and the law of identity, suffer the problem of induction, which means that they are never proven true. So they are convenient assumptions used to defend against sophistry, which could be said to be sophisms themselves.

Or can we talk about entities' properties without any reference to an observer? If the latter, can't we do the same sort of abstraction and apply the Principle to the set of all possible discernments? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can talk about the properties of entities without reference to an observer, and we commonly do. Unfortunately, an observer is always implied within such talk, and this implication is not always respected by everyone who looks at this issue. So, when you proceed onward, and talk about "discernments", it becomes evident that what you are talking about is an act which discerns a property. Since this act is necessarily the act of an observer, the implication of an observer is even stronger, more evident.

That is, within the set of all possible discernments, there is no case in which x ≠ y, thus x = y. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Since discernments are acts of observers, this claim makes an unjustifiable proposition about the nature of observers, as I said in my last post, which is blatantly false. The reality of hallucinations and such features of observers, demonstrates that this proposition would be false.

All possible discernments are not "subjective discernments,"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I do not see where you get the idea that what you would call "a discernment", could be anything other than the product of an act of discernment, which is the act of a subject. Because of this, I do not see how you propose the possibility of a discernment which is not a subjective discernment. Each and every discernment is produced by a subject, therefore all possible discernments (by induction only) are subjective discernments.

You might propose a form of discernment which is not subjective, but this would violate inductive reasoning, rendering it as a useless tool within your argument, so that your whole argument which is based on induction would be undermined, by allowing that a very strong inductive principle could be violated.

Perhaps this trivially reduces the principle to Leibniz Law, but I don't think it does because Leibniz Law leaves open the possibility of bare haecceities of difference, differences that never make any possible phenomenological difference, which is what the Principle denies. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Leibniz' law does not leave open the possibility of differences which make no difference. Instead, you ought to recognize that what the law intends, is that there is no such thing as a difference which makes no difference, this itself would be contradictory. If an observer notices something as a difference, then by that very fact that the difference has been noticed as a difference, the difference has already, necessarily, made a difference to that observer. The law does not speak of possibilities, and I think that is where you misrepresent it. It is based in an impossibility, which is an exclusion of possibility. This is the impossibility that an entity which could only be identified as itself, could also be identified as something else.

Different because the respective spins are not limited to opposites. — tim wood

"Spin" is a highly deficient concept. It is an attempt to represent non-dimensional, non-spatial activity which is understood to occur within the internal of a non-dimensional point (a somewhat incoherent idea), with a three-dimensional representation. So the property which is represented by "spin" is not adequately represented in this way, and restricting the possibilities to two opposites will ensure that the law of excluded middle is always violated.

The main difference is that you believe any understanding of reality must conform to grammatical conventions (which is a reduction of logic), whereas I believe any grammatical convention should adjust to accommodate a rational understanding of reality that may fall outside of its existing framework, — Possibility

Yes, "understanding" requires consistency with grammatical conventions. And obviously, we cannot change reality to conform to our conventions, therefore the conventions must conform to reality. You and I are in complete agreement to this point.

Where we disagree is as to which conventions correspond with reality, and which do not. I believe that classical conventions of dualism correspond, and are adequate to form a solid foundation for an understanding of reality. I also believe that numerous modern conventions, of physics and mathematics, such as the dimensional representation of spacetime, and some axioms of set theory, do not correspond, and ought to be rejected. You seem to believe the opposite.

A couple of points to clear up here. Firstly, there is a difference of configuration between not requiring ‘materiality’ and being ‘immaterial’. The former acknowledges a variability in the configuration of activity/being, while the latter offers only one configuration - enacting an agential cut that excludes activity sans three-dimensionality from mattering. — Possibility

I think that this is a gross misunderstanding. "Immaterial" does not imply inactive. I think this Idea comes from a modern day misunderstanding of Plato, in which "Platonism" is represented as comprised of the assumption of eternal, inert, passive Ideas, which cannot interact with the material word according to the "interaction problem". In reality though, this is Pythagorean Idealism, which Plato demonstrated has very serious problems. Since Plato's method of dialectics is very difficult to interpret, many modern interpreters do not see beyond Plato's exposé of Pythagorean Idealism to see that Plato was demonstrating the problems with it, mot supporting it, and pointing the direction toward resolving these problems.

So in reality, Plato offered us a solution to the "interaction problem", which involved demonstrating the lack of correspondence with reality of the the theory of participation which provided the support for Pythagorean Idealism. The central problem was that the theory of participation, represents "Ideas" as passive things which material objects partake of. So for example, as described in "The Symposium", a beautiful thing is beautiful because it partakes in the Idea of Beauty. Notice that the immaterial Idea is passive, and the material object actively "partakes". Plato revealed that this is a problem for Idealism, and went on to demonstrate with "the good" (understood by Aristotle as "final cause") that ideas must be active, causal.

Aristotle's metaphysics, with the so-called "cosmological argument" firmly refutes Pythagorean Idealism. He shows that all human ideas require the human mind for actual existence. If any human ideas have any sort of reality prior to being actualized by the human mind, this would be solely as potential. Then he excludes "potential" from the category of "eternal", by showing that anything eternal must be actual. This procedure shows that it is impossible that human ideas have eternal existence, effectively refuting Pythagorean Idealism. However it also shows that it is necessary to conclude actual Forms ("form" having the category of actual, or active) which are prior to material ("matter" having the category of passive potential) forms. In Christian theology, these independent Forms, whose existence is demonstrated as logically necessary by the cosmological argument, are proper to the divine realm of God and the angels. Substance dualism is necessary to support what you might call "an agential cut" between the actual Forms (substance) of the divine realm. which are causally responsible for the activities of independent material things, and the actual forms (substance) of the living human mind, which are causally responsible for the activities of the living human beings.

Okay, you’re making great leaps of assumption here. Not requiring three-dimensionality is NOT the same as non-dimensional. Subatomic particles lack a fundamental three-dimensional inertia. At least one of their dimensional measurements is in a constant state of flux, but this doesn’t render them non-dimensional, only not fundamentally three-dimensional. They can be configured as relevant/significant (material) in a four-dimensional (active) system, but in a three-dimensional (inert) structure they are considered ‘immaterial’. — Possibility

All you are doing here is continuing to obscure the problems of your conventions, with ambiguity. The non-three-dimensional particles you speak of are understood as having an effect ("relevant/significant") in a four-dimensional model, but they clearly cannot be shown to have a position, location, or place, in such a model, so we cannot say that this model shows them to have any actual existence. This is the type of activity we've been discussing, the "four-dimensional (active) system" model is only capable of showing that there is some type of activity which is unintelligible from the precepts of that model. That is why there is a wave/particle duality, quantum uncertainty, and all the other logical problems with this type of representation of subatomic particles. What is observed is the effect of this activity, but the activity itself, as the immaterial cause of those effects cannot be observed. Theologists are very well acquainted with this principle, as God, being immaterial, is understood through His effects, the presence of material existence, rather than through direct observations of Him.

The proposed "subatomic particles" are not particles at all because they cannot be represented as having spatial location, and so are much better (more honestly) represented as immaterial activities (Forms) which have a causal influence within the four-dimensional model.

The proposed "four-dimensional (active) system" is fundamentally deceptive because it reverses the true role of time. This is what I've been trying to tell you, but you refuse to acknowledge that this is the case. The base principles are all three-dimensional geometry, arcs, circles, spheres, triangles, planes etc.. and time is layered on top, as a further spatial feature. This does not allow that time can be properly represented as prior to, and therefore independent from space.

The reason I use a dimensional structure is because it retains an overall sense of logic and rationality as we move between limited systems or conventions of logic: ie. grammar, mathematics, physics. — Possibility

Actually, what you are demonstrating is that you prefer the conventions of mathematics over the conventions grammar. We can say that grammar and mathematics are both forms of logic. And, I can show you how there is inconsistency between these two forms of logic, especially at the most fundamental level, the law of identity. In the logic of grammar, the law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Two things may be according to some stated parameter, or quality, equal to each other, but two things cannot be "the same", because only one thing can be the same as itself. Being the same is a very special sort of equality which a thing can only have with itself. In the logic of mathematics however, two equal things can be said to be the same object.

Therefore, there is great inconsistency between the logic of grammar and the logic of mathematics. You choose the logic of mathematics, most likely because it has proven itself to be very useful. So your choice is most likely guided by a form of pragmaticism. I choose the logic of grammar because it has been directed by dialectics which is aimed at aimed at correspondence with reality, truth. And the logic of grammar has proven itself to be very useful in this way. So my choice is guided by a desire for truth.

My argument is that the findings are sound, and are compatible with a broader understanding of grammatical forms. — Possibility

No, the findings of quantum mechanics may not be said to be sound, because what the findings show is that a large portion of reality is unintelligible, but this has not been proven. And your attempt to show that there may be intelligibility produced by a "broader understanding of grammatical forms" I have adequately demonstrated, is nothing other than an obscuring of this unintelligibility produced by quantum mechanics, behind ambiguity. That is sophistry

In reality, what good grammatical form (clear definitions and adherence to fundamental principles) shows, is that the reason why quantum mechanics leaves a large portion of reality as unintelligible is that the logic being employed is faulty.

What quantum mechanics demonstrates is that materiality extends beyond the activity of material things. — Possibility

Again, you continue to demonstrate the incoherency of your supposed "broader understanding of grammatical forms". "Materiality" is defined by material, and "material" is defined by matter. And "matter" by common definition, and conventional understanding is defined by the physical presence of material things. Now you propose a "matter", in the form of "a materiality", which "extends beyond material things".

By this proposal there is absolutely nothing to constrain the concept of "matter", because it could be extended to any sort of fictional idea. If the concept of "matter" is not grounded in, or substantiated by, the real existence of material things, then we allow that "matter" and consequently "materiality" may refer to any fantasy or fictitious thing. This is why Aristotle, who first defined "matter" and expressed all the limitations under which the concept was to be understood, explicitly denied the possibility of matter which extends beyond the existence of material things.

I believe it is important to recognize that "matter" is a concept. The concept was produced to assist us in understanding the existence of physical bodies. Matter, as a concept was intended to represent a property of such bodies, a property which all bodies have in common. But if we move, as you propose, and make matter something which extends further than its original concept, something other than a property of physical bodies, then we invalidate the entire concept. All the things which were said about "matter", as a property of physical bodies lose their necessity as truths, because "matter" is now something else. And there is no principle which would allow that matter can maintain its status as a property of physical bodies, and also extend beyond physical bodies. So the entire conception is undermined.

We have a very similar problem when we allow that inertia extends beyond mass. The concept of "inertia" was produced as a property of mass. Now if we allow that there is inertia which is not associated with mass we undermine the concept. Of course the argument would be that the concept of "inertia" would be grounded in something else, just like the concept of "matter" above (which extends beyond material things) would be grounded in something else, but that's not really true. The proposal to allow such changes is just carried out in an effort to make the mathematics work. Therefore there is no real grounding, just an effort to make the equations work out.

So what is really the case, is that when the grammatical logic is strictly adhered to, the mathematics which uses a different and less rigorous form of logic does not produce the desired results. The easiest solution is to compromise the grammatical logic. But this of course undermines the conceptual structure and the rigor of the grammatical logic

Grammatical conventions need to be in the mix, but for them to effectively intra-act we need to accept their fundamental variability and limitations. It seems you’re not prepared to do this. — Possibility

Grammatical conventions must be variable, that I agree with. However the process (discipline) whereby these conventions are questioned, dialectics, is completely different from the process whereby mathematical axioms are question. The former is the philosophical quest for truth, and the latter is the pragmatic quest for usefulness. The two are not incompatible, but compatibility requires a hierarchy of purpose, or intent. The pragmatic quest for usefulness must be guided by the philosophical quest for truth. In other words, the purpose or usefulness must be the quest for truth, or else there can be no compatibility.

Therefore grammatical conventions, which are variable under the auspices of dialectics and the quest for truth, must take priority over the conventions of mathematics and physics which are variable according to pragmatic inclinations. When grammatical logic is altered under the direction of good dialectics seeking truth, this can be known as the evolution of language. But when grammatical logic is altered under the direction of mathematicians and physicists who seek to support the usefulness of their own discipline, we can call this a corruption of grammatical logic.

This is pure sophistry. It is not just elegance that I’m after, but elegant accuracy. Dualism is clunky and ignorant at best - its most glaring ambiguity lies in the absence of a logical, qualitative and dynamic relational structure between ‘material’ and ‘ideal’ Forms. — Possibility

Again, this statement indicates a gross misunderstanding of dualism, which I addressed above.

Grammatical conventions have logical form but are not ‘logic’ in the ideal sense. Accuracy in practise is more indicative of ‘truth’ than words systematically arranged. And the accuracy in our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths. — Possibility

I really do not know what you mean by "'logic' in the ideal sense". But I think what I wrote above ought to go a long way toward dispelling this myth, that "our practise of quantum mechanics makes it very clear that the remaining ‘fault’ in temporal conventions is in our grammatical logic, not the physics or maths." It's very clear that what is the case, is that physics and mathematics, in their submission to a usefulness which has been corrupted away from the desire for truth, have succumbed to a severely compromised grammatical logic. Yes, the fault is evident in the grammatical logic, because the inclinations of mathematics and speculative physics have produced the need to compromise the grammatical logic. But this is exactly why we need to go back to the good solid principles of dualism to sort out that mess.

The Principle of Indiscernability is this: if for some entity X, X is, in principle, always and forever indiscernible (for all observers) from Y, then we can assume X=Y. We can assume that X = Y because in all possible cases X will always appear to be equal to Y. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think that this principle can only be upheld by making an unjustifiable assumption about the nature of observers. You are saying that if X is indiscernible from Y, for all observers, then X=Y.

The first problem is the problem of induction. No matter how many observers perceive X as identical to Y, we will never know whether or not the next one will. So X=Y can never be proven.

The second problem which is more to the point, is that each observer is oneself, a unique and particular individual, according to the law of identity. Because of this, the observational apparatus and perspective of the observer is also unique to the individual. This makes it highly improbable that two distinct observers will ever precisely describe the very same thing in the exact same way. Accordingly, the criteria for "X", which needs to be the same description provided by all observers, will never be fulfilled, and "X=Y" will refer to nothing.

Because of these problems, the principle is completely useless and not applicable to anything. I think this may be the point that is getting at.

The best thing about him is that he is anti-war. — Hailey

I think that is just an illusion. He demonstrated bullying tactics throughout his life, and with every country that he dealt with as president. You can say that the bully just likes to pick on people, and does not want to start a fight. But people tend to have a limited tolerance for abuse, and when push comes to shove, the fight is actually started by the bullying.

Having said that, what quantum physics demonstrates is that activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality. It only requires two non-commutative variable values, in a measurement relation (ie. one of them corresponding to ‘time’), to be intelligible as ‘real’ activity. But because quantum physicists then describe this as ‘activity’, grammatical conventions dictate that ‘something’ (NOT the activity itself), is what is active. This leads to a chicken-and-egg style dilemma. — Possibility

We are fundamentally in agreement then. But, when you say, "activity does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", I say that this activity is immaterial. And when you talk about what "grammatical conventions" dictate, I say that this is what "logic" dictates.

So why hold the penchant for anti-dualism? It seems to me, like dualism is very consistent with what quantum mechanics demonstrates. In fact, it appears like one has to intentionally use ambiguity and obscurity with terms like "intra-action" to hide the fact that what quantum mechanics demonstrates is that the nature of reality is very consistent with what dualism dictates. There is the activity of material things, and there is also activity which does not require materiality, therefore it is immaterial. Doesn't that sound like dualism to you?

Form is this same notion of configuration, a particular way in which something exists. And this apparent distinction between material and immaterial Form is not a binary, but an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations. — Possibility

Again, your reliance on "dimensional" models is misleading you. The activity which you say "does not require ‘materiality’ in the sense of a qualitative three-dimensionality", cannot be "an agential cut enacted between three- and four-dimensional configurations", because this agency must be non-dimension, i.e. immaterial.

This is the ambiguity I am speaking of. You consistently argue for the reality of the immaterial, yet your anti-dualism bias (and I believe I am correct to call it that), inclines you to use obscure and ambiguous terms such as "intra-action", in an attempt to hide the obvious fact that what you are arguing for is in reality a material/immaterial dualism.

It is highly technical, but it’s really just that the relativity of time is in fact a relativity of all four dimensional variables - their non-commutative ‘properties’ are simply the irreducible quality of dimensionality. What Bohr is saying about measurement is that any properties of reality are, at minimum, a relation between two pairs of non-commutative variable values, one of which, for us, acts as time. So we don’t need to assume space or objects - we only need to recognise one of those values as ‘time’, and one of those pairs as our involvement - our entangled embodied subjectivity.

But I don’t agree with the notion of extension from one realm to another. If you invert this dimensionality as starting with time, then distance, then momentum and then position (which is the paradigm shift required), it’s not so much extension as differentiation. And when we talk about mathematics in relation to reality, we are naturally approaching it from a fifth-dimensional perspective: configuring reality according to relations between variable values, undifferentiated as time, distance, etc. So in my understanding, it’s not a ‘separate realm’ at all. — Possibility

This is why classical dualism provides a much better platform for an approach toward the understanding of reality than does the discipline of modern physics. What physicists are starting to notice is the primacy of time. This means that our understanding of reality is only as good as our understanding of time. The problem is that the temporal conventions employed by modern physics, from the continuity of Newton's first law, to Einsteinian relativity, are simply incorrect. On the other hand, traditional metaphysics provides the required principles for a true understanding of time. These principles begin with an apprehension of the substantial difference between past and future, which as I said already, renders Newton's first law without any necessity. And this duality of substance is what necessitates dualism as the true starting point toward an understanding of reality.

I have a preference for an elegantly accurate understanding of reality. Dualism doesn’t cut it — Possibility

I'm sorry that dualism doesn't seem to be capable of satisfying your desire for elegancy. I hope you will consider swapping the desire for elegancy with the need for truth. Then we may happily converse about the nature of time, but only after you put aside all those beautiful symmetries which are proper to the faulty temporal conventions.

Which do you think provides the road to truth, the grammatical conventions which we know as logic, or the temporal conventions by which we practise the manipulation of temporal objects?

I have trouble with this also. But in a social, let's say feminist setting, intra-acting amongst participants can and does produce "objects" - movements - and the flux of cause and effect is cloudy. — jgill

Movements are categorically distinct from objects, and one cannot be reduced to the other. They are fundamentally incompatible in nature. Aristotle demonstrated this very well. We often talk about a type of movement as a concept, as if this concept is an object. But that would be a Platonic object which is categorically distinct from a material object.

As to the notion that time pre-exists space, that's a metaphysical stance and as such cannot promulgate conclusions about the physical world without absurdities like intra-action. — jgill

The absurdity is actually the product of the currently accepted notion of time, and the conceptual structure which envelops it. The problem is in the way that the concept of time is tied to the concept of change. Conventionally, logical priority is given to physical change, such that time is a property of change. But physical change requires that there is something which changes. This is what I'm talking about with the incoherency of the idea of activity without something that is active.

So if we start talking about activity, or change, without anything which is active or changing, we cross into incoherency. However, the nature of material existence indicates to us that there must be a cause of material existence, and this cause must be active. Therefore we must conclude that there is activity which is prior to material existence as cause of it.

In classical metaphysics, this activity which is prior to material existence is immaterial Forms, and this got adopted into Christian theology as a representation of God. And since the concept of time is tied to material change, then God as an active immaterial Form and cause of material activity, must be outside time, i.e., eternal. The problem is with the conventional conception of time, which ties time to material change. or activity. This renders all activity which is prior to material objects, as unintelligible, being outside of time.

So the mistake is the tying of time to material change. This is what produces the absurdities. To conceive of time as prior to space, and material existence, frees us from these absurdities, providing us with the means for understanding the cause of material existence in a coherent, logical way.

I did NOT redefine ‘agency’ - I took that definition straight from Google (source: Oxford Languages). Can I be clear that I am not redefining any of these terms - I am only pointing out the variability inherent in their definitions, etymology and usage. And the relation between logic and reality is not bound by grammatical convention. The fact that quantum physics makes exceptionally accurate use of a logical structure which defies grammatical conventions should prompt us to rethink these conventions in light of reality, not the other way around. — Possibility

Your definition though, did not solve the problem, which is how there could be activity without anything which is active, and how material objects could emerge from this activity. Dualism has already provided a systematic resolution to these problems thousands of years ago. The activity which is prior to material objects is the activity of immaterial Forms, and how material objects emerge from this activity is through an act of will (traditionally, God's will).

You ought to see, that if you just relinquish your bias against dualism, you will readily understand that classical dualism provides a far more comprehensible, intelligible, and coherent approach to this problem than quantum physics does.

Your approach is to simply deny that there is anything active, in this activity which is prior to material existence. But this renders that proposed activity as entirely unintelligible. The way of classical metaphysics is to recognize this sort of activity, which is prior to the activity of material objects, as the activity of immaterial Forms. And, as "forms" their essence is intelligibility. Therefore this activity is necessarily intelligible.

You seem to hold as a goal, the intent of reducing these two, material forms and immaterial forms, to one another, such that there would be no difference between them. This would support your bias against dualism. But then you are left with this fundamental activity, from which material objects emerge, which is completely unintelligible, because you insist that this is activity with nothing which is active. Perhaps, when you apprehend the unintelligibility of the idea, of activity with nothing which is active, you will be inclined to relinquish your bias against dualism, and accept that what is active in this activity which is prior to the emergence of material objects, is something immaterial.

A photon is a particular instance of activity, but what is active here? It’s not a universal, not a type - it IS real, and yet it still has no mass. — Possibility

The photon, as a particular instance of activity, is an incoherent concept. That's what quantum mechanics demonstrates to us. The "photon" is two completely incompatible forms of energy at the very same time, energy transmitted as wave action, and energy transmitted as a moving particle. Further the photon always has the property of "uncertainty". This is the reality of the quantum physics, and you seem to truly believe that it provides a better approach to the foundations of the universe, than dualism does, although dualism has been well thought out, to avoid such problems.

So what does this activity consist of? Energy without substance. A particle of light. A packet of electromagnetic radiation. It’s a pattern of activity without anything which is acting. So is ‘doesn’t follow grammatical convention’ alone grounds to reject the existence of a photon? — Possibility

A photon is not a packet of light. Light can be clearly observed as wave action, refraction, interference etc.. There are many different applications which make use of electromagnetic waves, and although they can be packaged they do not naturally exist as packets. Waves do not move as packets. And, there is very clearly something which is acting in the case of waves, some substance. Waves are the activity of a substance. You simply deny volumes of observational data to claim that electromagnetic radiation is activity without anything acting. This denial of the evidence plunges you into a fantasy world of incoherency.

The ‘problems’ that you point to are the result of limitations that our perspective, language and assumptions impose on reality. If we’re talking about ontology, we need to get past all that - including intelligibility. — Possibility

But why would you assume that reality, or some aspects of reality are unintelligible? That seems to be a counterproductive, self-defeating assumption. The philosophical mindset is the desire to know, and this means everything. Even if it's beyond the scope of one person, we work toward the collective knowledge. If there is something which I cannot understand, I ought not assume that it is inherently unintelligible, but that it is inherently intelligible, and I just currently have not the means to understand it. Then we keep working toward understanding it. If we assume that it is inherently unintelligible, then we give up on trying to understand it.

If there’s one thing I learned from a qualitative understanding of quantum physics, it’s that dismissing ambiguity, uncertainty or incoherence puts limitations on the information we have access to, before we even begin. That doesn’t mean we necessarily have to use that information, but we do need to be honest about choosing to bracket it out intentionally. And when we don’t have sufficient access to information, we shouldn’t make assumptions based on our limited perspective, on conventions or traditions. What we can do instead is look for relations and patterns of logic, quality and energy in the ambiguous, uncertain and incoherent information that we do have access to. — Possibility

I'm not saying that we should dismiss the ambiguity, uncertainty, and incoherence, I'm saying that we should look at it for what it is, and that is evidence that the theories which give us this are faulty. So it's not the ambiguity, uncertainty, and incoherence that we ought to dismiss, we ought to give this high regard, as evidence that the theories which produce it ought to be dismissed. That's the thing, our knowledge is only as good as the theories we apply, and when such defects enter our knowledge it's because the theories we apply are faulty.

Agency is not ‘motion’ - you’re swapping out terms in order to imply the necessity of a pre-existing object. But there is no such necessity. The apparent incoherence of activity without any ‘thing’ to act comes down to grammatical conventions, nothing more. — Possibility

I'm sorry Possibility, but I will not accept this. Not only motion, but the idea of any instance of activity, without anything acting is incoherent. This is due to the categorical distinction between a universal, type, and a particular. Any type of activity, running, jumping, etc., can be described and understood through a description of the type. The description of the type does not imply any particular object involved in the activity, and this is a concept, a universal. But if we assume a particular instance of any named type of activity, there must be something involved in that activity, or else there is no particular instance being referred to, and all you are talking about is the universal conception. To say that a particular instance of activity does not require something which is active, because the universal conception does not require a particular which is active, is to make a category mistake.

You can write this off as "grammatical conventions, nothing more", but that's all logic is, grammatical conventions and nothing more. So you can insist on accepting illogical and incoherent principles, because logic is only grammatical conventions and nothing more, but what's the point to that?

We both agree that time is logically prior to space. I would say that it necessarily follows from this that time is materially prior to space (ie. activity is materially prior to objects). But you don’t seem to agree with this, and your sole argument is that it is ‘unintelligible’ or ‘incoherent’. — Possibility

I'd say it's incoherent, because matter without objects is incoherent. Matter is that which has mass, and occupies space, and that is what defines a physical object. Having mass, and occupying space, (i.e. being matter), yet not being an object, is incoherent. So your use of "materially prior" is incoherent to me, as if there is matter which is prior to objects. But this is incoherent for the reasons above. Being a particular instance of matter, and being a physical object are one and the same thing.

. You dismiss it as such not because it is inherently unintelligible, but because it appears to be so in your perspective. — Possibility

No, it is "inherently unintelligible" as described above. The only way to make it intelligible is to start redefining terms, as you did with "agency". Now "you'll have to redefine "matter", and so on and so forth, until you have a conceptua structure which is completely inconsistent with convention, and any cross referencing would constitute equivocation. What's the point? You\d just be making up a fantasy reality which is completely distinct from grammatical conventions, i.e. logic.

The idea of a particular instance of activity, without anything which is active, is inherently unintelligible. This would be nothing but a universal, a type of activity, and not a particular instance at all. What makes it a particular instance is the particular material which is active. You might insist that it is just a type, a universal conception, and not a particular instance which you are talking about, but then it's just a fantasy in your mind, and nothing real at all.

Or are you that certain as to the perfection of your own intellect, that if you can’t understand it, then it cannot possibly be understood? I’m not saying that everyone should be able to understand it the way that I’ve set it out, but I’m also not going to apply reductionist methodology that dismisses information on the grounds that it doesn’t follow grammatical convention. — Possibility

Yes, I'm quite certain that there cannot be any particular instances of activity without anything which is acting, or active. If you really think that activity without anything acting is a coherent idea, then explain to me what would this activity consist of. What would be the substance here? And, that "it doesn't follow grammatical convention" is very good grounds for rejection, as explained above.

I recognise that my perspective is limited, but that doesn’t mean my mind must be central to any proposed ontology, any more than the fact that I’m on earth means this planet must be central to the solar system. The same logical process can be employed - at a different qualitative level - to propose an ontology where my mind is understood as de-centred and variable, just as any other structure or system. — Possibility

The solar system is not comparable to ontology. We can model, or represent all sorts of supposedly independent things, like the solar system, but ontology does not have as its purpose, to model or represent any independent thing.

It is not the grammatical structure itself but the conventions surrounding it that are insufficient. For instance, the assumption that a verb is necessarily attributed to the subject as agency, which is denied to the object, is inaccurate in relation to what we understand about reality and the structure of events. We can still structure the sentence in the same way, but we cannot assume that this attribution of agency is necessarily what it means, and to insist on this configuration of dynamics in an event for the sake of ‘intelligibility’ is to endorse a variety of material-discursive practices that perpetuate ignorance, isolation and exclusion. This is as much about the reality of that cascade of events within a musical performance or telling time by a caesium clock as it is about cultural theory. — Possibility

I do not understand what you're trying to say here. Of course we can talk about verbs, and the meaning of them, "run", "jump", etc., without implying that any particular thing or object is carrying out that activity. That is not the issue, because in this case we are talking about the conception, what it means. But if we refer to a particular instance of such an activity occurring in the physical world, then we necessarily imply that there is something engaged in that activity. Would you be talking about an instance of running, or jumping, in which there is nothing running or jumping? That's incoherent, right?

Or, are you proposing a special type of activity, in which there is nothing which is active. If so, then you ought to be able to describe this type of activity, conceptualize it. Please explain to me what this proposed type of activity is like, and how it occurs, this type of activity in which nothing is active. Can you explain what is going on when this activity occurs, without talking about something being active?

What quantum mechanics indicates is that understanding the complete nature of reality will take more than the principles of physics. We must accept that the theories are incomplete. Let’s not throw out the baby… — Possibility

Ever read read Plato's Theaetetus? There is no baby there, only flatulence.

But look up the Michelson & Morley experiment - there is no ether. — Possibility

I already have. What these experiments demonstrated is that the relationship between the ether and material objects which was assumed, that they are distinct materials or substances, was a faulty assumption. It does not prove that there is no ether, just that the hypothesis of how the ether exists was incorrect.

THE TRIANGLE IS NOT OUT THERE, but added by the brain as a new meaning that is inferred, not seen — Gnomon

That thing is cool. I actually see a difference in the white between inside and outside the triangle, as if there's a line marking the edge of the triangle. But then I can make the line go away if I want to.

Wouldn't it be bad evolutionary design if our perceptual representations were giving us information about what was going on inside our own head as opposed to the things in the world they are supposed to represent? — Apustimelogist

Consider the way that you read. Do you read words as sounds? What's that all about, seeing things as sounds? Did the brain get so confused that it can't tell the difference between a sight and a sound? You could say that the sound in your own head is a representation of the thing outside your head, the written word, but what kind of representation is that, to represent a seen pattern as a heard pattern? Well, the representation, which is the sound in the head, simply represents what is seen by the eyes, which is an image in the head, so one representation just represents another representation.

If a representation represents another representation, how do you get to the point of concluding that there is something outside the head which is being represented? Suppose the brain just likes to produce things in a willy-nilly way, like the way pure mathematicians produce axioms, with complete disregard for anything supposedly real, in a supposedly real external word. Then, if those created things prove to be useful to the being possessing them, that might be an evolutionary advantage. However, we still cannot conclude that there is anything being represented, by those created ideas, images, or whatever you want to call them, we just have useful tools. Nor can we conclude that there is an real, external, physical world.

Agency: action or intervention producing a particular effect (from Medieval Latin agent-, doing).

This definition does not imply (necessarily or otherwise) that agency is a property of a thing or agent - you are making one of those Newtonian assumptions again. And again, not ‘distinct’, but differentiating agencies. Because we DO just have a whole bunch of activity. The capacity to speak of differentiating agencies within activity is still there - we just need to shed some institutionalised assumptions. — Possibility

It has nothing to do with Newton, but Barad clearly was talking about "distinct agencies" which emerge through intra-action. So even by your definition we have the problem I mentioned of a multitude of particular agencies coming into being, from a general sort of "agency". The general sort is unintelligible as motion without anything which is moving is incoherent. And so this sort of ontology ought not be accepted, because its basic presumptions, or premises, renders the coming into being of things, objects, as unintelligible. That is the recurring problem of all sorts of materialism in general.

I do not understand why you are so obsessed with defending this position, to the point that you incessantly deny the problems which I point to.

But it seems you are so taken with beliefs in representationalism and human exceptionalism that you refuse to accept this. The notion that humanity is not so central and immovable, and that the conventions surrounding grammatical structure are insufficient to ‘represent’ reality, seem too terrifying to contemplate. But just like the work of Darwin and Copernicus before him, the evidence in quantum mechanics is irrefutable. So we must accept it, and do our best to embrace the information and move forward, rather than try to bracket it out. — Possibility

You cannot circumvent the fact that your own personal mind is central, and immovable from any sort of ontology which you might believe in, or propose to others. Pretending otherwise, is self-deception, and then your proposals are attempts at deceiving others.

Yes, our current, conventional grammatical structure is insufficient to represent reality, but this is simply a reflection of a fundamental lack of understanding. Human grammatical structures evolve with human understanding, so grammatical insufficiencies are not paramount to misunderstanding, they can be overcome. Grammatical problems can be resolved in the evolution of understanding.

This underscores the need for clear and precise definitions in ontology, and demonstrates why yours and Barad's use of ambiguity in terms like "intra-action", and "agencies", is misleading, and conducive to misunderstanding. You obscure the unintelligibility and incoherency of your ontology with ambiguity, then produce definitions as required, but the definition is insufficient to account for the complete scope of the usage. This means that any usage outside the provided definition, is equivocation.

What quantum mechanics ought to indicate to you, is that we do not have the principles required for understanding the complete nature of reality. If we must accept the evidence of quantum mechanics, then we must accept this, that the theories by which we approach the foundations of the universe are faulty.

Electromagnetic waves are not unintelligible - they’re just incompatible with representationalism. Without this and other Newtonian assumptions, there is simply no need for any of these acrobatics. The notion of an ‘ether’ is just trying to allay fears: an attempt to describe electromagnetic energy without abandoning representationalism. — Possibility

That a wave only occurs in a medium, is not a "Newtonian assumption", it is simply the way that we understand the occurrence of waves. You are the one insisting that we need to talk "physics". Do you understand the physics of waves? Electromagnetic waves are unintelligible within the precepts of any theory which denies the reality of an ether, because waves without a substance, through which the waves propagate, is an incoherent notion.

I just think your understanding of time is based on a limited perspective, which forces you to accept a dualism. — Possibility

Any true account of time requires dualism because of the substantial difference between past and future. All forms of monism display a gross misunderstanding of time.

What is ‘occurring in the inside of space’ is simply your ongoing constructed prediction - a configuration of activity based on the information available. — Possibility

It is not "prediction" that I am talking about here, it is what is actually happening, as time is passing. Something must determine, or cause what will be, in existence, at each passing moment in time, because the future consists of possibilities. That, something which determines what will be, at each moment in passing time, is what I refer to as what is "occurring in the inside of space". Newton's first law simply takes for granted that the way things have been, continuously in the past, will continue to be the way that they are in the future, unless there is a force which causes things to change. But the nature of free will, and the reality of future possibilities, indicates that any existent thing could change or be changed at any moment of passing time. This tells us that the temporal continuity of existence expressed by Newton's first law is in no way necessary. Yes, things occur the way described, but this is not necessary. This is why Newton himself stated that his first law depended on the Will of God.

When we apprehend the reality, that each and every aspect of material existence could be discontinued at any moment of passing time, we are forced to conclude that the entirety of material existence must be recreated, reconstituted, at each moment of passing time. When we consider where this act occurs, this act which recreates the existence of each material thing, at each moment of passing time, it can only be the inside, or internal part of space.

The thing is that our conceptual reality (inner ‘space’) is not restricted to three dimensions, or even four. It is not grounded in temporality, but in pure relation, differentiating into logical, qualitative and dynamic potential. — Possibility

This is what I am arguing is the mistake. That the conceptual reality of inner space is not grounded in temporality is a mistake. Since what happens in inner space is activity, and activity occurs in time, then to make this "dynamic potential" logically coherent, it must be grounded in temporality. Any dynamic which is not temporal is incoherent and unintelligible. This is why I argue that time must be understood as logically prior to space. Traditional conceptions of space are of "outer space", three dimensional conceptions. "Inner space" cannot be understood through such traditional conceptions of space, because whatever this "inner space" is, it is substantially different from outer space. However, what the two have in common is activity, and what is required for all activity is time. Therefore the means for understanding the proper relationship between inner space and outer space is to understand the nature of time, it's what they both share. So, the activities of inner space are properties of time, and the activities of outer space are properties of time, and the two are related to each other by that subject, time.

I continue to stand by my argument that treating time quantum mechanically is an important step in eliminating dualism. — Possibility

Again, this is what I argue is a mistake. The goal of eliminating dualism is misguided, because it is dualism which gives us the principles which are best suited toward understanding the true nature of time. What quantum mechanics shows us is that the discipline of physics approaches the foundations of the universe with faulty principles, which render the universe as unintelligible. The appearance of unintelligibility is the consequence of faulty principles. This means that all the primary principles must be reassessed and analyzed for mistake. Dualism provides very good direction for how we ought to understand time.

The agencies are differentiating, not distinct. Distinct implies separation, which Barad is very careful NOT to imply. There is a lot of Newtonian assumption built into our use of language, and you’re displaying it here. Agency is not a thing, but activity. Agencies emerge through differentiating, which is intra-action. Just as the particular striking of a chord emerges though a particular song performance, emerging through a particular set emerging through a particular music festival. These are not things but events. So we’re not talking about properties of things, but involvement in events. You can assume that a song existed prior to the festival, but we both agree that we’re talking about particular events, not generalities. We’re talking about a particular performance - one that did not exist, with these boundaries and properties, until it was actually happening. — Possibility

Again, you are hiding (obscuring) the issue through ambiguity and sloppy use of terms. "Agency" refers to the actions of an agent. So this part of what you say: " Agency is not a thing, but activity" is true. But this part of what you say: "So we’re not talking about properties of things" is false. The term used, "agency", implies necessarily that the activity referred to is the property of a thing an agent. That there are distinct agents (as distinct entities) is the only way that Barad has the capacity to speak of distinct "agencies". Otherwise we just have a whole bunch of activity, and no capacity to speak of distinct agencies within this activity.

If we respect this difference, then a number of problems become evident. First, any intra-action activity which is prior to the emergence of agents, cannot be called agency, and it then becomes fundamentally unintelligible. It is activity without anything which is active, because there is no agent, like motion without anything which is moving. This is a fundamental issue with our understanding of electromagnetic energy. Without the ether which is required to understand the waves of electromagnetism, there are waves without a substance which is undergoing the wave activity. Failure to identify the ether has rendered electromagnetic waves as unintelligible to us, motion without anything moving.

Another problem is the issue of how distinct agents could emerge. We have first, activity without any distinct agents. This is a sort of random activity which is fundamentally unintelligible because it is designated as having no agents, nothing which the activity is a property of. Then, from this emerges activity which can be attributed to distinct agents. This is a significant change of category for the proposed type of activity, "intra-action", and we need to account for how such a change could occur.

That is why "intra-action" is really a very misleading sort of proposal. It classes both these very different forms of activity, the unintelligible activity of action without any thing acting, together with intelligible activity, agency, as if the difference between these two is insignificant. In reality, it becomes fundamentally incoherent to try and conceptualize action without an agent suddenly becoming the action of an agent because we need to know where the agent popped from.

I’m not trying to obscure anything. I can’t force a paradigm shift on you, but we are not talking about ‘things’ at all. Language convention leads you to assume that ‘agency’, ‘intra-action’ or ‘event’ in a position of noun means they are individual, pre-existing things or entities. But we’re talking about events within events within events. As Barad says, it matters whether you are talking about an event from inside (in which you are necessarily involved), or from ‘outside’ (where the ‘event’ is internally configured, and treated quantum mechanically). — Possibility

The problem is that "agency" implies an agent which is active, that is how the word is commonly used. Therefore the use of this word, if what is meant is activity without an agent, is a deceptive usage. And if we look at the idea of activity without an agent which is active, then we have an unintelligible proposal. So we ought to conclude that Barad uses the term "agency", or "agencies", intentional, to obscure the fact that what is being proposed is fundamentally unintelligible.

An event without anything involved in that event is unintelligible. And event within event, within event, within event, etc., produces an infinite regress with no substance to the world. This is the very same problem as if we say that matter is infinitely divisible. Each piece of matter can be divided to smaller pieces, infinitely, and the world has no substance.

What I said was that each event has a temporal structure, which can appear linear from within it. When you perceive a particular event from outside it, however, it has to include the other three dimensions, and so is structurally similar to spacetime, which it seems you assume to be something external to or other than the ‘physical’ universe. I am saying there is no ‘external’ perspective of reality - the dimensional perspective here is of an internal configuration to the event, and this is where quantum mechanics comes in. Because if we are observing the internal structure of an event, then we are necessarily involved, and if we are outside, then its internal configuration is unobservable, and must be treated quantum mechanically (ie. like spacetime). — Possibility

If you place yourself, as the subject, within the universe, then you are the agent. "The universe" is a creation of your senses, perception, and mind. The only way to get an "internal configuration" is to understand your own mind and perceptual apparatus, as to how phenomena, and concepts are created by your mind. Otherwise, you look at the universe as something external to your mind.

To be blunt, it is impossible to observe the internal configuration of an event, unless that event is internal to your own body. That's simply the way that sense observation works, any time we make sense observations we observe from the outside inward, and it is impossible to observe the internal configuration. Therefore your portrayal of quantum mechanics as observing the internal configuration of events, is misguided, and simply wrong.

I agree with your last statement here, and I think this is important. QM demonstrates that time is prior to space. So why do you keep bringing Newton into the discussion and insisting on ‘substance’ by way of ‘things’? Are you suggesting that objects exist prior to space? That time is not activity? Or that activity is not agency? This is what baffles me about your approach. — Possibility

"Space" ought to be understood as the property of objects, I think you mentioned this already. That is how the concept has been developed. We produced a concept of space for the purpose of measuring and understanding the properties of objects, so our "space" is fundamentally derived from and therefore refers to the property of objects. Objects are logically prior to space.

This means that we need to go further than space to ground, or substantiate, the existence of objects. Traditionally this was done through concept of "matter". The Aristotelian concept of matter has matter as described in terms of "potential", which is basically possibility. So matter is the potential for change, but this potential itself needs to be grounded in something substantial, and in the Aristotelian conception, this is time. Therefore matter is represented as that which does not change through the passage of time (represented now by conservation laws, mass or energy). This is represented by Newton's first law, which even today maintains its position as the basic premise of physics. This implies that the fundamental grounding, or the fundamental substance of the universe is temporal in nature. The problem is that Newton's first law does not adequately apprehend the nature of temporal extension.

I agree that ‘my reality’ can only ever be internally structured, but I disagree that ‘I am an impenetrable fortress’. Rather, I am an event, a spacetime structure of particular and ongoing internal reconfiguration, entangled with all of reality in our mutual becoming, with which I collaborate to enact an agential cut with every intra-action, every material-discursive practice, marking boundaries and properties that, despite my best intentions, are continually changing. When we invert our understanding of reality from space/objects as prior to time/activity, to time/activity prior to space/objects, then disembodiment is not a question of ‘spatial extension’ to a body, but of arbitrarily differentiating the ‘body’ from being. — Possibility

Consider that "impenetrable fortress" refers to the outside, and nothing crosses the external boundary. Things relating to each other externally through space, is how we model things, but try for a minute to imagine all real relations as through the inside. At each moment of passing time, everything comes from the inside, moving in an outward direction (as indicated by the concept of spatial expansion). So all true relations are through the inside, in the upward direction of time, because change must be initiated prior to the material effects being instantiated at the present moment. This means that all real events, as being causal, actually occur in the inside of space, while the outward expression is just the effect of the true internal event. I used to think of the passing of time as a process which involves the inverting of space. At each moment when time passes, spatial existence inverts from inside to outside.

Suppose we defer consideration of a law of identity, and consider two identical beings in different possible worlds, with the difference between the two worlds being of negligible relevance to the two beings. — wonderer1

The point is, that to be two beings there must be something which distinguishes them as one different from the other. If what distinguishes them one from the other, is "being in different possible words" then we cannot say that the difference between the two worlds is of negligible relevance, because we've already propositioned that this difference is what distinguishes them one from the other. Since being two distinct things rather than one and the same thing is fundamentally a significant difference, then it's necessarily of very significant relevance.

The only way which I see to proceed is to employ the proposition that the difference which makes two things distinct, instead of one and the same thing, is not a significant difference. But that is just asking for all sorts of logical dilemmas because that premise would annihilate our capacity to analyze differences, by saying that differences in general are insignificant. But that makes all things the same, and whatever means we might employ to distinguish one thing from another would be completely arbitrary.

And yet it is not beyond the pale to say that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer. — Banno

You got me thirsty already, and it's not even 7:00 AM: https://btpshop.ca/

However I took the anecdote as a comment on the distinction between material causation and the Aristotelian final causation. — Wayfarer

When thoroughly analyzed there is very little difference in the application of Aristotle's final cause and material cause, in the sense that they can each be applied toward the very same effects. The most significant difference though is that material cause is potential while final cause can be understood as actual. Because of this "material cause" is inadequate for understanding many of the things it is applied toward, as it cannot account for agency. So "the reason for", and "the cause of" are very distinct in the way that they do, or do not, account for agency.

In Banno's example, if I say wanting a beer "caused me to go" to the fridge (final cause), it is also necessarily the reason why I went to the fridge. Agency is accounted for as an act of the will. But if I say wanting a beer "was the reason why I went" to the fridge, there is no agency implied, causation is therefore not accounted for, and we are left uninformed as to the cause. Then one might look to the brain, or some other factor as the cause.

Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect (1970, 214). — Davidson

So when we say the mental supervenes on the physical, we're saying that if we had two humans who were identical in every way physically, they will necessarily have the same mental state. — frank

Isn't it contrary to the law of identity to speak of "two" physical occurrences which are in every way alike. If they are in every way alike, they are necessarily one and the same, not "two". So the whole premise of this thought experiment, the assumption of two distinct physical occurrences which are exactly alike, is fundamentally flawed making that thought experiment pointless.

I think this is what I was saying above to T Clark, but one of the problems often brought forth by the substance dualist is that there is not empirical proof that brain state X always causes behavior Y because fMRI results do not show that for every instance of behavior Y the exact areas of the brain show activity. — Hanover

So this is an example of the problem exposed above. When "brain state X" is referred to, what is meant is a specific type of brain state, not a particular condition of a brain which is exactly and precisely identical to the particular condition of another brain which is said to have "brain state X". In reality, "brain state X" refers to a generalized "brain state" which ignores many peculiarities of an actual brain's state, making brain state X a broadly universal condition, allowing that two very different brains, can both be said to have "brain state X". So the whole argument about supervenience is just so deeply flawed, and not worthy of serious philosophical discussion.

First of all, you are reading more into what I describe than what is here. Read it again. There is nothing in what I’ve written that deviates from Barad’s explanation - except that my word choice has maybe opened the door for you to insert your own assumptions. Unless you somehow missed my use of ‘not’ in what I described…? — Possibility

Look what your quote from Barad said though:

In contrast to the usual ‘interaction’, which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. — Karen Barad

Notice that the distinct agencies are said to emerge through "their" intra-action. This is what is incoherent. "Emerge" means to come into being. So if the agencies emerge trough this activity, the activity must precede the agencies in time. But "their" intra-action implies that the intra-action is a property of the agencies which emerge. Therefore the sentence quoted implies that the activities which are the properties of the agencies precedes the existence of the agencies. How is this logically possible, that a thing's actions precede the existence of the thing?

You say "The measurement process is an internal configuration, not an activity occurring between individual, pre-existing entities", but I have no idea what this means. If it's not "internal" to pre-existing entities, then what's it internal to? It appears to me, that instead of facing Barad's incoherency you try to obscure the meaning by saying that the intra-action is "internal" without indicating a type of thing which it is internal to.

Where do you get this assumption that an emergence must exist prior to what emerges? — Possibility

"Emerge" means to become, to come into being. And becoming implies a cause, therefore something from which the emerging thing emerges from, whether or not you use the term "from" or "through". You can insist that something can come into being without a cause if you like, but that's just the unacceptable notion of something coming from nothing.

When we ‘keep time’ with the quartz clock we are part of a cascade of internal configurations - within phenomena - that necessarily involve all of the precisely arranged parts, in a ‘clock’ body, keeping time for us through various prostheses. And we are materially entangled with these internal arrangements - the digital count reading the electric pulse reading the amplifier reading the vibrating crystal - whenever we ‘read’ the time as marks on the clock face. And each of these measurement ‘events’ is not ordered in time but roughly simultaneous and NOT identical. — Possibility

This is your obscure notion again, of "internal configurations". Now you say that the configuration is internal to phenomena. "Phenomena" is just a generalization, a universal, a conception. So now, if we are talking about an internal arrangement of parts, we are talking about a logical arrangement, a conceptual structure, conceptual parts arranged by a logical priority. We are not talking about an arrangement of physical parts. "Phenomena" refers to what appears to the senses, and we sense the external of things, not the internally arranged parts. We use logic to model internal arrangements, but then this is not what is actually internal to the phenomena, if "phenomena" is supposed to represent real physical events or objects, but a logically produced model of the "internal" of such.

A two-dimensional continuum is a variable plane - but not necessarily a geometrical one. It’s just describing a relation between two variables. And now either of those variables could exist as time, or distance, or direction, or energy, etc. And the universe begins to take shape, as it were. — Possibility

There is no universe here beginning to take shape, because you have only presented ideals, a two dimensional plane. There is no substance here, nor is there any activity here because there is nothing to be active, no agency. All you have is two ideal dimensions, and nothing taking any shape whatsoever, just the basis for a conceptual model.

Read what you wrote. You are arguing that an activity of ‘not being’ must precede the being of an object. Time prior to space. — Possibility

Exactly. That's what I am arguing for, time must be understood as prior to space if our intention is to understand the nature of reality.

Are you saying that no event can occur within another event? That a music festival, in which a number of acts perform, is not an event because it contains events within it? And a single instrument being played during one of those acts is or is not an event? And a chord being struck? I want to be clear on what you’re arguing here… — Possibility

What I am saying is that "a music festival" refers to something general, a universal, a concept or ideal, and therefore not any particular real event. Likewise for "a generation". To refer to an event, we need to specify a particular music event, or a particular family relation.

This has nothing to do with "events within", it's a matter of the difference between talking about a general idea (a concept or universal), and a particular event. You agreed that any particular event must have a temporal order. Then you went on to say that it is not necessary that all events have a temporal order.

To judge the truth or falsity of this, we must determine what "all events" refers to. Your example, "a generation", indicates that it refers to a generalization, a universal, and not anything real in the physical universe, just an ideal. But I do not think that this is what you had in mind. I think you want "all events" to refer to a compilation of all real physical events, rather than to a concept or ideal. If so, then aren't you just treating all real physical events as a single event, and therefore this particular event must follow the rule that all events have a temporal order?

And if you are treating the compilation of all real physical events as something other than a single particular event, then you need to explain what type of a thing this is, which you are referring to, and how it is possible that all events could exist together as something other than an event. Normally, when we talk about a bunch of events existing together as a single unit, we are just speaking about a bigger event, as your example of music festivals shows. And in the same way that the small event (a chord being struck), has a temporal order, the big event (the specified music event itself) must also have a temporal order, as all events have a temporal order.

Did you explain what "the meaning of the meaning" means during the last week or so of discussion? If so, I must have missed it. Please provide a quote. — Luke

I am now fully convinced that trying to explain anything to you will always be a hopeless effort.