The issue here is not the relationship between you and I, rather it is an issue of how Jaded Scholar and I both relate to some current problems of physics, in specific, the zero point in time. Let me paraphrase our discussion like this.
JS: The zero point in time, i.e. the point at the beginning of time, is a problem for physicists.
MU: Not only is the supposed zero point at the beginning of time problematic, but in any measurement of motion there is an assumed zero point which starts the measured duration, and this is also problematic, as described in Zeno's paradoxes.
JS: There is no current problem with this, because mathematicians have solved that problem.
MU: Mathematicians have only produced a sufficient workaround for the problem, and the same problem has reemerged as the time/frequency uncertainty relation of the Fourier transform.
JS: The time/frequency uncertainty relation is no different from any other uncertainty relation of conjugate variables.
MU: The time/frequency uncertainty relation is the basic uncertainty of the Fourier transform, from which the others are derived.
JS: Ad hominem galore.

You complain about getting compared to a muppet and then you insult all mathematicians by calling their science an art. Stealth insults are still insults. — universeness

I complained about JS's use of ad hominem, which is abundant throughout the post, everywhere. The muppet comment I could not even grasp so it has no bearing.

Mathematics is commonly classified by philosophers as a form of art. There is no insult here, just a statement of truth.

You continue to focus on complaining about what science still does not know for sure, and you then assume that this gives you legitimacy, when you offer your own very weak claims and pure speculations about what you claim must be true. You will only ever gain followers who are easily fooled but that will only ever be some of the people, some or all of the time. You have no solutions, and you offer no methodology that is even part of the solutions our species need. You remain part of the problem as you are ossified in your anti-science stance. That is a very unfortunate legacy to burden the more easily mislead members of the next generation with, imo. — universeness

Jaded Scholar is an odd sort, first engaging me with

...I think everything you said is generally on the right track.. — Jaded Scholar

Then,

I've given myself permission to be quite rude — Jaded Scholar

and

What you are saying is a collection of truth-adjacent things — Jaded Scholar

And when I pointed out that Jaded Scholar's tune was changed as we proceeded, this seemed to cause some sort of ill-temper. Now Jaded Scholar has become completely "unhinged", a word directed at me above. There is an extensive post as a reply to me, with nothing of substance, merely one insult after the other. There is nothing there for me to reply to without stooping to the JS's schoolyard level. It would be like "you're an asshole", "no I'm not". What's the point? I mean this is the lounge, but it's just not my type of entertainment.

I don't have a strong relationship of confidence with them, so if I disappear or die, they would not notice it. Hmm, my neighbors? The building porter? Who exactly would miss me if I am extremely isolated? — javi2541997

It's really not a matter of having someone who would "miss you". For most people, if someone they are acquainted with dies, it has an affect on them. Further, suicide seems to have a special type of affect because it is always perceived as an avoidable death. So it's kind of like they feel that they have played a role in the death, just by knowing the person, and not acting to give the person "help". I think that's the silent language. I haven't read any of Fosse's material, but it would be interesting to see how he portrays suicide.

Again, if my suicide would negatively affect someone, the latter had to respect or care about me previously. — javi2541997

I could disagree with this, but it would not be correct to disagree, because what really is the issue here is what it means to "care" about another. There is a bond which human beings have between themselves, supporting what is known as empathy, so most of us have an innate or instinctual tendency to "care" about others, no matter who the other is. Because of this, it's really redundant and meaningless to say "the latter had to respect or care about me previously", as this is already given, that people naturally care about each other no matter who the other is

This discussion reminds me of the debate on the tree that falls down, but nobody heard or noticed it... — javi2541997

There is a sort of irony here, and it is related to how I described Fosse as turning toward loneliness, maximizing loneliness, in his early ambition of writing. The most pure, original, creative artwork comes from the artist's communion with oneself, the "other" must be completely removed so that the writing is not directed toward, or intended to impress any particular or specific type of "other". However, it is impossible to completely remove the "other" because there must be some sort of "other" or else the writing would be completely uninspired as the intention would be that no one would ever read it, so there would be no need to write anything with meaning. Therefore the person's self becomes the other, as the author writes for oneself to read, effectively isolating the individual.

The irony is in the role that the self plays as "the other". You, in your writing refer to "the tree that falls down". So there is implied in this statement that you have some knowledge about this situation, you know that a tree fell down. But then you proceed to say that nobody "noticed" it. So your second statement contradicts what is implied by the first. The first implies that you know a tree fell, while the second implies that no one could know this. So it doesn't explicitly contradict, but there is an implicit contradiction, and that's where the irony come in.

The silent language works with what is implied, not explicit, like the example above, when Bylaw said "selfish" is pejorative. But the thing is that some implications are overt, conventional, practically a definable aspect of the meaning, like "selfish is bad", whereas other implications like what is implied by "the tree that falls down", are very well hidden, and only grasped by particular individuals in specific ways. So in reality there is a huge grey area, a lack of demarcation, between what is implicit and what is explicit.

To get back to the point now, when the writer increases the aloneness to the point of desiring the loneliness of self-isolation, for the sake of inspired writing, the self becomes more and more important, as not only the transmitter of the message, but also the intended receiver. This excludes the possibility of irony and any sort of doubt as to interpretation, to the point that such tools can only be produced by self-deception. And that's the case with your example, "the tree that falls down". You have fooled yourself, tricked yourself into thinking that you can talk about this fallen tree without anyone knowing that this fallen tree exists, when clearly you must know about it to talk about it.

Our philosophical language is full of such expressions, where people trick themselves like that in order to create the appearance of a philosophical problem. What is really the case, is that these writers, philosophers, are actually not considering the full implications of the words they use, being completely immersed in themselves, and the effort to creatively produce a philosophical problem which they might share with others. So they end up not completely considering the implications of the words, thereby fooling themselves, presenting the so-called problems to others and actually making a fool of themselves. In other words they engage in self-deception for the sake of creating something which appears philosophically creative to others, when in reality the creativeness is just self-deception.

Which is precisely what the others are expecting if they believe this. We would allow this kind of thinking for many decisions. They will be disappointed if I don't [go to the wedding, movies, Friday bowling, whatever] but I had a bad fall and it would cause me a lot of pain just to go and watch] The criticism eats itself and as I said after what you quoted, it add a guilt to an already painful situation. We are constantly making decisions out of our own needs and taking care of ourselves in ways we certainly do not for random neighbors and distant cousins, but even, because we are closest to ourselves, responsible for ourselves, making decisions that may not please others, but because of what we want and don't want. Selfish is pejorative. It is certainly a decision to do something that one wants to do that others may not want. And if one has lived with some love, then most will not like it at all. Nor would they if you moved to France, probably either, because of modelling or it was the dreamt of home you always wanted. A woman wants a career and her boyfriend and parents want her to have a kid. Someone leaves a sect they are in and every single person they have know is sad and upset. Are these situations also the definition of selfishness because they put their desires and wants before those of the people they know, even love? It's certain self-oriented to make these decisions. And these outcomes may seem positive or neutral - at least to some - so, they're ok. Move to France and you may be permanently removing yourself from people's lives. And in the main were before the internet. — Bylaw

I don't see your point Bylaw. Acting for one's own interests with disregard for the hurt it will cause to others is what selfishness is, whether or not that is a good thing or a bad thing. However, if this to you, means that "selfish" is pejorative, then it is you yourself who is saying that such a thing is a bad thing.

I think this is a very good example of how the silent language works. I describe an act as "selfish", you hear the word as pejorative, and this stirs negative feelings in you. So you proceed to look for examples where selfishness wouldn't necessarily be negative, in an attempt to dispel the negative feeling which your own interpretation of the word, as pejorative, has aroused within you.

Understood, why am I to disagree with those good points? Nevertheless, I still think that the receiver is not a key element of suicide. You are treating the receiver as a person who necessarily represents the cause of suicide, and this is not necessarily the main point. — javi2541997

The point is that there almost always is receivers, so the receiver becomes a sort of necessary accidental. Whoever the receiver (the living person who is affected by the suicide) is, is not necessarily a specific individual, so is in that sense accidental, but there almost certainly will be such an individual, or individuals.

In this way, it is sort of like the act of writing itself. The writing is not directed at any particular individual, but it is still necessary within the writer's mind, that there will be a reader. The writer, in as much as one might intend to write solely for oneself, knows that ultimately the writing must be composed in such a way as to ultimately be read by someone else. Likewise, as much as the suicidal may be wrapped up in loneliness, carrying out the act solely for one's own sake, the individual still knows that ultimately the act will be in some way interpreted by someone else.

Keep in mind that there are people who commit suicide because they feel lonely. In this case specifically, there is no receiver for communicating the silent language of suicide. Then, this act happens unnoticed. — javi2541997

Perhaps, in principle, this is possible. The extremely lonely person goes off somewhere, and no one ever notices the difference. In my analogy above, of the writer, this would be like a person writing, knowing the writing would never be read, and even hiding it to ensure that it wouldn't ever be read. This would be a sort of odd behaviour, actively writing to no one, and even intentionally hiding the material to ensure that it was never read. Would this be indicative of mental illness, or can we say that a person who keeps a personal diary, and ensures that no one will ever read it, is acting in a sane way? How can this be reasonable?

According to this data, lonely individuals tend to be more suicidal than social ones. We can conclude that those suicidal individuals have no receivers for their acts because loneliness is the main cause of this thought. — javi2541997

I think that there is usually receivers, because people do not live in total isolation, and sometimes the suicidal do not adequately plan to dispose of their own bodies. We have to consider that anyone in proximity will be affected by the suicide, in some, usually negative way.

Very interesting what you wrote in this paragraph, and I liked it. But would you consider it a desire rather than just the average transformation we all experience in our lives? I don't know to what extent Fosse desired companionship, but he started to learn more about his life and communicative skills. He began to have a fear of speaking in public, and he ended up reading a lecture in a Nobel ceremony. He just faced his fears. — javi2541997

We all grow up differently despite categorization like introvert/extrovert. The issue here I believe is the question of how we each learn to cope with our own peculiarities. Different introverts develop different coping mechanisms. I think that Fosse did very well. And, I think that he's trying to help and teach others.

Ugh, speaking of which, if you do honestly try to meet my challenge (I expect you won't), then I do ask that you stop embarrassing yourself with that foolishness about irrational numbers (which were never a problem for maths, only for mathematicians) or Newton's law prohibiting infinte acceleration (F=ma, you absolute and utter muppet - I already showed you those, four characters, which is all that anyone needs to see to understand that. Except the genuinely mathematically illiterate, I guess. Case in point.). — Jaded Scholar

I will happily fulfill your expectations. Your separation of maths from the mathematicians who practise the art, is a premise I cannot accept. Furthermore, ad hominem doesn't interest me, and that seems to be all you have to offer me.
See ya, wouldn't want to be ya.

Although I agree that the hurtfulness of suicide cannot be removed, I still don't see why this act (plus the suicide note) can increase the hurt. Whose hurt are we referring to? I can only imagine suicide as a revenge act, but in most cases, this rarely happens. — javi2541997

We're talking about the hurt to others which suicide causes. For example, people who know the person who carries out the act often feel a sense of blame and even guilt for not being closer to the individual in what is apprehended as a time of need. The suicide note can add to this feeling, which hurts. I think this is what points to with that article.

A person with suicidal thoughts starts giving up on life, and this makes him or her not feel motivated by anything, not even revenge. — javi2541997

It's all part of the silent language, which appears to be a sort of communication through feelings. The meaning apprehended by the receiver of the language is not necessarily the meaning intended by the transmitter of the language. This is due to the unreliability of the medium of transmission. Take what is known as "body language" for example, and there is also what is known as "inflection" in speech, a term derived from musical practise I believe. These forms of silent language may contribute significantly to the meaning of the spoken word, but the significance will vary considerable from one person to the other. The variance is so significant, that a person who is inclined to read the silent language will see very much meaning which another will not, and even much meaning which is not intended by the person who transmits it. Seeing the silent meaning which is not intended by the author is how we determine when a person is lying, by looking into one's eyes, or whatever.

Therefore, as much as the suicidal person is not motivated for "revenge", people close to that person may apprehend this type of meaning through the silent language. The silent language communicates through people's feelings, which is a sort of instinctual reaction, so that the receiver's conscious mind responds according to one's feelings. And as much as the conscious mind of the receiver may tell the person that the meaning which has manifested by way of feeling, was not really intended by the transmitter, this is often insufficient to suppress the feeling along with the associated meaning.

Suicide is only considered selfish if the suicidal person was loved or esteemed by others. Many people die in the pure state of loneliness, and nobody ever remembers them... — javi2541997

I think the referred to "pure state of loneliness" is fictitious. I also believe that this is the overall lesson taught by Fosse's speech, the meaning of the whole, or "moral of the story". The supposed complete isolation of a "pure state of loneliness" is actually impossible and therefore fictitious. As he described, his approach to writing was the approach of loneliness, a feeling created due to his innate problems of association, and which he later built upon, due to his problem with public speaking: "Through the fear of reading aloud I entered the loneliness that is more or less the life of a writing person – and I’ve stayed there ever since."

This act of separating himself from others to produce loneliness was what fueled his creative talent. However, the loneliness was incomplete, not really pure, because he could not dispel the idea that someone, at some time in the future, would actually read the notes he was writing, and this idea penetrated through the writing. Therefore within his writing there was always that seed of content, subject matter, which was intended as communication with others, making his notes more than just notes to oneself. This feature, that the loneliness he created could not be completed or finished, then probably became a central feature of some of his writing.

Slowly, he came to accept the fact that the loneliness he had desired in the first place, to escape the others, find security within himself in order to produce masterful art, was a false ideal, because it could not be completed in perfection. That was impossible. So he turned himself around, finding security instead in companionship rather than within himself: "And what gripped me the first time I saw something I had written performed on a stage, yes, that was exactly the opposite of loneliness, it was
companionship, yes, to create art through sharing art – that gave me a great
sense of happiness and security."

In the end, the entire speech can be seen as an attempt by Fosse to share his loneliness, which in many ways is the deepest gesture of companionship. From the loneliness which he created for himself, are derived his deepest, most significant and formative feelings, which shaped his creative talent. He shares this with us, with what I believe is the intent of inspiring others to share in his talent.

Here's what I believe are a few key points to consider chronologically. His loneliness was initially not created intentionally, it was the result of his innate personality along with the way that he received the silent language (feelings) of others in his formative youth. He first coped with the loneliness by playing music. In adolescence he turned to writing, and then sought to increase the loneliness because it was highly inspirational, and contributive to his writing. Then he slowly came to realize the incompleteness of the loneliness and how it was the desire for companionship that really inspired the writing. So he found a way to separate the desire for companionship, from the loneliness, which allowed him to write well, without the need for loneliness. That is the difference between being alone, and being lonely. This is how writing saved his life, and he sincerely hopes that he can share this message to help save the lives of others.

People who commit suicide may be in what they consider unendurable pain with no way out. — Bylaw

This is not the way to escape the accusation of selfishness. No matter how intense and unendurable the pain may be, to put one's own interests, (to end the pain), as having priority over the interests of others, is the very definition of "selfish". So this point just does not address that accusation.

Javi offered a much more comprehensive approach, which was "pure loneliness". This would respect the fact that the selfishness cannot be removed from the act, but it renders the selfishness as irrelevant to anyone else. So it becomes a matter of I can do what I want, so long as it hurts no one else. The problem, as I explained above, is that pure loneliness is a defective concept, so I really do not believe that the hurtfulness which inheres within the act can be removed in this way.

But this only happens if there is such a controversial relationship between the suicidal and the rest. Yet, it can be the scenario where a suicidal decides to commit suicide because he is bored of life or he feels depressed for some reasons which are not necessarily caused by others. I attempt to explain with these examples that suicide is an individual act that sometimes can affect others... — javi2541997

I believe this issue is best understood through reference to the silent language which is a communication through feelings. The problem of "blame", or feeling guilt, is not exclusive to those who are close to the suicidal person. The act, suicide, is generally apprehended by us as so final, so extreme, that anyone who is even an acquaintance of the person, and sometimes not even acquainted, is affected with feelings for the person, which can amount to a feeling of blame and guilt within oneself. This is "the problem" with the silent language, it may, and very often does, communicate meaning which is completely unintended by the author. This is because it works through the feelings of the recipient of the information.

Sponge toffee, delicious, tastes like burnt sugar and gets stuck in your teeth.

First of all, you can answer this and comment on the rest of the thread. I fully appreciate your contribution and opinions. Honestly, I haven't thought about the musicality of spoken language, and being more precise, I think I haven't paid attention to it because I was mainly focused on how Fosse went from written language to spoken language. As you explained, there are techniques regarding these methods which are important to write drama. Although I agree that pauses and length are very considered in plays, I start to wonder if written language has musicality or not, or if it is just monotonous... — javi2541997

Well, the method of music was important to Fosse, so I'm sure it entered his dramas.

Thus, it almost goes without saying, that writing is reminiscent of
music. And at a certain time, in my teens, I went more or less directly from
only being engaged with music, to writing. I actually completely stopped both
playing music myself and listening to music, and started to write, and in my
writing, I tried to create something of what I experienced when I played.
That’s what I did then – and what I still do.

A lot of people are drawn to a rich fantasy life because of their social phobia. Many writers seem to be drawn to the written word because it is a way of being social without needing to be directly with people. I was a writer for some years (newspaper and magazine feature articles, reviews, op eds) and it can be very seductive to drop 'bombs' via prose and not be there for when they go off. In writing, you can say what you need to say safely and carefully, with time for preparation, in a way that many could never do in person, in conversation. — Tom Storm

Writing allows one to talk to people without giving them the capacity to reply. However, the reader has the capacity of choice to freely decide whether or not to listen to, (read), the writer. So the writer must take this into account when deciding what to write, unless the writing is purely for self gratification.

But what do you mean when you say that words constrain imaginations? — jkop

When you read a novel, the author creates an imaginary scene. If the author is proficient, the words employed by the author, and read by the reader, constrain the imagination of the reader in a way intended by the author.

I think that a true description of an imagination is constrained by what one imagines. — jkop

I don't think that this is the case. Even the author, who creates the imaginary world, or scene, is doing this through the use of words. words provide freedom for the writers imagination, to go much further than where simple images would take one. So the writer can use words to create images which were not already imagined, but produced from the use of words. I believe that the imaginary scene created by the writer, is principally created with words rather than with images which words are put to, to describe, because words allow the writer's mind much greater freedom to go places where the simple use of images would not otherwise take it. In other words, words open up the imagination to all sorts of new territories, even within the act of writing.

I can understand that it could be devastating for the family and friends who are close to the suicidal. — javi2541997

This is why I said it is hurtful, because it is a "communicative act". It conveys something to others, and that is hurt. And I said that it is inherently hurtful because this is the first level of meaning derived from the act, and the hurt cannot be removed through the secondary levels of meaning conveyed at the time. The suicide note can mitigate or decrease the hurt to others but it cannot negate it. The suicide note can also be used to increase the hurt. Further, certain suicide techniques can be used to increase the hurt to others, and suicide can be carried out for the purpose of hurting others. I do not see how it is possible to remove the hurtfulness from it.

Are you trying to argue that suicide is also hurtful for the suicidal? — javi2541997

No, not at all. The point was that as a "communicative act" of the silent language, that is an act of communicating without words, it is hurtful. That's why it is often argued that suicide is extremely selfish. By carrying through with the act, the suicidal person places one's own well-being as more important than that of others.

We are pattern seeking creatures, and normally strive to make the most charitable interpretations of what there is to interpret, also when there is nothing to interpret but silence. But when less is said, our interpretations become more susceptible to whatever the context suggests. In this sense the meanings are not developed by the readers' minds but a context such as a romantic or modern tradition in which meanings are assumed to be hidden all over and in our minds. — jkop

I do not think that one can correctly separate interpretation of meaning by pattern, and meaning by context. The two are too deeply intertwined, and used together, that such a separation, even for the purpose of analysis is impossible. I believe the more intelligible separation is form/content. But from this perspective, "content" as what is derived directly from the author's intent becomes somewhat unintelligible, the separation being analogous to Aristotle's form/matter separation. Since "form" is what is intelligible to us, the content is left as fundamentally unintelligible, as the "subject matter" may elude us.

Patterns are formal, so if we represent the content as "context" like you propose, then the context is the author's mind itself. The desire to understand the context of a piece of writing, might incline an interpreter to attempt to put oneself in the position of the author. But this would fail, because like Fosse explains, the writer removes oneself from all accessible or outwardly available contextual influences (one's environment), and creates an imaginary context.

This is the manifest difference between speaking and writing. The speaker assumes that the hearer shares the same context (environment), so the speaker relies heavily on the surroundings for meaning (eg."bring me that hammer please"). What the surroundings, or context adds to the intended meaning, instead of the words forming this meaning, is the foundation of the silent language. In the example, the speaker does not have to explain what the hammer looks like, or its location, etc., this is all silent, and simply implied by "that hammer".

In the case of writing, the author creates an imaginary environment, or context, and this imaginary context supports the silent language. There are many factors which the author must respect in creating the boundaries of the context. The form of writing, drama, prose, non-fiction, poetry, etc., provides the foundational limitations which the author starts with. Then the context, as further boundaries in meaning, is created by the author. Fosse's use of silence breaks all the boundaries he creates with words, leaving only the foundational boundaries of the activities of the drama, and in a sense bridges the gap between writing and speaking, because the activities then produce the context rather than the words. But the impression that the gap is closed is just a sort of deception, because these activities are only a created context anyway, and so the entire environment or context is still created. The audience members are allowed freedom to explore their own imaginations not being constrained by the words of language, but the freedom is kind of illusionary as it only occurs within the boundaries already created by the activities which, which are a product of the author's mind in the first place.

Maybe, according to Fosse, suicide is a silent language... — javi2541997

As a meaningful act without words, suicide is clearly a part of the silent language. However, in itself it is extremely hurtful, if not the most intrinsically hurtful act possible. This is very ironic, because it is a physical assault on oneself rather than on another. You would think that any sort of physical assault on another would be inherently more hurtful than any type of physical assault on oneself, but suicide obviously demonstrates this to be false.

Secondary, to the intrinsically hurtful act, there is usually a further communicative act associated, with the suicide act. This may be a suicide note, which may serve to either increase or decrease the hurt, often very intentionally, or the suicide act may be accompanied by a physical assault on others. When the others are designated as enemies, this may elevate the hurtful act to the level of honourable. In this way of looking at suicide, whether it is considered good or bad, depends on how the hurt of the secondary level of meaning, the more explicit meaning, is directed. Notice that when the suicide is honourable, the secondary level of hurt negates the first, by making the act honourable. This is taken even further in the act of self-sacrifice, Jesus, and hunger-strike for example. But all these levels of meaning piled on top, cannot truly negate the fundamental fact that the act is intrinsically hurtful.

But, bringing in suicide again, I think this concept is only ambiguous if we dive into the mental state of the readers. Would you consider suicide as ambiguous? — javi2541997

No, suicide is not at all ambiguous, for the reasons described above. It is intrinsically hurtful. It is meaningful as a part of the silent language, but remember that the silent language is a part of of our communion with others. So, when one retreats, or escapes the others, into oneself, as Fosse describes in the act of writing, a person seeks to remove all influence of environment, surroundings, including others, to write a purely original and creative piece, suicide may appear to lose its essential nature, as hurtful, and this would allow the writer to create an imaginary description of it without that essential nature. But this is only an imaginary image, as the true act would remain an act within the context of the existence of others. So the silent language ensures that suicide maintains that very specific unequivocal meaning of hurt, regardless of the levels of meaning added on top, which appear to produce ambiguity.

what I meant was that presumably some things are physically impossible. — Janus

Then you gave the example, of the sun not rising tomorrow as something which appeared to be physically impossible, but isn't really physically impossible. So you just disproved your own presumption, that some things are physically impossible.

Physical impossibility is admittedly just a possibility for us — Janus

Now you're back to the contradiction I explained early, where "impossibility" is reduced to a type of possibility.

The problem you are demonstrating is due to a failure in your representation of "real possibility", which you incorrectly try to oppose with "physically impossible".

I think I expressed myself incorrectly. I attempted to explain that Fosse—this is speculation because I haven't read anything from him—didn't feel comfortable with having suicidal characters. This is why he admitted that he used this issue so much that it seems he legitimized suicide. He was afraid of how the readers would perceive him or his writings. Just as Fosse had a fear of speaking in public, maybe he also had a fear of addressing suicide. We have to keep in mind that he writes to run away from himself... I guess this is why he addressed suicide in his writings, to confront this problem. — javi2541997

Well, yes, he felt uncomfortable, but notice that this is referred to in the past tense. "I have been afraid that I, in this way, may have contributed to legitimising suicide." Then he goes on to say that he has been very touched by those who have said that he saved their lives. Therefore I think he had possibly felt some guilt, at some time, but has now vindicated himself.

Keep in mind also, that the silent message is not an unambiguous message. It is intended that the meaning come from somewhere other than the explicit meaning of the author's words, and this must be the reader's own mind. So if a reader thinks that suicide is being promoted through the use of the silent language, this is not necessarily the author's intention. And if the author's intent is to leave the subject ambiguous, thus allowing that one reader might see reason to move toward suicide, while another might be moved away from it, the author could feel as Fosse described.

If Fosse considered the reviews as 'poor,' then he cared about whether people were following his writing path or not. — javi2541997

Actually, I think he is saying exactly the opposite of what you conclude. He looked at some reviews by the critics, judged them as poor reviews, perhaps as complete misunderstanding, then he decided to continue writing regardless of the critics. Therefore we can conclude that he did not care "whether people were following his writing path or not". He decided to continue writing in the style that he had been, with complete disregard for what other people may derive from the writing.

Again, I think i's important to notice the past tense of these reflections on his life, making chronological order important. At that early point in his writing career he decided not to care about what other people said about his writing, thus allowing him to continue on, in his unique style. To be concerned about what others think, allowing this to influence one's work, is what I described as the corruption of the artistry. So he strongly resisted this in his early stages, which allowed him to produce a unique and original style, before he allowed corruption in the form being influenced by money to write drama.

Also consider that at some point in reflection he got concerned that he might have sent the wrong message concerning suicide. This is a clear indication that he became concerned about what others thought about his writing. But again, it's post hoc, he developed this concern much later, looking back in reflection, at the works he wrote earlier. This post hoc reflection is a big part of the "companionship" he described. He learned to look at his work, as a part of the audience, see it from that perspective, giving him an escape from the escape (the original escape being the supposed loneliness of writing), providing him a place in the community, and "a great sense of happiness and security". However, he has clearly produced a separation between the post hoc reflections which would "corrupt" his writings, and his act of writing which must remain prior to, and motivated by, what is prior to this.

Fosse knew how to use silence in written language, and he was comfortable using it in his novels despite receiving criticism. — javi2541997

Using silence, and using the silent language are two different things. I don't know Fosse's writing so I really cannot comment on his use of silence in his early work, but I think we need to distinguish between the use of silence in general, and the use of the silent language. One can use the image of silence within a piece of work, to convey a particular idea, and this would be a very intentionally directed, and meaningful image being produced. The silent language is somewhat different because it employs ambiguity to work with possibility, allowing the audience freedom to think and imagine these possibilities. So the silence is essentially ambiguous.

Fosse, describes his earlier writings as completely self-centered, therefore we cannot consider that he would think about how others would interpret himself. Thinking about how others see me is the corruption to the artistry. The artistic escape from that goes all the way back to his fear of reading aloud which was the original motivator of the art, to do something free from the influence of what others might think about me. So we ought not consider any use of silence here as being directed at a potential audience, or else we are making his early writings into speaking, and criticizing him on the basis that his work was corrupt from the outset. And that is exactly what he is saying that we need to avoid in order to truly understand his writing style.

Of course no author is going to admit to one's own original sin, so i would conclude that you are most likely correct here, and his use of silence as a form of what I earlier called "retaliation" toward any potential reader, goes right back to his most original writings.

What you wrote there reads to me like nonsensical philosobabble. — Janus

This would explain why you haven't addressed the point I made. Your example serves to demonstrate that your presumption of "what is physically impossible" is not justifiable. Therefore, as I explained in my last post, you use "physically impossible" in a self contradicting way, to refer to things which are actually possible, not really impossible. That is to say that "physically impossible" is just a possibility, and therefore not really impossible.

You say "Presumably what is physically impossible is physically impossible". What could this mean other than that the physically impossible is physically impossible? Therefore we must conclude that there could be no such thing as what is physically impossible, because that itself would be physically impossible. But you have in no way even defined what you mean by "physically impossible" and why you would presume that it is physically impossible for anything to be physically impossible, so to use your word, it's all just "philosobabble" anyway.

You're not getting the distinction between what is logically impossible and what may be, due to the nature of things, physically impossible, even though not logically self-contradictory. — Janus

When you say, "what may be ... physically impossible", all you are doing is signifying a possibility. So the use of "impossible" carries no weight, has no force, because you are simply saying that it is possible that such is impossible. Therefore "what may be physically impossible" is sort of meaningless except to signify a possibility. In fact it would be better off understood as self-contradictory. To say "it is possible that X is impossible" is just another way of saying "X is possible". And this means "X is not impossible". Your example ought to demonstrate this to you.

Are you sure that he does not feel guilt? He expressed in his lecture that he actually received correspondence from readers or 'fans' who thanked him for preventing suicide. He felt guilty because he accepted suicide in his writings. Thus, he feels comfortable or safe speaking about this taboo through his writings. — javi2541997

If he feels comfortable in it, then he does not feel guilt. Feeling guilt is a matter of knowing oneself to have done wrong and it is an uneasy feeling. When he says that fans thanked him, this is confirmation that he does not feel that he has done wrong. Therefore he is expressing that he does not feel guilt.

Whether he is being truthful in this expression is another question. The silent, hidden message, is most often not explained by the author, even when questioned in retrospect. Perhaps at some point in his life he actual wrote with the intent of conveying a silent meaning which legitimized suicide, and that could be an intended hidden message somewhere in his work, which he afterwards felt guilty about. Then he might be inclined to turn to the "thanks" from his fans, to overcome that feeling of guilt, justifying that portrayal of suicide as not a wrongful act, through some sort of rationalization. But I do not presently think there is a need for such speculation.

To be honest, I think he does, but he doesn't want to go further because Fosse is not confident enough about whether people understand him or not. — javi2541997

I don't think it's a matter of whether people understand him or not, the silent language does not work this way. The silent language provides the conditions for the reader to understand oneself. So the hidden message is intentionally vague, and perhaps I ought not even call it a "message". It is often an intentional ambiguity so that there is nothing specific intended by the author, other than to give the reader a chance to think about possibilities. Notice the use of the "pause", and how the silence brings one to "God's voice", God's voice coming from somewhere other than the spoken words of the play.

So the silent language, rather than confining the reader to the restrictions of conventional meaning of words, allows the reader freedom of interpretation. In a way it transfers the artistic license of the author to the reader. I think this is what is commonly known as reading between the lines. Careful attention to how you read between the lines helps to reveal much about your own mind. So for example, if we gave the same piece of prose, with significant silent language, to a number of different people, and a psychologist asked each one of them what they got from it, the psychologist would be able to say a fair bit about the different people, by comparing the different interpretations.

That's why I say it's not a matter of whether people understand him or not. When it comes to the silent language it's a matter of understanding "silent language" in general. When you understand that it works with possible meaning rather than actual meaning, you can start to see how powerful it is in its capacity to persuade people. The meaning comes from somewhere other than the words of the author. God? Maybe. Consider for example, Donald Trump as an artist of the silent language. He didn't actually tell those people to storm the palace, yet the silent language told them that it had to be done.

But now we approach speech, and spoken language, and that's where the silent language inheres. and is derived from. The unspoken, implied meaning is an essential part of spoken language. The spoken language evolved for efficiency in the moment, so the majority of what is said is not actually said, to make things quick and easy. The written language is formal and true unequivocal relations between symbol and meaning is essential to it. So it is this process, whereby the thinker who is naturally inclined to use true symbolic unequivocal relations, so as not to mislead oneself, turns to the outside world, "the others", where the silent aspect of language rules the use of language, that inspires the writer to incorporate the tricks of the silent language into the writing, slipping away from the true unequivocal meanings.

But I wonder if Fosse wanted to make fun of the system or perhaps find a way of feeling safe with himself. Remember that his lecture started by admitting that since he was a kid, he always had to face different challenges, with fear included in all of them. Fosse felt a bit intimidated by writing drama - despite it being necessary for earning an income - because he had to switch from written language to spoken language. He didn't feel confident, but this was one of his main successes as a writer paradoxically. This is why he said that he found a way to use silent language in drama, the pause. When Fosse learned that this could be included in the plays, he started to see drama in a different way. He was back to written language and silent expressions. — javi2541997

I would suggest, and this is pure speculation, that when he was asked to write plays, he was immediately confronted with what was until that point, a personal problem, the issue of the difference between spoken and written language. He knew of this difference, from childhood, and retreated into himself, and the world of written language rather than confront the problems he had with spoken language. (As an aside, Dick Feynman in his book "Surely You're joking, Mr. Feynman!" describes how at a young age he was uninterested in school, but very interested in electronics, electromagnetism, mathematics, etc.. He came up with his own symbols for things, and when he went to university, he had to learn conventional symbols for things he had already symbolized in his own language.)

I propose that when Fosse was asked to write drama he saw the need to confront the difference head on, in order that he could proceed into the public sphere. This is when he discovered the silent aspect of language, which he was not familiar with, because he was immersed in writing only. Then he found the means for incorporating it into the writing. And this is an essential aspect of all drama, because if it is simply written material, it's very dry and boring. So the author needs to know what it is about spoken language, which separates it from written language, and bring this into the writing of the drama in order to make it entertaining. All sorts of different tools may be employed, actions, body language, even the pause.

In the case of Fosse's speech one might want to say something about the nature of metaphors as he describes (metaphorically) his experience of writing as if sitting in a place inside himself. He refers to the poet Hauge who (metaphorically) compares being a writer to being a child building leaf huts in the forest where the writer sits feeling safe. Talk of places and meanings inside the mind is fairly common in the arts, especially in the romantic and modern traditions. — jkop

The "metaphorical" meaning is one type of implied, hidden, or silent meaning, meaning not spoken by the words. But metaphor is only the tip of the iceberg here. Since the silent language is essentially possibilities, as I explain above, there is no limit to the types of silent meaning which an author might employ. So the silent language opens up a huge realm of possibilities to the author, by allowing the author an entrance into the minds of the readers by finding a way to employ those minds for the development of meaning, rather than relying solely on one's own mind.

It is interesting how you pointed out writing drama as corruption because it is a paid job, and Fosse was not free in this expression of literature. However, he surprisingly entered in a new dimension which he was not very confidence in the beginning. Yes, drama needs dialogues, and it is out from the written language which he always rooted for. Nevertheless, he also found a way to feel comfortable with writing drama- as you also pointed out - and this was with the use of 'pause' in his works. Fosse argues that this is how he approaches to silence in a spoken language art as drama, and it is indeed the most important word in his experiences of theatre plays. — javi2541997

What I called "corruption" is a part of the way that a relation between the artist and the "others" is established, and I think it is a necessary part of all art forms. Generally, there is a system where the art is delivered to the public, and the system varies by art form and society. In the music industry for example, there is the record companies. In Fosse's case there was what he called a publicly funded initiative to support Norwegian drama.

The system takes what is desired by others and impresses it onto the artist. Basically it tells the artists that if they want to be financially successful they need to follow the rules of the system. In Fosse's case the rule was to produce drama. Many artists are fiercely independent and refuse to succumb to the "corruption" of the system. However, many artists, like Fosse, are capable of striking a balance between what is wanted by the others (the rules of the system), and the true freedom and independence of oneself, the individual, to create freely as one desires. Your example of Kurt Cobaine may be a case of imbalance.

This balance is what I see as the context of Fosse's "silent language". Notice that I called it a retaliation, and this is because many artists who feel unduly constrained by the rules of the system will find a loop hole, or a secret way within their own mind of getting around the rules or making fun of them, ridiculing the system, or whatever, within the art itself. That's how I see "the pause" which he used.

The pause allows the others (audience) to use one's own imagination, free from the influence of the rules implied by words, to develop a separate understanding of the meaning or intent of the author. So in this sense it is a communication without words. Notice also, that in drama there is acting as well as speaking, which is already a sort of communication without the requirement of words, so I think Fosse borrowed from this reality of drama to extend this idea of what is said by the author (or more appropriately what is shown, "to express the unsayable"), with out the use of words. It is the meaning conveyed which is not actually said by the words.

In his speech he develops this a bit further, as "the totality of a work". I think of this as what is implied by the work, as separate from what is explicit to the work. In my first reply to the op, this is presented as "the moral" of the story. We commonly use that expression "the moral of the story" to refer to a lesson learned from the writing which is not explicitly written by the author, it is somehow implied by the story. But "implied" here is not used in the sense of any formal logic, so interpretations of "the moral" may vary greatly. There is no explicit words to get at what the author intended as "the moral", but the writing is arranged in such a way as to indicate that the author intends some sort of secret or "silent" message, so we must conclude that the author intends some sort of hidden message.

In different forms of writing, the silent message varies from being extremely obvious, such that the audience cam easily agree on the meaning of "the moral", to being very veiled and obscure. Fosse gives an example of "Septology" in the relation of one Asle to the other Asle, and the hidden message one could conclude concerning the "now" of time. (I'm not familiar with the writing.)

It is in this context that I approach what he says at the end of the speech, concerning suicide. He says that there are many suicides in his books. But we must take these representations as part of what is explicit. However, he seems to have some fear of the possibility that some people could interpret the implicit part, the hidden or silent part, as legitimizing suicide. Notice though, that he does not express guilt, so this was never his intention, never the hidden message he desired to convey, so such interpretations of the silent part would be faulty. Furthermore, he states that numerous people have expressed to him the opposite, that his writings have saved there lives, so I think that what he says through the silent part, the not saying, is meant to guide people away from suicide rather than toward it.

I understand the tenses to be closely related to modal distinctions made in relation to the present, but I don't deny the modal distinctions, nor the practical psychological distinction between past and future, or what McTaggart crudely referred to as the A series (is psychological time really a series?). But like McTaggart, I don't think the information content of the "A series" has any obvious relationship to the B series which is all that the public theory of physics refers to, or to the broader physical conception of time that Wittgenstein occasionally referred to as "information time" which i think of as a "use-meaning" generalisation of McTaggarts B series that also includes the practice of time keeping ( see Hintikka for more discussion on Wittgenstein's evolving views on the subject). — sime

This is what I don't understand. How can you accept the modal distinctions based in the present, and the psychological distinction between past and future, of the A series, yet then say that this has no relation to "the broader physical conception of time". Obviously, "present", and the distinction between past and future are temporal concepts, so they must have some relation to the broader concept of time. Or would you be assuming that either one or the other, A or B, provides a complete represent of time, and the other is simply misguided or wrong, so that there is no relation between the two?

The word "present" is only used to stress the distinction between the A and B series and the fact that observations are always in the present tense, even when they are used to evaluate past-contigent propositions (which are understood to be past-contigent in the sense of the B series, but not necessarily in the sense of the A series)

So yes, observations are not of the present but they are always in relation to the present tense. Furthermore, if the B series isn't reducible to facts that are obtainable in the present-tense then the existence and usefulness of the B series can be doubted or denied, and at the very least cannot be reconciled with the the present-tensed practice of physics. — sime

Nor do I understand what you say here. Observations are most often stated in the past tense, X happened, Y happened, or x was observed. Of course the past tense is "in relation to the present tense", but this does not mean that we can characterize them as being in the present tense.

We often will make an inductive generalization from a number of observations, and state the general principle in the present tense. But a generalization is not itself an observation, it is a conclusion drawn from a number of observations.

This draws into question what you say about the B series. The B series representation is obtained exclusively from the past. It is completely derived from past observations, and any statements about "the present" suffer the problems discussed by Hume. Observations of the past can only be related to the present through some form of inductive generalization. Therefore the potential problems which you indicate for the B series are very real.

It is not logical to say that if the B series did not relate to the present tense this would produce problems for the practice of physics, and conclude therefore that the B series must relate to the present tense. In reality, all we need to do is take a good look at the problems of modern physics, and we can see the possibility that many of the problems which it has encountered are likely created because the B series which it employs does not adequately relate to the present.

A logical possibility is anything which is not self-contradictory, while a real possibility is something that could actually come to be. For example, it may or may not be a real possibility (epistemically speaking of course) that there are unicorns on some distant planet, whereas as there is no possibility that there may be perfectly round perfectly square rocks on some planet somewhere. — Janus

I don't see any difference here. If it is something which could actually come to be, then it is "not self-contradictory". And if it is not self-contradictory then it s something which could actually come to be. Your examples support this. You have just said the same thing in two different ways, "not self-contradictory", and "could actually come to be", are just different descriptions of the same type of possibilities. So all you've done is defined "real possibilities" as being the same as logical possibilities, rather than describing a distinction between these two.

But the receptors can disappoint the writer's desires. This actually happened with some other artists such as Kurt Cobain, for instance. — javi2541997

Consider the fine line between simply giving the audience what they've said they wanted, and showing the audience what they want, and giving that to them, which I described above. It's a very delicate balance, which destroys the artistry, and perhaps even the artist, if taken too far one way or the other.

I understand you better now. I agree that maybe my original post is generalizing the process of writing. My intention was not to divide this into two parts but to discuss with you to what extent you agree with Fosse's lecture on the Nobel ceremony. Although it is only a seven-page paper, I think it is very worthwhile to read because he focuses on some philosophical questions and topics, apart from literature itself. — javi2541997

On your advice, I've read the speech, and will provide some suggestions of interpretation for you. To begin with, and in general the speech is loaded with ideas which are not well presented. One could say there's abundant content with poor form. However, you should keep in mind that this piece of writing is meant as a speech, therefore it is principally a spoken act of language, rather than a written act of language, so it demonstrates that difference between the two, where content rather than form is usually more important to spoken language, and form over content is usually more important to written language.

The paradox I referred to is well expressed at the bottom of page two.
"One thing is certain, I have never written to express myself, as they say, but
rather to get away from myself."
The writing act as explained by Fosse can be seen as a retreat into oneself. So he's describing a way of hiding from himself within himself. It's so paradoxical, that we must really question his form of presentation. To "express myself" implies others, whom I express myself to. We cannot truly escape the reality of others, so this reality, "others" must be included into this statement. Therefore, what I suggest is really meant by Fosse with this statement, in order that we avoid the paradox of hiding from oneself within oneself, is 'to get away from others'.

This allows us to make sense of that statement, and also put the division between spoken language and written language which he speaks of into a better context. The spoken language provides a communion with others, while the writing provides a communion with oneself. It cannot be described as "to get away from myself", because despite the fact that it might allow me to relate to myself as if I am another, like I might be communicating with myself as another person, allowing myself to be other than myself, I am not really getting away from myself by hiding within myself, rather I am getting to know myself even better.

This act, of getting to know myself better, I think is essential to any artist. It is how the artist comes to know one's own capacities, skills, inclinations, ambitions, etc.. Notice how he describes moving away from music to focus on writing. There is also another essential feature of artistry which he describes quite well, and this is the process of being recognized by others, which produces what is known as success.

The existence of "others" is paramount to success. The artist turns inward, hiding from others within oneself, as I described above, and this is well explained by Fosse with his innate fear of public speaking, originating as the fear of reading out loud. The fear is centered on reading the words of others, probably because he does not necessarily know those words which originate from others, and would mispronounce them or something like that, causing great embarrassment. So the fear is based in the possibility of misrepresenting what is wanted by others. Therefore Fosse retreats into himself, to find and do what he better knows is wanted, wanted by himself.

Success, however, has the prerequisite of providing for others, what they want. Now there is a fine line of balance for the artist to walk. You can tell me what you want, and I can give that to you, hopefully resulting in my success, or, I can show you want you want, by giving it to you, thereby influencing you to want what I have to offer. Notice that the latter is what provides real success for the artist because it allows the artist to maintain the internal relation with oneself, as knowing what is wanted, without succumbing to the desires of others. But of course, these are idealistic representations, and the artist will always be "corrupted" to some extent by the desires of others.

This process which I call corruption, he describes as turning toward writing drama. It is a paid job, where he must write the form of material which he is paid for. His form is then very much restricted. However, he describes a way of retaliation, what he calls "the silent speech", where the content, imagination, is allowed to overpower the form. This is an example of what I referred to as the artist showing the audience what they want, and giving it to them, rather than having them tell you what they want. That amounts to the success of an idiomatic form.

Notice how he describes using that technique when he goes back to writing novels like "Septology". Also notice how this "corruption" of the artist, when he is paid to write dramas, becomes very evident as a negative feature, when he goes back to writing prose. " And during the writing process of that novel, I experienced some of my happiest moments as a writer...". At this point he has freed himself from the formal restrictions which he had forced upon himself by the need to be financially successful.

However, he also describes how writing dramas had provided him with a very important, positive lesson. That is that he got to observe his own plays, allowing him to, in a way, see himself as others see him. I believe that this is an extremely important aspect of how an artist relates to success. Notice at the beginning he is very adamant that he is not expressing himself. But then he has to realize the reality of the situation is that if he has any degree of success, others inevitably will see him as expressing himself. This is when he must realize that he has to play to the audience, and actually see himself as expressing himself, otherwise he would be forever locked within the paradox, never being able to relate to his own success.

Good luck with that javi. I hope it gives you at least something to chew on. The speech is jammed full of "stuff", as I said abundant content, and the lack of form leaves interpretation wide open. The chronological order appears as the principal logical form, so it is sort of an expression of a life of learning.

Not an auspicious omen for a fruitful conversation. — Janus

I think what was required is that you better explain yourself. What I explained to you is that I could not make sense of your description of real possibilities as "physically law-abiding". But you wrote it, so it must make sense to you, therefore you would probably be able to explain to me what you actually meant by this.

If we don't undertsnd it, how can we draw any conclusions about it? Sounds like the very defintion of "undecidable' to me. — Janus

I can assure you that people draw a lot of conclusions about things which they do not understand. That is what is known as misunderstanding and it's very common. It is not the case, that if a person does not understand, they will not draw any conclusions about that which they do not understand, because often they think that they understand when they actually do not understand.

So for example, I drew a conclusion about what you meant by possibilities which are "physically law abiding", and the conclusion was that this would be a self-contradicting proposition. But obviously you did not mean to present me with a self-contradicting proposition, so we can make a further conclusion, that I misunderstood you, and I made a conclusion about something which I did not understand.

You are ignoring that fact that all possibilities remain such for us (since we cannot know the future). So even if what we think of as real (i.e. physically law-abiding as opposed to merely logical) possibilities are actually necessities (if determinism is true) they still remain just possibilities, epistemologically speaking. — Janus

Sorry Janus, I just cannot follow you. It seems like we must each have a completely different idea of what "real possibilities" means.

I do not see how a real possibility could be "physically law abiding". The very nature of "possibility" implies that the selective process which decides which possibilities would be actualized, cannot be described by "physical law". If the selection was describable by physical law, then the thing selected would be necessitated by the reality which that law itself describes. So there would be no real possibility there, only a deterministic world with our lack of knowledge creating the illusion of possibility.

After rereading your answer, I am not sure if you're actually scolding me or just disagreeing with Fosse. — javi2541997

I was trying to be careful not to provoke sensitivities, so most likely I was not actually doing either of those two. I was just trying to find a way to bring some sort of objectivity to bear on a very subjective issue.

The point being that this question you ask, "Do you agree that writing is a process of approaching only ourselves?" is sort of paradoxical in nature. If writing was only about approaching oneself, then each individual's reasons for writing would be just as unique as that person is, the writing being solely a reflection of the person. But then the generalization which produces that statement, that writing is only about approaching oneself, would be false, because some individuals would have reasons other than approaching oneself for writing, and the writing would reflect this.

Writing ought not be portrayed as essentially different from any other art form. And like any art form, the reason why any individual artist partakes in the art that one actually does partake in, is particular to the artist. So your question about whether this specific art form, writing, can be portrayed as a relationship with oneself, could at best, only be partially answered, as it would be more true for some, and less true for others.

I discussed with Vera Mont and @Bella fekete whether literature or the art of writing is an individualistic or collectivist act. I want to know what you think because, following Fosse's thoughts, it helped him in pure loneliness, giving him a sense of safety. He faced and overcame fear by starting to express himself in an individual language.

...

Do you agree that writing is a process of approaching only ourselves? — javi2541997

I would be careful not to attempt this type of wide ranging generalization. It's bound to be flawed induction. There is clearly many different factors which motivate writing, as there are many different forms of writing. Distinct motivating factors would produce distinct forms of writing, but the distinctions are not made clear. So, the different forms are not as separate and distinct as a critic might like them to be, or even represent them as being. So, as you describe with Foss, fiction crosses into philosophy. Such a crossing of genres is common, and fuels the attempt at wide ranging generalizations, which are very poor inductive conclusions

Plato was very critical of the way that narrative infiltrates philosophy. There appears to be no line of division between fact and fiction within the narrative. In Plato's time the moral lessons were passed down from generation to generation through narrative, without such a line between fact and fiction. The fact/fiction line was unimportant so long as the moral lesson could be taught. However, what Plato disliked was that the lack of such a line allowed for various different types of narratives, providing for degradation of the moral lesson.

In other words, teaching morals through narrative allows for "bad", or faulty morals to be taught through "good" narrative form. This can be seen in the content/form distinction employed by some critics. Good writing form is very pleasing and entertaining, but if the content is flawed, bad moral lessons may be taught through this good form.

This is indeed beautiful. However, I've discovered a new way to perceive suicide. When I read Mishima back in the day, I interpreted suicide as an artistic act of dying with honor, and this author genuinely romanticized it.
Suicide has always been a key component in art and literature, but a significant difference emerges between Western and Japanese culture. Fosse even felt uneasy about writing extensively on suicide, but he understood that it was a necessary topic to explore. — javi2541997

This may be a very good example of such a degradation of the moral lesson. It may actually be morally wrong to glamourize, or romanticize, the suicidal artist. This could motivate the suicidal inclinations of individuals who might feed on the thought of looking to create a big splash, the flash in the pan, going out with a bang, or some misguided idea of being a hero.

I don't see how it follows that there must be real possibilities which do not become actualized. If nature is fundamentally random there would be, but if it is fundamentally deterministic there would not be, and we have no way of telling whether nature is fundamentally random or deterministic. — Janus

The supposedly unanswerable question was, "whether there are real possibilities that never become actual or whether all real possibilities are determined to become actual". Within that question "real possibilities" is assumed. And "real possibilities" implies that not all of those possibilities become actual, because then they would be necessities rather than possibilities. They would just have the appearance of possibility but not really be possibilities.

So I really cannot understand your way of thinking here. The assumption of "real possibilities" as a primary premise, denies the possibility of determinism, leaving the proposition "nature is fundamentally deterministic" as necessarily false, therefore not relevant in this context.

If I speculate that the past might change, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the past"?

And If i speculate that the future is already decided, then aren't I contradicting the very definition of what i mean by "the future"? — sime

I don't see that at all. It would require that "past" and "future" be defined in such a way so as to create those contradictions. But that is not the way that we normally define past and future. We normally define them in relation to time, as the time not yet come and the time already gone by, or in relation to physical events as those not yet occurred and already occurred. Notice that neither of those two stipulate whether the past might be changed, or whether the future might be already decided. To produce the contradictions you refer to, we need to add these metaphysical/ontological principles as premises.

I don't conceive of a clear distinction between the tenses and the modalities. I interpret both empirically within the context of the present, even I don't consider their meanings to be empirically exhausted by present observations, memories, intentions, actions and so on. — sime

I really don't understand what you are saying here. You appear to be saying that you see no clear distinction between past and future, because you interpret everything "within the context of the present". But isn't it the case that your reference to "the present" already implies a clear distinction between past and future? What could you possible mean by "the present", other than an assumed separation between memories of past, and anticipations of the future? Therefore your reference to "the present" seems to already imply a clear distinction between past and future.

Furthermore, you refer to "present observations", but this concept is logically flawed. There can be no such thing as present observations because "to observe" is to take note of what happens, and this implies that an observation, being what has been noticed is necessarily in the past. It is this idea, of "present observations" which is actually self-contradicting.

Put predictions aside for a moment. How would you deal with possibilities in the sense of "it is possible for me to do X, and possible for me to do Y", when X and Y are mutually exclusive? If I act for Y, then X is made to be impossible, and if I act for X, then Y is made to be impossible. However, at the time when I am deciding, both are possible.

How can we model this type of future in relation to this type of past, when both X and Y change from being equally possible in the future, to being one necessary, and one impossible in the past? What happens at "the present" to change the ontological status of these events?

Surely it is not the human act of deciding which causes the change in ontological status, which is known as the difference between future and past. That would mean that human beings have the capacity to create real ontological possibilities when those possibilities would otherwise not be there. How could human beings create possibilities in an otherwise determined world? It makes far more sense to assume that the possibilities are already there, as a characteristic of passing time, and human beings just have the capacity to take advantage of those possibilities.

The interesting {but unfortunately unanswerable) question is as to whether there are real possibilities that never become actual or whether all real possibilities are determined to become actual. — Janus

I don't see why you would say this is unanswerable. If there is real possibilities then many do not ever become actual, otherwise they would not be real possibilities. Possibility means that actualization is not necessary.

But we are looking at two lines, not planes. — jgill

Yeah I know, but the imagery of the metaphor works better to talk about "planes of existence" rather than lines of existence. The representation of the real numbers as a line is just an analogy in the first place. The numbers have a corresponding value, and unless something provides real position to the number line, nothing justifies the assigned order. Placing the perpendicular line at zero, the origin, the Cartesian method, provides a grounding for order, negatives one side, positives the other. I believe that the imaginary part of a complex number produces the need for separate rules of ordination. This alters the relationship between the spatial representation (the line) and the numerical value assigned to the number, leaving the values without fixed location on the line.

At the end of my metaphor, it all gets reduced to the temporal dimension being outside any spatial concepts anyway. I believe that is the only true way to deal with the human urge demonstrated by mathematicians, to escape the boundaries of spatial constraints (and this need is demonstrated to be very real in the local/nonlocal problem of quantum physics), yet still maintain some sort of logical order. The order must be based in a temporal representation, which allows the spatial features to emerge. In this way, spatial order which appears to be illogical from our current representations can be provided for with the appropriate temporally based logic.

Unfortunately, string theory can't give us an answer, at least not yet. The trouble is that string theory isn't done — we only have various approximation methods that we hope get close to the real thing, but right now we have no idea how right we are. So we have no mathematical technology for following the chain, from specific manifold to specific string vibration to the physics of the universe. — universeness

Some physicists, like Smolin would say that string theory is done. It cannot give us an answer ever, because it has run into a dead end. The next foray is quantum loop gravity, but this appears to be headed toward a similar dead end.

"Two genres", I like that. The main criticism with this, or difference I would request, is that I would replace "rational" and "imaginative" with "true" and "fantasy".

Now, we have the "true world" on one plane of existence, one genre, and that consists of everything which is, and must necessarily be, as it what is real by the status or the true physical world. Therefore possible expressions concerning the true plane are restricted by the reality of the physical world. On the other plane of existence, the other genre, we have the fantasy world, and the only restrictions here are the mental capacities, of the human mind. So this plane consists of all the things we want and desire of the world, and in a very fundamental way it is free and unrestricted by that plane of truth and reality.

However, the two planes intersect, the two are orthogonal. Therefore, what we apprehend as the true plane of existence, all the realities of the physical world, must have a logical bearing on the imaginary, all the things we want and desire from the world, or what we want the world to be. And in this way the imaginary plane is truly restricted. I caution you though, be extremely wary because the relation is not defined as unidirectional, therefore it might just as well invert itself, and the imaginary world of all the things we want and desire, and how we want the world to be, might reflect back onto the perpendicular "true world" influencing the way that we apprehend and represent the "true world". Then the axioms for our understanding of that plane would become more representative of how we want things to be rather than how we actually perceive things to be.

Here is what I think is a very good way to look at these two planes. They are temporal in nature, the true world is the past, and this world imposes restrictions on the future world of possibilities, which is the imaginary plane. Notice that if we understand this relation as temporal, unidirectionality is enforced by our understanding of time. However, we cannot place this understanding of time on either of the two planes, because that would restrict it according to the axioms of that plane, disallowing its superiority and ability to order both planes relative to each other. Therefore we must put time as outside any planes, or such a spatial form of representation.

Wheeler suspects that most of the universe consists of huge clouds of uncertainty that have not yet interacted either with a conscious observer or even with some lump of inanimate matter. He sees the universe as a vast arena containing realms where the past is not yet fixed.

I wonder what a cloud of uncertainty looks like. There's something essential missing from this perspective. What is the case, is that we do not in any way actually observe the "cloud" of uncertainty, or possibility, it is detected by logic, and not seen or sensed at all. What is observed is the posterior, the physical universe after those interactions which are referred to.

So, we do not observe the cloud of uncertainty, yet we do observe what is known as "interactions". And whatever it is that happens, which brings something to be from the cloud of possibilities, this, as an actual cause, cannot be an observable "interaction". But as a cause it is prior in time to the observable interactions of the physical universe, and it must itself be an "action".

This implies that there must be something actual, an actual cause, existing within that cloud of uncertainty, which is unobservable. As an actual cause though, it must also be intelligible. Recognition of this intelligible actuality, inherent within the cloud of uncertainty, as the cause of the particular event which is observable, is the essential aspect which is missing from that perspective. We must recognize that the cause of something observable, the cause of observability, is itself necessarily prior to the act of observation. This frees us from the illogical assumption that the posterior act of observation could be the cause of what is observable, also rendering the cloud of uncertainty or possibility, as inherently intelligible, in relation to the observable physical universe.

I continue to dabble in the complex plane where the world is two dimensional — jgill

I don't know if you can accurately say that is "the world". Isn't it more like two distinct perpendicular worlds, the world of real numbers and the world of imaginary numbers?

The principal problem expressed in Zeno's paradoxes, involves an issue with the way that we relate space and time, and this problem manifests today in the Fourier transform, as the uncertainty relation between time and frequency.*
The irrationality of pi and the square root of two indicates a problem with the way that we represent space with distinct dimensions. Modern physics demonstrates that these dimensions are not sufficient for a true and accurate understanding of spatial activity. So "string theory" for example proposes a number of extra dimensions, and "quantum gravity" may be viewed as an attempt to avoid dimensions altogether.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.05417.pdf
*Added by edit: https://sepwww.stanford.edu/sep/prof/fgdp/c4/paper_html/node2.html

Just so that you understand where I'm at JZ, I pretty much lost all my interest in discussion with you when you wrote the following, what I consider to be a very closed minded statement.

When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being.

Otherwise the rest of your answer is based on introducing notions such as intentional acts (voluntary, with a purpose, with priorities and scales of value). But introducing these notions is wrong, in the sense that they are far from being able to describe the non-intentional and non-voluntary aspect that belongs to the thing that occurs as an internal relationship between elements of something like a triangle. Except for the notion of "order" which is referred to formalization of set theory then also transcends the psychological act. But I suspect that what you understand by order is rather referring to the human act of ordering things. — JuanZu

If you refuse to even consider the role of intention in your representation of meaning and ideas, I don't see how this discussion could progress in an meaningful way.

I'm sorry but that is absolutely false. Even empirical evidence refutes it. For example, as children we do not imagine something like a "triangle" but rather we find it in books or in the virtuality of a screen. — JuanZu

I already went through this. I called it "learning". But if every idea of "triangle" comes from learning, this produces the infinite regress I described. So we know as historical evidence indicates, that there must be a beginning to humans producing triangles in their minds. Plato tried to escape the infinite regress by characterizing learning as recollection. Please don't ask me to circle back and repeat what I've already explained, this gets us no where.

But there is no approach in which the terms, operations and relations of geometry are equivalent or can be replaced by other terms, other operations and other relations. — JuanZu

I don't see why you request that the terms be "replaced". That seems irrelevant. But if you insist, we could replace "triangle" with the Spanish "triangolo", or some other language. And operations differ as well, as the French do long division in a way different from the English. But, as I said, I really do not see the relevance. We could all use the same words, and the same operations, and all this would indicate is consistency in the teaching methods. It still does not demonstrate that the ideas are not humanly created in the beginning, that they are not artificial but discovered.

Let me teach you something: When you say that something IS psychological and is reducible to the psychological, you are determining an identity, that is, you must necessarily determine it semantically as well, and go from that identity to a reduction that results in a replacement of terms, then of operations and then of relationships (since geometry is constituted, like any science, by these things). So assuming you have the terms of psychology you have to carry out a replacement, as long as you are talking about BEING X. If the reduction is understood as an identification then it is an eliminativism. — JuanZu

I gave you my method of reduction, the ideas of geometry are completely imaginary therefore the subject of psychology, as psychology deals with imaginary ideas which come to the mind. You have not at all justified your claim that replacement of terms is required so I'll treat it as a ruse, until you justify this claimed need.

The principal point of my argument is that you should developed or presented a real reduction. But you didn't and just constantly repeat that something is psychological because geometry is something created by humans. That kind of statements need to be well explained and demonstrated. But that's not your case. — JuanZu

As I said, "psychology" deals with things of the mind like ideas, and this includes geometrical ideas. I don't see that you have refuted this in anyway. Here's a passage from the Wikipedia entry on "psychology".

Psychology is the study of mind and behavior.[1] Its subject matter includes the behavior of humans and nonhumans, both conscious and unconscious phenomena, and mental processes such as thoughts, feelings, and motives. Psychology is an academic discipline of immense scope, crossing the boundaries between the natural and social sciences. — Wikipedia: psychology

It seems like our disagreement concerns what "psychology" refers to, not what "geometry" refers to.

Not at all. That the field of geometry is closed to the field of psychology means that the geometric thing is not reduced to nor can it be identified with the geometric thing. Again, the relationships that are discovered, the semantics that are implicit, operations, terms, etc. — JuanZu

I'm really not able to follow you at all JZ. What do you mean by "the geometric thing is not reduced to nor can it be identified with the geometric thing". Are you saying that contrary to the law of identity, a thing is other than itself?

Regrettably in this case I have to agree with your opponent. — Wayfarer

Yes, I already knew that you held this opinion. You like to portray the issue as a debate between nominalism and realism, and through that approach I've tried to get you to change your mind numerous times.

The principal issue which Plato pointed to, Aristotle elucidated, and Aquinas expounded on, developing clear principles to deal with, is that we need to maintain a real separation between "Forms" which exist independently from the human mind, and "ideas" which exist within the human mind, and are therefore dependent on it. A careful understanding of Plato and Aristotle will see this separation revealed in the usage of "idea" prevalent in Plato, and the distinct term "form" which Plato introduced, and became prevalent in Aristotle. (https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/77950/how-when-and-why-platos-ideas-were-changed-to-forms-in-english-translation). This separation is the only conceivable way that we can account for the reality of error in human ideas, and human knowledge in general.

Without the separation, we'd have to say that some human ideas are true, independent Forms, with eternal truth, while other human ideas are fallible. Then we would need some principles to distinguish which human ideas are properly independent Forms, and which are fallible human opinions.

So, we can proceed by examining the evidence available to us, which appears to us as the existence of human ideas, just like Plato did. Then we find through Plato's guidance, that there is no real identifiable difference between the very subjective ideas such as "love", "friendship", "beauty", "just", and the supposedly more objective ideas like "chair", "bed", and even the mathematical axioms. The difference between the two is the strength of the human conventions which 'fix' the meaning of the terms in what appears to be unchanging, eternal forms. We can also see that this strength, or fortification of the human idea through convention, is supported by usefulness.

This evidence, derived from the extensive and very thorough investigation and analysis into the true nature of human ideas is what leads to nominalism. But that is not the end of the story because now the fortitude of human conventions, along with the moral virtue and ethics which support these conventions, becomes the central issue. What the investigation and analysis of human ideas revealed to Plato, is that human ideas precede in time, the artificial things which the human beings bring into existence, in the sense of being causal. This is the formula which is applied in production, and this causal role he associated with "the good", what Aristotle termed as "final cause". The priority of the ideas is revealed in the cave allegory as what causes the shadows which most people think are the real things. You'll see in The Republic, that the carpenter works with an idea which is the formula for "bed" and this is supposed to be a representation of the divine Idea of "Bed". But the formula, as the idea in the carpenter's mind, is not actually the same as the divine "Idea", the perfection of the "ideal", which following Aristotle became known as the independent "Form", it is only as near to the ideal as the carpenter's human (less than perfect) mind will provide for.

Now we have the principles for the separation between the divine, separate Forms, and the human ideas, which are supposed to be a representation of the divine, but are really just the best that the individual human being's capacities will provide for through the means of the fortitude of human conventions. This separation is pursued by Plato in books like The Timaeus, and Aristotle in his Metaphysics, and the ensuing efforts of Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians.

Well, here you are talking about reducing the concept of a triangle to a pure psychological act. And this is where my refutation comes in. The processes that lead to the discovery of an essential relationship in a right triangle cannot be determined as psychological operations, since the difference between the terms and operations of both fields is necessary. You would have to make this reduction and explain it. But I know you won't do it, because it can't be done. Any attempt at something like that would only establish association relationships between elements. But association does not mean identity, much less identity in operations and relationships. — JuanZu

What I am saying is that there is no such difference, it is all psychological. You are merely insisting on a difference to support your ontological position. All the geometrical terms, points, lines, angles, etc., what you call the "elements", along with the relations between them, refer to things imagined by the mind. And things imagined by the mind are studied in the field of psychology. There, I have made the reduction and explained it.

Now, the onus is on you to support your claimed "difference". You refer to "the discovery of an essential relationship in a right triangle", but this makes no sense to me. Any supposed "essential relation" can be shown to be made up, fabricated, created by a mind, and that is why this act (as an act of the imagination), is reducible to being a psychological act. It is not an act of discovering something. An act of discovery could not be described as purely psychological, because there would be something independent of the mind, which would be what is "discovered".

There are two "essential" aspects of the right triangle. One is the right angle, which I described as two lines crossing with equal angles on all four sides, and this is completely imaginary. The other is the triangle, which I described as a plane figure with three sides and three angles. A "plane figure" is completely imagined, and not discovered, therefore this essential aspect is also reducible to being purely psychological. The relation between these two essential aspects, which is to put these two together, and create a right triangle is also a constructive act of the imagination, and therefore psychological. It is all imaginary, psychology, there is nothing here which is discovered.

The field of geometry is closed in relation to the field of psychology. You are not reading, you are assuming things and creating straw men. Saying that the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate. That is, certainly the field of geometry is closed to a psychological approval that attempts to found and determine it. — JuanZu

You are only providing more evidence that you are simply begging the question with your claim: " the field of geometry is closed with respect to that of psychology is only a necessary argument for the debate."

What you appear to be saying, is that this premise is not made "necessary" by any real evidence, it is just necessary for your argued position. However, as I explained, it is the only way that you can support your conclusion, by starting with a premise which leads necessarily to that conclusion. Begging the question.

The incommensurability between both fields is especially present in the methodological order: Association is not equivalent to identity or equality. — JuanZu

As I clearly explained, and gave very good examples to support what I said, incommensurability does not imply closure and a separation into two fields closed to each other. There is often incommensurability within the very same field.

You have said that they are incommensurable, but that incommensurability, as you treat it, if we follow your strange reasoning, since it evokes an absolute difference, you cannot speak of two numerical systems. You would have to talk about a numerical system and something else that can no longer be a numerical system. That is why you fall into a performative contradiction, because you are involuntarily assuming the same within what you try to express as different. — JuanZu

This very poor logic. There is no "absolute difference" implied, even though I cannot say that I understand what that would actually mean. As I explained already, two things of the same type can be called by the same name. Two different dogs are both called "dogs". Two different numerical systems can both be called "numerical systems". And, the two incommensurable numerical systems can exist within the same field, mathematics. Your claim that only one could be called a numerical system, and the other would have to be called something else, is nonsensical and clearly illogical, as being not supported by any premise which would produce that conclusion.

And if you stated the required premise you would see how unsound it is. The premise would be "two incommensurable things cannot be of the same type". But, here we have two incommensurable numbering systems, things of the same type, which are also incommensurable. The required premise is obviously false.

I read it and refuted it. Showing how your argument leads to the misunderstanding that would not allow us to talk about two types of anything. Well, I contrasted analogy with equivocation: that a thing be identical and different at the same time. — JuanZu

Well, if you do not agree that two different things can be said to be the same type, then I believe this discussion is pointless. And I really do not see how you conclude that this would make it impossible to speak of two different types.

I think you need to show your arguments more clearly JZ. State your premises clearly and show the logic which leads to your conclusion. Simply making assertions that your conclusions are logical doesn't cut it. Look, you concluded that my way of looking at things would mean that there could not be two different numerical systems, without showing any premises or logical procedure which produces that conclusion. In a very similar way, you now claim that what i said leads to the conclusion that we cannot speak of two different types. Where are your premises, and logical procedure which produces these absurd conclusions?

When I talk about "meaning" I am not referring to something that happens in language, or something from authors with intentions and purposes, or anything like that. I am talking about the sense of, for example, an internal relationship between the elements of an object called a triangle. They occur from the object itself and have a meaning that is contrary to our intentionality, in the sense that it affects us from the outside, so to speak. The meaning here is that of the thing itself, that which belongs to its being. — JuanZu

This is all psychology, as explained above. The supposed "elements", lines and angles, along with the internal relations, are completely imaginary. These are all created by the imagination, and so is your supposed "object itself", a product of the mind. Your proposed "thing itself", the right triangle, along with whatever meaning is supposed to be associated with it, since it is all, in its entirety, a product of the imagination itself, is to be understood through psychology.

Something I've noticed is that there is almost no reference to 'emotions' in classical texts, whereas there are very frequent references to 'the passions'. You will know if you read Stoic literature, that 'the passions' are something to be subdued, and that 'subduing the passions' is one of the marks of wisdom. I don't think they're praising callousness or mere indifference to suffering, but the ability to rise above feelings, emotions and moods. 'Constancy of temperament' was a highly prized virtue in the classics (reflected in the name 'Constance'). — Wayfarer

Yes it is interesting that ancient texts refer to passions as opposed to emotions. It may be because the chemical basis was not fully understood. Even more recently, Robert Burton's 'The Anatomy of Melancholy' considered melancholy as connected with humors. — Jack Cummins

Yes, this is what a modern such as Spinoza means by affects – 'passions', or passive reaction – which is the focus in two sections of his Ethics: III. — 180 Proof

I think that the issue here is a lot more complex than one might think.

To begin with, we now have one word, "emotion" which may be used to refer to either positive or negative, meaning good or bad, "feelings". I believe that most cultures in the ancient days would not have had the words or concepts which would allow them categorize good and bad in the same category.

It was Plato who worked this out by demonstrating that pleasure and pain could not be properly opposed to each other. This allowed for another category, "good", which both pleasure and pain could partake of. So neither pleasure nor pain could be said to be unconditionally, or necessarily good. That provided for the separation between pleasure and good. Plato's discussions allowed that both pleasure and pain, as well as other feelings which he investigated, could be either good or bad depending on the context of occurrence. But I believe that this was very advanced psychology for the day, and not indicative of how the common people spoke, or the way they commonly thought in those days.

I think it is evident that people in that ancient time tended to place what we put in one category (emotions) into two distinct categories, good and bad. There was no such category as "the emotions", and all the different types of feelings which we would class as "emotions" were classed some as good and some as bad. Feelings associated with love and pleasure were judged as good, while pain and suffering were bad. We can see in The Old Testament that God was said to be a jealous God, so jealousy being related to love was also judged as a good. And the ancient terms now translated as "passion" may involve a lot of ambiguity, but this word was generally tied to emotional pain, suffering, so it was judged as bad. Passion was associated with anger and hate. I do not believe that "passion" was associated with love, as we find today. The turn around perhaps can be found in the concept of "The passion of Jesus". Jesus sacrificed himself, suffered on the cross, for his love of others, and the meaning of "passion" took a turn for the better.

In any case, we ought to consider that the way we talk about emotions, and also the way we actually feel emotions, is most likely not static, but evolving. And if it is evolving this implies necessarily that there is variance between individuals.

Among the evidence is the impossibility of carrying out a process with the same results based on certain terms and operations. The terms and operations of psychology and geometry are radically different. The terms and operations carried out in geometry reveal internal relationships that you cannot discover by exchanging these terms for others in psychology. — JuanZu

The field we are working in here is philosophy. We are discussing the reality, and objectivity of geometrical objects, that is philosophy. You have assumed that we are discussing two distinct fields, geometry and psychology, and this forms the premise for your argument which proves that these are distinct fields. That is called begging the question.

I really do not see how your other premise, "the impossibility of carrying out a process with the same results based on certain terms and operations" is at all relevant, or even how it is meant to be interpreted. Therefore you need a much better explanation of what you are talking about before this phrase can be admitted as "evidence".

You didn't . The only thing you said is that geometry objects are not isolated objects. But that's assuming you can delimit the field of geometry from every other field, which is not the case, I assume you can't do that. — JuanZu

Obviously you did not understand me, so I will repeat with explanation. I said: "geometrical terms get defined by a wider field of mathematics, and concepts of spatial dimension. This issue is often addressed by philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in On Certainty, because it appears like it may produce an infinite regress of meaning, leaving no concepts truly justified as "ideal", in the sense of perfect, absolute certitude."

To explain in a simpler way for you, all terms and conceptions get defined and understood by a wider context. There is obviously no assumption here that geometry is "delimited", as what is expressed is exactly opposite to that. I am saying that no concepts are actually "delimited", and this has been an issue for philosophers. Wittgenstein said in the Philosophical Investigations for example, that concepts have no inherent boundaries, though a person may create a boundary for a specific purpose.

This I assume would be the case when we define a term for the purpose of a logical operation, as a premise. The issue I am telling you about, is that the understanding, or interpreting of this definition takes us outside the boundaries which the definition is meant to create. So, for example, if we define "right triangle" as a triangle with one right angle, then to understand these terms, "triangle", and "right angle", we must go to a wider context. We can define "triangle" as a plane figure with three sides and three angles, and we may define "right angle" as the angle produced when two lines cross each other and have equal angles on all sides. To understand or interpret these definitions we need to go to a wider context. We need to define "plane figure", "sides", "angles", "lines".

As you can see, at each step of defining the terms, then defining the terms of the definition, and then defining the terms which define the defining terms, we move into a wider and wider context, with an increase in terms to be defined, and an increase in the possibility of ambiguity and misunderstanding. It appears to many philosophers that this need to continually place the terms into a wider and wider context, in one's attempt to understand, would lead to an infinite regress rendering true understanding as impossible.

On the other hand, I have exposed the incommensurability between one field (geometry) and another (psychology). Relative to the field of psychology the field of geometry is closed in the sense that none of its terms, operations and relationships can determine the nature of the field of geometry. — JuanZu

This is exactly why what you are arguing is self-contradictory. First you say geometry cannot be delimited. This means that this proposed "field", geometry has no fixed boundaries. Then you argue that there is incommensurability between this proposed field, geometry, and another proposed field, psychology, and so you conclude that the two fields must be closed. Your conclusion contradicts your premise.

Do you apprehend the blatant contradiction? On the one hand you assume, 'geometry is not delimited. Then from here you say, 'but there is incommensurability between the terms of geometry and the terms of psychology'. So you conclude, 'relative to psychology, geometry is closed'. But this is obviously a fallacious conclusion. You do not have the premise required, which would state that there cannot be incommensurability within the same field. Furthermore, we have all sorts of evidence of incommensurability existing within the same field, which proves that such a premise would be false.

For example, within the field of mathematics there is incommensurability between real numbers and imaginary numbers. The use of imaginary numbers produces all sorts of complexities within the field, making the above mentioned concept of "plane" extremely difficult and complex. The use of imaginary numbers creates the need for a completely different definition of "plane".

Now, we can justly inquire whether the use of imaginary numbers is better described as a mathematical operation, or a psychological operation. We can look at this usage from at least two perspectives, what imaginary numbers actually provide for us within the field of mathematics, and also from the perspective of the psychology behind the desire to create such a thing as imaginary numbers. If there is incompatibility between these two, as you seem to assume, then we can conclude that imaginary numbers do not fulfil the purpose they were intended for.

They are the same insofar as they are numbers, they are different insofar as they are different types of numbers. — JuanZu

OK, now the point is that there is incommensurability between the different types of numbering systems. And, this incommensurability exists within the same field. Therefore your conclusion that fields are closed to each other when there is incommensurability between them, is unsound. Furthermore, your argument that geometry and psychology are distinct fields is also unsound. And, we can conclude that your presumption that these two names are representative of two distinct fields is nothing but a prejudice which is presented a premise for a fallacious argument, due to the fallacy of assuming the conclusion, begging the question.

Have you ever read about being as equivocity, as univocity and as analogy? Well, it seems that you speak from equivocity (all things are different and none can be the same in any sense), but contradicting yourself by using the same numerical system sign. — JuanZu

Did you not read where I explained the difference between "being the same thing", and "being of the same type". I'm really starting to think that you do not even bother to read half of what I post JZ.

A geometric object is presented to us and given to us even though it is a human creation. But it is given to us as a set of internal relationships and meanings that transcends the acts of its creation. It is in this sense that it gives itself: — JuanZu

Now you're finally saying something which appears possibly reasonable, which warrants a thorough investigation. You say that geometrical objects are created, but their meanings transcend their creation. Is that correct, and what exactly do you mean by "meanings that transcends the acts of its creation"?

Let's look at "meaning" to begin with, in its most simple and ordinary sense. When someone uses words, we say that the meaning is what is meant by the author, what the author intended with the words. Do you agree with that? If so, how would you say that "meaning" in this sense, "transcends" the act of creation, which is the act of the author thinking up, and giving physical existence to the conglomeration of words? Would you say that "transcends" is used here in the same way that we might say that one's intention "transcends" one's intentional acts?

If so, then we have your expression of "internal relations and meanings" as transcending the intentional act. But I defined "meaning" as what is given by the act itself, what is meant by the act. It appears wrong to say that meaning could transcend the act, because meaning seems to be intrinsically tied to the act. How could there be any meaning when the act which gives meaning is non-existent? We might be better off to say that "intention" transcends the act, and meaning is what is created by the intentional act, but intention is defined by terms which lead us in a different direction. It is defined by "purpose".

Let's say the "purpose" of the intentional act, or act of creation, transcends the act. And "purpose" implies a completely different type of "relations", which are not spatial relations at all, like what geometry works with. The relations implied by "purpose" is a hierarchy of values and priorities in relation to goals or ends. So, would you agree with me, that if there is a sort of "relations" or even if we might call it "meanings" which transcends the act of creation, these relations are "value" relations, which are distinct from spatial relations, being based in "priority". We might see that mathematics also is based in a type "value" system, and "priority" is paramount in the concept of order which is very important to mathematics.

We can say that it is something created and discovered for the reasons I have given (genesis and structure). A straight line could perhaps have been imagined once, or imagined by three different people at different times, or simply be an imaginary act repeated three times. That doesn't matter (and it's important that it doesn't matter), the important thing is when those lines entered into a relationship and crossed forming a triangle (three angles appeared). Something like a leg and a hypotenuse appeared and relationships emerged between these elements, regardless of how the lines were created. — JuanZu

Let's look directly at what I've identified as the relations which could possibly transcend the human, artificial act of creation, "priority", "order", and "value". If "order" transcends the acts which create mathematical axioms, is it possible, in mathematics, to have a set with no order, or no elements? Wouldn't such an axiom be necessarily false, therefore needing to be rejected as ontological wrong. However, mathematics does employ such axioms. Therefore it appears impossible, because of falsity, to argue that "priority|, "order", and "value" transcend the axioms of mathematics, because these axioms define what those things are.

Well, I precisely maintain that they are different fields, not only in terms of validation but in their terms, their relationships and operations. — JuanZu

So you're argument amounts to "I stipulate that these fields are different", and you think that this validates your perspective. That's called begging the question.

But you are assuming it is the same field (psychological acts) by simply repeating it, ignoring all the evidence I have presented to you and in no way refuting it. — JuanZu

You've presented exactly zero evidence, only some blabbering about relationships between fictitious imaginary elements. On the other hand I've presented the example of learning, the problem with infinite regress if concepts are only learned, Plato's proposal of "recollection", the problem with this, and Aristotle's resolution to that problem.

you are saying that it is not a closed field but without giving any justification or argument. — JuanZu

I explained why no field is a closed field. You don't seem to know how to read Juan. Or do you prefer just to ignore evidence which does not support what you believe?

And yet you continue to refer to both cases as "numerals". You have not yet understood that you cannot speak of the different as the same. That is, if you speak of two cases (Greeks and Arabs) as species of the same phenomenon (numbers) , you are only arguing against yourself. I say again, you do not explain the same thing by what is different. — JuanZu

Yes, two very different instances of the same type of phenomenon. This implies a difference between the two specified things, and in no way implies that the two are the same thing. However, two different things may be of the same type, so your objection "that you cannot speak of the different as the same" is ridiculous. Two different things cannot be the same, yet they can and often are, said to be the same type. So, very commonly we speak of the different as the same, so long as we maintain the distinction between particular and universal, and recognize that "the same type" does not mean "the same individual".

What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." — JuanZu

What I saw as contradiction was that you said a right triangle is "objective" because it "gives itself" and presents itself to us. This was the alternative to my claim that the right triangle was created by us. Later, you said "But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective."

Therefore we need to conclude that whether or not the right triangle is objective, is irrelevant to whether or not it "gives", "presents itself" to us, or whether it has been created by us. And all this talk about objectivity is just a ruse.

What you see as a contradiction between creating and discovering is actually a difference between the pair of concepts called "genesis" and "structure." That is, the first geometer may have imagined a line, the first line in the world; However, this line was already the object of a length, and the object of union with other lines that formed a triangle. But then the lines autonomously maintain a relationship with each other, which, depending on the measurement or value of their length, is equivalent to this or that other value. The key here is autonomy and the internal relationship between a set of elements. This relationship between elements can no longer be thought of as a psychological act of the imagination. Why? Because these relationships are said of the elements and not of the imagination. That is why geometry is objective, created and discovered at the same time. — JuanZu

So your argument here is worthless. The "autonomy and the internal relationship between a set of elements" is no more likely if the triangle is natural than if it is created.

Furthermore, what you say about "the first line in the world", that " this line was already the object of a length, and the object of union with other lines that formed a triangle", is clearly false. If it is the first line in the world, it is contradictory to say that it is already a union with other lines, making a triangle. This would imply that it is not the first line, but that it coexisted with other lines. But this is impossible, because you described it as the first line in the world, created by the first geometer.

Here I repeat the argument that I have presented in relation to your example of numbers. — JuanZu

The argument which amounts to an ignorance of the difference between 'being the same thing', and 'being of the same type'?

Maybe you think it's not relevant because you're not understanding it very well. For example, if you don't talk about neuronal synapses, you can talk instead about cognitive processes, or psychological acts. So what I have said about neural processes a fortiori is said of any theory that attempts to reduce (reductionism) one field to another. — JuanZu

I still don't know what you are trying to say JuanZu. My point was that one is prior to the other, as the cause of the other. Minds are prior to ideas as the cause of ideas. Since ideas and minds are subjects of the very same field, there is no attempt to reduce one field to another here, and your supposed "a fortiori" assertion is irrelevant. You seem to be wanting to claim that ideas are prior to minds, so please address the arguments I've made, instead of attempting to change the subject and using that very change of subject as the basis for your claim of a fortiori.

I did. As I have exposed an internal relationship between the elements of a closed field, in this case geometry. — JuanZu

Geometry is not a "closed field", there is no such thing as intelligible objects which exist in total isolation from others. So geometrical terms get defined by a wider field of mathematics, and concepts of spatial dimension. This issue is often addressed by philosophers, such as Wittgenstein in On Certainty, because it appears like it may produce an infinite regress of meaning, leaving no concepts truly justified as "ideal", in the sense of perfect, absolute certitude.

Or can u say that geometry theorems are different through different cultures? ). — JuanZu

Yes, geometrical ideas have been very different in different cultures. All you need to do to find this out, is read someone like Plato, where it is described how the different geometrical concepts were derived from different parts of the world, Egypt and Babylonia for example, and from there the ideas spread to other parts of the world like Greece, and what is now Italy, where they were assimilated through the process of working out differences, inconsistencies and incompatibilities.

A more modern, and also very clear example, can be found in numerical systems. Currently we use what is known as "Arabic Numerals". This numeral system came to supplant the use of "Roman Numerals" in the western world. It is not the case that these two are simply different names for the same conceptual system, because these two conceptual structures were completely different, as is plainly evident from the absence of the zero in the Roman Numerals. I admit that this example is not specifically "geometry" but it is related, and it gives very clear evidence of how highly logical theorems very clearly vary through different cultures.

Now, you will say "but geometry does not represent anything and is something created." Quantum physics is also something created, logic is too. But of course the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective (even if we follow ur argument no one can say that a computer or a sintetic chemical element is non-objective just because it's artificial) . — JuanZu

Why are you arguing against yourself now? You used "objectivity" as evidence that ideas are discovered, presented or given to us, rather than created by us. Now you claim "the fact that it is something created does not prevent it from being something objective", so you've just undermined your entire argument.

Ur argument, if I understand correctly, is based on a sense of objectivity as representation wich grounds it. That is, as the correspondence between the theory and a referent wich is provided by the sensory system. But if we abandon that idea of ​​objectivity as representation we also abandon what you say about geometry as something non-objective. And let me tell you: We have to abandon your sense of objectivity as a representation or as a necessary link between theory and an empirical reference that must correspond to. In the case of geometry it can be said that it is its own reference, and to the extent that we discover its internal relationships we discover things, regardless of the fact that it has no other origin than Humanity.

U can call this "objetive constructivism". — JuanZu

Remember JZ, you introduced "objectivity". I'm happy to go ahead without that term, as something irrelevant, but your claim was that being "objective" implies that concepts are not created, but discovered. You said that the reason why a right triangle is "objective" is because it gives itself to us, or presents itself to us as this type of an object. So you are very clearly saying that being "objective" is what implies, or justifies your claim that the right triangle is a discovered (natural) object rather than a created (artificial) object.

In my opinion the term "Real" has no place in the discussion because a thing like that, a thing like a triangle simply "gives itself" and presents itself to us as an object of study, without being able to be reduced to a psychological act. To say that there is an incommensurability in its being does not add to or take away anything from the fact that it is presented and given to our knowledge and has effects on it. That is why it is objective, since an internal relationship can be established, whether one of incommensurability, which tells us what a triangle like this – is. — JuanZu

That is what you said.

It is not false. You are pointing out particular accidents to say that we are not referring to the same thing. But obviously in the act of communication an identity and repetition must take place so that there is a minimum of understanding, this is the meaning. If you say to a Greek and an Egyptian to give you 5 units of that fruit and not 4, they will probably both give you the 5 units; Well, this fact is not a simple coincidence and must be explained. But obviously we cannot explain the same from what is different. We cannot explain, for example, why the Egyptian and the Greek acted in the same way based on the sound differences that each one heard, on their culture wich they belong, on their language, etc. — JuanZu

With respect to the identity of an object, each accidental of that object must be accounted for, or else two distinct objects, with different accidentals would have the same identity, and therefore be the very same object. Therefore in any instances when the accidentals differ, as not being the same in each of the instances, we must conclude that the two objects are distinct objects and not the same object. This is derived from the law of identity.

You have confirmed what is seen frequently here that when one turns philosophical on an issue one goes back in time to see what the Greeks had to say, and to join them across the ages in their despair. — jgill

We look back in time to see how the problems which exist today developed over time. And when we look back we see others who have looked back, and we learn from them. I would not call this an act of despair, but rather the propagation of hope. The denial, which appears more common, that the problems exist today, and the relationship between the past manifestations of the same problems, appears more like despair to me.

Out of curiosity, are you an old guy like me, middle aged, or a "youngster"? — jgill

I've seen you state your age, and I'm not that old, but I'm by no means a youngster.