When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill
What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. That type of chain is shown to be logically consistent and therefore logically possible, and even attractive to some people, as seductive in a a sort of aesthetic or emotional way. . . . . Of course there is an issue with inductive principles as shown by Hume, so those who enjoy thinking about, and conceiving, chains receding to infinity, often feel justified in presenting these as if they could be real physical existents — Metaphysician Undercover
I really wish you would stop demeaning the post without anything but a deriding opinion. I have answered your questions and critiques, so I would like a little more respect for what I've written here. Either demonstrate the argument is false, or not. — Philosophim
I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not. — jgill
"1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows"
I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not. — jgill
...but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions... — jgill
This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. — Metaphysician Undercover
And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed. — Metaphysician Undercover
This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
You've lost me here. How is it different?
— Philosophim
It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover
The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being.
— Philosophim
That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
I expected clear logic: Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one thing that does not.
This convoluted language stops me at the very beginning. — jgill
I gather it's intended to be something like
∀x∃yCyx ∨ ∃x¬∃yCyx
'For all x there is some y such that y caused x, or there is an x such that there is no y that caused x'.
it is valid. — Banno
I've done some searching and find that causality and causal chains is enormously complex, far more than I anticipated. — jgill
Then what appears, is that if there is a "first cause", there could be absolutely nothing prior to the first cause because "cause" is meant to be all-inclusive. But that's deception, because there must be criteria as to what constitutes a "cause" so there could always be something else outside that category. And that's the deception which Philosophim argues, that prior to the first cause, there could be absolutely nothing, therefore no reason for the first cause's occurrence. That's why I proposed switching for the word "thing", to expose this sort of sophistry. If there is no thing prior to the first thing, it appears like there is absolutely nothing, but that's a mistaken conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Instead, the position of any cause in the order might be determined on-the-fly, and only when it is necessary to preserve causal consistency.
For why should the universe decide before our measurements and observations, what is and is not an initial cause? That question might look contradictory, but only if it is assumed that the universe consists of an absolute order of events whose existence transcends our observations and measurements of it. — sime
Which is fine, but how does that apply to the argument? — Philosophim
...but represents the convergents of analytic continued fractions... — jgill
The key word here is "represents". The problem with representations is that they do not qualify as being the thing which they represent. That's why the word "represents" is used, to signify that it stands for something, but it is not itself the thing which it stands for. And to complicate this problem we can create representations which are completely fictional, having no real thing which they correspond with. They represent something imaginary. So in a discussion of whether or not infinite chains are real, a representation of an infinite chain serves no purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
jgill is quite right that the topic is complex. In particular, what it is to be a cause has remained fraught throughout this thread, and the logic of necessity in use has never been made clear. — Banno
There are limits to what "first" means — Philosophim
I've clearly defined what a first cause would be correct? — Philosophim
There is no prior thing which causes itself to exist. — Philosophim
What I don't agree on is how this difference is anything but the fact that a first cause cannot be explained by a prior cause. — Philosophim
By definition, I cannot be wrong. — Philosophim
The only difference between a first cause and a normal cause is that a first cause cannot have something prior which explains its existence. That's it. Meaning by definition, there can be no other cause which explains its existence. — Philosophim
If you want to explain to me why there isn't a contradiction, please demonstrate how its not a contradiction for someone to claim that having a first birthday one year after giving birth, doesn't necessarily mean they didn't have a prior birthday. — Philosophim
I'm trying to have a conversation to see if what I'm claiming holds upon scrutiny. — Philosophim
I claim a first cause is logically necessary. Not that there can be only one first cause. Meaning other things can exist in the universe, and something appears uncaused by anything within that universe. Meaning that the replacement of 'cause' with 'things' doesn't work. — Philosophim
I don't see it being particularly fraught myself, but I'll define it if need be. Take any set of existence. What caused that set of existence is anything outside of that set of existence which is needed for that set to be. A set which does not need anything outside of itself to exist, is a first cause. — Philosophim
It is as a mathematical "fact", but it might not appear in nature. — jgill
The issue is the limits to what "cause" means, not the limits to what "first" means — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes you've defined it as the first in a chain of causes. However, there are other types of causes which do not occur in a chain like that, specifically the one I mentioned, "final cause". Therefore a "first cause", as defined by you, could still have a cause prior to it, so long as it is a type of cause which does not occur in chains, as per your definition. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are wrongly interpreting your own argument. The difference between the first cause and the other causes in the chain, is that no part of the chain is prior to the first cause, whereas parts of the chain are prior to all the other causes in the chain. This in no way implies that the first cause "cannot have something prior which explains its existence". — Metaphysician Undercover
By definition, I cannot be wrong.
— Philosophim
"By definition, I cannot be wrong"? Are you saying that the definition of "Philosophim" is "the person who cannot be wrong"? — Metaphysician Undercover
When "my first birthday" occurs, or when it is referred to, it means the first in a chain of significant days. But this does not imply that there are no other significant days in your life prior to your first birthday. So prior to your first birthday, there are many other significant days in your own life. — Metaphysician Undercover
The first cause, by your definition, is very explicitly the beginning of the chain. This implies that the reason for the first cause, the cause of the first cause is something which cannot be said to be a part of the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
The fact that you keep on insisting that your conclusion is valid, after scrutiny shows you that it is not, inclines me to think that your are improperly attached to your conclusion, and would resort to trickery to persuade people of it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry Philosophim, but "set of existence" seems to be incoherent. Do you mean "set of existents" or "set of existing things"? Maybe you could make another try. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's not what the argument shows. The argument shows that the first cause is the first in a chain. It does not show that there cannot be a prior cause, it shows that the prior cause cannot be a part of the chain. "First" is in reference to the chain, it designates the beginning of the chain. It does not designate "the first cause" absolutely. This is evidenced by your insistence that there could be many first causes. — Metaphysician Undercover
Anyway, by Aristotelian metaphysics, each and every existent has two distinct requirements needed for it to be. One is matter, the other is form. In this way there is always at least two distinct types of cause needed for a thing to be. If one of these types of cause forms a causal chain with a first cause, there is still the other type of cause, which may well be prior to the first cause of the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
But that's not what I'm stating. I'm stating the first cause period. This is not a specific type of cause, so there can be no other invented type of cause that is separate from what I'm defining. — Philosophim
I'm a bit at a loss here on what you're trying to say. Its very simple. Either something is caused by something else, or it isn't. Its not complicated. I'm not sure a final cause makes sense unless this cause ended all of reality. Otherwise causality continues. — Philosophim
Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain? — Philosophim
No, I'm clearly noting the definition of "First cause" is that there is no prior cause. — Philosophim
Incorrect. When I say "my first birthday" I mean, "My first birthday" No other days. First birthday. First cause. No other causes. You are saying, "There could be prior cause to the first cause" is the same as "There could be prior birthdays to the first birthday". This is clearly wrong. If the other days in the analogy are making it difficult, eliminate them and just say, "First day". You cannot have a prior X to the "first X" by definition. — Philosophim
No, I've already stated the reason it is a first cause is that it has no prior cause that explains its existence. Its part of the definition which I feel I've been pretty consistent and clear on. — Philosophim
I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time. — Philosophim
I'm insisting my conclusion is valid because you have not presented a valid counter to it so far. I'm claiming, "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition." You're proposing "A first cause could have some prior cause". You are stating, there could possibly be a prior X to a first X. If this is the case, isn't this a contradiction? — Philosophim
I meant exactly what I said. The word "existent' in English is an adjective, not a noun. It means specifically, "having existence or being; existing" https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/existent#:~:text=adjective-,1.,existing%20now%3B%20present%3B%20immediate
An existing thing describes a thing with a verb. Except that people might say that thoughts are not things. So I don't want to describe things, I want to describe what exists.
We largely agree on most of what's being said here, so lets not nitpick over petty grammar though. I really want to figure out this difference between us. — Philosophim
A prior cause means its part of the chain of causality. I'm more commenting on this comment so you understand what I meant by first causes. A few chains intersecting somewhere is an intersection of causality, and a continuation. The intersection is not a first cause. Multiple first causes would be the start of each chain. When we get to multiple first causes, its probably better thought of as a web, with the first causes being the beginning of each strand. — Philosophim
If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion. — Philosophim
That is not correct. You stated the first cause in a "chain of events". This does not imply "first" absolutely, it only implies first in that chain. That is what allows you to say there might be a multitude of first causes. If you accept this, then you know that "first" does not mean "the first cause period". — Metaphysician Undercover
So, I suggest to you, that if you better understood the concept of "cause", and the multitude of different types of "cause" which have been described over the years, you would see that some types of "cause" do not occur in chains. — Metaphysician Undercover
I recommend that you read some philosophy concerning the concept of causation. Aristotle's outline of the four principal ways that "cause" is used is a good place to start. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you saying that in front of the first cause of a chain, there's another chain that causes the first cause in the first chain?
— Philosophim
No, I am proposing that there is a type of cause which does not operate through a chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
Look up Aristotle's "formal cause" for an outline of a type of cause which is free from the constraints of a chain. Then you might start to understand how "final cause" as the defining feature of intention and free will is a type of cause which is independent from any chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
Philosophim, do you read what I write? I clearly stated that there are "significant days" which are prior to your first birthday, not that there are "prior birthdays to the first birthday" as you straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'll admit when I'm wrong no problem, I do it all the time.
— Philosophim
Then get on with it. Why do I have to repeat the same thing over and over again, while you keep insisting that your mistakes are not mistakes? — Metaphysician Undercover
You accept that there could be a multitude of "first causes" as the beginnings of a multitude of causal chains. Since there is nothing to ensure that the various beginnings are all at precisely the same time, then please confess to your mistake. The following statement or so-called "definition" is incorrect, or inconsistent: "A first cause means there can be no prior cause by definition". — Metaphysician Undercover
This does not at all help me to understand what you meant by "set of existence". — Metaphysician Undercover
Now you propose to define "prior" in a way which renders "prior in time" as unintelligible. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you would like, you can introduce why you think Aristotle's four causes is pertinent to this discussion.
— Philosophim
That's very straight forward. In your argument you restrict "cause" by definition, to mean an event which occurs within the context of a chain of events. But the way that we understand reality involves using "cause" in ways which are other than the context of a chain of events. This was very well explained by Aristotle. — Metaphysician Undercover
In our understanding of reality we use "cause" in the way of "final cause", intention and free will, and this is a type of "cause" which is independent of any chain of events. Therefore your definition, which restricts "cause" to an occurrence within a chain of events is not representative of the way that we understand reality, and is thus a false premise. — Metaphysician Undercover
↪javra
Nice icon. — Banno
Sorry Philosophim, but I am interesting in this issue of alternative interpretations of "change". I might start a new thread if it turns out to be necessary, though. — javra
Since we cannot refute this possibility on the basis of the nature of the concepts of existence and cause (as distinguished from the empirical fact that these things always seem to go together), we therefore cannot make the case that it is impossible for anything to come into existence without a cause – after all, anything is possible unless it is logically impossible. — expos4ever
"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. — Philosophim
I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language?If we don't know whether our universe has finite or infinite chains of causality A -> B -> C etc...
Lets say there's a finite chain of causality. What caused a finite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is.
Lets say there's an infinite chain of causality. What caused an infinite causal chain to exist instead of something else? There is no prior reason, it simply is. — Philosophim
Because considering a variety of cases in terms of similarities to and differences from the central case helps one to understand it.Why? Why not deal with the one he (@philosophim) presented, and either help him work out the defects, or understand what he's trying to say... — AmadeusD
We focus on the "A caused B" kind of cause. If the spark caused the explosion, we can ask what caused the spark and what effects the explosion caused (and sometimes it can cause another explosion, as in an atomic bomb). That's our paradigm of causation.But to your main point. You have a sequence, A is caused by B, B is caused by C, C is caused by D, and so on, and you suppose it to be valid to ask what causes the entire sequence. — Banno
That's true, so far as it goes. But we can ask, and answer, the question why people are born and then those people bear children. But not in the same terms. We need an analysis of the sequence, not an addition to it. That's what happens in the case of the explosion.For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno
This is not an argument. If you have in mind a particular idea, please demonstrate it. If not, my point stands. — Philosophim
The chain is just a visual metaphor. How does your proposal work? How do I have a first cause, then have another cause that causes the first cause without there being a causal link between the two? You have to understand by this point, what you're proposing without a concrete example is coming across as a clear contradiction to me. — Philosophim
I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V
In the first paragraph it talks of "existence" being caused - I take that as meaning "existents", things that exist - then slips sideways to constituents - "neutrons, electrons...", but constituents are different to causes; — Banno
Consider a different sequence, that of mothers: A was born from B; B was born from C, C was born from D. For any person, it is legitimate to ask from whom they were born. It is not legitimate to ask that of the sequence of births - it is not a person and so does not have a mother. — Banno
I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause.
— Philosophim
"Later" is a long time. How long would you wait?
For me, it will always seem more likely, and always possible, that any putative first cause will turn out to have a prior cause (or, in my language, that we will develop a prior cause) than the alternative. — Ludwig V
I notice that here, as elsewhere, you use the word "reason" at this point, instead of cause. "Reason" and "cause" are not synonyms, are they? At least, not in philosophy. So what is the significance of this change in language? — Ludwig V
I was just telling you where the information can be found. There's much reading and too much for me to present to you here. Your argument is refuted by the possibility of other types of causes, along with the fact that the "first cause" which you conclude is a different type, as I've shown. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, I'll stick right to the point. The issue is how you switch from "cause" to "reason" in your argument, without proper definition. You demonstrate the necessity of a "first cause", then you conclude:
""4. Alpha logic: An alpha cannot have any prior reasoning that explains why it came into existence. An Alpha's reason for its existence can never be defined by the Z's that follow it. If an Alpha exists, its own justification for existence, is itself."
You continued to insist that there cannot be any prior reason for the first cause, despite the fact that I pointed out that this is not a valid conclusion. And above, you even denied your own statements with the following:
"Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above."
Simply put, your conclusion of "first cause" provides you with no premise for making any statements about the reason for the first cause, without further premises to define what "reason" means. Your conclusions about "the reason" for the first cause are invalid. You cannot conclude that there cannot be a prior reason for the first cause, or that the first cause is its own reason, because you have no premises about "reasons". Any such statements are not conclusions but personal opinions not supported by the argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
You show that there is necessarily a "first cause", which means a first event. You then proceed to assert that there could be no "reason" for the first event, as prior to, and being the reason why the first cause occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover
And since "cause" is defined by "event", and "prior" "a reason" might be something other than an event, yet still prior, as demonstrated by free will and intention. Your argument does not exclude the possibility that the reason why a first cause occurs could be something other than an event. — Metaphysician Undercover
An "event" as we know it has a cause and an effect, a prior and posterior. This is because it occurs in a duration of time. But the argument produces the conclusion of a "first cause", and this is not consistent with "event" as we know it. Therefore your argument's definition of "cause", restricting it to an "event" is inadequate, false, because the meaning of "event" which is necessitated by the argument is inconsistent with empirical evidence of events. The argument produces the conclusion of an event (first cause) which only has a posterior part, without the prior part, and this is inconsistent with observation. This demonstrates that your definition of "cause" is false causing the argument to be self-refuting. — Metaphysician Undercover
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