This is the same problem with space as there may be with time. — RussellA

I don't think these two are similar at all. When we look at things in space, we see all sorts of boundaries, the edges to objects, etc., but we do not find any such boundaries in time. All boundaries in time, except the boundary between future and past, are completely arbitrary. And the boundary between future and past is very indefinite because it's always changing.

I imagine Trump is pissed at Netanyahu. Hopefully this episode will further disentangle the US from that government. — NOS4A2

Trump distance himself from Israel? I sure as hell hope that happens, because it would mean that he's in the grave.

I am assuming by temporal duration we mean that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment in time. As the Planck length is the smallest measurable unit of length, there is a smallest unit of time. ie, a duration. — RussellA

There is a further problem involved, if we assume that time itself cannot be reduced to a moment. There is then the question of what exactly is a moment. If time itself is continuous duration, then "the moment" is artificial, fictitious, something just made up by us for practical purposes. For example, we assume "a moment" which separates before 7:00 AM from after 7:00 AM, and this moment provides the foundation for measurement. Therefore, if time itself is actually continuous, without moments, yet our measurements of time are dependent on the use of such moments, then our measurements are fundamentally flawed, because they employ a concept which is not representative of time in reality.

I look at the world and can see a tree, static at one moment in time. — RussellA

I am very skeptical of this statement, and I would ask you to reevaluate. If you saw a tree at a moment in time, how could you ever determine whether that tree is static or not? If activity requires passing time, and there is no passing time in a moment, you would not be able to determine whether the tree is static or active without watching it for a duration.

I do believe that if you reflect on your actual experience, you'd recognize that you do not ever see a tree at one moment in time.

However, I believe that we approach this from different philosophical positions. I assume that you support Direct Realism (though I may be mistaken), whereas I support Indirect Realism. — RussellA

This makes no sense to me.

The arrangement of the parts which makes the whole that whole of this type is the form imposed upon parts (actuality imposed on actuality); and if this is true, then the parts and their arrangement are what dictate potential that a thing has—not some substrate of potential (viz., matter). There’s no extra entity called ‘matter’ going on here. — Bob Ross

Aristotle showed how this is problematic. Each part, if it was divisible, would itself be an arrangement of parts, and that would lead to infinite regress. And, if we assume that things are composed of fundamental indivisible parts, like the atomists proposed, this is also problematic. There would be nothing to distinguish one indivisible part from another indivisible part, and all would be one.

In the sense of what I think Aristotle means, I would say that ‘having potential’ is to have a substrate that can receive actuality in some way — Bob Ross

I think it would be more appropriate to say that the underlying substrate has received actuality. We are talking about what actually is, and this means it has form already.

I believe the problem you are encountering is due to your jumping ahead, trying to understand "matter" as potential, without getting a fundamental understanding of how "matter" is defined. "Matter" goes into the category of "potential", but this is not how it is defined in the basic sense.

I still haven't been able to wrap my head around what 'matter' is if it does not refer to merely the 'stuff' which are the parts that are conjoined with the form to make up the whole. — Bob Ross

You'll find the answer to this question, in its most basic form, in Aristotle's Physics, where he defines "material cause", in Bk2, Ch 3 "that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists". Notice that the matter of a thing, is in a sense, independent from the thing itself. The matter precedes the existence of the thing, and it persists in existence after the thing perishes. I believe that this is important to understand, because it is the basis of "contingent being". All things made of matter were generated, and will perish, as their matter out lasts them.

So "matter" accounts for the perishability of things, and the fact that things have a beginning in time. But since "matter" cannot account for the reason why a thing is the thing it is, rather than something else, we need to posit "form" as well, to allow that things have whatness.

I know about my environment because I can see trees and mountains. But my experience of temporal duration only exists in my mind, and is not something that I can see in my environment.

Therefore, I cannot know about temporal duration in the same way that I know about my environment. — RussellA

When you look at a tree, do you not see the leaves moving in the breeze? When you look at a mountain, do you not see clouds moving? These activities are indications of temporal duration. In the very same way that you deductively conclude that you can see things called "trees" and "mountains", you can also deductively conclude that you are seeing temporal duration.

The problem here seems to be that you are not allowing that seeing activities qualifies as evidence of seeing temporal duration, yet you do allow that seeing something relatively static, an object, qualifies as evidence of seeing objects like trees and mountains. Therefore I insist that you are being inconsistent in the premises which you accept as true, in producing your deductive your conclusions. You allow that staticity is evidence of something, but you do not allow that activity is evidence of anything.

A sceptic may deny that trees and mountains exist in the world. However, a sceptic cannot deny that they experience a sense of temporal duration.

Even for the sceptic, there is a difference between what exists in the mind and what exists outside the mind. — RussellA

As explained above, you appear to be biased in your skepticism. You allow that perception of staticity is evidence of something real in the world, objects like trees and mountains, but you disallow that perception of activity is evidence of something real in the world, like temporal duration.

2. The parts of the apple expose the apple inherently to the possibility of change because it exposes it to having potentials that could be actualized. — Bob Ross

What does this mean, "it exposes it to having potentials that could be actualized"? How are you using "expose" here? What would be the difference between having potential and being exposed to potential? If the apple doesn't have potential, but is exposed to potential, where would that potential exist other than within something else. But if the something else has potential relative to the apple, then doesn't the apple also have potential relative to the something else. So doesn't this just amount to saying that the apple has potential, i.e. matter?

If I exist within a duration of time, how can I know that I exist within a duration of time? — RussellA

As I said, it's basically the same way that you can know anything about the environment which you live in. You can be an extreme skeptic, and deny that you can know anything, but what's the point?

My experiences being a part of me suggests that "I" could exist without them. But is this true? — RussellA

This isn't really true, if it is what is called an essential part. This means that it is a necessary part,

I am still interested in how we are able to perceive duration. — RussellA

I think it has to do with what I said about being composed of different parts, and comparison between them. The brain compares information from various senses for example. This is like comparing different, yet concurrent experiences. So for example, you see something in the distance, and hear the sound a bit later, you can know from watching your watch how long it took for the sound to arrive relative to the visual image.

It is true, however, that if I did exist at one moment in time, I could compare my memory of the object being to the right at time 2pm and being to the left at time 2.05. This would allow me to perceive that there had been a duration of time. — RussellA

That is not perception, it is a deduction. Deduction does not qualify as "perceive" in either of your definitions.

I can judge a duration from the viewpoint of one moment in time, but how can I judge a duration when I am part of that duration? — RussellA

"Judge" is a much better word to use here than "perceive". The problem is that your preferred definition of "perceive" allows ambiguity in the division between what is sensed, and what is produced by judgement. So for example, if you say that you perceive a tree, that there is a thing you perceive, and it is a tree, is actually judgement. Judgement inheres within the perception. The actual sensation is just information. However, the information is always mediated through the brain, and therefore some degree, or form of judgement applied, before it is even present to the conscious mind.

You may want to excluded all judgement from sense perception, and ask whether we can perceive temporal duration. But that is not a realistic version of perception. Then if we allow judgement to inhere within perception, we have the problem of drawing the boundary between judgement prior to conscious judgement, and posterior to conscious judgement.

In other words, it appears to me, that you want to design your definitions of "judge" and "perceive", to allow that you can judge duration if there are moments in time, and deny that we could perceive duration if there are no moments in time. What's the point to this?

He ends with his "utopia of cognition":

Whatever of the truth can be gleaned through concepts beyond their abstract circumference, can have no other staging-grounds than that which is suppressed, disparaged and thrown away by concepts. The utopia of cognition would be to open up the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it the same as them.

I think it's important to note that Adorno's cognitive utopia remains conceptual, i.e., it is not mystical or intuitive.

QUESTION: This description of philosophy as essentially paradoxical can look rather too irrationalist. Would it be a misrepresentation of Adorno to just say that philosophy seems paradoxical, but there might be a way to do it? I know he wants us to keep contradictions open, but this one to me is a bit on-the-nose. — Jamal

I think the answer here is to look at the process rather than the concepts themselves, or even the supposed relations between concepts and objects. If truth is a relation between concept and object, then the act which makes this relation is what produces truth, and that act is not the concept itself. Notice that it is a type of act, which is described by "open up the non-conceptual with concepts". This is the act of applying concepts to the nonconceptual.

So philosophy becomes paradoxical, even self-contradicting, when it totally envelopes itself in concepts, applying concepts to concepts (thinking about thinking perhaps). This "thinking" is said to be a type of activity, but it's not a real activity because objects are avoided instead of engaged with. Intentionally avoiding objects makes it the opposite of activity. Real activity engages concepts with objects, and this I believe is Adorno's proposal for avoiding paradox, a dialectics which consists of real activity.

Trying analogies: i) can one hand wash itself, ii) can a snooker ball at rest start to move without any external force, iii) can the mind be conscious of its own consciousness, iv) can something arise from nothing, v) can there be an effect without a cause, vi) does an evil person think that they are a good person. — RussellA

I would answer "yes" to some , "no" to others, so I don't see the relevance.

Suppose I experience an object moving from right to left. — RussellA

You are repeating the same basic mistake. You have an experience, within yourself, and you interpret the significance of that experience, as an object moving from right to left.

Notice how your description leaves out a key aspect, the means of sensation by which you drew that conclusion. So instead, your description would be more accurate if you said, I saw something move from right to left, or I heard something move from right to left, or I saw and heard something move from right to left.

When you include this, the means of sensation, you indicate that this part of your experience, seeing that, or hearing that, is not your complete experience. So "an object moving from right to left" is not what you experience, it's an interpretation of a part of your experience, what you saw, heard, etc. The interpretation itself is another part of your experience.

However, if "my experience" is internal to "me" but separate to "me" then this is the homunculus problem — RussellA

I didn't say it is separate, I said it is "is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being". This means that it is a part of being human, not something separate.

Therefore, "my experience" must be "me", in that I am my experiences rather than I have experiences. — RussellA

No, my experience is not "me", it is a part of me, just like my heart is, and my brain is, except it is a different type of part of me, a different category.

But that means there exists only one thing, "me" This one thing can be called either "me" or "my experience", as they are one and the same thing. — RussellA

Do you understand what "an aspect" means? It is impossible that the aspect is the same as the thing it is an aspect of, or else it wouldn't be "an aspect"?

My question is, accepting that one thing can be aware of a second thing, how can one thing be aware of itself? — RussellA

I really do not understand why you think that self-awareness is impossible. Are you not aware of yourself? If you think that you are not self aware, maybe you cold explain why?

This takes me back to my analogies, how can one hand wash itself.

How can a single thought think about itself?

How can a single thought that has a duration think about its own duration? — RussellA

A hand can easily wash itself, it uses tools, wash basin, scrub brush, etc.,. You may have experienced this if you've injured a hand. I really think you are placing undue restrictions, and trying to make a problem where there is none to be found. Why do you limit yourself to "a single thought" when you are thinking about duration?

Have you ever noticed that you can think a number of different thoughts at the same time? When you count the number of chairs in a room, you must think about what qualifies as a chair, and also count at the same time. That's how we measure, and make comparisons in general. So, you can see the object move from right to left, and also watch your clock, at the very same time, to measure how long it took. This is because the human experience is made up of many different aspects, all occurring at the same time.

I exist within a world of trees and mountains, but I am external to these trees and mountains.

The problem arises when I am not external to what I experience. — RussellA

You're really not making sense Russel. People are not external to their experiences. Experience is an intrinsic aspect of being a human being. It doesn't make sense to talk about experiences which you are external to, or which are external to you.

Can an experience experience itself. Can a thought think about itself. — RussellA

Sure, Aristotle claimed that thinking about thinking is the highest virtue. Why would you move to exclude the possibility of such activities?

Can a duration be aware of its own duration? — RussellA

Isn't this the only way that a duration could be accurately measured? The thing experiencing duration must be aware of its own duration in order to measure that duration. This is the case of all measurements, they are inherently subjective, being interpretations made by a subject, of the subject's experience.

That is what constitutes "empirical science", human beings being aware of their own sense experiences, and using conventional tools, established standards, to measure these sense observations. The conventional standards which are applied, are said to be "objective", because they have been justified, but the thing measured is subjective, as a sense observation, and the act of measurement is also subjective, as an act of the subject. So the subject is aware of its own subjectivity, and making measurements of that subjective experience, using objective standards.

Therefore we ought to conclude that a subject can be aware of its own duration, just like it can be aware of any sense experiences, and proceed to make measurements of that duration in a similar way to the way that it makes measurements of any sense observations, by being aware of them, and applying "objective" standards to measure them.

How can I perceive a duration if I exist within this duration? — RussellA

Why not? You have a multitude of senses, a brain, and all sorts of tools within your body, which could enable you to experience the very duration which you live in. Your question is like asking how can I experience the same world which I exist within?

But if I existed within a duration, then my awareness, which has a duration, cannot be aware of its own duration. My only awareness could be of a timelessness. — RussellA

I do not see the logic here.

I don't think there is any science which truly reveals how long the present is for a human being, but I've seen reports of lengths up to a couple seconds. This is not the duration of the present, in any objective sense, because human experience is. purely subjective.

Also, I think that when you speak of your awareness of an event which just happened, as part of your experience of the present, I think you need to include your awareness (anticipation) of an event which is about to happen, as part of your awareness of the present.

Very meta. I don't know what to say about it, except that I don't think the non-identical is a positively applied category so much as a limit concept, a negative name (a bit like noumena in kant). — Jamal

This is why I brought up the phrase "the identity of identity and non-identity". But to be clear, it is Hegel whom Adorno accuses of giving identity to non-identity, in that way, which I claim puts contradiction into the object. This is the means by which Hegel enables substantive thinking: " the determinate particular was determinable by the Spirit, because its immanent determination was supposed to be nothing other than the Spirit". The problem being what is indicated by Adorno at the beginning of the section, that the law of non-contradiction applies to objects, not to subjective thought (here as Spirit, which is in essence free). So when the determinate particular is nothing other than a determination of the free Spirit, this effectively avoids that law, allowing contradiction within the determinate particular, as the identity of non-identity.

Adorno I believe is rejecting Hegelian dialectics, recognizing what is described of Hegel at the end of the section as a mistake. Adorno is looking for a way to give primacy to the object rather than to the subject, but this would be a restriction to Spirit. Primacy of the subject is what I claim leads to contradiction within the object. So for Adorno, the non-identical is not a positively applied category (as you say, and I agree), as it is for Hegel. And, I think he is attempting to avoid any conceptualization of "non-identical", because conceptualization will inevitably be contradictory, as was the case when Aristotle tried to conceptualize "potential", and "matter". Nevertheless, it must be at the base of substantive thinking, as what enables it, the foundation.

So, as is the case with objects, we can name it without conceptualizing it. This provides a twist to Wittgenstein's bedrock, instead of a foundational certainty (which Adorno seems to think will always end up as a contradiction, such as the identity of non-identity), it is a foundational uncertainty. Even Wittgenstein's approach to the foundation is conceptual, an attempt "to say what cannot be said" and therefore contradictory. So Adorno's proposal, of a negative dialectics, seems to be to simply name it, so that we can speak of it, without actually conceptualizing it, which would be the attempt to give it identity.

It appears to me, at this point, like this will lead to a discipline of description, with Spirit being fundamentally free in its artistic endeavours, but discipline required for truth in representation.

It seems to me that we exist at one moment in time, including our mind and brain, as well as everything else in the world, including trees, tables and chairs.

That being said, I also feel that I am conscious of the persistence and duration of time. This raises the mysterious metaphysical problem of how a duration of time can exist at a moment in time. Kant thought it could, and he called it the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. — RussellA

I believe we actually perceive motion, activity, and this requires temporal duration, therefore we do perceive duration. I think that the "moment in time" is an artificial construct.

The multiplicity or polyvalence—which I've also described as diversity, difference, and richness—is currently experienced as hostile, as anathema to the subject's reason. This is because it reveals the subject's inability to fully capture it. In contrast to this failed mediation, genuine reconciliation would produce a happy mediation, a successful and non-dominating one. (This reconciliation is the ultimate secret goal of dialectics; see "dialectics serves reconciliation" in the next paragraph) — Jamal

Consider this passage, and the diversity of difference referred to. When primacy is granted to the subject, this diversity, which actually constitutes the richness and beauty of being, is lost into a category which we commonly hear as 'differences which don't make a difference'. For Adorno this is the category of non-identity, or non-identical. These differences can have no identity, because they do not fit into the categories imposed, trying to fit them creates contradiction, so they are simply left as unidentified.

However, this dialectical approach is actually based in an act of categorizing them, as non-identical. So there is an illusion created, that those differences which are impossible to categorize, have actually been categorized. But the category is really 'the contradictory', as the non-identical which have been given that contradictory identity.

Since I was struggling to understand that last sentence, I finally worked it out by putting it in the form of modus tollens: If Hegel's dialectics had not hidden the non-identical then philosophy would have collapsed into positivism and nihilism; but philosophy has not collapsed into positivism and nihilism, therefore Hegel's dialectics did hide the non-identical.

Adorno's idea is that although Hegel hid the non-identical by turning contradiction into reconciliation and subsuming difference—and did this with idealism, insisting on the identity of concept and object—it was in order to produce substantive knowledge. If he had not asserted this right of philosophy to find truth, then there would be no other philosophical tradition except those that resign themselves to the reduced role of handmaiden to science. — Jamal

So I generally agree with this, but I maybe wouldn't say it is a matter of hiding the non-identical. It's maybe even the opposite to that, as allowing the non-identical (as contradictory) right into the mind as if it has an identity. It hides it by making it so obvious that it's just ignored.

Consider this analogy. You go out in the morning, and take notice of all the minute differences around you, different shades of green in the leaves and grass etc., this is the richness of diversity. You can go out every day, and notice this richness within the non-identical. But if you just go out and noticed the identified things, your bike, your car, your mailbox, etc., you can completely ignore the non-identical. And it's not a matter of having hid the non-identical, it's just a change of attitude, attention, focus. All that diversity just becomes 'the other' so you ignore it all together, but that ignorance is actually a matter of accepting it into your mind, as 'the other'. and something to be ignored. So if it is a matter of hiding it, it's a matter of hiding it from oneself, within one's own mind, by designating it as insignificant. It is that act of recognizing it, classifying it, designating it, which actually hides it.

I did not interpret Adorno as criticizing Hegel for reading contradiction into the objects. Not saying you're wrong, just don't really get it. — Jamal

I'll try to explain to you why I see it that way. Notice the end of the last section. "Contradiction is non-identity under the bane [Bann] of the law, which also influences the non-identical." The "law" referred to here is the law of non-contradiction, and contradiction renders identity as impossible, resulting in non-identity.

Then in this section, "REALITY AND DIALECTICS", it is stated that "This law is however not one of thinking, but real." This is a bit off the normal interpretation of that law which would hold it to be a law of thinking. But Adorno is stating that it is a law about what is real, rather than about what we can think. We can in fact think in contradictions, yet the real object cannot exist in a contradictory way.

Later in the section he talks about the lack of substantive thinking, which results in "null and void forms of cognition". This type of thinking is the rejection of content, and the content is the representation of the object, and that is what supports non-contradiction. So lack of substance in thinking is lack of object, and without real objects there is nothing to prevent contradiction in thought.

Hegel however, allowed for substantive philosophizing, but he held the primacy of the subject. This results in "the identity of identity and non-identity". But notice how the identity of non-identity is itself contradictory. So this is what happens with Hegel's principle where "the determinate particular was determinable by the Spirit". "Identity" is the subjective side of the relation between concept and object, due to the primacy of the subject, in this sense of identity. So assigning identity to non-identity is to make non-identity (contradiction) into an object. Simply put. it assumes a contradictory object. And unless identity is assigned to the object itself, "non-identity" is required to make "identity" intelligible through the dialectical method. Therefore to make this type of "identity" intelligible it is necessary that contradiction inheres within the object, as the non-identical aspect of it. That's why I said Hegelian dialectics projects contradiction into the object.

I believe the context for the next section is set by the opening sentence, referencing non-contradiction: "This law is however not one of thinking, but real". That suggests to me, that contradiction is not within the particular objects which the subject approaches, but within the subject's approach, and this constitutes the difference, the separation between the two, object and concept. Dialects attempts reconciliation. The conclusion I draw is that the Hegelian approach, which forces the primacy of the subject, is mistaken, because it wrongly projects contradiction into the object, and finds its supposed reconciliation that way.

Well, I had to look that one up. I didn't know how to take it, but thank you. We'll see how the reading progresses, but the critical question seems to be what is the best approach toward a knowledge of the object. If, there is a natural separation between the concept and the object, and the effort to unite the two in some form of identity is a mistaken approach, because that identity is a mere illusion, then what are we left with? If we wanted to analyze the difference, how could we even start? I would say that each instance of failure of identity, is a demonstration of that difference.

Identity, centrally, is a failed mediation; and the non-identical, rather than a negation of identity, is the remainder of that failure. — Jamal

I believe Plato went through a very similar issue with his dialectics, i.e. the failure of identity as a mediation. This is why Aristotle made identity something other than a mediation, placing the identity of the object within the object itself (a thing is the same as itself). And that's the basis for Kant's separation. Notice that this is a relation of separation between object and subject rather than a relation of unity. It implicitly states that the identity which the subject assigns to the object can never be the same as the true identity within the object.

Hegel rejected Aristotle's law of identity, so post-Hegelian "identity" reverts back to this sort of mediation, which had already been proven by Plato, to be a failure. This is alluded to by Adorno when he speaks of the "Aristotelian critics of Hegel". The issue is, where the logic of contradiction fails, and Aristotle 'identified' this as "potential", the "matter" of a thing. He proposed violation of the law of excluded middle, to accommodate this category, where the logic of contradiction is inapplicable.

However, Adorno seizes on this form of "identity", what he calls "the appearance of identity", which is already a property of the subject rather than a property of the object, and he rejects it. It fails because the identity which the subject assigns to the object can never be "total", complete, or perfect. That leaves the part which cannot be apprehended by the human mind with its logic of contradiction, as unintelligible matter, or potential. For Adorno, it appears like the belief in the "totality" of this form of identity is what misleads us, in the primary sense. That totality of "unitary thinking", which assumes all (the totality of the object) can be represented as a unified system, is an illusion created by that sort of ideology.

The appearance [Schein] of identity dwells however in thinking
itself as a pure form from within. To think means to identify.
Conceptual schemata self-contentedly push aside what thinking wants
to comprehend. Its appearance [Schein] and its truth delimit
themselves. The former is not to be summarily removed, for example
by vouchsafing some existent-in-itself outside of the totality of thought
determinations. There is a moment in Kant, and this was mobilized
against him by Hegel, which secretly regards the in-itself beyond the
concept as something wholly indeterminable, as null and void. To the
consciousness of the phenomenal appearance [Scheinhaftigkeit] of the
conceptual totality there remains nothing left but to break through the
appearance [Schein] of total identity: in keeping with its own measure.
Since however this totality is formed according to logic, whose core is
constructed from the proposition of the excluded third, everything
which does not conform to such, everything qualitatively divergent
assumes the signature of the contradiction. The contradiction is the
non-identical under the aspect of identity; the primacy of the principle
of contradiction in dialectics measures what is heterogenous in unitary
thinking. By colliding against its own borders, it reaches beyond itself. — p15

I don't think "real" solves the problem. If our primary distinction is between concepts and objects, and we are talking about relations between concepts and objects, all three are "real", concepts, objects and their relations.

So my proposal was that since we understand such relations as concepts, the relations must be themselves concepts. You don't think Adorno would accept this, so he must have a third category, something which is neither concept nor object, but consists of the relations between these. Do you think that this is the case? Would we put "identity" in this category? Is the category itself "identity", or does "non-identity" fit into the category as well, as a relation which is not an identity relation?

This word for appearance, Schein, is the same as in appearance/essence, and it similarly suggests illusion. Here, the illusion is that thought has exhausted the object, that mind and world are united completely. But this is an illusion that arises from within, from the way we think: to think means to identify. — Jamal

Here's a good example of such a relationship, expressed here by the word "exhausted". But this relationship, which is a complete identity relation, is said to be an illusion. And this is why "real" might be misleading, to refer to these relations, because they may be true or they may be false.

In other words, we cannot (or ought not) deal with the mismatch between mind and world by appealing to a noumenal realm beyond concepts — Jamal

Here, the word is "mismatch", and this word is supposed to describe the reality of that false relationship which was an illusion. But "mismatch" described a supposed relation which may not even be a real relation. So it may turn out that what appears as an illusion of a relation, may in reality not even be a relation at all.

I think that this is what happens with "identity". Identity, as described by Adorno is a relation. But if we negate identity with non-identity, it may turn out that the thing which was thought of as a relation, because that's how it appeared to us, is not even a relation at all. I think we need to leave this open, as a possibility. When we critique the artificial unity it may be necessary to deny all relations, as potentially illusory.

The answer, I suppose, has to be that the claim that contradictions are inherent in the object is not a claim of metaphysical essence. Instead, it is a claim that contradiction is neither solely on the side of ontology nor just a subjective inadequacy, but is an objective feature of the relation between the two. There is more to be said here but I'll leave it for now. — Jamal

I find that this is a very confusing use of "objective". We have the subject on one side, and deficiencies in the approach of the subject are called "subjective". Also, we are discussing whether contradiction inheres within the object, and I would assume that such would be "objective". Now, you mention "an objective feature of the relation between the two". How can you classify a feature, which relies equally on the subject and the object, as "objective"?

I believe this is important, because when we seek to understand "relations", and this is key to understanding what Adorno calls identity thinking, we need to completely distance the relation from both sides of the related things, to understand the general principle of "relations". This becomes non-identity thinking. Then, from this perspective, I think that we find out that all relations which we talk about, are necessarily the products of subjects. And these relations are of two principal categories, those intended toward truth (correspondence), as representing supposed real relations, and those intended toward use (domination). All relations therefore, as understood, are subjective.

So don’t misinterpret me: the distinction is real. For example, beneath the ideology of employment—free contracts, the work ethic, meritocracy, etc.—there is exploitation. The former is the appearance that masks the latter essence. This is not imaginary, not mere highfalutin metaphysics, and this was Adorno’s original point. — Jamal

As far as I can tell that distinction is arbitrary. And from what I've read so far, Adorno treats it as such, regardless of whether or not he asserts that it is real. It is a tactic of philosophers, a ploy, to assert that something is real, "given", as a means of avoiding justification. This is "the postulate", which Adorno is very critical of, because acceptance of it makes one like a bleating sheep, and that stymies deep speculation. Read the beginning of the lecture very carefully, and you may come to agree with me, that Adorno is actually criticizing this postulate, that the distinction between essence and appearance is real. Consider that the claim to be "real", is what he refers to as "factuality".

I set aside here the consideration that one consequence of the postulate of
absolute certainty underlying the rejection of speculation – which is
itself the product of what we might call an inflated idealism, by which
I mean that we come to expect things of concepts that they cannot
possibly satisfy, namely absolute certainty – one effect of this postulate
is to muzzle thinking, thus preventing it from advancing beyond
the point warranted by supposedly certain facts. To the extent that
such concepts as certainty and factuality or immediate givens become
the object of philosophical reflection, they cannot be presented as
criteria for a priori thought. And it is the very ideas that are indigenous
in this realm, that is to say, the ideas that concern themselves
with the rightness or wrongness of such criteria which, looked at
naïvely from the standpoint of factuality or givenness, appear as
speculative. By uttering the word ‘appear’, I have arrived for the first
time in these lectures at a distinction that cannot be taken seriously
enough and that, if there is such a thing as a criterion of what is
philosophy and what isn’t, must certainly qualify as such. This is the
distinction between essence and appearance, a distinction that has
been sustained in almost every philosophy – with the exception of
positivist critique and certain invectives in Nietzsche – throughout
the entire philosophical tradition. I believe that it is one of the essential
motifs, I almost said one of the essential legitimating elements,
of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance
is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is
real. — p 99-100

Now, turn to the conclusion of the lecture, and see how it supports what I say about the opening:

Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them.
Thus the concept of depth always implies the distinction between
essence and appearance, today more than ever – and this explains
why I have linked my comments on depth to that distinction. That
concept of depth is undoubtedly connected to what I described to
you last time as the speculative element. I believe that without speculation
there is no such thing as depth. The fact that in its absence
philosophy really does degenerate into mere description may well
seem quite plausible to you. This speculative surplus that goes beyond
whatever is the case, beyond mere existence, is the element of freedom
in thought, and because it is, because it alone does stand for freedom,
because it represents the tiny quantum of freedom we possess, it also
represents the happiness of thought. It is the element of freedom
because it is the point at which the expressive need of the subject
breaks through the conventional and canalized ideas in which he
moves, and asserts himself. And this breakthrough of the limits set
on expression from within together with the smashing of the façade
of life in which one happens to find oneself – these two elements may
well be one and the same thing. What I am describing to you is philosophical
depth regarded subjectively – namely, not as the justification
or amelioration of suffering, but as the expression of suffering, some
thing which understands the necessity of suffering in the very act of
expression. — 107-108

That basic illusion, the so-called "façade of life", is the fundamental claim to facticity itself, supported by that principal postulate, of a real distinction between appearance and essence, which justifies factuality at its base. Smashing that façade is what provides to the subject, freedom of thought, happiness of thought, and depth of speculation, to go beyond those conventional limits which formulate "what is the case", facticity.

Then we'll have to carry on disagreeing. Adorno believes there are beliefs and ways of thinking that obscure underlying social relations, and uses appearance/essence to frame this. In other words, the distinction is real, meaning that it's not something merely dreamt up by metaphysicians. But we can think of this as a re-purposing of the distinction in a new, dialectical context (which probably goes for all of the binary distinctions he uses). — Jamal

Due to the inconsistency in what you have written here, I interpret what you are really saying is that the distinction is not something real, it is merely metaphysical speculation, and that's the reason why it can be re-purposed by Adorno, because it's not fixed in anything real. If it was something real, it would be fixed by that reality, and not re-purposable.

The best approach is to work out how LND and ItS can be consistent. Two comments of yours, one from your most recent post and the other from the previous one, stand out to me as possible obstacles along this path: — Jamal

Sometimes, it is good to look specifically at inconsistencies. This I think, is "critical" analysis, and that approach helps to reveal the evolving aspects of an author's thought. We can oppose this approach (perhaps as the negative approach) with the one which looks for consistency (the positive approach). I think that this is a very good way of reading Plato for example, but it requires much study. So Plato is commonly divided into 3 phases. My interpretation is that he works hard to elucidate Pythagorean idealism in the first stage. In the process he notices the interaction problem, so he proposes "the good", and also a medium between body and intellect (tripartite soul), as a remedy. Then by his late period he is firmly rejecting Pythagorean idealism. The defective interpretation produces "Platonism" as a rendition of Pythagorean idealism, and attempt, through misinterpretation, to make late Plato consistent with the early.

I admit, that when I look at an author like Aristotle, what I look for is consistency from one work to the next. The principles he sets out in one work, when well understood, are applicable toward understanding another work. The works sort of build on each other, and Aristotle clearly started with some principles which he would adhere to throughout..

But maybe this difference is the difference between a negative dialectic (Plato), which criticizes and deconstructs, and a positive system-building type of philosophy (Aristotle).

This is not how Adorno's logic goes. — Jamal

In that example, in LND, he explicitly brings up sociology as a means of exemplifying the essence/appearance distinction, and the claim that it is a real distinction rather than just an artificial division produced by metaphysical speculation. With the use of this type of example however, we must be very careful to judge how well the example actually portrays the purported principle. With Plato, for example, he'll provide a principle, then an example to portray it, and I am sure that the example is intentionally chosen to disprove the principle. Plato doesn't draw the conclusion though, that the principle has been disproven, but leaves the reader to make that conclusion. So, the dialogue will read as if the example provides proof of the principle, but careful reading reveals the exact opposite. This may be the case here in Adorno's LND.

Notice how the example really twists and turns, with the immediacy of subjective behaviour being an illusion, and society producing the illusion as a necessity, and this being ideology. But, ultimately the subject, through deep speculation can resist that supposed "necessary" illusion. So really, what Adorno has done with that example, is proved that the essence/appearance distinction is not real, because "deep" speculation can overturn it. So he proceeds through the rest of the lecture speaking about philosophical resistance, and deep speculation, which actually would be impossible if that essence/appearance distinction was real.

Specifically on society, it is better to think of society as the relation, the totality in which we can non-rigidly identify essence and appearance: social structures, modes and relations of production etc, on one side (essence); and beliefs on the other (appearance). If you force Adorno to say that society is essence and individuals are appearance, you are imposing your own framework, because Adorno says no such thing, and never would. — Jamal

I believe this passage indicates that you and I are now consistent in our interpretations. In the above, I accept that what Adorno is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of the claim that the essence/appearance distinction is real, it is actually a product of metaphysical speculation. This is consistent with your claim of non-rigid identity. Further, I indicated that "society" is a sort of gap filling concept, used to fill lapses in our understanding, so we can pass over them with that word, without requiring that we actually understand what the word refers to, allowing the supposed concept of "society" to be a shape shifting form, determined by context. This is consist also with your determination of non-rigid identity.

The key to making our interpretations consistent (and this I believe is more important than trying to make Adorno consistent), is the recognition that when he says that within the "entire philosophical tradition", "that the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real", and he appeals to sociology to demonstrate this, what he is really doing is demonstrating the falsity of this principle. Then when he says that human beings are becoming ideology, this is not necessary, or essential, it may just be appearance, and therefore can be reversed without the need for the abolition of human beings.

Is this consistent with your interpretation or does it suggest an amended one? I'm thinking of course of your attribution of "separation" to Adorno (and me), and your either/or framework. — Jamal

I would say that it is just a little but amended. And that is very easy to understand, because "society" is an extremely difficult and vague concept, generally shaped and adapted toward the purpose of the discussion, in general usage. That's much like all the connotations of "ideology" you listed. The concept "society" is similar to "God" in that way, it generally fills a gap in our understanding, so the concept at play, changes form depending on the context.

As for the separation, the subject/object distinction is significant, and I do not see how it can be anything other than a categorical distinction. If for example, there was a difference of degree between subjective and objective, such that if a subjective idea became well enough justified, it would become objective knowledge, this would allow both to be of the same category. However, I do not think that this is what we're talking about here with the distinction between moral human subjects, and the objective structures of society.

So the difference I see is that in the LND "society" has a place of priority over the human subject, whereas in this "Introduction to Sociology" there is more of a balanced and equal relation between the two. That society has a place of priority in LND is evident from the beginning of the exposé on p100. The relation between society and human subjects is brought up to exemplify that the distinction between essence and appearance is a real distinction, not just a distinction of metaphysical speculation. So here, that relation between society and human beings, must fit that mold, of a real distinction. We can of course maintain the possibility that Adorno's actual intention was to doubt, and criticize claims that the essence/appearance distinction is real, and something more than just speculative. However, he goes on in that exposé to explain "that subjective modes of behaviour in modern societies are dependent on objective social structures", and this implies that human behaviour is mediated rather than immediate. Then he goes on with "the nature of society"... "to produce the contents of the minds... to ensure that they are blind...". So he is describing society as something with this described nature.

In this passage, "Introduction to Sociology", "society" is given a slightly different concept. Instead of having priority over human individuals, "to produce...", "to ensure...", society is said to be a "relationship between individuals". I believe the description in LND is somewhat dismissed with "On the other hand, it should not be seen as a pure, over-arching concept existing for itself", and also with the dismissal of "something existing, rather like an organism, in itself ". Those phrases I feel are applicable to how society is described in LND, because it is described as a thing with a specific nature, but that is rejected here.

So in this passage, society is robbed of its thinghood (which it has in LND), and described as a type of relation. The two, individuals and society, are said to name opposing categories, but they aren't really opposing, though they are clearly distinct categories. Truly opposing terms are usually within the same category. And, I can see another problem which could develop. This way of describing "society" doesn't necessarily produce a whole. And if there is a whole, it needs another name. There is human beings, and there is relationships (society), but what is the whole in this model? Normally, we'd say that the whole itself, human beings and their relationships, is society, and this is why we think of society as an object. Now, Adorno says there is human beings, and there is their relationships (society), but we do not have a whole, what the unity of human beings and their relationships produces. The other description in LND is more conducive to a interpreting society as that whole, therefore a describable object with its "nature".

Any way the you approach it, understanding the concept "society" is not an easy task. And, I think it tends to be a shape shifting sort of thing, which takes it form from the context of usage.

I have to say that for Adorno theory and praxis are two completely different things. — Pussycat

I don't think so. In that lecture he explicitly said that he does not accept a clean separation between the two.

But suppose there were indeed such a principle that would claim universality as to what meaning is, then I guess that would be a perfect example of identity thinking, as it would not fully represent the whole spectrum of meaning. Additionally, it could easily turn out to be and become totalitarian and dominative, strangulating other voices that think otherwise. Correct? — Pussycat

Yes, I think that's the point. Such a principle of universality of "use" would necessarily be false, because actual use is inherently formed to match the uniqueness of the circumstances. So this would in a sense, misrepresent each particular instance of use, in order to fit it into the universal. That's representative of "identity thinking", which neglects aspects of the true identity of the individuals, in order to identify the individual conceptually.

Rather than ideology producing the beliefs, a better basic understanding is: ideology is the beliefs. — Jamal

OK, so this difference of interpretation is rooted in the different ways that you and I apprehend "society". You have claimed that society is an object, and Adorno seems to accept this premise as well, with "objective social structures". And so Adorno sees society as essence (objective), and individuals as appearance (subjective).

Now, I do not see this separation of category, and my basic intuitive inclination is the opposite to this. I see things exactly the way that Adorno is critical of. I see society as an extension of human individuals, so that society might be called "inter-subjective" but this does not support the unity required for "object". This is what I explained at the beginning of this adventure, I have difficulty conceiving society as an object.

So, I make the attempt, to conceive of this object, society, with objective social structures, in order to read and properly understand the author. Accordingly, you should recognize that I have no basic principles (biases or prejudices) by which I would draw a boundary to distinguish properties of the object, society, from properties of the subjects, the human beings. So when Adorno says that this distinction between appearance and essence is real, that's just a subjective statement to me, and I continue to believe that all such distinctions are metaphysical efficacies. However, I have to accept this principle to understand the author, therefore I am prepared to apply it within his material, to determine whether he actually adheres to his own stated principles.

With respect to "ideology" then, I believe Adorno very clearly describes it as property of the object, society. To me, the entire object (society) is fictional, imaginary to begin with, so I have no problem with proceeding from this principle, to assign whatever fictional properties are required to understand this supposed object. You however, seemed to be inclined by "the reality" of the situation, and you cannot separate "ideology" from the beliefs of individual human beings, because that's what you believe is real. For me, I have already accepted what I consider a fictional object, "society", so I have no problem doing what Adorno proposes, and accepting ideology as a property of this fictional object. The critical point, for me, is that whether or not Adorno actually believes in this separation between human subject, and society as an object, is not relevant. What is relevant is that this is what he is proposing, for whatever reasons.

For you, you already accept this separation between human subject and society as an object, so the truth or reality of this is irrelevant to you as well, you accept it as a premise. However, Adorno uses a term, "ideology", which is very ambiguous, having many connotations, which allow it to cross the boundary, and refer sometimes to a property of the minds of subjects, and sometimes to a property of the object, society. And, since you already accept this boundary, between human subject and societal object, you already have a preconceived idea as to which side of the boundary this term applies, the subjective. Therefore you need to pay special attention, read very closely, to determine how Adorno is using the term, because if he is using it in a way which makes it refer to a property of the other side of the boundary, societal object (and I submit that he is), then to read it in the other way is a sort of equivocation.

Therefore I beg you please, consider the following: "it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the minds of human beings" -100. He does not explicitly define this as ideology, but do you not agree with me, that that this "nature of society to produce the content of human minds" is precisely "ideology"?

Well, I explained it already. Here you are conflating speculation and metaphysical speculation. I agree that he is promoting depth and a kind of speculation, but when he says that the distinction between appearance and essence is not just a product of metaphysical speculation, he means to oppose the more common position in the twentieth century that the distinction is metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. Note that it doesn't follow from this that he is 100% on board with metaphysical speculation, since by this he is referring vaguely towards the targets of contemporary sceptics of the distinction, targets like German idealism and earlier kinds of metaphysics like Leibniz. In other words dogmatic metaphysics. But I've forgotten why we're arguing about this. — Jamal

This is problematic. Adorno's claim that the distinction between essence and appearance is real, can simply be dismissed as itself metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. So he does not make any progress here with those metaphysicians like myself, who already deny that distinction. However, he appeals to people like yourself, who already accept a real categorical division between societal object, and human subject. But if you are in this position, of accepting this distinction, then you need to carry through with a complete understanding of what he proposes, and that is resistance to the societal object (as resistance to ideology).

The following is indicative and very powerful:

Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them. — p 107

You can't get from the structural necessity of ideology, which is what "socially necessary illusion" refers to—you can't get from that to intentional deception without some additional premises. — Jamal

Aren't you just admitting here, that you actually believe that Adorno is using "ideology" to refer to a property of society? This statement clearly exposes the problem with the 'human subject/societal object' division. Once you put ideology into the 'societal object' category, as Adorno does, and you do here, then you separate it from intention, which is proper to the human subject. By doing this you separate it from moral value, leaving terms of moral reprehension like "intentional deception" as inapplicable.

Now, with that vague separation between moral human subject, and amoral societal object, immoral, blameworthy, intentional actions can be hidden as property of the amoral societal object. So you talk about "the structural necessity of ideology", but if this is a true objective necessity, distinct from human intention and moral value, how could a lowly human being, with subjective human values, ever obtain the authority to judge ideologies?

How the comparitively innocent "Yeah! Yeah!" has become intentional deception in your mind I really can't tell. — Jamal

Human actions are inherently intentional, and naivety, or claims of innocent 'going with the flow' (which leads to mob rule), do not absolve one from responsibility. If a human being rapes another, and "innocent" others are cheering, those "innocents" are actually complicit and not so innocent.

In neither case is there any intentional deception as far as I can see.

EDIT: Actually, there is a small space for intentional deception to get in there. I said the innocent bleaters "probably do not know it is false or illusory," which suggests that maybe sometimes some of them do. Certainly it's reasonable to believe that some of the cheerleaders know that the ideas they're cheering on are not quite true, that they prioritize the effectiveness of the ideas over their truth (this is obviously the case with a lot of deliberate propaganda, e.g., in times of war). But I don't think this is paradigmatic of ideology, and I think Adorno would say this makes it less ideological (in Minima Moralia I think he says fascism is less ideological than liberal capitalism). — Jamal

This is exactly the problem with the 'human subject/societal object' distinction, or 'division' I'd prefer to call it because it makes a categorical separation. The object, society, cannot have status of moral responsibility, because it cannot have intentionality, as explained above. The 'innocent onlookers' accept authority, having no status to judge principles of the society (ideologies), also alluded to above. The "bleating", Yeah! Yeah!, cannot be assigned the status of "unintentional", because then you allow that the individual acts of individual subjects are included into the amoral societal object. That would be analogous to saying that the democratic vote (the Yeah! Yeah!) is unintentional, whenever a voter didn't adequately understand the principles being voted for.

I have just a few last remarks before we leave this difference of interpretation, which may not be substantial anyway. It appears to me, like the difference is based in you attributing ideology to the subjective mind of the individual, and I attributing ideology to the objective social structure. The issue is "the facade". We agree that the facade is an aspect of appearance, beliefs in the minds of human subjects. Where we disagree is on the method required to break through the facade. I understand, that since ideology is an attribute of social structure, and ideology produces these beliefs, Adorno is promoting a resistance to the prevailing social structure, which may even be characterized as the abolition of human beings. You reject this, and seem to think that there is another way to break through this facade of human belief, but I do not understand what you are proposing.


Here's something from p 101 to consider:

This at any rate is what I understand by speculation:
it is hostility towards the ideological as an alternative to resigning
oneself simply to establishing facts, in very marked contrast to the
habits of a science based on such a statement of facts – while the
prevailing habit of thought is of course to conflate speculation and
ideology.

.

My interpretation is backed up indirectly by what he says on page 102: — Jamal

I don't see how 102 supports your interpretation. He says, that the attempt to deny the distinction between appearance and essence is the arch-ideology. And he says this right after he describes philosophy as resistance to ideology. So as much as the distinction between appearance and essence is commonly disputed, this is exactly the arch-ideology which deep philosophy must resist.

It doesn't follow that he's promoting metaphysical speculation in the sense he is using the term. — Jamal

How can you deny this? It is the conclusion of the lecture. He promotes "depth", and speculation is depth.

Thus the concept of depth always implies the distinction between
essence and appearance, today more than ever – and this explains
why I have linked my comments on depth to that distinction. That
concept of depth is undoubtedly connected to what I described to
you last time as the speculative element. I believe that without
speculation there is no such thing as depth.
— p 108

You describe it as intentional deception, but it's systemic, and is in fact also reciprocal. — Jamal

I think you misunderstand the meaning of "socially necessary illusion". This refers to an illusion which is needed by society. This necessity implies 'required for its ends'. Therefore it is intentional deception, just like a noble lie. It's an illusion which society needs, to fulfill its ends in its relation to its subjects.

I believe, that the reciprocation aspect is what actually makes it intentional. Ideology is produced from earlier speculation, but how it becomes ideology is questionable. There is either shallow acceptance in the form of innocent "bleating", or depth of further speculation, which is true resistance. The innocent "bleating" may be characterized as reciprocation, but it is described as a "self-aware form of bleating" therefore we can say it is intentional. And the more dangerous form of bleating, which he alludes to seems to be no less intentional. So I do not see how you escape "intentional deception".

The real problem is what I pointed to earlier. The supposed objective "society", or "social structures" is really a false objectivity. So the reality of ideology is based in this reciprocation. But reciprocation is actually nothing but human to human interactions, and when understood in this way, the supposed object, "society", is redundant. The object, society, is nothing but intersubjectivity.

Good morning Jamal, I see that you somewhat misunderstood what I wrote, so I'll clear up that aspect right away:

As for the abolition of human beings, here is Adorno:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense this [human beings becoming ideology] would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by saying in good American: that’s just too bad.

And here is you:

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is doing, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something).
— Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't claim that he supports the abolition, but rather supports the claim of abolition. — Jamal

Oh, I see, I wasn't clear, and you misunderstood me. What I intended (meant), is that the person who objects, is claiming that Adorno supports the abolition of human beings, not that Adorno is claiming himself to support such.

In a nutshell, first you reify what is meant to be dialectical and fail to see that both essence and appearance are mediated — Jamal

Then what meaning do you give to the following?

I believe that it is one of the essential motifs,
I almost said one of the essential legitimating elements,
of philosophy – that the distinction between essence and appearance
is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is
real. — p100

Is he saying that the essential motif of philosophy, which takes the distinction between essence and appearance as real, is a mistaken motif? Then why does he say, or "almost" say that it is an essential legitimating element of philosophy?

Ideology is in the realm of "subjective modes of behaviour" as that which is produced by the objective social structures (again with the caveat that this is too static a picture, a shorthand for a dialectical process). — Jamal

This is clearly backward. Ideology is a feature of objective social structures, which produces subjective behaviour.

On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary, that is to
say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the
minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure
that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and
determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat
them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness
of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure
ideology. — p100

Look, "the immediate consciousness of human beings" is an illusion, a form of deception which is "socially necessary". The means for this deception is ideology, and since it is said to be socially necessary, the goal or end inheres within society itself, as an entity. Therefore it is society which is using this means called "ideology". It is not the human beings who are deceiving themselves in self-deception, it is society which is deceiving them with ideology. As I've been saying, it's a form of Plato's "noble lie".

By "real" he means actually operative in the world. He does not mean to align it merely with essence. And he is saying that if you do philosophy you should believe that there is a distinction between appearance and essence, that it is not just an artifact of the conceptual or linguistic paraphernalia of metaphysical speculation as claimed in various ways by phenomenologists, logical positivists, pragmatists, and ordinary language philosophers. He is alluding to contemporaneous philosophies, explicitly going against the fashion of collapsing or rejecting the distinction. — Jamal

In that context, where he is distinguishing between essence and appearance, he does not at all say what you are saying here. I believe you are reading into it, extra baggage, for the sake of supporting your preconceived ideas, which support your faulty interpretation.

In this context of LND, he is using the distinction of subject/society, to apply to the distincton of mediated/immediate, to elucidate the appearance/essence distinction, as something real, not merely metaphysical speculation. So, the behaviour of individuals is said (as a primary assumption) to be dependent on objective structures of society. This validates '"structures of society" as operative in the world, real. Then he proceeds to assert (which I'll mention, is without proper justification, which "God" serves as in theology) that these structures of society are actually immediate, rather than the behaviour of individuals. The idea that the behaviour of individuals is immediate is claimed to be an illusion produced by those structures of society which are operative in the world, and this illusion is claimed to be "socially necessary". (As I explained in the last post, this social necessity is produced by the removal of God). Then he assigns the name of "ideology" to these structures of society process create that illusion.

Thus he embraces metaphysics more in a negative sense than intended by the term "metaphysical speculation". — Jamal

He simply points out a specific inverse relation involved with metaphysics. When a philosopher expresses disdain for metaphysics, that person is actually demonstrating the highest regard for metaphysics. This can manifest in many ways, even to the extent of the hypocrisy of Wittgenstein which I mentioned. So for Adorno, it appears like metaphysical speculation is this process, negative dialectics, within which metaphysics is criticized. It's a twist in the matter of "taking things seriously" (and this reflects back on "that's just too bad"). To simply praise something creates the illusion that you take it seriously, when in reality you are just going with the flow, and not taking any time to understand it. To criticize it requires that you actually take it seriously.

We could say, then, that an essential aspect of the concept of depth
is that the insistence on the idea of depth negates the average traditional manifestation of it. — p106

You are saying that Wittgenstein was a hypocrite? That the famous "meaning is use" is invalid, not because there isn't a correspondence between meaning and use, but because Wittgenstein's true intention was hidden behind this principle? — Pussycat

There is more to meaning than simple use. That is exemplified by ambiguity. The person who speaks, or writes, is the user of the words, and proper "use" is attributable to the author's purpose. The audience however must interpret, and this itself is an assignment of "meaning". This assignment of meaning s not a matter of "use". it is what Adorno would call a mediated act, whereby the immediate would be the social structures which trained the individual to interpret the way that one does.

What do irrational acts have to do with theory? — Pussycat

Theory is rational. It is through the means of theory that we avoid irrational acts.

As far as I understand, but of course I could be wrong, Adorno is saying that there are people whose thought system is deeply non-identical, like it is and feels natural for them, without much effort: these are the true artists. Adorno realizes that himself is no artist, for example he cannot write poetry or paint, however, he has a knack for theory. And so he wants to provide the theoretical framework. — Pussycat

I see no problem with this. And, think that it s likely that the non-identical here is the irrational.

I don't understand this interpretation of ideology as essence, since it undermines his whole point about breaking through the facade: — Jamal

It's actually a very subtle difference of interpretation, with significant consequences. First, consider all those different connotations of "ideology" which you provided. Think about things like " a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class". Now, do you consider ideology to be a feature of the individual human being's mind (subjective), or do you consider it to be a feature of a specific society (objective)? I think you will accept the latter.

Further, the following phrase is easy to pass over, but really needs to be seriously considered: "the distinction between essence and appearance is not simply the product of metaphysical speculation, but that it is real". That line sets the context, of the distinction between what is real (the true essence) as the social constructs, and what is appearance, as metaphysical speculation. Don't forget though, that what he is promoting, is metaphysical speculation. Not any speculation, but that which is "deep", as opposed to shallow. So he is promoting an aspect of appearance (metaphysical speculation), which extends right to the essence, by being deep. This would be the boundary, where our metaphysical speculations about where the boundary lies, do not always line up exactly with the real boundary. And so it is with ideology itself, it may not itself be properly representative. And that's where the facade comes in, where ideology misleads the subjects.

Then he exposes the common misunderstanding between the immediate and the mediate. This common misunderstanding places behaviour of the subjects as immediate. This is because we see ourselves as acting subjects, interacting with others, and the empirical experience of human subjects is prioritized. So this behaviour is perceived as immediate, and the structure of society is apprehended as something which develops from these subjective interactions, therefore the social structure is understood as mediated by the interactions of the subjects. That is the illusion. Adorno proposes that a proper understanding requires that we turn this around, and we see social structure as the immediate, and the interactions of the subjects as the mediated. This puts priority onto the social structure, making it the cause of subjective interactions.

In the traditional, classical hierarchy, the immediacy of the state is easier to understand, because God is placed at the top, higher than the state. Then the ruling class, clergy and aristocracy, with their ideologies, are immediate to God. So the subjects are mediated. The modern society removes God, but this leaves no principles to support the superiority of society, or the sate over the subjects, so priority must be handed to the individual. Marxism does this, it makes the purpose of the state to serve the needs of the individual. And it does this by removing God, so that the priority is no longer that the individual serves God through the state, in the state's immediacy with God. Without God, the relation between state and individual is reversed, because the state no longer has the claim of closeness to God, required to maintain its priority over the subjects, and so there is nothing left but to prioritize the individual.

Now, since human subjects act with intent, ideas and goals, and this intent guides their actions, we need to interpret "ideology", (which shapes these intentions), as the immediate, a property of the social structure, which shapes and forms the intentions of individual subjects, making their behaviour a representation (as appearance) of the underlying essence, which is the society itself, with its ideology. I suggest you read the following very carefully, and apprehend what he is actually saying. This is representative of Plato's "noble lie". Notice that society produces the illusion of "the immediate consciousness of the human being", and for reasons unexplained, this is said to be a necessity for society. That is ideology.

On the other hand, however, this appearance is also necessary,
that is to say, it lies in the nature of society to produce the contents of the
minds of human beings, just as it is the nature of society to ensure
that they are blind to the fact that they mistake what is mediated and
determined for actuality or the property of their freedom, and treat
them as absolutes. It follows that since the immediate consciousness
of human beings is a socially necessary illusion, it is in great measure
ideology. — p100

So all that is just a sort of preamble, a setting up of the context, or conditions for this idea, "the abolition of human beings". We have the following two important principles. Ideology has created the illusion of the immediacy of the human being, and philosophy resists ideology. Third, we can say that Adorno is promoting philosophy, and not just any philosophy, but deep philosophy. Now, we can approach his mention of "the abolition of human beings from that perspective. Please read the following passage thoroughly:

If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense
this would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by
saying in good American: that’s just too bad. By this I mean that this
abolition is being brought about not by the inhumanity of the idea
that describes it, but by the inhumanity of the conditions to which
this idea refers. And if you will permit me to make a personal remark,
it seems to me very questionable for people to take offence at
statements that go against their own beliefs, however justified and
legitimate these beliefs may be, simply because they find such statements
uncomfortable – instead of attempting to incorporate such statements
into their way of seeing things and where possible making use of
them to arrive at a correct form of practice. — p100-101

What this passage means, is that if anyone objects to what he is dong, claiming that he supports the abolition of human beings, then that's just too bad (Indicated by the qualification of "good American" as —used in an ironic way to show that one is not sorry or does not feel bad about something).

Then, he goes on with a "personal remark", about people who "take offence at statements that go against their own beliefs", simply because the statements make them "uncomfortable". He says it is "very questionable" that they take offense in this way, instead of attempting to include such statements into their own perspective, and try using such statements in their own practice.

Yes, and what he’s doing is claiming that, in a sense, human beings are being abolished. I don't see any support for the interpretation that he is promoting the abolition itself. It’s not “human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck,” but rather “I’m claiming that human beings are being abolished, and that's tough luck.” — Jamal

What he is saying is neither "human beings are being abolished", nor "I'm claiming that human beings are being abolished". He is proposing a deep speculative philosophy that resists the current ideology which prioritizes individual human beings, and that proposal is an approach to the necessary abolition of human beings. And if this makes you feel uncomfortable, well that's just too bad. You ought to instead, consider the truth of his principles, and work with them to be consistent with your principles, and make them conducive to your own practices. Consider for example, that if human beings are inherently evil, then the abolition of them is the rational choice.

It's not that subjectivity is just ideology, but that it's becoming ideology. He marks a contrast between the era in which the ideology of liberal humanism had something real, or emancipatory, about it; and the late twentieth century, in which it has been entirely hollowed out. My way of putting this was to say that ideology has become all-pervasive due to the total absorption of the masses into the system by means of bureaucracy, all-encompassing commodification, mass media and the culture industry. — Jamal

I agree with your interpretation, and the import of historicity, process, becoming, but Adorno leaves significant ambiguity for interpretations which are inconsistent with yours. Since he designates the structures of society as "essence", and the behaviour of individuals as "appearance", then we have to assign priority to ideology, as an essential aspect. This makes the actions of resistance, assigned to the philosopher, non essential, therefore not-necessary, and free in that sense. So freedom of the individual is derived from breaking out of, or resisting ideology, but this has necessitated a response from the ideology, which has turned this freedom into an ideology itself. The idea of the freedom of the subject, as an individual distinct from society, has evolved from being speculative philosophy to being an ideological therefore essential aspect of society.

Imagine that the speculative philosopher in the past, has dreamed up ways to resist, and be free from the oppression of ideology. Then these speculative theories are accepted by others, until what was once speculation becomes itself ideology. This is why he rejects such philosophy as shallow. It's not speculative anymore, as such subjects were when they were newly speculated, it's just mimicking the prevailing ideology now. It's old hat, and that philosophy is now a matter of following ideology, rather than resisting it, even though it might bare the name of being new and innovative, "deep", because it was given that name when it was such.

He is not lending support to the abolition of human beings (in the sense of human subjectivity), but to the claim that human beings are being abolished. He doesn't mean he thinks it's a good thing; he means that we should not not be afraid to point it out. — Jamal

I believe that the ambiguity mentioned above, could allow the interpretation that he is lending support to the abolition of human beings, and I think that is the proper interpretation, what is intended by the author.. I suspect that this is where he turns things around, in a lecture which is rather twisted. First, it is fact, by the objective essence of societal structure, that the individuality of the human being is supported by the ideology of that structure. This is what our society has come to. The philosopher's position is one of resistance to the prevailing ideology of society, resist the essence. If the ideology is one which prioritizes the human being, then to resist this, is to negate it with the abolition of the human being. So I interpret Adorno as actually promoting the abolition of human beings.

"If anyone objects that I am lending support to the claim that in a sense
this would mean the abolition of human beings, I can only reply by
saying in good American: that’s just too bad.'

Notice, "that's just too bad" in this context, means something like 'tough luck for you, that's what I'm doing, and you won't be stopping me'. And he explains, this idea of abolition is not itself inhumane, but it is the conditions which produce it which are. Then he makes those remarks about people who "find such statements uncomfortable". Philosophers ought not reject such ideas outright, but understand them, and "incorporate such statements into their way of seeing things and where possible making use of them to arrive at a correct form of practice."

So, the "abolition of human beings" is not metaphorical, it's a speculative principle, proposed as possibly something to be pursued in practice. And, it's an example of philosophy which is very deep. We'll find that this principle is well supported by both science and theology, so it makes a good candidate for secular theology. Science has shown us the reality of evolution, and we can tunderstand the reign of humanity as just a passing phase in the evolutionary process. Further, sciences such as genetic manipulation, and perhaps AI, may bring such an abolition into the range of practicality. And theology, with its principle of a being greater than the human being (God), has long emphasized human weakness, and the deficiencies of the human intellect. So the abolition of human beings, as a deep philosophy has much support.

Here's a sort of example. In ancient philosophy, the human species is referred to as "man". Aristotle defined "man" as rational animal. It wasn't until the Latin greats, Aquinas and the scholastics, that "man" was replaced by "human being". This is actually a significant difference marked by a better understanding of our position in the universe. Most people do not see this as significant, but in actuality "man", the rational animal, was sort of abolished as inappropriate for the newer beings who wanted to distance themselves from the old. This allowed them to escape the traps of established ideologies. After abolishing "man", and creating this new identity for themselves, "human being", they were able to revisit the old, "man", as superior to man, and reject foundational certainties (Wittgenstein's bedrock) which man believed, but were found after this rejection, to be false and misleading. A specific example is the nature of the solar system, and the cosmos in general.

It seems that M absent F is a no-thing, because were it a thing, it would have F. But if M a no-thing, a nothing, a not anything, and not just an aspect of F, then, not being, how can it be? It apparently has by itself no substance and no predicates. As such, any proposition of the form M is x is nonsense on its face. Yes? No? — tim wood

That's right, withot form, matter would be a no-thing, pure potential. As potential, it neither is nor is not. That's what we were discussing earlier, whether possibility, under the Aristotelian conception, violates the law of excluded middle. This I argue, is what makes it unintelligible.

F without M seems also nonsensical. The distinguishing characteristic of both M and F would then be particularity. They require a particular something in which to be. But if every-thing is simply an instantiation of M and F necessarily together, than what does "is" mean? Where does being come from; what is being? And if M and F exhaustive of the constituents of everything, being cannot be a part of any thing. That leaves being itself as a predicate, which as such is only in the mind of the one predicating - a product purely of that mind, an idea and apparently useful fiction. — tim wood

I don't see how any of this is irrelevant. But form without matter is not left as nonsensical, because form is demonstrated to be prior to matter as cause of a material thing being the thing which it is. Matter is not necessary for particularity, as the essence of a thing is its form. This is what allows for the immaterial forms of Christian metaphysics. That the particulars appear to us as composed of matter and form, does not necessitate that they are not caused by independent forms, prior to material being.

it seems that none of these concepts is problem-free. Which is to say they don't actually work. — tim wood

Having problems is not the same as not working. Human knowledge and understanding will likely never obtain the level of perfection. That implies that even though the things we do have problems, they still work for us. We live with problems. One issue which Aquinas took up. is that because the human intellect is united. and dependent on matter, its ability to understand forms will always be impaired.

Then he says something strange: human beings are becoming ideology, and in a sense this would mean the abolition of human beings. — Jamal

What he says is that subjective behaviour of human beings is just the appearance, while the objective social structure which in a sense is the cause of that behaviour, is the essence. So what we take as the immediate, subjective behaviour, is really the mediated. He turns around the common perspective. Then, he says that this perspective, which we commonly hold, of the immediacy of consciousness, is just appearance, and actually an illusion. Further, this illusion is "socially necessary", so it is ideology.

I would interpret this as similar to Plato's noble lie. The idea of the immediacy of consciousness, and priority of the subjective human existence, is set up by the social structures, as an ideology of deception, because it hides from the individual subject, the reality that the individual being is just an extension of the true essence, which is society.

So, when he says that human beings are ideology, I think he means that the idea of individuality, that we are distinct individual human beings with that sort of freedom, is ideology. So, human beings are ideology. Further, I think he says that this ideology needs to be abolished, because it is an "inhumanity".

He goes on to say, that speculation is the "anti-ideological element". It is hostility towards the ideological, and philosophy is "the power of resistance". He actually proposes this as the only true definition of philosophy. But this resistance must not be irrational, it must develop within a theoretical framework.

That is what brings him to "depth". This is a tricky concept because of the connotations, especially in German thinking, and we must heed them. He reviews a definition of depth as the "theodicy of suffering", which he says is itself shallow, and this itself is viewed as an ideology.

We could say, then, that an essential aspect of the concept of depth
is that the insistence on the idea of depth negates the average
traditional manifestation of it. And the idea of a radical secularization of
the theological meanings, in which something like the salvaging of
such meanings can alone be sought, comes in fact very close to such
a programme of depth. The dignity of a philosophy cannot be decided
by its result. Nor can it be decided by whether it results in something
affirmative or approving, or by whether it has a so-called meaning. — p106

His conclusion: "the mark of depth nowadays is resistance". This is not a shallow resistance of "bleating".

" Depth means to refuse resolutely to remain satisfied with the surface, and to insist on breaking through the façade."

...

" Resistance means refusing to allow the law
governing your own behaviour to be prescribed by the ostensible or
actual facts. In that sense resistance transcends the objects while
remaining closely in touch with them." - p107

"What I am describing to you is philosophical
depth regarded subjectively – namely, not as the justification
or amelioration of suffering, but as the expression of suffering,
something which understands the necessity of suffering in the
very act of expression. " - p 108

Let's start with this: is M itself material or immaterial? Maybe this way: is M a something or a no-thing? It seems clear it must be a something. — tim wood

Strictly speaking, matter is potential. What gives it actuality is form. Matter without form, as "prime matter" which Aristotle pondered, is a no-thing, because things have a definite form. In my understanding, Aristotle rejected prime matter as an impossibility, but this is still debated.

To say that it is in itself unintelligible can only mean that by itself M is not any particular something. — tim wood

Yes, that is what Aristotle says. What you call "by itself" is what would be prime matter. Prime matter was proposed by some ancients, as the fundamental stuff which makes up all reality. It could have any form, infinite possibility, and as such, it cannot itself have any form. It's infinite possibility, and that's what makes it unintelligible. He also provided an argument to demonstrate that it is physically impossible.

F, apparently, is the what-it-is of a particular something. Thus F alone would appear to be simply a descriptive general term for that which every particular F has and is. In other words, no actual particularity, no actual F. It seems reasonable to accommodate this in the abbreviation by changing F to PF. — tim wood

I don't quite follow this. But I understand the law of identity as assigning the form directly to the particular, as in the thing itself. That's what Wayfarer seems to disagree with, saying that A was not interested in particulars.

So far, then, all things known by their admixture of M and PF. And for so long as the urge to translate M and PF into stuff and shape/form, i.e., into modern scientific concepts, is resisted, good. And that is the great problem that swims just below the surface breaching and breaking through the surface, devouring Aristotelian sense.

It is the scientific method against Aristotle's dialectic. In Kantian terms, Aristotle could do no better than to make the world conform to sense, sense being the final arbiter, while modern science tries to make sense conform to the world, the world being final arbiter. And that leaves Aristotle as an historical figure, his ideas enduring either as historical curios or vestigially. — tim wood

I don't follow this at all.

It is not the case that I see a tree and a moment later I see the same tree, but rather I see a tree persisting through time. — RussellA

That is what I dispute. We can only see at the moment of the present, so that there is something there which persists through time, a tree in your example, is a conclusion drawn with the aid of memory.

But I only exist at one moment in time, meaning that I can only be conscious of my present, my "now". — RussellA

That's not true, because we have memory. So we are conscious of the past. Also, we anticipate the future, so we are conscious of the future too.

All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing.

I would question the truth of this proposition. What is perceived is change, not persistence, and the supposed "persistent thing" which is required for time-determination, could very well be something within the perceiver. The "thing outside me" represents the persistence which is supposed to be perceived. But it may be the case that this persistence is only within me, and projected onto the outside, creating the illusion of a thing outside me.

What to do about it is certainly different, Adorno is active, whereas (early) Wittgenstein is passive. — Pussycat

There's a type of activity, which is sort of passive, what Wittgenstein called idling. Wittgenstein criticized this, but he was wont to demonstrate in his use of words, what he criticized with the meaning of his words, in a sort of hypocritical way.

Now, as much as Adorno calls thinking and theorizing an activity, simply thinking is really not doing anything. So Adorno seems to request a balance between the Marxist's call for action, and the logical requirement of theory. To avoid irrational acts we must make rationality into an act itself, so that it can qualify as virtuous.

I don't really understand what you are asking but I'll try to answer your questions to the best of my ability.

That leaves the question, what is form - assuming the question is meaningful. — tim wood

Form is, as I said, what the thing is. And, since all things have a whatness unique to themselves, it is what individuates one thing from another. It doesn't make much sense to ask what is form because that's like asking what is the form of form. You could ask such a question, but since each form is different from every other form, there cannot be an answer because that would require that all forms are in some way the same. But form is a principle of distinction, not a principle of sameness, while matter is what all material things have in common, so it is the principle of sameness.

As all that is subject to sensation refers back to matter, form cannot be a matter of sensation. Not hard, soft, rough, smooth, hot, cold, etc. But form must be perceived. — tim wood

Form is what is perceived, we perceive differences. Matter is not perceived. We do not perceive sameness, we infer it through reference to memory, 'things have stayed the same', 'the same things are here that were here yesterday', etc.. However, what I was explaining to Wayfarer, is that we do not perceive the entirety of a thing's form, the complete form in its perfections which are proper to it being the thing which its, we perceive an abstracted form. This is why Aristotle has two distinct senses of "form" corresponding with primary and secondary substance. Form is "actual" and Aristotle outlines two very distinct senses of that word.

That leaves a question as to what is in or about matter that lends itself to discrimination due to form. And it would seem to me that whatever it is would lie in the matter itself. — tim wood

Matter is strictly potential, specifically the potential for change. Being the potential for change, it does not itself actually change. Think of concepts like inertia, and the conservation laws of mass and energy. The potential for change does not itself change. In reality, "matter" is purely conceptual, but I believe it refers to something real, something we do not understand, but we know it as temporal continuity. So I think, the fact that many things here in my room today, are the same things which were here yesterday, despite the numerous changes which have occurred in the meantime, is due to their matter. The matter being the potential for change, which does not actually change.

Thus a warm furry kitten is not a red brick, and this difference due to the differences in their matter. — tim wood

Clearly the difference between a kitten and a brick is a difference of form.

. To read Aristotle as if he were simply asserting the self-contained identity of particulars is to read him through a modern lens that doesn’t fit

...

Aristotle's position is that form is what makes an individual intelligible as a member of a kind. — Wayfarer

This is simply wrong, and not at all representative of what is actually found in Aristotle's Metaphysics. I've provided much evidence for you, in our past discussions on this matter, but you seem to have a strong bias which inclines you to ignore the evidence. It's well known that Aristotle's hylomorphism provides an approach to the substance of individuals, and the form of the individual is responsible for what it is, not just its type, but "what it is" in a complete sense. It would be a significant inconsistency, making Aristotle's metaphysics unintelligible, if form was responsible for the type, and matter was responsible for individual features. Notice that the suggested "prime matter" could have no features whatsoever, and would be absolutely unintelligible. This implies that all features of an individual, including those unique to the individual, which make a thing the particular thing which it is, must be formal.

What individuates one member of a species from another is matter, not form - matter is what individuates them. To suggest that each individual has a form unique to itself closer to nominalism. — Wayfarer

This statement demonstrates a misunderstanding of "matter". Matter itself cannot have any individuating features. That's what makes it fundamentally unintelligible. The separation between matter and form is what provides the distinction between what is in principle intelligible, and what is not intelligible. The fact that some features of an individual are not intelligible to the human intellect does not render them unintelligible in an absolute sense, because a higher intellect might grasp them. Therefore all the features of individuation, which make an individual what it is, whether its genus, species, variety, or the unique features of the particular, must be formal. To maintain consistency, all individuating features must be formal.