Here's a passage from your link distinguishing internal teleology from external:

Aquinas does however think that the intelligibility of teleology internal to agents intending and acting for an end requires an explanation involving an intelligent agent, but a very different kind of intelligent agent than the kind that imposes external teleology on otherwise inert things. The external agents of this world can only impose external teleology upon other beings within the world because they presuppose the existence of those other beings, presuppose what they are and seek to modify them by imposing external teleology upon them. External agents imposing external teleology upon objects presuppose the already existing natures of what they act upon, and that those objects they act upon will respond actively or passively according to their own natures. An electron will respond differently to an artificially produced magnetic field than will a neutron, because of the natural difference between an electron and a neutron. A lion will respond differently to being pulled on by a human being than will a dandelion, because of the natural difference between a lion and a dandelion.

So even when an external agent imposes external teleology upon some object, it presupposes some internal principle of active or passive response. However, the intelligence that is responsible for the internal teleology of natural causes cannot presuppose their existence, because in giving to some being its internal principle of teleological movement, it is giving to that object its nature. Even as an external agent responsible for the internal teleology of the object, it does not presuppose the nature of the object by which it could passively or actively respond. On the contrary, it gives to the object its nature by which it passively or actively responds to other external but natural agents.

However, a being cannot exist without some presupposed nature by which it actively or passively responds to its environment. So, this intelligent external agent in causing beings to have internal teleology gives to those beings their existence. And he presupposes nothing about them at all, since without him, they are strictly speaking, nothing at all. If you think there can be beings without presupposed natures, describe one for me in a way that does not tacitly appeal to an intelligible account of what they are.

I believe that when we consider the way that internal teleology is 'given' to beings, it is necessary to conclude that this is a bottom-up process of creation rather than top-down. Top-down suffices to describe external teleology, but internal teleology, by which teleology is internal to each member, or part, of the whole, is necessarily bottom-up. According to the passage, what is given, is no specific nature whatsoever, but simply the will, or teleology to produce one's own nature. This would be a bottom-up process.

Once again, it is clear that we do not have enough common ground for a fruitful discussion. — Dfpolis

This is not true at all. We've had many discussions in the past, and it is very clear that we have significant common ground. However, when specific points of difference become apparent, it appears like you choose to ignore my criticisms. You seem to be intent on throwing away all that common ground, along with any insight into specific problems which I may be offering. And for what?

The second principle of thermodynamics tells us that entropy increases in a closed system. The first principle of thermodynamics states that the total energy is conserved. No physicist I know of have ever made the claim you make here, i.e. that the increase of entropy entails a violation of the law of conservation of energy. So, in my view, you are in the position to give a justification of what you are saying here. Unless you prove your claim (you can also link to a scientific paper if you want), it is reasonable to think that you are wrong here. — boundless

I don't understand why this feature of the concept of "energy" is so difficult for so many people to grasp. It's actually quite simple and straight forward, yet the minds of individuals are inclined to simply reject it out of principle. So, let me explain, and you tell me where you have a problem to understand.

First, consider the condition "closed system". There is no such thing as a system which is absolutely closed. Second, experimental evidence has indicated over and over again, that the complete amount of energy is never conserved in any active system. That's why there is no perpetual motion system. So, the tendency was always to write off the lost energy, as lost to the system due to incomplete closure. Classically these were losses like heat loss due to friction, and other losses which could not be properly accounted for. No system could even approach an efficiency of a hundred percent, and the classical explanation was that this is because of absolute closure being physically impossible.

However, there are still some people who like to hypothesize an idealistic, absolutely closed system. We can theorize, that fi a system was absolutely closed, energy would be conserved within that system. But evidence indicates that even if such a system could be constructed, energy would likely still be lost to that system, and this loss was called entropy. This probable (probable because an absolutely closed system cannot be produced to test it) loss of energy, to the idealistic, absolutely closed system, (which would be a violation of the conservation law) is understood as a feature of the passing of time, and this is why we know time as asymmetrical.

Please indicate which parts you have difficulty understanding.

There is a translator's note in the pdf, if you would like to read it. — Pussycat

I read the translator's notes, and they say nothing about what you are claiming. There is no mention of "style", and I do not see the issue with style which you are talking about. I can read Plato's dialogues, translated from ancient Greek, which is far more distant to English than German is, and with a decent translation, the style comes through quite well. Some of the meaning is lost though, often because of ambiguity. This is what is referred to in the translator's notes, when he describes how he translates specific words.

Overall though, the aesthetic comes through, and this is what the translator means when he says:

Strange as it sounds, good translations are actually rather like the false
color images of distant planets relayed by spacecraft: Neptune and
Pluto wouldn’t actually look like that to the naked eyes of an astronaut
cruising the dim outer reaches of the solar system in person, but the
reprocessed and rescaled image does justice to the reality, by making
the inexperienceable nevertheless experienceable after all.

Remastering, if it is done well, enhances the experience, it does not degrade it. So the difference between a good translation and a bad one, is the difference between enhancing and degrading the experience. This might be closely linked to how the style is presented by the translator, but there is nothing to indicate that a good translator cannot enhance the style. It takes knowledge of both languages, effort, and skill.

But tell me, do you think that languages are historically conditioned? — Pussycat

I really don't know what you are asking here.

This poses an additional challenge, as english readers can't be helped by language, the dialectic is neither immanent nor immediate in it. — Pussycat

I don't see how you draw this conclusion. You've pointed out differences between English and German, but you haven't indicated why you think one is more conducive to negative dialectics, or dialectics in general, than the other. You simply assert that German is "a highly dialectical language", without explaining why.

It appears like you base this on flexibility. But flexibility is multi-faceted, and your AI report focuses only on flexibility of form. Your AI was baited because you limited it to "grammatical structure" with complete disregard for semantics. Most of that report doesn't even make sense. "Suspense" it says "is useful for complex or abstract reasoning". How does that make any sense? It just speaks nonsense and appears to support the conclusion you wanted it to.

It is clear that you do not understand physics. So, you should not use it as the basis for your theories. — Dfpolis

Such blatant refusals to discuss the topic, only indicate that you know that you are wrong so you will not approach the issue. Why twist the facts of physics to support your metaphysics? If the facts don't fit, then you need to change the metaphysics or else dispute the facts.

If you cannot understand the difference between a wine barrel having a purpose and a wine barrel thinking, further explanation will not help. — Dfpolis

We were not talking about "thinking". We were talking about having "intention". Can you not distinguish between these two?

I believe that thinking is an intentional activity, it is intentionally caused. Therefore intention is prior to thinking, as thinking is caused by intention, so thinking is not a necessary aspect of having intention. Do you not agree with this? Or, are you claiming that intention comes from thinking, is caused by thinking, so that all intention involves thinking? If you are proposing the latter, how would you justify this?

Very interesting post, MU, I like it. I think your interpretative scheme of death/religion, profound/profane, sacrosanct/blasphemy, is inventive and enlightening. I think it's a good model, or instance, of what Adorno is referring to—or else a metaphor (or both). I don't think it reveals his central referent, as you seem to be suggesting, but it's a good way of thinking about it anyway. I particularly like the idea of the critique of ideology as profanity. — Jamal

I think the metaphor works pretty good, even to take it so far as to the expressions of suffering. The use of profanity in language is very often a response to mistake, pain, or wrongdoing, sometimes like a reflexive response to pain. Yet swearing is also a way of rejecting profundity, and not long ago swearing was unacceptable in most social settings. Its expression was a rejection of that taboo. Now, swearing is becoming more and more pervasive, and corresponding with this comes the idea that ideology is bad. We act out the taboo, to swear, and this is a symbolic rejection of the ideology which says don't swear. It's an expression of freedom. But it goes much deeper than a simple rejection, or expression of freedom, because it is derived from those who are being hurt by the ideology, and it is a reflexive response to that pain.

But it's not just that facts are not enough; it's that knowledge in the form of facts is already ideological, is value-laden without knowing it (or without saying so). To uncover the truth then is not just to add more, or different kinds of, information, e.g., including formerly marginalized voices, but to critique the facts themselves to reaveal the truth negatively. You can see this better with a fact like, workers are free in capitalist society because in taking jobs they voluntarily sign contracts. This fact can be criticized to reveal that the company and the worker are not equal parties except in a narrow legal sense, and that the choice between the burdensome job and destitution is no choice at all. — Jamal

I take this attitude toward facts as applicable to all fields of knowledge. At the base of all forms of knowledge, lies the given, the posited. You might call these the brute facts. Wittgenstein posits hinge, or bedrock propositions, and suggests that it would be irrational to doubt them. Adorno actually recommends that we criticize through negative dialectics, these basic facts, the supposed elements of certainty, which constitute the foundation of ideology. So from the positivist perspective, Adorno is irrational.

I take for example, Newton's first law of motion, a basic fact which underlies much of modern physics. You would think that this is just a pragmatic principle which is highly useful toward understanding motion, so this "fact" would be irrelevant toward any suffering caused by ideology. But that is just the tip of the iceberg. In reality, Newton's first law of motion is the basic premise of determinism, which is pervasive, as a backdrop, to materialist philosophy.

Now, I believe that determinist ideology is very harmful and causal toward suffering, because it propagates fatalism and thoughts of helplessness. This, I believe, is how Adorno shows that despite his rejection of idealism, he is in touch with true spirituality. Look at how he talks about finding freedom through resistance to the given facts, and transcending them. Then consider how we describe objects through determinist facts. When this (determinist) objectivity weighs on the subject through the medium of ideology, the expressions of the subject are those of suffering (profanity by the metaphor above). The expressions are symbolic of the desire for freedom.

The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow
itself to be governed by the given facts, transcends them even in the
closest contact with objects and in the renunciation of sacrosanct
transcendence. What in thought goes beyond that to which it is bound
in its resistance is its freedom. It follows the expressive urge of the
subject. The need to give voice to suffering is the condition of all truth.
For suffering is the objectivity which weighs on the subject; what it
experiences as most subjective, its expression, is objectively mediated.

This school of thought enlarges the meaning of intent (or value or purpose) beyond that which only conscious subjects are able to entertain. — Wayfarer

I think it is better, perhaps, to use terms like "agency" rather than "intent". The latter generally gets restricted to consciousness. The former may introduce ambiguity, because inanimate agency, as efficient causation, is acceptable language. But when we use "agency" we enable understanding of Aristotle's powers of the soul, the potentia. These are things such as self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection. In our understanding of these 'powers', it is common to attribute them to the material aspect of the being, the concept of matter being used to account for that potential.

Rejection of dualist metaphysics leaves the agency involved with the powers of the soul, as efficient causation. However, under Aristotelian principles, the soul is required as the form, the actuality which actualizes the various powers. What is important in Aristotelian biology is the idea that the powers are not constantly in action, sensation takes a break in sleeping for example. This is why the powers are classed as potentials, requiring actualization from the soul itself. We can consider actualization as a form of selection, even choice, at some fundamental level, because something must select which potentials to actualize. Scientism and physicalism will reduce this selection process to efficient causation, and represent it as a sort of reflex action, the organism responds to the activities of its environment in the way of efficient causation. But clearly this cannot adequately account for the way that the organism selects from possibilities in response.

Aquinas made an extensive inquiry and investigation into the nature of "habit". That term as used by Aristotle refers to properties of an organism and the Latin reflects this as what the being "has". What the being has, is a propensity to act in a particular way, and this is a habit. Aquinas inquired as to where the habit is properly located, where does it reside. And, if my memory serves me properly he eventually saw the need to attribute habits to the potential for action, rather than to the action itself. This is a difficult concept, because properties are generally aspects of the form, which is the actuality. So here we are attributing an act, or the inclination to act in a particular way, to the potential itself. This readily translate to the idea that matter itself has a propensity to act in specific ways.

Well, what isn't conserved is usable energy, not total energy. — boundless

If it can be detected, it is usable. If you are proposing a type of energy which cannot be detected, then that's not really energy, is it? Energy, by definition is the capacity to do work. The idea that there is such a thing as energy which is not usable energy is just contradiction.

Deterministic genetic variation and mutation produce variant offspring that are selected by processes guided by the same laws of nature. — Dfpolis

"Selected" implies choice. Do you think that processes governed by deterministic laws are capable of making choices?

Yes, its original purpose will be reflected in its form. That is not the same as the object, itself, having an intention = being a source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

I think you\ll need to explain this proposed difference to me Df. How would you characterize the difference between intentionality in the sense of an object having a purpose, with this purpose being reflected in its form, and an object being a source of intentionality?

To me, any human being, which you might say is a source of intentionality, was actually given that intentionality by its parents, and this is just another case of purpose being reflected in the form. See, your proposed classification "being a source of intentionality" requires that you show that intentionality can actually begin within a thing, as the source of that intentionality. But intentionality is hereditary.

Please! I told you what entropy means. You can accept what I say, or not. But, if it means what I say, it does not mean that the system is subject to indeterminacy. I suggest you read a bit more about entropy. — Dfpolis

You said;
"Entropy measures the number of microscopic states (we do not know) that can produce a macroscopic state we may know."

Clearly, if entropy means that the system "can produce a macroscopic state we may know", and "entropy" refers to the measure of possible corresponding microstates, then indeterminacy is implied. The very nature of possibility is indeterminacy. It is not the case that the physicists believe that the actual corresponding microstate could be known. If that were the case, it would not be called "entropy" because the information would be available to them. Why do you deny the obvious? You are trying to shape the meaning of "entropy" for your own purpose. Indeterminacy is fundamental to the current understanding of physical systems. And "uncertainty" is understood as an aspect of the system which may be measured as entropy.

Of course such systems reflect the intentionality of their makers. Still, there is no reason to think they have an intrinsic source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

Don't you think that it is correct to say that the intentionality is intrinsic to the system? If something is made for a specific purpose, isn't that purpose intrinsic to the thing? I mean, I see how you would separate the cause from the effect, in the case of efficient causation, but in the case of final cause, wouldn't you say that the purpose of an intentionally designed thing inheres within the thing itself, as a defining feature. If something is not used according to its purpose, it is not the thing which it was meant to be.

Take language for example. If we do not assume that the meaning intended by the author, inheres within the written material, then we are free to interpret it in any arbitrary way. However, interpretation must stay true to the author's intent, therefore we must assume that the meaning, the purpose inheres within the words as expressed.

Entropy measures the number of microscopic states (we do not know) that can produce a macroscopic state we may know. As such it reflects human ignorance, not physical indeterminacy. — Dfpolis

That's pure sophistry. If the states are not known, then clearly you cannot assert with any justification that it is "not physical indeterminacy".

But if they were known, then it could not be called "entropy". Therefore it is impossible that they could be known, or else we could not call it "entropy". Since it is impossible to be known, it is necessarily physical indeterminacy.

Interesting. Could you give me a reference, please? — boundless

Look into Plato's "tripartite soul".

Conservation laws have been repeteadly confirmed in experiments — boundless

Actually, every experiment done demonstrates that energy is not conserved. The loss is known as entropy. This is why we cannot have one hundred percent efficiency, or a perpetual motion machine, So contrary to what you say, conservation laws have been disproved repeatedly in experiments.

Finally you might be getting it. — apokrisis

I get it. But as I've told you before, I find it irrational. I find denial of the principle of sufficient reason irrational. I think that anytime we stop trying to understand something, by assuming that it simply cannot be understood, that is irrational. Therefore we must assume that anything, and everything, can be understood. The principle of sufficient reason applies, or else when we find something difficult to understand we will conclude that it is one of those things which cannot be understood, and we will give up on trying. And that is irrational behaviour.

Cause is about the constraint of fluctuation. The world seems organised and intentional because in the end, not everything can just freely happen. Order emerges to constrain chaos. — apokrisis

OK, but don't you think that there is a reason why "not everything can just freely happen"? I mean, if specific constraints apply, then shouldn't we assume that there is a reason why those constraints apply, and not others? So when "order emerges", wouldn't you think that there is a reason why it is this order instead of another order. That is the fundamental metaphysical question of being qua being, as laid out by Aristotle, why is there what there is, instead of something different.

To say that things just emerged that way, for the sake of constraining chaos, "order emerges to constrain chaos", doesn't answer the question. In fact, it's extremely ambiguous. On the one hand "emerges" seems to imply that things evolve this way by mere chance, but "to constrain chaos" implies that there is purpose behind this evolution from the very outset. But even if this is proposed as the purpose behind the evolution, from the very beginning, it is nothing but what you apprehend as the purpose, and that may be completely different from the real purpose.

Notice that if we assign purpose as behind it, we must assume a real purpose, that of the causal agency. This is what happens with the common theory of evolution. We assign the purpose of "survival". But this is just what we apprehend as the purpose, within our theory. But if we assign purpose, in this way, then we need to assume real purpose of a agency behind evolution, and our theory of "survival" may not correctly represent the real purpose.

As quantum field theory says, Nature is ruled by the principle of least action. All paths are possible, but almost all the paths then have the effect of cancelling each other out. That Darwinian competition selects for whatever path is the most optimal in thermal dissipative terms. — apokrisis

This is an example of a theoretical purpose. it's just what the theory presents as "the purpose". But unless we know the agency which acts as causation, and know its reasons for acting that way, we cannot in any way claim that this is the real purpose.

And this is a fact proved to many decimal places. Quantum calculations of physical properties like the magnetic moment of an electron take into account all the more attenuated background probabilities that faintly contribute to the final measured outcome. The tower of cancellations that results in the final sum over histories. — apokrisis

Probabilities prove the accuracy of the statistics, they don't even approach the purpose for the action. So it is false to claim that QFT proves that nature is ruled by the principle of least action. A very small portion of nature, observation of which produces those statistics, supports that principle.

So the basic symmetries of Nature – the Noether symmetries that create the conservation laws – act like boundaries on freedoms. Spacetime is a container that expresses Poincare symmetry. It says only certain kinds of local zero-point fluctuations are possible. All others are prevented. — apokrisis

Now you are blatantly contradicting yourself. Above, you were saying that global constraints are emergent, they emerge to constrain chaos. But here you are positing foundational constraints, fundamental constraints on freedom which are not emergent but prior to, or coexistent with, basic freedom. Where do these constraints come from? If constraints are by nature emergent, then how can there be foundational constraints?

I'm not disputing agency. I'm defining it properly in terms of naturalistic metaphysics. — apokrisis

I would correct this to adequately represent what you say, as 'you are not disputing agency, but describing it in a contradictory, irrational way'.

The maxim is: "If it can happen, it must happen". If something is not forbidden, it will occur. — apokrisis

This, the principle of plenitude, requires the physical reality of infinity, infinite time, for its validity. And acceptance of the physical reality of this principle produces all sorts of absurdities, like the infinite monkey theorem.

Apokrisis’s explanation is effectively that the movement and life force we observe is like water flowing downhill. It doesn’t need an animating force, it naturally flows to the lowest point. The whole biosphere is just another cascade of entropy and once there is no gradient left, the world will return to stillness and we will be just ghosts. — Punshhh

That's a good way of putting it. Life thrives in the eddies of negentropy. It appears like the activities of life are contrary to the overall flow of entropy, but in reality by apokrisis' philosophy, we must accept that these eddies are just a part of that flow.

But I wondered in what way the ideology from which the postulate has been snatched away by our bold consciousnesses was supposed to appear as profound. — Jamal

I believe we must pay attention to what Adorno says about profundity in philosophy, in the preceding paragraph. Profundity is related to death and religion. And profundity appears to be the facade which the speculative moment must break through. This relates to what he says about "the renunciation of sacrosanct transcendence".

What is silenced and swept under the rug is a
theological terminus ad quem [Latin: end-point], as if its result, the
confirmation of transcendence, would decide the dignity of thought, or
else the mere being-for-itself, similarly for the immersion into
interiority; as if the withdrawal from the world were unproblematically
as one with the consciousness of the grounds of the world. By contrast,
resistance to fantasms of profundity, which throughout the history of
the Spirit were always well-disposed to the existing state of affairs,
which they found too dull, would be its true measure.

I believe he is saying that resistance to fantasms of profundity is the true measure of the Spirit. There is a deep issue with the "sacrosanct", which is well represented with the word "blasphemy". This is the difference between the profound and the profane. What he appears to be saying in the final paragraph is that the true measure of Spirit, true transcendence, is found in the renunciation of the profound, i.e. it\s found in profanity. And, in this rejection of that ideology, what is taken as profound, whereby the Spirit breaks those boundaries, is the Spirit's expression of freedom.

This brings us squarely to the issue of suffering. And, I must admit that I do not really know how Adorno relates these two. So I will speculate. I suppose that this resistance to ideology, this renunciation of the sacrosanct, is itself an expression of suffering, as if that profound, or sacrosanct ideology is oppressive. This is similar to what Plato says in "The Republic" about the relation between the philosopher and the ruler, a relation known as 'the philosopher king'. The philosopher knows that the job of ruling is the worst possible job, and in no wants to do that job. So the philosopher will not move to take that position until the suffering of having to live under the punishment of the prevailing rulers is worse than the pain of having to rule. It is the suffering caused by poor leadership which brings out the good leader.

So to relate this to what Adorno says about "the need to give voice to suffering". Ideology gains its power of authority through the appearance of profundity. But the ideology may itself be a medium of oppression, by which objectivity weighs on the subject as suffering. The facade of profundity is what needs to be broken, through the speculative moment. This is the expression of suffering, profanity.

Things stay the same when further change ceases to make a difference. Once things hit the bottom, they can't fall any further. — apokrisis

Doesn't that require a judgement of whether the change makes a difference or not? Anyway, it appears like you believe that change is not caused, it just happens.

I hold that purely physical systems evolve deterministically, because they have no intrinsic source of intentionality. — Dfpolis

Well, the question would be whether a purely physical system, in any absolute sense, is actually possible. As scientists, human beings can design what they like to think of, as purely physical systems. This is what I talked about earlier in the thread, we can have as our purpose, the intent to remove purpose, and this provides us with the closest thing we can get to objective truth. But the purpose of removing purpose can't quite remove purpose in an absolute way.

So, we have to consider the reality of every aspect of a "physical system", to see how successful we can really be. I believe that the reality of entropy demonstrates that no physical system actually evolves in a completely deterministic way. That aspect of the activity of a physical system, which escapes determinability is known as "entropy". Therefore "purely physical systems" refers to an impossibility, if that implies completely deterministic evolution..

Well, it seemed to me that you said that scientific theories are good for explaining the past but you also denied that there is a time 'before' the arising of life. — boundless

I didn't actually deny that. I said it was an unsound conclusion. I do not accept it, nor do I deny it. I just think that it is an assumption which has not been adequately justified to be able to make that judgement.

Interesting. Why? — boundless

Look at the passage. It says "the participation of the blessed in the communion with God will forever increase". The only thing which provides for the premise of "forever" is death. After death, we may be united with God, forever.

For instance, how can we explain the mind-body interactions if the mind and body are different substances? Would such an interaction 'respect', say, the conservation laws that seem to always hold? — boundless

The interaction problem was long ago solved by Plato who proposed a third aspect as a medium of interaction.

Conservation laws do not hold, to the contrary, they are always violated. This is the nature of entropy, that part of reality which is in violation of conservation. It's a loss which we just write off, and work around.

The conservation laws are ideals which do not actually represent physical reality, because physical reality doesn't match that degree of perfection prescribed by ideal conservation. As an analogy, consider how the ancient people thought of the orbits of the sun, moon, and planets, as perfect circles. By logic, perfect circles are eternal, so these orbits were eternal circular motions. That was an ideal, which did not actually represent the reality of physical motion, which is less than perfect. Likewise, conservation laws are ideals which do not actually represent the reality of physical interactions, which are less than perfect with respect to conservation.

I don't know, that seems quite trivial. Where's the frightening part?

And I don't beleive that questioning those things you mentioned is enough to abandon the concept of the 'universe' as a totality. — boundless

We disagree then.

How do you explain the arising of life? — boundless

I don't. And, I don't think anyone can. But I don't pretend.

How do your points here about the past square with what you said before with respect to our understanding of cosmology, biology etc? — boundless

Do you think that you apprehend inconsistency in what I wrote? If so, please point it out to me so I can address it.

I believe that reductionism is wrong but reductionism is not the only possibility for a physicalist. — boundless

As you'll see from my reply to apokrisis, I believe in reduction, but not in physicalism. I believe that reduction is what ultimately demonstrates the necessity of dualism, which I believe in. The modern trend for physicalists is to turn away from reductionism, because it cannot succeed without dualism. At the base of material existence is the immaterial, as cause. So I think that this turning away from reductionism, is a mistake. The physicalists cannot bear the consequences, the necessity of dualism which reduction leads to, so instead of facing that reality, they retreat to a new form of physicalism, which, as it is physicalism, is equally mistaken.

On the other hand, I believe that St. Gregory of Nyssa had a quite dynamic understanding of the state of the blessed (which he called 'epektasis'), where the participation of the blessed in the communion with God will forever increase. In a sense, this means that the desire for the Good will never be satisfied. But at the same time, the blessed do not fall away from the communion because they know that they can't find ultimate peace, happiness and so on anything except God. In a sense, however, I would say that even in this dynamic model the blessed yearning for the good is satisfied in the sense that they stopped to seek elsewhere the source of their happiness. Would you agree at least with this? — boundless

It still looks like death to me.

Force and interaction are synonyms in physics. — boundless

Not at all.

Please do not give your interpretation of my position, as you do not understand it. — Dfpolis

Sorry about that. I just stated what I remembered you telling me in a discussion we had a couple years ago.

In the same way, what gets us from the initial state of the universe to the advent of a species is not simply the initial state, but the continuing and determinate way that state evolves, i.e. the laws of nature. — Dfpolis

Do you not believe in real possibility, real choice? If you believe that the universe unfolds in a determinate way, then you deny the possibility of real choice.

My problem is with all this talk about teleology without God. — T Clark

I agree, I have the same problem. This teleology without God is the "new physicalism". It appears to me, that traditional physicalism, which was basically reductionism, ran into a problem. At the base was found to be possibility, which necessitate the assumption of choice. And classical metaphysics had already posited divinity to account for the foundational choices. Physicalists of course will not accept a divinity, so the modern trend is to reject reductionism because it leads to the reality of the immaterial. Now, physicalists like apokrisis will assign some sort of "telos" to global constraints, making the basic choice not a true choice, but a constrained act. But this is not compatible with intention as we know it, which is found in the freedom of the individual to choose, not in the constraints of "the society" in general. The constraints of society do not cause the individual's choices and actions.

If you take a simpleminded constructive approach to the existence of things, then even the existence of raw matter becomes impossible to explain. — apokrisis

This is why the divinity is needed to explain the existence of matter. Matter being that which stays the same as time passes. But instead of recognizing the need for final cause at the base, to account for the existence of matter itself, the physicalist abandons the whole reductionist enterprise, and proposes a bogus form of telos, as the concept of "global constraint". However, this fails as states "Constraint isn't causation". So you don't actually avoid the need for an external final cause, the divinity, you hide it by proposing a bogus teleology which is not actually causal.

This is a rubbish argument. What distinguishes the coward from the conscientious objector? You are introducing "desire" as a vague preference that could be construed in many ways. What social framing are you going to impose on the situation to make it clear how one is going to interpret the idea of "going rogue"? — apokrisis

Desire is what drives final cause. And there is no need for "social framing" as this motivation to act transcends all social frames. Are you afraid to face this reality?

So finality would "inhere" in the parts – or rather shape the scope of freedoms possessed by those parts – to the degree those parts were actively part of the collective system. — apokrisis

By your own words, constraints are global. So it's contradictory to say that what shapes (constrains) the freedom of the parts, inheres within the parts, as you seem to be saying here.

Shake hands with God. The prime mover.

No thanks. — apokrisis

You ought to try it. At least the concept of "God", as First Cause, is consistent with the truth, according to the knowledge which we have. This is unlike your idea of "top-down constraints" which provides no actual cause.

Each individual member of the army must have the desire to follow the plan, and be a member of the army, or else they go rogue. So final cause must be portrayed as inherent to the local freedom of each part, rather than as a global constraint.

A simple example is to have the functional thing of an army, you have to turn a random mob of humans into battalion of soldiers. — apokrisis

The problem with this example, is that ultimately the principles which turn the mob into a battalion, come from the minds of individuals, members of "the mob" who are the leaders. So your portrayal, global constraints (the army), shaping the raw material (the soldiers), to express the "global purpose driving the whole show" is incorrect. There is no such "global purpose". The purpose comes from the local minds of the individuals who are the leaders of the army. Purpose does not come from this global thing called "the army".

Your inclination to avoid reductionism, yet maintain physicalism is misleading you. To properly understand reality we must follow the reductionist principles, which are correct, to their base, where we find that something further, the immaterial intent is beyond that, as the thing which creates or produces matter itself. This is why @Dfpolis in his Aristotelian representation, places the basic intent to create, as internal to matter itself. It must be local, rather than global. But I think that the proper interpretation of Aristotle puts the basic intent of final cause as transcendent to the matter, but in a local sense. This allows final cause to give matter its basic form, transcending it internally, with the form coming from beyond the boundaries of matter to the inside, while Df thinks its immanent to the matter.

This seems like the whole infinite regress problem. A rock is moving with intention, but the intention came from outside it. Where did that intention come from? From the other rock that knocked into it? Where did it's intention come from? How far back do we have to go? When is intention actually inside something non-sentient? — T Clark

Actually "final cause" was intended to put an end to the infinite regress. Any chain of causation would begin from an intentional act. If it wasn't begun in a freely willed act of a human being, it began as a freely willed act of God. I don't think God can be classified as "sentient".

It struck me just now why I find the teleological approach to understanding the world so distasteful. It's disrespectful to the universe - to reality, to the Tao - to try to jam it into human boxes. It's arrogant and self-indulgent. I really do hate it. — T Clark

I find it odd that you say this, because I think the exact opposite is the case. "The universe" is just a human concept, it refers to the way that we perceive and understand reality. This is analogous to the ancient humans who had a geocentric universe. Our current conception is really not much further advanced.

To say that reality is confined to this human box called "the universe" is an arrogant self-indulgent attitude of certitude. It suggests that we have reality all figured out, and it all fits into this concept, "the universe". But the reality of intention and free will don't fit into this concept, and this demonstrates to us that a significant part of reality actually escapes this determinist concept of "the universe".

Furthermore, the concept of God is meant to remove reality from that human box. It acknowledges that there are all those aspects of reality which do not fit into the human box. It is required, to account for how weak and fallible the human box actually is, and defend us against that confident, arrogant attitude that human beings have it all figured out, and it all fits into this box called "the universe". So contrary to what you say, the scientific approach is to jam reality into the box of human experience, empiricism, while the teleological approach, which accepts the reality of free will and intention, allows for a vast aspect of reality beyond what we can experience with our senses.

I think the deeper philosophical issue here revolves around the problem of self-organisation — or what Aristotle might call self-motion. How can living systems arise from non-living matter? How can purposeful activity emerge in a world governed by entropy? How can something move or structure itself? — Wayfarer

I look at all of this type of concept, "matter", and "entropy", as products of how we relate to aspects of the world which appear to remain the same as time passes. But along with that which remains the same as time passes, there is also change. And change cannot be caused by that which remains the same, it must have another source. Therefore there is no question of how does life arise from matter, or emerge from a world governed by entropy, because those principles only apply to that part of the world which stays the same, while life is a cause of change, therefore it is a completely different part of reality.

Consider that "matter", and "a world governed by entropy", are principles, laws of physics. Laws of physics apply to an aspect of reality which we know as inanimate. However, there is a very significant part of reality which we simply do not know about, and this includes the cause of change, which itself includes life. And when I say "change" here, I'm talking about 'real change', not the deterministic actions of matter, which are predictable by science, which are not real change because they are just a continuation of that which remains the same. If you believe in free will, then you believe in 'real change', change which is not a continuation of that which remains the same, and is therefore not predictable by science.

When we accept free will, and 'real change', there is no issue of how could life arise from non-living matter, because "matter" is a concept which does not allow for real change and doesn't apply. Therefore it is impossible that life arose from matter because the concept "matter" doesn't extend to that aspect where life is derived from. That's why there is dualism. Furthermore, there is no issue with purposeful activity arising from a world governed by entropy, because "entropy" is a similar concept which applies to that aspect of the world which remains the same. But "entropy" is much more interesting because it is the word that applies to the part of reality which escapes that which remains the same. As time passes, energy is supposedly conserved, as a law of that which stays the same. In reality, some escapes as entropy, so "entropy" refers to this part of reality where real change is possible, and happens.

That’s precisely the question I’m exploring through Terrence Deacon’s Incomplete Nature. His project is to show how order can, in fact, emerge from thermodynamic chaos — not through external design or miraculous intervention, but through specific kinds of constraints and relational structures that arise in far-from-equilibrium systems. He calls this “emergent teleology,” and while it’s a naturalistic account, it isn’t reductionist in the usual sense. — Wayfarer

It appears to me like you are getting sucked in by physicalism. Stop that, and look at the true nature of free will.

That’s where something like the Cosmological Anthropic Principle strikes a chord — the idea that the fundamental constants (or constraints?) seem to lie within a very narrow range necessary for complex matter to exist and for life to arise. Whether one interprets that as evidence of design, necessity, or simply a selection effect is, of course, open to debate. — Wayfarer

We need to respect the fact that fundamental constants or constraints do not cover the entirety of reality. There are aspects of reality which escape these, these constants do not apply. This is where we find "entropy" for example. The energy of a system remains constant (fundamental constraint) however, some actually gets lost (entropy). So "entropy" really refers to an aspect of reality which doesn't play by the rules.

The word 'design' almost always implies a designing agency, which is not what I mean by ‘purpose’. Rather, I’m pointing to the deeper philosophical issue of how order emerges from apparent chaos — — Wayfarer

This is what I dismiss as incoherent. We know that order does not simply emerge. The second law of thermodynamics supports this knowledge. Therefore we need to assume an "agency" of some sort as the cause of order. If the agency is said to act with purpose, but not with design, this wouldn't really make sense to most people. How could there be purpose without a goal for direction? However, I fully understand and respect the problem which you are bringing to my attention. I believe I've addressed this in my reply to T Clark above.

I proposed a distinction between intention and purpose. "Intention" implies an end or goal which is sought through action and this is how "design" is commonly used. But we also commonly allow that there are purposeful acts which lie outside the boundaries or constraints of the concept of "intention". This is exemplified by the reality of accidents, and accidentals. An accident is not a part of the intentional design yet it is still purposeful. And accidents are very useful in the production of knowledge as we learn from them. Trial and error for example is full of accidents, and knowledge often progresses through a determination of what is impossible. And this is how I class the so-called random mutations of evolution, as purposeful accidents.

That is how I understand the problem of the appearance of emergent order. Accidentals are the results of purposeful actions of an agent, which appear to be chance occurrences. The issue however, is that this does not completely remove the need for intention and design, in an absolute sense. Accidentals fall outside of the intentional goal which lies behind those purposeful acts that are apprehended as accidents. So it is still necessary to conclude a designing agency, i.e. an agent with a goal of some sort, telos. Even orthogenesis, which you propose, requires a designing agency to support the existence of an overall goal. The problem being how to support the reality of a goal, or end, without it being derived from a designing agency.

But I still don't have enough reasons to say that 'the universe' is a false concept. — boundless

I do have those reasons, and I mentioned some, the failure of science where the current theories reach their limits. These are issues like dark matter and dark energy in physics, and the need to assume random mutations and abiogenesis in biology. As I said, what these failings indicate is not that we need to extend conventional theories further, but that the theories need to be replaced with something fundamentally different, a paradigm shift. Therefore the current concept of "the universe" is a false concept.

if there is something transcendent of it, it can't be known scientifically — boundless

That is the whole point. Evidence indicates that something does transcend what is known as "the universe", and what can be known scientifically. That is why the need for metaphysics is very real, and why physicalism must be rejected. Observation based knowledge is severely handicapped in its ability to apprehend the totality of temporal reality. All observations are of things past, and the future cannot be observed in any way whatsoever. This means that observation based knowledge, empirical sciences, are only accurate toward understanding half of reality, the past, while the future lies entirely beyond scientific apprehension. We can predict what will come to pass, based on observations of the past, but this in no way indicates that we understand the nature of what is in the future.

I don't think that 'being fulfilled' implies that activity stops. — boundless

I think death is what is implied by that statement of Augustine, where he says "rest in You".

agree with that. In this case, the mass of nucleons isn't just the sum of the masses of its components but it is also given by the mass of the interactions. — boundless

No the mass is not given by "the mass of the interactions", it is given by the force. This is the basis of the energy-mass equivalence. And "force" is an extremely difficult concept to grasp, especially if we remove the mass required for momentum, to conceive of a force without any mass, to allow that the energy-mass equivalence represents something real. If the energy-mass equivalence is real, then there must be a force, called "energy", without any mass. This force would turn out to be nothing but the passing of time itself. Since the principles of physics don't allow us to conceive of a force without some sort of momentum, in application the photon must be assigned some mass, to account for its momentum, this is "relativistic mass".

Maybe I’m a bit confused. Are you saying that it makes sense to think of non-sentient objects as capable of having intention? — T Clark

I am not saying that explicitly. There are a number of different ways in which intention can be the cause of the movements of things, without intention being within the thing that is moving. Since we observe the activities of things, and notice that many are moved by intention, while the intention which moves them is external to them, (including chains of causation), it makes sense that non-sentient objects could be moving in intentionally designed trajectories without us being aware of the intention which sets them on their way.

If you define “intention” as a synonym for “purpose,” then you’re just restating the position of the OP - — T Clark

Yes, I am in agreement with the op. But intention really shouldn't be synonymous with purpose. Purpose is the defining word for intention. Generally, the defining word is the broader category. So for example, human beings is defined by mammal, which is defined by animal which is defined by living. In this case, conscious is defined by intention which is defined by purpose.

Often though, there is an inclination to make intention synonymous with purpose. This would mean that all cases of purpose are intentional. However, I think it is probably more productive in the long run to maintain a conceptual separation. This would mean that not all instances of intention are conscious, and also that not all instances of purpose are intentional. This allows versatility to the concept of "purpose", providing freedom from the restrictions of an end, or goal, which "intention" imposes. Purposeful acts could be carried out without being directed toward any specific end, such as in the case of some forms of trial and error perhaps.

I think you’ve restated the argument in the OP, as I understand it, very clearly. Do you find that way of looking at things compelling? — T Clark

Yes, I think it is the only reasonable way of looking at things. What we notice through sensation is specific ways in which things are, and this allows us to generalize. But in order for things to exist in specific ways, rather than absolute randomness, these ways must be designed, and the things somehow ordered to exist in these ways. So, as is the case with human artifacts and all artificial things, the design is prior in time to the thing, and the thing is brought into existence in accordance with the design.

However, like I mentioned above, I think we ought to allow that "purpose" extends beyond the limits of design, which is the restriction that the concept "intention" tends to impose. The need for this is evidenced by accidentals, which are not a part of the design, but are still purposefully caused. Simply put, an accident is not part of the intent, yet it is part of the purposeful act. It is the part which is not consistent with the designed end. And, since accidents still have purpose, as we learn from accidents and they can be very educational, they are in some way purposeful yet not intentional.

Accidents appear to be a significant part of the evolutionary process, in features like mutations for example, and people tend to think of them as chance though they are purposeful. Accidentals are what account for the uniqueness, peculiarities, and idiosyncrasies of the individual. I believe that we must allow that all the vast array of difference which we observe in life, and which I think manifests as the beauty of life, (the number of different colours found in flowers for example), are just as purposeful as all the sameness which we observe.

I’m working on the theme of ‘mental causation’. — Wayfarer

A very interesting and important theme I will say. And, when you get to the part about the criteria by which we judge whether specific instances of mental causation are good or bad, that is probably the most important theme there is.

Back to the Euthyphro dilemma. Is it good because it is loved by the gods, or is it loved by the gods because it is good?

Speaking of conspiracy theories, the BlueAnon dupes of Russiagate are in for some more surprises. DNI Gabbard just dropped some frightening info. — NOS4A2

I took a look at the links, and don't see anything new. What is this frighten info that we're supposed to find?

(I'm exploring this topic through phenomology, which I've only begun reading the last couple of years. My current reading list is The Phenomenon of LIfe, Hans Jonas; The Embodied Mind, Varela, Thompson and Rosch; Mind in Life, Evan Thompson, Incomplete Nature, Terrence Deacon; and Dynamics in Action, Alice Juarrero all of which I hope to finish this year.) — Wayfarer

Wow, you do a lot of reading.

But this seems too convoluted for me. It would be much easier to say that the universe is simply fine-tuned in a way that it either necessitates or allows the emergence of life. In such a case, life isn't an unintelligible accident that 'just happened' for no reason. — boundless

It might be easier for you to say this, but that is a matter of avoiding the point. Instead of acknowledging that the concept which we know as "the universe" is a false concept, you are accepting it as true, and proceeding from that premise. Of course it's easier that way, because you have your starting point already laid out for you. However the falsity of it misleads you.

Why physical laws allow life? I don't know and I find it a fascinating mystery which isn't solved by the 'multiverse' either. Just saying that there are other worlds with different physical constants or even physical laws and our world just happens to be one that allows life isn't a good explanation to why life was even possible in the first place. Of course, one might say that there is no 'why' but it is undeniable that life is allowed by physical laws. This is of course a tautology of sorts. But it makes you wonder if there is some reason of this allowance. I don't think the existence of such a 'reason' can be discovered by science. — boundless

Actually, these "laws" you refer to are the product of human knowledge. Human beings have created these laws in their efforts to describe activities observed.

Regardless of the existence of the 'deeper reason', since life are allowed, in no way reductionism is implied. That is if the 'laws of nature' allow life and are a sufficient explanation of it, it would seem to me that properties of the entire world ('laws of nature') explain the arising of life. Hence, life would be explained in terms of the properties of the whole, in the same way as we can understand the behavior of the momenta of single particles as a consequence of the behavior of a whole isolated system, as I explained before: — boundless

If 'laws of nature' are proposed as what the laws of physics are meant to describe, or represent, then we must ask how is it the case that physical bodies can obey the laws of nature. Would you propose that material bodies have access to some set of laws, which they read, or learn in some way, and then conduct themselves in a way so as to obey these laws? If not, then what would you propose as the process by which material things would interpret and obey a set of 'natural laws'?

Since God is the Good, whoever finds communion with the Good stops seeking fulfillment outside that state. — boundless

Why would you conclude this, it makes no sense to me. To begin with, "God" is not defined as "the good". The good is what a human beings seeks, and we do not necessarily seek God. Further, if one does seek God, it is impossible for a human being to know God in an absolute way, so that person would always be seeking to be closer to God, never reaching the fulfillment you refer to.

Yes, but it is assumed that the mass of, say, the Earth is the sum of the masses of its components. — boundless

But this method only works to an extent. If you divide a hadron into quarks and gluons, the hadron has a lot more mass than the sum of its parts. This is a feature described by the energy mass equivalence. The mass is a product of force, the strong force.

Phenomenology has re-conceived intentionality as something much broader than conscious intention, instead identifying it as an aspect of the will to survive (re Hans Jonas The Phenomenon of Life) — Wayfarer

I think that this re-conception of intentionality is the key to understanding your position. Once we understand that conscious intention is just one form of intention, that opens up an entirely new range of possibility for how we understand and study the nature of "telos", teleology.

Restricting intention to human consciousness, such that only human actions can be understood as teleological, is a foundational, metaphysical mistake, which is common and prevalent in the modern western society.

When we understand the common defining term of "intention" as purpose, and see that all sorts living beings act with purpose, then we must accept the reality that restricting intention to conscious human action is a mistake. And, this mistake is very misleading metaphysically. Removing intention from those constraints (consciousness), and respecting it simply as a cause of action (final cause), which is inconsistent with the deterministic causes understood by physics, allows us to develop a much more productive, or constructive, conception of intention.

This allows us to better grasp the reality of intention in its spatial-temporal relations, and in relation to physical existence in general, rather than dismissing final cause, and free will as an illusion. This dismissal is inevitable if we cling to the deterministic causation of physics, and physicalism in general, rejecting the reality of teleological causation.

Further, releasing intention from the constraints of consciousness allows us a much less confusing approach to the principles of panpsychism. "Consciousness" is generally understood as a property of higher level living beings, dependent on a brain. When panpsychism proposes consciousness as fundamental to the universe, this is commonly apprehended as incoherent, due to the fact that "consciousness" as we generally conceive it, is dependent on a brain. So when we release intention from the constraints of consciousness, and understand how intention relates to temporality in a way not at all understood by human knowledge, because temporality is not at all understood by human knowledge, this allows intention as a "consciousness-like" aspect of reality, to be pervasive in its causal role.

The exclusion of purpose was never, and in fact could never be, empirically demonstrated; it was simply excluded as a factor in the kind of explanations physics was intended to provide. Meaning was left behind for the sake of predictive accuracy and control in specific conditions. — Wayfarer

Yes, meaning was intentionally left out from the development of physics, and this formed the division between physics and biology. Physics was specifically designed to deal with the mechanical motions of bodies. The early physicists who pioneered the way, did not exclude the reality of the spiritual, or immaterial, they recognized the division, and knew that physics was being designed exclusively to understand that one aspect of reality, the bodily.

Modern biology, on the other hand, had a highly ambiguous start in this respect. As the material and immaterial were understood to be united within the living being, a division between material causes and immaterial causes could not be apprehended, therefore could not be upheld. As a result, there was a clear separation between the causal propositions of Lamarckian evolution, and the causal propositions of Darwinian evolution. Lamarck proposed habit as a fundamental cause, then Darwin replaced habit with chance, perceiving "habit" as unscientific. To this day, this causal question has not been resolved, and modern understanding of genotypes and epigenetics is pointing back toward Lamarckian principles.

But the further move, so often taken for granted in modern discourse, is the assertion that because physics finds no purpose, the universe therefore has none. — Wayfarer

This ought to be restated. It is not the case that "physics finds no purpose". It is intentionally designed, and employed, so as to avoid purpose. This is what I was talking about earlier in the thread. We can adopt as our purpose, to avoid purpose as much as possible, and this is supposed to be our way toward "objective truth". But purpose is pervasive, and you can easily see how having as your purpose to avoid purpose, does not actually avoid purpose. Furthermore, it becomes evident that all of those determinists who cling to the causation described by "physics" and insist that free will is an illusion, actually have things backward. In reality, the idea that physics can avoid purpose, and provide us with objective truth is what is an illusion.

Ok, I see. But, at the same time, if we deny that we should also explain why it seems to be the case. And, as in everything, we should take the more convincing view. Just saying this is not enough for me to deny that in this world there was a time when no living beings existed. A lot of scientific evidence points to that. — boundless

I agree, but you don't seem to be getting the point. The problem is not with concluding that there was a time with no living beings, the problem is in assuming the concept referred to by "this world" as the premise. Assuming the conventional "this world" is begging the question, because a time with no life is implicit within that concept. So once you assume "the world", the conclusion is inevitable. The problem is with the concept "the world", in general.

To me, philosophy demonstrates that "this world" is a pragmatic concept which serves our mundane purposes, but it is far from reality. The evidence that "this world" is a false concept s demonstrated at the limits of the conception. Where accepted science fails us, it comes to a dead end. The dead ends are not simply a case of needing to go further with more application of the existing theories, they are an inability to go further due to limitations of the theory. This is evidence that much of realty escapes the theories altogether, and cannot be grasped by them, indicating that "the world" s not what it pretends to be. This implies that the theories are wrong, right from the base. Examples are dark matter, dark energy in physics, and the reliance on random chance in evolutionary biology, leading to the acceptance of abiogenesis.

If we could find the 'ultimate truth', I can stil imagine that we might perpetually contemplate and deepen our understanding of it. What we can't do is to reject and trying to find something else in an agitated state. — boundless

There are some very good arguments n Christian theology which indicate that human beings are incapable of apprehending the ultimate truth. In general, this is the difference between human beings and God, and why we can never consider ourselves to be in any way equal to God.

But, at the same time, I don't think that causation implies intentionality, let alone a conscious one. One, however, can still ask why the potentiality of life was there in the first place. — boundless

I agree, but the thing is that once we rule out the possibility of a deterministic physical cause, tthen we seem to be left with two choices. Either its random chance, or some other type of cause. We know that final cause, or intentionality, is another type of cause. Also, we know very little about how final cause actually works as a cause in the physical world, only that it does, from the evidence. Since we cannot actually see final cause in action, only the effects of it, and since our judgements as to which specific types of things are the effects of final cause, are completely subjective, why not consider the possibility that final cause is far more extensive than what is commonly believed? Once we allow that final cause exists not only in human actions, but also in the actions of other living things, then why not consider that the actions of the heavenly bodies, as well as atoms and subatomic particles, which are "ordered", or "orderly", are not also the effects of final cause?

Think about philosophy. When knowledge is gained, philosophy ceases. This doesn't imply that there is no action at all. It does imply, however, a state of fulfillment. — boundless

I don't think I agree with this. Knowledge is always being gained, but philosophy never ceases because there is always more to learn.

I think it would be more appropriate to say "knowledge" in English perhaps; "all men by nature desire to know." This is why the life of contemplation is the highest form of life for Aristotle (Ethics, Book X). The mind, being "potentially all things," can possess all perfections in this way (at the limit). All appetites are ultimately towards a sort of union, and knowledge is the highest form of union. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This doesn't resolve the issue we were discussing. When we put life in general within the context of purpose, assuming that life is purposeful, then knowledge itself is pragmatic, useful toward further ends.

Ok, but how do you explain the fact that scientific evidence seems to indicate just that? — boundless

That is not a fact, and can be equally disputed as it can be asserted. That conclusion is what called misapplied science. The fact that you say it "seems" to indicate that, is evidence that you are speculating, not applying science. In reality scientific evidence, indicates that our representation, which is called "the universe" is faulty, therefore a false premise, as I explained above. We do not, for instance, have an accurate understanding of mass and gravity.

Well, perhaps it's a bit off topic, but I would say that what you said about the good is also valid about the truth. When we learn things, we know some 'truths' but we aren't satisfied, we want to know more. It's possible that there is an 'ultimate truth' and if we knew that truth, we would find rest in it. Just like the case of the good. — boundless

I think that this is very misguided. Human beings, as all living beings, are fundamentally active. That is their primary nature. To propose that the ultimate end is "rest" is contrary to the nature of life, and better associated with death. Perhaps you believe that the end of all life is death, but that would be annihilation of all living things, and by nature we reproduce and carry on, despite individual death.

Well, if the probabilistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are right potentialities can be actualized randomly in a way that satisfies the Born Rule, which seems intelligible to me. So, I don't think that it's impossible that potentialities can be realized by 'chance'. That said, one can still ask why the potentialites were 'there' in the first place. So, even if they are realized by chance, it doesn't totally exclude teleology IMO. — boundless

The Born Rule in no way indicates randomness. It indicates the very opposite. If probability can be successfully used to predict outcomes, this indicates that there is an underlying reason for the specific outcome. To say that the outcome is "random" or "chance" is implicitly contradictory to what is indicated by the success of the probabilistic method.

It appears to be your opinion that outcomes which can be successfully predicted through statistic could be chance occurrences. I think this is incoherent for the reason described. What you are arguing is that a meaningful pattern could be created by chance. I would argue that this is fundamentally contradictory. For a pattern to have any sort of meaning it is required that the pattern demonstrates something about its cause. The cause may be efficient cause, like a physical process, or final cause, such as intent. But to say that a pattern demonstrates predictability, is meaningful in that way, but does not demonstrate anything about its cause, is incoherent.

Well, I am sympathetic with this theistic argument, which BTW is not exclusively Christian. But, I am not sure if we can say that the evidence here is 'beyond reasonable doubt'. I actually don't think so and non-theist can rationally reject this reasoning. This doesn't mean that the theistic argument is false, just it isn't compelling even in 'beyond reasonable doubt' sense.
Perhaps you agree with that, as you characterise the evidence as 'subjective'. — boundless

Yes I do agree. Nothing in philosophy is "beyond reasonable doubt", because philosophy is based in doubt.

Well, I think that many different things can qualify as teleology. Of course, when we human beings act with a rationale, our actions are teleological. We act with a purpose in view which we believe it's possible but isn't realized yet. I would say there is also teleology in the actions of a bacterium, which in a rudimentary way strives for its survival and the survival for its specie (not in a conscious way, of course). Perhaps there are even more subtler kinds of teleology. But I am not sure. — boundless

Notice how teleology, as you explain it, concerns itself with actions. How do you cross that category division, to say that the purpose of action is rest?

I think that it is undeniable that there was a time in the past without living being in the universe. — boundless

The point is that if the concept "the universe" is not representative of what we commonly refer to as the independent objective reality, then this statement of yours is rather meaningless. It takes a false premise "the universe", and derives a conclusion from it. According to this conception, the conception of "the universe", which I am saying might be a falsity, there was a time when the universe was without living beings. If the premise is false then the conclusion is unsound.

While I would agree that truth is related to purpose - in fact, I would even say that truth (like the good) is the ultimate purpose of our rational actions - I am not sure how this answer my question. — boundless

I think that this is sort of backward thinking. We know "the good" as that which is intended, the goal, the end. As such, there is always a multitude of goods. In the manner proposed by Aristotle, we can ask of any specific good, what is it good for, and create a chain, A is for the sake of B which is for the sake of C, etc.. If we find a good which makes a final end, as he proposed happiness does, then that would be the ultimate purpose. However, "truth" really doesn't fit the criteria of the ultimate purpose.

Yes, the potency was a necessary condition for the arising of life. But this doesn't imply that the arising of life is necessary for the potency being there in the first place. There is no evidence that outside life there are purposeful actions. — boundless

I don't see how this is meaningful.

And yet... can we truly speak of potency without assuming some form of teleology? — boundless

I don't think that such speaking would be coherent. Suppose that there is true potential, such that as time passed, there was some degree of real possibility as to what happens from one moment to the next. If one possibility is actualized instead of another, then some form of agent must have chosen that possibility as the one to be actualized, and this implies teleology. The alternative would be to say that one possibility rather than another is actualized by chance, because it cannot be a determinist cause or else it would not be real possibility. But it is incoherent to think that it happens by chance, because this would mean that something happens without a cause, which is unintelligible, therefore incoherent.

If the former, however, what is the evidence of that teleology? — boundless

As I said, evidence of purpose is subjective. If you look at Christian theology, any sort of existent is evidence of teleology. This is because in order for us to perceive something as existent, it must be somehow organized, and organization is only produced on purpose. This is why, for them, all physical existence is evidence of teleology.

What do you think qualifies as evidence of teleology?

I really like your post. I guess it helps that I agree with you on just about everything, but I don’t know that I could have expressed it as clearly as you have. — T Clark

Thank you T Clark, compliments are meaningful.

What about the objection, though, that life and consciousness arose in the world many billions of time after the Big Bang? — boundless

The Bing Bang is just the conventional theory. It's just an aspect of the current model, or conception, which represents a universe. But this conception is just a product of purpose. Further, as I explained, we often make the goal of truth, or objectivity, our purpose, so such a representation could have been produced from the goal of truth. In this case, when our goal is truth, our purpose is to remove purpose from our conceptions. Notice that it really can't be completely successful, because truth itself is a goal, a purpose.. And, as much as we may attempt to remove purpose, striving for truth, we are merely human beings, and usefulness toward other ends such as prediction, tend to overwhelm us distracting us from the goal of removing purpose.

I don't think that strictly speaking this means that the actual arising of life was necessary for the very existence of the inanimate. But, rather, as a potency life is an essential aspect of the world. I don't think that this 'potency' can be captured in a mathematical model, which is essential for physics. This to me suggests that life can't be explained in physical terms, precisely because the method that physics uses isn't adequate to explain the properties associated with life. So, the 'unlikeliness' might be explained by the fact that the models neglect some fundamental property of the physical world. — boundless

If the universe is prior in time to life, then potency must also be prior in time to life. It is a feature of time which would be necessary for the creation of life.

A more convincing explanation might be that we know only in part our physical world and, therefore, the 'unlikeliness' is merely apparent, due to observation bias (like, say, that we are more likely to observe brighter galaxies and, therefore, we might understimate the number of less bright galaxies). So, maybe, if we study more in depth the 'arising of life' won't be as 'unlikely' as it seems. But this might imply that, indeed, a more deep study of our physical universe will eventually reveal that the reductionist/weakly emergentist paradigm is simply wrong. — boundless

This is the point I take, above. The existence of a physical world requires intentional being. This is because, as a physical world, is how things are perceived through a purpose based apparatus. Therefore it makes no sense to say that it is unlikely for intention to exist in this particular physical world, because intention is necessary for any physical world.

In this way we turn the strong anthropic principle on its head. All the things which are said to exist in the physical world, physical laws etc., which are required for the existence of life, are really creations of life. These are the products of our purpose driven perceptions. They are conceptions, produced from our perceptions which, rather than being designed through random chance evolution, have been designed purposefully. our perceptions support our endeavours in the world, meaning they are very useful to us, in a pragmatic sense, but they don't necessarily equate to any real truth.

However the question of purpose, or its lack, doesn’t always require invoking some grand ‘cosmic meaning.’ Meaning and purpose are discovered first in the intelligibility of ordinary life—in the way we write, behave, build, and think. The moment we ask whether something is meaningful, we’re already inhabiting a world structured by purposes. Furthermore, the belief that the Universe is purposeless is itself a judgement about meaning. Asking what this purpose might be, in the abstract, is almost a red herring - it doesn’t really exist in the abstract, but it is inherent in the purposeful activities of beings of all kinds, human and other. It is, as it were, woven into the fabric. — Wayfarer

I think we ought to consider that what we know as the Universe, is a construction of human minds, and as such it was created with purpose. What modern physics demonstrates to us is that much of reality is far beyond our grasp, not even perceptible to us. What we take to be the Universe, the model we make, is formed and shaped by usefulness and purpose.

If we extend purpose, and intention to life in general, and assume that purpose is at work in the mechanisms of evolution, then we also need to assume that the way that the world appears to us through our sense organs and brains, is also a product of purpose. If we ask, why does the world appear to us through our senses, in the way that it does, when physics tells us that it is really not like the way it appears, the answer is that it proved purposeful through the process of evolution, to perceive things in this way.

If we want to get beyond this representation of the universe, which was created on purpose, to understand the true reality, the independent, objective world, the reality of which we like to posit, then we need to remove purpose from the representation. This is the purpose of the concept of "truth", to have a representation which is not influenced by purpose. Notice that it is impossible to actually remove purpose, as there is even a purpose for truth, which is to get beyond purpose. But this is about as close as we can get, to creating a representation of the universe which is not influenced by purpose, to have as our purpose, to remove purpose and its influence.

Given the hostility that there so often is between ideologies, I would expect that to be a major factor in how people decide to draw the lines. — Ludwig V

Hostility, in relation to ideology, is very interesting. We can look at it in two different ways, hostility as caused by an ideological difference, and hostility as the cause pf ideological difference. Often, we are inclined to take the simple way of looking at things, and assume that a specific case of hostility is the result of a difference in ideology. This results in each side being rational, yet with distinct ideas about what is true and good. However, since we must accept the reality that people actually draw these lines, which constitute separations in ideology, the matter is much more complex, as hostile action will induce the creation of a boundary.

The issue I believe, is that hostility is related to actions, and actions are not always driven by ideology. There are many different types of causes related to human actions, from reflex, intuition, irrational passions, through to ideological principles. So many actions which create hostility are derived from irrational sources, and only the ones which can be traced to some specific ideology can be described as rational. Because of this, many hostilities have an irrational source, and this justifies the exclusion of the purveyors of such actions from ones ideology. In other words, the ideology is designed so as to exclude the others as acting from an irrational source. The others are portrayed as savages, and whatever ideology they are acting on must be distinctly unacceptable, impossible to understand, as irrational.

I can't disagree with that, except that, at least as things are, the distinction between ideologies is extremely obscure. The lines are drawn on the level of praxis rather than intellect. — Ludwig V

I think any boundaries between distinct ideologies are theoretical and made for a purpose. Consider, that no two people really share all their believes, so in that sense we could say that everyone has one's own distinct ideology. But on the other hand, if we limit a particular "ideology" to just a small set of very. general ideas, then many people have the same ideology. So the drawing of lines between ideologies is complex and purposeful, yet somewhat arbitrary.

Here's a slightly different way of looking at things.

01 - Ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals that form the basis of economic or political theory and policy"

if ideology is a “system” of ideas and ideals, where ideas are about how things are (beliefs) and ideals about how things should be (norms), then those beliefs and norms are somehow interdependent. If ideology is the basis for economic/political theorising and policy, then ideology is a pre-theoretical system of ideas and ideals relevant for economy and politics. — neomac

Under this definition, there is no distinction between ideology, and facts, as stated by the op. The facts, i.e. truths, are the ideology. It is what we believe about how things are, and how things should be.

02 - "The set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual"

If ideology is characteristic of a social group, then ideology is not only a shared system of beliefs, but something that helps us identify social groups. — neomac

Under this definition, we accept that there is division, disagreement as to the facts, the truth, and this division manifests as distinct social groups.

With this way of looking at things, the two definitions are consistent, and not actually describing two different things, but they are just different ways of describing the very same thing. In the first, what is described is the agreement amongst people, as to what they believe, and this constitutes their "ideology". In the second, we acknowledge that not only is there agreement amongst people as to what they believe, but their is also disagreement between people, and this produces a multitude of social groups with distinct "ideologies". So the first describes a general concept, "ideology", while the second describes what distinguishes separate, distinct and specific, ideologies. They both describe the very same thing, but the second simply adds the condition that there is not one system of ideas of how things are and how things should be, facts or truths, which everyone believes.

Though Adorno notes that the responses have been obscure, he wants to speak up in favor of this speculative thinking, or a moment within thinking, whereby the facts, on their face or as read, do not determine thought, but rather produce a facade through his thought must push towards and outward from in order to get closer to the things themselves. — Moliere

I think that we need to make sure that we properly interpret how Adorno uses "facts" here.

The speculative moment survives in such resistance: what does not allow itself to be governed by the given facts.

I believe the "given facts" are what is posited, postulated by positivism, as what is the case. So the resistance spoken about, which is correlated to the speculative moment, is a resistance to the ideology of positivism.

You are giving as granted that I or the child who suffered abuse in the past is now happy. What if the person can never be happy? Although I can agree with you that time can cure the scars and help us to move on, I still see it as hard that a person who passed through that kind of experience could be happy nowadays. I accept that he or she can live a normal life, but nothing more. I doubt they can be happy. For this reason, some of them even start taking drugs. We can pick a random drug addict, and probably this person suffered in the past. I know that there are many different examples and each individual is a different case. But it is difficult to be happy to understand those kinds of circumstances. — javi2541997

I don't see how any of this is meaningful. I took many drugs, chronically, for many years, perhaps as an escape from abuses in earlier life, and I consider myself to have been happy then, and to be be happy nowadays. Happiness is not an unobtainable ideal, nor does it require strict criteria. In fact, the less that you restrict your criteria, the easier it is to be happy. You can provide for yourself, the freedom required to be happy.

Why do you think it is always the right thing? — javi2541997

I think it is always the right thing, because I understand the benefits, and I was trying to explain them to you. Again, I suggest you read some Plato, the dialogues are very entertaining, and enlightening.

You keep thinking that the characters and situations that make me suffer are just narrative. Well, imagine a real alcoholic abusive father. It is not hard too. Unfortunately and sadly, there are hundreds and hundreds of these kinds of monsters. Who is the one who has to forgive here? — javi2541997

If the abuse you talk about is in the past, then the narrative is in your own mind. It is how you describe the person's actions to yourself, via memory. You have that medium, your own memories, between you and the actions which are making you suffer. As that medium is your own creation, your own fabrication, you can construct it in two very distinct ways, or two extremes with a multitude of possibilities in between. You can maintain a narrative which has you sharing in that abusive individual's suffering, or you can maintain a narrative which has you sharing your happiness with the abusive individual. Each is fictional, because the past is gone and the suffering or happiness is at the present. Forgiving involves the latter narrative, sharing your present happiness with the abusive individual.

Nonetheless, the childhood has already been taken away, and they are probably traumatised for many reasons. — javi2541997

I really do not understand what is meant by "the childhood has already been taken away". I understand "trauma", but unless this involves unconsciousness, or coma, this is a matter of receiving experience, not a matter of taking anything away.

We have the risk of passing through serious dilemmas when we are doubting whether forgiveness is the right thing to do or not. — javi2541997

Why doubt? It is not a question of whether forgiveness is ultimate or absolute. But it is always the right thing. And, the knowledge you can develop from understanding the other's actions instead of simply suffering from them, will always benefit you in dealing with the person in the future, even if future actions require you to use physical force against the individual.

Furthermore, this only applies to specific cases that we are close to. I can't 'forgive' an abstract abusive father. I know these exist, but it is true that I don't have direct contact with them. I am affected because of the suffering of others who are experiencing that. This is the main issue. I want to be part of their struggle, and I am comfortable with this for the moment. — javi2541997

The problem here is what I'm trying to get you to understand. That is why I used the word "fiction", as a shock tactic, which disconcerted you. You, "want to be part of their struggle", but it is the struggle of an abstract victim of abuse. There is no particular individual whom you are acquainted with, or even unacquainted with, who is suffering that abuse. It is an abstract idea in your mind. Unless you identify a particular individual, whom you can relate to, and be a part of that struggle, the idea that you can be a part of that struggle is a fiction. How can you be a part of the struggle of an abstract abuse victim? Now you are left attempting to do what is impossible, being a part of the struggle of an abstract, fictional, individual. So you are engaged in a hopeless task, which will never be productive, and always be disappointing. But if you choose a particular individual, to be a part of that person's struggle, you will find that the way is to share your love and happiness with that person, not to share in that person's suffering.

But we the humans also have a soul, and we suffer from what we experience. — javi2541997

As I explained, when others behave badly, you have no obligation to share in their badness. You ought not let them impart their suffering to you, and your moral responsibility is to share your goodness with them. In Christian tradition this is known as forgiving.

https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/adult-health/in-depth/forgiveness/art-20047692
https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/eight_keys_to_forgiveness

Notice in #4 of the second link, that true empathy is derived from sharing your love with the other, forgiveness. This act of giving your goodness to the other, giving your understanding, is the basis of empathy, not a sharing in the other's badness. It is a matter of understanding the other, such that the other feels your goodness, not a matter of feeling the other's badness. This is why true empathy cannot exist through the medium of narrative. Through narrative, the other has no access to your understanding, you merely have access to the suffering of the other.

So, by your submissions then, some wars are good and some wars are evil. Then, please tell me, by who or on what authority can a decision be made that any specific war is good but another war is evil? — Pieter R van Wyk

Again, my suggestion is that you study some philosophy and learn some principles. This will answer your question.

But the starving child still exists, whether you want to accept it or not. — javi2541997

Sure, but my point was that one does not need to empathize with, or share that person's suffering. The better approach is to share one's happiness with that person who suffers. And this requires only that you acknowledge that the suffering is real, not that you sympathize, empathize, or in any way share in that suffering in any way. You just need to take the necessary steps toward sharing your good fortune with the less fortunate, without yourself sharing in the suffering of the less fortunate.

Sorry, but I disagree with you in that part. Trust me when I claim that the characters and plot shown in Dostoevsky's works are far from being 'fictional'. — javi2541997

I'm sorry, "fictional" was not the correct word to properly convey the meaning. Let me call it "narrative". The point is that the words, and form, of the author's narrative are intentionally chosen and designed for the purpose of creating those feelings. So you are not actually empathizing with those particular suffering children, by being in contact with them and understanding them, you are empathizing with that narrative which the author has created. This was the point of the UNICEF example. It's not that I believe those pictures of starving children are fictional, but they are portrayals (a narrative) designed to produce these emotions of sympathy.

Because of this mistake on my part, I request that you please reread the post and replace "fiction" with "narrative", as described above, and this will produce a better understanding of what I was trying to say.

But then, who or on what authority, can a decision be made that any person, with authority to declares any war, is in fact rational or irrational? Surely, any person that declares any war would regard himself to be rational. Also, the people that has given the authority to the person declaring this war, will regard this person rational, not so? — Pieter R van Wyk

You might consult some good philosophy to get to the bottom of this issue. If you are truly interested, then I assume that is what you will do. Happy reading!

By your assertion then: All war is good. — Pieter R van Wyk

Why would you conclude this? Just because you may find a person, or persons, in every instance of war, who would say this particular war is good, doesn't mean that all war is good. Such a conclusion would require equivocation. because these different people calling different wars good, and the wars that others called good, bad, would have conflicting ideas as to what defines "good".

So, you continue to demonstrate that the fatal flaw in your reasoning is faulty generalizing.