I was struck by something Rorty said about truth. 'We don't need to define truth, we know how to use it.' I kind of feel the same about morality. I'm not generally big on definitions, actions are more interesting to me. Anyone can say any kind of guff about ethics and principles. But what is it that we do? — Tom Storm

But this is what leads to misunderstanding and confusion. That's what Plato showed in his dialogues. Different people all 'know how to use' the same word. But when you ask each of them what they mean when they use that word, they come up with different answers. This is clear evidence that there is misunderstanding when that word is being used, and knowledge of the subject is elusive.

Suffering bad. — Tom Storm

"Suffering is bad" is theory. It doesn't require a long statement to be a theory. In fact, it appears like the theories which people hold as being the most important (like 'God exists' for example), are the simplest, short and sweet.

Again, this odd interpretation has the result that when one says the lectern might have been in the other room, one is talking about a different lectern. — Banno

That's right, as it should be, as Janus indicates. That's because if the lectern we are talking about is in the other room, it is a different lectern from the one we know to be in this room, necessarily. "Necessarily" here is supported by the law of identity which is the premise which forces this conclusion.. Just like, if the lectern we're talking about is made of plastic, when this one we know to be made of wood, we would necessarily be talking about a different lectern.

That's how the law of identity works to prevent sophistry. It's very intuitive, and restrict us to saying things we truly believe, while sophistry is a matter of saying deceptive things. You don't truly believe that the lectern which is in this room might be in the other room, do you?

Yes, "might have been" implies a different time, and so we can allow that the lectern might have been in a different room, at a different time, but to use "might have been" to imply at the same time, is just deceptive speaking.

As if "The lectern might have been in the other room" were false. — Banno

Yes, it's false because it is deceptive speaking. It's deceptive speaking because it employs ambiguity, as "might have been" implies a different time, whereby the described possibility would be acceptable, but it is used to mean at the same time, whereby the described possibility is unacceptable (by the law of identity).

That's why I asked, do you really believe that the lectern which is in this room might be in the other room. If not, then what are you saying with "might have been"?

I've always assumed that one's personal preferences are derived by enculturation. But I should have also said that there are likely to biological factors. I'm not really trying to nail down a totalizing explanation for all things. — Tom Storm

I think the common standard is to attribute personal preferences to genetic predisposition. This predisposition may get amplified through practise and enculturation.

For me morality is in the doing not in the theory. I generally hold to human flourishing as a key guide. — Tom Storm

Well, we surely need some theory to be able to judge the doing as good or bad. Whether or not "human flourishing" makes an acceptable principle is debatable. I suppose we'd need to start with a good definition of "flourishing".

This is not a science and should be an open, ongoing conversation. — Tom Storm

I agree with this.

This is interesting to me. Even though don't think I can incorporate it into my worldview. — Tom Storm

I think that the vast majority of knowledge is not "about reality". Knowledge mostly consists of how to do things. You being pragmatist must recognize this. But this gives moral philosophy a supreme position on the epistemic hierarchy, because it deals with what we should and should not do. But then we must go even higher than this, to ground our moral principles, so we turn toward understanding reality, and this is metaphysics.

Interesting. I think I'm a monist - I just do things and rarely reflect (no doubt I am the unremarkable product of enculturation). :razz: The advantage I have found is that I am almost always content and in positive relationship with others. :wink: — Tom Storm

Contentment is not always good. We ought not be content in a bad situation. And one cannot judge the situation by one's contentment, saying if I am content, then the situation is good, because we need to base goodness in a view toward the future. Understanding what "the future" is, is a subject of metaphysics, and this is why we need accurate metaphysics for a good moral philosophy.

Personally I think metaphysics and ontology mostly come down to personal preferences — Tom Storm

I perceive a little inconsistency between this (metaphysics and ontology are just personal preferences), and your earlier statement, that you are the "product of enculturation". How do you suppose that one's metaphysics and ontology could escape one's enculturation, to acquire the status of personal preference? See "personal preference" points to taste, but "metaphysics" points to an understanding of reality. So how could one's understanding of reality be more like the product of taste than the product of enculturation?

But keeping with Kripke's judgement that being made of wood might be essential property of this lectern.. — RussellA

Being made of wood is not essential of being a lectern. However, if we are talking about a particular thing, that lectern in particular, then every property is essential to it being the very thing which it is. That is the law of identity. So when we talk about particulars, every property is essential, and there is no need to make the arbitrary judgement of which properties are essential.

Someone could say that there is a possible world where this lectern could have been made of plastic, which is highly likely. However, there can be many definitions of "possible worlds", but this is not what Kripke's means by "possible world". For Kripke, a "possible world" is a world in which this lectern keeps its essential properties. — RussellA

This is where things get difficult for Kripke. By the law of identity all properties of a particular individual are essential properties. So if he wants to bring a particular into a possible world (where a particular could have properties other than it does), he violates the law of identity. This is why the standard, traditional procedure, is to represent the particular object as a logical subject. Then we maintain the separation between the logical subject, which may partake of may possibilities, and the material object which by the law of identity is what it is, necessarily, and therefore allows of no other possibilities

Therefore, this lectern, which is made of wood, has the essential property of being made of wood, meaning that in all possible worlds it is still made of wood. This lectern is necessarily made of wood in all possible worlds, because by definition, if this lectern is made of wood in the actual world it must also be made of wood in all possible worlds. — RussellA

The problem I see here is the judgement factor. That particular lectern is judged to be made of wood. That is a human judgement which could conceivably be wrong. So we cannot say that it is necessarily made of wood, that might be a mistaken judgement. However, we can represent that particular object as a subject, named "a wooden lectern". This subject is necessarily made of wood, because it is stipulated. Then we can place that subject, a wooden lectern", in whatever possible world we like, where it is always necessarily made of wood. The point here being that we make a distinction between the material object which is always exactly what it is (by the law of identity), and what we say of that object. The possible worlds consist of what we say. This allows for the reality that we may be mistaken in our judgement of what is a property of any particular object.

I agree to some extent, but most of the folk I know who privilege science would say it allows us to understand the aspects of reality humans have capability to understand, (or access to) not 'ultimate reality' - which is a different speculative metaphysical postulate. And science is an approach which develops and morphs. — Tom Storm

The problem is that science consistently employs speculative metaphysical propositions, in the form of the hypotheses which it tests. The scientific method is to test hypotheses, but it dictates nothing about where these hypotheses are derived from. So, science plays a role in helping us to understand the aspects of reality which we are capable of understanding, but it does not provide that understanding by itself.

Now, consider your claim that science develops and morphs. Isn't it true that the directions which science goes in are greatly formed by the metaphysical hypotheses which are presented to it, to be tested. Your proclaimed "skeptical pragmatism" ought to help you to understand this. There is always reasons why the hypotheses which are drawn up, are drawn up, and this is what gives direction to the morphing and development of science. But what happens if science starts to get its direction from bad ontology, and bad metaphysics?

What do you propose to be kinds of knowledge about reality we can attain without science? — Tom Storm

I'm dualist, and I believe that all human knowledge requires both aspects, theory and practise. Science, as a method is a form of practise which validates theories. Theory without practise is not knowledge, nor is practise without theory. There is however a special type of knowledge described in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which is called intuitive knowledge, and I believe it involves the relationship between practise and theory. I would not say that this type of knowledge is necessarily "about reality" but it is necessarily prior to science, and it is necessary in order to have any understanding of reality.

Kripke wrote: "To state the view succinctly: we use both the terms ‘heat’ and ‘the motion of molecules’ as rigid designators for a certain external phenomenon. Since heat is in fact the motion of molecules, and the designators are rigid, by the argument I have given here, it is going to be necessary that heat is the motion of molecules." — RussellA

Kripke's misuse of "necessary" is very well displayed at the point where he states "if the table is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice". By using the conditional "if...", possibility is implied. So necessity here, only follows from the fulfillment of that one possibility. This makes "necessary" contingent, which is a category mistake.

He employs this fallacy (category mistake) as a sophistic trick to bring "necessary" into the category of "contingent". Whether or not the table is made of ice is always a human judgement. And a human judgement is intrinsically fallible, therefore does not provide the conditions required for "necessary".

So propositions like "the table is made of ice", and "the table is not made of ice" can never express anything which is necessary, because those statement are contingent on that empirical judgement which is fallible. Kripke repositions the contingency of such a proposition, from the judgement to the conditional "if...then necessarily...", to create the illusion that the conditions of necessity may have been fulfilled. However, the proposition is conditional therefore the conditions have not been fulfilled, and "necessary" is just an illusion created by him.

Then Kripke proceeds to misuse "necessary", as in your example.

Is it intrinsic to this particular blind spot that its enactors are often blind to it being a blind spot? Is this when a blind spot bites? When it is not recognized as a limitation? — Tom Storm

I would say that blind spots are intrinsic to the nature of theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge has limitations, and when the knowledge is put into practise the limitations may become a problem. The issue with being blind to the blind spot is that often the limitations cannot be known in advance, they only become evident as a result of practise.

So scientists use the scientific method to experiment and observe, and this helps to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the various theories, as a sort of practise. But experimentation occurs in a very controlled environment which doesn't properly represent the natural environment where free practise occurs.

That's true and unless you're unremittingly scientistic, that would be well understood. Not many actual scientists seem to be members here, but there are a number of folk who consider science to be a more reliable pathway to understanding 'reality' than many other approaches. Where is the line drawn? Seems to be about where you think reality begins and ends. — Tom Storm

This points to the issue I mentioned near the beginning of the thread, the difference between the inside of an object and the outside of an object. Science is always looking from the outside in. That is the scientific way, to observe through the senses, and this is to put oneself outside the thing being observed, thereby producing objective observations. On the other hand, the subjective "introspection" gives one a look at what is going on inside an object. So we can come to understand that these two ways of looking at an object give us very distinct and different understandings of what an object is.

Now, what I must insist on, and what is so difficult to get across to the hard headed scientistic people who claim "science to be a more reliable pathway to understanding 'reality'", is that this is 'reality'. So it is completely incorrect to assume that science is the more reliable path towards understanding reality because it only has a method toward understanding a part of reality. The true reality is that there is such a difference between inside and outside, and that is why dualism has been the principal ontology for thousands of years.

Scientism tells us that science has brought us beyond dualism, and that there is no longer a need for dualist ontology because science is the only method required for understanding reality, as you imply with that statement. But the true reality is that science alone, by its current method, cannot deliver to us adequate principles for drawing a line between where the outside ends and the inside begins. It looks at everything from the one direction, and cannot give us the principles required to designate properties of "the inside". And without adequate principles for what constitutes the inside, science cannot make an accurate differentiation between inside and outside.

On the other hand, dualism starts with a much more accurate description of reality, the fundamental difference between inside and outside, thereby providing us with the basic premise required for the differentiation, and a true understanding of reality. That's why dualism has been the standard ontology for thousands of years, and has only recently gone on the decline due to the increase of scientism.

It does seem to me that this problem either clicks with people or does not click. What exactly is the difference? Is it world view or experience or an actual blind spot? — Tom Storm

So I would say that the difference is a difference of "world view". Science takes from the inside (theory), and applies what is taken from the inside, to the outside (practise). The application effectively proves and disproves what has been given by the inside, and this is the scientific method. Scientism denies the importance of the inside, insisting that the scientific method is all that is required for the existence of knowledge, thereby creating a blind spot for itself, its reliance on the inside. So science does not create the blind spot, nor does science reject dualism, it's the scientistic philosophy which rejects dualism, dissolving the difference between inside and outside, thereby producing a philosophical (not a scientific) blind spot.

Actually it's your conclusion which is non-sequitur. The scientist, just like everyone else in the world is confronted with problems which are not scientific problems. I.e., many problems we face cannot be solved with the scientific method. So, that the problem is not a scientific problem does not mean that scientists are not confronted with it.

One can make a valid argument, free of sophistical persuasion, and still be wrong. — Paine

Sure, but we need to differentiate between being valid and being sound. From what I understand, valid logic means that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. This does not mean that the conclusion is necessarily correct, because the premises might not be correct. The truth or falsity of the premises affects the soundness of the conclusion. A sound conclusion requires both valid logic and sound premises.

So it's not that the neuroscientist has a "blindspot" as you stated here
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/771468
and actually that it is only a "hard problem" for idealist (or subjectivist) philosophers '. I agree. — 180 Proof

You seem to misunderstand. Neuroscience has a blind spot, I think that's obvious, as described by the analogy of @Olivier5. Having a blind spot, what I described as having a weakness, is not necessarily a problem though. So long as we all recognize our own weaknesses and we work around them, the weakness is not a problem.

When someone does not recognize one's own weakness, that will be a problem because the weakness will manifest in a mistake when unexpected. This is not "the hard problem" explicitly. The hard problem is something more like the difficulty of recognizing the weakness, seeing the blind spot.

I too find fallacies curious. — PhilosophyRunner

We could start with the basic fallacy, non sequitur, which means that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, or that the reasoning is not valid. I believe that what is meant by "valid", is that the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. Validity is based in this idea of necessity, that if the premises are true, it is impossible that the conclusion not be true. So the fallacy of non sequitur would be to misjudge this necessity, to attribute necessity when its not warranted, to say that a conclusion is necessary when it is not.

Can you give me an example of a neuroscientist you think is committing this error? — Isaac

I described the conditions which would qualify as an error. I have not intent to judge any particular individual unless you bring the person here to take part in the discussion so we could make that judgement. Sorry if this disappoints you.

So "the hard problem .." is not a scientific problem like I've stated. — 180 Proof

No not really, because the specific problem I stated is not explicitly "the hard problem". To tell you the truth, I still don't really understand the supposed "hard problem". I'm dualist so I don't see "the hard problem", it appears to be the consequence of unreasonable premises and poor ontology. I see a lot of hard headed people though.

I explained in the last post. The problem is when the incapacities (blind-spots, to use the term introduced by Wayfarer) of the science are not recognized by the scientist. So for instance, a neuroscientist who believes that neuroscience is giving a representation of consciousness, such that the neurological activity being studied is equivalent (or something like that) to consciousness, would be a problem. Look back to this analogy:

I know smoking kills; My attitude is generally a don't-give-a-damn one; My belief is quitting should mean I get to see my grandchildren; My practice, chain smoker. — Agent Smith

Let's see, this looks simple. Smoking kills, dying is not wanted, therefore do not smoke. It's very similar to: eating poison kills, and dying is not wanted, therefore do not eat poison. The latter rule is easy to obey, the former is not. Why? The issue is "habit". This is why Socrates and Plato argued that virtue is not a form of knowledge, contrary to the sophists who insisted that they were teaching virtue. The reality of "habit" makes us inclined to do things which we know are wrong. Therefore virtue consist of something more than just knowledge.

We can apply this principle to the process of reasoning. Even when it's been demonstrated to us, that a certain type of reasoning is fallacious, we will continue to do it, because reasoning is an habitual activity, and habits are not broken simply by recognizing them as undesirable.

.. which is only a "problem" for philosophers and not for neuroscientists. — 180 Proof

I'd say that's exactly why it's a problem, because they don't see it as a problem. If a person notices one's own deficiencies and incapability's, the person will have a healthy respect for those weaknesses, and work around them, knowing that they are weaknesses (blind spots). But when a person does not recognize one's own weaknesses, that person will forge ahead in blind confidence toward inevitable mishap.

Of course there is no appearance of a problem for the person forging ahead in blindness, at that time of forging ahead in blindness, the problem is only apprehended by the observer who understands what's going on.

If you select any text in a post, — Wayfarer

If I didn't already know how to use the quote button, I would not know what it means to "select" a text, and I'd be lost already.

Can you explain how to do the @so and so? I always forget and do it wrong.

I wonder about this, in both the construction of logic and the interpretation of evidence, especially as both logic and evidence based research are meant to come from a perspective of rationality and neutrality. In his discussion of logical fallacies, Withey points to many assumptions which are logical fallacies in philosophy arguments, including ad hominem arguments, appeal to emotion, faith, fear, tradition and nature, as well as hasty generalisations, moralistic fallacy and magical thinking, as well as straw man thinking. — Jack Cummins

I would be interested to investigate what constitutes a fallacy. Fallacy is defined as reasoning which is invalid, and Wikipedia for example, gives a list of specific forms of fallacy. Each named form is a type of reasoning which has been designated as invalid, therefore an unacceptable part of the reasoning process. We could say that these are mistaken actions in the reasoning process.

Now the question is, what justifies each specific named type of fallacy as being called a mistake (invalid). Since reasoning is a human action one might think that "mistake" would be justified through reference to some moral principles (Plato implies this with his conception of "the good"), but this does not seem to be the case. It appears like the characteristic of "fallacy" is meant to be supported with evidence. That is, if a certain course of reasoning can be shown to give unfavourable results, it is designated as mistaken, and receives a name as a fallacy. But even if this is true there is still a matter of stipulating what constitutes a favourable result, and what constitutes an unfavourable result.

There are many named types of fallacies, but before creating divisions of types I think it would be preferable to determine exactly what constitutes a mistake. We'd also need to separate inductive reasoning from deductive reasoning, because they are so different that mistakes of the one would not be the same as mistakes of the other.

Just this first paragraph is hopelessly confused. It seems to say that describing things is not to describe them... — Banno

Of course it seems like that to you, because you think that describing is an essential aspect of using mathematics. One cannot use mathematics without using it descriptively. So when I say that using mathematics is not necessarily descriptive, it appears to you like "describing things is not to describe them".

As I explained, that's where your essentialist attitude (the use of mathematics is descriptive in any possible world) misleads you. The essential property must be proven as such, and induction is fundamentally fallible.

Sure, counting can be describing, and mathematics can be used to describe things. But counting, and mathematical predictions are not necessarily descriptions. That's where the problem lies, and why I said "using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described".

This is the fallibility of essentialism. Essential features facilitate deductive conclusions, so we assume essences as necessary features, to facilitate logic. When the essences are eternal Platonic ideas, mistake is impossible. But if the named essential features are just the product of human judgement then they may not be true essential features, (like description, a posteriori, is not a true essential feature of mathematics, a priori), so the premise is unsound and the logic misleads.

So, back to the example. Heat diminishes in one body, and increases in another. Mathematical models can accurately predict this. But the process which you referred to as heat moving from one body to another, has not necessarily been described. The success of the mathematics doesn't provide you with the premise to even say that heat has moved from one to the other, as this in itself is a description which is unsupported. The mathematics shows coincident loss and gain of heat which is predictable.

All this to say it's high time neuroscience takes thinking as seriously as musicologists take music. No musicologist worth the name would use orchestra heat scans to explore Mozart. — Olivier5

That seems like a good analogy.

You've a very odd view on things, Meta. A mathematical model that makes accurate predictions is not for you a description. — Banno

Very obviously not, for the reasons I gave. Simply put, to count something is not to describe it. And no description is required for a count because the basic count is nothing but order. That's why there is a difference between quantity and quality.

The heat moves from one body to the other, in a process that can be described with mathematical predictability. — Banno

Using mathematics to make a prediction does not imply that the process has been described. That's why Thales could predict the solar eclipse without knowing the proper orbits. And it's also why quantum physicists can make accurate predictions without knowing what's going on.

Is banning someone as difficult as firing someone? I guess not, when the person is Bartricks.

That's the problem with monism. It has no proper ontological principles to separate what's within the mind from what's independent of the mind. So we have Banno insisting "the actual world is a possible world". And the ensuing sophistry of "the alternative would be to claim that the actual world is impossible".

Think systems in a state, such as a classic rock at time T. — noAxioms

By the principles of classic rock I would say there are many worlds for sure. Let time T be the time of John Lennon's "Imagine". Clearly there were many worlds at this time because the world "as one" is purely imaginary.

Don't you think it's the word "heat" which is the most metaphorical here? Afterall, you say heat is not in a body, nor is it actually transferred between bodies. It's simply an outdated term which no longer has any use in modern science because it does not jive with the way we understand the world by scientific principles. Yet it maintains descriptive power by way of metaphor, so it is still used. It's sort of like "the sun rises and sets". We know that "sunrise" is just a metaphor, and there is really a more complex scientific explanation as to what is really going on, but "sunrise" maintains its descriptive power through metaphor, regardless of the facts.

We can say that there are numerous possible ways to describe the very same thing. But as soon as we say that one of these ways is the correct way, or true way, we deny the status of "possible way" to the others, because they are now designated as incorrect ways. Then if used, they are metaphor. But if we adhere strictly to relativity theory, there can be no correct or true way, no literal truth, and all of the possible descriptions are metaphor.

Heat doesn't radiate. Heat is the transfer of thermal energy between two bodies.

There are three modes of heat transfer, conduction, convection and radiation. The transfer of heat by radiation needs no material carrier. Thermal radiation is electromagnetic radiation.

It is incorrect to speak of the heat in a body, because heat is restricted to energy being transferred.

Kirchhoff's law of thermal radiation is regarding a body at temperature T radiating electromagnetic energy. The body is not radiating heat, it is radiating electromagnetic energy.

The sun doesn't radiate heat, it radiates thermal radiation. If this thermal radiation doesn't hit a second body, as heat is the transfer of thermal energy between two bodies, no heat will be transferred.

When Theodore Parker said "Cities have always been the fireplaces of civilization, whence light and heat radiated out into the dark", he was using it as a poetic metaphor. — RussellA

If I understand you correctly, you say that heat is not in a body, it is the transferal of energy between bodies. However, thermal radiation, which is one mode of heat transferal cannot properly be called "heat", or even "heat energy", because if the thermal radiation does not reach another body there is no heat transferred, i.e. no body being heated. So heat transfers from one body to another, but it's never actually in a body. Nor is it in the radiation which transfer it from one body to another.

I assume then that "heat" refers to the activity which is the warming or cooling of a body. It is not necessarily a transferal of thermal energy between bodies, because a body can lose heat without another body gaining it. However, the body which loses heat never had heat within it in the first place, you say. "Heat" is really meaningless then, because if it referred to the activity of heating or cooling, it would necessarily be in the body, in order that the body could heat up or cool down. Or is "heat" just metaphor to you?

My interpretation is that the 'noumenal' refers to 'objects of intellect', i.e., facts that can be known directly by reason without appeal to the evidence of the senses. These were traditionally understood as a priori truths, arithmetical proofs, and the like - truths of reason, which could be known without recourse to empirical evidence, while 'phenomenal' refers to the domain of appearance. Hence the traditional philosophical distinction between reality and appearance which to all intents was declared obsolete by Russell and Moore's rejection of philosophical idealism. — Wayfarer

I think you and I have approached this issue before, but we were incapable of progressing very far. So I'm going to state some principles here in very simple terms (oversimplified perhaps). But if you understand and accept them, that will lay some groundwork toward understanding this difference between Plato and Kant.

What came out of Aristotle's critique of Plato, and Pythagorean idealism in general, was a separation, a division, between the forms of human intelligence (universals, mathematical formulae, etc.), and the independent Forms of the divine realm (God, and the angels).

Aristotle showed that human ideas exist only as potential prior to being actualized by the human mind. Then with his so-called "cosmological argument" he showed that anything eternal must be actual. Simply put, eternal potential could not actualize itself. This excluded human ideas (as based in potential) from the realm of the eternal. But at the same time, the cosmological argument necessitates an actuality (Form) which is prior in time to all material existence, matter being potential.

A thorough reading of Thomas Aquinas will show that he goes through great lengths to explain and expound on this separation. The separation between the forms which are understood by the human mind, and the separate independent Forms, is a consequence of the human intellectual objects (forms) being dependent on the material body, and the senses which are a part of the body. That's why he says that man cannot adequately know God (as a separate independent Form) until his soul is separated from the body, after death. The prior condition, why the soul has been punished by being united to a body in the first place points back to mysticism and the original sin.

So you can see that while Plato allowed that the human intellect can apprehend the separate independent Forms directly, Kant imposes the medium of the human body and its sense apparatus as a divisor between the human intellect and the noumena. However, Kant leaves a large unexplained area, as a priori intuitions, and the pure intuitions of space and time which are deemed necessary for the human mind to receive sense impressions..

1) Heat is the transfer of thermal energy between two bodies, not the flow of thermal energy between two bodies. — RussellA

Even this is problematic because current principles of physics allow that the second body, the receiving body, is not necessary. Radiation of heat from an object is a function of the temperature of the object itself, in relation to absolute zero, such that thermal radiation is not currently understood in terms of a temperature difference between two objects. I believe this principle provides for Kirchhoff's law and "blackbody" physics. Consequently heat can radiate off into nothingness, and from this comes the proposed heat death of the universe.

The original meaning of "noumenal" was derived from the root "nous" (intellect) - hence "the noumenal" was an "object of intellect" - something directly grasped by reason, as distinct from by sensory apprehension. It ultimately goes back to the supposed "higher" reality of the intelligible Forms in Platonism. — Wayfarer

I believe that the principal difference between Kant and Plato on this matter is that Plato believed that the human mind could have direct unmediated access to these independent intelligible objects (what Kant calls noumena), but Kant denied that the human mind could have any direct knowledge of the noumena. So for Kant all knowledge of the independent Forms is necessarily mediated through the sense appearances, phenomena, while Plato thought that the human mind could know the independent Forms directly.

One can now use different models with which this excitement can be described and concretized. We are still at the biological level here. Thus, the physical theory of dynamical systems could be transformed into a model in which that consciousness could be described as an attractor, the physical concept of information (not Shannon!) in connection with information or structure density describes the same dynamic 'center', or evolutionary graph theory can be described as an orientation (random) walk. — Wolfgang

I think you still have a huge gap to bridge. Physics employs "tensors", you suggest a biological "attractor". Don't you need to show how attractors effect tensors, or vise versa, if you want to set any sort of equation between the two?

I know, and I'm not worried, I just thought I'd mention how your specific use of words affected me.

See, I'm calling you a user too, by saying that you use words. But by specifying exactly what it is that you are using, I avoid that blackhole, or vacuum of nothingness (which triggers the imagination), that your use of "user" fell into in my mind.

I consider introspection a valid form of evidence, at least potentially. — T Clark

There's a big difference between saying that introspection is potentially a valid form of evidence, and having actually accepted any incidences of introspection as valid evidence. The former is a statement meant to imply an open mind, the latter provides proof as to whether the person's mind really is open.

he seems to be an interesting user. — javi2541997

That's a strange way to refer to a person. It carries some bad connotations in my mind which are very difficult to separate from the term.

The actual world is a possible world. The alternative would be to claim that the actual wold is impossible. — Banno

No, the alternative is to understand that the actual world is categorically different from the possible worlds. The former being the material world we live in, the latter being mental constructs. From this alternative perspective, to say that the actual world is a possible world is just a category mistake.

things known empirically that he claims are necessary truths. — Banno

This is mistaken too. Things known empirically cannot be taken as "necessary truths", because empirical knowledge is fallible.

As I explained to you, this is why we need the law of identity, to impose necessity on the material world. This law makes a statement about the temporal nature of reality, asserting that what is is necessarily as it is. It makes no claim about specific things known empirically, and its necessity is purely intuitive.

Following the fall of Paul, allegiance was transferred to the supreme God Plush, who is entirely indifferent and non-interventionist with respect to TPF. — Jamal

What was that guy's name who took over PF just to transform it into a cesspool? And whatever happened to that site, is it completely gone now?

It's consistent yet violates the law of identity?

Well, if it violates the law of identity, then it is by that very fact not consistent. — Banno

Banno, consistency is a relation between the axioms or premises employed. It does not rely on the law of identity. But consistency is commonly related to non-contradiction. If the law of identity is not one of the axioms employed, then the law of of identity is irrelevant to consistency when consistency is determined strictly by non-contradiction.

Here's a tree proof:
https://www.umsu.de/trees/#A=A — Banno

Ha ha, very funny. I hope you meant that as a joke.

Of course there is an actual world. It's one of the possible worlds. — Banno

You don't really believe this do you? What about the error you just pointed to, whereby possible worlds are reckoned to be an actual place? How would you reconcile these two, your claim that the actual world is one of the possible worlds, and your insistences that it is an error to think of a possible world as an actual place you might go to?

This is where Kripke shows his true colours, as a deceptive sophist. He says it's an error to think about a possible world as if it were an actual place that one could go to, yet it turns out that the only realistic way to interpret "possible worlds" is that one of them is the actual world where we live.
Kripke is anti-realist, but is trying to distance himself from anti-realism:

Saul Kripke described modal realism as "totally misguided", "wrong", and "objectionable".[27] Kripke argued that possible worlds were not like distant countries out there to be discovered; rather, we stipulate what is true according to them. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_realism

Notice, "we stipulate what is true according to them [the possibilities]." As I said, you are being lead firmly into anti-realism. You do not separate the representation (a logical possibility) from the actual world, as consisting of material objects with an inherent identity (by the law of identity). There is no such separation when you insist that the actual world is one of the possible worlds: https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/

This is the problem with Kripke's work which I pointed to already. If we accept his premises as coherent, we have only two ontological possibilities, Platonic realism, or anti-realism. If the "rigid designator" signifies a real object we have Platonic realism, because the logical possibilities are all ideas, mental fabrications, and we say that the mental fabrication is "real". But if we reject the reality of the mental fabrication, (logical possibility or possible world), then we have nothing independent of the mental fabrication, to call "the real world". The real world is just a mental fabrication, as you state here, "it's one of the possible worlds". This is firmly anti-realist, though sophistic authors will present it as a form of realism, "modal-realism", "model-dependent realism", etc..

The sophistry lies in the way that the supposed actual world is distinguished from the other possible worlds, in this anti-realist structure. To be consistent, all logical possibilities must be represented in the same way, as possibilities. The rigid designator signifies the same possible subject in each. So when you state a counterfactual such as "I might have put my slippers on. I didn't", you speak deceptively because you imply that one of the logical possibilities has a status which the other does not (what actually occurred). But you have no premise to make that conclusion. Therefore your statement is prejudiced and thereby compromised.

The issue is a logical dilemma. If one of the possible worlds is supposed to be the actual world, then we need some principles whereby we make that judgement, and decide what to believe as the truth. But if we introduce principles (premises) into this logical system whereby one logical possibility would be distinguished from the others as what is actually the case, that would give this one a status which the others do not have, rendering it as other than an equal possibility.

That's why we ought to reject Kripke's principles altogether. If every logical possibility is equally possible, as indicated by the definition of "rigid designator", and one of the possibilities is supposed to be the actual world, rather than a representation of the actual world, we have no real principles for judging the truth.

The possible world in which I have slippers on is not the one in which I have slippers off. Whether you like it or not, this is not a contradiction. — Banno

What is contradiction is saying that it is the "very same" person in the distinct possible worlds.

The modal logic is consistent, as Kripke and others have shown in their considerations of possible world semantics. — Banno

Yes, it's consistent because they violate the law of identity, as I described. The three fundamental laws of logic, identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle are all tied together. If the law of identity is violated, then contradiction can be taken as being consistent. Consistency is judged relative to the axioms employed. Remove the law of identity and all sorts of strange things become consistent.

But without the metaphysical baggage you attach. A=A is valid. It is a necessary truth. When you say stuff like — Banno

The law of identity is not valid. If you think it is, then show the logic which proves it.

Again, no, since the actual world is a possible world. That's been explained to you before. — Banno

OK, so you deny any form of realism. Each possible world is just as likely to be true as any other because there is no real, or actual world to look at for correspondence. And, when you stated that you did not put your slippers on, you were stating this as a possibility rather than as what you believed was actually the case. I apologize for calling you a liar, you are just an anti-realist and did not state your perspective properly.

By what principles do you propose that I choose one possible world over another, to believe as the truth? In one possible world you put slippers on, and in the other you did not. There is no actual world, so how do you propose that I decide which of the possibilities to believe as the truth? There is no law of identity, so this person "Banno" put slippers on , and the same person, "Banno" did not put slippers on, both at the same time, and there is no actual or real person with that name. Where do I find a hint of truth here?

Anyway, I hope it is clear to others that Meta's account is quite at odds with Kripke's, — Banno

There's no doubt about that. I thought I made that clear in my first post on this thread.

Yeah, it is me. That's implicit in "I might have put my slippers on". It's a sentence about me, not about someone else. — Banno

But it's false, you did not put your slippers on. When you say "I might have put my slippers on" you are lying because you know that you did not. Therefore the statement doesn't serve to identify you, it can only mislead if we think that it does. That's where the problem lies. We ought not think that falsities serve to identify. The person identified in that statement as "I" is not a real person, because the statement is false, and the person stating it is not truthful because the real person did not put slippers on, and knows this.

And from there, your account goes astray. What follows in your post is erroneous. — Banno

This only follows if what you say is the truth. But it's not. You lie when you say ""I might have put my slippers on" when you know that you did not put your slippers on. Therefore the "I" does not refer to you personally, it refers to a deceptive image of you, a fiction. And no matter how you insist that it does refer to you, you are lying and it's all a deception.

So be it, if your will is to insist on deceiving.