Actually the "idea" got reduced to the way that the word may be used. Endless possibilities for use got reduced to "arbitrary" actual use. I don't really care about any designations of "ism", so the warning that I'm on the road to behaviorism doesn't phase me. But it's surely not what I'm driving toward, so something's misdirected in your characterization.

If the word may be used in any way one wants, then how is it that the idea of equality is not arbitrary? Put it this way, there's a word I can use, "equal", to assign a relation between two things, the relationship of "equality". I can assign that relationship to any two things I want. How is it that the meaning of this idea "equality" is not completely arbitrary? What it means to be equal could be anything I want.

No one really knows exactly whats going on at the quantum level. If you simply follow the math and avoid all this metaphysical stuff, you do well at predicting. Apparently. Once the science popularizers get into the game, however, you see the Earth in basketball nets. Best to let the Q-physicists argue it out. My opinion. FWIW. Not much. — jgill

Leave the metaphysics to be done by the physicists? Surely that's a mistake. Metaphysics consists of different principles which physicists have not been trained in.

It seems germane to the topic. — Wayfarer

I agree. At first glance, it appears to me like "equal" is a completely arbitrary designation. But such a designation must be justifiable, so it requires a reason. However, the prerequisite "reason" may be extremely variable, from a specific purpose, to an underlying similarity, or a combination of both. This leads back toward "equal" being an arbitrary designation.

But it’s motion IS relative to material bodies, or rather relative to any inertial frame including the one in which the material body is stationary. The second premise says that directly. — noAxioms

Try looking at it this way noAxioms. By the principle of relativity no body can be truly at rest unless all bodies are at rest. So "inertial frame" is a sort of arbitrary designation requiring only constancy, uniformity. Motion which stays the same as time passes is the principle of relativity's "rest". And as you say, the motion of light "c" is relative to any inertial frame. But "inertial frame" is a feature of the theory, it is a theoretical observational tool derived from the uniformity observed in the passage of time. What defines the "inertial frame" is the uniform, constant passage of time. Therefore the speed of light is not grounded in, or relative to any material bodies, it is relative to the defining feature of the "inertial frame", which is the uniform passage of time.

I understand your point, however the specific contrast being made was between an observer qua reference frame and an observer qua rational agent. Only the latter can be understood as a user of quantum theory, and thus active in that sense.

Unfortunately, I was not able to easily follow the rest of your post. Perhaps you could concisely state your claim and quote specifically from SEP what you're arguing for (or against). — Andrew M

I figured you wouldn't easily follow the post. It's an unconventional perspective, therefore adjustments to fundamental assumptions are required for understanding. So I'll give you the gist in a more straight forward way.

The first point is that I do not accept the proposed contrast between "observer qua reference frame and an observer qua rational agent". All observations are human (rational agent) based activities. We can however, make a separation between the types of tools used by human beings in observation. We can distinguish the use of theories as tools, from the use of material objects as tools. It's easy to see that these two types of tools are fundamentally different, so this provides good grounds for a separation of distinct types of observational tools.

So we can start with the "frame of reference", and understand this as a theoretical tool intended to aid in the interpretation of information received in observation. It is a feature of basic relativity theory which allows for choice in observational interpretation. All that is required is a valid "rest frame", or in the terms of the referred article, "inertial frame". The rest frame provides a grounding for the application of temporal measurement through the assumption of uniformity or constancy in the existence of mass relative to the passing of time. This is what is required for Newton's first law to be applicable. This law being a description of the existence of material bodies relative to the passage of time. So whenever the motion of an object is constant relative to that of another, we have the means for representing those objects relative to an independent measurement of time, and therefore a choice of inertial frames. Each is a valid inertial frame as constant relative to an independent measurement of time.

The point I made in the last post is that special relativity effectively robs us of that choice of inertial frames by denying the validity of the independent measurement of time. Instead, it assigns an absolute value to the speed of light. There is still the illusion of a choice of inertial frames, but any such choice must be rectified in relation to light, so the absolute value assigned to light actually nullifies any truth to such a choice.

Under special relativity the passage of time is not represented as relative to the inertial frame (as Newton's first law describes it with the constant, or uniform existence of mass), it is relative to the electromagnetic activity. In other words, the passage of time is not understood as, and measured as a constant relative to moving bodies, it is understood as a constant relative to the activity of light. The important point is that this means that there is no true inertial frame. Mass was defined as the temporal constant, now light gives the temporal constant. The concept of "inertial frame" is rendered invalid because no frame of reference can be constant. Each frame is moving relative to light, and time is understood as relative to light, so there can be no valid rest frame. The result is that uniform or constant motion, the property of an inertial frame, which is how Newton relates the passage of time to the existence of mass, is not a valid concept. Therefore there is no valid concept whereby the passage of time is related to the existence of mass.

That, as I understand it, describes the theoretical aspect of observational physics. There are two distinct theoretical frameworks for interpreting information received in observation, the Newtonian perspective of "inertial frame", of the temporal continuity of mass, and the Einsteinian perspective which I'll call "energy". One bases the passage of time, therefore the standards for understanding time, in the constant uniform existence of mass, the other bases the passage of time in electromagnetic activity, "energy". There is an inconsistency between these two theoretical tools, which is displayed by the concept of "relativistic mass".

From here, we can move toward understanding the other type of observational tool, the material objects which are employed as aids in receiving information. Consider an observational glass like a magnifying glass. Interpreting information received through the use of such a tool requires an extra layer of theory. We need theory as to how the light is affected by the glass prior to being observed by the human eye. This is the theory which goes into the production of the glass. Understanding the theory by which the glass affects the light, and by which the glass was produced, is an important feature required for a proper interpretation of the information received through the glass.

Now consider the equipment used in typical wave-particle experiments, detectors and things like that. Within the equipment itself, there is built-in interpretive theory. So the information received by the observational equipment is interpreted according to the applied theory, and presented to the human being as already interpreted, an interpretation based in that theory. And, as explained above, we have two inconsistent theories with respect to temporal information, the inertial frame perspective (Newtonian), and the Einsteinian perspective, "energy". Therefore it is very important that we know exactly how (by which theories) the equipment interprets temporal information.

On the contrary, he brought light to be included in the principle of relativity, that it moving at c was such a law of physics that was unchanging, part of the principle of relativity. — noAxioms

I believe this is an improper interpretation noAxioms. The principle of relativity makes all motions equally relative to each other. To stipulate that one movement, "c", is exempt from that principle, is to remove it from the application of that principle, "relativity", and give it special status, and we are left with "special relativity".

I see it as bringing light into PoR, and you see it as being taken out. — noAxioms

I think you are "seeing" it incorrectly then. Prior to Einstein there appeared to be no way to make the motion of light compatible with the principle of relativity. It was a practical problem involving the difficulty in measuring the speed of light. If light was included within the application of the relativity principle, then the person on the embankment, and the person in the train car, would have to measure the light from the same source as having a different speed. Einstein saw that as very impractical, (and of course the difference is very small in proportion), so he suggested that we just stipulate that the speed of light is always the same, and we produce principles to make adjustments to the different frames of reference accordingly.

Therefore, he does not bring light "into PoR" as you suggest. He leaves light as exempt from PoR and makes adjustments to PoR to allow that light can be related to it. So we have the substance of material bodies (mass) understood as obeying the principle of relativity, and light which is in a separate category of substance which does not obey relativity. Special relativity states the principle by which these to distinct substances can be related to each other. General relativity works out the details of this relation. The problem is that the whole idea that we can employ the relativity principle, and arbitrarily exempt something like light from it, for simplicity sake, is fundamentally flawed. That special exemption produces all sorts of problems which cannot be resolved. The result is two distinct and fundamentally incompatible (evidenced by "relativistic mass") temporal perspectives, space and time from the theoretical framework of light, and space and time from the theoretical framework of mass.

But it’s motion IS relative to material bodies, or rather relative to any inertial frame including the one in which the material body is stationary. The second premise says that directly. — noAxioms

You are using "relative" ambiguously, and you need to be careful not to equivocate. In the relativity principle, the motion of bodies is "relative" in the sense that velocity varies according to the frame of reference. But the motion of light is constant, "an absolute" in relation to the motion of material bodies, not variable or relative in that sense. Therefore it is not "relative" in the sense of the relativity principle. So when you say the motion of light is "relative to material bodies" you are using "relative" in a way other than it is used in relativity theory, because every body regardless of its relative motion (according to relativity principle) is essentially at rest "relative" to light.

But those are all frame effects, not observer effect. For instance, a clock coming at you fast will tick slow in your inertial frame, but it will be observed to run fast. Observer effects and frame effects are not the same.
There are objective demonstrations of say length contraction, contraction that is real regardless of observer or choice of frame. That makes length contraction part of ‘a true perspective’, if that phrase is to have any meaning. — noAxioms

I think our respective understanding of terms is too far apart for me to properly address this, but I'll try anyway. To put it simply, the observer chooses the frame, so "frame effects" are observer effects. They are effects produced by interpretive theory. Special relativity impairs the observer's capacity to employ the relativity principle by producing those special effects. Those effects are the result of giving light the special status which exempts it from the relativity principle, yet still allowing light a special relation to the bodies whose motion the relativity principle is applicable to.

See, the ace is not a one, it's an ace. In some cases a person might be able to use the ace as a one. But having multiple possibilities is just part of what makes an ace an ace rather than a one.

Since I can't see how any of you have addressed anything I've actually said, I have no response to make. — Janus

If you do not grasp that a priori truths, and universal rules of logic like the law of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, make statements about internal thoughts rather than particular external objects, and that these universal principles are much more accurately confirmed, and certain, than statements made about particular external objects, then we'll just have to leave it at that.

No, not the axiom! Being axiomatic is considered being self-evident; but it is clearly not self-evident that aces beat two's! — Banno

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident. — Banno

In philosophy axioms are supposed to be self-evident truths. But this is not the case in mathematics. In mathematics axioms are simply stipulated. This is what provides for the field of "pure mathematics", there are no such restrictions concerning the production of axioms. In philosophy we want to have basic rules which restrict the creation of rules (must derive from what is self-evident), but the mathematician wants to create rules in a way which is complete freedom from all rules. In general though, the mathematical axioms produced are reflections of practise already in process. This ensures that they will turn out to be useful. So practise usually precedes rules, and the rules are formulated to confine the practise to activity which has already proven successful.

Alternatively, when the deuce-holder yells,"two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces," I yell "aces high!" Deuce-holder then yells, "numbers don't lie!" I then yell, "legal stipulations trump common sense!" — ucarr

The poker analogy is completely out of place. Aces are not ones, just like jacks are not elevens, queens are not twelves, and kings are not thirteens. Poker is a pattern based game, not a math based game.

Yes, and excellent post MU. — Andrew M

Thank you Andrew. Compliments are very rare around here so they are appreciated when received.

The notion of an observer gained importance in physics already before the development of quantum theory. One of its most prominent appearances is in Einstein’s original article on special relativity [27]. Here the “Beobachter” plays a key role, for quantities such as time and spatial locations are only defined relative to them. Special and general relativity still portray the observer in a passive light — Testing quantum theory with thought experiments, p4-5 - Nurgalieva and Renner

I believe that the notion of a 'passive' observer is actually inconsistent with relativistic physics. Passive observation must be from a "rest frame', or else it cannot be said to be "passive". And, the position of "rest" provides a foundation for the concepts of "mass" and "inertia" as the defining features of rest.
These features are described as the resistance to change. So "rest" implies a special power or capacity, resistance to change, which is the capacity to continue to be at rest. We can say that staying the same as time passes, i.e. 'being at rest', is the base attribute of mass, and the larger the quantity of mass, the greater the capacity to resist change. However, under Newton's laws, any constant motion is equivalent to being at rest in its resistance to change. This allows for relativity theory, and true "rest" is fundamentally incompatible with relativity theory such that a designation of "rest", or a "rest frame" is basically arbitrary. This feature is what provides for the wide ranging applicability and the great practical power of relativity theory.

Since the other necessary condition of "rest", or "staying the same", is "as time passes", the arbitrariness by which we can designate "rest", which relativity theory provides us with, also has an effect on our capacity to measure time. The position of "rest" is the base observational perspective from which change is noted, and recorded , providing the principles for measuring time. If "rest" ever became truly, or absolutely arbitrary, then our measurements of the passage of time would also be absolutely arbitrary.

The precepts of special relativity place a limit to the arbitrariness of rest by using the speed of light as a cap or a ceiling to the maximum velocity a thing can be moving, and still be "at rest", or a "rest frame". But this produces some "subtle differences" (as mentioned in my last post) with respect to our understanding of mass and inertia. Strictly speaking, through true application of special relativity, a photon moving at the speed of light cannot have inertia, or mass, because it cannot be at rest relative to any object. Therefore it cannot provide what is required for a rest frame. Nor can it have the capacity to resist change, nor any temporal duration of existence, these being the attributes of mass.

But "energy", as the defining attribute of a photon, something necessarily in motion, (instead of mass as the defining attribute of something at rest), is truly observed to have temporal duration, persistence. This requires that the photon be assigned a "relativistic mass" to allow that energy is a temporal constant. In my understanding, the difference between rest mass (invariant mass) and relativistic mass accounts for the difference in how the passage of time is conceptualized from the two different observational perspectives. These being the perspective of energy, and the perspective of mass. From the observational perspective of mass, the passage of time is relative. From the observational perspective of energy the passage of time is absolute.

So any particle which is assigned a velocity that is measured relative to the speed of light (measured as moving energy), rather than measured relative to other particles (measured as moving mass), requires a "relativistic mass". This means the particle of energy's mass (resistance to change) is determined according to an absolute principle of temporal duration (energy), rather than a relative principle of temporal duration (mass). It ought to be evident to you, that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two observational perspectives. These two are the perspective of energy , (employing an absolute conception of the passage of time), and the perspective of mass, (employing a relative conception of the passage of time).

There is a good article on inertia in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If you take the time to read it, you might notice the incompatibility described above, along with the conventional resolution, explained in sections 2.2 - 2.5. You'll see that the resolution is found in how general relativity employs "rotation". Rotation is an ancient concept (described by Aristotle as eternal circular motion) which allows for a central point of rest (absolute), with motion relative to that absolute.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-iframes/#QuasInerFramNewtCoroVI

There's an 'observer effect' in Einsteinian relativity which nobody objects to. — Andrew M

The "observer effect" is actually the significant feature of relativity theory in general. I believe Galileo showed that observations of planetary motions based on a Ptolemaic description could accurately be transformed to be consistent with observations based on a Copernican description. The principle of invariance demonstrates consistency between the two. The 'observer effect' comes about as a result of the subtle differences between the two, where exceptions to the laws need to be applied. We can call these exceptions the effect of observational perspective, hence 'observer effect'. So one observational perspective will deal with the subtle differences, making exceptions to the principles, in a way which is completely different from another. Analysis of this 'observer effect' can guide us in judging one observational perspective as better than the other (Copernican is better than Ptolemaic).

What Einstein does with "special relativity" is to give 'special' status to light, freeing it from the principles of relativity, to allow that its motion is not relative to the motions of material bodies. This amplifies the 'observer effect' by greatly increasing the possibilities for subtle differences. Now there is a need for principles like time dilation, length contraction, relativistic mass, and things like that. These concepts are the 'observer effect', the need to adjust fundamental principles of measurement to allow for the possibility of the multiple observational perspectives implied by relativity theory. It is very important to understand these differences if one wants to consider the likelihood of a true perspective.

It seems to me that both of you are using unnecessarily complex language coupled with inherently inadequate dichotomies to discuss the subject matter. — creativesoul

I have been trying to adhere to the dichotomy proposed by Janus in an effort to show that the application of this dichotomy is not useful toward a true understanding of reality. Janus proposed a separation between knowledge of external, public things, like material objects, and knowledge of internal, private things, like thoughts, sensations and feelings. The knowledge of external is called "science" and the knowledge of internal was given a lessor value, like subjective opinion.

Then Janus proposed that one's knowledge of external things would be more reliable than one's knowledge of internal things, because it is in some way "confirmable". I've argued that Janus has this backward. All knowledge of external things is dependent on principles derived from internal knowledge, and is therefore only as reliable as the knowledge of internal things which supports it. This is commonly expressed in terms of a priori/a posteriori.

Of course each observation of an object of sense is particular, and the details of those observations in general are publicly confirmable. — Janus

We'd better get this clear, an observation may be of a particular, if that is what is observed, a particular. But I do not think we should jump to the conclusion that an observation is itself a particular. Observations, I think are better described as relations, and relations require more that one particular. And an observation is more like a relation than a particular. Therefore I really don't think it's correct to call an observation a particular.

If I say "This car is made of steel" this assertion can be publicly checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. If I say " This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel" this assertion is not publicly checkable and cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. That, in a nutshell, is all I'm saying. — Janus

You are making my argument easy for me Janus, by demonstrating the faults of your position. Look, to confirm your proposition "this car is made of steel", I need to know what you mean by these words. And of course your thoughts are not publicly available to me, except through your words. I could point out to you that the car might be partially made of steel so we ought not either confirm or deny your proposition. Therefore, in reality, despite what you say, your proposition is not easily confirmed or disconfirmed. But of course, you could proceed to employ a Banno style trick of sophistry and insist that what you meant is that the parts made of steel are made of steel. But then the external public thing would play no role at all in the confirmation. We'd base the confirmation on logic alone.

On the other hand, your proposition "This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel", is very easy to confirm. This is because it is an undeniable truth that we think about the words we are saying. Even talking in one's sleep involves a strange sort of thinking which occurs when we are sleeping, dreaming. Therefore you cannot say "a car made of steel" without thinking about a car made of steel, and it is confirmed that the thought you were having when you said "a car made of steel" was about a car made of steel.

From this, it ought to start becoming clear to you that statements about internal things are much easier to confirm, to a far higher degree of certainty than statements about external things. This is why valid deductive logic provides us with a very high degree of certainty. And when our conclusions tend to faulter its because of weakness in the premises, unsoundness in premises which are often inductive conclusions made from observations of external things. So a proposition like "the parts which are made of steel are made of steel" produces a very high degree of certainty, and is easily confirmable, because it does not rely on any external observations, only an internal process of thinking logically.

We know no more now about Anaximander's notion of "Apeiron" than we did at first utterance; we know no more now about Plato's notions of "Forms" or "The Good" than we did at first utterance; we know no more now about Aristotle's notion of "Eudaimonia" than we did at first utterance; we know more now about Kant's notion of "Categorical Imperative" than we did at first utterance; and we know no more now about Leibniz's notion of "Monads" or Spinoza's notion of "Substance" than we did at first utterance. — Zettel

Speak for yourself Zettel. Employing a vague unqualified "we" like this, is rather pointless.

Do you or anyone else here ever post anything other than unsupported sentiment? — Zettel

It's one thing to state an unsupported sentiment as "I believe...", but quite another thing to state an unsupported sentiment as "we know...". The former may be a truth, the latter is a falsity.

Why'd you poke me buddy? I'm trying to get some work done here. Hey, wanna go for a beer?

Empirical observations in general, any observation concerning the characteristics of objects of the senses are publicly available. These observations are definitely confirmable. If I am with ten people, looking at a red apple with a yellow stripe, I can ask all those people what unusual feature they see on that apple and predictably they will most likely all agree it is the yellow stripe. — Janus

This is a category mistake. Characteristics of objects "in general" are not publicly available. What is publicly available is particular instances or circumstances. And, we each observe these from a different contextual perspective. The generalizations which you refer to are produced from inductive reasoning. There is a problem with inductive reasoning, known as "the problem of induction". This means that your claim that these "observations in general .. are definitely confirmable" is definitely false.

If I am entertaining a particular thought and I ask you what I am thinking you cannot tell me. That's the difference between private thoughts, feelings and sensations and publicly available objects of the senses. I shouldn't have to point this out to you since it is obviously the case, as attested by everyday experience. — Janus

All that you are showing me is a good example of a category mistake. I really don't think you properly grasp your own proposed division between publicly available objects of the private sensations, thoughts, and feelings.

You portray "observations" as publicly available, when they need to be classed as "private thoughts, feelings, and sensations". If you would take the time to classify things correctly, according to your own proposed categories, you would see that "observations" ought to be classed as private. Therefore "observations" are only confirmable in the same way that any other private sensations, thoughts, or feelings are confirmable, (i.e. without certainty). And your proposed division between science of the external and knowledge of the internal cannot be supported in the way that you propose.

If you propose a separation between external objects which are public, and internal feelings, thoughts and sensations which are private, then all observations, (which are thoughts), must be classed as internal, regardless of whether they are observations of external features or of internal features. And, all we have as the means for confirming or validating observations is other internal, private things. Reference to "external objects" does absolutely nothing for validation or confirmation of these observations (which are internal) because all we have to work with is an internal representation of what an "external object" is.

So a person might produce an internal, private idea as to what an external public object is, and proceed to use this idea in an effort to validate or confirm observations (as other internal private ideas), but this is just an idea of an external object. Therefore the assumed real, external, public objects, if they really exist, do nothing for the validation or confirmation of the ideas. And the idea which you hold, that somehow the real existence of real external, public objects, is making the science of external features somehow more reliable than the science of internal features, is actually the opposite of what is really the case. This idea, this internal feature of you, is actually misleading you. So your assumption about how these real external things serve to confirm your internal thoughts and feelings, as science of the external, is a false premise, which produces within your internal thoughts and feelings a false confidence. And false confidence produces unreliable actions and unreliable science.

Furthermore, there are numerous other internal dispositions and inflictions which will taint and influence the science of the assumed external public objects, in many other ways. This is why the science of the external is only as reliable or dependable as the science of the internal. If we do not analyze and isolate the way that different internal attitudes affect the science of the external, we will not apprehend the resulting deficiencies of the external science. So it ought to be clear to you, that any science of the external, public objects, can only obtain to a level of reliability provided for, or allowed by, the science of the internal, private thoughts and feelings.

The public/private distinction breaks down completely when the 'private' part becomes existentially dependent on the public part. — creativesoul

Exactly, in reality, the public is dependent on the private, and we could exchange public and private for external and internal here as well.. That is what Janus denies and refuses to acknowledge. As much as we like to model the private as emergent from the public, thereby making the public prior to the private, "the public" is nothing more than an idea and is therefore fundamentally dependent on the private. In other words, our minds have no way to get out of one's own mind, to take the perspective of the public as prior to the private, despite evidence which indicates that the public ought to be modeled as prior. That is a basic defect of the human mind, we intuitively apprehend that the public must be prior, yet the mind cannot get outside itself to make this intuitive perspective a true perspective. Therefore any such model is defective, because the private produces a model whereby the public is prior to the private which creates it.

Since it is impossible for the human mind to get outside itself, our only recourse for a true understanding of the nature of reality, is to adopt the perspective that the private is prior to the public, as the true perspective, even though it is counterintuitive. So any proposal which puts the public as prior to the private, must be apprehended as a base falsity, a counterfactual premise, proposed for some purpose other than understanding the true nature of reality.

Not at all; it speaks to the fact that our perceptual organizations are similar enough, and that the minutest details of external objects do not depend on who is observing them. — Janus

So what's your argument then? A bit of rock in the ground here is "similar enough" to a bit of rock in the ground on the other side of the world, that we can make conclusions and state "scientific" principles which apply to both. And, our "perceptual organizations" must be "similar enough" in order that a multitude of us can agree on these details. On what basis do you conclude that we can make valid scientific conclusions about the similarity in the rocks but not about the similarity in the internal perceptual organizations?

Some observations may be available only to those who are trained to know what to look for and what they are looking at, but all scientific observations are publicly available in principle. — Janus

You are missing the point. The observations are only made by those participating in the performance of the experiment. Therefore the observations are not publicly available. You can read someone else's observations, but to assume that the other person's observations are the same as yours would be in that situation, is to presuppose the principle you stated above, that "our perceptual organizations are similar enough". And if that presupposition is true then there is no problem for me to make scientific conclusions about your internal perceptual organizations based on an analysis of my own internal disposition.

The other possible way that observations are available to the public is if we follow the stated method to replicate, and do our own experimentation. If you've ever done this though, you likely have found out that we commonly do not really notice the same "minutest details". That's a faulty assumption on your part, and correcting it is what leads to the hard problem.

Problem is your and my "internal self" are different "objects", whereas our observations of say an apple can be confirmed down to the minutest details. — Janus

Yes, so the fact that our observations of external things can be confirmed down to the "minutest details" only proves that your and my internal self are the same down to the minutest details. That we are actually distinct is not very relevant to this purpose, because we are the same down to the minutest details. And when we produce general principles through inductive reasoning, as is the practise of science, differences in the minutest details are not relevant.

But there is a difference between phenomenology and the empirical sciences because in the case of the latter the objects of observation are publicly available, — Janus

Again, you are incorrect here. When a scientist performs an experiment, only those present have access to observe the "objects" which are observed. Scientific experiments are not publicly available. Yet the scientists establish conclusions and principles which can be applied publicly, to many other objects, and other experiments, which may be different, by way of minute details. These minute differences are deemed by us to be irrelevant when applying these principles. And so the minute differences between your and my internal self ought to be deemed irrelevant in a similar way.

Phenomenology is an empirical science, as "empirical" means from observation, or experience. It is just a different field of science, distinct from most other fields, and not nearly as far developed. It is not as developed because the pragmatic forces which motivate the human being's inclination to study, have not inclined vast numbers of people toward studying this field.

The difference between "good honest observations" of subjective experience and scienitifc observation of the external world is that the latter can be checked and corroborated, while the former cannot. — Janus

This is incorrect. You tell me your observations of your internal self, and I compare them with mine. There is nothing more problematic then scientific observations here. The idea that scientific observations can be corroborated by a number of people, presupposes consistency between your observational capacities and mine. So, by that same presupposed consistency, we may corroborate our internal observations just as well.

How can I know that even my own introspection is accurate? — Janus

How is this different from sense observations. How can you know that your senses are accurate? Description is simply a matter of putting words to what is noticed. We commonly make mistakes, regardless of whether the described things are internal or external.

It's simply the case that words have been used far more for the purpose of referring to external things than internal, for pragmatic purposes. So language has developed further that way. All we need to do is properly develop our use of words for referring to internal things, to give us a similar degree of knowledge of the inside. Look, you think that we can corroborate between us concerning descriptions of external things, assuming consistency between us. So you assume that we sense external things in a similar way as each other. Sensing is carried out by organs and the nervous system, which also provide internal feelings. So, why wouldn't there be similar consistency between internal things, such that we can corroborate internal observations?

"The thought process that went into building [social media] applications, Facebook being the first of them … was all about: ‘How do we consume as much of your time and conscious attention as possible?’ — Baden

The best way to consume as much of a person's time as possible is to encourage them to "poke" as many people as they feel comfortable poking, and to poke them over and over again as much as possible. Encouraging people to poke each other will surely exploit their vulnerabilities.

It's not really a matter of what's on the mind of the singer, but more the image that they want to conjure up in the minds of the audience. So you might consider Kiss, Alice Cooper, Ozzy, etc.. On the female side, there seems to be pressure from the machine (industry leaders), to present the women as desirable in some way, and this does not really exist on the male side.

There is no invisible thing associated with consciousness. There is no soul, as some envision, that is the essence of consciousness. There are only the outward signs associated with being you or me, and that is what is meant by consciousness, as I see it. Even in my investigation into NDEs, it's still the same thing, i.e., you can ask the same questions, and the answers would still be the same. — Sam26

It is when we move from the question of what is consciousness, to the question of why is there consciousness, i.e. ask for the cause, that we are incline to conclude that there must be something like a soul. And, seeking causes is a scientific endeavour.

The problem is that observations alone can only take us so far and we want to know about things outside the range of direct sense contact. So we take a collection of observations, apply inductive reasoning to make general principles, and we employ those principles as premises for deductive logic.
In this way we proceed toward understanding things outside the range of immediate sensation.

There appears to be two principle ways that things can be "outside" the range of sense contact, spatially and temporally. But already we can apprehend a fault in this premise. Spatially, we can see a need to allow for things which are out of range of sense contact by being spatially "inside". So the use of "outside" is prone to misleading us. And when we relate space to time, and we look for the cause of change, we look to the outside of the thing which is changing (in the Newtonian way of being acted on by a force). This inclination renders our minds blind to causation from inside.

We can see this problem quite clearly in the application of systems theory. There is stipulated a within the system, and an outside the system, therefore a proposed boundary between the system and other, its environment.. The system itself (within the system), will continue its existence according to Newtonian laws, unless acted on by something outside the system. But this provides no principle for distinction or separation, between an external boundary and an internal boundary. So all causes of change to the system are from external sources. This is due to our conventional conceptions of space which only allow for space which is external to a point, and do not allow for space which is internal to a point. We have no principle to allow for changes to the system which come across the internal boundary. So these are commonly represented as unknowns coming across the external boundary.

I'm just curious about a fact that's obvious given but a moment's reflection - why are there no aesthetically-challenged female singers? — Agent Smith

No challenge is too great for the cosmetic industry, so there is no such thing as "aesthetically-challenged".

I think pageantry has always been an important part of musical performance. You'll find that it pervades and persists throughout time, from the liturgical dramas of Gregorian chant, to Opera, and the theatrics of classic rock concerts. The form of pageantry employed is always changing, just like the music itself, that's the result of the desire to be original.

I mean since scientific observations are publicly available whereas consciousness is not publicly observable it's hard to see how it could work. — Janus

There is no basic problem here. All that is required is good honest observations, and this is fundamental to science anyway. So, in the same way that a person copies another person's scientific procedures to verify the honesty of the reported observations, we can verify another person's internal observations by making our own in a similar way.

The issue is not that internal observations of consciousness are fundamentally unscientific, the issue is that the scientific community has been mostly disinterested in internal observations. So these forms of science are pushed to the fringes. The scientists are motivated to produce more and more creature comforts into higher and higher levels of luxury, because that's where the money is. There is no money in learning about the true internal nature of consciousness and the intellect so view scientists will work on these observations.

Is lying, deceiving, creating a false front animalistic, a base instinct? It’s true that animals and plants have evolved various strategies of deception, but this would seem to be quite different from human strategies. The difference as I see it is that our strategies are consciously planned, rather than evolutionary mechanisms concealed from our own awareness. — Joshs

The way I see it is that there is in human beings, a base animal instinct toward false fronts. It may be derived from competitive factors, fear, or whatever, we cannot adequately make conclusions here as to "why". Being at a very base level, you might not be inclined to call this "deception", because you might not see it as a conscious, intentional thing. However, the subconscious interplays with the conscious greatly, continually, and it affects the conscious in ways that a person practising introspection cannot perceive, or apprehend. I can apprehend through introspection that there are subconscious causes involved in my actions, but I cannot grasp the specifics.

Further, I believe that at the conscious level we are taught through moral training, that the best approach to subconscious influences is to confront them all, and filter them. So for instance, when a subconscious emotive force inclines me toward action, I ought to arrest that motivating force and assess the action which it is inclining me toward, as to whether it is bad or good, before proceeding. If I fail in this conscious 'arrest and assess', I may fly off into a fit of passion.

From these two factors, the base inclination to deceive, and the need to 'arrest and assess' the base inclinations, we can conclude that if one's moral training in the 'arrest and assess' feature is not completely adequate, the person may develop habitual actions of consciously deceiving others.

We deceive for many specific reasons: to avoid hurting someone we care about (this relates to the moral training you mentioned), to protect our own ego from the feeling of shame and failure, to defend ourselves from enemies. What all these forms of planned deception have in common is that they depend on a gap in mutual understanding. We only feel the need to lie in circumstances where the truth will not be understood by the other the way we understand it. — Joshs

As I mentioned above, and this seems to be a critical point in my discussion with you, I strongly believe that we cannot properly apprehend the subconscious motivations to our actions. Because of this, we cannot say what are the specific reasons why we are inclined to deceive. And the inclination to act is prior in time to the conscious willing of an act, so the conscious will cannot go back on the inclination to act, and arrest it, prior to it inclining the act. So the only power that the conscious will has is to arrest the inclination to act, prior to acting, allowing deliberation and assessment of the act which it is inclined toward.

The critical 'gap in understanding' which results in the immoral act of deception, is not a gap in understanding between people, but a gap in understanding within the person performing the deceptive act. This is the gap between the act which one is about to carry out, and the motivations for that act. As described above, we cannot apprehend, grasp, understand, or know, the motivating factors, in any reasonable sense of these words. This is because the conscious mind has at it's disposal, a grasp of the act which it is inclined toward, but a very minimal grasp of the motivating factors, being derived from the subconscious.

The fact that we can lie so easily and freely with our social media ‘friends’ is an indication that we know we have less at stake emotionally with them than we do with our closest companions. — Joshs

This I believe is a failure of the ability of our moral training to keep abreast with the technological advancements which provide for many new possible forms of communion. The application of the 'arrest and assess' method has not kept up with all the different new forms of technology. So for example, I being old-school, living prior to the advancement of computers, find it somewhat easier to be freer to withhold information from the other, or even use misleading speech, over the telephone, than I do face-to-face. I believe I developed a face-to-face attitude of strict 'arrest and assess' producing a very restricted freedom when speaking to my parents and family, but later, when I picked up the phone, there was no such training on how to use the phone, and I found myself with more freedom to speak.

But what about those who have not developed the skills to form deep , intimate connections with anyone, and are thus attracted to the superficial environment of social media? The argument can certainly be made that the social validation they receive keeps them tethered to an environment that makes establishing deep connections very difficult. — Joshs

I believe the real issue here is the true nature of freedom. To be free to act in any way requires that one not be acting at all. So the "free will" is empowered by "will power", which is central to 'arrest and assess'. When technology offers us vast quantities of possibilities, it is easy to jump on board, and go with the flow of this new found "freedom". But human behaviour is naturally habitualized, so a specific type of new possibility rapidly becomes 'the only choice'. Therefore without learning to completely apply 'arrest and assess' in a consistent manner, the appearance of freedom evapourates. The idea that one is exercising one's freedom when playing the same electronic game for hours everyday, is just a manifestation of the misunderstanding caused by the gap I referred to above.

But his comments about identity... make me wonder how I managed to read your OP three or four times and miss how you defined identity. I've probably wasted a lot of your time and my own by failing to read this part of your OP properly. I'll take this as a learning lesson, showing that I really have a hard think about how to avoid this problem in the future. I think I just read the parts I thought were interesting, and impatiently skimmed over what seemed unimportant, I have ADHD, so maybe that's a factor... — Judaka

Baden's use of "identity" is very difficult, I had to read the OP numerous times myself. It's fundamentally counter-intuitive to think that a person could have many identities. It makes you think of a spy or something, but that would be the way that one presents oneself to others. Baden is asking us to represent oneself, to oneself, as having multiple identities, and that is quite difficult. I believe he validates this request by uniting the multiple identities under one "self". But this just kind of defers the problem because we now have a multitude of different identities united as a self, instead of a multitude of different actions united as an identity, and we are left with no principles as to how "the self" could produce such a unity.

In lieu of diving into this for now, while we both espouse a form of freedom as a goal, my impression is that your route primarily involves normative claims about potential modes of self-conceptualization whereas mine primarily involves descriptive claims thereof to further a normative claim re the action of social institutions. Would you agree? — Baden

Yes, I'd agree to that. I think we adequately understand each other.

I'll tell you what I think is the principal point of difference between my perspective and yours, and you tell me if you agree. But first, bare in mine that I believe we are fundamentally animalistic, so many of our base instincts involve putting up a deceptive shell or façade to create an appearance for others, which hides one's true feelings, emotions, ambitions and motivations. My description of this feature is what @unenlightened is concerned about, but the feature is very real, and may comprise a large part of a person's inner motive force, whether the person properly apprehends oneself to be behaving in this deceptive way, or not. Animals have been interacting with each other for millions of years, and their interactions are generally not friendly, they are filled with destructive behaviour and fear of one another. So, this propensity to deceive may be very strong, and must be duly respected in any understanding of oneself.

Our social environment, our upbringing and training, inclines us to see others as having an identity. That is how we see differences and we are taught to respect others despite these differences which constitute the other's identity. Though we are aware that another may present us with false features (deception), we learn to understand and respect others through respect for identity. And, through thousands and thousands of years of moral training, we learn to suppress some of these animalistic tendencies toward creating false fronts and deception, but these inclinations still exert a strong force through instinct.

Now, the issue we are concerned with arises with introspection, looking at oneself, and introspection is something very human, probably not practised by other animals at all, as an aspect of self-consciousness. So we are not guided by instinct here, and we must be guided by principles we develop. Introspection reveals immediately to us, that the idea that a person has "an identity" is faulty. So you move to resolve this issue by assuming that a person has multiple identities. My introspection reveals to me that the whole concept of "identity" is faulty here, and it cannot suffice as an adequate tool for understanding oneself.

That is how I see our difference. We both recognize that the idea of having "an identity", is an inadequate approach to understanding oneself. So you propose that a multiplicity of "identities" is what Is required. I think that the whole idea of "identity" is not suited towards a proper understanding of a self, and we ought to move to something else.

So you escape from contradiction into falsehood. And in so doing, you undermine your own being, because it is now clear that you are not worth talking to. — unenlightened

It appears like I have adequately demonstrated my point then. Attempting to deceive is a very real part of the social interaction of human beings. Whether the person is "found out", as I was, (and consequently my own being has been undermined by being found out), or the deception is successful, (and the being of the other is undermined), is irrelevant. The point is that attempts to deceive and successful deception are very real, and constitute a very significant portion of social interaction in general, regardless of whether you personally want to face reality and talk about it, or not.

Well if you are trying to deceive us, you don't deserve an answer at all. — unenlightened

The problem though, is that it is only a possibility, that I am trying to deceive you. And you state a conditional, "if you are trying to deceive us..." So you need to make that judgement whether or not I am trying to deceive you, which you cannot accurately do without engaging me in some way.

A narrative, like a story, establishes some significant connection between its elements that gives it the power to subsist as an organizing emotive force for those elements. Narratives have emotional power. — Baden

This is exactly why I have been arguing that narrative is improper as a formula for a true identity. The connections between events, which you refer to, that give the narrative emotive force, often consist of invalid implications as I described. A "true" story would consist only of a description of observed events, what your referenced page calls a "recount". Notice that this is described as the method of science. But a "narrative" as you use the word, adds something to the true story, it adds "significant connection" between the events. And as I explained in the last post, these added aspects often consist of invalid implications, and false representations of goals and intentions.

And it is these unsound aspects of the narrative, the proposed relations which are often invalid, or simply incorrect, which give it its emotive force. Therefore to have a proper and true understanding, we must remove these aspects from the narrative (or if that's essential to "narrative", remove narrative altogether), to give us a simple "recount". This is for the purpose of separating the true from the fictitious. Then relative to a person's identity as a temporal being, the person's past is represented truly, by removing that emotional force.

To get a proper understanding of the causal relations between events, intention, we can now turn to the future aspect, which consists of how we view goals and possibilities. Separating these two aspects, the past and the future is necessary for a proper analysis. Imagine if the person who gave the recount of a science experiment added statements about why such and such events occurred, without properly validating these claimed causal connections. Of course this would give the recount emotive force, but this is undesirable when describing events scientifically. So this would not be acceptable science. Likewise, the element which give "emotive force" to the narrative is undesirable.

This I believe is the Heideggerian principle. The tendency to look at oneself in terms of narrative (how we look at others) gives an inauthentic identity. We cannot see the goals and intentions of others, so we add those elements as we see fit, and these are unsound features of the narrative which give it emotive force. Then, when I turn inward, and look at myself in this way I employ the same technique, as is the habit of narrative. The problem though, is that since it is myself that I am making a narrative of, rather than another, I tend to simply assume, and believe, that I have real access to these causal elements, as my goals and intentions, therefore I think that I am making a true narrative here. But all I've done is deceived myself. If I look more deeply in introspection, I realize that I really do not properly understand my intentions and goals, and how they influence my behaviour

The reality is, as Heidegger indicates, that there is a real separation between the past (observable events) and the future (possibilities), and this separation constitutes being at the present. We cannot understand being at the present until we move to represent this separation. Unifying these two in a narrative is a false representation. Only after the separation is properly understood can I produce a true representation of my identity at the present. And, because each of those past events, when it occurred, was an instance of existence of this separation, i.e. being at the present, it needs to be represented separately. So we separate the recount of events which may obtain scientific truth, from the proposed goals and intentions which are supposed to be causal, but with far less certainty than the recount. Then we no longer have a narrative but two separate stories.

So the point is that the narrative gives a combination of described events, and a view of goals. I argue that this is a false or unsound combination because it combines the verifiable with the unverifiable. in reality the agent living and acting at the present, behaves as a separation between past events and future possibilities. What would constitutes a true or authentic representation of my identity would be to completely separate my past from my future. This would allow me to make true, unbiased decisions.

Also, the idea that a proper narrative "does not include the goals or intentions of the agents" and that "if a goal is included into a narrative, it is not a valid part of the narrative" is utterly baffling to me. I have no idea where you got that from but I would challenge you to support it as it would preclude probably most of the great stories of humankind as being narratives. — Baden

What I mean is that a "narrative" as such is not a true or sound recounting of events.

Identities gain strength over time precisely insofar as they provide coherent frameworks for the activity of our desires as defined both through our conceptualised goals and immediate needs for gratification. Identities may be directed by goals and direct goals. There’s no contradiction here. — Baden

There's no necessary contradiction, that's for sure, but when a person's goal is to better oneself, then there is a problem. Identity does not suffice, because exactly what is desired is to cease being what you have been to be something better. It brings to mind a line from the Elton John movie, "Rocket Man": "You gotta kill the person you were born to be to become the person you want to be." So Elton takes this to the extreme, killing the old person, and becoming a new person (a new identity), with each new album.

To truly represent how we deal with our goals and desires, we need to understand this aspect of temporal discontinuity, this way that we separate ourselves form our past, to be a person in the future completely different, 'new and improved', from the past person. We recognize our sins as sins, and move to become the new person who is free from them The real separation between multiple identities is temporal like this, we cease having one identity to take up another. Yet there is overlap.

There is no deficiency excepting the imposition of a level of determinism applied to the idea of how identity functions which not only have I never implied but that runs counter to the core of my argument. The logic of my posing the problem of self-conflicting selves contains within it the notion that breaking the “rules” of an identity is both something that happens and that is problematic. So, yes people get “lost in some situations” because a goal or desire conflicts with one or more of their identities. That’s part of the point I’ve been making. — Baden

Based on what I just said, I would argue that we do not only break the rules of this or that identity, but we break the rule of what it means to have an identity. The temporal extension of having this identity or that identity over a temporal duration, is what we continually strive to resist. That is what freedom is, to become a new person at each passing moment through striving to better oneself, and not being constrained by any such identity which has been the "me" of the past.

Yes, humans are inherently social. It's our ultimate contextualization; a recognizably human consciousness absent of all social interaction is incoherent. But we're social in a specifically human way that doesn’t preclude the prioritization of goals other than the immediately social. E.g. Our relationship to ourselves is mediated through the social phenomenon of language, which not only doesn’t restrict the variety of goals available to us but largely enables it. So, to speak of an overarching social goal that organizes our other sets of goals is just to admit that insofar as we are human we can't separate ourselves and our goals fully from our particular social context and the ideological hold it has over us. — Baden

This is where things get quite difficult, the social context. But I think that you and I have some agreement here. How we each get here though, is quite different. The reason I say that freedom of choice, goals, intention, and desires, are tied to "social context", is because most of our natural inclinations involve others. If our goals and desires did not involve others we could produce a separation, but they do, so that would be unrealistic.

To me, it’s as if you are trying to understand art by starting from one category of elements in different paintings as if they had such significance outside their individual framings they made such framings irrelevant. — Baden

I don't understand what you mean by "framings" here.

Firstly, it elides the importance of dispositions, histories, capacities (analagous to other elements in the paintings), which are necessary for the realisation of goals. — Baden

As I said, most goals involve others, therefore the social aspect is necessary to the realisation of goals.

Secondly, it conceptualises the frame overly simplistically as a pure limitation. But just as It's the frame that allows for art to function as art, it's identities and the ideologies that underly their formation that allow the social to function as social. To imagine a world where the individual pursuance of goals absent of ideological framings occurs under simple social limitations is hardly coherent. The social finds its form not in a bunch of obstacles we as individuals need to navigate but as the very field of possibilities which allows us to define ourselves as the kinds of beings who navigate. — Baden

Again, you'd need to elucidate on what you mean by "framing" here. I don't consider framing to be a necessary aspect of art. To me art consists of content and form, and framing may enter into the form. Depending on how you look at it, the entire form might simply be a framing of the content. So yes, social ideologies are a necessary aspect of personal desires and goals, just like art is not pure content, it must have a form, that's just a statement about the nature of personal goals and intentions. However, the social does not provide the "field of possibilities", I think that's a false representation. The individual's imagination provides the true field of possibilities, while the social aspect limits that, just like the artist's mind provides the field of possibilities, and the medium used by the artist restricts the possibilities.

There’s no necessary contradiction between an identity being a narrative and being the manifestation of the variety of goals we have for ourselves. — Baden

I think there is a very clear difficulty here. A "narrative" is a description of events occurring in a chronological order. We can produce a narrative describing observed past events, or potential future events, and even fictional events. The difficulty is that a proper narrative does not include the goals or intentions of the agents, these are only seen to be implied. And since there is not a necessary relation between a goal and an action,(free will), the implication is not valid. This means that if a goal is included into the narrative, it is not a valid part of the narrative.

For example, "he reached for his car keys because he wanted to drive his car". The first part is a valid descriptive narrative. The second is not. That phrase, "he wanted to drive his car", is not part of chronological occurrence of events, so it is fiction added by the author. It is not an observed part of the event, the observer does not truly know this, and it is implied only by invalid logic, as he might have grabbed his car keys for some other reason.

From the perspective of the first person though, I can say "I reached for my car keys because I wanted to drive my car", and this appears like a valid narrative. However, it is still not a valid narrative, for basically the same reason. It is not a part of the order of events itself, and the important thing is that the author does not necessarily have a handle on one's own intentions. And this is very evident in habitual actions. So you ask me, why did you reach for your car keys, and without thinking I reply "because I wanted to drive my car". However, in reality I was leaving to go to work, and my habit is to grab the car keys as I go out the door. My goal or intention was to get to work, driving is the means to that end, and so I was grabbing the car keys. As Aristotle displayed, ends when questioned become means to further ends, and true intention is hard to isolate.

Therefore, I think that for reasons such as those described above, the narrative must be kept separate from the goals in the basic description of a self, and one's identity. I could produce a personal identity based solely on a description of my past activities (narrative), or based solely on my goals for the future (intentions), but when I try to relate these two, to represent my presence, I have extreme difficulty. I believe this is what Heidegger points to as inauthenticity. My understanding of my self, being present at the current moment in time, is fundamentally inauthentic because I cannot establish any necessity in the relationship between my describable activities of the past, and my goals for the future.

The identity is a means whereby those goals are organized / conceptualised / made coherent. — Baden

Relating my identity strictly to my goals for the future would be extremely problematic. The reality of freedom allows that I may alter my goals at any moment in time. This is extremely important in a person's capacity to adapt to risk factors. If an individual is involved in a dangerous activity and the occurrence of events strays form the plan, the person must be capable of altering goals at any moment.

So I do not think that "identity" provides a good principle for establishing a hierarchy of goals. This principle is more directed toward the narrative of past events, and any proposed "identity" gains its strength from an extended temporality. That is to say that an identity is something derived from a long period of time. The structuring of goals on the other hand must be extremely adaptable, such that even goals which we have held on to for a very long duration must be capable of being dropped at a moments notice, due to the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances.

Part of the identity of “mother” is bound up with goals that are largely defined in terms of responsibilities and duties which have sociobiological roots. These can be organised under the general idea of what it means to be a mother. Of course, individual mothers will not all agree on what this is but their narratives will have a common core which organizes their dispositions as mothers and which is their “mother” identity. — Baden

This is an example of the use of "types" which I said previously is deficient for describing a person as an active agent. The point being that one's goals must be strongly individualized, due to the role of 'the present circumstances' and the need to adapt,, as outlined above. An individual might refer to a "type" as guidance in producing goals, but ultimately the urgency of the current situation will necessitate that the rules of the type must be broken. Then if the person is trained only in the ways of choosing according to type, that person would be lost in some situations.

This is not (generally) a consciously calculative process but the outcome of the human need to meaningfully interact. It is that need, that overarching goal that organizes our other disparate goals into manageable narratives that we can set against each other in order to more efficiently and less resource-intensively make decisions. E.g. If we prioritize certain narratives about ourselves, it makes it easier to choose between conflicting desires / goals. Our goals are given an extra layer of meaningful contextualization. And this is just what makes human social life possible. General social identities (your narratives of the other) become internalized in specific but not unrelated ways (my narratives of the self) so that we may relate coherently to others. — Baden

What you appear to be doing here is placing the need for social interaction as the highest priority in ones goals. Then the other goals will be shaped and prioritized around this. I see the opposite situation. Social interaction is inevitable, absolutely unavoidable, as portrayed in unenlighten's post. Goals are prioritized according to what is wanted or needed, and this constitutes privation. Therefore social interaction is at the opposite end of the scale from where goals are. Goals relate to freedom of choice, possibilities, while social relations related to necessities, what is impossible to be otherwise.

So it appears to me, like the difference between starting from a narrative, and starting from goals or intentions, produces a huge gap between the way that you and I understand these things. It's not a huge difference, because the understanding is quite similar, but it's a huge gap, like flip sides of the same coin. We both understand both sides, but disagree as to which side is up.

If it is part of your well-being to speak meaningfully, then this clause is a performative contradiction. — unenlightened

But "speak meaningfully" does not exclude deception. So I can speak meaningfully in a way designed to support my own well-being, which will also undermine your well-being.

Hilary Putnam makes the argument that if the basis of our valuative, ethical judgements is an evolutionary adaptation shared by other animals then it is as though we are computers programmed by a fool ( selection pressure) operating subject to the constraints imposed by a moron ( nature). Those theorists, like Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Prinz, who believe that the basis of our ethical values is biological and therefore relative, find a way out of this problem by distinguishing between biological and rational faculties.

According to Prinz, even though moral values are dependent on subjectively relative emotional dispositions, it is possible to determine one moral position as being objectively better than another on the basis of non-moral meta-empirical values such as consistency, universalizability and effects on well-being. Prinz's dualist split between empirical objectivism and moral-emotive relativism thereby upholds ethical correctness as the identification of breakdowns of rational objectivity that take the form of cognitive biases , distortions and errors of judgement. For instance, Prinz(2011) suggests that “Hitler's actions were partially based on false beliefs, rather than values”. — Joshs

This is difficult, and I am trying to understand exactly what is meant here. The last line suggests a clear division between belief and values, as if a value is somehow other than a type of belief. But I can\t see how you get to this position.

It appears as if you are driving a wedge between objectivity, being associated with empirically verified beliefs which are considered to be true, and emotional features, "values" , which are subjective. But after making this division you want to say that it is possible that values may be objective, if grounded in something like "well-being". However, my well-being does not necessitate your well-being, and the reality of competition often results in the opposite situation.

So it really doesn't look to me like Prinz offers a very good understanding of the relation between beliefs and values. The whole separation between objective beliefs and subjective values seems completely artificial and imaginary to me, contrived for the sake of proposing that something like "well-being" could be used to introduce objectivity into the realm of subjective values.

(Have you read my OP btw? Some of what you've written suggests to me you haven't, particularly as I define how I'm using the concept of "identity" there quite directly.) — Baden

Yes, I've read the OP a couple times, I'll go back and make it three now. The problem I have is that your description of a person's identities, and the relationship that the identities have to the self, is not really consistent with my personal experience. I can follow your description of that, but then when you get to the point of relating the self, along with its identities to the social environment which gives context to the self, I cannot follow, because the way that you've described self and identities is unreal to me.

So to begin with, I don't see that people create identities for oneself. We create identities for others, and narratives concerning others, and sometimes I might include myself in such a narrative, but the narrative is essentially about the other, not about myself. As "myself", I have an identity which is completely different from the narrative I have of others,, being based in my wants, desires, needs, and intentions. The narratives which I assign to others, giving them their identities, is based on their past actions, yet the identity I give to myself is based in what I want for the future. If I look back, and get overly concerned about how others have viewed me in the past, and I try to produce some sort of narrative from this, I will lose my bearing on the future, and lose track of myself.

Therefore I see what you call a person's identities, the identities which a person makes for oneself, as nothing other than the manifestation of the variety of goals which a person has for oneself. And, these goals often involve relations with others. So if I present myself to you in one way, to get what I want from you, and I present myself to another person in another way, to get what I want from that person, I see this not as giving myself a multiplicity of identities, but as having various distinct goals. However, an outside observer might look at my various different forms of behaviour, and conclude that I have different identities.

This is the principal difference then. I look at myself as one coherent self, with one identity, being myself. The differences within me which make it appear to others like I have a multitude of identities, is simply the result of me having many widely varying goals. And the behavioural features which you describe as different identities are simply the result of differing goals. Furthermore, it is very often that a person does not well define and prioritize one's own goals, such that it is common for one to have conflicting goals within creating the appearance of conflicting identities.

I see the issue then as a matter of understanding and prioritizing goals. I will behave differently around one group of people from how I behave around another, and this makes me not want them all in the same room together. And if I ask why I behave differently, it's because I have different expectations of them. To use Joshs' terms above, these are conflicting subjective values which I myself hold. To straighten out this conflict within myself, I must confer with something independent, a separate scale which would somehow give me objective principles for how I ought to behave consistently.

To get to the part of the OP where you talk about the "advanced" society, what I see is a society which offers, and even induces through advertising and all sorts of social media, a wide range of goals for a person. You call this "freedom", but it's not really freedom, just a wide range of offers, more like a multitude of suggestions. As producing conflicted selves with unsettled goals, we might say that this is a bad society. But being in this unsettled condition is also what inclines one toward understanding and prioritizing goals, and understanding the need for the objective scale, so in this sense it would be good. .

There are compatibilities with Heideggerian notions of authenticity but I don't need to invoke Heidegger to make the point that people have a range of potentialities, the pursuance or not of which may open or close spaces for different types of being, some of which utilize more or less personal potentialities, some of which inhere more or less quality. — Baden

The problem is that "potential" is a very difficult concept, and it's meaning will vary greatly depending on its ontological context. So, the way that one understands "that people have a range of potentialities" is greatly dependent on one's metaphysical perspective.

However, if we assign priority to inauthenticity, we deny true identity, and in doing this we deny the applicability of "types of being". So we approach the problem without this assumption (types of being), assuming only what appears to be infinite possibility (potential) for action. There is no authentic representation of "what I am", producible through reference to types of being.

Sure, but we can have an overarching self-narrative... — Baden

This is highly doubtful, due to the result of what I explained to Josh earlier. There is much that affects us without us apprehending that it affects us,. So any self-narrative that one produces will be extremely defective, missing many key elements. I believe this is why Plato argued strongly against the use of "narrative" in general. If one believes the narrative, it will inevitably mislead due to the deficiencies of narrative in general.

So analysing the power dynamics (i.e. what’s relevant to the argument concerning domination) how do we differentiate between the boss / model employee relationship where model employee A conceptualises themselves as model vs. where model employee B conceptualises themselves as a "liar"? — Baden

This is why assigning priority to inauthenticity is beneficial. The person's real, or "true" identity is neither identity A nor identity B. And if we move to propose a distinct identity which encompasses the two, an overarching narrative, we will not be able to encompass everything about the person, and this will end up being opposed to some other identity which the person displays, and we will need to account for this other identity as well.

I believe this principle is a manifestation of Hegelian dialectics, he gives priority to the active "becoming", which sublates the passive logical states of being and not being, and these lend themselves to "identity". In an Aristotelian interpretation we might say that neither/nor is the true identity, violating the law of excluded middle, but Hegel would want us to say that both are the true identity, violating the law of non-contradiction. Whichever you choose has metaphysical implications.

The principal point being that when we make "being" active (instead of the passive what is), and especially in the case of assigning agency to a being, then the principle of identity and therefore the three fundamental rules of good logical practise are no longer applicable. Then we need to seek principles other than identity to ground the activities of being (more appropriately stated as "becoming"). This other base, or grounding was proposed by Plato as "the good", and you apprehend it from a perspective of pragmaticism.

Authenticity narratives are corrupted with the kind of individuality narratives that I've criticized previously. — Baden

This, I think is a bit of a misunderstanding, because Heidegger gives priority to inauthenticity. So from this perspective there is no authentic narrative, only inauthentic narratives. Therefore authenticity narratives are fundamentally misguided. Authenticity however, is something we can strive for, but this requires an understanding of one's temporal existence, including an apprehension of potentialities, referred to above. The deficiency of a "narrative" is that it does not capture the reality of potential.

So when Heidegger describes one's being at the present, as falling, we must look at this as a position created by having been thrown. And the being thrown is purposefully directed, a projection. One's past therefore consists of purposeful directing, and the intention involved in this is not adequately represented in the narrative.

I suspect that were I to attempt to address this you would simply double down, so I'll leave you to your own devices. — Banno

Isn't that the point of such a discussion, to explore the interpretations of others? If I don't "double down" (which really means explain why I interpret things the way I do) you would have no hope of any further understanding of my interpretation. If you simply want to ignore interpretations which do not jibe with yours, denying the relevance and implications of these interpretations, restricting yourself to an investigation of the implications of your own interpretation, then why do you even need to discuss the article? Can you not simply work out its implications on your own?

To understand is to free form completely from matter. — Aquinas on Sensible and Intelligible Forms

This is why human understanding of sense objects is always deficient. The intellect understands a form which is distinct from the form of the sense object, it understands a universal form, while the sense object is a particular form. This leaves a gap between the understanding of the intellect, by means of universal forms, and what is present to the senses, particular forms. And it appears like the gap cannot be closed, hence a duality of forms is called for.

To relate this to the topic of the thread, through the internal process, introspection, the intellect can be seen to have direct access to the form of a particular, the individual human person. In this way we can break down the gap. If the intellect grasps "forms", then it might grasp a particular form if it is present to it, despite its habitual process of employing universals toward what is present to the senses. But the gap can only be broken if we allow for the reality that the intellect can actually grasp the form of a particular in this way, and allow that this is a valid procedure of understanding. Otherwise we are stuck with the gap that cannot be closed, and we can never properly understand the particular.

But that seems unwieldily. It does not seem to be part of what Socrates is, that he be a member of such a set. — Banno

I think that this is an idealist principle which accounts for the assumed fact that an object is a creation of the human mind. The act of individualization, which distinguishes an object from its environment (Moore's internal/external mentioned in the article, for example), and properly gives an object its existence as an object, is a perceptual act. Therefore this act must be accounted for as a necessary part of the object.

Consider the following:

It is not critical to the example that appeal be made to an abstract entity. Consider two objects whose natures are unconnected, say Socrates and the Eiffel Tower. Then it is necessary that Socrates and the Tower be distinct. But it is not essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower; for there is nothing in his nature which connects him in any special way to it. — Kit Fine, Essence and Modality

In reality, in order that we understand Socrates to be "an object" ("object" implying a sort of self-contained wholeness, it is necessary that we do understand how Socrates is separated from the Eiffel Tower. External is just as "essential" as internal. Keeping this in mind, the prior statement is revealed as untrue:

Strange as the literature on personal identity may be, it has never been suggested that in order to understand the nature of a person one must know to which sets he belongs. There is nothing in the nature of a person, if I may put it this way, which demands that he belongs to this or that set or which even demands that there be any sets. — Kit Fine, Essence and Modality

To understand the nature of a person we must know what sets the person off from the rest. This is the basis of the commonly touted claim, that to know what something is requires knowing what it is not.

So, if we remove the realist assumption of independent existence of the object, along with the law of identity, which recognizes the object's independent existence, and assume that the object's existence is dependent on being perceived (Berkeleyan idealism), we can represent this in the way you describe. The existence of the object called "Socrates" is dependent on the individualization and naming of something called "Socrates". Therefore having a set of things called "Socrates" is prior to, and a necessary condition of having a thing called Socrates".

The ontology here would be that things are not found by us, in the world, they are constructed by us. And in construction we produce the blueprint then create the object to match the blueprint. As you see, this ontology lends itself well to the idea that we can create an object (mathematical object for example) with a definition. But it opens up a gap as to how we are supposed to understand the real, or 'true' object. Platonism would say that the objects (even if composed of a definition) are real, eternal truths, which are discovered by us, while an anti-realist would say that the definitions are arbitrary, and there is no real grounding to our individualization and defining of objects.

The further issue addressed by the article is the one-way nature of necessity. If we make the set prior to the individual then the set is necessary for the individual, and if we make the individual prior to the set, then it appears like the individual is necessary for the set. In each case, reversal of the necessity cannot be carried out because the posterior is contingent. This allows that the introduction of a null set will provide for special powers, or potency. The null set assumes no base necessity, and allows necessity to flow in either direction.

Here are the two directions, start with a definition, and produce an object, or start from an object and produce a description:

We have seen that there exists a certain analogy between defining a term and giving the essence of an object; for the one results in a sentence which is true in virtue of the meaning of the term, while the other results in a proposition which is true in virtue of the identity of the object. — Kit Fine, Essence and Modality

The problem with the latter, is that it requires the assumption of an existing object with an identity (it requires the law of identity for support. Furthermore, we can produce imaginary objects which act as the basis for a set, without reference to an empirical object. So starting from the object, with an assumed identity, is somewhat faulty. Once we remove the necessity of the object (and the law of identity), as not a true necessity, then the latter becomes the same as the former, and the flow of necessity appears to be only from the definition to the object.

What is not covered by the author, which might resolve some of the issues brought up, is that when we assume a null set we are allowed to say what constitutes "an object". Then we can say either the object is supported by an empirical description, or the object is supported by a definition, allowing for both empirical objects and mathematical objects.

But who is the “true” me here? — Baden

I believe this is the issue of "authenticity", which Heidegger dealt with to a considerable extent. You might think that the individual can look at oneself, and answer this question quite simply, who is the true me. The traditional sense of "authenticity" would have one looking for one's true identity or self. However, I believe that according to Heidegger we are fundamentally inauthentic. So this presents a sort of paradox, to find the true self is to find inauthenticity, and this is probably why we are prone to multiple identities. We cannot say that one or another is the true identity, because it's like asking what are you doing with your life, when the person is involved in many projects.

I believe that Heidegger holds that a human person has the capacity to be authentic, but this requires an understanding of one's temporal existence. We look to the future as possibilities for projection. We look at the past as having been thrown. So at the present we are in a sort of condition of falling, but not free-fall, because the reality of future possibilities. And when we look at the past as thrownness, what has put us in the present condition of falling, we must apprehend it as an intentional projection. From this we grasp the reality of past mistakes.

What constitutes a stimulus for you is different than what constitutes one for me, even if we are in the same room at the same time. — Joshs

I disagree with the generality of this statement. It is very clear, that many things will stimulate numerous people. So many things constitute stimuli for many people. And, since your claim was that stimuli could "simply go unnoticed and have no effect on our thinking or feeling", you have no premise for such a statement.

You want to use "stimulus" in two different ways. Your prior use was such that a stimulus could have no affect on a person whatsoever. But now when I called you on that, you want to say that this does not qualify as "stimulus" for the person.

How do you account for that type of "stimulus" which appears to have no affect on a person, but really does? And when I say "appears to have no affect", I mean it appears this way to everyone involved, both observers and the individual involved. Once you accept the reality, that stimulus can affect a person, and have a real affect on one's thinking or feeling, without that person even noticing oneself to be affected, then you'll understand what I am talking about.

Harmful stimulation can never evade detection. Such a stimulus would simply go unnoticed and have no effect on our thinking or feeling. — Joshs

This seems to show that Kelly is fundamentally wrong, if you've made an accurate representation. The most formative period in a person's life is before the person knows what's going on. In a sense, the adults are taking advantage of the children by feeding them stimulus which directs them without them knowing that they are being directed. And some semblance of this persists through an individual's life. We are sometimes directed by others toward ends which we are unaware of, and we are even unaware of being directed. This is what allows for the reality of deception, along with milder forms, like subliminal advertising.

But at that early time, in a child's life, which I would argue is the most formative time, the child has no choice in the matter, and one's basic modes of thinking and feeling are being intentionally manipulated by "educators", and whatever stimulus the "educators" let in. By the time the child recognizes that there is purpose to what the adults are doing, such that the child might resist, or move to choose one's own influences, it is already too late to change what has been instilled.

The basic principle here is that the person must learn how to detect influencing stimulus prior to being able to choose which stimuli to accept. And this is such an extremely difficult task that even the most highly trained philosophers do not develop an enviable capacity.

What seems interesting is that as our society becomes more and more conscious and aware of the presence and potential harmfulness of influencing stimuli, the priority in teaching the children will be increasingly directed toward detection and judgement. This will create a base level problem, as it is directly adverse to the nature of teaching, the fundamental hypocrisy of teaching one not to be able to be taught, like teaching skepticism. The result as Baden implies, may be good, may be bad, who knows.

I'm not familiar with any authors who have taken this perspective directly. Is this a sort of negative pragmaticism? Pragmaticism takes the desired end (the good) as the feature with the most power to shape knowledge and society as a whole. Does philosophical pessimism take failure to achieve the desired end as the formative feature of society?

The Great Whatever, who was a high-quality poster who refused to make a small change to his spelling habits. — Jamal

Uh-oh, does my refusal to accept the Americanism of my spell-check subject me to the possibility of banning? I always thought "practice" is a noun and "practise" is a verb. But the spell-check doesn't look at it that way.

"This lectern" is a rigid designator. It picks out that specific individual in any possible world in which it exits. — Banno

We've already explained to you why this cannot be the case. It is a false premise. Now I've moved on from that, to describe the difference between a particular and a type, which follows from proper employment of the law of identity.