Do you think there is any thing in the account you quote at length that is at odds with the account of realism I just gave? — Banno

Try this:

Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

as opposed to this:

It holds first off that there are things in the world, and secondly that these things have at least some properties that are not dependent on us. — Banno

Notice in Wayfarer's passage "dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness", and your quote "not dependent on us". That is an ontological difference in how we understand "things".

but this is not idealism in its strictest sense, insofar as external material reality is tacitly granted as a necessary condition. — Mww

Idealism, even in its strict sense grants external reality, or else it would be reducible to solipsism. What a strict idealist (like Berkeley) would deny is that external reality is properly characterized as "material", insisting that it would be better characterized as "formal", or "ideal". This is why Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason proposes an idealism, by assigning to the proposed independent noumena the classification of "intelligible objects" rather than matter.

What happens to the various idealisms, how people get lost within, and cannot find their way because idealisms begin to look incoherent, is that it is necessary to posit something as a medium which separates the ideas of one mind from the ideas of another, or the intelligible objects of my mind from the intelligible objects of the external world. The simple solution is to posit something like matter as the medium of separation. But this results in dualism. It is this complexity of dualism, which idealism necessitates as a result of the separation between my ideas and other ideas, which deters people from idealism. Reality is just too difficult, complex, so they do not go down that road where idealism leads to dualism.

Yes, that's right. Here's the paper for anyone else interested. — Andrew M

There was a member here, active a couple years ago, I can't remember the name, but a self-proclaimed physicist who was big on this time reversal stuff. I think the fact that processes at the quantum level might be understood as reversible is simply a reflection of a fundamental misrepresentation of mass.

Cantor's proof (by contradiction) shows that the set of real numbers is uncountable and thus can't be enumerated. Since the set of real numbers can't be enumerated, the diagonalized number therefore can't be computed. A similar point is made by Carl Mummert (a professor of computing and mathematics) on Mathematics Stack Exchange. — Andrew M

What do you think this means, to assume numbers which cannot be counted nor computed? To me it's a form of unintelligibility, to say that there are numbers which cannot be accessed by us, or used in any way. Supposing that such a conclusion would be a logical consequence of the axioms assumed, then why would we assume axioms which produce the conclusion that there are numbers which cannot be accessed by us? As real numbers, being implied by our mathematical axioms, this would indicate that there are aspects of reality which we cannot access, grasp. apprehend, or understand in any way, which correspond with these numbers which cannot be accessed.

Since axioms are produced by mathematicians who practise pure mathematics, and those people who apply mathematics have a choice as to which axioms are used, it would appear like we ought not use axioms like these, which necessitate that aspects of reality will be unintelligible to us. Instead, we ought to look for axioms which would render all of reality as intelligible.

Do you see a difference between being held to the ground by gravity and accelerating-due-to-gravity to the ground while free-falling through space? — ucarr

With respect to what the gravity is doing in the two scenarios, there is no difference. In other words, the cause is the same in the two, but the effect is different due to the same type of cause acting in different situations.

Okay. So, you think cause and effect -- even when contextualized by ordinality instead of by temporal antecedence -- only has coherence when cause is prior in time to effect? — ucarr

I don't see how you are understanding your categories. Cause/effect is a type of ordinality, but this does not mean that all ordinalities are causal. Cause and effect are contextualized by ordinality, but the ordinality in this case is defined as a temporal ordinality. That eight is a greater quantity than six is a different type of ordinality, which does not imply temporality. But causation is a different type of ordinality from quantity because the terms of that specific form of ordinality are defined by temporality, before and after, rather than by quantity.

Okay. So, you think cause and effect – even when manifesting simultaneously – must always be understood in terms of temporal antecedence in order to have coherence? — ucarr

Yes. if cause and effect manifested simultaneously we would not be able to distinguish which is the cause, and which is the effect because the temporal relationship of cause/effect, by which we would determine one is the cause, and the other the effect would not exist.

So in your example of bacterial infection.. The symptoms are the body's (immune system's) reaction to a high volume of bacteria. The high volume of bacteria is observed to be temporally prior to the reaction (symptoms) therefore affirmed to be the cause. If the two suddenly occurred in a truly simultaneous way, we could not say that one caused the other, the occurrences would be said to be coincidental. And if we try to assign cause and effect to two coincidental occurrences we have no way of knowing which is the cause and which is the effect.

I think of a blue cube in my mind, even if this comes from sense impressions earlier, what does it mean to be "in my mind"? — schopenhauer1

Right, what does it mean for something to be in the mind? It makes sense to say it, and everyone understands when it is said, but no one really seems to know what it means.

I think truth is elusive to humans and generally avoid people who think they possess it. — Tom Storm

You'd better avoid me then, because I, as the antagonist of Socrates, happen to know everything.

Not at all. I know many rich socialists. It's a thing - we even have the expression Bollinger Socialism.

What matters is what people do not the theories they claim to believe. Don't you think? — Tom Storm

That's what I said early, there's a lot of hypocrisy involved when people classify themselves. It's better to judge by a person's actions rather than what they claim to be. So I said, despite no one confessing to be idealist, I've seen a lot of closet idealism in this forum. That is generally attributable to the fact that idealist premises produce the best arguments but idealism is associated with religion, which is frowned upon. So people tend to argue from idealist world views, and idealist premises, all the while insisting that they are not idealist. I think perhaps we can blame Wittgenstein for setting this example.

Can you demonstrate that idealists are less individualist or materialistic? — Tom Storm

That idealism is commonly opposed with materialism would be a good indication that idealists are less materialistic. Don't you think?

You had to reach to Tel Aviv university to find a page closer to your definition? — noAxioms

That's a hell of a lot better than Wikipedia.

This is blatantly wrong. For one, the appearance of the sun revolving around the Earth once a day is not explained by the Earth revolving around the sun once a day any more than we’re revolving around all those other objects (moon, stars, etc) once a day. Secondly, the sun revolving around the Earth (once a year) violates basic Newtonian physics (lacking a reaction for the action of the sun). Newton’s laws were not in place back then so Galileo wouldn’t have known that.
Anyway, his pitch of principle of relativity used a boat’s relation to the water as the example, not celestial mechanics. The idea was that one could not tell from inside the boat whether the boat was moving relative to the water or not. — noAxioms

You clearly have not read any of Galileo's material, and continue to demonstrate that you do not know what you are talking about.

This statement is especially ambiguous. Which of them is moving/immobile relative to what exactly? — noAxioms

One body relative to the other body, is what is being discussed. Obviously, each is moving and neither is immobile. That it is impossible to determine that either one is immobile, yet possible to say that each is moving, implies that neither is immobile. And of course this becomes more obvious when the number of objects considered relative to each other is increased.

Humans tend to imply the ground since that’s their lifelong reference, but the implication is begging in this context. — noAxioms

Why do you incessantly resist and deny the point of the principle of relativity? The basic principle is that nothing is immobile (nothing is at rest). The principle of relativity renders the concept of "at rest" as obsolete. That is what allowed Newton to apply his first law of motion. The traditional concept of "at rest" which implied that a body had to be acted upon to be moved, is replaced with "uniform motion" by Newton, because by the principle of relativity "at rest" is not a valid concept. Then through extension of Newton's first law, a rest frame, or inertial frame, can be derived from any body displaying uniform motion because "uniform motion" is the concept which has take the place of "at rest".

I’m referencing far more reputable sources than are you. — noAxioms

Yeah Wikipedia, great source.

Firstly, what makes you think that there is an objective matter of fact as to whether an effect was intended or accidental? Secondly, if there are such facts, then what do those facts consist of? — sime

It doesn't matter as to whether there is such an objective matter of fact. What matters is that it's a useful distinction which demonstrates your model as faulty. The example demonstrates this. The man walks for the purpose of health. Health is the man's purpose for walking. If the man then proceeds to get an injury and dies from walking, we cannot conclude that getting sick and dying was the purpose of his walking, because this is contrary to his true purpose.

That it is a "subjective fact" that he was walking for his health, rather than an objective fact, is irrelevant to the reality of the situation. And as philosophers, what we are trying to understand is the reality of the situation. We are not attempting to constrain "reality" to objective fact, when reality also consists of subjective facts.

If we narrowly interpret the meaning of an "intention" as referring only to the agent's internal state, , then intentions as such cannot be teleological, for the agent's actions are explainable without final causes. — sime

No the actions are not explainable without final cause. That's the point to the example of accidents. Such an explanation would be wrong, like in a court of law when they demonstrate from the physical evidence that the perpetrator's intentions were X, when in reality the intentions were Y. The explanation is wrong, plain and simple.

So in order for intentions to be considered teleological, one must consider both what is going on inside the agent as well as the environmental effects that the agent's behaviour produces, - effects which play no causal role in the agent's history of decision-making. Yet this understanding of 'intentionality' as a type of relationship between the agent's behaviour and the environmental biproducts of his actions, in turn implies that the agent is fallible with regards to knowing what his intentions are. For who now gets to decide what the agent truly intended? — sime

Again, this is wrong. The environmental effects produced ny the intentional action cannot enter into a true understanding of the agent's intentions, because they mislead, as I just explained. The only things which can enter into such a determination are the precedent conditions. This is the only way to give a true representation of the position which the agent is in at the time. The agent, at the time does not have access to the outcome of the actions being deliberated on, therefore in understanding the agent's mind-set (intentions) at that time we cannot allow the outcome of the agent's actions to influence our judgement, because the outcome might be totally inconsistent with the intention, as explained. This becomes extremely relevant when the agent's intent is to deceive. In this case, the actions are intended to mislead.

Note that the problem of "Inverse Reinforcement Learning" is the problem of inferring an agent's overall goals from a history of the agent's behaviour, including the environmental consequences it's actions. It is a chicken-and-egg paradox; In order for observers to estimate an agent's overall goals given a history of it's behaviour, they must assume that the effects of the agent's actions were in accordance with it's intentions, that is to say, they must assume that the agent is an expert who understands his environment. But how can it be known whether the agent is an expert? Only by assuming what the agent's goals are :)

This implies that teleological concepts are either semantically or epistemically under-determined. — sime

Yes, this is exactly the problem. That teleological concepts are "under-determined" is very obvious to me, because of the subjective nature. Is it not obvious to you?

Therefore, in the event that Alice decides not to press the button, i.e. that event NOT A occurs, shouldn't Alice be open to the possibility that her decision not to press A was the effect of Bob deciding on NOT B 'before' Alice made her decision? — sime

No, if Alice believes that pushing A will cause Bob to push B, as your premise states, then there is no stated premise which denies Bob from pushing B even without Alice pushing A. You'd need to state that B occurs if and only if A. But then B is completely dependent (causally) on A, and there is no indication that not B could cause not A, as this would require a reversal of the dependence, and there is no statement of A if and only if B. Therefore Alice is continually free to push A at any moment of time, and the fact that Bob has not yet pushed B has no relevance because Alice's choice is dependent on something else.

the notion of anyone disagreeing with you is obviously absurd, — Isaac

Sure seems absurd to me, obviously.

Okay. The gravitational field doesn't predate the ocean. So, at all times, the ocean currents are under influence of both earth and moon gravitational fields.

Does the strengthening gravitational field predate the rising tide?

The ocean tide rises with the progressively closing approach of moon to earth. As strengthening field intensifies, ocean tide heightens simultaneously. There is no time lag in the action-at-a-distance of the gravitational field. Were that the case, when a suicide jumps from the bridge, they would hover in the air for a positive interval of time before accelerating towards the ground. — ucarr

All this makes no sense to me. The suicide jumper is acted on by gravity before jumping. And, the "action-at-a-distance" of gravity is understood to not be instantaneous. The force of gravity, like light, takes time to traverse space. And I'd advise you not to get your images of physical actions from cartoons. Ever see the one where they cut a circle in the floor around a person, then the person just hangs there for a few frames before falling?

Have you seen this hover-in-the-air hesitation first-hand in your own experience? — ucarr

Come on ucarr, you're being ridiculous. Obviously gravity is acting on the person prior to falling over the edge. Why would you think that gravity would only avt after the person steps ove the edge?

Can you cite a definition of cause and effect that explicitly incorporates temporal antecedence?
4 hours ago — ucarr

Please don't waste my time, ucarr. If you do not believe me that causation is a temporal concept then do your own research, and find out how the term is used. Then get back to me with what you find. You know, asking me for a definition is pointless, because I can go through the web and pick and choose what I want to reproduce for you. I do not deny that one might define causality such that it is not necessary for the cause to be prior in time to the effect. What I've said is that this would render causation as incoherent and unintelligible.

Here's what Wikipedia says about causality in physics:

"Causality means that an effect can not occur from a cause which is not in the back (past) light cone of that event. Similarly, a cause can not have an effect outside it's front (future) light cone."

Further:

"Such a process can be regarded as a cause. Causality is not inherently implied in equations of motion, but postulated as an additional constraint that needs to be satisfied (i.e. a cause always precedes its effect)."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality_(physics)

Here's some further reading material for you. If you read some of this stuff you'll see that most traditional definitions of causality list temporal precedence as a necessary condition . However, some might allow for simultaneity, but as I said this renders causation as unintelligible because then there is no true principle to distinguish cause from effect.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradford_Hill_criteria#:~:text=Temporality%3A%20The%20effect%20has%20to,greater%20incidence%20of%20the%20effect.

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1007/1007.2449.pdf

So, we can interpret that the vote comes from him. :eyes: — javi2541997

Right, judge for yourself. Am I an honest voter, or a troll?

I've often heard the view I subscribe to called model-dependant realism, but I don't know if that's the right term. — Isaac

Why didn't you vote idealist then? Model-dependent realism, as a manifestation of Platonist mathematics in conjunction with idealist physics, is the epitome of idealism.

I think this site Is full of closet idealist. Even Banno displays idealist tendencies when discussing mathematics and bivalent logic. There's a special form of hypocrisy which Wittgenstein demonstrates well, and it seems to have caught on with many philosophers, and that is to use idealist premises to produce idealist arguments while all the time asserting that idealism is unacceptable. Hmmm.

The gravitational field of earth's moon causes the rising and falling of ocean tides. Do you say that the moon's gravitational field predates the oceans covering the earth? — ucarr

No, if the gravitational field is the cause of the tides, it predate the tides, not necessarily the oceans.

Do you instead acknowledge that before creation of the material universe, cause and effect were temporally sequential whereas, in the wake of said material creation, cause and effect are not always sequential? — ucarr

No, that is illogical, cause and effect are always sequential by definition, that's the essence of causation.

I've already agreed that ordinal relations are not necessarily temporal. Causation is a temporal relation though. This points to my first premise. When we observe, and conclude through inductive reasoning, that material things are caused, what "cause" means is something prior in time. So we cannot change the meaning of "cause" here unless we get empirical evidence of a cause which is not temporal. Removing the temporal essence of "cause" would destroy the soundness of the argument.

Upon consideration of the above essentials, your thesis gives highest priority to time. It is the principle essential, ranking above even God. This must be so since God cannot exist or take action without the sanctioning empowerment of time, a principle essential that predates God. — ucarr

Yes, this is because God is defined as being "actual", and time is prerequisite for acting.

Is idealism here the love that dare not speak its name? Are the idealists in their cupboard, hiding their true feelings behind excuses and lack of commitment? Or do these forums disproportionately attract contrarians? — Banno

There. Happy now?

But "Final causes" are representable in terms of bog standard causation without invoking teleological purposes, as demonstrated by reinforcement-learning algorithms that train a robot to implement "goal seeking" behaviour via iterative exploration and feedback . In this case, one might say that the "final cause" of the trained agent's behaviour is the trained evaluation function in the agent's brain that maps representations of possible world states to their estimated desirability. In other words, the final cause refers not to the actual goal-state in the real world that observers might colloquially say the learning agent "strives towards", but to the agent's behavioural policy and reward function that drive the agents behaviour in a mechanistic forward-chain of causation from an initial cause in a manner that is teleologically blind. — sime

As I explained already, this does not give a true representation of "final cause" because it provides no real basis for a distinction between consequences which are intended, and consequences which are accidental. In other words, if final cause was truly determinable from an agent's behaviour, all accidental acts by the agent would necessarily be intentional acts.

If you accept the distinction between purposes and causes, then there is no case for the concept of causation to answer to regarding the distinction between intentions and accidents. For that's purely a matter of teleology and not causation. — sime

Exactly, and that's why the model fails. Final cause is teleological purpose, by definition. You give me a model without purpose and teleology therefore your model models something other than final cause.

A is at the beginning :) Either a "final cause" is used to refer to a bog-standard initial cause that implies none of the teleological controversy commonly associated with aristotolean "final causes", else "final cause" refers to a teleological concept such as a purpose that is defined in relation to a goal state that is external to an agent's brain and that plays no causal role in the agent's behaviour, despite the fact the agent's behaviour converges towards the goal state. — sime

Why do you think that "purpose" ought to be defined in "a goal state that is external to an agent's brain"? Obviously, the goal which motivates (causes) one to act is within the agent's mind, and nowhere else. Furthermore, the truth and reality of acting toward goals is that such actions are not always successful. So the external state which is brought into being (caused) by the agent's actions is not necessarily consistent with the goal which motivated the action. Therefore the only true representation of the motivating factors (causes), must be to represent what is in the agent's mind.

I suspect you are deviating from the commonly accepted notion of "final cause". The whole point of the "finality" in "final cause" is to imply that teleological concepts are necessary for explaining the effects of causation, which isn't the case in the dominoes example; teleology is explainable in terms of purposeless causation, as AI programmers demonstrate. But causation isn't explainable in terms of teleology. To mix up the concepts leads to confusion. — sime

You "suspect" something, but according to what I've stated above, you are obviously quite wrong in your suspicious mind. "Final cause" was proposed as a means toward understanding the purpose behind intentional actions, as the cause of these acts. It's obviously not intended as a means toward understanding the effects, because the effects are plainly observable and do not require teleology.

Take Aristotle's example. Why is the man walking? To be healthy. The action is walking, the cause is the man's desire to be healthy. Whether or not the man actually is healthy or becomes healthy from walking doesn't even enter the scenario. We see him walking, we ask for the cause of him walking, and it is his idea (goal), to be healthy, which is the cause. We cannot judge teleology from the effects because often the person's ideas and beliefs are incorrect. Therefore the effects do not properly reflect the cause in a logical way. The man might become ill from walking, and we would never know that the cause of him walking was to be healthy, unless he told someone this.

Which demonstrates the point i was trying to make, that what we call the "temporal order" has to be distinguished from the "causal order". That A causes B but not vice versa, doesn't necessitate that A occurs before B in every frame of reference. Also recall the time-symmetry of microphysical laws, models of backward causation etc. — sime

Since temporal order is what defines causation, separating the two only renders causation as unintelligible.

So God causing the physical-material universe out of time does not cohere with the axiom: causation cannot occur outside time? Theological God is thus incoherent with causation? — ucarr

Let me try again.

As I explained earlier in the thread, the conventional conception of time bases the passing of time in physical (material) activity. By this conception of "time", God is outside of time. And so the theological conception of God, as outside of "time" is coherent on this conception of "time".

Where the problem lies is that God is understood to be actual, and the acting cause of material existence. "Acting", and "cause" are conceptions which imply the passing of time. So there is an inconsistency. God cannot be both outside time, and also an acting cause.

Since the logic which dictates the necessity of God, as an acting cause prior to material (physical) existence is sound, then we ought to conclude that God is not outside of time. So we can see that it is the conventional conception of "time", which forces the conclusion that God is outside of time, and this conception is therefore faulty. It is only in relation to the faulty conception of "time" that God is said to be outside of time. God is outside of time by that definition of time, but since this creates inconsistency or incoherency, the definition of time is incorrect, and God is not outside a true definition of time.

can we assume someone can speak or write a logical statement that necessarily leads to:

the conclusion that there must be a cause prior in time to all material (physical) things. (?) — ucarr

Yes, I went through this logic already. We know through observation and induction that each and every material thing has a cause. The cause of a material thing is prior in time to the existence of that material thing. Therefore there is a cause prior in time to all material things.

Okay. Regarding the ordering of reality, if something is logically prior to time, then its priority over time is by a standard of measure not temporal? — ucarr

I really don't know, but obviously not temporal. Someone would have to show me the logical order before I could make the judgement as to what is demonstrated by it. I just stated that as a possibility.

In the above quote priority is temporal? — ucarr

Yes, because we were talking about "cause", and "cause" implies a temporal order.

So time is the product of physical activity is a false premise? — ucarr

Correct.

So God exists and acts within time is your main premise? — ucarr

For that part of the argument. However that God exists and acts within time are conclusions drawn from the preceding part, which we already discussed.

God’s existence in time is non-physical whereas human existence in time is physical? — ucarr

Yes, humans are physical (material) beings. God as the cause of material (physical) existence cannot be a material (physical) being, otherwise God would be the cause of Himself, which is incoherent.

Edit: I had to delete my reply to the following questions because I misunderstood:

So God causing the physical-material universe out of time does not cohere with the axiom: causation cannot occur outside time? Theological God is thus incoherent with causation? — ucarr

I had to delete many of his low quality comments every day. The staff discussed his case several times and we were generally in agreement.

We went out of our way to keep him here, but he just couldn’t do what we asked him to. — Jamal

I sometimes (but more often not) enjoyed interaction with Agent Smith. I completely agree that flagrantly causing extra work for the moderators is intolerable, and that's a principle with no exceptions regardless of the rationale.

...and that causation is still undergoing formalization... — sime

If this is true, it's proof that there is no formalized definition of "cause".

And, since there are two distinct principal types of causation, efficient and final, there will never be an acceptable formalization of causation until the relationship between the two is represented properly. Formalization of one principal type of causation while excluding the other principal type of causation does not give a true formalization.

Causal models merely express the concept that doing something leads to observations that otherwise wouldn't occur. — sime

This is exactly why a formalization is impossible, and causation will always be philosophical rather than scientific. This provides no basis toward understanding the cause of "doing something". So, a person does something and this causes something which otherwise wouldn't occur. If we want to know whether the thing which otherwise wouldn't have occurred is intentional, or accidental, we need a much better principle than this. And if you claim that this is irrelevant to "causation", all that matters is whether the thing otherwise wouldn't occur, you fail to properly represent "final cause" in your formalization, and you provide no principles for excluding accidents from our actions. However, it's quite obvious that the effort to exclude accidents is very important.

Causal models essentially define causes as being 'initial' with respect to the causal orders they define or describe, making "final causes" an oxymoron in the sense of the causal order. — sime

The use of "final" in "final cause" seems to be misleading you. "Final" is used in the sense of "the end", and "end" is used in the sense of "the goal" or "objective". The terms "end", and "final" are used when referring to the goal or objective because the intentional cause is what puts an end to a chain of efficient causes when looking backward in time. So if D caused E, and C caused D, B caused C, and A caused B, we can put an end to that causal chain by determining the intentional act which caused A. It is called "the end", or "final" cause because it puts an end to the causal chain, finality.

Take a chain of dominoes for example. We look at the last fallen domino and see that the one falling prior to it caused it to fall. Then the one prior to that one caused it to fall. When we continue to follow this chain of causation, we find the intentional act which started the process, and say that this is "the final cause", because it puts an end to that causal chain. The terminology is derived from our habit of ordering things from the present, and looking backward in time, so that the causes nearest to us at present appear first, and the furthest are last.

Nevertheless, causal models have nothing to say regarding the order and linearity of time itself unless their variables are given additional temporal parameterization. All that they demand is that causes are considered to be controllable preconditions of their effects, not that causes are necessarily temporally prior to their effects in some absolute sense, which might well be considered a matter of perspective. — sime

This I do not understand at all. The fact that accidents are still considered to be caused, demonstrates that causes are not necessarily "considered to be controllable preconditions". Furthermore, I've never heard of a causal model which allows for a cause to be after its effect. You simply create ambiguity here by saying "in some absolute sense" because the principle of relativity of simultaneity allows that from the perspective of different frames of reference, the temporal order of two events may be reversed.

The fact that you say the cause is a "precondition" of the effect, implies a temporal order in itself. So to say that causes are not necessarily temporally prior to their effects is blatant contradiction whether or not you qualify this with "in some absolute sense".

I understand Aristotle's definition of a 'final cause', but it makes no sense to me to muddle such "final causes" with the "causes" meant by the modern scientific definition of "causes" that refer to experimental inventions that go on to produce measurable effects. — sime

You don't seem to understand causation sime. There is no scientific definition of cause. Cause is a philosophical concept.

Since, by your declaration, logical priority ≠ temporal causality, it seems to follow that a realm of ideal forms exemplifies your statement that:

...we have an inductive principle that there is a cause prior to every material thing.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Furthermore, it seems to follow that this realm of ideal forms, being outside time because it timelessly causes material objects to exist, holds possession of a metaphysical identity in the sense that it is beyond both the temporal and the physical. — ucarr

No, not at all. A cause, as I painstakingly explained, cannot be outside of time.

Furthermore, you seem to be implying time is physical. — ucarr

No, not at all. As I explained, the idea that time is physical is what leads to the conclusion that God is outside time, God being the immaterial cause of the physical. This renders "God" as unintelligible, incoherent, as a cause, or act which is outside of time. Since logic indicates that the material (or physical) world must have a cause, we must conclude that time is not material (or physical).

Since you appear to be having difficulty let me restate the principles which I've been trying to explain.. Tell me what you don't understand.
1. Logic produces the conclusion that there must be a cause prior in time to all material (physical) things. This cause cannot be material (physical) because it is prior in time to material (physical) things. Theologians call this "God".
2. If time is the product of physical activity then God must be outside of time.
3. As an actual cause, it is impossible that God is outside of time.
4. Therefore time as well as God must be prior to material (physical) things, and is not material (physical).

Does this incline you to think time has a cause? — ucarr

No, that's what I describe as incoherent. "Cause" implies temporality, it is a temporal concept where a cause is understood to be prior in time to the effect. To say that there is something prior in time to time, as the cause of time, is incoherent. If we wanted to speak of something prior to time, we would have to use terms other than temporal terms to describe this sort of "priority". We might say "logically prior to" for example. But this would require a description of time itself, to determine what is logically prior to time, and we do not have such a description.

Does the following train of thought reflect your thinking: Since time predates God and God created the material world of physics, time must be something other than physical. — ucarr

No, that's backwards, you need to reverse it. We have the physical world first, as our source of evidence. We see that something preexists each and every material thing as the cause of existence of that thing. So we have an inductive principle that there is a cause prior to every material thing. This is what theologians refer to as "God". But "cause" is a temporal term, implying an act, and acts only occur within a duration of time (another inductive principle). So God requires time as a precondition for acting.

I think the whole idea of final causation was a casuality of the Scientific Revolution and the rejection of scholastic/Aristotelian ideas of causality. Note however Aristotle's Revenge by Edward Feser — Wayfarer

I think that's right, that "Revolution" came along with the rejection of Aristotelian philosophy. It started when Galileo and others demonstrated faults in his physics. Then there was no need to teach his physics, and this attitude progressed through his other topics, and eventually even his logic was removed from the standard curriculum.

As a part of his physics, "final cause" was an early casualty. It was completely removed from the field of physics, as irrelevant. The social sciences, such as law, replaced "final cause" with "intention". Now, "intention" retains the status of "final cause", as causal. But in as much as intention is seen as causal in law, this is far removed from physics, so the relationship between these two types of causes, efficient cause and intention, is not very well upheld in any discipline.

Because of this, we have no accurate representation of intention as a cause in the physical world, physics using "efficient cause". There is intention in law, where it is implied that intention is a cause, and there is efficient cause in physics, where it is presumed that there are no other forms of causation. As a result, intention is commonly comprehended as a form of efficient causation. Then there is no understanding of "final cause" at all, in any scientific discipline.

You can see this from sime's reply. The idea that thoughts and goals caused the existence of the shed is off-handedly rejected, because it is inconsistent with the understanding of "cause", as efficient cause. After this off-handed rejection, sime is left with the incoherent proposition 'the shed caused me to build it', as a representation of final cause.

If I had to quibble or add something, I’d want to emphasize that “material needs” for Marx included social, creative, spiritual and intellectual needs. — Jamal

Right, and I think that is actually quite important. The reason I said Marx is so insightful, is the same reason why his materialism is so similar to Hegel's idealism. He successfully transforms Hegel's "Idea" into "matter". So instead of rejecting Hegel, as pie-in-the-sky idealism, he just takes Hegel's historicity pretty much as it is, goes one step beyond, and grounds it in something supposedly real, i.e. matter. Therefore all the features of the Idea are manifestations of matter.

This is similar to what Aristotle did with Plato's "the good". The good is cast as some sort of guiding principle for the human being, combining both body and mind to act coherently, in unison. But the good is left by Plato as fundamentally unknowable. Aristotle saw that if the good is supposed to be the guiding principle, it cannot be left as unknowable, so he moved toward positing a real tangible "end" to human actions and that was "happiness".

The issue which arises, is that if the thing posited as the real tangible end, happiness for Aristotle, or material existence for Marx, turns out to be elusive, incoherent, or unintelligible itself (merely a pie-in-the-sky ideal), then the proposal is eroded, the structure collapses back, and is revealed as being just another form of idealism. So what is pivotal is the truth to the grounding of the idea.

Thanks Tom. It's an oversimplification which I believe to be somewhat accurate.

According to one of the two main accounts of causality, namely the perspectival "interventionist" interpretation, a causal model is a set of conditional propositions whose inferences are conditioned upon variables that are considered to have implicative relevance but which are external to the model, such as the hypothetical actions of an agent. These models, whose use is now widespread in industry and the sciences, are thus naturally "compatibilist" in conditioning all models inferences upon hypothetical or possible values of external variables that are considered to be chosen freely. So I presume you are criticising earlier historical conceptions of causality such as Bertrand Russells', which assumed a causal model to be a complete description of a system's actual dynamics (thus making cause and effect redundant notions). — sime

Look at it this way. The "variable" in the model described is a freely chosen act. But from the perspective of the agent, the chosen act is not a variable. It is known by the agent, chosen, and in that way determined. So to model the chosen act as a variable does not provide a good description of what a chosen act really is.

What I don't follow is the relevance of a "final cause", unless it is surreptitiously being used to refer to an initial cause, i.e. a bog standard cause. For example, if I am working to build a shed in the back garden, what is the "final cause" of the shed here? Obviously my thoughts, goals and motivation throughout the project cannot be considered a literally "final" cause, which speculation notwithstanding, leaves the resulting actual shed as the only remaining contender for the final cause. Are you insinuating that the resulting shed caused me to build it? (which incidentally isn't likely to look anything like my imagined shed due to my terrible practical skills) — sime

"Final cause" is the intent, the purpose. So it is exactly the case that your thoughts, goals, and motivation are literally the final cause of the shed. Whatever reason you had, whatever purpose you had in your mind, this is the reason why the shed was built. Therefore these ideas, as intent, are the cause of your actions, and by extension the cause of existence of the shed. This is the basis of the concept of "intent" in law, the decision to bring about consequences.

That is why "variable" does not serve as an adequate representation. The fact that you wanted a shed, and this motivated you to go out and built a shed, is the cause of the shed. And you could further specify the particular purpose you had in mind for the shed when you built it. The intent, purpose in mind, or "final cause", is not a "variable" in the coming into existence of the shed, it is the cause of existence of the shed

.

Without knowing exactly what you mean, I tend to agree. However, it’s probably essential in understanding Marx to see that he was attempting a philosophy of praxis, a realization of philosophy in history: — Jamal

I'll see if I can state succinctly what I believe to be the important point. The difference between Hegel and Marx is the difference between idealism and materialism. The two are actually very similar, but there is an inversion between them in the way that first principles are produced, which results in somewhat opposing ways of looking at the very same thing.

So Hegel described the State as being a manifestation of the Idea. The Idea might be something like "the good", "the right", "the just", and being ideal, it's derived from God. From here, the history of the State is described as a history of the Idea, and how human beings strive to serve the Idea. The Idea comes from God, and there is always a need for the human subjects to be servants to the Idea.

Marx liked Hegel's historical approach, but figured he got the first principle wrong. In order to produce a true historicity he had to replace the Idea with matter, as the first principle. This was to place the living human being, and its material body as the first principle, rather than some pie in the sky "good", "right", or "God". So from Marx's perspective there is real substance grounding these ideas like "good", "right", "just", and this is the material needs of the material human being. From this perspective we can have a real history of the State, judging by its practises of providing for the material needs of material human bodies.

You can see the inversion. From the Hegelian perspective, the people must be judged in their capacity to serve the ideals of the State. From the Marxian perspective, the State must be judged in its capacity to serve the material needs of human beings.

Your assumptions lead you towards your understanding and mine mine. So you are already assuming that there is a correct understanding, meaning your reasoning is circular. — Janus

No, there's no circle. I've already noticed that some of my presumed understandings turn out to be misunderstandings. And that is the basis for the conclusion that there is such a thing as correctness. It's not circular because the grounding for "misunderstanding" is in my personal failures.

How do you know there is a correct metaphysical understanding and how would you identify it as being correct? — Janus

I can know this from the same principle. I know that some supposed understandings lead to success, and some lead to failures, and, metaphysics is comprised of propositions for understanding. By deduction I can conclude that some metaphysical understandings lead to successes and others to failures.

How do you know there is a correct metaphysical understanding and how would you identify it as being correct? — Janus

I tend to judge metaphysical understandings by how pervasive they are through multiple cultures, and how well they stand up to the test of time. I think that those principles provide a good indication of success and therefore correctness. It's similar to natural selection in evolution.

One is my Anglo mode, in which I’m a plain-speaking direct realist, and the other is my sort of phenomenological, sort of Marxian, quite traditional, wannabe Hegelian mode, in which philosophy has ambitions as grand as you’ve set out here. — Jamal

I believe that Marx provided a very unique and informative approach (in the form of basic assumptions) toward the interactions between things, both animate and inanimate. He has very insightful principles which ought not be ignored by anyone interested in the interactions between beings, things, and both.

If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. — Wayfarer

When Aristotle addressed being qua being, in his Metaphysics, this he said was the fundamental question, why is a thing what it is, rather than something else. As an approach to this question, the law of identity, that a thing is necessarily what it is and not something else, was presented. When he considered the law of identity, (that a thing is necessarily what it is and not something else), along with the activity of becoming (coming to be), he concluded that the form of the thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of it. We can say that the form predetermines, as a cause, what the thing will be, so that when it comes to be, it will be the thing that it is, rather than something else.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. The idea that some are "correct" and others not, tout court, erroneously fails to acknowledge the different presuppositions in play, and the reality of talking past one another on account of that. — Janus

The problem is that some assumptions lead us toward understanding, while others lead us toward misunderstanding. Since understanding is what is desired over misunderstanding, it is appropriate to say that some assumptions are correct and others incorrect.

What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? — schopenhauer1

The tree wraps its roots around the rock, and takes from the rock whatever it can get. Unbeknownst to the tree, the rock is also active, and may roll, killing the tree. This is the way of interaction between living things and inanimate things. The living being wants to take all that it can get from the inanimate. But the living being's inadequate knowledge of the activity of inanimate things makes this a very risky activity. So the being must develop a balanced approach between taking all that it can get, and producing the knowledge and capacity required to restrain itself, according to the dangers involved with the activities of inanimate things.

Beyond the problem of interaction between living beings and non-perceiving things, there is a further problem of interaction between distinct living beings. This problem is far more difficult because when the basic problem is complex, and unresolved, the difficulties tend to mount exponentially.

Okay. God is not self-caused. Does God have a cause? — ucarr

I don't know, I can't imagine the possibility of anything uncaused, so probably. But God is noy well understood by me so I can't make any firm judgement.

Okay. Time predates God. And God created the material universe.

So, time before God was metaphysical and there were no material things?

Okay. God can only act within time.

So, outside of time God cannot exist? — ucarr

I think my answer to all this is generally yes. But I don't know what you mean by saying time is "metaphysical". If you mean that it's an object of study in metaphysics, then I agree.

Also the answer to the last question depends on one's conception of time. In relation to the conventional conception of time (which is faulty), God is outside of time. In relation to a true conception of time God cannot be outside of time.

This demonstrates the usefulness of the conception of God. It helps us to understand the reality of faults in conventional conceptions, and the fallibility of humanity in general, as indicated by unenlightened above.

Are they following rules when they play then?

I think it’s the ‘realm of possibility’ and that it is a real realm, in a way analogous to ‘the realm of intelligible objects’. — Wayfarer

I agree, and I see a problem with the determinist attitude. Describing activity in the physical world in terms of efficient causation has been a very useful and practical venture. The problem is that this descriptive format has limitations which the determinist ignores or denies. We find that within human beings there is an active mind, working with immaterial ideas, to have real causal affect in the physical world. Causation from the mind, with its immaterial ideas is described in terms of final cause (goals purpose and intent), choosing from possibilities, which is completely distinct from efficient causation.

So there is a very real need to recognize the limitations of "efficient causation" as an explanation of the activities in the physical world. And we need to accept the reality of the immaterial "final cause" as having real efficacy in the material world.

Yes, I think so. This is clearly seen in the case of jazz. The innovators made the rules that those who came after them learned and followed. But the innovators did not make the rules in the sense of first making them and then playing according to them. They played and those who studied them codified them. — Fooloso4

So the innovators don't make rules at all. They just play. The ones wo study the innovators are the ones who make the rules.

No important reason. I'm accustomed to form and substance as a set. I perceive form and matter as being interchangeable.

It's true substance has a meaning other than matter. It can mean quality.

Do you think quality has form? More generally, do you think abstractions have form? — ucarr

A material object consists of matter and form. And, material objects are also said to be substance. So it cannot be correct to say that substance is matter. You could define "substance" to say that it is the same as "matter", but then why not just use "matter" instead?

I've never heard anyone use "substance" to mean quality. That's a new one on me.

Self-creation of God took time to occur? — ucarr

I already said that self-creation is incoherent, and I explained why. This discussion is not progressing.

Time predates God? — ucarr

If God is actual, time must predate God, because any act requires time. Don't you agree? How could God ever begin to do anything if there was no time?

No matter which intermediary you choose, all of it is a part of the environment, which is directly accessible and perceived directly. — NOS4A2

It is not directly perceived though, that's the point. I do not sense space, it's conceptual. But if you're quite sure that you are sensing space I see no point to the discussion.

The intermediaries you speak of are in the environment, which is still directly accessible, and therefor still entails direct realism. You seem to be stuck on this point. — NOS4A2

Ok, I'm stuck on this point because you seem to be incredibly wrong to me. I see some stars very far away. There is obviously an intermediary between my perception and the stars which I perceive. What is this intermediary, space, light, ether? How do you think that any of these proposals to account for the apparent separation between me and the stars, would be directly accessible to be perceived? I see each and every one of such proposals as a logical construct produced as a means to account for the intermediary. Don\t you? If I could see the thing between me and the stars, it would block my vision of the stars.

So the question is, where is this potential? — EnPassant

And the fact that this causes us to ask 'what we mean by "real"' is central to the whole matter. — Wayfarer

We might combine these two questions, to ask what does it mean to say that potential is real. The best way to look at this, in my opinion, is in respect to the nature of time. The reality of "potential" can be found to inhere within the way that time passes at the present. In relation to the future, there is real possibility as to what will come to be. This real possibility constitutes the reality of potential.

From the perspective of the living breathing human being, there is real possibility (therefore real potential) with respect to future acts. This real possibility is what gives human beings their power of choice, and their power to create. Mathematics is a great tool in exercising this power, therefore the reality of mathematics, in our understanding of it, is related directly to human potential.

But this opens the question of how human potential is related to real potential. We, from our human perspective, comprehend real possibility to inhere within the passing of time. The passing of time provides us with real possibility in future acts. However, it appears to us, that this real possibility requires the human mind to manifest its realness. How this could be the case is extremely difficult to grasp. How could it be that physical existence appears to progress in a completely determined manner of causation, yet somehow the human mind grasps real possibility to inhere within this determined world?

This is to say that the physicist will model the passing of time in the physical world as deterministic, and maybe even some would claim that this is a real representation of the world, yet this model excludes the reality of possibility. Then the philosopher will step in and say wait, human potential demonstrates real possibility. Now we get a sort of compromised understanding. The compromise is to say that there is real possibility, real potential within the world, but that real potential only exists as a property of the human mind, as ideas and conceptions within the human mind.

Any rigorous analysis of this compromised understanding will demonstrate that it is faulty. If the human being has real capacity to change things in the world, the potential for change must inhere within the world itself, in order that the world itself may be changed. And if the capacity to change things in the world is only a property of the human mind, it is an illusion, a falsity. The one perspective is that of free will. The other perspective is that of determinism. The compromised understanding is compatibilism.

In my mind the “internal stages” are a part of the perceiver and thus mediated by him. I don’t see why we need to include some other intermediary. If there is no intermediary the perception is direct. — NOS4A2

There is no mitigating factor or intermediary between perceiver and perceived, therefor the perception is not indirect. — NOS4A2

You seem to be stuck on this point, which is incorrect. We hear things which are far away, therefore there is an intermediary. We see things which are far away, therefore an intermediary is called for. Touch and taste appear to have no intermediary, but smell appears to have an intermediary.

Because of these differences between the various modes of perceiving, we cannot make any general statement about whether perception requires an intermediary or not. Therefore we need a more precise description as to how we perceive, one which would be inclusive of all five senses, before we can make any general conclusions about whether there is an intermediary or not.