So, to assess the claim, for those who don't know, you need to assume the principle of conservation of energy is true, and then see if what I have said is correct. — Bartricks

What is the point of assuming to be true, a principle which is demonstrably false? Anything which follows from this discussion will be irrelevant to the reality of the situation, as is the case when we assume a false premise to be true. The conclusions which follow are unsound and do not have any useful meaning.

Yes you're right the energy is released elsewhere than where the measurement tool is being used. Just like we argued about the room releasing heat to the environment. — Benj96

This is a statement drawn from your false assumption, that all the missing energy still exists as energy. You say "the energy is released elsewhere". The problem is that energy is a feature of the measurement not of the thing measured. As I explained, we measure the motion and proceed to calculate the thing's energy. So if the missing motion cannot be located and measured, and the energy calculated, it is a faulty assumption to say that the energy is elsewhere.

What I'm saying is "wasted" because it wasn't measured is the wrong word.
It's gone elsewhere. Just because I can't measure every molecule of water that goes over niagara falls per second doesn't mean what I couldn't measure is "wasted"... "lost" "disappeared". — Benj96

The issue is that all attempts to locate all the missing motion and energy have failed. And, we conclude that it is impossible to locate all the missing energy, as indicated by the second law. Therefore the assumption that this motion exists, and could be located, measured, and assigned a value as energy is simply false. We know that this is not the case, as expressed by the second law.

So this is not comparable to water over the Niagra falls. In this case we assume that we could set up a collection basin, and measure all the water coming over the falls, without a drop being missed by that measurement process. In the case of energy, we assume the exact opposite, that it is impossible to detect al the motion, measure it all, and assign a value as energy, because we assume that some will always be lost, as per the second law. Therefore we have no good reason to believe that this motion exists at all, and no good reason to believe that the law of conservation is stating something true. It is a simple falsity, which we can clearly see as a falsity, and know it as a falsity, but we use it because it is useful.

Heat disperses outwards and as it does it heats up the environment its spreading into, the further it spreads out the less amount it heats up each part. But it still heats them up by ever more minute amounts.
Absolute zero when reached is a timeless state of no change (no heat/kinetic motion) where all energy is only "potential" again. The exact same conditions as at the big bang. Alpha state = omega state — Benj96

These two statements directly contradict each other, as incompatible, inconsistent. In the first, you say that heat spreads out, and heats less and less, but continues to heat, implying an infinite regress in this continuity of heating less and less. In the second, you suggest an end to the infinite regress, "absolute zero". But clearly, what you describe in the first denies the possibility of the absolute zero which you speak of in the second.

It definitely is. If I punch a punchbag at a fairground, the force of the impact (the momentum of my arm) is measured digitally in a number scale. Which can be compared to others - maybe a professional boxer. — Benj96

No, the force is calculated from some measurements, as I described, through the application of some principles, such as f=ma. The exact principles employed in each instance is irrelevant, and whether the calculations are carried out by a human being with pen and paper, or by a computer using algorithms, is irrelevant.

The measurement must use some of the energy in its measurement. Otherwise how exactly can it function as a measuring device? Are measuring devices somehow magically outside of all cause and effect relationships/energy transfer and the information those hold? — Benj96

Sorry, I cannot grasp what you are saying here. There are different ways of measuring motion, in some cases the measuring instrument absorbs the motion, such as your punching bag example. Some measuring techniques simply observe and make comparisons from numerous observations. Which is more accurate is irrelevant, because no matter which one you use, you will still have to make adjustments for inefficiencies, therefore energy which is lost during the activity being measured.

I don't think so.
The device converts kinetic force into a voltage and the measurement of that voltage is a measurement of the energy that generated (converted) into it. — Benj96

You're still wrong Benj96. Voltage is a measurement of electric potential, and some principles of conversion must be applied to state an energy equivalent to the voltage measured, joules or something like that.

Such an argument would suffer from your faulty premise, MU. Planck units are approximative metrics and are no more "ficticious" than e.g. yards, inches or light seconds. Besides, account for Einstein's model of the photoelectric effect – from which Planck's constant is derived IIRC – without them. — 180 Proof

The issue is whether there is a real discrete unit within the continuum of space-time, independent from human existence. Neither yards, nor inches exist as independent units either, so you are just making my argument for me.

In parallel to this, we can look at three different states of H2O: steam, water, ice. — ucarr

Your example confuses "different" with "distinct". We are talking about distinct, discrete individual units, not differences within the same thing. That is the issue, how to place a boundary within something which appears as a continuous change, to say that it consists of discrete units. I am different today from what I was yesterday, just like the ice is different this morning, from the liquid it was yesterday, but these differences do not make me a distinct thing from what I was yesterday. So your example is not relevant to what we were talking about.

If I take a prism and hold it before a source of white light and a subsequent spectrum of red and blue and green light emerges, are these three primary colors of radiant light, each one measurable, non-existent illusions? — ucarr

I will address this when you show me how you will place an exact boundary between each colour. If you show me the exact division, where each colour ends, and the next starts such that there is no ambiguity, and you base your boundaries on principles which are independent from one's which are arbitrarily chosen by human beings, then you will have an example for me to address. Otherwise, your example just hands me a continuum without any real boundaries, with you insisting that there are boundaries.

When I walk down the street, I move through a sequence of transitory positions while I remain in motion. — ucarr

Are you claiming that the activity of walking consists of a series of static positions? Come on ucarr, get real. Each of those "positions" would be an instance of standing, and any activity of walking would occur between the instance of standing.

But clearly, walking does not consist of a series of static positions. If it did, then what would we call what happens between these static positions? How would the person get from one static position to the next? They couldn't walk from one static position to the next because that would just imply more static positions.

Let's imagine you and I standing on the street having a conversation. I think we exist as discrete individuals. You deny we exist as discrete individuals. How does your experience of the conversation differ from mine? — ucarr

The fact that we are sharing words, conversing, indicates that there is no real boundary between us, and the idea that we are distinct individuals is an illusion, an artificial creation. This is an illusion which you seem to believe in.

Do you think process philosophy shares some common ground with Platonism_Neo-Platonism?

Neoplatonic philosophy is a strict form of principle-monism that strives to understand everything on the basis of a single cause that they considered divine, and indiscriminately referred to as “the First”, “the One”, or “the Good”.Jan 11, 2016 — ucarr

I always understood Platinism and Neo-Platonism as dualist philosophies, not monist. So you'd have to better explain your interpretation before I could address your question here.

How is Neoplatonism different from Platonism?

Platonism is characterized by its method of abstracting the finite world of Forms (humans, animals, objects) from the infinite world of the Ideal, or One.

Neoplatonism, on the other hand, seeks to locate the One, or God in Christian Neoplatonism, in the finite world and human experience. — ucarr

You've left out "the good" of Platonism here, which is not the same as "the One" of Neo-Platonism. For Plato, the ideal is "the good", but it is distinct from "the One". "The One", for Plato is a mathematical Form, a fundamental unity, as explained by Aristotle, yet "the good" is an unknown, as explained in "The Republic" which falls into the class of "Many" as implied by the arguments in "The Sophist". Therefore "the One" cannot be the same as "the good".

Some people might dub such an experience 'numinous' — Tom Storm

The aesthetically beautiful can only be accounted for in terms of numeral. This why we have numerology.

How is that the only inductive reasoning possible? It could be this case. But it could also be that not all the energy can be measured.

Does something not exist because it can't be measured?

Does my internal state of mind not exist to you because it cannot all be measured at once? Except by me - considering only I hold my memories, beliefs and emotions (my personal consciousness). — Benj96

Actually, energy is not something measured. Measurements are made, and the energy level is determined through the application of mathematics. So energy is synthetic. I think this might be where the problem lies, in the tendency to reify energy, as if it is something which is measured.

I didn't say it could capture all the energy lost from the room did I? — Benj96

We\re talking about all the energy. That's what the law of conservation of energy implies, all the energy is conserved. If you are not talking about calculating all the energy then your example is useless.

In that way you can calculate with reasonable accuracy to account for the remaining heat energy you haven't picked up on the camera. And you can prove it by reference to the dropping temperature within the room. You can say okay at this rate the room will drop by 1 degree celcius every 30 minutes until it reaches ambient (outside) temperature. — Benj96

As I said, any properly carried out experiments have demonstrated that all the energy cannot be accounted for in this way, hence the second law of thermodynamics. That law is necessary to account for the fact that it is always impossible to account for all the energy.

Sum the heat released (energy) with the remaining masjids (energy) and it should equal the sum of the mass and chemical energy of the original food. — Benj96

You say, "it should equal...", and that is according to the law of conservation. The fact is, that it never does. That is the "waste" which was referred to in the statement of the second law which I provided.

Why do physicists believe it is then? When given the choice to throw out the conservation of energy or cartesian dualism, they tend to throw out the latter. — Down The Rabbit Hole

People believe in it because it's a law of convenience, which is extremely useful. The amount of wastage is generally so slight, and consistent, that it can easily be corrected for. As I said before, it's a matter of the efficiency of a given system. The efficiency (degree of wastage) can be determined and corrected for. We do not ever expect a hundred percent efficiency in practise, so the law serves us fine. But the fact that the ideal, being the theoretical law, is different from what we get in practise implies something significant about the nature of reality, i.e that reality is different what we think it is, if we believe the law to be true. Therefore it is a mistake to believe that law to be true.

Infinite. Isn't the ineffable, in its own way, the inspiration for these questions? — Moliere

"infinite" is a curious case. What we cannot express with words, mathematics has proven to have the ways and means for understanding. So the ineffable is not a problem, mathematics is there for us. But then there are places where mathematics cannot go, and here we use words, like "infinite". Interesting, ineffable is not a problem unless you think it is, but then it's something personal. There's really just a matter of needing to know the limits of words, and the limits of math.

Can you send me a reference to that proof then? — Benj96

I already told you, it's been proven by many, many scientific experiments. Never has all the energy been accounted for, in any experiment. So the conclusion is inductive, some energy is always lost. All you have to do is look up any experiment where there was an attempt to account for all the energy involved in an event, and you will find that all the energy has never been accounted for. Therefore we can make the inductive conclusion that contrary to the law of conservation, all the energy is never conserved.

Of course you can. Set up an infrared camera outside the room and you'll see the heat energy lost from the room. — Benj96

Sure, you can put up an infrared camera, but as I said, you will not find all the energy, only some of it, even if your sensing device encircles the entire building. You are the one being silly, suggesting that a mere infrared camera could capture all the energy lost from a room.

The only proof you've provided is personal opinion. — Benj96

It's an inductive conclusion, as are many of the proofs of scientific hypotheses.

Entropy is the tendency for energy to disperse further afield. Down a gradiant from high energy to a more widespread low energy state. The energy can't disappear it just keeps spreading out until it becomes matter (still energy). — Benj96

That is your baseless assertion. The following is a statement of the second law:

The second law of thermodynamics states that as energy is transferred or transformed, more and more of it is wasted. — https://www.livescience.com/50941-second-law-thermodynamics.html

Unless you can demonstrate where that "wasted" energy is, then to claim that it is actually conserved is a baseless assertion. Where is your proof that all of this "wasted" energy is actually conserved? I think it is actually you who is in the position of needing to prove what you are asserting. If all of the wasted energy is actually conserved, you ought to be able to show exactly where it is.

We can just agree to disagree if you'd like? But so far you haven't convinced me of your explanation and I cited several examples to the contrary. — Benj96

You have cited exactly zero examples of an experiment in which all of the energy available prior to an event has been accounted for after the event. Your example of an infrared camera is simply ridiculous. Until you provide something more realistic,, your claim to have cited examples is simply bullshit.

We can agree to disagree, if that's what you like, but you need to take a serious look at what you are asserting.

Living in the cave is like cutting your arms repeatedly on the shackles, suffering thus and wondering why or where this suffering comes from. Yet seeking comfort in the fact that you don't know.

All the while, a key sits in the locks unturned. Waiting if it is no longer ignored. But that key is frightfully uncomfortable to look at. The uncertainty the key represents from a state of delusion. — Benj96

Comfort of one sort brings suffering of another sort. So we often do not really understand when it's time to discontinue the comfort, as a bad habit, for the sake of something else which appears to require effort.

Transactions of energy from A to B lose energy from the |AB| system as heat, light and sound energy (usually due to unavoidable friction).

That doesn't mean energy conservation isn't true. It just means not all energy in A can be transformed perfectly into B (perpetual motion) without loss to C - the external environment (unless that environment is a frictionless/gravitiless environment - of which outerspace is a close but not perfect fit for those conditions). — Benj96

That is just a completely unproven assumption. In fact, it has been proven to be false. You assume that the lost energy actually exists somewhere else, and is measurable in that form, somewhere, however it exists. But it has really been proven that this is false. Despite all sorts of attempts to find it, all of the lost energy has never ever been located. Therefore your assumption that it exists somewhere as energy, is simply false, having been proven to be false by many, many, experiments. Numerous experiments have demonstrated that all of the energy cannot ever be recuperated therefore we must conclude that it does not exist as energy.

Not only that but the transaction of energy from A to B doesn't even have to be a loss. It can be a gain - from C.
If a cold cup of water is put in a hot room, the hot room heats up (gives energy) to the cold cup system (A - the container and B the water) until the heat in the cup and the heat in the room are equal and balanced, and energy is exchanged equally in both directions, constantly. — Benj96

I don't see how this is relevant. There is still energy lost to this system. You could say that some of the heat from the room is lost to the outside, but if you go outside and make measurements, you will not find it all. And it makes no difference if the outside is warmer, so that heat from the outside enters the room, you still will not be able to account for all the energy.

The sum of energy in any system |AB| plus C (the environment/ system encapsulating |AB| is conserved. — Benj96

That's exactly the assumption which has been proven to be false, as explained above. Measurements of C, "the environment", cannot account for the loss of energy to the system. And many attempts to do this have proven that the lost energy cannot ever be completely accounted for, therefore your statement is false.

If you don't believe that you would have to challenge all of physics based on the laws of thermodynamics (which is a lot) which I doubt will get you very far in proving without undoing all the useful technology (like fridges and AC) that work because of those principles. — Benj96

As I said, the laws of thermodynamics include the second law, which accounts for the loss of energy with entropy. But the second law is just as false as the law of conservation, because it assumes that the lost energy still exists as energy, when it does not. That's where the fundamental deficiency in the laws of thermodynamics lies, in the idea that the energy which is lost (rendering the law of conservation as false), still somehow exists as energy. That assumption, that the lost energy still exists as energy, is necessary to maintain the law of conservation, which has been proven to be false by the fact that all the energy cannot ever be accounted for.

My takeaway from your claims is, presently, that Process Philosophy is kinda like metaphysics of fluid dynamics -- without the practicality of the quantitative equations -- wherein the practitioner puts on, as it were, a pair of QM glasses, subsequently viewing life as a movie, except it's a movie stuck in a state of super-position, wherein no discrete individualities are distilled. We're inside the cloud of probabilities that plays like lightning in a bottle. Thus, parent_child_grandchild are as one within an indivisible conglomerate of activity, with heads, arms, legs etc., (mere evanescences, not material realities) showing themselves more illusion than individualities. — ucarr

If you say so... But I really can't decipher this. Doesn't a movie exist as a succession of distinct still-frames?

Here's the rub. Somewhere down the line, even process philosophy has to talk about something that exists discretely, otherwise there's nothing intelligible or linguistic to talk about. — ucarr

I tend to agree with this, but in process philosophy it's an event which 'exists' discretely. Now, my question would be, do these discrete events really have true existence as discrete entities, distinct from other events, or do we just artificially conceive of them in this way, so that we can talk about them? Do you see what I mean? You say there must be discrete things because that's all we can talk about, but I'm saying that perhaps we randomly create distinct things by arbitrarily (meaning not absolutely random or arbitrary, but for various different purposes) proposing boundaries within something continuous. So I am saying that in reality it may be that there is just one big continuous event, and depending on what our purpose is, we'll artificially project boundaries into this continuity, boundaries which are completely imaginary and fictitious creations, and this allows us to talk about distinct parts, and do our thing. So it's true that we can only talk about discrete existents, as you say, but this doesn't imply that discrete existents are actually real, because they might all be imaginary fictions, created by us for a variety of purposes.

Could it be the time element, at low resolution on the super-atomic scale, parses the flow mechanics of super-position into apparently discrete individualities? — ucarr

The problem again, is the question of whether such individualities are true or fictional. Currently we use the Planck scale, to individuate distinct, fundamental space-time units. But I would argue this is completely fictitious, and such individualities have no real existence. Until we discover the real basis for any such division of the assumed continuous substratum, into discrete units, any such proposed individualities will remain completely fictitious.

The truth is, 'conservation of energy' is not true. In reality all transactions of energy lose some energy and this is why 'perpetual motion' is unobtainable. This loss of energy is understood under the concept of efficiency. In a mechanical system energy is lost to friction for example. You might think that we could measure the heat from the friction, and this would account for the lost energy, but it wouldn't, because some would still be lost to the system of measurement.

So 'conservation of energy' is not true, and the second law of thermodynamics has been proposed as an amendment, a way to account for lost energy. And since the second law of thermodynamics is a proposal meant to amend the falsity of another law, it is actually false itself.

It sounds as if you're reifying 'potential energy'. — Bartricks

Isn't any talk of a transfer of energy a matter of reifying energy? That's the problem. When energy is reified we have to disclose the means by which the same energy might cease being a property of A and start being a property of B. We don't have to assume a mental event as the medium, we could invoke "force" or something like that. But force is just as much immaterial as "mental event" is. So in any case, mental event or not, we still need dualism to account for energy transfer.

The problem I see here is that we are not really imprisoned, or held captive in Plato's cave. We are simply very comfortable there, and so have no desire to leave. So the point is that we do not go out and discover the truth about reality because we have no need to, we are quite satisfied living our lives in the shadows. And not only that, it is difficult, painful, to face the true reality, as the sun hurts the eyes.

So if we take the "hard as steel shell" comparison, it is not the case that the agrarian society forces an extremely difficult life of hard labour and moral duty on us, which we need to escape from. It's actually the very opposite to this. The society provides us with a very relaxed and easy, luxurious life, which we have absolutely no inclination toward breaking away from. In fact, even such a suggestion would be scorned as ridiculous. This is why the philosopher in Plato\s cave allegory has such a difficult task to lead the others out of the life of illusion, toward the truth. The deluded are very comfortable in their delusions.

I believe the situation is sort of like this. A has a specific quantity of kinetic energy, as a property of its activity. Relative to C, that kinetic energy is potential energy. But after causation occurs, the kinetic energy is now a property of C. So when the activity of A causes the activity of C, it does this through the medium of potential energy. Therefore potential energy is B, the medium between the activity of A and the activity of C. This is the immaterial aspect of the world.

Is time a mathematical construct external to matter , such that it acts as a generic and universal limit on matter , while matter itself has aspects or properties which can be understood independently of time? Is time external to and unaffected by the things located in time? — Joshs

I don't see how anything could be understood independently of time. I think we could presume to understand something independent of time, but that would just be a misunderstanding.

Progression of physical matter.
Clocks are physical matter that can delivery a number. — Mark Nyquist

But what is measured by the clock, as time, is decisively not the "progression of physical matter". It is something which applicable to all the progression of all physical matter, yet it is not the progression of any physical matter itself. This is evident from the relationship between time and light. In this sense, time, as the thing measured, becomes more like a limit or restriction to the progression of physical matter.

All we are doing with the idea of time is piggybacking on the progression of physical matter. — Mark Nyquist

No that's not the case at all. As indicated above, we use time in the practise of physics, to restrict the things we can say about the progression of matter. So it is not a case of "piggybacking", it is a case of us saying, this is what time is, and time imposes limitations on matter, so our conceptions of matter must abide by these limitations which we say time enforces. A good example is the law of entropy.

The problem though, is that when we stipulate this is what time is, and these are the limitations it imposes on matter, how do we know that we have it right?

You're baking a cake. When you do this, are you claiming that all of what baking a cake entails is non-existent? — ucarr

Yes, that's what I am saying. Baking a cake is an activity. And, we cannot say that activities exist. You would say that activities necessarily involve existents, like baking a cake involves ingredients, but this is what process philosophers dispute. They claim that activity is fundamental and there is no need to assume any ingredients

Your parents conceived you. Does process philosophy say that, before your birth, your parents and your conception were non-existent? If this is the position of process philosophy, I claim it has done away with much of (if not all of) causation (and causality). Following from this, how can objects come into existence in the terms of process philosophy if the means of creation of objects are non-existent? — ucarr

This, I can't make any sense of. You are not distinguishing between the act referred to with "conceived", and the objects , "your parents" which are supposed to have been involved in that act. Until you start to separate these concepts discussion on this issue is pointless.

I have the impression process philosophy assigns premium value to motion_dynamism_change. Regarding these three, I don't care if they're physical or metaphysical, in either case they populate a continuum of existence. — ucarr

Yes, but the question is whether essence is prior to existence.

Cite me an example of consciousness in the absence of existence. You're the one trapped in contradiction. The reasons for this I've already articulated in my post above yours. — ucarr

I'm not talking about consciousness, I'm talking about essence. You brought up consciousness as a way to support your claims. But your attempt at justification is only a vicious circle. We cannot replace "essence" with "consciousness".

Throughout our conversation, you've been acting in violation of your dictum above. Notice how you ascribe highest logical priority to "existence." When you deny existence-in-process ( a denial of existence itself), you destroy the individuals to whom you try to make reference. — ucarr

I didn't ascribe "highest logical priority" to existence. I simply stopped there in my example of logical priorities.

This is exactly the point. If you want to understand process philosophy pay close attention to this very point. When we proceed forward in our attempt at substantiation, there is a need to validate "individuals", because reference to individuals is what substantiates all the other logical categories. Process philosophy claims that we find the supposed individuals to be nothing but processes. The reality of individuals, as separate independent units, needs to be supported, and only processes are found to be there. This implies that we must assign logical priority to something which is prior to the existence of individuals, and this is what I called essence. There is no contradiction here, just a resolution to the incoherency and contradiction which arises if we stop at "existence" and claim it to be the first principle.

As I read the Wikipedia definition above, it claims that process (a fluid, dynamical phenomenon) is the principal operator in Process philosophy. — ucarr

I think it's pointless to discuss interpretation of a Wikipedia article, because I do not accept Wikipedia as a valid authority in philosophy, to begin with.

The issue I pointed to, was that from the perspective of process philosophy, the appearance of a thing, or an object, is the result of, therefore posterior to, activity. Since things, or objects, are what we attribute "existence" to, then form this perspective there is activity which is prior to existence.

Other operators, such as material objects and thoughts, although objectively real, hold subordinate positions of importance beneath processes. It doesn't claim processes are the only elements of the real world. Rather, the claim says there is a hierarchy with processes at the top. Are you denouncing this hierarchical definition? — ucarr

I do not know how you distinguish top from bottom in your analysis, but process philosophy puts processes at the bottom, as the foundation for, and prior to, existence. And not only that, it is processes all the way up. That's the point of process philosophy. The appearance of "an object" is just an instance of stability in a system of processes, such that there is a balance or equilibrium (symmetry perhaps), of processes.

My weird language above, as definition of non-existence, exists because I'm contorting it into something that does exist in order to talk about non-existence with a semblance of rationality. When trying to talk about something non-existent, we're thrown into the paradoxical land of talking about non-existence as an existing thing. — ucarr

Your approach defeats your proposed purpose of "rationality" by causing contradiction. If it is the case, that we can only talk about existent things, and because of this you are inclined to define the non-existent as existent, so that you can talk about non-existence, then your approach is producing contradiction. You need to change your approach, and allow yourself to talk about non-existent things as well as existent things, to avoid this contradiction which you have just forced onto yourself. This means that you need to redefine "exist", to allow that we talk about non-existent things as well, because you find yourself inclined to talk about nonexistence.

Whenever I see a claim of non-existence, I'm reminded of the question "Why is there not nothing?" My answer to the questioner is "Because you exist." This is a way of saying ontology has a special problem of perspective. This problem of perspective is rooted in the fact that existence is an all-encompassing ground WRT consciousness. Query presupposes consciousness, and consciousness presupposes existence. Existence, when it queries "Why existence?" presupposes itself in the asking of the question, which presupposes the ground for asking the question i.e., existence. — ucarr

This is a good example of the deficiency in your approach. You create a vicious circle between consciousness and existence, which traps you, and incapacitates you from understanding. That's what happens if you define one term (consciousness) with reference to another (existence), then turn around and invert this by defining the latter (existence) with reference to the former (consciousness).

Instead, the better way to proceed is to use increasingly broad (more general) terms, always assigning logical priority to the broader term. So for example, we can say "human being" is defined with "mammal", which is defined with "animal", which is defined with "living", and then "existing". In this way we do not get a vicious circle. And we can avoid an infinite regress by moving to substantiate, that is, to make reference to individuals.

Speaking linguistically, you cannot claim something doesn't exist because, in making the claim, you posit the existence of the thing denied existence. Coming from another direction, when you deny the existence of something, that denial contradicts itself.

All of this folderol is a way of saying conscious beings cannot think themselves out of existence, nor can they think material objects out of existence.

When you say "Predetermination is not existence." I suppose you want to say something parallel to saying "Unicorns don't exist." Unicorns do exist as thoughts, as proven by the denial. — ucarr

The result of this is that you have no way to distinguish between a truthful statement and a dishonest one, an outright lie. In fact, there is a unicorn on my front lawn right now.

In physics time is what the clock says. — Mark Nyquist

Sure, but in measurement there is a duality of the thing measured, and the measurement. These two are distinct. What the clock says, is the measurement. What do you think is being measured?

and that reality is physicalist in origin. — Tom Storm

It's not really true this, because a physicist can be dualist, and believe that God created the universe, and also believe that physics is only applicable toward understanding that part of reality which is physical. Hence the often quoted expression, 'shut up and calculate'. This can be interpreted as 'don't get distracted by what is outside the discipline. For example, biology does not rest on any assumptions about the origin of life. Nor does physics rest on any assumptions about the origin of reality.

It’s easy enough to understand, just not easy to accept. Superficially, his account works well enough; it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday. Oversimplification, I know, but still a place to start. — Mww

The problem though is that the dog is not the complete perception. The dog is only a part of the perception, so it is not very accurate to say that each time a dog is seen, that this is a perception of a dog. That's not what perception is like, it always consists of many aspects, so that the dog is only a part. Perception always has many facets.

Maybe that’s exactly the key. If Hume understood it is only possible in humans to have one thought at a time, and asserting the mind to be the container of thoughts, Hume very well could have figured the mind can only do one thing at a time, which must include receiving impressions one at a time, otherwise he suffers self-contradiction. Even though this is logically consistent given the set of premises Hume worked with, it subsequently became obvious the premises were not as sufficiently explanatory as they need to be. — Mww

Right, because if this was Hume's premise it would be very inaccurate. The reality is that we can perceive with all of the senses at the same time. So a person might be looking at something, while hearing something else, and also touching, tasting, and smelling all at the same time. And even with one sense, such as sight for example, there are many different things being sensed at the same time. How would Hume describe this type of perception?

Incidentally, we often think of observation as watching with the eyes, but it's interesting to note the importance of hearing in ontology. Vision often gives us an image with the majority of the aspects within that image, appearing quite static, staying the same as time passes. But hearing only gives us the effects of a change. Something changing is what causes a noise.

The Pythagoreans understood sound as a vibration, and had developed some theories about the division of the octave, and basic musical principles. As I understand it, they hypothesized that if there was a sound which was constant and unchanging, it would not be heard. And this formed the basis of their cosmology. They posited a background vibration in an aether that permeates the entire cosmos, the vibration being continuous and consistent, so that it could not be sensed with the eyes. Then all the heavenly bodies in their orbs, are supposed to be variations to the background vibration, making them visible.

Suppose that non-existence = unspecifiably small volume of unlimited application. — ucarr

I can't see how you can conceive of a small volume with unlimited application. That seems incoherent. As a matter of fact, i can't see how you would conceive of anything having unlimited application. That in itself appears incoherent.

lso ontology of becoming, or processism is an approach to philosophy that identifies processes, changes, or shifting relationships as the only true elements of the ordinary, everyday real world. It treats other real elements (examples: enduring physical objects, thoughts) as abstractions from, or ontological dependents on, processes. — ucarr

This is poorly written. If processes are the only elements of the real world, then there is no such "other real elements. Someone made a mistake writing that Wikipedia piece, and you are running away with the mistake.

Trial and error is how we learn, yes, but not necessarily as individuals, that is to convoluted. We get most passed on by our parents, society at large, by tradition.... and then we can work with that and try out some things, sure. But almost nobody has the time, energy and the genius to make that sort of strategy work purely as an individual. — ChatteringMonkey

You think trial and error is convoluted, it's actually extremely simple compared to trying to explain how we learn from others.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww

I've given it considerable thought, and I just cannot understand Hume's description of perception as a succession of individual perceptions, related to each other through resemblance. This seems to be completely inconsistent with my experience.

If I take an experience of sitting and paying attention to my senses, I have the experience of a continuous act of perception. That a large part of what I am perceiving with my vision is remaining the same, as time passes, indicates to me that this is one continuous act of perception. Yet I know that it is extended temporally because my perception does not remain the same, perfectly. The sense of sound especially, provides me with many changes which are not evident in my visual field. There are sudden sounds for example, a bird, a dog, or continuous changing sounds, like a car passing or other machinery operating. These aspects of change which coexist with my continuous visual perception of many things remaining the same, vary greatly in the way that they punctuate the continuous perception. The sound of a gun shot for example, is sudden and quickly disappears, but in the visual field, the sun moving across the sky is slow and persistent, requiring a willful reference to memory to be noticed. In none of this, do I experience a succession of distinct perceptions which are related by resemblance, as is required to be consistent with Hume's description.

So I think that Hume manufactures this description, by throwing in artificial interruptions. By hypothesizing a succession of interruptions, Hume creates the illusion of a succession of distinct perceptions. But it's not really a succession of distinct perceptions, it is the continuous act of perception with numerous interruptions. Or, it might be a number of distinct acts of perception, each being a continuous act, but for a limited duration of time.

And if I look at the act of the conscious mind, as willful, intentional thinking, I do not find that this is consistent with Hume's description of a resemblance relation either. The progression of thoughts is not related by some form of resemblance, rather the thoughts are related by principles of conception, or other associations, and habits produced over time, and by training. There does appear to be what can be referred to as distinct thoughts, probably due to the use of distinct words which are like united bundles of meaning, but they are not related to each other in the way that Hume says perceptions and impressions are related to each other.

Even if I look for something that fits in between my act of paying attention to my senses, and my willful thinking, something like dreaming, where my mind appears to run free without influence from the senses or conscious intention, I do not find what Hume describes. I find that I might describe this as a succession of distinct impressions, but I do not find that the impressions are related by resemblance. In fact I see it very hard to see how the distinct impressions of a dream are even related to one another because it is not consistent with my conscious habits of association and training. It appears like there's a large aspect of randomness in my dreaming.

So I find that Hume's description of perception is not at all consistent with my experience. He doesn't properly consider the continuous act of sensing and proposes interruptions to break this act it up into distinct perceptions. But this is only done to make perception consistent with thought, which seems to employ distinct objects. Then he tries to manufacture continuity out of these distinct objects, through a resemblance relation, and this cannot provide him with continuity as we know it, in its basic, intuitive form, as derived from continuous perception. So he insists that this manufactured continuity is erroneous, a falsehood. And yes, it is a falsity, but only because it does not adequately recreate the continuity which continuous perception gives us, it is a synthesized continuity. Therefore he does not disprove continuity, as an erroneous idea, like he claims, he just proves that this synthesized continuity, which he has manufactured from interrupted perception, is not an adequate representation of the true continuity of perception.

Predetermination of what it will be IS an existence so, coming into existence is voided by this language. — ucarr

Predetermination is not existence. You might like to claim some sort of principle like, only something existing could predetermine, but I think the proper position is that only something actual could act to predetermine, as cause. And it is not necessary that an act is an existent. I think that is the point of process philosophy.

Also, how does predetermination of what will be come into existence? Infinite regress. Why? When you try to speak analytically regarding existing things, you plunge into infinite regress. This is why useful analyses begin with axioms. — ucarr

I don't see this problem of infinite regress. I only see infinite regress from your proposal that only an existent could act to predetermine an existent. This produces an infinite regress of existents, as each existent requires an existent as its predetermining cause.

As above, "randomness" is an existing thing. Your language indicates this: ...there would just be randomness... — ucarr

No randomness is not an existing thing. It's a principle which we talk about, but very far from being an existing thing. Not everything we talk about is an existing thing.

This seems overly simplistic. Banno can do better. — jgill

This is Banno's patented bullshit story, which Banno knows is bullshit, yet will continue to defend until the very end of Banno's time. Simply put, you see yellow on one side, and you see red on the other. You do not see yellow changing to red, nor do you see red changing to yellow, as the latter assigns a priority to red, and the former assigns a priority to yellow.

This bullshit is just a ploy by Banno to create ambiguity in the meaning of "change", so that equivocation can be effectively used in the practise of sophistry. It is examples like this which display the reason why I accused Banno of dishonesty in the truth thread.

But my general point is that every choice we make is done in a situation of infinite possibilities and without anyway to know we have done the best or correct thing. — Andrew4Handel

Your approach to 'what should I do?' is far too complex and convoluted. You are asking, after I've done what I choose, how will I know whether I've done the best thing. Give this up, only an omniscient being, like some assume God to be, could ever answer that, and we are only human. Furthermore, being human we also know that we could always make mistakes. Therefore it doesn't even make sense to even try to do the best thing, because doing the best thing, even if you could know what that is, is often beyond your capacity as well. So forget all that nonsense, it's a very poor approach to decision making which will paralyze you in fear of not doing your best.

So, I suggest that you start with a simple trial and error type of approach. Choose a random thing to do. After you've done it, take note of some coherent observations of the act itself, and of the consequences. Then, see if you can judge whether it was a good thing or a bad thing. Do this a few times, and see if you can start to produce some sort of scale, definitely bad, could have been better, definitely good. After a while you'll be able to start to understand what sort of consequences you prefer (good), and which you dislike (bad). Assuming you are not in jail by this time, you can proceed toward judging the observations you've made in your trial and error process. You'll be able to see what type of actions produce a favourable result and which produce a bad result. This ought to help you in the future, to decide what to do.

Existence precedes essence. — ucarr

Not really. When a thing comes into existence it must be already predetermined what it will be, or else there would just be randomness, consequently no thing, as a thing has structure. Therefore a thing's essence, (what it will be), must precede its existence, (that it is).

As a math person what immediately comes to mind when the word metaphysics arises is Leibntz's notion of the infinitesimal. These tiny things cannot possibly exist, yet they can be used to develop profound mathematical results. — jgill

Yeah, these are tiny fictions which are used to resolve mathematical problems. I have a more accurate description for them "white lies".

The rest of the section, 213-218, is pretty much a rehash of what has been already stated, with little new material. He states a challenge at the beginning of 213:

Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted,
and however like, are still
different from each other ; and let any one upon this -
supposition shew why the fancy, directly and immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu’d, and uninterrupted, and identical; and after he has done this to my
satisfaction, I promise to renounce my present opinion. — 213

Here we have complete evidence of Hume's mistaken interpretation of the philosophical concept of "identity". Notice that he uses "identical" here, and this is indicative of how he interprets "identity". For him, "identity" is a continued invariable existence which he earlier called "perfect identity". But in philosophy, the law of identity, and even in vulgar uses of "identity", the word is used to refer to a thing which remains being the same thing despite undergoing changes. So it is not at all meant to indicate invariable existence as Hume supposes.

So "identity" does not equate with "identical", and the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, is actually intended to provide for the changing nature of a thing. It allows that we can say the identified thing, X, at one time has the property A, and at another time does not have the property A, all the while continuing to be the same thing.

The entire section therefore, has Hume attacking a strawman "identity", due to his misunderstanding of identity. So his purported causes, or reasons, why we assume an independent existence (dual existence), being a fanciful imagination, are incorrect, and his claim that the dual existence is unjustified is equally incorrect.

To get to the real causes for the assumption of dual existence, look at Hume's premise above. "Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted, and however like, are still different from each other". "Interrupted" refers to a break in temporal duration. And, although it is true that sense perceptions do get interrupted, it is also true that they have a temporal duration inherent within them. A perception requires a temporal duration. So each perception has an extent of duration, and does not exist as an atemporal, timeless, static moment. This duration provides us with an uninterrupted perception, during which time we perceive the activity of change.

Now, we can understand that sense perception is fundamentally an uninterrupted observance of activity, which occurs through temporal duration. Hume throws interruptions into the sense perception, and these interruptions (being caused for a multitude of different reasons) are very real as well. So the fundamental constituent of perception is continuous uninterrupted activity, which is change. But, these perceptions may also be interrupted. When they are interrupted we perceive the before and after of change, and we do not perceive the activity of change itself. So we posit the independent object, as the thing which is changing, to account for the reality of the changes which occur that we do not perceive when the perception is interrupted. Accordingly, any time that I perceive things (such as my chamber) to be different from the last time I perceived it, having been an interruption in my perception, but due to a very high degree of resemblance remaining, I am inclined to believe that if my perception had not been interrupted, I would have perceived a continuity complete with the activity of change, then I invoke the "independent object" to account for this deficiency (interruptedness) of my perception. The change, which I did not observed, happened to the independent object while I wasn't looking.

So you can see that rather than assuming an independent, invariable, unchanging "identical" object of Humes "perfect identity", what the "identity" of philosophy, and common use, refers to is a changing object. This misunderstanding has completely misled Hume as to what causes us to take the independent, distinct and continued object for granted. The independent object is not an imaginary, fanciful ideal, of a perfectly invariable, unchanging object with "perfect identity", as Hume presents us with, rather it is a continuously changing object which philosophers and the vulgar take to be the independent object with "identity". And such an independent object is assumed not as something from the imagination, as completely fictitious and erroneous, but it is assumed with good reasons. We assume it to account for the difference between continuous, uninterrupted perception, and the interruptions in perception, which naturally occur for many different reasons.

More evidence of Hume's mistake can be seen at 215. Here he repeatedly refers to the idea of continued existence, as something imaginary, in complete denial or ignorance of the fact that continuity, or continued existence is derived directly from sense perception. We sense activity, motion, and this requires an uninterrupted duration of time, constituting a continuity of existence. All of our five senses detect motion, activity, therefore continuous existence, and the idea of continued existence is derived from this, not from the imagination.

Consider the following:

The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new
fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy,
by ascribing these contrary qualities to
different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the
continuance to objects. — 215

He does not assign continuance to perceptions. If he properly assigned continuance to perceptions, which is necessary due to the fact that we actually perceive motions and activities, which can only be described in terms of temporal continuity, then he would see that the presented contradiction inheres completely within sense perception itself. We have continuous perceptions which get interrupted. Therefore continuity, "continuance" in this case is a feature of the perception itself, and we do not need to assume an independent object to account for the reality of continuity. Continuity is inherent within our perceptions. However, we do assume the independent object to account for the interruptions in our perceptions. When the continuity of sensation is interrupted, and we have good reasons to believe that there was continuity, then we need to assume the independent object to account for these good reasons.

Notice that the assumption of the independent object is not a product of the fancy, or imagination, as Hume claims, it is the product of good reasons. Hume's strawman "identity" as a perfect, ideal, invariable continuity of an object, rather than the changing existence of true identity and true objects, is what misleads him into thinking that the idea of an independent object is a product of the imagination rather than a product of good reason.

Again, we see a similar issue at 216. He says that we must make any supposed external objects to resemble internal perceptions. But he does not respect the duality of perception which I've pointed out. We perceive some aspects of a perception as unchanging, and some aspects as changing. And it is this dual nature of perception which leads to the contrariety which he refers to, rather than a difference between sense and reason. Some aspects of the perception appear to continue unchangingly, and other aspects of the perception are changing. Both of these are inherent to the perception itself.

So finally, p217, we see a very clear expression of how Hume's misunderstanding of "identity" has misled him.

'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our
resembling perceptions are numerically the same ; and .'tis
this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these
perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even
when they are not present to the senses. — 217

Clearly, it is the activity, and motion of our perceptions which incline us to believe in the continuity of perception. The resemblance between interrupted perceptions does not lead us to believe that they are identical, or "numerically the same", thereby causing us to create this imaginary fiction of continuity as Hume claims. The idea of continuity has already been created by our perceptions of activity. The resemblance between one interrupted perception and another, which is not a "perfect identity", only inclines us to believe that there is a continuity of activity, or change, which unites the two, thereby validating what we tend to believe, that they are not perfectly the same. So it is change which we attribute to continuity and identity, not sameness. The independent, identified thing, is assumed to be continuously changing, not maintaining a "perfect identity", as in "identical" like Hume has presented.

This is just assertion. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I'd say it's specualtion, and it would require a long discussion to get through all the reasons for that speculative assertion, but I did provide a brief explanation, and some examples.

I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example. — Manuel

I think the point is that both perspectives are supported. This is why we can't say that one or the other, sense or mind is correct, they are each tuned in to different aspects of reality, kind of like each different sense is tuned in to a different aspect. It wouldn't be correct to say that one apprehends truth and the other falsity.

That's why I argued that reality is complex, and referred to Aristotle's system by which everything is composed of both matter and form. These two aspects seem to be completely incompatible, but somehow things consist of both. The mind has a wonderful way of making incompatible things appear to be compatible, like the number line of real numbers, makes distinct and discrete units, numbers, appear to be compatible with a continuous line.

I'm going to go try to finish reading the section now, and will report back.

The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception? — Manuel

Where I have a problem is with the idea of a distinct sense perception. I do not believe there is such a thing, and therefore I think this idea is a misrepresentation. As you agree, sensation always occurs over a duration of time, and we might add that there is always a spatial element as well. What could possibly constitute the spatial and temporal boundaries of a perception, boundaries being required to make the sense perception properly distinct from other perceptions? Time appears continuous, so it seems that any temporal divisions would be completely arbitrary, imaginary and fictitious. And a spatial boundary for a distinct sense perception could not be well defined either, as sensations seem to just get blurry, fuzzy, or confused, toward the sense's spatial limits.

My proposal would be to completely dismiss the idea of a distinct sense perception, as unreal, and misleading. Then, if there is such a thing as a distinct perception, this would be something which the mind has created with the imagination. And, we can see that we do this (create the illusion of distinct perceptions), for a reason. The mind is fundamentally analytic in its desire to understand, so it breaks down the sense information into composite parts, which you might call distinct perceptions. We can see this analysis and comparison of parts, in the mind's treatment of each and every one of the five senses, and also in its comparison between what the various senses provide. So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions.

But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events. — Manuel

I think that this is exactly the case. All that the senses provide is movement information. We need to pay attention to the very close relationship between senses and the brain, and recognize that the brain is not a sense organ. So whatever the brain adds to sensation, this is not coming from the sense. And if our proposed separation is between mind and sense, then we would say that since it's not coming from the sense, but from the brain, it must be contributed by the mind.

This is a basic problem with Hume's approach. His proposed separation appears to between the senses, and reason. But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area.

It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world. — Manuel

What higher mammals have, which allows them to perceive the world in this way, is greater brain capacity. This is not a greater sense capacity. And it's very interesting to look at the sense capacity of some of the lower mammals, rodents, and even creatures like reptiles and insects. Some of the specific sense capacities are unbelievable. So the term "higher" here is used to refer to the creature's brain capacity, not its sense capacity. And when you say that higher mammals perceive the world in a specific way, this is attributable the type of brains that they have, not to their senses.

If we adhere to the principles then, we sense continuity, but the brain wants to break up the continuity into discrete, or distinct parts for the purpose of understanding. Therefore, individual, fixed and distinct objects is a creation of the brain, hence mind (even reason?) rather than senses. Now Hume says that this is an unjustified creation, an erroneous fiction. However, we must pay respect to the fact that we call these creatures with the advanced brain capacity "higher" mammals. And, we consider that this analytic aspect of the mind which breaks the sensations into parts for separate comparison and understanding is an advantage. Therefore we ought not conclude that this separation into distinct objects is an erroneous mistake, as Hume does. Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects with the concepts of gravity, mass, and inertia. And so, we really ought to conclude that it is the senses which are misleading us, with the appearance of continuity, not the mind or brain with its assumption of distinct objects.

Of course, that is an oversimplification because we really need to separate space and time to distinguish whether one of these is responsible for the intuition of continuity, and the other responsible for the intuition of distinct objects. That's what I mentioned earlier in the thread, that there is a fundamental incompatibility between continuity and distinct objects, though Hume simply classes these together and talks of the continued existence of a distinct object. If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive, and as we now know from things like gravity and electromagnetic fields, objects overlap each other in their spatial presence, so that spatial distinctness is a bit elusive as well.

Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.

So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated. — Manuel

So the problem here is with the sense/reason division. As described above, there is vast area of activity which fits neither category, it lies between these two. We can find other ways of dividing, sense/brain, or body/mind, but each has its own problems of not being able to properly account for everything, sp we get aspects, parts of reality which have no category. This indicates that this sort of division is not the best way to go. The same problem is evident in the distinct perspectives of Parmenides and Heraclitus, and Plato's attempts to resolve the issue with the mind/body dualism.

This is why Aristotle proposed a completely different system. The proposed division is between actual (formal) and potential (material). The difference here, which made his system so useful is that all elements of reality are considered to consist of both aspects (although he did leave open the possibility of pure, separate form). This means that instead of classifying all aspects of reality as either of the mind or of the body, we say that within each individual part of reality which is presented to us for consideration, there is a formal aspect and a material aspect. From this perspective, the difficulties we incur in our attempts to understand, (such as that presented by Hume), are due to our inability to properly differentiate the formal (actual) part of the thing from the material (potential) part of the thing.

In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world. — Manuel

The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way.

One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new. — Manuel

The subject of duration in relation to sensation is very intriguing, and actually quite difficult. Suppose we take your example, the chamber, and you observe it in a way one would describe as continuously. Now when you think about it, you are only ever actually perceiving the chamber at any given moment of time, at the present. The rest of your supposed continuous observation is in the past. So you always have a moment of perception, now, and memories of past perceptions, and this constitutes your continuous observation.

If I ask you to describe what you see, you might be inclined to describe a static scenario, walls windows, chairs, desk, etc.. It is this idea of a perception, that a perception is of a static thing, or static array of things, which produces the problem of identity which Hume describes. This is because you would also refer to past static descriptions, a few moments ago, as perceptions, and there would be some slight changes to your perceptions, as you say.

But what if you described activity instead? The curtain is moving in the wind, a dog is running outside the window, someone has walked into the chamber and is now moving a chair. Isn't this really the way that we describe what we are seeing at any given time? We sense activity, and this is very clear with hearing. And when we describe what we are sensing, these are observations of activity..

The issue here is that perception is not ever at an instant in time which is the moment of the present. We tend to assume that there is a moment at the present, which constitutes the instant that sense perception is taking place, but in reality sense perception only occurs over a duration of time. So what the senses are really picking up is motion, activity, and we actually directly observe change with the senses.

So, if someone represents our observations of change as seeing the way things are at one moment (a perception), then seeing them in a different way at the next moment (the next perception), and we conclude with the use of reason, that change has occurred between these two perceptions, this is really not the way that we actually sense change. Through the senses we are actually perceiving change directly. And this, perceiving change directly, as activity and motion, is what leads us to believe in continuity. Instead of seeing the chair here at one moment, and there at the next moment, we see someone moving it. We see the curtain moving in the wind. And this, sensation of activity, is what produces the propensity toward believing in continuity. So when our sensing is interrupted, as it often is, and we see that the chair is in a different place than it was yesterday, we assume a continuity of change between these two perceptions, because this is what we would have seen if we kept up the observation.

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. As Aristotle demonstrated, change is what occur between is and is not. A thing goes from having a given property, to not having it, and "change" refers to the intermediate, neither having nor not having the property. But reason tries to describe change as a series of static pictures, of is and is not. Things were like this, then like that, and finally like so. Notice that change is always what occurs between the static pictures which reason likes to employ. So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else.

If you are willing, I will proceed further with the reading of the presented section. I believe I broke off at page 208 where he is in the midst of supporting the claim that continuous identity is an erroneous, fictitious principle.

He continues on with this argument, proposing the possibility of assuming an external object, independent from the perception. Such a 'dual existence' could resolve the contradiction, allowing that perceptions are interrupted, and the independent object maintains identity as a continuously existing object. This, assuming an external object independent from perception, is what he called "feigning a continu’d being". He says that this is done to support "identity". We have perceptions from one time to another, which appear to be perfectly identical, so we want "identity" despite the interruptedness of perception, and so we assume an independent object to support "identity".

This feigning of continued being is attributed to the "vivacity of the idea". (We ought to have proper respect for the fact that "vivacity" implies activity, change.) The vivacity involves a smooth passage from the present impression (I assume this is a strong sense perception) to the idea. But this description is rather convoluted, as it involves smooth passage between numerous impressions, and also the "propensity of the imagination". So the vivacity of the idea is really a very complex concept, involving numerous impressions, memory, and imagination. In any case, the vivacity of the idea is what leads to, or causes the feigning of a continued being, identity.

Simply put, we have impressions which through the use of memory appear to be perfect resemblances, but interrupted in time. The interruptions are caused by us (lack of attention etc.). And so we ascribe continued existence to independent objects.

So we have the foundation here for dual existence. The perceptions, separated by time, though providing the appearance of perfect resemblance, are known not to be perfect resemblances. |Perfect resemblance" of these impressions is a falsity. So they do not provide a reasonable approach to identity (209). However, the resemblance is very strong, vivid, producing the propensity for the idea of "identity". Thus philosophers have assumed "identity", and independent objects, to account for what is believed to be a deficiency in perception. Perception is incapable of providing the reason for an independent object, but the false principle "identity" provides a philosophical remedy to this deficiency.

Now he proceeds with descriptions of experiments which demonstrate that perceptions themselves do not have any independent existence. They are dependent on the organs of the body. So philosophers adopt a separation between perception and the object. This is a principle Hume calls "palliative", as a supposed remedy for the senses' inability to provide us with true identity, a vivid idea which we have a propensity toward due to the resemblance of perceptions.

So again we have the sort of paradox exposed (211). We start with the assumption that our only objects are our perceptions. We are led from the appearance of perfect resemblance amongst the impressions, toward believing in a continuous identity. But the perceptions are also known to not actually give a perfect resemblance. But resemblance itself produces a propensity to believe in identity, so we assume independent objects to support identity. But this negates the starting point, that our only objects are our perceptions. (A sort of Hegelian dialectics here.)

So at this point (212) we have two contrary positions, the vulgar, that our only objects are our perceptions, and the dual existence proposed by philosophers, that there are independent objects, distinct from our perceptions. The stumbling point between these two is "identity", and the supposed continuous existence which is the only support for this principle..

Thanks for the added information. However, what you've provided, I think, only confuses the issue more. It's been a long time since I picked up that book, and I never read it in completion. I suppose I was unimpressed by Hume's perspective.

I do not like the idea of classing all things which appear to the mind, together as perceptions. Clearly a sense perception has a completely different type of existence from an emotion. How can we say that an emotional feeling such as anger, for example has the same type of existence and effect on the mind as a visual image? Aren't emotions affections, implying that the mind has already been affected by the time that the emotion exists. The emotion seems to have an inner source, and is directed outward toward something external, while the sense perception seems to have an external source making an impression on the internal.

And I really think we need clarity on what Hume means by "reasoning". Where does reasoning fit in to this structure? It is clearly not the same as sensing. But if sensing is the means by which the mind creates sense perceptions, what does reasoning create? Is there a different type of perception created by reasoning, or does reasoning just do things with preexisting perceptions?

We’ve been granted the very thing we’ve no warrant to trust. The skeptic cannot defend his reason by reason, so how does he defend it, or does he not bother defending the very thing by which he acquires his ideas? — Mww

Here's the thing. By what means can we say that ideas are acquired by reasoning? Without a separation between the different types of things which are present to the mind, we have no basis for saying that some perceptions are produced from the senses, and some are produced by reasoning. This comes back to the issue of the difference between sensing and dreaming. If we cannot make any separation between the things within the mind which are directly derived through sensation, and the things which are directly created by the mind itself, then we will be hopelessly lost when approaching skepticism. Since there is always elements of uncertainty in anything we do, the only way to get beyond skepticism is to set up some divisions, some categories to properly classify the different types of things which are present to the mind, thereby attempting to isolate the uncertainty. Without this, the uncertainty will appear to be everywhere.

I think these relations are, let's say, of the mind, but not present to mind; that distinction belongs exclusively to perceptions, and the relations among perceptions are not themselves perceptions. — Srap Tasmaner

If only perceptions are in the mind, and relations are not perceptions, then where are the relations? Does this mean that they have separate, independent existence? But this doesn't seem right, because when we say that something is bigger than another thing, this is a judgement made in the mind. Now we could say that this relation, "bigger than" is an idea in the mind, but since this idea relates perceptions, one to another, it must be something other than a perception. This is why we need to allow distinct categories of the different types of things which exist in the mind.

What are they then? I think they are something like laws. — Srap Tasmaner

This is where the issue gets very tricky, and difficult, I believe. Relations such as the one mentioned above, "bigger than", can be described as laws, like you propose. However, these laws are universals, the same law is applicable to the relations between many different individual perceptions. But when we assume that perceptions are particulars, individuals with a unique identity, as Hume does, then applying the universal laws reveals the uniqueness of each individual's particular relations with others. This we know as measurement. So in a sense then, we assume universal laws as a means for determining each individual's unique relations. This means that the relations are of the particular, the thing being measured, not of the law, which is the thing being applied in measurement.

The laws of nature are there in somewhat the same way the laws of inference are in an argument. We have our premises, we pass from one formula to another, reaching a conclusion, but if we rely on modus ponens or conjunction elimination, they are not there in the argument as premises, but as the laws that carry us from one formula to the next. We're used now to axiomatic deduction systems in which the rules of inference are explicitly chosen — and thus part of the system though part of no argument — but in olden times, modus ponens would be present only implicitly, and perhaps postulated, or discovered, as a legitimate way of getting from some claims to others. — Srap Tasmaner

This is why it is important for us to determine exactly what Hume means by "reasoning", if there is any understanding to be found here at all. We do not really follow laws in reasoning, the laws are just stated in attempts at formalizing reasoning, describing what reasoning consists of. So for example, if I say all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal, I draw this conclusion without following any rules or laws. I just know somehow, that if everything in this class is mortal, and Socrates is in this class, then Socrates is mortal. It's because it makes sense to me, it is reasonable to me and everyone else, that it becomes a rule. It is not reasonable because it is a rule. We can see this more clearly with something like the law of noncontradiction. Contradiction does not make any sense, it is unreasonable, and so it was unacceptable long before anyone formulated the law of noncontradiction. So reasoning doesn't follow laws, the laws follow from the reasoning.

With those analogies in mind — and I think they're close to Hume's intentions and world-view — most of the book is an exploration of the mechanisms by which we pass from certain perceptions, be they impressions or ideas, to other perceptions, generally (but not always) to new ideas. He says something like this on almost every page of the book — we pass smoothly from this one perception to this other one because of the resemblance between them, that sort of stuff. It's everywhere, because it's the whole point of the book. But those resemblances, for instance, they're something we can reflect on and have ideas about, as he has done, but they are not themselves perceptions present to the mind. (There's a regress argument here, but I'm not sure it's Humean. It's the same problem you would have if you had nothing with the status of an inference rule, and had to take modus ponens as a premise. That doesn't work.) — Srap Tasmaner

This does not seem like a good way of describing reasoning, the act of passing from one perception to another. It does not account for the creative aspect of reasoning. Reasoning creates ideas. Consider the example above, All men are mortal, Socrates is a man. What is created by this reasoning process is the idea that Socrates is mortal. So we start with a universal law, and make a conclusion about a particular. And of course there are other forms of reasoning, like inductive, where we take particulars and create a universal.

Our subject here, the belief in body, I believe is something like one of these laws of thought, not an idea we have but how we pass from the lamp impression to the lamp object belief, from the book impression to the book object belief, and so on. — Srap Tasmaner

Th problem though is that Hume gives an account which is incoherent. So we must ask why, determine where his mistakes lie, which render the subject as incoherent.

But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head. — Manuel

I think that this is the key to the issue, the concept of unity. Thinking, or reasoning, is not a simple matter of successive perceptions. There is a unity of perceptions created, through categorization, or logic or other means. So when Hume talks about recognizing resemblance relations, this is only a part of the operation. Such relations allow us to categorize things as being of "the same" type, thereby creating a unity of different things that are the same type. But we do not believe that the things classed as the same type, and being part of that unity, are the very same thing, in the sense of perfect identity. So reasoning concerns itself with creating unities out of distinct parts, and it really has no interest in whether the distinct parts have a proper. or "perfect\" identity within themselves. Reasoning is only concerned with the identity assigned to the distinct parts, as member of such and such categories, the part's position in the unity.

"Unreasonable" cannot be the right word here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's a fair word, because he states in the very first sentence of the section, that the skeptic concerning the existence of body, "cannot defend his reason by reason". Therefore we can conclude that this is unreasonable.

I think your disagreement is with Book I Part I Section I, where Hume claims that all our ideas are derived from impressions. Thus, no innate ideas. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the premise is clearly stated at that part of the book. Now we ought to dismiss this premise as false, mistaken,for the reasons discussed.

So, no, Hume is not ignoring other causes that arise from within your own body: they are all impressions. — Srap Tasmaner

This cannot be true. He describes the perceptions (or "impressions" if you prefer) as having "relations" with each other. Relations are different, distinct from the things which are related. Yet the relations are necessarily present within the mind, and are part of the mind. Therefore it is false to claim that the mind consists only of impressions, or perceptions. It is becoming very clear that this is Hume's mistaken premise. Look at his description of mind at 207 for example:

As to the first question ; we may observe, that what we
call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different
perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos’d,
tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and
identity. — 207

The problem is, that Hume's former premise, that the mind consists only of perceptions, or impressions, is what is actually proven to be false here. The concept of identity is not proven to be false. This scenario, of perceptions passing in and out of the mind, while maintaining continued, independent and distinct existence, is supposed to be the falsity, the error, which he exposes. But if this were really the case, of how the mind exists, then what constitutes being in the mind, is having "certain relations". Now, in this scenario, where perceptions have identity, "relations" are what is essential to being in the mind, not perceptions, as the perceptions maintain their identity in a continuous manner, even while outside the mind.

If it is the case that having relations with other perceptions is what constitutes being within the mind, as this is what is necessary to justify the belief in independent objects, then we need to account for what having a relation is, because this is now the essential aspect of the mind. The perceptions are allowed to exist independently, so perceptions by this description can no longer be considered to be the essential aspect of mind. The mind now must be understood as this activity which produces these relations between perceptions. So we have Hume implying that having "certain relations" is what is essential to being within the mind when he tries to justify independent existence from the premise that the only thing present to the mind is perceptions.

So he starts with that premise, that the only thing present to the mind is impressions, or perceptions, and then he tries to justify our belief in continued distinct (independent) existence of body, from this premise. The attempt to justify this belief in body fails, and he is inclined to say that the belief in independent continuous existence is an error of judgement. However, he has really demonstrated that this premise is wrong because it is inconsistent with his other premise, the belief in independent bodies, which he says we cannot deny. In other words he has taken two incompatible premises. The premise, that mere perceptions are the only thing present within the mind, is not consistent with the belief in independent bodies. To establish consistency with the belief in independent existence, he must reformulate the premise, so that the mind now consists of relations between perceptions, and these relations are what is essential to being within the mind, rather than simply perceptions themselves.

But all that aside, you’re right, I think, in that Hume didn’t identify a sufficient cause for continued existence of our impressions. And I think there is a very good reason why he didn’t carry his theory further, re: he mistakes that all perceptions of the mind, which are only one of either impressions or ideas, can only be derived from “experience and observation”, and that impressions and ideas are necessarily connected to each other. — Mww

I think I am beginning to see things your way, more and more. Hume seems to rely here on two important premises, or principles. The first one is stated clearly and explicitly, that we cannot doubt the existence of body, that to do so would be unreasonable. The second premise appears to be a bit more obscure, but it has to do with what is present to the mind. Simply stated, the principle seems to be that the only thing present to a mind, is perceptions. This is made very evident from his description of mind as a simple unity of perceptions.

Because of this second premise, only perceptions are given real causal efficacy within the mind. So as a case in point, identity is seen as a mistaken idea because it is demonstrated to be impossible that identity has been derived from perception. However, to maintain this conclusion, it is necessary that identity could not have been truthfully, accurately, or reasonably derived from a source other than perception. That the idea of continued identity has a valid cause which is other than perception would make it more than just an imaginary and erroneous fiction.

Now, when we look at the tradition involved with the law of identity, it was proposed by Aristotle as a way to account for the reality of what was demonstrated by Socrates and Plato, that our conceptions of the way that things are, is often wrong, i.e not consistent with how things actually are. So Aristotle proposed a separation between how we perceive and conceive things, as abstract forms, and how things really are in themselves, as particular material forms. The identity of a thing is the latter, the thing itself, as a material form.

Since this principle, the law of identity, implies that individual, particular things are actually different from the way that we perceive them, our perceptions of them, it is necessary that the law of identity is derived from something other than perceptions. We cannot conclude directly from our perceptions that things are not as we perceive them to be.

And, we can also understand that a human being having itself a body has access toward understanding the nature of body, or in Hume's perspective, the human being has causes which influence one's understanding of body, which are other than perceptions. We have a vast array of emotions, desires, and intentions, which influence the judgements made by our minds, which do not appear to the mind in the form of perceptions.

Here we can turn to the Platonic tradition of "the good". For Plato the good is the source of, and cause of all true understanding. But the good is not properly apprehended by the mind, like a perception would be. Also, Aristotle proposed intuition as the source of knowledge and intuition as a cause of judgement, does not appear as a perception either.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience. — Manuel

I believe "instinct falls into the category of things I mentioned above, intuition, intention, and the good. These things have a great causal efficacy over our idea formation, yet they do not necessarily exist within the mind as perceptions. So Hume, by narrowing the field of things which are present to the mind to perceptions only, wrongfully excludes the influence these other things have within the mind. Then, when he considers identity, and continued existence, and finds these not to be supported by perceptions, he wrongfully concludes continuous identity to be imaginary, fictitious, even erroneous. But this is only because he doesn't consider the other category of influences in the mind, the causes which come directly from one's own body, instinct, intuition, desire, intention, and the good. Therefore if we allow that we can derive valid information about "body" directly from one's own body, without the medium of perception, these ideas about the nature of body, identity, and continuous existence, may be supported that way.

Still, consider the times. In the treatise, Hume mentions God four times. Count ‘em. Four. In however-many-hundreds of pages. This goes great lengths to show the separation from the philosophical standard of the time he is making, and for which he is, as ↪Manuel says, definitely of historical importance. Can’t really blame the guy for not getting the finer points out in the open, when he was the first to seriously open the box out of which his successors would step. — Mww

It was a time when human beings were stepping away from God as an explanation for what is natural. This was opening up the field of natural philosophy allowing speculation into other causes as to the existence of natural things (previously attributed to God). This was relatively early in the study of natural philosophy, so the fundamental principles were still being established.

From Hume’s point of view, from the Treatise, you mean? I’d agree with his premise, or principle, that our reason is insufficient for grounding the certainty for the existence of bodies. But it isn’t reason by which that certainty arises anyway, so his claim with respect to reason does nothing to prohibit some other means by which the certainty of the existence of things is given. — Mww

The issue is not so much certainty about "the existence of bodies", as such, because we take that for granted, with great certainty. But the uncertainty arises when we question what does this mean. What does it mean to be a body, and to exist. Then we find great uncertainty. And this is why we have the contrariety. There is extremely little certainty concerning the meaning of a phrase which we accept with great certainty.

Here is a brief exegesis of the next section (p205-208):

After determining that the idea of continued existence is a fiction, he proceeds to question why we produce such an idea. So he considers the following contradiction:

The smooth passage of
the imagination along the ideas of the resembling perceptions
makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity. The interrupted
manner of their appearance makes us consider them as
so many resembling, but still distinct beings, which appear
after certain intervals. — p205

This contradiction causes an "uneasiness" within us, and begs to be resolved. One or the other, of these contrary principles must be sacrificed. The notion of identity supports smooth passage of our thoughts, so we are very reluctant to give up that idea in favour of each perception existing as a distinct being. So we turn to that side, the idea that our perceptions are not interrupted. However, the interruption can be so extensive that we are forced to consider that the perceptions may have existence independent from the mind.

Now there are two questions raised (p207) relating back to the stated contradiction. How can a perception be absent from the mind without ceasing to exist, and how can it become present to the mind without creation, or become present again to the mind without some form of recreation. So he proposes that a mind is nothing more than a unity of perceptions, united by relations, allowing that any particular relation may be broken and outside the mind, thus allowing the separation of a perception from a mind, thereby apparently resolving both of these two questions.

The problem I see with this proposal is that he does not ascribe a cause to these relations. The mind exists as a unity of perceptions, such that we have a "connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a. thinking being". But "thinking" is an activity, and he has posited no real cause to account for his proposal of a unity of perceptions in the act of thinking. There is no cause given for a perception to establish a relation and become part of the unity, and no cause given for a perception to break its relation and become independent from the mind.

Because of this problem. the assumption of continued existence is said to be a "feigning" (208). If we could identify the cause of perceptions coming into the unity (which is the mind) and going out of the unity, then we would have the reason for this, and we would not have to resort to invoking a feigning to account for this. So the issue here is that thinking is an activity, and thoughts or perceptions come into and go out of the thinking mind, but we have no identified cause of this activity.

If we had an identified cause, we could accurately, and truthfully say (without feigning) whether the perceptions are recreated each time they come into the mind, and annihilated when they leave it, or whether they are passed off whole into an independent space, and later come back from that independent place.

Because the cause is not identified, Hume is left saying that we "feign" continued existence. He then proceeds to analyze why we have a propensity toward believing this idea which has been feigned.

You know…..it’s awful hard to maintain the conceptual schemes of outdated philosophies. One has to keep in mind what the original author knew about, and from which his terminology derives, even if he himself alters its meaning. For instance, perception. Perception now means something very different than how Hume wanted it to be understood with respect to his “new” philosophical approach. The concept of mind itself was still taken to be one half of the entirety of human nature, while in later times it became merely an apex placeholder, having no exacting import of its own, at all. — Mww

I try to maintain a chronological order to my understanding of philosophy. It is always good to put a philosopher's writing into a temporal context. This is why I believe it is imperative toward understanding philosophy, to have a good training in ancient philosophy. This allows one to conceive of ancient ideas, how things were understood in those times, and grasp how different ideas evolve over the course of time through different influences.

...what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief,... — Manuel

Sure, that's what Hume has explicitly said is the subject of this section of the book. The section is not really concerned with the vulgar beliefs themselves, it focuses on the causes of these beliefs. And, when it is found that a principal cause of one such belief is an error, this presents us with a problem.

If his reason cannot be trusted with respect to determining the existence of bodies, why would it be trusted to reasonably ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted? Furthermore, why would we be “induced to believe”, when the principle which grants the existence of bodies has been given to us, insofar as Nature has “….not left this to his choice….”? — Mww

I believe that this is exactly the unresolvable inconsistency which Hume finds himself up against. Overly simplified, it's reasonable to take the existence of bodies for granted, But it's also reasonable not too. What I think this indicates is that we ought not claim certainty about the existence of bodies.

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187) — Manuel

The conclusion that continued existence is an erroneous assumption is not completely inconsistent with the assumption of body. It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does. In mysticism and some religions we find the idea that the whole world, every single body uniquely., must be recreated at each moment of passing time. We are led toward this idea because of the reality of change, and the reality of the free will. This constant recreation, which is done in a way that produces the appearance of continuity to us (consider the analogy of a succession of still frames producing a film), is attributed to the Will of God. It is necessary that God acts at every passing moment to maintain the appearance of continuity, the continuance of order, which is known to us as the laws of nature.

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies. — Manuel

Yes, "far weaker" indeed. He explicitly describes the reasons for our belief in continued existence as an error, and deception. You can rationalize this however you please.

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable — Manuel

What you quoted clearly supports what I've said. Hume believes perceptions to be distinct from each other, therefore not of a continuously existing body.

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) — Manuel

Yes, this is the point here. Most philosophers except that there is not continuity to our sense perceptions. The necessary consequence of this is that the idea of continuous existence ought to be rejected altogether. However, philosophers, except some skeptics (such as Hume) are reluctant to reject this idea of continuous existence.