Lee Smolin is a great contributer to the physics and the human community. I will leave it to him to dispute your sophisticated, skewed interpretations of his work. — universeness

Good, summon him up, I would appreciate that greatly.

The temperature at which something boils exists, therefore the boiling point exists. — khaled

The boiling temperature varies with pressure, so it is relative. Therefore it is not true that there is a temperature at which something boils. And accordingly it is not true to say that such a thing exists.

That is the issue with Platonic realism, it only gets validated through absolutes. However, principles of physics such as "the boiling temperature" are always relative, and therefore cannot validate such realism. So the Platonic realist turns to principles which are more "pure", free from the influence of the physical world, mathematical axioms, and attempts to demonstrate that these are absolute.

Science via scientists will always strive to improve any shortfalls or imperfections apparent in the very dependable current laws of physics which continue to demonstrate robust predictive power.
I predict your viewpoints on the conservation laws will remain mostly ignored and ridiculed.
Meantime, I will continue to listen to the real physicists regarding the laws of physics and continue to read posts from sensationalists like yourself, as a form of curio and entertainment. — universeness

Actually, contrary to your personal prediction, there is a growing movement in this direction already. It's sometimes referred to as the quest for a "Theory of Everything", and it is required because of the inconsistency between the laws of quantum mechanics and the laws of general relativity. So your prediction has actually been proven wrong already.

That's why I gave the reference to physicist Lee Smolin, and further information on quantum gravity. But even with "real" physicists disputing your views, all you can say is that quantum gravity is "hotly debated", and "we are just too far apart to be able to establish effective communications". Yes, we are far apart, because you would not even consider the enormous problem of modeling a conglomeration of massive objects like a galaxy, as having a centre of gravity. You will never move on toward discussing possible solutions when you deny the problem. And it is your insistent denial of the problem which leaves us "too far apart" for effective discourse.

Of course, the reasons for these new theories, which I've pointed you toward, are the shortfalls of the current laws, which lead to occult concepts like dark energy and dark matter. These are the shortfalls in the predictive power, due to the falsity which you deny and refuse to acknowledge. Your claim of "robust predictive power" is what is ridiculous. As reflected by your personal prediction made above, which has already been proven wrong, your idea of successful prediction is sorely deficient. Ignore and deny any evidence which is inconsistent with the prediction, and deem the predictive power as robust.

If this is where you are in your musings then we are just too far apart to be able to establish effective communications. — universeness

I knew this way back when we first engaged. You simply refused to accept and discuss the reality of the situation, opting instead to insist on the truth of some ideal.

We need to address the issue of how the ideals which are employed diverge from the reality which they are supposed to be modeling, if we want to progress in any true understanding of reality. Simply insisting that the model is a true representation, when the observations clearly demonstrate otherwise, is a pointless venture.

You totally ignore the issue of the arbitrariness of "mass" which I already explained to you. The value for mass is assigned to objects in a way to maintain consistency with theories of energy, just like the value for height was assigned in the glider experiment, in a way to maintain consistency with the conservation law, therefore it was a matter of begging the question. The idea that galaxies are "gravitationally bound", and expansion only occurs in intergalactic space, is just a convention meant to facilitate calculation. A massive object is assigned a centre of gravity, and the space within an object is not understood to be expanding, because that would make traditional concepts for representing the interactions of objects (like Newton's first law, inertial mass, etc.) inapplicable, wrong.

But the problems which arise from this conventional way of figuring mass and gravitation, demonstrated by the need for things like dark energy and dark matter, indicate that this conventional way of determining mass and gravitation is fundamentally incorrect. The incorrectness is very intuitive, because we know that objects consist of parts which are separated by space, so it would be very inaccurate to assign a centre of gravity to a large object, simply ignoring all the distinct parts, and therefore not assigning a separate centre of gravity to each part. This is why your statement, and reference to things which are "gravitationally bound", demonstrates you have little understanding of the issue. Take a look at quantum gravity:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/could-gravitys-quantum-origins-explain-dark-energy/
https://www.space.com/loop-quantum-gravity-space-time-quantized.

So, are you suggesting that the expansion of space over time, directly affects the local measurement of 22 cm of paper? — universeness

No, it doesn't affect the measurement, that's done here and now. I am saying that the feature of reality which we know as expansion, will affect the paper if it exists for a long period of time.

A 22cm measurement would have been the same 10 billion years ago and it will be the same 10 billion years from now. The measurement is invariant and is not affected by the expansion of the universe. — universeness

This is what I am saying is false, this sort of invariance. Banno says:

This is just wrong-headed. — Banno

But if you knew a little more about these concepts, like spatial expansion, and dark energy, you'd see that this type of thinking is not wrong headed at all, it is well justified. Take a look at the article I linked to above, concerning dark energy. Though it is stated that the proposed solution is most likely incorrect, the stated problem, that expansion is accelerating, is very real. Issues such as this demonstrate that invariance is what is really "wrong-headed".

I think your attitude toward the anti-schizo establishment can be categorized as a paranoia. This puts you in the schizo category. It's a no-win situation for you, because you only encourage the divide which sets you apart and gives them power over you.

This is the common problem with any sort of anti-establishment movement. Characterizing yourself as anti-establishment (even if establishment is characterized as anti-...) puts yourself into a me against them situation which is guaranteed to render you as an oppressed individual, not having the power of the group.

I believe that the only true way to get what you want is to actually break down the divide which you seem to be intent on emphasizing. This allows you to disguise your anti-establishment passion, giving you entry into the establishment. Then you might be allowed to work from within to bring about the changes you desire. Positioning yourself as an individual who has willfully distanced oneself from the group, and is picked on because of this difference, will not get you much sympathy.

Is it the philosopher's task or aspiration? It isn't like the relevant information hasn't been presented. The public at large is responsible for what it consumes. Perhaps philosophy should try to sensationalize itself? — Pantagruel

In Plato's cave allegory it is the task of the philosopher. After escaping the cave, and getting a glimpse of the true reality, it is the responsibility of the philosopher to go back, and educate the others. The task is very difficult because the public, as you imply, is already happy in its current consumption. So I don't think it's a matter of simply presenting the reality to the public, it's more like a matter of forcing them to face reality.

That's just wrong. Quantum Electrodynamics is not about everyday stuff, but measures the fine-structure constant to ten decimal places. — Banno

This only demonstrates that you misunderstand Quantum Electrodynamics. The principles are established through observation, and the measurements you refer to, are simply an act of applying the principles. I went through this already, a number of times in this thread, because it seems really difficult for some people here to understand.

Energy is not ever directly measured. Measurements are made, and then the quantity of energy is calculated through the application of formulae to the measurements. So any supposed measurement, which is made in terms of energy (like what you suggest), is a theory laden calculation, and not a direct measurement at all. The amount of energy is calculated through application of the formulae, and the supposed measurement is a conclusion from the calculation.

As if accuracy were cumulative; as if, when I measure a piece of paper as being 22±0.1cm, somehow the error will grow such that after a week it's 22±0.7cm This is just wrong-headed. — Banno

You still don't understand. The error is in the formula through which the extrapolation is made, not in the initial measurement. That extrapolation is based in the assumption of invariance. And the assumption of invariance is the error. So for example, if your paper is measured at 22 cm, the error is in the assumption that it will continue to be 22 cm through an indefinite period of time, if it is not acted upon by a force which would change it. That's basically Newton's first law, the law of inertia, and that law is an expression of this error, the error of assuming that invariance is the natural condition of passing time.

The reality is that the simple passing of time will cause change, as if the passing of time were itself a force. And this we know from the concepts of entropy and the second law of thermodynamics, as well as spatial expansion. Invariance is a myth, a falsity. Though it is a useful principle, it is a falsity if presented as a representation of reality.

So here we are, two mutually indestructible foolish dialecticians. I don’t mind that either. — Mww

I'm good with it.

Let me see if I can help you two to understand the principle. It's quite simple really. The idea is that the laws of physics which we use are only accurate when applied to what is immediately present to us, the here and now. That is all that is observable to us, and all that these laws are tested on. The principle is that the further we project away from the immediate here and now, the less applicable the laws are, due to a changing, or evolving universe.. That this evolving universe idea describes the true nature of reality is supported by the concept of expansion of space, and the need to posit dark energy.

So in the example I gave, if in ten years time, we lose .01 percent accuracy in a specific law (the particular number used is just an arbitrary example), then over a million years that error is multiplied by 100,000 times. The error of .01 percent over ten years, represents the rate of change that the universe is undergoing, away from the applicability of that law.

As for Plato's cave, really big cave if you ask me! After 2.5k years of dedicated effort, we're still inside it. — Agent Smith

That is due to the failure of philosophy. The philosopher's task is to lead the people out of the cave. After 2.5k years, the philosophers have failed, and we remain, in the cave.

No. The relevant issue is that again you have shown that you do not grasp the maths. 1% of ten is not a smaller fraction than 1% of a million. — Banno

You seem to have difficulty understanding that what I have provided is good reasons to reject the mathematics of invariance. I have no doubt that the mathematics of invariance produces the invariant conclusion you claim. The issue is whether this mathematics produces a good representation of reality.

The existence of error, no matter how it is expressed in percentage, or whatever, indicates that invariance is a false representation. Your conclusion relies on the mathematics of invariance, and what I explained is why we ought to reject such mathematics of invariance because it provides a false representation as demonstrated by the existence of error. This is what is explained by Dr. Smolin in the referenced book. So you have not given anything relevant in your appeal to invariant mathematics, only the assertion that the application of invariant mathematics provides a conclusion based in invariant principles. That's useless toward the topic of discussion, which is whether invariance is a true representation of reality.

You need to address the issue, and explain why you believe that invariance provides us with a realistic representation. I have explained why we ought to reject such invariance as unrealistic. Now if you do not accept this, show why, or show how, invariance is a better representation. But simply stating the principles of invariant mathematics does nothing for you.

Smell is not a thing, therefore cannot in itself be an experience at all. — Mww

All I can say here, is that you use "experience" in an unusual way, which makes it difficult for me to understand your perspective. I think you are saying that an experience is necessarily of a thing. But I would think of an experience as being of an event, and an event is categorically distinct from a thing, as the activity which things are involved in. So I would understand the essential aspect of experience as activity rather than as things.

We might as you say, conclude the presence of things from experience, with a premise such as 'if there is activity then there is things which are active', but the soundness of this premise needs to be investigated, and i think that's what process philosophy does.

So I do not believe that we can get to the assumption of a particular thing in the way that you say. The "smell of coffee" is a generalization. And each time someone says "I smell coffee" this is a general statement which does not in itself give credence to the conclusion that there is in existence, a particular thing called "coffee" which is being smelled at that time.

And of course science supports what I am saying here because the experience of smelling is known to consist of an interaction of molecules inside the nose. So in this more scientific understanding there is the assumption of a multitude of things, molecules, with many differences, hence the wheel with a wide range of descriptive terms.

The assumption of "a thing" (coffee) being smelled, or "things" (molecules) really depends on the purpose of your communication. In some cases we would say there is a thing (coffee) giving off the specified odour, and that thing is smelled, but in other cases we would refer directly to the odour, assuming that there is something wafting in the air (molecules), which is what is being smelled.

Notice that the type of "thing", or "things". assumed to be involved in the activity of providing you with the experience of smell can vary greatly. This is because the existence of things is just an assumption made by us, to facilitate communication. We sense activity, and to talk about the activity we assume things which we say are doing the activity. But the type of things which we assume are doing the activity varies depending on our purpose. And so for example "things" in high energy physics is fundamental particle, and there becomes some question as to whether these things actually exist. And of course there is such questioning because "things" at any level of communication are simply assumed to facilitate the conversation.

Because coffee is an empirical object, the rule must follow from that which is the case for any empirical object, and that which is the case for any empirical object which makes the rule and thereby the circumvention of irrational reasoning possible, is the sensation by which objects are presented to us in order for there to be anything to even assign non-contradictory conceptions to in the first place. — Mww

This describes the basic premise you hold, which I don't agree with. You say "objects are presented to us" through sensation, and from this premise you conclude that "coffee is an empirical object". But I think that all sensation consists only of activity (consider the example given by others, neurological activity). What I think is that the mind creates the objects, as a type of conception, to facilitate understanding and communication. That the objects are created by the mind, rather than given by the senses is evident from the fact that the same sensation (smell in the example) can be explained through reference to different types of objects. In one description, coffee is the objects sensed. In another description, molecules are what are sensed. And in the neurological description there is some electrons or some vague type of object. This is very clear evidence that the objects are not presented to us by sensation, they are created, and assumed by the mind, in its attempt to understand its own experience of sensation.

Am I to understand by this, that the act of deceiving is the presupposition for the cause of errors in judgement? All we need to justify that, is posit what the act of deceiving is. If judgement is part of the cognitive process, the act of deceiving as cause must be antecedent to the error contained in the judgement as effect, thus also contained in the cognitive process. So what part of the cognitive process deceives? What’s worse, apparently, is whatever part that is, it may not deceive, thus may not be the cause of errors in judgement, which is to say there isn’t one. So some part of the cognitive process both deceives and doesn’t deceive, and the only way to tell which, is by whether or not there are errors in judgement. But determining whether or not there are errors in judgement can only arise from a judgement made on whether or not there has been a deception. — Mww

I don't think you are properly representing "judgement" here. Judgement necessarily applies to something external to itself, there is something judged. Even if the judger wants to judge one's own judgement, that's a second judgement which places the first as outside the second. So "judgement" necessarily implies something external, as it is always of something external or outside the act of judgement. This implies that the evidence employed in the judging, what is mulled in the mind, must say something about something other than itself, and this is what we know as inferring. So the error in judgement is principally a wrongful inference concerning the external to the mind judging.

The act of deceiving is to mislead the judge in the presentation of evidence, so as to create an erroneous inference. Notice that the concept of deception employs a separation between the judger, and the presenter of evidence. We assume such separations all the time, and this is the same principle whereby we assume "objects", through an assumed separation between a thing and its environment. The assumption is done for the sake of understanding. So for the sake of understanding, we assume a separation between senses and mind, and this allows that the senses deceive the mind. The senses present to the mind, evidence in such a way as to mislead the mind and create erroneous judgement.

The issue, or outcome of all this is that separation is very real and results in erroneous judgement. Separation is also the principle by which we assume "objects". However, our assumption of "objects" has a strong degree of arbitrariness, depending on purpose. This means that our understanding of separation has a strong degree of arbitrariness as well. But since separation is real, and is responsible for erroneous judgement, there ought to be real principles which we can produce for an understanding of separation, which would allow us to understand real objects.

What a incredibly foolish….errr, irrational…..way to do things, wouldn’t you say? Let’s just remain with the idea there isn’t a deception, there is only a subsumption of conceptions in a synthesis of them that doesn’t relate to that which the conceptions represent. That this doesn’t belong to that isn’t a deception, it’s merely a misunderstanding, which manifests as a error in judgment, proven by a different understanding that does relate different conceptions properly. Simple, sufficient, logically non-contradictory. What more do we need? — Mww

I strongly disagree with this. I think that to deny the reality of deception is what is incredibly foolish.

Oh, but I can, and I’m justified in doing so, if the point to make was the valid notion of differences in experiences relative to differences in the objects senses. — Mww

OK, you can do what you want, it's a free world, but I don't buy your justification because you are making a very similar category mistake to the others. You were saying that "the smell of coffee" is experienced as a "thing", rather than saying what it really is, a generalization. It is this fact, that "the smell of coffee" represents a generalization, which allows for the vast variance within how "the smell of coffee" is described, that is demonstrated by Banno's flavour wheel. This intrinsic variance, along with the possibility of contradiction, indicates that what "the smell of coffee" refers to is not a thing.

Deception is merely error in judgement, and judgement is not what the senses do, so….. — Mww

Again, you are misrepresenting. Error in judgement can have many causes. Deception is a cause of error in judgement. It is not itself the error in judgement. You ought to separate the means from the end. That the error in judgement occurs, as the end, is evidence that the deception has been successful. But the act of deceiving is not necessarily successful. When we recognize that deception is a valid possibility as a cause of error in judgement, we can take measures to prevent it, and that includes not relying on that which might deceive (the senses in this case).

And you really should relinquish your love affair with David Stove. — Mww

:up:

The relevant issue is the applicability of the law. Application demonstrates a degree of error, the cause of which is not accounted for. Since it's not accounted for, we do not understand it. If the activity described by the law, which the law is applied to changes over time ,then the margin of error, and the applicability of the law would also change over time. That is what Smolin deals with in "Time Reborn". He calls it "the evolution of laws", and he uses the concept to support his theory of "cosmological natural selection". Other relevant concepts include quantum gravity, anthropic principle, variability in the mass of fundamental particles, and of course expansion with dark energy.

The significant feature here, which is very relevant to the discussion on conservation of energy is expansion, and the need to posit dark energy. The need to assume "dark energy" in cosmology demonstrates that the traditional concept of "energy" (its quantity dictated by human calculations) along with the proposed conservation of this energy, cannot account for all the 'real' energy in the universe.
https://physicsworld.com/a/dark-energy-emerges-when-energy-conservation-is-violated/

If, as the article claims, the concept of dark energy is the product of the violation of conservation, then we can see that at earlier times in the universe, when expansion appears to be faster, what is really the case is that conservation is less applicable. The crux here is the real degree of invariance of mass of the electron. It is assumed that the electron has a constant rest mass. But an electron is not at rest, and can be induced to a high speed. And the electron is the common means by which we relate the massless (immaterial) photons to the massive (material) particles.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1112.0225

Check out Lee Smolin's "Time Reborn". He is a PHD physicist and he provides a good explanation as to why we ought not think of the laws of physics as timelessly invariant.

I think the opinion that the conservation laws are not prefect is a rational sound landing zone, but typing that they are false or untrue, leaves you skidding all over the place or leaves you like that millionaire, who rejects the label, as they can only absolutely account for $999,900. — universeness

The fault which makes me say "false" is not that the law is an approximation, or imperfect. The fault which leads to the accusation of "false" is in the way that the law is represented, and applied, as timelessly invariant.

So, the issue is that we as human beings occupy an extremely limited spatial perspective, and also an extremely limited temporal perspective. Our range of possible observations (possible to us) is very small in relation to the broad temporal spatial extent of the universe. We do experimentation in this narrow range of observational capacity and produce our laws from this.

Now, the observations do not match the laws perfectly, as you say, and there is some slight variance, even within our small range of observational capacity. Yet we extrapolate from these laws to the wider universe applying the laws as if they are perfect representations. in this mode of extrapolation. In this mode of extrapolation, we cannot adjust for the imperfections, the variances, because we do not know the causes of them.

Here's a simplified example. Suppose some experimentation is carried out over ten years, and it proves to have a relatively insignificant margin of error of .01 percent, and we produce a law based on this. If we extrapolate from ten years to a million years, then the margin of error might be multiplied 100,000 times. The law becomes useless. But since we have nothing to apply in making that extrapolation, except that law, we'd proceed and produce conclusions about that time period of a million years, which would be completely wrong. And we'd have no way to make adjustments for that margin of error within the law, because if we could do that we would know the cause of the error, and we'd simply write the law in a way to eliminate the error.

Coffee with sugar will always be experienced as coffee with sugar, coffee with just milk will be experienced as coffee with just milk. — Mww

No, no, no. You cannot make blanket generalizations like this. A small coffee with triple sugar is much different from a large with single sugar. And the experience of a coffee with milk and just a couple grains of sugar is much more similar to the experience of a coffee with just milk, than it is to the experience of a coffee with sugar, despite the fact that it is a coffee with sugar. That is why it is commonly said by philosophers that the senses deceive us.

So you are now saying that since George Eliot was also named Mary Ann Evans, these are two distinct individuals, and that the author of Middlemarch and Mary Ann Evans are different people. — Banno

No, I never said any such thing, and I can't see how this is relevant.

We can have two different descriptions of the very same thing. We can have two names for the very same thing. We can have a description and a name that both refer to one thing. — Banno

The point was that Isaac implied that they are not the same thing, by explicitly confirming that there is not a one-to-one correspondence relation between what the specified "neural activity" refers to, and what "I smell coffee" refers to. Clearly, we do not have two different names of the same thing then.
In the case where two distinct names refer to the same thing (like your example), there is a one to one correspondence in what the names refer to.

Further, if "neural activity", and " I smell coffee" are both descriptions, rather than names, then there is no identified, or named thing which these are supposed to describe. If you don't identify the thing which is being described, then there is no reason to believe that they describe the same thing. You have two separate descriptive phrases "neural activity", and "the smell of coffee", and no entity identified as the thing which these both describe.

If, as Isaac seemed to want to say, one is the named thing, and the other a description of the thing, then what "neural activity" and what "the smell of coffee" each refer to are of separate categories, like one being the subject, and the other the predicate. So in this case it would be a category mistake to say they both refer to the same thing, as "red" does not refer to the thing which is describe as being red, unless we are identifying the particular red of that thing.

Another possibility would be that there is an assumed thing, which the specified "neural activity", and "smell of coffee", as descriptive phrases, are both describing. But what could this third thing possibly be? And why assume a third thing which we have no indication of its existence, just because that's what's required to support such a piss-poor ontology?

So no matter how you look at it, what Isaac was saying did not make any sense.

You failed to note "provided this functions as part of the task at hand". Look to the use. The meaning of a sentence is found in its use. — Banno

The point was that it cannot function for the task at hand, as that would be made impossible by the prescribed circumstances.

On your argument, the copy of Joyce's Ulysses sitting next to me on the bookcase is two different things, a novel and a block of cellulose. — Banno

You're not quite right there Banno, because "novel" and "block of cellulose" are both descriptive expressions, and neither names a particular thing like "the copy of Joyce's Ulysses sitting next to me on the bookcase" does. The latter is the name you have given to the item, indicated by the definite article "the". The other two are descriptive terms used to describe the item, that is evident from your use of the indefinite article "a" rather than the definite article "the".

Therefore in your usage neither "a novel" nor "a block of cellulose" name a thing, as indicated by the indefinite article. So your statement that these are "two different things" is fundamentally ungrammatical, and simply employed as a trick of sophistry for the sake of a failing argument. Those are just two different descriptive expressions which could be used to describe one and the same thing, the named article. Neither "a novel" nor "a block of cellulose" name a thing, and you practise deception by suggesting that "two different things" are named here.

Of course it can be described with any word one wants to use, and provided this functions as part of the task at hand, that's fine. That's how words work. — Banno

The point though, is that anything which can be described with any word that one wants, (i.e. there is no degree of correctness or wrongness to the description, and absolute arbitrariness is allowed for), will actually not be described at all, when that arbitrarily chosen word is applied. This is because the consequence of designating the thing as describable by any word, is to designate that there is no correct description. And this designation is not itself a description, it is a statement about the thing which does not describe it. In "talking about" a thing, we can go beyond description to say something about the thing which is not descriptive. That allows us to say, about the thing, that it cannot be described, without self-contradiction.

This is part of the reason why "the ineffable" is so difficult, and appears as sort of a paradox. "Description" is a limited expression, it implies a certain type, or way of saying something about something. "Description" is bounded to allow that we can say more about a thing than the concept of "description" allows. This implies that "description" is a part of a larger category "talking about".

Then we have "naming" of the thing, which is categorically different from describing it because it is meant to identify without saying anything about the thing. That's why naming can be absolutely arbitrary, it does not necessarily say anything about the article. So as a basic philosophical principle, "naming" does not say anything "about" the the thing, it is categorically distinct from "talking about". We can apply a name without saying anything about the named thing.

However, we can twist and distort the concept of "naming" to fit it into the category of "talking about". We can say that naming is to say something about the thing, to say that it is the thing which bears this name. (The problem though, and keep this in mind, is that this is deception, because simply naming a thing does not actually show which thing bears that name.) Now we have created a form of "talking about" a thing which is distinct from describing, yet in the same category (through the means of that deception). The categorical separation between "talking about" and "naming" has been annihilated.

So we use "the ineffable" to name (notice the definite article) the thing which we cannot talk about. And if we maintain the categorical separation between "naming" and "talking about", there is no problem with the concept of a named thing which cannot be talked about. But when we make "naming" a form of "talking about", then even to name a thing as the ineffable is contradictory, creating the appearance of some sort of paradox. But this is really just the result of that faulty procedure which describes "naming" as a type of "talking about".

ndeed. It does exactly that. — Isaac

So, before you explicitly said there is no one-to-one correspondence, now you explicitly say there is one-to-one correspondence? What are you really saying?

Will is then linked to choice and as you say, we can drive a wedge between the two. What does the world look like now? — Agent Smith

As I said, will is wrongfully linked to choice. When we drive a wedge between the two it is to change the way we look at the world. Then the world looks more real because we see causation in a realistic way. Consider Plato's cave allegory, the real existence of "the good" is not even acknowledged by those still in the cave.

That's your claim. It's not what I've said. — Isaac

What you said is that there is a lack of one-to-one correspondence, and then you described this as a gap. I can remove "gap" if you want, and say that the lack of corresponds presents a "difference". This implies that the two are not the same.

It's not missing. The difference is that one's a name and the other is a
So epiphenomenalism then? Just because a correspondence has yet to be empirically demonstrated does not mean there isn’t one.
— Mww

collection of neurons firing. — Isaac

So, the difference implies that the named thing is not the same thing as the described thing.

You've misunderstood reference. 'The apple' refers to the apple. They're two different things (one an expression, the other a fruit). They don't both 'refer' to different things. 'The apple' refers. The apple is just an apple. — Isaac

You have this wrong. It is not me misunderstanding, I fully understand, that you are producing a bad misrepresentation. This is not analogous to "apple" and "fruit", where "fruit" refers to the type of thing which the apple is. "Neurons firing" refers to a completely different type of thing than the named thing, "smell", and cannot be said to be a type of smell.

If your proposal is that the named thing is "neurons firing", and a special type of neurons firing constitutes a smell, then we might have something to work on. But the proposal that "smell" is the named thing, rather than the descriptive term, and "neurons firing" is the descriptive phrase rather than a named thing, is simply nonsensical, and cannot take us anywhere.

Of course it does. Your spleen is in the group {parts of MU}. — Isaac

You've changed the name from "MU" to "parts of MU". Of course the name "parts of MU" name the parts, that is explicit. But the name "MU" does not name any of the parts, which was your claim that it names the parts.

That group was christened by naming something MU which was not a simple. You christened that group by naming the entity MU even though you do not know it's actual constituents. The point of all this being that you don't need to know what makes up the sensation 'smelling coffee' in order to name it. — Isaac

No Isaac, that's still nonsensical, logic does not work that way. Naming a thing such as "MU" does not imply that you've "christened" a group named "the parts of MU". That's a basic category mistake. You ought to distinguish between naming an individual thing, and naming a group, collection, set, or type, of thing. If the thing named is supposed to be a group, then this must be made explicit in the naming, as you do with "the parts of...". But if you just name a thing "MU", you are naming one individual, not a collection of things.

ndeed, but denying a one-to-one correspondence is not, I think, the same as denying a correspondence of any sort.

What I'm saying is that we group some loose collection of neural activity as 'smelling coffee' so whenever any activity which falls into that group occurs we're inclined to think that we're smelling coffee. — Isaac

Isaac, in order to say that a specific collection of neural activity corresponds with smelling coffee, this must be a one-to-one correspondence. Otherwise that activity could sometimes signify something else, or smelling coffee could occur without any of that neural activity. It makes no sense at all to say that this neural activity corresponds with smelling coffee, but it's not a one-to-one correspondence. If it sometimes corresponds, and sometimes does not, then we cannot make the general conclusion that this neural activity corresponds with smelling coffee.

The contention that the aroma of coffee cannot be described in words is blatantly wrong. — Banno

Yeah, judging by your wheel of aroma, it can be described in pretty much whatever words anyone wants to use. And something that can be described in whatever words anyone wants, is pretty much the same thing as something that can't be described with words at all.

Sure there is an association but the question is how closely are these two related. If we premise that all willed acts are chosen acts, then we run into the problem which Socrates and Plato exposed. Sometimes choices are not acted upon, we do not end up doing what we choose to do. This would demonstrate "choice" to be more broadly defined than "will". Not all choices are willed.

And when we start driving this wedge between choice and will, it starts to appear possible that some willful acts might not even be chosen. This is what happens sometimes when we act from habit. You might willfully choose to walk to the store, for example, but you do not consciously choose all the particular actions which get you there, like each individual movement of your legs and feet. So there is a cause and effect process which proceeds from the willful act which makes it not required to choose each particular aspect of a willful act, after the causal chain is put into action. Therefore we do not necessarily choose the particular acts which follow from the habit, but in relation to moral responsibility, and law, these acts are still willful acts.

Now we've broken the association between will and choice, showing that it is a faulty representation. Not all chosen acts are willed, and not all willed acts are chosen. We have no means for logical implication either way. Choice does not imply will and will does not imply choice.

But this dead end does necessarily impede our process of understanding "will", because we have other alternatives. And by the process of elimination, understanding advances. "Will" is commonly associated with "intention", such that a willed act is necessarily an intentional act and vise versa. We might assume that there is an equivalence between the two. All willed acts are intentional, and intentional acts are willed. And when we look at the defining feature of "intentional", we find "purpose". The common definition is such that all purposeful acts are intentional acts. "Intention" is what gives purpose to an act. So when we look at an act, and judge that there is purpose to the act, we can say that it is an intentional act, and being intentional implies that it was willed. We can conclude that a purposeful act is an intentional act, and rely on our judgement of "purpose" in acts, as an indication of whether the act is willed. ( "Choice" having been shown to be unreliable.)

Of course you will see all sorts of mechanistic acts in artificial things, which have purpose, and wonder how it is that each of these acts is a willed act. But artificial things are created, so their very existence is willed, and so by extension each act of the artificial thing is instilled with intention by the willful act which creates the thing. So the intention of a willed act has the capacity to continue in time far beyond the point in time which the act was willed, through the chain of cause and effect. This is the consequences of a willed act. The "end" might be far in the future from the beginning, but it is still intentional as the result of a willed act.

It seems that some other posters are of the view that will is tied/linked to choice. — Agent Smith

I addressed this issue already. Choice is made by the mind, reason, or rational intellect, and the will is not "tied" to that choice or else it would not be free. If the will were tied to choice, we would not be able to do other than what we choose as the right thing to do. But experience shows us that people often make a choice about what ought to be done, then still end up acting otherwise, without being forced to act otherwise. That is because the will is free, and not tied to choice.

Will, to me, is simply a kind of desire. — Agent Smith

Desire is just an inclination toward an object or goal. Will is what acts on the desire. That we do not necessarily act on our desires indicates that will is not a kind of desire.

Pantagruel said something similar somewhere in the discussion. Well, to me, that doesn’t explain anything and justifies a most unhelpful dismissive attitude to people who are wrestling with what they experience as a great difficulty. You and Pantagruel are entitled to your beliefs. But since you don't want to accept any involvement in their problems, what you believe doesn't really matter. — Ludwig V

You've got this backward Ludwig. To say that your unwanted actions are caused by a habit, and therefore your will has no power to prevent them, is the dismissive helpless attitude, not vise versa.

OK. But then what is the role of consciousness? And what makes this will my will? Why can’t my heart and lungs just get on with what they need to do? (Breathing, of course is more complicated than the heart, but there are lots of other things that are fully automatic, like digestion.) — Ludwig V

Are you asking me what is the purpose of living? How am I supposed to know? Each individual person must have one's own particular purpose. We are, each one of us, a single part in a massive multitude, each with something to do, therefore a role to play. It is not my role to tell you what your role is, we all have the freedom of will to determine our own roles.

In my book, my heart-beat is not a freely willed act and even though it has a purpose, it is certainly not intentional (or unintentional). — Ludwig V

How can you separate "purpose" from "intention" in this way, to say that something with purpose is not intentional? "Intentional" is defined as having purpose. This implies that if an action has purpose it is intentional. If we separate "purpose" from "intentional" in the way that you propose here, then we have no way to understand "intentional". The definition I give here grounds "intentional" in "purpose".

If we remove that grounding, then "intentional" is left floating freely, with no real meaning. You could associate "intentional" with anything you want, and disassociate it from anything. That's what you are trying to do with "habit" disassociate intention from it, so that you can say that a habitual act is not intentional, and therefore not willed. From here you may seek to absolve yourself from responsibility for an habitual act.

I thought that the point of the concept of the will was to distinguish between actions, which can be free, and "events" caused by something else, which can’t; that’s why we are reluctant to call the latter “actions” at all. — Ludwig V

This all depends on what philosophy you are interested in. Different philosophies have a different purpose behind the way they define "will". I am interested in metaphysics, so my purpose in defining "will" is to fit the will into an ontology, give it a place in the overall reality of existence. Other philosophies, or fields of study might seek to position will in relation to some specific aspect of reality, giving "will" a different definition, for a different purpose. The legal system for example produces its own definition of "will" suited to its purpose.

guess there is a paradox involved here, in that two things that cannot be discerned as distinct must be the same thing and, contrariwise, if two things can be discerned as separate, they must be two things, not one. It then seems as if the only true or real case of identity is a thing’s identity with itself, which is a limiting case and not typical. You can use the words that way if you choose to do so. But the standard use is different. When we say that two things are identical, we mean identical in relevant respects, (relevant means appropriate to the context). In a similar vein, we can justify applying a single general principle where situations are similar in relevant respects, because it is not merely useful but fundamental to understanding things. — Ludwig V

A thing's "identity with itself" is the law of identity. That's the definition of "identity" or "same" which we are interested in, in ontology. When you say that two different things are "identical in relevant respects", you are not saying that the two things are the same, you are saying that they are the same in certain respects. This is like saying that they are the same type. In this case "same" does not refer to the thing itself, but to the type. They are "the same type". This is the basis for the concept of equality, and equivalence, saying that two things are the same in some respect. You and I are equal as human beings for example (assuming you are not a bot), because we are the same type, "human". Notice however, that this form of sameness (of the same type) does not produce identity. Identity is what is given to the individual, so "identity" in its proper sense means "identity with itself".

But I don’t think that’s enough to justify your approach, since it sweeps all differences and details under a carpet labelled “the will” and prevents understanding the phenomena in detail and working out what we can do something about and what we cannot change. — Ludwig V

I am not looking at sweeping "the will" under the carpet, just looking for a realistic way of representing it. If the will is supposed to be the initiator of human actions, then we need to maintain this principle in a consistent way. It makes no sense to say some actions are willed, and some are not, and then produce some arbitrary principles in an attempt to produce a separation between the two. If the desire is to produce an understanding, then we need fast principles to adhere to in our inquiry, and see how far this takes us. So, I propose we begin with the principle that the will is the initiator of action, and we see how much sense this makes, and how far we can go with this, until we meet unresolvable problems. When we meet the unresolvable problems, we might get an indication of where the principle is faulty. But if we start with the principle that some human actions are willed, and others are not, we will forever be in discussion trying to establish the boundary, due to the arbitrariness.

An observation: – we started out, didn’t we? – asking what the will is. We’ve identified lots of things that the will does. But have we answered the question what it is? In the case of the train driver, I can identify the driver independently of his activity. How can I identify the will? If we can't do that, then the will becomes just a disposition (or potentiality) to do certain things and a label for what we do not understand. — Ludwig V

Try looking at it this way. You can identify the train engineer individually because you can see the person. But if you just see the train, you cannot identify the engineer, nor can you even say that there is an engineer (the train might be automated). Now, look at the human person. We cannot see the driver. So there is a possibility that the person is automated. However, people's actions indicate that human beings are not automated. So it's a better conclusion that there is a driver which cannot be seen, then no driver at all. Now we have identified "the will" as the driver. The next task is to look at all the different types of human activities existing on the planet, and proceed with the use of logic, to describe the driver. From the actions, we ought to be able to say something about the driver, or at least start with a confirmation that there is a driver, and not an automation, or vise versa.

es, but that says there's a gap between my narrative and my my speech, not between my neural activity and my narrative. — Isaac

That's exactly the point. There's a gap between what "neural activity" means, and what "I smell coffee" means, which indicates that the two do not refer to the same thing. If we assert that the two do refer to the same thing, then our supposed understanding is missing all the reality of the difference between what these two actually refer to, which manifests as the real difference between them. That is to say, all the aspects of reality which constitute the difference between them is not being described, so asserting that they refer to the same thing denies the reality of that difference, but recognizing the gap acknowledges the difference between them.

It seems to be your intention to recognize the difference, by talking about the gap, and the fact that there is no correspondence relation between the two modes of description, yet assert that the thing refer to by each is the same thing. If so, that's simply contradiction.

No, but that's not the claim I made is it. — Isaac

You said "If you name your car 'bob; then you are naming (in part) a carburettor". That's nonsense, by way of division fallacy, face it.

What you term 'my brain' is made up of elements you're not even aware of by naming the whole. It still contains those elements and they still form part of what you've called 'my brain' even though you're not aware of them. — Isaac

Sure, the supposed parts make up the whole, but to name the whole is to name the whole, and this in no way names the parts. That's simple, and to try to stretch this into a case where the person naming the whole, is also naming a multitude of completely unknown parts, is a serious epistemological mistake.

didn't, you did. I said there's no one-to-one correspondence. several patterns of neural activity could be given the same name, and the criteria for such naming might change over time. — Isaac

"Gap" is your word. Look.

do think, however, that there's a possible (more charitable) interpretation of the 'gap' here which might be something more like a gap between my identifying the neural activity as 'smelling coffee' and my being inclined to describe it thus, verbally. I suppose it's possible that I might choose to do otherwise at that juncture, but I can't see what ontological consequence that might have. — Isaac

But it's not a semantic issue. If two separate descriptions of the very same thing cannot produce a one-to-one relation, then something is missing, whether you call it a gap or whatever.

If you name your car "bob" then you are naming (in part) a carburettor even if you don't know what a carburettor is because there's one in your car and you named your car. — Isaac

You utter nonsense. To name a car is not to name an engine, or any component of the engine. That is simply ridiculous. That my name is MU does not imply that my heart or my lungs are named MU, that's a division fallacy.

What. I don't see anything missing. There's some neural activity and there's the name we give it. What's missing? — Isaac

You said there's a gap between the two. What do you think constitutes a "gap"? How is there a gap between the two descriptions, neural activity and I smell coffee, unless there is something missing between these two descriptions? "I smell coffee" is not the name we give to neural activity, "neural activity" is the name we give to neural activity. And "it smells like coffee" is not the name we give to neural activity.

Yes, but the key thing that some miss, I think, is that there's no one-to-one relationship between the two, such that a small and variable number of 'chemical and physiological reactions of my brain in the presence of coffee' might be described by us as "I smell coffee". — Isaac

Correct, and the existence of this gap means that there is a lot missing between these two. Within that gap is the ineffable. We know there's more to it than what we say, from either side, but we haven't the words to say it even if we try.

I tried to discourage the reams of babble that emerged early on, to no avail. — jgill

Come on jgill, a thread on the ineffable could be nothing other than babble (a typical Banno thread). Why discourage them? Just let them play their games. Consider the infinite monkey theorem, something meaningful is bound to pop up once in a while.

1. You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are. — Sargon

There is no such thing as "the way you are". We are constantly active, changing, and each activity you are engaged in is making you different from before. So the premise is self-contradicting. The fact that you are doing what you are doing implies that you are actively changing, therefore it is impossible that there is such a thing as the way you are.

Improving is a public enterprise. It can be seen, or it amounts to nothing. — Banno

What about all the internal behaviour, which can't be seen? This is what is commonly called thinking. A person learns one thing here, another thing there, and something else from someone else, not necessarily displaying anything publicly yet, of what has been learned in these various places, though keeping the teachings in mind as considerations. Then through a process of synthesis, the person mixes up a bit of this with a bit of that, along with some of the other thing, also throwing in some innovation, and displays something original and unique to the public. The critical aspect here is the synthesis, and this is a private enterprise. Sure, improvement can be seen if it is displayed in public, but where it occurs is within what is private.

You say that the will is continuously active and even while asleep. — Ludwig V

This is because the common way of understanding the will is to tie it to consciousness, so that a willful act is necessarily a conscious act. But that is very similar to tying will to reason, and this leads to the problem I described. How can you consciously do what you consciously do not want to do? So instead, we define "will" as the initiator or cause of our various acts, whether or not the acts are consciously decided upon. This allows for the reality that we go ahead and do things which we consciously decided not to do. The will as the first cause of motion in the body is not causally determined to follow the conscious mind.

Actually, I would think that when I do something absent-mindedly, my will not engaged (the clue is in “absent”), but I suppose you would disagree. — Ludwig V

In this case, it is not that your will is not engaged, it is. What is the case is that your conscious mind, and power of reasoning is not engaged.

I assume, though, that if someone is in a coma, you would agree that the will is not active. — Ludwig V

I would tend to think that the will still is active in some sense, when the person is in a coma, just like I said it is active when the person is sleeping. At this time, the will would be very limited in its capacity to do things. However, whenever things are being carried out for a purpose, implying the existence of intention, then the will is active. This would include things like breathing, and the beating of the heart.

But I don’t see what the activity of the will consists of once it has started an action off. Are you saying that the will is like the driver of a train, who always monitors, but only acts when required, or that it is like the driver of a car, who has to control the car every second it is moving? I assumed the will just gave a push to start things off and the action was performed without its intervention. — Ludwig V

This is a very good question. Due to the way that I understand time, I think that the will has to be active at every moment of passing time, to keep the body alive. This is similar to the way that I understand the physical universe. God's will must be active at every moment of passing time, to ensure that things remain similar to the way that they were the moment before, instead of there being complete randomness at each passing moment. I believe that in order to account for the reality of change, and freely willed acts of human beings, it is necessary to believe that the entire universe is recreated at each moment of passing time. This is why it is the case that things are not exactly the same from one moment to the next, the world gets recreated at each moment, with those changes. That the world is recreated at each passing moment in a way which is consistent with the way that it was at the last moment, implies a cause.

I don’t think there is any problem about how habits are acquired. A repeated cycle of stimulus and response is enough. — Ludwig V

Maybe, that would be the case, but in reality there is no such thing. Each set of circumstances at each moment of time is unique. So there may be similar incidents of stimulus, but the situations are not the same. How can we account for the same behaviour, same response, in different sets of circumstances, which are merely similar? It is wrong to represent this as a repeated cycle. This is the same issue we have with abstraction, and creating general principles. We make one general principle which is applicable to many different situations which are merely similar. We can't say that the situations are the same, so we cannot justify the applicability of the one general principle, by saying that it is applicable because it is based in a repetition of the same situation.

2) I’m not at all sure that Plato’s "thumos" is equivalent to our will. For one thing, Plato does not think that "thumos" is the only precursor of action. "Epithumia" is another. But that’s a side-issue. It was a surprise that you think that my will doesn’t necessarily align with my desire. I think most people think of the times when physical events take over, as in addiction, extreme hunger, pain, what I then do is not done by me, hence not the result of my will. — Ludwig V

The point is that to be consistent, the will must always be the cause of action. It would make no sense to say that sometimes the will causes a human action, and sometimes it did not. Then we'd have to differentiate between which actions are caused by the will, and which actions are caused by something else. In reality though, we see that all human actions have a similar source, and it is not the case that some are derived from one place, and others from another place. I believe, that to say my actions were caused by an addiction, or by some physical event, rather than admitting that it was my will, is just to try and make an excuse for one's wrongful actions.

I came across a good example of the ineffable in the thread called "The Will". When the free will prevents a person from doing something, as in the case of resisting an habitual activity, and instead of replacing the habitual activity with another activity, it simply prevents the activity from occurring, how could we describe what the will is doing in this case? The will is acting, but we cannot call what it is doing an activity without contradicting what has been stipulated.

I propose that this is where we meet with the appearance of "the ineffable". Any time that we can make a statement about something, and the statement is reasonable (some of course will argue that the above statement with a "free will" is not reasonable), yet what is stated cannot be described without contradiction, then we have the ineffable.

Another example is if we try to talk about what happened prior to the beginning of the universe (Big Bang). Since there was no time at this time, it makes it impossible to talk about. So any time that we propose an activity which is not a physical activity (describable in the terms of physics), then we have the appearance of something ineffable.

Of course, this is only an appearance, and in truth we can avoid assuming the reality of the ineffable by adjusting the way that we look at, and describe things, by employing different principles. So for instance, when we adopt dualist principles we allow for the reality of activity which is not physical activity, and we bring this realm of activity, which appeared to be ineffable, into our domain of discourse by positing the principles which allow for that.

...

I think you partially misunderstand me. I'm suggesting that a mechanistic causation is the case, but that we can override even that through concerted effort. — Pantagruel

But if this is the case, then the overriding concerted effort is the manifestation of "will" rather than the mechanistic causation. That is because "will" has to match up with what actually occurs, what the person does, as "the will" is said to be cause of this, in either case.

Now this concerted effort which overrides the mechanistic causation of what could have happened, if the person did not exercise the will in this way, has to be looked at for a cause of it. If the mechanistic action has a mechanistic cause, then why wouldn't the concerted effort to prevent that action also have a mechanistic cause? Each can be said to be "the will". Either the will allows the describable mechanistic action to occur, or it disallows it, so the type of causation, as "the will", is the same in each of the two cases.

So, what's the point here?

Right, and behaviourism steps in and says that this is environmentally triggered and there you are. I'd propose an interpretation that is a kind of soft-determinism in conjunction with a modified conception of what constitutes free-will. — Pantagruel

But it is not true that actions are necessarily environmentally triggered. That is what will power, and the capacity to break habits demonstrates to us. If we cannot in every instance of a willfull act, establish a necessary relation between an environmental trigger, and the act, we cannot make the conclusion that such acts have an environmental trigger. And there are many little experiments you can carry out by yourself, to prove that acts are not necessarily environmentally triggered. Hold an object in your hand for example, and decide at some random time, to drop it to the floor, without any environmental trigger.

Let's assume that when we act, we are operating mechanistically in that the conditions of the success for an action trigger that action which exists in us as a tendency. — Pantagruel

This is not an environmental trigger, it is an internal decision, as to the probability of success.

But suppose also that it is possible to alter these instincts or habits through concerted and prolonged effort (the phenomenon of hysteresis, prevalent in organic systems evolution). Then, by choosing to modify our habits, we choose the direction in which our willing proceeds. Choice which is free to be determined by reasoned effort. Reasonable choice. Maybe we do not have free-will; but maybe we are free to (reasonably choose) to have will. — Pantagruel

We have the will to break habits, and we often do, so I do not think that there is any question here. What is a more interesting question, is how do habits, and even instinctual actions come into existence. Habits must be developed, we practise the same thing over and over again, and this requires effort. So just as much, or more, will power is required to produce a habit, as is required to break a habit. This leaves the issue of how can we account for the reality of instinctual habits.

So the act of will starts a reasoning process which can lead to a judgement, but the judgement doesn't necessarily initiate any action. So is it correct to say any action must be initiated by another act of will? Does there have to be another reasoning process for this second act of will? — Ludwig V

I don't quite see what you are asking. The act of will is what initiates an act. Are you calling the act of will a "second act", because it is the cause of the act which can be observed? So for instance, you can observe someone's act of walking, or even your own act of thinking, but there is necessarily another act, the act of will (more properly called the first act as prior to the other,) which is the cause of the observable act. In any case, since this act is prior to the reasoning act, there is no need to assume a reasoning act which is prior to this act, if that is what you are asking. That is what makes the will "free".

So am I right to conclude that an act of will is necessary to start even a habitual action? So how come I find myself carrying out habitual actions even when I don't want to? — Ludwig V

This is the separation I referred to, between what is consciously wanted, through the reasoning mind, and what is acted upon by the will. That is the issue which gave Socrates, Plato, and other ancients, much trouble, how can we do the act which we know that we do not want to do, i.e, knowingly act bad. The answer is that the will is free, and so it is not necessarily compelled by reason. So Plato posited spirit, or passion, as a medium between the body and the mind in his dualism. The spirit can be aligned with the body, or with the mind. So if you engage in habitual acts which you do not want to, I would say that this is an instance of your spirit being aligned with your body rather than your mind.

If I imagine myself driving a car along a road, I think of myself carrying out all sorts of actions, cognitive and executive, all of them habitual. Are they the result of a single act of will, for example wanting to go to the supermarket, or are there multiple acts of will? Does each adjustment of the steering wheel involve an act of will?

Forgive me if these questions are naive. This is new territory to me. — Ludwig V

I would say, that the will is continuously active, and so we are continually moving and thinking all the time, even while asleep. Have you ever tried meditation, where the goal is to calm this activity? The result of separating the will from the mind in principle, provides us with a good starting point for understanding the reality of human actions.

We are all naive here, as this is simply unknown territory. What I say on the subject is only speculation, so feel free to correct me.

Yes, you did, and this is due to your own misunderstanding of the complexities of the physics involved.
I found the points made by those who fully accept the conservation laws in the physics stack exchange much more compelling than those, like you, who dissented. — universeness

I find that very easy to believe, because you've demonstrated over and over again that you are extremely biased in your approach, and you either willing deny, or completely misunderstand what is written by the experimenters you yourself referenced.

I think you should perhaps start using terms like 'imperfect' or even 'incomplete' as opposed to 'false' or 'untrue,' when offering your interpretation of conservation of energy. You might be taken more seriously by doing so. — universeness

You told me this much earlier in the thread, and I explained to you exactly why "false" is a better word. Countless scientific experiments have demonstrated that energy loss is very real, and not one has ever demonstrated conservation. And so conservation does not correspond with fact. It is a very useful principle, but it is simply wrong because it is not consistent with what scientific experiments have demonstrated as the truth about this matter.

And it is not a matter of the principle of conservation being "imperfect", or "incomplete" because as I told you last time, it is the exact opposite of this. The law of conservation states something perfect and complete, conservation, when experiments show that in reality things are not perfect and complete, in the way that this principle states. So it is an ideal which does not take into account the reality of the imperfections which actually exist in the world. Therefore it's simply false, like any other Utopian ideal.