mostly motivated by material gain for their religious organizations but not the "true believer" foot soldiers – "the flock" whipped-up and driven to slaughter with consecrated fairytales about defeating the infernal conspiracies of Them "evil-doers" that's preached by their "Shepherds" – sheep converted into rabid wolves against "the hounds from hell". — 180 Proof

These people "the flock" are murdering for the purpose of material gain of the organization, as you state. That they are brainwashed fools, and think that they are murdering for some other purpose, is beside the point.

my point here concerns religious true believers who have always willingly martyred each other and each other's children for their respective Holy Lies. — 180 Proof

But these people, the brainwashed fools, do not know that what they say is untrue, because they believe it. Lying is deceiving, i.e. knowing what one is saying is not the truth. These people believe it to be the truth, so they are not lying, and you cannot say it's "their respective Holy Lies". The lying is being done by those "High Priests" who are motivated by material gain rather than true religion (actually True Religion is a brand name). So they are not properly characterized as "Holy Lies", they are better called "materialist lies".

Using probabilities and statistics in any framework of thought, philosophical or other, is not mathematizing. — Alkis Piskas

Could you explain what you mean here? Aren't probabilities and statistics mathematical?

so these assessors with their many diseases, physical and mental : broken, fragmented, compromised… think they can just put together bits and pieces of collected information from here and there, shifting their positions like weasels, as they glean from others and change their vocabulary, have the audacity to think they “have it down’? — skyblack

Why do you think that one who is constantly changing positions, would think that they "have it down"? Wouldn't the person who thinks oneself to "have it down", never change positions? And the one who is always changing positions does so because that person does not assume to "have it down".

But if you have an insight that I do not, then I will always mistake that which is in you for that which is in me when they are not at all the same. I will be like a blind man using the word 'see' and understanding it as a metaphor "I see what you mean", but can only understand "I see a car coming down the road"as some kind of superior directional hearing type thing, or remote touch, or... — unenlightened

I must say that I don't know exactly what you mean by "insight", but wouldn't it be possible to show someone else how to have the same insight as yourself, even if that person does not presently have that insight? Then the two of you could talk about it.

I think that the blind analogy is not quite applicable, because the blind man does not have the capacity to see, and cannot be shown how to see something. The person who does not have the same insight as another might still have the capacity to have that insight, if the way is shown.

Even if that's true, given just a little thought, MU, the religious kill each other in the name of Holy Lies which command "thou shalt not kill" and "love each other" whereas the so-called "materialists" are not nearly as murderously – sacred-ends-justify-profane-means – hypocritical and dishonest about their motivations. Faith in (demonstable, hearsay) falsehoods facilitates vicious self-deceptions, as Voltaire points out — 180 Proof

I think what I said, or at least meant, is that the materialists kill for material gains, and they claim this killing to be in the name of God, i.e. for an ideological purpose. These are the ones who are "hypocritical and dishonest about their motivations". You may have observed, or heard about these people who kill for materialist purposes, and heard how thy claim to be killing for an ideological divinity, and wrongly concluded that they were hypocritically killing for that divinity, when in reality they were killing for material gains.

...whereas insight is immediate and present. One cannot share insight, but only relate it as experience from the past, so what one shares is knowledge. — unenlightened

"Immediate and present", I wonder what that means. I think I see why you say it's that whereof we cannot speak. By the time we speak of anything immediate and present, it is in the past, and not present. And if we speak of the present itself, as a boundary between past and future, it seems like it must consist of a little of both. But that's contradictory. So it appears like there is some validity to your claim concerning an incapacity to speak about this.

But I still think there must be a way to talk about things which are in the past and the future at the same time, or are neither in the future nor the past, and other insightful things. And if we haven't figured out how to speak that lingo, we might be able to learn it, if we try. We could study the spiritual masters, and learn how to speak that sort of language which shares insight rather than sharing knowledge. To begin with, I would say that it doesn't involve thinking up different words, special jargon, or anything like that, it's just a different way of using the well-worn words which we already have

Rather I would place the spiritual in that place 'whereof one cannot speak'. — unenlightened

I look at all those places "whereof one cannot speak" as challenges, to find a way to speak about them. What "whereof one cannot speak" refers to is only temporary, as language evolves.

The latter is the smart (sane) bet; yet the world's always been overrun by gullible suckers who are ready at moment's notice to get off their calloused knees just long enough to go murder or be murdered by each other's children in order to "defend" one Holy Lie "against" some other Holy Lie. — 180 Proof

I think a proper analysis would reveal to you that most of the killing which has occurred in the wars we have seen is materialist based, the desire for property, territory, land, rather than based in an ideological Holy Lie. But the killers might claim the name of God in an attempt to justify their materialistic greed.

The mind-independent world is necessarily thought as being external to the mind (and body). — Janus

As I explained earlier, external and internal are spatial terms. We tend to set, or assume a boundary between mind (and body) and the external, but we assume no such boundary between mind (and body) and the internal. Why not? The activities of the mind (and body) are intermediate between the proposed external world, and the internal soul. If the external world is supposed to lie on the other side of a boundary, then for consistency sake, we ought to assume that the internal world also lies on the other side of a boundary.

If we take a sphere, we assume an external circumference, as a defining boundary. The dimensionless "point" at the centre of the sphere though, is indefinite due to the irrational nature of pi. To properly understand the reality of "the centre", as a proposed non-dimensional point with a specific location in a spatial entity, we need a defining boundary between the dimensional and the non-dimensional. In mathematics it is represented by infinitesimals. In practise, this is the boundary between the dimensional (external), and the non-dimensional (internal). But if we propose a boundary between human activity and the external, we need also to propose a boundary between human activity and the internal.

So if we proceed from here to ask which is the real "mind-independent world", the external or the internal, there is no necessity to conclude that it is the external. And this is why dualism is so appealing, it allows us to conceive of the reality of both, the internal and external "mind-independent" worlds. And the supposed "interaction problem" is left without bearing, because the mind (and body) is the realm of interaction.

Maybe that shit which Banno referred to was the fire and brimstone of God's wrath.

Take the usual examples of a pencil balanced on its point, or Newton's dome with a ball perfectly balanced on the apex of a frictionless hemisphere. The pencil and ball are objects in a state of symmetry, being at rest with no net force acting on them, so they should never move. But then we also know that the slightest fluctuation - a waft of air, the thermal jiggle of their own vibration, even some kind of quantum tunnelling – will be enough to start to tip them. The symmetry will be broken and gravity will start to accelerate them in some "randomly chosen" direction. — apokrisis

Such symmetry is pure fiction, a useful principle employed by mathematicians with no corresponding reality in the world. The type of things that you cite, which would break the symmetry, would never allow such a symmetry in the first place.

So metaphysically, this is quite complex. Some history of constraints has to drive the system to the point that it is in a state of poised perfection. The symmetry has to be created. And that then puts it in a position where it is vulnerable to the least push, that might come from anywhere. The sensitivity is created too. The poised system is both perfectly balanced and perfectly tippable as a result. The situation has been engineered so randomness at the smallest scale - an infinitesimal scale - is still enough to do the necessary.

All this is relevant to the OP - as the Big Bang is explained in terms of spontaneous symmetry breaking. And thus the conventional models have exactly this flaw where the existence of the "perfect balance" - a state of poised nothingness - is just conjured up in hand-waving fashion. And then a "first cause" is also conjured up in the form of "a quantum fluctuation". Some material act - an "environmental push" - tips the balance, as it inevitably must, as even the most infinitesimal and unintentional fluctuation is going to be enough to do the job of "spontaneous" symmetry breaking. — apokrisis

So this entire proposal of "spontaneous symmetry breaking" for the creation of the universe is pure "hand-waving" nonsense in the first place. The proposed "state of poised perfection" is an impossible ideal, which could have no corresponding reality, and the entire proposal is a non-starter. This is just an attempt to validate platonic realism, by placing a mathematical ideal, "symmetry", as prior to the physical universe.

If you think that what is apparent to us constitutes evidence either way, then it is the case that the vast bulk of observational evidence suggests the existence of a mind-independent world. — Janus

The issue I pointed to earlier in the thread, is the nature of the assumed "mind-independent world". This world is not necessarily external, it might be internal, and we simply model it as being external.

If what is apparent to us does not constitute evidence one way or the other regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, then QM like the rest of science and empirical observation and investigation, is neither here not there in that connection. You can't have it both ways. — Janus

I can\t imagine how "what is apparent to us" could possibly not constitute evidence regarding the existence of a mind-independent world, in one way or another. It appears to me, like such a claim would be the result of not interpreting "what is apparent to us" in relation to the issue.

Not necessarily; it depends on whether the observational evidence is relevant to the metaphysical perspective in question and it is never the bare observation that is relevant in any case, but some interpretation of it, which rather begs the question. — Janus

The point was that since metaphysics concerns being, or existence, in the most general sense, all observational evidence is relevant to any metaphysical perspective. To dismiss the evidence as "unsupportive" rather than "undermining", and insist that it is not relevant, is simply denial.

unless change is part of the thing's identity, as a whirlpool for instance, or the human body's continuous process of food intake and subsequent evacuation. — Art48

These are activities, not things. Activities are attributed to things, as what a thing is doing, so the law of identity doesn't apply. This is partly why it is very difficult for us to gather a complete understanding of activities.

That metaphor is probably as old as humanity, describing the rebirth of the soul, after an individual's death. When one dies it is replaced by another. I believe Christians tried to adapt the metaphor to symbolize Christ's resurrection, but it doesn't really work, because the point of the Phoenix is that the dead one is replaced by a new, distinct one, not a resurrection of the old.

You appear to conflate two difference senses of "realism". In the context of the phrase "scientific realism" it's contrasted with "scientific instrumentalism". Scientific realism says that scientific theories are "true" in the sense that the world is as the theories say, whereas scientific instrumentalism says that our scientific theories are just useful or not. — Michael

This is a very good point. Isaac and I spent days arguing the accuracy of systems theory, only to find out in the end, that Isaac was arguing the usefulness of systems theory, and I was arguing that systems theory does not give us truth. I thought Isaac was arguing the truthfulness of systems theory. But there was really never any inconsistency between us, because usefulness is not the same as truthfulness.

I think it's more the case that quantum physics does not seem to offer a realistic picture of what is going on at the "fundamental" level; but that does not equate to "undermining scientific realism", it' seems more that it just doesn't appear to support it. — Janus

When the observational evidence does not support a particular metaphysical perspective, isn't this a case of undermining that metaphysics? Metaphysics, as speculative, is not "proven" per se, it is supported or not supported. How much evidence inconsistent with a particular metaphysical perspective is required before one accepts that the metaphysics is off track? Since metaphysics deals with everything, being, or existence in the most general sense, evidence which does not support a perspective, is evidence of a different perspective, therefore necessarily undermining to the former.

Metaphysical wisdom moves forward by determining which proposed perspectives are not accurate, and are therefore unacceptable. This is a process of elimination. We find that certain perspectives are unacceptable because the evidence does not support them, so we dismiss them as not rational possibilities.

When the world is modeled as consisting of possibilities, the premise of the model denies that there is such a thing as "what is the case". However, from the many possibilities, we can proceed to determine what is impossible. "What is impossible" is a determination of "what is not the case". And since "what is not the case" (what is impossible) is diametrically opposed to "what is the case", we let "what is the case" in, through the back door. So we could call this a back door realism, "what is" consists of all the possibilities which have not been excluded as impossible.

You can’t question what is observed - that is the empirical fact. — Wayfarer

Actually, as philosophers, we can and ought to question what is observed. There are two principal facets of observation. First, the person prepares oneself into a position to observe. This is the perspective one takes, and the perspective greatly influences what is observed. So for example, observations in quantum physics are done through the means of instruments. And we ought to question the observational capacity of these instruments. Second, an observation is what is noted. So an observer notes what one thinks is important, and chooses one's words to describe what is observed. So we can question why somethings are noted, and others not, and we can also question the observer's choice of words in describing what is observed.

I have no idea what a systems theory ontology might be. Systems theory is a modeling tool. It makes useful predictions and sets up the parameters of useful frameworks. It doesn't bring things into existence. The cell pre-existed systems theory, which merely describes how the cell functions in statistical terms. — Isaac

Oh good, because when you say things like "The only truly closed system is the universe so any part of it decreasing entropy is not defying the second law", and ""Everything within the cell membrane is the system, everything outside of it is not", you give me the impression that you think that things like the universe, and a cell, actually are, each, a different type of "system".

Now that we're clear on what a "system" is, a predictive modeling tool, do you see from the evidence I've provided you with, that systems theory would be a very flimsy sort of tool for modeling the true reality of things like the universe and a cell? Really, systems theory is not a good tool for modeling the true existence of any type of object or thing. As a simple predictive tool its usefulness is very limited to simple predictions, therefore there is no real place for it in ontology.

That's the point. They seem external. The authors identified the models associated with them seeming external, but they are not actually external. — Isaac

All the things we hear, see, touch, and otherwise sense, "seem external", but this does not necessarily mean that any of them actually are. That is the point.

As usual, I have no idea what you're talking about. The Markov boundary is a statistical feature of a network. It's not an object. It is at the membrane, not the membrane itself. — Isaac

So if I look at a cell membrane through a microscope, I will see a "statistical feature of a network" there "at the membrane"? If not, then what do you mean by "it is at the membrane"?

It seems to me, like you are stuck in a huge category mistake, and instead of accepting this you dig yourself deeper in. The "network" is supposed to be the thing being modeled, the statistics are the modeling tool.

Do you see, that in systems theory, a "system" is a model, not the thing being modeled. They take a natural thing, and assume that the thing can be compared to a system a true system being an artificial thing, not a natural thing). So they create a model of a system which is comparable to the natural thing. But the natural thing cannot be called a system because systems are artificial.

The reason why I say systems theory is flimsy, is that instead of recognizing how big the differences are between the actual natural thing, and the model system which it is compared to, systems theory ontologies tend to find ways to dismiss or overlook all these big differences, and insist that the systems model provides a good representation.

The rest doesn't mitigate your contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sorry Tones, You have not pointed out any contradiction. If I remember correctly, you define contradiction as saying 'is' and 'is not' of the exact same proposition. "I cannot agree to abstractions as objects, without specific restrictions", does not contradict with "I can readily conceive of abstract objects". All conceptions require restrictions, that's what conception is, understanding the specified restrictions.

So, 1) the science of Markov blankets doesn't directly address the philosophical issue of subjective experience (as explained in the first paper) and 2) colour terms like "red" don't (only) refer to some property held by some external world cause but (also) by something that happens "in the head" (even if you want to reduce qualia/first-person experiences to be something of the sort described in the second paper). — Michael

The problem with this way of modeling is that it sets a boundary to the outside of the system, but it does not set a boundary to the inside. As Isaac describes, everything inside the boundary is designated as inside the system. This means that causal influences which change the system must come from outside the system. The only change caused from within could be the cause of the entropy of the second law of thermodynamics.

Consider a sphere, and all within the sphere is internal to the system. Now suppose there are changes to the system which cannot be accounted for by outside influence. A simple example could be the cause of existence of the system itself. We cannot say that it is the system which causes these changes because the system on its own can only follow the second law of thermodynamics. And in the simple example we'd have to conclude that the system caused itself.

But if we put a boundary to the inside of the system, suppose an infinitesimally small centre to the sphere, and we allow that this "internal" is not a part of the system itself, that problem is resolved. We can now have internal causation to the system, which is not a part of the system proper.

This is why systems theory is not very good for this type of modeling, it only imposes one boundary, between the system and everything else. In reality though, we need two boundaries, one between the system and the external, and one between the system and the internal, because the system is always going to exist as a medium between the two extremes, which are not part of the system itself.

You quote the first line of a post and you ignore the rest. I see no point.

These ideas are not up for debate in math. — Real Gone Cat

Sorry to disillusion you Real Gone Cat, but this is a philosophy forum, not a math forum.

No. It's part of the cell, so part of the system. — Isaac

Now you contradict yourself. You said very distinctly and explicitly: "Everything within the cell membrane is the system, everything outside of it is not". Now you say the boundary itself is inside the system. Or are you saying now, that the membrane is inside itself, being both inside the system, and the thing which everything within it is inside the system? The membrane is inside itself?

So let me get this straight. The membrane is not the boundary, as you said earlier, the membrane is inside the system, therefore part of the system, and inside any proq|aaposed boundary. What is the boundary then?

I suggest that you do not have a "boundary" at all, just principles whereby you judge some things as part of the system, and other things as not part of the system. And unless your principles are stated as spatial principles, your use of the spatial terms "internal" and "external" is misleading. The parts of "a system" may be scattered around the world, like a network of microwave communications, certain things being designated as part of the system, and other things as being not part of the system, and to use spatial terms like "internal" and "external" is rather misleading, because the things which are not a part of the system are intermingled with the things which are.

Would you agree with this characterization? If there is not a spatial boundary which circumscribes an area of inside, leaving another area as outside, then really what you have is a judgement as to which things are a part of the system, and which things are not. And the things which are not a part of the system could be physically inside the system, or they could be physically outside the system. So for example, the molecules which pass through the cell membrane in the process of osmosis, may or may not be part of the system both before and after they pass through the membrane, depending on how one models "the system", how things are included as part of the system. Being inside or outside the membrane is an arbitrary difference, if the membrane is assumed to be part of the system, because the membrane is not a boundary in this sense.

So? They only need to be defined systems for the model to work, not closed ones. — Isaac

I have no doubt that such models may work. I've repeated that already, they are created for specific purposes, and are adequate for those purposes. What is at question is the truth or falsity of the models, in the sense of correspondence, and that is whether the models are a fair representation of what is supposed to be being modeled. Mathematics can be used, with statistics and probabilities, to create predictive models, with the models being symbolic (having predictive significance), without representing the activity being predicted.

Who says the definition is not represented in reality? — Isaac

I said that. That is exactly the evidence I have been giving you, and arguing. Have you not been paying attention to the evidence I've given you? What's the point to this type of discussion, if you just pay attention to the parts of what I say that you want to?

Overlapping and sharing in no way prevents a system for being defined, and it only need be defined to have internal and external states, to have probability functions performing gradient climbing equations against entropy. — Isaac

You are not paying attention to what I write. I clearly indicated that overlapping does not prevent a system from being defined. I said it prevents a system from being defined as "discrete", which is the word you used.

Easily thus. "Everything within the cell membrane is the system, everything outside of it is not". Nothing about the fact that my newly defined 'system' exchanges molecules with the system outside of it, prevents it from being defined as a system and therefore being modelled as performing this gradient climbing function. If you can't explain how you think the openness of systems prevents this model then simply repeating that it does doesn't get us anywhere. — Isaac

Good example. Now do you see that the "cell membrane" in your example is a third thing? It is neither within the system nor is it outside the system, according to your statement. Does your model account for the existence of this third thing, the boundary, which is neither within the system nor outside the system?

Of course the nature of the boundary is extremely important to the nature of the system because it has a very important function in relation to the "openness" of the system. And in your example, the activity called osmosis demonstrates this fact.

Internal states are literally defined as those which are not hidden. It's just the definition of the terminology. — Isaac

I know, that eternal states are defined that way, you've stated that. What I am arguing is that the definitions employed by systems theorists are false premises, and that is why systems theory is flimsy. So, the point is that "internal states" is literally defined as those which are not hidden, bit this false definition literally hides the fact that many internal factors of any system, actually are hidden.

Then it is an external state as far as the system is concerned. — Isaac

Again, you were not paying attention! The possibility that it is an external state can be excluded through observation. The influence on the system, of external states can be observed. But when the system acts in a way such that it is influenced (caused) to behave in a way which is neither the result of observable external causes, nor the system itself (2nd law), then we ought to conclude internal causes which are not part of the system itself. To conclude "hidden" external causes is a false conclusion, because properly designed experiments have the capacity to exclude the possibility of unobservable external causes.

Now, refer back to the "cell membrane" which is neither inside the system nor outside the system. Clearly it has an influence on the system. Is that influence better classified as from inside the system, or outside the system. Since it is an integral part of what composes the system, it must be inside the system, so we cannot truthfully say it is outside the system. But by your description, it is not inside the system, it is the boundary.

Two posts now I've attempted compromise, but you still haven't addressed my proposal. It appears very much like you are the one incapable of giving fair consideration.

Sure, you can't conceive of an empty set. But lots of people do.

But the problem is more fundamental with you. You can't conceive of abstract objects.

Here's a difference between you and me: You're a dogmatist. I am not. — TonesInDeepFreeze

As I explained, I readily conceive of abstract objects, but I maintain a difference between abstract objects and physical objects, as necessitated by sound ontological principles. You it appears, do not seem to be ready to accept the dualism required for a true understanding of "abstract objects". That's the real difference between you and me, I understand abstract objects from sound and consistent metaphysics, while you simply assume "abstract objects" for the purpose of mathematics, without any kind of understanding of what an abstract object might consist of.

In these kinds of matters, you cannot be bothered to give fair consideration to frameworks other than your own. — TonesInDeepFreeze

This is untrue. I've given you adequate opportunity to explain the principles that you adhere to, which I find contradictory. I'm very willing to proceed with you, but not until we resolve apparent contradictions in your primary principles. I refuse to proceed from faulty principles. That would be nothing but unsound logic and a waste of time. So I give you fair consideration, but it is you who has not given fair consideration to the ontological problems I have raised. Instead of addressing my concerns, you now insist that I ought to just drop them, and take up some "different perspectives", even though I still apprehend your perspective as based in contradiction because you have done nothing to resolve this problem.

So, as I proposed, we can have an empty set, so long as "set" refers to the category, or type of thing which is going to belong to the collection, not the group of things itself. If the group had no members it could not be a "set" if "set" referred to the group itself. No members, no group.

This proposal allows that we could have a type, but no things of that type. Would you agree with this as a compromise principle? Then the "set", which is a category or type, is not a group, so that it can be empty, and the members of the set have a distinct kind of existence from the set itself, being the things which are categorized as being members of the set. So we have sets, and we have members, such that there are these two aspects of any set, the set (category), and the members (things classed as within that category, and there might not be any. And, we might even classify sets as things of a sort, such that we could have a set where the members are sets. But the set which has sets as members, would be a special type of category. So for example, "colour" could be a set which would have sets as members. The members would be "green", "red", etc., each being a category, or set on its own.

If sll you meant was that yhr boundaries overlap, then I don't see how that forms a criticism. Systems can be defined. They therefore had thst which is the system and thst which is not. If they don't have those two categories they are not defined. — Isaac

Sure, you can talk about different systems in that way, and even "define" what would make one system distinct from another. But if in reality, there is an overlapping of the things which you are applying the theory to, then these things cannot be adequately understood as discrete systems.

That is the whole point which you do not seem to be grasping. You can "define" anything, anyway you want, but if that definition is not represented in reality, then the definition is just a falsity, which becomes a false premise if used in any logical proceeding. So, you define systems as being distinct or discrete, but the things which you apply the theory to are not really that way, they overlap, and share, etc., so your systems theory is just giving you false premises, i.e. that the thing identified as A is a discrete system, and the thing identified as B is a discrete system, when in reality they are not discrete. And, the need to assume "open systems" demonstrates very clearly that this is a falsity

Christ! Is this going to be one of your stupidly arrogant "all maths is wrong" arguments all over again. The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy increases during any spontaneous process in an isolated system. Living systems are not isolated systems. The only truly closed system is the universe so any part of it decreasing entropy is not defying the second law. This is physics basics I learnt in school. — Isaac

You're really not making any sense Isaac, we're not talking mathematics here. We're talking ontology. You insist on "discrete systems", but now you deny "isolated systems". How could there be a discrete system which is not isolated from other systems? To make it discrete there must be a boundary which separates it from others, or else the many supposed systems really exist together as just one continuity. If there is a boundary then it must consist of something real, which would separate one system from another, thereby isolating them from each other. Otherwise the boundary is purely theoretical, and absolutely arbitrary. Arbitrarily placing theoretical boundaries, within a continuity, does not produce discrete entities. The hour existing between one o'clock and two o'clock is not a discrete unit of time, it's just created from theoretical, arbitrarily placed boundaries

Mathjax error, my apologies. I've corrected it, so thanks for pointing it out. The Mathjax 's' is the hidden state, not the normal type 's'. — Isaac

Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that we need to assume internal hidden states as well, for the reasons I explained. The composition, or constitution of the system doing the inferencing is hidden from it. The system does not apprehend its own composition, and this is internal to the system.

Ha ha, nice try Tones. Ernst's proper reply would be: "I have no collection of rocks. I sold all my rocks".

OED, collection: 1. the act or process of collecting or being collected. 2. a group of things collected together, esp. systematically. 3. an accumulation; a mass or pile (a collection of dust)."

I really don't know how you can conceive of a group of thing, or a mass or accumulation, without anything there.

Your source claims that systems are open, not that they have no definition. In fact he claims the exact opposite. — Isaac

When did I say systems have no definition?

He suggests that biological systems reverse the direction of the second law, the flow uphill of it. — Isaac

Right, therefore contrary to your claim, these supposed "open systems" are not subject to the laws of physics. The second law of thermodynamics being a law of physics. This is a very good reason why systems theory is, as I said, very flimsy. Within the parameters of systems theory, we need to assume "open systems", which are incompatible with the laws of physics, in order to account for the existence of living beings.

It is temporary and doesn't defy any physical law. — Isaac

Isaac, you are not making any sense. You admit that the biological "system" is contrary to the second law, yet you also claim that this does not defy any physical law. Is the second law of thermodynamics not a physical law in your mind?

The system and the internal are the same thing. — Isaac

Yes that is exactly the problem I described. The internal and the system "are the same thing". This is another big defect of systems theory. You have a boundary which separates "the system" from the external, but no boundary to separate "the system" from the internal. Therefore you have no way to account for changes to "the system" which are not from an external, observable, cause, and are not caused from within "the system". "The system" changes in a way which is not caused by "the system" itself. Such a change would be consistent with the second law. And, "the system" must follow this law of physics or else it cannot be classed as a "system". A "system" is a human construct. Further, there is no observable external cause of these changes. The changes must be internal, because external causation can be excluded. But they are not from within "the system" because "system" does not allow for changes which are contrary to the laws of physics. If it changes in a way other than by the laws of physics, it cannot be understood as a "system". So these causes of change which are contrary to the laws of physics must be excluded from "the system". They must be caused by something not within "the system" yet they cannot be classed as external, because such causes can be excluded through observation. Therefore we need a boundary to the internal, as well as a boundary to the external, so that these changes can be properly understood as not having an external cause, nor being caused by temporal changes to the system itself (2nd law).

No, there are no hidden internal states. Internal states are definitionally those which are not hidden. — Isaac

Clearly there must being internal hidden states, when "hidden states" is described as you did. You said that they are states hidden from the system doing the inferencing. The constitution of the system doing the inferencing is hidden from that system. Look at the diagram you provided a few pages back, (which doesn't copy in the following quote). Notice that it shows both internal and external "S", when you say "S" is a hidden state.

A 'Hidden State' in active inference terms is just a node in a data network which is one (or more) node(s) removed from the network carrying out the inference.



'S' are hidden states. They're not hidden from 'us' (the organism), they're right in front of us, I can see then touch them, feel them. They're hidden for the network doing the inference because that network can only use data from the sensorimotor systems ('o' and 'a' in the diagram) with which it has to infer the cause of that data (the external states). I probably should use the term 'external states' but that gets as much flack from the enactivists who then bang on about how it's not really 'external' because we form an integrated network with our environment. So I could call then 'nodes outside of our Markov Boundary', and no-one would have the faintest idea what I was talking about...So 'hidden states' seemed the least controversial term... Until now. But this... — Isaac

I've no interest at all in being lectured with a series of random assertions from nobodies off the internet. Provide arguments, cite sources, or at the very least show a little humility if you don't. I can't for the life of me think why you'd assume anyone would want to learn what some random people happen to 'reckon' about cognitive science and systems theory. — Isaac

I cited the source, Ludwig von Bertalanffy. If you're into systems theory you ought to know him.

Karl Ludwig von Bertalanffy (19 September 1901 – 12 June 1972) was an Austrian biologist known as one of the founders of general systems theory (GST). This is an interdisciplinary practice that describes systems with interacting components, applicable to biology, cybernetics and other fields. Bertalanffy proposed that the classical laws of thermodynamics might be applied to closed systems, but not necessarily to "open systems" such as living things. His mathematical model of an organism's growth over time, published in 1934,[1] is still in use today. — Wikipedia

Your claim was that neurological "systems" follow the laws of physics. Bertalanffy's claim is that "open systems" (biological systems) do not necessarily follow the second law of thermodynamics.

Also I have no interest in being lectured by another dry, opinionated academic who thinks that cognitive science and systems theory have any priority, beyond their own personal set of prejudices, in respect of philosophical questions. — Janus

That\s exactly the problem I pointed to, with the application of systems theory. Boundaries may be so arbitrary, that people can use "systems" to support any hypothesis that they want to support.

One step back. The declaration of an internal state and an external state (necessary simply by declaring the object of our thought to be this and not that) Requires that there is what we call a Markov boundary between the internal and the external states. This is (again no ontology yet) simply a statistical feature of there being internal and external states, there simply must exist in any network those nodes which connect to the external states and the internal states. These are the Markov boundary (and anything within them is inside the Markov blanket). — Isaac

The problem with your internal/external boundary is that you employ a boundary between the system and the "external", but you do not employ a boundary between the system and the "internal". And since there are internal hidden states as well as external hidden states, you need a boundary between the system and the internal, to account for the reality of these hidden states. The living "system" is best understood as a medium between the internal and the external, as pointed out by Wayfarer earlier in the thread. As Plato indicated, living acts are best understood as carried out by the medium between soul and body. This is why we can say that Plato resolved the interaction problem which is commonly attributed to dualism.

That is why systems theory is very flimsy. You employ a boundary between the system and the external, but you do not employ a boundary between the system and the internal. The "system" is a human construct, a model. The unknowns are not accounted for by "the system" because they are unknown. In modern formalism, unknowns are allowed right into the logical system. There is no boundary to separate the unknowns which are within the system, from the system itself. So we think that all the unknowns are external, coming from outside the boundary, when there is really a lot of unknowns within the system, and having no boundary to exclude them from the system on the inside. The consequence of this, in modeling biological systems, is that there is no way to distinguish between internal causes and external causes. Epistemological deficiencies appear like ontological issues, and there is no principles allowing us to distinguish these from each other.

Correct use of language is determined by the community using the word, not by some subset. — Isaac

This makes no sense. Do you propose that we hold the entire community to a vote every time we wonder whether language has been correctly used or not? Even if we did that, unless the vote was unanimous, we'd still be left with only a subset saying that the use was correct. Clearly, "correct" language use does not require such unanimity. It only requires that the one spoken to understands the one speaking.

This is simply not possible (where 'internal' applies to some self-organsing system). To recognise a system, a self organising one, there has to be an 'internal' and an 'external' otherwise you're just referring to 'everything', and a self organising system has to have a probability distribution function that is opposed to the Gaussian distribution, as this is just the definition of self-organising. — Isaac

I told you, systems theory is very flimsy, and I explained why. The exact separation, or boundary, between what is internal and what is external is impossible to establish, so that any proposed boundary is somewhat arbitrary, or sufficient for a specific purpose, but not a real boundary in any true or absolute sense.

So simply by the definition of a discrete system we've got, of necessity, an internal state, an external state, a Markov boundary, and two different probability functions on either side of that boundary. — Isaac

There is no such thing as a "discrete system" in nature. This is just a useful fiction. All natural things have other things overlapping them in space and time. The earth and sun overlap by gravity and radiation for example. My existence and my mother's existence overlap in space and time, as I come from her womb. And many other things overlap my existence.

The idea of discrete systems may be useful for some specific purposes, but not for describing living beings, or parts of living beings, because of the large degree of overlap. Von Bertalanffy described living beings as "open systems". An open system cannot be a discrete system because the environment is just as much a part of the definition ("open") as is the "system".

But I'm saying the regularities and rational relationships inhere within the conscious experience-of-the-world - so it's neither 'in the mind' nor 'in the world', and that this indicates a deep philosophical issue. — Wayfarer

This is what Plato pointed to years ago, and it is why there is no interaction problem for dualism. "Ideas" actually exist within the medium between soul and body, and are therefore themselves part of that very interaction. In Aristotelian hylomorphism, and consequently Marxist materialism, ideas consist of both a formal aspect, and a material aspect (content, subject matter).

Not how I use the word reason. — Isaac

OK, but "reason" was my word, and it was used synonymously with "why":

The physical instantiation is the model. the thing represented by that model is neurons. The point being that we cannot determine the reason (why) for the thing, through reference to the reason (why) for the representation. So we cannot determine whether the neurons act representatively, through reference to the model, because the model represents how the thing behaves, not the reason (why) for that behaviour. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you giving "reason" a different meaning was nothing but trying to argue through equivocation. And now you attempt to explain away that equivocation, by implying that you were trying to change the subject and create a distraction from what I was saying (to talk about something different, to use 'reason" in a different way).

The purpose of neurons is not to represent the outside world. — Isaac

You seem to have missed what I was saying to Banno, and just butted in to the conversation using words in a completely different way. In no way was I saying that the purpose of neurons is to represent the outside world. I was actually arguing the opposite to that, denying the reality of an outside world. I was saying that the human 'system' (if you'll allow me to use this word in an informal way), creates images, ideas, and such things within the mind, as symbols, which have meaning.

What I argued is that the symbols, (just like words for example), need not be in any way similar to any "external thing". Dreams are a good example. So the images within our minds whether they have sense input, or are derived through the dreaming mind, or some other creative way, relate to other things in a way which is analogous to the way that words, as symbols, relate to other things. There is no need for any sort of similarity between the symbol, and the thing "represented" by the symbol, constituting the meaning of the symbol.

Now, I do not think I even used the word "represent". The word I chose was "symbolize":

Any pattern could symbolize something. And not all symbols necessarily appear like symbols to everyone. — Metaphysician Undercover

But Banno asserted that it is known that neural nets are not representational. So my root word "symbol" got replaced by Banno's root word "represent", and you use Banno's word in a completely different way, to assume an "outside world".

To be clear, I stated earlier that there is no need to assume any "external world" at all, and extreme skepticism which doubts the reality of an "external" world. is well justified. To expand on this, I will say that it is highly possible that all of our relations with the so-called external world, including sensations, and communications with others, is done internally. It could well be the case that we simply model these activities as occurring through an external medium, but our models are backward, upside down, as often turns out to be the case (geocentrism for example), and all these activities actually occur through an internal medium. What is external to us may be absolutely nothing, a wall of nothingness could constitute the external boundary to one's body, as 'outer space', nothingness. Then the real medium, as that which lies between you and I as a separation, and through which we communicate, may be through the internal, 'inner space'.

If you don't accept the notion of abstract objects, then I admit that there's not much for us to discuss. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I cannot agree that abstractions are objects, unless we restrict "object" to refer only to abstractions. But then we could not use "object" to refer to anything else, or we'd have equivocation. And we would have to create a special form of the law of identity, such that when 'the same' abstraction exists in the minds of different people, we can still refer to it as "the same" abstraction, despite accidental differences between one person and another, due to different interpretations. The current law of identity requires that accidental differences would constitute distinct 'objects' which are therefore not the same, so we'd need a different law of identity.

If you do accept the notion of abstract objects... — TonesInDeepFreeze

If the law of identity describes what an "object" is, then I cannot accept the notion of abstract objects, for the reasons explained above. I might accept the notion of abstract objects, so long as you agree with me that the law of identity does not apply to this type of object, and we proceed with caution, so as not to equivocate between these two distinct types of objects, physical objects being described by the law of identity, and abstract objects being a different type of object to which the law of identity does not apply. Can you agree to that?

then I point out that a set theoretical intuition may begin with the notion of a thing being a member of another thing: The notion of membership. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Sure, "a thing" in this context, I assume is an abstract object, with no possibility for identity, so you can say whatever you want about "a thing", or "object". You can even say contradictory things about an object, because the object has no identity as a physical object does. You could say one thing about "the object" and I could say a contradictory thing about it, because there's nothing to ensure that we maintain consistency between the object in your mind, and the object in my mind, which both bear the same name. How would we even know that we're talking about the same object, except that we are using the same name? Do you propose that the name is the object? Then where is the abstraction?

So there are no restrictions in the sense of truth or falsity by correspondence, and to say contradictory things about the same object might be completely acceptable. The "thing" is a purely imaginary fiction, and we can use contradiction in fiction without a problem, though it might make the imaginary "thing" seem counterintuitive.

The notion of membership. — TonesInDeepFreeze

All right then, considering the above conditions, I'm ready to try and understand what "membership" means. What does it mean for one thing to be a member of another thing? Is it necessary that the thing which is a member be a different type of thing from the thing which it is a member of? If not, how would I distinguish between which things are the partakers, and which are partaken of?

That offers at least these prongs of refutation:

(1) I am mostly (but not exclusively) self-taught from textbooks; and textbooks in mathematics don't indoctrinate. Rather they put forth the way the mathematics works in a context such as presented in the book. A framework is presented and then developed. There is no exhortation for one to believe that the framework is the only one acceptable.

(2) Indeed, mathematics, especially mathematical logic, offers a vast array of alternative frameworks, not just the classical framework, including constructivism, intuitionism, finitism, paraconsistency, relevance logic, intensional logic .... And mathematics itself does not assert any particular philosophy about itself, as one is free to study mathematics with whatever philosophy or lack of philosophy one wants to bring to it.

(3) It is actually cranks who are narrowminded and dogmatic. The crank insists that only his philosophy and notions about mathematics are correct and that all the mathematicians meanwhile are incorrect. The crank doesn't even know anything about the mathematics yet the crank is full of sweeping denunciations of it. The crank makes wildly false claims about mathematics, and then doesn't understand that when he is corrected about those claims, the corrections are not an insistence that the crank agree with the mathematics but rather that the corrections merely point out and explain why what the cranks says about mathematics is untrue. It's as if the crank says, "classical music is all wrong because classical music never has regular meter" and then when it is pointed out that most of classical music does have regular meter, the crank takes that as narrow minded demand that he like classical music. And the crank is not even aware that mathematics, especially mathematical logic, offers a vast array of alternatives. Meanwhile, the crank's usual modus operandi is to either skip, misconstrue, or strawman the refutations and explanations given to him, thus an unending loop with the crank clinging to ignorance, confusion, and sophistry. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I disagree on a number of key premises here, so I do not consider any of this to be acceptable refutation. But that's all beside the point, just a difference of opinion on trivial matters.

Wrong again. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I'm glad to be wrong, of course. I actually enjoy discourse with you TIDF, you're generally well behaved and intelligent. I just don't see that you know any strong principles.

I don't need premises. I don't consider ants have bank accounts. I don't consider atoms have feelings. I can't for the life of me think why anyone would consider neurons having reasons for long enough to even consider the premises required. — Isaac

Well, if you consider that each and every internal organ has its own purpose, function, relative to the existence of the whole, which is a living being, then you would understand that each of these organs has a reason for its existence. If it has a function, it has a reason, that's plain and simple. It serves a purpose relative to the overall whole, which is the living being, therefore it has a reason for being there, to serve that purpose. Obviously, neurons serve a purpose relative to the existence of the being, therefore there is a reason for their existence.

I really do not understand how anyone could even consider denying this obvious fact. Those who do, seem to suffer from some form of denial which appears to be an illness.

Ha! But the notion that neurons have reasons is practically watertight? — Isaac

Yes, that neurons have reasons for being, based on their purpose, is a very sound principle. That neurons comprise a system is a very flimsy principle because they are actually a small part of a much larger "system", better known as a living being. And neurons serve a purpose (they have a function) relative to that being, but they do not make up an independent "system" in themselves.

If only we wrote posts on this forum as we would an article in a reputed philosophical journal! — Agent Smith

Some of us would not want to lower ourselves to that level.

They just fire according to physical laws, they don't have a reason. — Isaac

What about those "hidden states"? Those unknown aspects disqualify this conclusion. All you can say is that they act according to physical laws to an extent which does not include thos hidden aspects.

Why is there even a reason for the behaviour of neurons? They just fire according to physical laws, they don't have a reason. — Isaac

The point was, that you haven't the premises required to logically conclude that there is no reason for the behaviour of neurons.

We're back to the point where Banno started this, by claiming that the behaviour of neurons is not representative. I said you cannot conclude that without knowing the reason for the behaviour. To simply assert "they just fire according to physical laws" does not give that reason. You appear to assume that there is no reason. This is obviously an unsupported assumption, as the following example demonstrates.

All tools created by human beings operate according to physical laws, and this does not necessitate the conclusion that there is no reason for them. You are just proving my point, knowing how a thing operates (according to physical laws) does not provide you with the knowledge required to make any conclusion about why the thing operates that way. Denying that there is a reason why, is simply an uninformed, unjustified, and unwarranted assumption. So I've just gone around a circle, with you taking up where Banno left off, and proceeding back to Banno's starting point.

Put simply, a Markov boundary is the set of states which separate any system we're interested in studying from the parts we're not. — Isaac

Systems theory is extremely flimsy. Boundaries can be imposed for various reasons, and various degrees of arbitrariness, with varying degrees of openness and closedness. Then, on top of all these levels of arbitrariness, when things don't behave according to what is dictated by the imposed boundaries, we can just rationalize the misbehaviour through reference to mysterious things like "hidden states".

The mathematical approach is to assume that any object can be divided in any way, so there is an infinity of possible divisions for each thing to be divided. In physics though, the way an object can be divided is highly dependent on the composition of the object. — unenlightened

Yes, in physics the way an object "can be divided" is highly dependent on the composition of the object, but sometimes this fact is ignored by physicists. That's the problem I referred to with the way that frequencies and wavelengths are treated. The problem appears to be that there is no identified medium within which the electromagnetic waves exist, so the real properties of the waves cannot be determined or described, and physicists are left with theoretical mathematics which assumes an infinity of possible divisions.

But mathematicians have no mercy, and maths is full of irrationality ever since Pythagoras. Irrational numbers are the devil in the detail that he proved the existence of geometrically, and the fact that mathematicians (and others) are still trying to insist that maths should be fitted within the limits of their thinking is more to do with psychology than mathematics. — unenlightened

I would say that if the geometry can prove the existence of irrational numbers, then this is an indication that the geometry is faulty. The issue with pi and the square root of two appears to involve the traditional geometer's use of distinct dimensions. So the irrational nature of the square root of two shows that any two distinct dimensions, produced by the right angle, are fundamentally incompatible. Set two new points, equidistant from a starting point, on two traditional dimensions (making a right angle), and the distance between those two points will always be indefinite (an irrational number).

The issue with pi is very similar. A straight line has one dimension, and a curved line has two dimensions. These two types of lines are fundamentally incompatible. Some might say that an infinitely large circle, has an arc so gradual that it's actually a straight line, but how would you ever get two dimensions, a curve, or a circle then? Likewise, some might say that a polygon with infinite sides is actually a circle, but this doesn't really reconcile the incompatibility, because each side is still a one dimensional line, at an angle to the next side, it's sides are distinct straight lines and that's not a curved line.

I like your example of the taxicab geometry. I'm not sure, but it appears to deny the reality of the one dimensional straight line. But it appears to me, like if we deny the straight line, then we'll need an infinite number of dimensions, because there would be an infinite number of possible ways to get from one point to another point. So this doesn't really get rid of the irrationality.